AR 525-30
Army Strategic Readiness

This new Department of the Army regulation, dated 3 June 2014--

- Institutionalizes the fundamentals of Army Strategic Readiness (throughout).
- Contains extensive information regarding Army Strategic Readiness and how it is reported, prepared, reviewed, and submitted (throughout).
History. This is a new Department of the Army regulation.

Summary. This regulation prescribes the purpose, policies, procedures, and responsibilities for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing Army Strategic Readiness. It describes both existing and maturing concepts, responsibilities, policies, and implementing procedures and is intended to evolve as Army Strategic Readiness matures. This regulation establishes the basis for coordinated Army Strategic Readiness Assessment execution within the Department of the Army to support national objectives.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to Department of the Army civilians.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity’s senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25–30 for specific guidance.

Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions in accordance with AR 11–2 and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix B).

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington DC 20310–0400.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington DC 20310–0400.

Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)

Chapter 1
Introduction, page 1
Purpose • 1–1, page 1
References • 1–2, page 1
Explanation of abbreviations and terms • 1–3, page 1
Responsibilities • 1–4, page 1
Statutory authorities • 1–5, page 1
Background • 1–6, page 1

Chapter 2
Roles and Responsibilities, page 3
Assistant Secretaries of the Army • 2–1, page 3
Contents—Continued

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) • 2–2, page 4
Chief Information Officer/G–6 • 2–3, page 4
Chief, National Guard Bureau • 2–4, page 4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1 • 2–5, page 4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2 • 2–6, page 4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/S/7 • 2–7, page 4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4 • 2–8, page 5
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8 • 2–9, page 5
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve • 2–10, page 5
Chief of Engineers • 2–11, page 5
The Surgeon General • 2–12, page 5
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management • 2–13, page 5
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command • 2–14, page 5
Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command • 2–15, page 5
Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command • 2–16, page 5
Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command • 2–17, page 5

Chapter 3
Terminology, page 6
General • 3–1, page 6
Key terminology and lexicon • 3–2, page 6

Chapter 4
Concepts, page 7
General • 4–1, page 7
Process • 4–2, page 7

Chapter 5
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process, page 8
Introduction • 5–1, page 8
Organization input • 5–2, page 9
Measures and indicators • 5–3, page 9
Primary and supporting strategic readiness tenet proponents. • 5–4, page 10
Proponent analysis • 5–5, page 10
Strategic Readiness Assessment Group • 5–6, page 10
The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment • 5–7, page 10

Chapter 6
Future Readiness, page 11
General • 6–1, page 11
Predictive analysis of Army readiness • 6–2, page 11

Chapter 7
Resourcing and Strategic Levers, page 11
General • 7–1, page 11
Resourcing • 7–2, page 11
Strategic levers • 7–3, page 12
Manning strategic levers • 7–4, page 12
Training strategic levers • 7–5, page 12
Capacities and Capabilities strategic levers • 7–6, page 12
7–7. Equipping strategic levers • 7–7, page 12
Sustaining strategic levers • 7–8, page 12
Installation strategic levers • 7–9, page 13
Budgetary and/or programming strategic levers • 7–10, page 13
Conclusion • 7–11, page 13
Contents—Continued

Chapter 8
Army Strategic Readiness Reviews, page 13
   General • 8–1, page 13
   Strategic Readiness Update • 8–2, page 13
   Joint Force Readiness Review • 8–3, page 13
   Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress • 8–4, page 13

Appendices
A. References, page 15
B. Internal Control Evaluation, page 16

Table List
Table 5–1: Army Strategic Readiness tenet proponents and/or supporting proponents, page 10

Figure List
Figure 1–1: Comparison of AR 220–1 with this regulation, page 2
Figure 1–1: Army Strategic Readiness concept, page 3
Figure 4–1: Army Strategic Readiness concept model, page 8
Figure 5–1: Army Strategic Readiness Assessment, page 9
Figure 7–1: Leading indicators and strategic levers, page 12

Glossary
Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
This regulation establishes the Army Strategic Readiness process and provides responsibilities for its execution.

1–2. References
Required and related publications and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
Abbreviations and terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary. Chapter 3 explains the terminology and lexicon used in this regulation.

1–4. Responsibilities
Responsibilities are listed in chapter 2.

1–5. Statutory authorities
Statutory requirements from this regulation originate from Title 10, United States Code (USC), as well as 32 USC, which provides the statutory requirements for the National Guard while operating under the command and control of the respective States.

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01 establishes the functions of the Department of Defense (DOD) and all of its components.

b. Department of the Army General Order 2012–01 establishes the Secretary of the Army’s expectations for the functioning of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and assigns major functions and responsibilities to the Principal Officials of HQDA to assist the Secretary of the Army in the operation and functioning of the Army.

