SUMMARY of CHANGE

DA PAM 600–72
Army Manpower Mobilization

This new Department of the Army Pamphlet--

- Describes the manpower and personnel management activities necessary to expand and sustain the Army in wartime or peacetime emergency.

- Explains how the Army will integrate and use manpower resources from the Active Army, Reserve Components (RC), the civilian component, the private sector, and host nations to man and sustain the Army during mobilization.
Personnel General

Army Manpower Mobilization

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

WILLIAM J. MEEHAN II
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

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Applicability. This pamphlet applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). It applies to all personnel involved in mobilization planning and operations.

Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC–MOB, Alexandria, VA 22332–0430.

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Glossary
Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
This is a pamphlet on Army manpower mobilization. Its purpose is to improve mobilization planning and operations by promoting a common understanding of the Army’s manpower mobilization processes at each level of organization down to installation level. It is a comprehensive reference for mobilization planners in the Active, Reserve, and civilian components of the Army. It will also serve as a professional development resource for faculty and students at staff and senior service colleges, and others desiring a broad appreciation of Army manpower mobilization.

1–2. Summary
This pamphlet describes the manpower and personnel management activities necessary to expand and sustain the Army in wartime or peacetime emergency. It explains how the Army will integrate and use manpower resources from the Active Army, Reserve Components (RC), the civilian component, the private sector, and host nations to man and sustain the Army during mobilization. It covers the manpower mobilization roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, other Federal agencies, the private sector, and host nations and how they affect the Army. It also offers a discussion on demobilization as a guide for planners who may be charged with demobilization planning.

1–3. Organization
Chapter 2 defines the Army’s Manpower Mobilization System, and provides an overview of the functional activities covered in detail in chapters 3 through 6. Chapter 3 explains procedures for determining mobilization manpower requirements and supply. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 cover the acquisition, qualification, and distribution of mobilization manpower. Chapter 7 describes the automation network that supports manpower mobilization functions. Chapter 8 discusses demobilization and its implications for Army manpower and personnel planners.

1–4. Applicability
This pamphlet applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). It applies to all personnel involved in mobilization planning and operations.

1–5. Suggested Improvements
The proponent agency for this pamphlet is the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-MOB, Alexandria, VA 22332–0430.

1–6. Distribution
Distribution of this publication is made in accordance with the requirements on DA Form 12–09–E, block number 5075, intended for command levels C, D, and E for Active Army, Army National Guard, and US. Army Reserve.

Chapter 2
The Army Manpower Mobilization System

2–1. INTRODUCTION
a. The capability of the United States to expand its Armed Forces rapidly and efficiently during mobilization is an essential factor in deterring potential enemies and assuring Allies of our national resolve. The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the Active and RC of the Armed Forces, but also in preparedness to convert civilian manpower rapidly into new military units and individual replacements. The greater the Army’s capability for timely, rapid mobilization, the higher the risk a potential enemy would incur as a consequence of behavior that could escalate into an armed conflict.

b. For the Army, rapidly and efficiently mobilizing manpower is a challenging and complex business. It is challenging because the Total Army Policy has placed more than half of the Army’s manpower resources in the RC, thus mandating a major mobilization to generate its full military capability. It is complex because the Congress and the Army have created almost 30 categories of mobilization manpower, together, with numerous authorities and rules governing their use, in an attempt to balance responsiveness with fairness in an environment of fiscal austerity.

c. This chapter describes the Army’s Manpower Mobilization System. It explains the logic for the plans and supporting automatic data processing (ADP) systems and procedures for mobilizing all sources of manpower, military and civilian, to expand and sustain the Army during war or national emergency. It also provides a framework for subsequent chapters by describing how mobilization manpower requirements and supply are determined, and how the Army acquires, qualifies, and distributes personnel during mobilization. The objectives are to provide an overview of
how the Army intends to meet the manpower mobilization challenge and cope with the complexity created by competing demands for responsiveness, fairness, and economy.

d. Readers unfamiliar with the types of mobilization and the relationship between mobilization and operations plans (OPLANs) should read the following section. Those with a knowledge of mobilization and operations planning may go directly to the section on the Army Manpower Mobilization System.

2–2. MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS

a. Overview. Mobilization is the act of assembling and organizing resources to support national security objectives in time of war or other national emergencies. It is the process whereby all or part of the Armed Forces are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergencies. This includes activating all or part of the RC as well as assembling and organizing military and civilian personnel, supplies, and materiel.

b. Mobilization Spectrum. The law provides a range of mobilization options that give the President and the Congress great flexibility when responding to a developing crisis. This spectrum of mobilization options is described below and summarized in figure 2–1.

(1) Presidential Call-up of 200,000 Selected Reservists. The President may augment the Active Forces by ordering to active duty units and individuals of the Selected Reserve, up to 200,000 members from all Services, for up to 90 days (with authority for an additional 90 days if required) to meet the requirements of an operational mission. Although this action calls Selected Reserve Forces to active duty, it is not considered a level of mobilization because of the brief duration of the authority and because there is no authorized increase in active duty endstrength inherent in the authority.

(2) Partial Mobilization. This is an expansion of the Active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (to any level short of full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for 24 months) to mobilize RC units, individual reservists, and retirees, as well as the resources needed for their support. The expansion meets the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

(3) Full Mobilization. This is an expansion of the Active Armed Forces resulting from congressional action, normally at the request of the President, to mobilize all RC units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and retired military personnel. It includes resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

(4) Total Mobilization. This is an expansion of the Armed Forces resulting from congressional action, normally at the request of the President, to establish additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure. It includes resources needed for their support to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

(5) Selective Mobilization. Although not a part of the mobilization spectrum highlighted in figure 2–1, the selective mobilization authority provides for augmentation of the Armed Forces to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an external threat to the national security. It involves augmentation of the Active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress, the President, or both to mobilize ARNG units and the resources needed for their support.

2–3. MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS PLANS

a. Overview.

(1) Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of joint commands develop OPLANs according to the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) managed by the Joint Staff. The purpose of these plans is to provide or augment the military forces required by the CINCs to execute their war plans. Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) is a major part of these plans. These data are used to plan the mobilization and deployment of units, as well as individual filler and replacement personnel.

(2) All major OPLANS require some level of mobilization to call up the units and individuals needed to reinforce and support the Active Forces assigned to the CINCs in peacetime. Accordingly, each major OPLAN is supported by a mobilization plan.


(1) The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) integrates mobilization and operations planning in the Army. It implements the Army’s responsibilities under JOPS and provides a single source of guidance for developing Army mobilization plans. AMOPS is prepared and published by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) with input provided by the Army Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff, for Personnel (DCSPER), in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of Army Reserve, provides the input to AMOPS for manpower mobilization planning.

(2) Below Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) supplements AMOPS and guides development of RC unit mobilization plans and installation mobilization plans. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Mobilization and Operations Planning System (TMOPS) provides guidance and direction for its installation mobilization plans and
for training base expansion. Other Army major commands (MACOMs), such as U.S. Army Health Service Command (HSC) and The U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), also prepare mobilization plans based on AMOPS guidance.

2-4. THE ARMY MANPOWER MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

a. Overview. Despite its complexity, Army manpower mobilization fits neatly into a simple system model in which input is converted by functional activities into desired output. As shown in figure 2–2, inputs to the Army Manpower Mobilization System are military and civilian manpower. Outputs are qualified soldiers and civilian employees assigned worldwide to man and sustain the Army. Personnel inputs from each source of manpower are converted to the desired output by their acquisition into the Active Army through a mobilization, accession, or hiring process; qualification for Army service in needed skills; and, distribution to appropriate jobs in the Army’s force structure. The system is fueled by requirements to man the force structure, changes caused by feed back from supported commanders, requests for replacements, and force structure modifications.

b. Inputs.

(1) Requirements.

(a) The baseline requirement for mobilization manpower is determined by the number of manpower spaces and mix of skills in the Army’s wartime-required force structure. The replacements required over time are added to this baseline because of battlefield casualties and other forms of attrition.

(b) Force structure requirements for mobilization or war are documented in modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for tactical organizations. Mobilization tables of distribution and allowances (MOBTDA) document mobilization personnel and equipment requirements for support organizations, like installations, and include civilian as well as military spaces. All MTOE and MOBTDA are recorded in the Army Authorization Document System (TAADS).

(c) Due to funding constraints, a portion of the force structure is not authorized in peacetime. These units must be organized, manned, and equipped when authorized after mobilization. In addition, many units in the peacetime authorized force structure are not manned at the wartime required level. Fillers are required immediately upon mobilization to bring these units to their wartime required level of fill.

(d) Other requirements for mobilization manpower derive from support to be provided by private sector contractors and host countries. Examples of requirements satisfied by contract include the operation of dining facilities and real property maintenance at installations in the continental United States (CONUS). Typical host nation support (HNS) includes medical services, maintenance support, and operation of supply lines. Contract and host nation support activities are included as claimants for mobilization manpower in this text because the support provided by these sources would otherwise have to be provided by adding force structure to the Army. These arrangements with the private sector and host governments save money and substantially reduce the demand for military manpower during mobilization and war.

(e) Mobilized manpower is required to support the Army’s role across the spectrum of conflict (from terrorism to major conventional warfare) because some military skills reside only in the RC. Although most mobilization plans are based on a major conventional conflict scenario and full mobilization, the Army is more likely to become involved in limited objective operations like the Grenada (1986) and Panama (1989) incursions. In both operations, volunteer civil affairs specialists were called to active duty when the need for them was recognized. It is essential, therefore, that mobilization authorities, plans, and procedures be considered in these circumstances as well as in those that would require a more extensive mobilization response.

(2) Sources of Mobilization Manpower (Supply).

(a) There are nearly 30 categories of manpower that have been created to apply against manpower mobilization requirements. Major categories are listed in figure 2–3 and will be defined briefly here. All categories and subcategories will be described in detail in chapter 3.

(b) Active manpower is composed of all soldiers in the Active Army.

(c) Reserve manpower consists of personnel in three primary categories created by the Congress in 1952 in the interest of achieving a balance between responsiveness and fairness in a Reserve force system. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a pool of reservists in units and various individual reserve categories that are “readily” available with Presidential action. Retirees and standby reservists, with one exception, require congressional action for call-up. The exception is Regular retirees and Retired reservists with 20 or more years of active duty. Individuals in these categories may be recalled involuntarily at any time (including peacetime) by the Secretary of the Army when their services are required and not available from other sources.