1–6. Background

a. Senior leaders. Department of the Army senior leaders recognize the need for a comprehensive readiness assessment of the Army at the strategic level. In the past, Army senior leaders directed formal efforts and studies to develop a strategic readiness process. These efforts mostly focused on technological systems and, in some cases, pushed readiness assessments to lower echeloned units. Even though these efforts moved the Army in the right direction, they did not satisfy the intent of Army senior leaders.

b. Unit readiness measures. Unit readiness measures, codified in Army Regulation (AR) 220–1, would become input into a strategic readiness assessment. AR 220–1 focuses at the operational and tactical levels; is unit centric (primarily company, battalion, and group and/or brigade levels); and features quantitative measures of current resources and training. AR 220–1 satisfies the needs of the Army concerning unit status reporting. Figure 1–1 compares AR 220–1 with this regulation.
c. Army Strategic Readiness. Army Strategic Readiness focuses on the readiness of the Army as an institution to provide sufficient, capable units to support the national military strategy (NMS). This regulation enables Army senior leaders to obtain an integrated view of current and future strategic readiness, by creating a process to assess the status of the strategic readiness tenets (SRTs); review the leading indicators that drive particular trends in readiness; and, ultimately, provide a strategic level assessment of the Army's near-term (0–2 years) and future readiness (2–6 years). These assessments will allow the Army to report on strategic readiness and provide information to Army senior leaders to inform critical resource decisions necessary to address and mitigate shortfalls in Army readiness. Army readiness assessments consider readiness trends and the analysis of the impacts of events and decisions on current and future readiness.

d. Strategic levers. The analysis process identifies leading indicators that drive particular trends and provides Army senior leaders actionable adjustments to mitigate strategic readiness shortfalls. Using these actions, Army senior leaders can mitigate or eliminate Army strategic shortfalls by changes in policy, strategy adjustments, or other actions. Strategic levers, for use by Army senior leaders, range from changes in force structure, program funding, adjustments in training, and equipping outputs beyond the unit level.

e. Developing the Army Strategic Readiness concept. The current Army Strategic Readiness concept, figure 1–2, provides Army senior leaders the ability to look across the Army to identify the status of current readiness and forecast future readiness. The concept was originally developed to answer the following questions: 1) “What can Army senior leaders do to prevent a hollow force while drawing down post Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom?” and 2) “Can the Army build a process that provides a view of future readiness?” While the concept was created to address these questions, it is meant to be an enduring process for assessing Army Strategic Readiness.
(1) **Objective and subjective analysis.** The concept in figure 1–2 is analytic, relying on clear, objective measures. Thus, the process begins with the analysis of measured areas submitted from organizations across the Army, identifying both current levels and respective indicators that may signal a change in future readiness.

(2) **Strategic readiness tenets.** The SRTs are Manning; Training; Capacities and Capabilities; Equipping; Sustaining; and Installations. The following chapters will explain the use of these tenets in determining the Army’s Strategic Readiness. Within these tenets, leading indicators and strategic options are identifiable.

f. **Existing readiness processes and procedures, outlined in AR 220–1, coupled with the Army Strategic Readiness concept (see fig 1–2), form the Army Strategic Readiness process.** Subsequent chapters in the regulation explain Army Strategic Readiness and emerging processes in detail.

### Chapter 2

**Roles and Responsibilities**

**2–1. Assistant Secretaries of the Army**

The ASAs will work with the appropriate Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCSs) and ensure effective coordination within the Department of the Army on strategic readiness policies and programs in their assigned functional areas of responsibility and provide independent advice to the Secretary of the Army on Army Strategic Readiness. Each responsible ASA will assign members of their staff responsibilities to work with and assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the development of the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment and procedures for using strategic readiness data to improve the readiness status of the Army. Additionally, each ASA will coordinate with the appropriate DCS(s) to ensure that data is accurate, holistic, and provides the necessary information to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army. Additionally, each ASA will review and provide advice on the Strategic Readiness Update (SRU), the Joint Forces
Readiness Review (JFRR), The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) and other documents relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.

2–2. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
The ASA (M&RA) will—
   a. Supervise the development and ensure the execution of policies and programs pertaining to Total Army readiness and training.
   b. Set strategic direction and provide oversight for ensuring Army policies, plans, and programs for personnel; force structure; manpower management; training; military and civilian personnel readiness; and reserve affairs are executed consistent with law, regulation, and policy.
   c. Serve as the Secretary of the Army’s senior policy advisor for the strategic readiness of the Total Force.
   d. Provide oversight of the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Group (SRAG) and strategic readiness reporting.
   e. Reviews the SRU, the JFRR, the QRRC, and other documents relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.
   f. Serve as the Army’s lead for the Manning, Training, and Capacities and Capabilities SRTs.

2–3. Chief Information Officer/G–6
The CIO/G–6 will—
   a. Assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 by providing an action officer (AO) as a participating member in the SRAG.
   b. Provide the DCS, G–3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators in support of information technology and the Army’s network.

2–4. Chief, National Guard Bureau
The CNGB will ensure that the Director, Army National Guard—
   a. Provides each SRT proponent the information necessary to measure the Army as a Total Force.
   b. Assigns Army National Guard (ARNG) members, on a quarterly basis, as members of the SRAG, to assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 in properly assessing the overall strategic readiness of the Total Force.

2–5. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1
The DCS, G–1 will—
   a. Assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 by providing an action officer (AO) as a participating member in the SRAG.
   b. Provide the DCS, G–3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations within the Manning SRT.

2–6. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2
The DCS, G–2 will—
   a. Assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG.
   b. Provide the DCS, G–3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations in support of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and the area of battle space awareness within the Capacities and Capabilities SRT.

2–7. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7
The DCS, G–3/5/7 will—
   a. Oversee Army Strategic Readiness reporting and reporting the Army’s status to provide an accurate readiness picture for prioritization and resourcing decisions.
   b. Develop policies, standards, and procedures to assess and measure Total Force strategic readiness.
   c. Ensure required reports are submitted to the proponents of the SRTs in a timely manner.
   d. Plan, develop and manage the SRAG.
   e. Process and distribute strategic readiness assessment information and data in a usable format to, upon request, appropriate Department of the Army agencies, commands, Joint Staff, and Government agencies.
   f. Develop and issue guidance for the use of strategic readiness information.
   g. Task ARSTAF agencies and the responsible ACOM, ASCC, DRU, and/or the CNGB, when applicable, to provide supplemental information and data for analyzing strategic readiness, analysis of strategic readiness status information and data, and recommendations for improving the Army’s overall Strategic Readiness.
   h. Collect, compile and staff the SRU, JFRR, QRRC, and any other forum relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.
   i. Provide information in support of the JFRR, QRRC, SRU, and any other forum relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.
   j. Provide an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations for the Training SRT.
   k. Provide an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations for the Capacities and Capabilities SRT.
l. Ensure the policies and procedures established in this regulation undergo review and revision no later than 2 years after the release date and every 2 years henceforth.

2–8. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4
The DCS, G–4, in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA (ALT)), will—
   a. Assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG.
   b. Provide the DCS, G–3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations within the Sustaining SRT.
   c. Work directly with ASA (ALT) in measuring and analyzing the Sustaining SRT.

2–9. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8
The DCS, G–8 will—
   a. Assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG.
   b. Provide the DCS, G–3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations, within the Equipping SRT. (With ASA (ALT), provide readiness assessment of Army equipment modernization plans.)
   c. Coordinate programmatic decisions with projected readiness impacts across the program objective memorandum (POM). Work in concert with relevant HQDA officials to ensure impacts are calculated and senior officials are informed of impacts and include those assessments in POM development. Update decision briefings to Army senior leaders as part of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.
   d. Provide future programmatic force readiness assessments to Army senior leaders as part of both the Army SRU process and the PPBE process, including as a special topic in the annual POM executive summary.

2–10. Chief, U.S. Army Reserve
The CAR will—
   a. Provide each Army SRT proponent the information necessary to measure the Army as a Total Force.
   b. Assign U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) members, on a quarterly basis, as members of the SRAG to assist in properly assessing the overall strategic readiness of the Total Force.

2–11. Chief of Engineers
The COE will ensure that the CG, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as stipulated in AR 10–87, identifies strategies and resources for engineer training consistent with requirements synchronized and coordinated with the Joint engineer. This includes the identification of facility requirements supporting unit and system training, sustainment, and deployment.

2–12. The Surgeon General
TSG will ensure that the CG, U.S. Army Medical Command will support to the DCS, G–1 in the analysis of the Manning SRT. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 10–87.

2–13. Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
The ACSIM will—
   a. Assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG.
   b. Provide the DCS, G–3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations within the Installations SRT.

The CG, USASOC will provide support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the analysis of strategic readiness for Army Special Operations, across all of the SRT on matters concerning Special Operations Forces. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 10–87.

2–15. Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command
The CG, FORSCOM will provide support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the analysis of the Capacities and Capabilities and Training SRTs. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 10–87.

2–16. Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
The CG, TRADOC will provide support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the analysis of strategic readiness, concerning the Training and Capacities and Capabilities SRTs. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 10–87.

The CG, AMC will provide support to the DCS, G–4; DCS, G–8; and ACSIM in the analysis of the Equipping,
Installations, and Sustaining SRTs. As the Army’s lead materiel integrator, AMC will synchronize the distribution and redistribution of materiel to achieve the highest level of readiness for equipping for the near-term (0–2 years). This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 10–87 and AR 525–29.

Chapter 3
Terminology

3–1. General
The terminology and lexicon used in this policy will help facilitate clear, effective and consistent internal and external communications regarding the Army’s strategic readiness assessment process and procedures. (Note: Some terms do not translate universally across the DOD or the Joint Staff; some terms are expressly used by the Army and for the purposes of this publication).