(d) Civilian manpower includes all civilian employees of the Army and individuals employed by contractors providing services and other support to the Army. They are an important source of mobilization manpower because, without them, more military personnel would be required to perform their functions.

(e) HNS is considered a source of mobilization manpower because the support and services provided also offset wartime military manpower requirements. This support may be provided by host nation military organizations or civilian firms under contract to host governments. The legal basis for this type of support is provided by bilateral agreements between the United States and host nations.
(f) Volunteers and draftees will sustain the Army for the duration of a war or emergency. Volunteers include individuals with prior military service who have completed their statutory military service obligations (MSOs), and those without prior service. Draftees are involuntary inductees who could be called after Congress amends the military Selective Service Act to authorize involuntary inductions.

c. Functional Activities.

(1) Overview. Functional activities include a variety of actions that must be taken by the Army to acquire each source of manpower, to ensure that personnel acquired are qualified for Army service, and to distribute personnel wisely to optimize the Army’s capabilities. Each of these is described briefly here and in greater detail in later chapters.

(2) Acquisition.

(a) The term acquisition, as used here, refers to those activities necessary to make the various sources of mobilization manpower available for service in the Active Army, according to wartime or emergency priorities. Members of the RC, for example, must be ordered to active duty and then accessioned onto the Active Army rolls. Other examples of acquisition activities are the hiring of additional civilian manpower, implementation of host nation support agreements, and accession of volunteers and draftees.

(b) Active Army personnel do not need to be “acquired” as do members of the RC, but Active Army soldiers in transit to overseas assignments, students in Army schools, and those within a few days of separation must be made available for reassignment against wartime priorities. Therefore, stop-loss and stop-movement activities are also included within the meaning of the term “acquisition.” See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the acquisition function.

(3) Qualification. These activities fall into two categories: (1) Skill qualification; and, (2) qualification for movement overseas (for those being assigned overseas). Skill qualification includes the verification of each individual’s competency in a needed skill. Qualification for movement overseas involves actions necessary to ensure that all soldiers or civilians being assigned overseas meet statutory or administrative requirements for service there. The law, for example, requires that all military personnel have a minimum of 12 weeks of training before deployment. Other requirements include having a Panorex dental x-ray on file, and having a negative Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) test result. Qualification is described in detail in chapter 5.

(4) Distribution.

(a) Distribution includes allocating manpower resources among competing claimants and assigning personnel according to wartime priorities. These activities are described in terms of the level at which they are accomplished. The terms are cross-leveling, redistribution, and distribution. Installation commanders cross-level assigned personnel resources among units, according to established priorities, to make as many units as possible mission-capable. Requirements that cannot be met within installation resources are raised to CONUSA or MACOM level where resources are redistributed between installations to ensure the optimal utilization of critically short assets. PERSCOM is the Army’s wholesale personnel distributor. In its role, PERSCOM distributes qualified personnel to the Army components of the warfighting CINCs and the Army’s CONUS MACOMs. PERSCOM makes wholesale distribution of new resources as they emerge from the training base. PERSCOM also acts upon execution of OPLANS to fill preplanned requisitions for initial fillers and replacements needed by warfighting CINCs.

(b) Civilian personnel distribution activities during mobilization are also centered at installation level where civilian personnel managers realign incumbent employees from peacetime to wartime functions and hire new employees to handle increased workloads. Organizations above installation (all the way to the cabinet level of the Federal Government) ensure that the available civilian manpower is equitably distributed among competing claimants like the Military Departments, other departments of the Federal Government and defense industry. The distribution function is described in chapter 6.

d. Output. The output of the Manpower Mobilization System is military and civilian personnel, having the right skills, assigned according to wartime priorities to optimize and sustain the Army’s capability to perform its mission. Feedback from commanders on how well the system is meeting their requirements, requests for replacement personnel, and changes to the force structure renew requirements and keep the system energized until the war or emergency is over.

2–5. THE MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PROCESS

a. Figure 2–4 provides a generalized manpower mobilization process overview. It applies to personnel in pretrained individual manpower pools and to personnel with no current service affiliation (prior or non prior services, draftees, and volunteers). IRRs are mobilized with a Western Union Mailgram from the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) directing them to report to a designated mobilization station within a specified period of time. They are accessed into the Active Army at the mobilization station. If their military skills are verified, they will be directed to a CONUS replacement center (CRC) and assigned to a deploying unit or a CONUS sustaining base unit. Personnel directed to a CRC will complete overseas movement requirements at the CRC prior to deployment as filler or replacements for forward deployed units. If their skills are not current and cannot be refreshed in a unit, they will be assigned to an Army training center or school for needed training, and then reassigned overseas or in CONUS.
b. Retirees with preassignment ("hip pocket") orders will normally be notified by a media announcement that they are to comply with their orders. They will in general follow the same accession and qualification process as their IRR counterparts. Most will be assigned where their skills are needed in CONUS to displace a younger soldier for overseas service. Once they are assigned, they are subject to reassignment overseas (if qualified) to meet critical shortages that cannot be filled by younger soldiers.

c. Prior-service volunteers with no remaining military service obligation and nonprior-service personnel (draftees or volunteers) will first be ordered to a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) and, if qualified for military service, assigned to a unit or a training center for appropriate training. Those completing training will be further assigned in CONUS or overseas to sustain the Army.

d. Other categories of military manpower will be mobilized and assigned in much the same manner as the categories used in the examples. Details do vary, however, and these are covered, as appropriate, in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

e. A generalized description of civilian personnel management during mobilization is also provided in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

2–6. SUMMARY

a. Manpower mobilization is a challenging and complex business, but fits neatly into the simple systems model shown in figure 2–2. Based on wartime requirements, personnel from the various sources of mobilization manpower are acquired, qualified, and distributed by Army personnel managers to man and sustain the wartime Army.

b. Figure 2–3 lists the major categories of mobilization manpower. Figure 2–4 provides an overview of the manpower mobilization process of individuals. Detailed descriptions of each manpower category, how requirements are determined, and how the Army acquires, qualifies, and distributes manpower are provided in chapters 3 through 6.

### MOBILIZATION SPECTRUM

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<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Partial</th>
<th>Full</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Executive Order</td>
<td>Augment active units by a callup of the Selected Reserve</td>
<td>Up to 200,000 of all the Services</td>
<td>90 Days (May be extended additional 90 days)</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation of National Emergency (or Act of Congress)</td>
<td>Public Law or Joint Resolution of Congress declaring war.</td>
<td>Same as Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential proclamation of National Emergency (or Act of Congress).</td>
<td>To meet the requirements of war or National Emergency.</td>
<td>Up to 1 Million of all Services (or other limit established by Congress).</td>
<td>24 Months (or other period established by Congress).</td>
<td>Same as Partial</td>
<td>Same as Full</td>
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Figure 2–1. Mobilization Spectrum
Figure 2–2. Manpower Mobilization System
SOURCES OF MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

- ACTIVE MANPOWER
- RESERVE MANPOWER
  - READY RESERVE
  - RETIRED RESERVE
  - STANDBY RESERVE
- RETIREES WITH 20+ YEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY
- CIVILIAN MANPOWER
- HOST NATION SUPPORT
- VOLUNTEERS AND DRAFTEES

Figure 2–3. Sources of Mobilization Manpower

MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PROCESS OVERVIEW

Figure 2–4. Manpower Mobilization Process Overview
Chapter 3
Mobilization Manpower Requirements and Supply

3–1. INTRODUCTION

a. Identifying mobilization manpower requirements and applying resources against them are no easy tasks. The peacetime Army is not manned at its wartime required strength. Pretrained individual manpower (PIM) pools, although adequate in terms of the total numbers of personnel, do not contain the required mix of grades and skills. Consequently, there are substantial overages or shortages in many military occupational specialties (MOSs). Other factors, such as competition with private industry and the other Services for quality recruits in a declining youth population, serve to further challenge mobilization manpower planning.

b. At HQDA, the manpower manager’s tasks are to develop, resource, and implement a manpower program for the peacetime Army, provide a pool of pretrained manpower to fill the Army to its wartime required strength upon mobilization, and obtain new soldiers and civilian employees to expand and sustain the Army in war. Below HQDA, commanders and their personnel managers are concerned primarily with their needs for fillers to bring units and organizations to wartime required strengths, and replacements to offset attrition and sustain maximum operational capability.

c. This chapter describes factors that affect manpower requirements and supply, methods for determining Army manpower mobilization requirements at each level of command, and the sources of mobilization manpower supply.

3–2. FACTORS AFFECTING MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY

a. The task of military manpower policymaking is to formulate and ensure execution of a manpower program during peacetime that will provide (for foreseeable peacetime needs and mobilization contingencies) skilled manpower in sufficient quantities when and where needed. Figure 3–1 illustrates the scope and complexity of this task and lists some of the factors that influence requirements and the eventual supply of manpower. Thorough understanding of these factors, how they interact, and accurate estimation of their effects on requirements and supply provide the basis for making manpower policy and program decisions.

b. The framework for a defense manpower program is established by the size and composition of the force structure, the war scenario chosen for planning and programming, and predictions concerning the state of the economy during the planning or programming period. The force structure provides baseline requirements for manpower by grade and skill. The war scenario (used in battlefield simulations to provide casualty estimates and other results of combat) provides time-phased requirements for replacements. Predictions of trends for improvement or decline in the economy, (used to estimate how attractive the military will be to prospective soldiers and civilians in the job market) lead to estimates of the supply that will be available to fill peacetime requirements.

c. The framework, once established, provides the basis for policies which establish the composition of the force, including the peacetime mix of Active Component (AC) and RC units, the mix of military and civilian employees, and the role of host nation support. These policies, in turn, provide the basis for policies establishing recruiting and retention standards. Standards influence supply. If set too high, fewer personnel will be eligible to serve; if too low, soldier and civilian employee quality might become a problem.

d. The relative success of programs implemented to retain soldiers and civilians influences manpower supply and peacetime attrition. If pay and allowances fall substantially below prevailing rates in the private sector, more soldiers and civilian employees will leave the Service for better paying civil-sector jobs. Soldiers with critical skills, however, may be enticed to stay in with a reenlistment bonus tied to their skills.

e. Given attrition rates and force structure overages and shortages, the manpower planner can determine accession needs. Together with entry standards, accession needs are analyzed against the prevailing manpower market to determine a set of peacetime accession policies that are likely to produce enough quality recruits and civilian hires. These policies usually specify recruiting goals for females, high school diploma graduates (HSDGs), and those in the top mental categories. Related policies establish ceilings that limit the numbers of non-HSDGs and lower mental category recruits that can be enlisted.