3–2. Key terminology and lexicon
   a. Army Strategic Readiness. Army Strategic Readiness is the Army’s ability to provide adequate forces to meet the demands of the NMS. The NMS provides the ways and means by which our military will advance our enduring national interests as articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy and to accomplish the defense objectives in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
   b. Total Army. The Total Army refers to the service in its entirety, encompassing all activities, organizations (AC, ARNG, and USAR), personnel (military and civilians), contractors and contract services, installations, and so on, which support and carry out the Army’s Title 10 functions.
   c. Operating forces. Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof (see AR 220–1).
   d. Generating force. The generating force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by Joint force commanders (see AR 220–1).
   e. Future readiness. Future readiness is an assessment of the Army’s strategic readiness levels in the mid-term (2–6 years). This projection is based primarily on assumptions made about future requirements, funding and resourcing; as well as anticipation of possible emergent events that could adversely affect the expected or desired readiness status of the Army (Capacities and Capabilities).
   f. Strategic levers. These are measures the Army can take, upon direction to mitigate possible readiness shortfalls. Descriptions of strategic levers are further described in chapter 7. Such actions include, but are not limited to, changes to policy, resourcing, and funding.
   g. Strategic readiness tenets. The Army SRTs are Manning; Training; Capacities and Capabilities; Equipping; Sustaining; and Installations. Each readiness tenet contains a number of measureable objective and qualitative indicators which provide leading indicators of future changes in readiness.
      (1) Manning - the Total Force’s ability to provide authorized personnel by grade and skill.
      (2) Training - the Total Force’s ability to conduct unit collective training, institutional training (initial entry training, leader development, professional development, functional training), and officer commissioning sources, (United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Officer Candidate School).
      (3) Capacities and Capabilities (Organizing) - the Total Force’s ability to provide the trained and ready forces to meet current demands, projected demand and surge demands to meet the NMS.
      (4) Equipping - the Total Force’s ability to provide equipment to units for meeting current demands, projected demand and surge demands to meet the NMS.
      (5) Sustaining - the Total Force’s ability for sustaining operations. This includes strategic mobility, Army war reserve stocks, industrial preparedness, central supply, internal operations of Army depots and arsenals, procurement of secondary item Army war reserves transportation and depot materiel maintenance. Sustainment of the force also includes measures to assure the quality and timeliness of sustainment resources and to deploy, sustain and redeploy Army operating forces, develop and maintain strategic logistics systems, manage weapon systems, provide security assistance and conduct logistics long-range planning. Sustainment additionally includes the overseeing, operation, performance, and security of the supply chain.
      (6) Installations - the Total Force’s ability to provide excellence through streamlined processes, strategic partnerships, and good stewardship of resources that address Army priorities and meet the mission requirements of Senior Commanders. This translates into the ability to provide a growing and transforming Army with the infrastructure and support services it needs to remain a highly effective, expeditionary and campaign-quality force, today and in the future. This includes the measures which capture data across all Army land-holding organizations for Active, ARNG, and USAR.
      h. Strategic readiness tenet proponents. These are the key participating staff sections in the SRAG. SRT proponents
are assigned specific roles and responsibilities (see chap 2). The proponents are the subject matter experts in their respective tenet areas as depicted in table 5–1.

Chapter 4
Concepts

4–1. General
Army strategic readiness is a process that assesses the ability of the Total Force-AC, ARNG, USAR, as well as the operating and generating force-to execute its role to meet the demands of the NMS.

   a. The Strategic Readiness Assessment is an ongoing process with a quarterly report to Army senior leaders. This process combines both objective and subjective measures that look at the elements of the Army’s readiness to define whether the Army is ready and will continue to be so at different time horizons.

   b. The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment (ASRA) provides a comprehensive assessment that informs senior leader decisions, actions, and other requirements; reports to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman’s Readiness System, projections of future Army readiness; and efforts to mitigate potential problems in Army readiness.

4–2. Process
Using the SRTs as a starting point, the SRT proponents will work with the ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, and the USAR (fig 4–1) to identify key measures and indicators that influence the overall readiness of the Army. The organizations then provide their findings for each measure and indicator to the HQDA proponent for the relevant SRT (see para 5–4). The Army Strategic Readiness process is not exclusive to those ARSTAF sections that are proponents of a particular SRT. In order to obtain an accurate measure of the Army, at the strategic level, all primary ARSTAF must participate in the SRAG at all levels; the AO, colonel, and general officer (GO)/senior executive service. Other agencies outside of the primary staff may participate in the SRAG, as deemed necessary by the DCS, G–3/5/7.

   a. HQDA proponents are then responsible for aggregating the results of each of the measures and indicators, determining the effects on the overall readiness of the Army and developing an analysis of those impacts from the perspective of their tenet. Each SRT will then provide their analysis to the SRAG.

      (1) Upon receiving each HQDA proponent’s input, the SRAG provides an overall assessment of Army strategic readiness considering each of the six SRTs together, any other data, trends, or indicators from other ARSTAF sections and any other source needed to render an overall strategic assessment of the Army. From this analysis, combined with military judgment, the SRAG develops an overall ASRA.

      (2) The ASRA provides Army senior leaders with a holistic view of readiness across the Army. This allows Army senior leaders to address readiness concerns by employing appropriate strategic levers to influence changes in policy and budgeting in order to address problems in Army Strategic Readiness.
b. Indicators and measures.

(1) **Indicators.** A trend or objective measure that indicates the state or level of organizational readiness. Organizations in the ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, USAR, and ARNG must identify the tenet driven key indicators of readiness that depict a positive or negative trend for use as a tool to determine future readiness. The key indicators provided must remain consistent, every reporting period, in order to develop trends that facilitate the analysis.

(2) **Measures.** A status assessment calculated from authoritative data that is highly objective. ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, USAR, and ARNG have established measures within their organizations that provide their status on each indicator.

c. **SRAG.**


(2) Comprised of representatives at the AO, colonel, and GO levels from each of the HQDA proponents listed in paragraph 5–4 and any additional members deemed appropriate by the DCS, G–3/5/7.

**Chapter 5**  
**Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process**

**5–1. Introduction**

The ASRA process is a HQDA process that relies on inputs from the Total Army to assess the Army’s Total Force readiness (see fig 5–1). This process produces a strategic assessment of readiness across the Total Force. Vetted through the SRAG, it produces a collaborative and comprehensive strategic assessment of current and future readiness. The ASRA process accomplishes this by analyzing and assessing key strategic level measures and indicators. Army
organizations, utilizing existing respective systems and processes, identify macro level measures and indicators that influence current and future readiness then submit these measures and indicators to the proponents of the SRTs for further analysis. The SRT proponents, upon completion of their analysis, convene the SRAG, led by the DCS, G–3/5/7, Army Readiness Division, as depicted in figure 5–1.