f. Accession policies form the basis for recruiting programs aimed at motivating qualified personnel to seek employment in the military. Like retention programs, these greatly influence both the quantity and quality of the manpower supply, as well as provide a measure of how well the Services compete with each other for quality manpower.

g. The collective effects of the foregoing peacetime standards, policies, and programs determine the point at which the Services must start to expand the force in the event of mobilization. Mobilization and wartime policies are developed to expand the force as rapidly as possible and sustain it at the required level for as long as necessary. These policies, and the procedures for implementing them, will be covered in detail from an Army perspective in chapters 4 through 6.
h. The size and composition of the force actually achieved in peacetime (and projected for wartime) are continually assessed against evolving peacetime and wartime criteria. Results of these assessments modify the framework for manpower planning and the cycle begins again.

i. Standards, policies, and programs are also changed, eliminated, or replaced in order to correct problems like MOS shortages, poor retention in Reserve Component units, or an inadequate supply of PIM. The ultimate objective is continued improvement in Total Army manpower readiness and capability.

3–3. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION

a. Department of the Army Level.

(1) Total Army force structure and estimated wartime attrition form the basis for determining mobilization manpower requirements at HQDA. Force structure requirements are recorded in TAADS. Attrition occurs over time and includes many factors such as estimates of battlefield casualties, disease and nonbattle injuries, and indiscipline (for example: absent without leave (AWOL), confinement, etc.)

(2) PERSCOM determines mobilization manpower requirements using the Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN). For a given wartime planning scenario, MOBMAN estimates projected, time-phased manpower surpluses and shortfalls aggregated, and by MOS, in 10-day and 30-day increments. Figure 3–2 illustrates the logic used in MOBMAN for determining requirements. Force structure requirements, based on wartime-required strengths documented in the Mobilization TAADS (MOBTAADS), are added to net casualties (battlefield casualties plus disease and nonbattle injuries minus returns to duty) incurred during the time period. (Other contributors to attrition, like AWOL and personnel in the stockade, are accounted for elsewhere in the program.) The result is a table listing the numbers of military personnel required for specified intervals (10 or 30 days) after M-day. Data are normally computed for the first six months of the scenario, but MOBMAN can analyze data for up to 360 days after mobilization.

(3) Figure 3–3 provides a graphic example of typical MOBMAN output. It shows the cumulative number of infantrymen required to fill and sustain the force in a notional wartime scenario and full mobilization.

b. Below Department of the Army Level.

(1) While the HQDA manpower mobilization planner is concerned primarily with developing and justifying plans, programs, and budgets for manning and sustaining the Army during wartime, commanders and their planners below HQDA level are concerned with the timely availability and flow of fillers and replacements.

(2) Theater Army Commanders in Chief are responsible for determining their initial wartime filler and casualty replacement requirements. They do so by developing theater shelf requirements, based on fillers needed to bring units to full strength and estimated casualty replacements for the first 90 days of war. This so-called “shelf requisition” is prepositioned at PERSCOM and lists the Theater Army Commander’s time-phased requirements, by skill and grade for individual fillers and casualty replacements. Shelf requisitions are required by the AMOPS for all Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved OPLANS.

(3) Units and organizations in CONUS, whether they are scheduled to deploy or remain as part of the CONUS training or sustaining base, do not prepare requisitions for personnel fill upon mobilization. Their mobilization filler requirements are determined as part of the ARPERCEN Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS). Figure 3–4 illustrates the process. Wartime requirements to man units and organizations are documented in the MOBTAADS at grade and MOS level of detail. AC requirements are generated at PERSCOM by matching faces (personnel on hand), recorded in the Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB), with the requirements. The AC requirement, a list of unfilled spaces, is provided to ARPERCEN quarterly. RC requirements are generated monthly at ARPERCEN by matching faces from the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System for the U.S. Army Reserve (SIDPERS–USAR) and SIDPERS for the Army National Guard (SIDPERS–ARNG) (provided by the Army National Guard Personnel Center (GUARDPERCEN)) files with requirements. ARPERCEN then merges the AC and RC requirements in order to determine total unit military mobilization manpower requirements for full mobilization. Requirements for less than full mobilization can also be determined as long as the force structure to be mobilized is specified.

(4) Mobilization will also require an increase of skilled civilian workers at installations to support mobilizing and deploying and sustain the mobilizing force. Up to 150,000 new civilian hires may be required within the first 6 months of full mobilization.

(5) Civilian requirements for each organization are determined by organization or installation commanders with the assistance of their manpower staffs and civilian personnel offices (CPÔs). This process considers the organization’s mobilization mission and wartime workloads associated with the mission.

3–4. MOBILIZATION MANPOWER SUPPLY

a. Overview. Mobilization manpower supply is a measure of the availability of physically, mentally, and educationally qualified people, both prior service and nonprior service. It includes members of the Active Army, USAR, ARNG, military retirees, initial entry training (IET) graduates, and Army civilian employees. Personnel working for private contractors and host nation personnel, committed by bilateral agreement to provide essential wartime service support,
can also be considered part of the Army’s mobilization manpower supply because they offset manpower requirements that would otherwise be filled with Army soldiers or civilian employees.

b. Determination of Military Mobilization Manpower Supply. The MOBMAN process also predicts military mobilization manpower supply. As shown on the right side of figure 3–5, the number of personnel assigned to AC and RC force structure units and organizations is added to the supply of pretrained individuals maintained in data files at ARPERCEN. Training base output, based on expected mobilization training base capacity, is also added. The total supply can then be compared to requirements as in the example in figure 3–6. These data can be used in a variety of analyses, but especially in those that support manpower programs and planning for training base expansion. The predicted shortfall of infantrymen after M+40 (in the example at fig 3–6) challenges manpower planners at HQDA to develop and implement programs designed to increase the supply of infantrymen in pretrained manpower pools.

3–5. SOURCES OF MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

a. Overview.

(1) Total Army mobilization manpower is composed of the military components and civilians. Military manpower includes personnel in the Active Army and RC units, prior-service individual reservists, retirees and volunteers, nonprior-service volunteers and draftees, and host nation military personnel in units committed to supporting the U.S. Army in wartime. Civilian manpower includes United States and foreign civilian employees of the Army, employees of private sector firms under contract to the Army for various services, and employees paid from nonappropriated funds (such as post exchange (PX) profits).

(2) The many categories of mobilization manpower are shown in figure 3–7. Each category is unique. They were created to satisfy one or more considerations such as responsiveness, equity, and affordability. They are defined and discussed briefly below.

b. Active Manpower. Active duty soldiers are the first source tapped to meet mobilization filler and replacement needs because they will be immediately available. The Active Army is divided into a Force Structure Account (FSA), and an individuals account. The FSA is composed of those soldiers serving in units. The individuals account includes trainees, transients, holdees, and students and will be referred to hereafter as the TTHS account. Personnel serving in units of the FSA in the CONUS are subject to an immediate PERSCOM levy for deployment overseas as fillers or replacements. The TTHS account is also used as an immediate source of theater fillers and replacements. There are approximately 100,000 personnel in the account on any given day, but only about half are fully trained and immediately available as mobilization assets. Personnel categories in this account are defined below:

(1) Trainees. All enlisted personnel attending IET. Personnel in this category are not available for assignment as fillers or replacements until graduation from their MOS-producing course and, by law, must complete a minimum of 12 weeks training before deployment.

(2) Transients. All personnel enroute to a permanent change of station (PCS) assignment. The only portion of this category used for fillers or replacements is personnel enroute from CONUS to overseas. These personnel become available immediately after implementation of a stop-movement order by HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), which cancels their orders and allows them to be diverted to meet mobilization priorities. Personnel enroute to a CONUS assignment will be directed to continue to that assignment and thus will not be available for cross-leveling until after reporting for duty.

(3) Holdees. These are active duty personnel dropped from the assigned strength of a unit and attached to a holding activity because of medical, disciplinary, or preseparation nonavailability (generally a 2 to 5-day period of outprocessing for separation from the Army). Medical and disciplinary holdees become available after release from patient or prisoner status. Preseparation holdees become available upon implementation of a stop-loss order which precludes continued separation of most personnel.

(4) Students. These include students in officer and enlisted professional development courses, skill qualification courses, civil schooling, and commissioned officers attending an officer basic course. Personnel are available for use as fillers and replacements upon graduation or termination of the course. (AMOPS, Vol III, specifies which courses are terminated upon mobilization.) Warrant and commissioned officers in IET become available upon successful completion of the course. Officer candidates, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and United States Military Academy (USMA) Cadets are not available until after branch qualification.

c. Reserve Manpower. All Reserve manpower is included in one of three RC categories: the Ready Reserve; the Standby Reserve; or, the Retired Reserve.

(1) Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve is composed of military members of the ARNG and USAR, organized in units, or as individuals liable for recall to augment the Active Component. Ready Reservists (with one exception as explained below) are available call-up with a Presidential declaration of national emergency. There are three subcategories of Ready Reservists.

(a) Selected Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of units and individuals so essential to wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. Unlike other Ready Reservists, they are also available for call-up with the Presidential 200,000 call-up authority. The Selected Reserve consists of trained personnel in units, unit members undergoing training, and trained individuals.
1. Trained personnel in units are composed of drilling reservists and unit support personnel. Drilling reservists participate in unit training activities on a part-time basis. Unit support personnel are those who serve on active duty as military technicians or as part of the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Program. Military technicians are Federal civilian employees who provide full-time support for administration, training, and maintenance to the unit while maintaining their status as drilling reservists. AGR personnel are ARNG or USAR members of the Selected Reserve ordered to active duty or full-time National Guard duty, with their consent, to help organize, administer, recruit, or train their units. They will be mobilized with the units they support.

2. Selected Reservists in the training pipeline are not deployable until they have completed IET. They will mobilize with their units, but may not deploy with them.

3. Individual members of the Selected Reserve are either members of the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) or Individual AGR Programs. IMAs are trained individuals reassigned to an Active Army, Selective Service System, or Federal Emergency Management Agency position that must be filled soon after mobilization. They train two weeks or more annually with their assigned organization. Individual AGR personnel perform the same types of full-time active duty as unit support AGRs, but they are assigned to headquarters and other supporting organizations, not units.