**5–2. Organization input**

Organizations across the Total Army are responsible for determining their respective readiness, by assessing their SRT driven key measures and indicators. Organizations can accomplish this by using existing systems and processes. The measures and indicators must reflect impacts on the current and future readiness of the organization, by any of the six strategic readiness tenets. Reporting organizations then submit their strategic level input to the respective readiness tenet proponent on the ARSTAF (see table 5–1).

**5–3. Measures and indicators**

The measures and indicators can reflect any of the following characteristics: objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective. The measures and indicators must reflect impacts on readiness at a strategic level. They must closely relate to the six SRTs. Submissions from organizations may relate to one or many SRTs. Organizations will submit information for consideration that may not fit perfectly within the tenets, but is of key strategic concern to the respective organization. SRT proponents and the SRAG will collaborate with the submitting organizations to ensure clarity of information in order to complete the analysis. The SRT proponents and SRAG, over time, will refine and standardize the measures and indicators for all ACOMs and agencies.
Table 5–1
Army Strategic Readiness Tenet Proponent and/or Supporting Proponents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness Tenets</th>
<th>ARSTAF Proponent</th>
<th>Supporting Proponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
<td>DCS, G–1</td>
<td>CAR, ARNG, U.S. Army Medical Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR)</td>
<td>TRADOC, ARNG, CAR, FORSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipping</td>
<td>DCS, G–8</td>
<td>AMC, CAR, ARNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustaining</td>
<td>DCS, G–4</td>
<td>AMC, CAR, ARNG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5–4. Primary and supporting strategic readiness tenet proponents.
The primary SRT proponents are representatives from the ARSTAF as depicted in table 5–1. The ARSTAF proponents are responsible for the collection, reviewing, processing, and adjudication of the submitted strategic measures and indicators. The proponents will conduct their respective analysis and prepare a preliminary assessment for review and discussion at the AO level SRAG. Supporting SRT proponents, in the development of the ASRA, are organizations external to the ARSTAF that are tasked to support the ARSTAF in matters pertaining to strategic readiness. Table 5–1 reflects the alignment of these supporting agencies with the ARSTAF proponents and the associated tenet. The efforts and collaboration between the primary and supporting SRT proponents will enhance the overall development of the ASRA.

5–5. Proponent analysis
The proponent analysis conducted at the strategic level informs the determination of current and future impacts on readiness. The preliminary assessment will include the following: a problem statement, impacts on readiness (near-, mid-, and far-terms), courses of action, recommendations, and way ahead.

5–6. Strategic Readiness Assessment Group
   a. The SRAG is the forum for the formal analysis, review, development, and presentation of the approved ASRA. As previously stated, the SRAG convenes at three levels: AO, council of colonels, and a GO steering committee. The AO level develops the formal assessment for presentation to the council of colonels for additional guidance, input, and approval consensus. After approval by the council of colonels, the staff prepares the formal assessment for presentation to the General Officer Steering Committee.
   b. The DCS, G–3/5/7, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate (DAMO–OD) is the proponent for the SRAG forum. The Army Readiness Division is responsible for the coordination, facilitation, and presentation for all levels of the SRAG. The Director of DAMO–OD serves as the host for the SRAG General Officer Steering Committee. The permanent members of the SRAG will consist of two representatives (primary and alternate) of the SRT proponents and other invited stakeholders from the ARSTAF, identified by the SRAG, on a case by case basis.

5–7. The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment
   a. The ASRA is a quarterly comprehensive analysis of the strategic readiness levels across the Total Force. This assessment combines the strategic measures and indicator assessments from the SRTs and any other strategic information. The intent of this assessment is to portray a holistic view of current, future, and projected readiness, expressed in the near-, mid-, and far-terms.
   b. The ASRA is narrative in format and submitted with supporting data. It extends the current view with a future and projected outlook. The ASRA combines objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective data and information.
   c. The utility of the ASRA is broader in scope than any current process. Not only does it provide the strategic readiness view of the Total Force for Army senior leaders, but it also informs external audiences and specific statutory requirements.
Chapter 6
Future Readiness

6–1. General
Predictive analysis support resourcing decisions in order to maintain readiness thresholds, provide input into the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA), support the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA), support COCOM operational requirements, and enduring Army activities.

6–2. Predictive analysis of Army readiness
a. The purpose of predictive analysis is to determine the impact of resourcing decisions, alternatives, changes to strategy, and demand for forces, on Army readiness. Impacts must be assessed over the near- and mid-term. These assessments understandably have varying levels of accuracy. Unforeseen changes in funding, demand for forces, or other factors have varying degrees of impact on current projections. These assessments support Senior Leader decision-making processes across a range of DOD forums.

b. Predictive analysis allow HQDA to forecast future readiness. Predictive analysis must be informed by tactical and operational readiness reporting, combined with information from the measures and indicators from the SRTs. These assessments will be used to support strategic execution, risk assessments and resourcing decisions.

c. ARSTAF elements conduct detailed analysis and prediction of relevant readiness measures associated with the six SRTs. This analysis will encompass current and historical trends ranging from tactical unit readiness (that is, unit status reporting trends) to aggregated analysis and prediction of critical elements supporting the six SRTs.

d. Predictive readiness analysis provide critical input into several recurring processes and forums within DOD. Some examples are:

   (1) The annual CJA and CRA. Both of these assessments are informed by the Army’s tactical, operational, and strategic readiness processes. The CJA and CRA are developed by including all measures of Army readiness.

   (2) Budgetary/POM submissions, which are based on an intensive review of strategy, risk and operational demands in order to establish budgetary priorities.