(b) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). IRR are Ready Reservists not in the Selected Reserve. The IRR is the largest single source of pretrained individuals, although not all its members are fully trained. There are three subcategories of IRR.

1. Recently trained within 12 months (RT–12). These are members of the IRR who have been released from active duty or a unit of the Selected Reserve within 12 months. They are assumed to be fully trained and immediately available upon call-up for use as individual replacements. Current plans call for their call-up before other IRR members or retirees, and processing through CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) for deployment overseas.

2. IRR. A manpower pool consisting mostly of individuals who have served previously in the Active Army or in the Selected Reserve and have some portion of their military service obligation remaining. Most are considered trained, but because of skill degradation, their skills must be evaluated at the mobilization station after call-up to determine whether they are qualified to serve in a unit or required to return to the training base for additional or reclassification training.

3. Zero skill level IRR. These are individuals who had not completed IET when transferred to the IRR (for the remainder of their military service obligation) for hardship or other reasons supported by a determination that they had potential for future military service. When mobilized, they will be ordered to the training base to complete IET.

(c) Inactive National Guard (ING). ING are members of the National Guard in an inactive status. Although attached to a specific unit for administrative purposes, they are not part of the Selected Reserve. They do not participate in unit activities, but upon mobilization would mobilize with their units. INGs retain Federal recognition and are subject to immediate involuntary mobilization in time of Federal or State emergency. In order for these personnel to retain ING status, they must muster once a year with their units. Like the IRR, all members of the ING have legal, contractual military service obligations.

2. Standby Reserve. This is a very small number (about 600) of offices and enlisted personnel with and without a remaining MSO, but with no statutory requirements for peacetime training. They are not earmarked for units and must be certified by ARPERCEN as being available before they can be recalled.

(a) Active status Standby Reserve. These are Standby Reservists with a remaining MSO, temporarily assigned for hardship or other reason, such as membership in Congress or identification by employers as “key personnel” because they are critical to national security in their civilian employment.

(b) Inactive status Standby Reserve. Individuals who are not required by law or regulation to remain members of an active status program, but who desire to retain their Reserve affiliation in a nonparticipating status and have skills that may be of possible future use to the Army. The inactive status list also includes individuals who volunteer for assignment to the active list of the Standby Reserve and have not been assigned.

3. Retired Reserve. The Retired Reserve is composed of all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retirement pay on the basis of active duty or combination of Active and Reserve service; all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retirement pay but have not reached age 60 (and who have not elected discharge or are not still voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve); and, other Retired reservists.

(a) Retired reservists (20+ years active duty). These are Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who have completed at least 20 years of active duty; enlisted personnel with more than 20, but less than 30 years of combined Regular and Reserve duty; and, those who are retired with pay for service or by reason of disability.

(b) Other Reserve retirees. These include other categories of Retired reservists who may or may not be receiving or be eventually eligible to receive retired pay. Included are those not drawing retired pay even though they are eligible, those over age 60 and receiving pay, and those not drawing pay and not eligible for pay at age 60.

d. Regular Army Retirees. These include Regular Army officers and enlisted personnel who have completed at least 20 years of active duty and are retired with pay, or were retired with pay by reason of disability.

e. Retiree Eligibility Policy.

(1) Retirees, Regular or Reserve, who have completed at least 20 years active duty, may be recalled to active duty whenever required as determined by the Secretary of the Army. Other Reserve retirees may be recalled only in time of
war or national emergency declared by the Congress when the Secretary of the Army determines, and the Secretary of Defense concurs, that there are insufficient qualified Ready or Standby Reservists.

(2) Department of Defense policy also requires that retiree eligibility for mobilization also be categorized by length of time after retirement, age, and disability. Category I retirees are those within the first 5 years of retirement, are under age 60, and not disabled. They are subject to involuntary preassignment until age 60 and may be deployed overseas as fillers or replacements. Category II includes those who have been retired more than 15 years, but are still under age 60 and are not disabled. They also may be deployed. Category III includes all others, including those who are disabled. Category III retirees with selected skills (primarily medical personnel) are considered as mobilization assets on a case-by-case basis.

f. Civilian Manpower. An adequate supply of skilled civilian personnel is absolutely essential to provide a wide range of professional, technical, and other support to the Army in war. Civilians provide the principal manpower resource for expanding and sustaining the CONUS support base. United States and foreign national civilian employees fill emergency essential civilian (EEC) positions in overseas theaters. EECs provide critical support to ensure the success of combat operations. Contract employees also provide essential support services in wartime. Categories of civilian manpower are defined below:

(1) United States Direct Hire (USDH). These are employees of the Department of the Army paid directly from appropriated funds. They can fill authorized positions in the CONUS base and EEC positions overseas. Those not in EEC positions overseas and returned to the United States in noncombatant evacuation operations become a primary source of skilled civilian manpower for immediate hire in the expanding CONUS base.

(2) Direct Hire Foreign National (DHFN). Citizens of host nations hired by the Department of the Army for authorized positions and paid directly from appropriated funds. They can also fill EEC positions.

(3) Indirect Hire Foreign Nationals (IHFN). These employees are not hired or administered directly by the Department of the Army, but furnish support according to contracts, agreements, or other arrangements with host governments. The United States provides appropriated funds to host governments for their compensation. IHFN employees also fill EEC positions.