   (3) Joint Combat Capability Assessment, JFRR, and QRRC. Quarterly, ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, ARNG, and USAR provide readiness projections of designated assigned forces.

e. Predictive readiness analysis assist planners to forecast future readiness that will provide operational readiness levels for allocation and apportionment planning as outlined in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. These projections are intended to be the result of staff estimates from organizations and not additional reporting burdens passed to tactical unit commanders. All ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, USAR, and FORSCOM will provide a 12-month readiness estimation of forces assigned or service retained in support of the JFRR submission process. Those ASCCs with limited assigned forces will work in coordination with the force provider to gain situational awareness for planning consideration of Army forces apportioned for planning.

Chapter 7
Resourcing and Strategic Levers

7–1. General
The Army can mitigate strategic readiness shortfalls through various policy or strategy adjustments across the six SRTs identified in chapter 4, as well as by other executable decisions implemented by Army senior leaders. Following an assessment by the Army SRAG Army senior leaders may re-prioritize or re-program resources to mitigate readiness shortfalls. Additional strategic levers, from changes in force structure and program funding, to adjustments in training and equipping outputs beyond the unit level, are potential mitigation actions available for use to improve the Army’s readiness in key areas.

7–2. Resourcing
a. At the strategic level, the Army often addresses or rectifies readiness deficiencies through the following: The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army Campaign Plan, and the Army Campaign Support Plan (ACSP) are the most notable examples through which the Army can effect readiness over the near- and mid-terms. The ACSP addresses the shaping of the future Army. Army modernization is a subset of the ACSP. The ACSP also addresses concerns from across all six SRTs for the near-, mid-, and long-term planning.

b. The ASRA also provides analyses of projected readiness trends informed by concurrent leading indicators across the SRTs. Each readiness tenet contains a number of measurably objective and qualitative indicators which forecast changes in readiness. For each of these measures, there are actions the Army can take to adjust and mitigate potential readiness shortfalls (see fig 7–1).
7–3. Strategic levers
Strategic levers serve to influence or mitigate the risks posed by readiness deficiencies at the strategic level. While financial resources represent one type of strategic response, Army senior leaders and other decision-making authorities possess a range of other mechanisms at their disposal to effect readiness. The foregoing actions are the primary tools available to the SRAG and are commensurate with the six SRTs discussed in chapter 4. While budgetary and programming activities are not one of the six SRTs, the impact of its reach warrants inclusion as a strategic response.

7–4. Manning strategic levers
a. Readiness impacts to personnel end strength and health of the force are affected through accessions, retention and separations policies, as well as adjustments to medical policies, Soldier programs, and training strategies.

b. Senior Army leader input to the Total Army analysis process and resulting adjustments to force structure are reflected in the Army structure and force design updates.

c. Changes and adjustments to the Army’s future force generation model effect readiness across manning, training, and equipping functional areas at various “aim points” along the force generation cycle that produce trained and ready Army units to meet COCOM operational requirements.

7–5. Training strategic levers
Army training proficiency levels including its inventory of trained and experienced leaders and Soldiers, in both operational units and the generating force, are indicators of Army Strategic Readiness. Impacts to training readiness are effected through various adjustments to training strategies, promotion and professional military education policies, as well as training aim points along the force generation cycle.

7–6. Capacities and Capabilities strategic levers
Readiness impacts to meet COCOM and operational requirements are affected through adjustments to force structure (for example, high demand, low density units), AC/RC capabilities mix, and training strategies. The Army’s ability to meet COCOM requirements are assessed by its risk in fulfilling the NMS and the Defense Planning Guidance.

7–7. Equipping strategic levers
Army impacts to equipment readiness are effected through adjustments to the Army modernization and equipment distribution strategies, strategic mobility enabling programs, and fleet management program. Additional actions include equipment shelf life extensions, equipment redistributions, and programmed replacements. The Lead Materiel Integrator can perform strategic risk assessments of various combinations of strategic levers involving varying equipping levels.

7–8. Sustaining strategic levers
Strategic Impacts to sustainment readiness are effected through adjustments in the depot workloads, war reserves stock, ammunition program, and an organic industrial base.
7–9. Installation strategic levers
Strategic impacts to Army facilities and Soldier quality of life are effected through adjustments to the Ready and Resilient Campaign Plan family readiness programs, facility standards and space utilization, and installation modernization enhancements.

7–10. Budgetary and/or programming strategic levers
As discussed in paragraph 7–2, the Army’s PPBE process provides many opportunities to adjust resourcing to impact future Army readiness. Budget execution decisions, programmatic guidance and funding adjustments reflected in the Army POM effect readiness across the Army’s Title 10 functions within the program evaluation groups over the future-years defense program and PPBE cycle.

7–11. Conclusion
Prescriptive approaches to readiness deficiencies are often cross-cutting and interdependent, requiring approval authority beyond the unit, proponent, or organizational levels. Impacts to one SRT often affect another, in which case, the ARSTAF at HQDA (G–3/5/7) serves as proponent for strategic level implementation. Risk mitigation strategies and resourcing actions must also conform to statutory and regulatory provisions. While the Army is afforded the flexibility to implement various risk reduction measures or commit/reduce resources across the SRTs, policy changes at the strategic level will require Army Secretariat and/or Congressional action.

Chapter 8
Army Strategic Readiness Reviews

8–1. General
Continuous assessments of the current and future strategic readiness environment shape the Army’s ability to execute its’ mission requirements within the NMS. In general, the SRU, JFRR and QRRC are outputs informed by the ASRA (see chapter 4). Each requires and integrates assessments from ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the ARSTAF that feed into the ASRA process. Army senior leaders then provide direction, additional guidance and prioritize efforts that ultimately shape desirable outcomes of Army missions in support of the NMS. Applying broader strategic guidance assists in focusing, guiding and influencing a more definitive end state in the execution of Army objectives.

8–2. Strategic Readiness Update
The SRU is the forum that allows Army senior leaders to provide clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction (monthly) between ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the ARSTAF. This interaction promotes an early, shared understanding of the strategic readiness of Army units; resourcing, policy, or employment decisions; risks; and other key guidance factors. Command updates and focus topics presented by select ACOM, ASCC, DRU, USAR, ARNG, and key ARSTAF elements are intended to provide updates to Army senior leaders on additional key components of Army readiness that may impact unit readiness. This enables specified commands or staff elements to present findings from their own analysis and elevate concerns to Army senior leaders.

8–3. Joint Force Readiness Review
The JFRR is governed under Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.01E. The JFRR is a quarterly principal assessment to the Chairman’s Readiness System that combines and analyzes unit and COCOM, Service, and Combat Support Agency readiness assessments. The Army JFRR process evaluates changes in strategic readiness through measurements of the Army’s SRTs (see chapter 5). The SRT leading indicators are assessed in order to validate and project the Army’s overall readiness assessment level. Certain assessment indicators act as triggers that assist Army senior leaders in determining the decisions necessary in order to revise policy, program resources or choose an alternate course of action. The Army’s input to the JFRR is briefed to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and/or the Chief of Staff of the Army for approval on a quarterly basis. Continuous parallel planning and coordination with the Joint Staff ensures that Army input to the JFRR clearly articulates applicable readiness concerns across the SRTs.

8–4. Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress
The QRRC is a comprehensive report governed by 10 U.S.C. 482. Prepared by OSD for Congress, the QRRC outlines the DOD’s ability to fulfill its statutory requirements. The QRRC consists of three components: Summary of the JFRR; Combatant Commander Assessments, and Unit Readiness Levels, to include Service Operational Overviews; and
Expanded QRRC Readiness Indicators. In conjunction with the completion of the JFRR input in the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, the Joint Staff provides a text summary of the JFRR to OSD as required for inclusion in the QRRC to Congress. The summary includes an overall readiness assessment of the DOD’s ability to execute the NMS. Army input to the QRRC includes the following readiness indicators: Personnel Strength; Personnel Turbulence; Other Personnel Matters; Training (to include Unit Readiness and Proficiency); Logistics (Equipment Fill, Equipment Maintenance, and Supply); and Readiness of National Guard to Perform Civil Support Missions.
Appendix A

References

Section I
Required Publications

AR 220–1
Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies (Cited in paras 1–6b, 1–6f, 3–2d, and 3–2c.)

Section II
Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication. DOD publications are available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/. USC is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action.

AR 10–87
Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

AR 11–2
Managers’ Internal Control Program

AR 25–30
The Army Publishing Program

AR 71–32
Force Development and Documentation

AR 525–29
Army Force Generation

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.01E
Joint Combat Capability Assessment (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm.)

Department of the Army General Order 2012–01
Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army

DODD 5100.01
Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

DODD 5149.02
Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)

DODD 7730.65
Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)

JP 1–02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/)

National Defense Authorization Act (current fiscal year)
(Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action.)

10 USC
Armed Forces

10 USC 221
Future-years defense program: submission to Congress; consistency in budgeting
Appendix B

Internal Control Evaluation

B–1. Function
The function covered by this evaluation is Army Strategic Readiness.

B–2. Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation is to assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 in evaluating the key internal controls listed below. It is intended as a guide and does not cover all controls.

B–3. Instructions
Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation, or other). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action identified in supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 11–2 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).

B–4. Test questions
a. Is this regulation reviewed at least once every 2 years and updated as necessary?
   b. Are the officials responsible for Army Strategic Readiness oversight knowledgeable regarding the provisions of this regulation and is this regulation and other required references available and in use?
   c. If applicable, were any published instructions that supplement the provisions of this regulation coordinated with and/or approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) in accordance with this regulation?
   d. Do the processes developed to produce the ASRA adequately provide the framework for SRT proponents to strategically measure their respective tenet(s)?

B–5. Supersession
Not applicable.

B–6. Comments
Help make this a better tool for evaluation of internal controls. Submit comments to the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.
Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

AO
action officer

AC
active component

ACOM
Army command

ACSIM
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

ACSP
Army Campaign Support Plan

AMC
U.S. Army Materiel Command

AR
Army regulation

ARNG
Army National Guard

ARSTAF
Army Staff

ASA
Assistant Secretary of the Army

ASA (ALT)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

ASA (M&RA)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

ASCC
Army Service Component Command

ASRA
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment

CAR
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve

CIO/G–6
Chief Information Officer, G–6

CJA
Comprehensive Joint Assessment

COCOM
Combatant Command

COE
Chief of Engineers
Army command
An Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army, performing multiple Army Title 10 functions across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control.

Army force generation
A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements (see AR 525–29).

Army National Guard
As used in this regulation, ARNG describes Army units under the control of the individual States and Territories that become a component of the Army when in the service of the United States. Also, those Army organizations designated as force structure component (COMPO) 2.

Army National Guard of the United States
As used in this regulation, the Army National Guard of the United States describes federally recognized Army units consisting of members of the ARNG who have been mobilized and come under the control of Federal authorities.
**Army Service Component Command**
An Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army, composed primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component for a combatant commander. If designated by the combatant commander, it serves as a Joint Force Land Component Command or Joint task force. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with operational control and administrative control (see AR 10–87).

**Army Service Component Headquarters**
An Army headquarters designated by the Secretary of the Army to support subunified commands see AR 10–87).

**Assigned mission**
An operational requirement that a unit is formally assigned to a plan for, prepare for, or to execute.

**Assigned mission level**
The assigned mission level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish its primary assigned mission. The assigned mission levels are further explained in AR 220–1.

**Category level**
The category level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish/provide core functions/designed capabilities and to execute decisive action as represented in its mission-essential task list (METL). This overall assessment is derived by considering the current status of four measured areas—personnel, equipment-on-hand, equipment readiness/serviceability and training—that indicate the availability status of resources (personnel and equipment) and unit training proficiency measured against the requirements and capabilities established by the unit’s modification table of organization and equipment.

**Civil support**
DOD support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities (DODD 3025.18 and Joint Publication (JP) 1–02).

**Combatant command**
A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments. The organization is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command (see JP 1–02).

**Command authority**
The authority over a subordinate unit/element that enables the higher unit to task organize and direct that subordinate unit/element for operations in accordance with the Army command relationships defined in Army doctrine (that is, organic, attached, and operational control).

**Critical dual use equipment items**
Critical dual use equipment items are those equipment items that support both the operational requirements of Army units (COMPO 1, COMPO 2, and COMPO 3) and that are necessary to enable Army units (COMPO 1, COMPO 2, and COMPO 3) and personnel to assist civil authorities in responses to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters as identified in national planning scenarios (that is, facilitate defense support to civilian authorities).

**Direct reporting unit**
An Army organization composed of one or more units with institutional or operational functions; designated by the Secretary of the Army; providing broad general support to the Army in a normally single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. Direct reporting units report directly to a HQDA principal and/or ACOM and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army (see AR 10–87).

**Equipment readiness and/or serviceability**
A logistic indicator that portrays the combined impact of equipment shortages and maintenance shortfalls in a unit’s ability to meet wartime requirements. (Note: the term “equipment serviceability” is used at the Joint level).

**Future-Years Defense Program**
A requirement under 10 USC 221 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress each year, at or about the time that the President’s budget is submitted to Congress, a future-years defense program (including associated annexes) reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary to support the programs, projects,
and activities of the DOD included in that budget. Any such future-years defense program will cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is submitted and at least the four succeeding fiscal years (for a total of 5 years).

**Generating force**
The generating force mans, trains, equips, deploys, and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. The generating force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operating forces of the Army. The generating force is also the Army’s principal interface with the commercial sector. Our Nation’s industrial base provides equipment and sustainment for the Army, which is managed by the various headquarters of the generating force.

**Major headquarters**
An Army headquarters higher than battalion level.

**Major unit**
An Army unit larger than battalion size.

**Measurement**
A status assessment that is highly objective because it is calculated from authoritative data.

**Mission**
The task together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military organizations, a duty assigned to an individual or organization; a task (see JP 1–02).

**Mission-essential task list**
A compilation of collective mission essential tasks, which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission. Also see standardized METL.

**Modification table of organization and equipment**
An authorized document that prescribes the modification of a basic table of organization and equipment necessary to adapt it to the needs of the specific unit or type of unit (see AR 71–32).

**Operating forces**
Operating forces consist of units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight. They include about two-thirds of the Active Army, and three-fourths of the Army’s Total Force.

**Readiness**
The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels: unit readiness and Joint readiness. Unit readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Joint readiness is the combatant commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute their assigned missions (see AR 220–1).

**Reporting unit**
AC and RC units and key installations (includes both operating forces and generating force) that are registered in the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army database and that are required to submit a unit status report in accordance with the provisions of AR 220–1 to meet either internal or externally-directed requirements.

**Special Operations Forces Groups, Regiments, and Commands**
Active and reserve special forces groups, psychological operations groups, special operations aviation regiments, ranger regiments, and civil affairs commands.

**Standardized mission-essential task list**
A set of essential standardized tasks for like units that reflect their designed capabilities. The standardized METL will be developed or prescribed in accordance with Army doctrine established by TRADOC and will be approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7.

**State adjutant general**
An individual appointed by the governor of a State to administer the military affairs of the State. A State adjutant general may be federally recognized as a general officer of the line provided he or she meets the prescribed
requirements and qualifications. However, they may be federally recognized as a general officer, Adjutant General Corps, for tenure of office.

**Task**
A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations.

**Training level**
The overall unit training level indicating the degree of unit training proficiency in the wartime tasks for which the unit was organized and designed. The T-level is measured against the unit’s all-inclusive training requirements to achieve or sustain full METL proficiency. It incorporates the unit’s pre-mobilization training requirements and nuclear, biological, chemical training requirements, if applicable.

**Unified command**
A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander, composed of significant assigned components or two or more Military Departments, and established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see JP 1–02).

**Unit readiness**
The ability of a unit to perform as designed.

**Unit status**
The measured resource and/or status levels in a unit at a specific point in time.

**Section III**
**Special Abbreviations and Terms**
This section contains no entries.