(4) Contract Employees. These personnel are employed by private sector firms under contract to the DOD or Department of the Army in CONUS and overseas to provide wartime services. Many contract services provided in peacetime are also required in wartime. Contract provisions require contractors to plan and maintain required capabilities upon mobilization and during an emergency. In CONUS, major installation support functions like logistics, engineering, and housing may be performed by contract. Contractors may provide a variety of essential services overseas like aircraft and automated data processing equipment maintenance.

(5) Nonappropriated Fund (NAF). NAF employees will be required in greater numbers in the CONUS base upon mobilization to operate post exchanges and provide other services for greatly increased installation populations. Those returning from overseas in noncombatant evacuation operations are an immediately available manpower source for CONUS NAF activities and authorized direct-hire civilian positions.

(6) Military and Civilian Retirees. Federal civilian retirees and military retirees not recalled for military mobilization requirements have also been recognized as a potential source of skilled manpower for civilian mobilization manpower needs. The Defense Manpower Data Center provides annual listings of these retirees to installations for identification and recruiting during mobilization.

(7) Host Nation Support (HNS). Bilateral support agreements with allied host nations in Europe and Asia offset requirements for approximately 125,000 Army mobilization manpower spaces. There are two categories of HNS, direct and indirect.

(8) Direct HNS. Direct HNS applies to host country reserve military units which remain under host nation command, but are organized and tasked to provide exclusive support to United States forces. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) will provide combat support and combat service support units that will perform military police, construction, signal (cable construction), tactical bridging, medical evacuation, ammunition handling, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) transportation, smoke generators, and maintenance functions. These units are equipped, stationed, trained, and sustained with United States resources, but recruited and paid by the FRG.

(9) Indirect HNS. This form of HNS is provided by host countries from the private sector. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, for example, have agreed to provide engineer, communications, police, medical, ordnance, quarter-master, maintenance, and transportation support along the lines of communication from aerial and seaports of debarkation in those countries into the FRG. Without this support, the United States would have to substantially increase its European force structure to accomplish the reception, onward movement, and support of reinforcing units and supplies.

g. Nonprior Service Personnel. This group includes personnel without prior military service who are enlisted in the Army’s delayed entry program (DEP), and those without any prior MOS who might volunteer for essentially patriotic reasons or be inducted through the Selective Service System. Members of the DEP can be mobilized with a Presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency prior to their scheduled entries onto active duty. A draft can begin after Congress has amended the military Selective Service Act to authorize inductions. Volunteers can be enlisted into the Active Army at any time.

h. Prior Service Volunteers. This category consists of individuals with prior service, not serving in a Reserve status,
who have fulfilled their MSOs, but desire to offer their services to the Army again. Like nonprior service volunteers, they can be accessed into the Active Army at any time.

3–6. SUMMARY
Requirements for mobilization manpower are based on the Army’s wartime required force structure plus expected attrition due to battlefield casualties and other causes. Supplies of manpower to fill the required force and provide the necessary replacements come from many different sources: military and civilian personnel; Active Army and Reserve Component units and individuals; host nation support; contractors; volunteers; and, draftees. At Department of the Army level, the manpower manager’s challenge is to develop and implement policies and programs to ensure an adequate supply of mobilization manpower when needed. Below Department of the Army level, personnel managers determine requirements for fill of units and identify the supply expected to be available for distribution and redistribution to meet requirements.

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**Figure 3–1. A Systems View of Defense Manpower Policymaking**

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MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION

- AGGREGATE AND BY MOS
- 10-DAY INCREMENTS TO M+120
- 30-DAY INCREMENTS TO M+360

Figure 3–2. Mobilization Manpower Requirements Determination
Mobilization Manpower Requirements

Figure 3–3. Mobilization Manpower Requirements
DETERMINING UNIT MILITARY MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

TAPDB - Total Army Personnel Data Base
* These data will eventually be included in the TAPDB

Figure 3–4. Determining Unit Military Mobilization Manpower Requirements
MOBMAN METHODOLOGY

- AGGREGATE AND BY MOS/AOC
- 10-DAY INCREMENTS TO M+120
- 30-DAY INCREMENTS TO M+360

Figure 3-5. Mobman Methodology
Figure 3-6. Mobilization Manpower Supply & Requirements
Figure 3–7. Total Army Mobilization Manpower

Figure 3–7. Total Army Mobilization Manpower—Continued
Chapter 4
Acquisition of Mobilization Manpower

4-1. INTRODUCTION

a. This chapter explains the activities necessary to acquire each source of manpower. Included in these activities are Presidential and congressional actions invoking legal authorities for the call-up of military reservists; congressional actions authorizing involuntary inductions; actions by the OSD, the Joint Staff and other Government agencies to establish manpower priorities, allocate manpower, and suspend peacetime controls; and, actions by the Army to acquire personnel to meet mobilization requirements.

b. The term “acquisition,” as used in this text, includes a broad array of activities necessary to access reservists, volunteers, and involuntary inductees into the Active Army, to hire additional civilian employees, and implement wartime contract and host nation support agreements. Also included within the scope of the term are stop-loss and stop-movement actions. Although these actions do not “acquire” personnel for the Army, they are included because they are taken to make the maximum number of Active Army individuals available for timely distribution against mobilization priorities.

4-2. ACQUISITION OF MILITARY MANPOWER

a. Overview. This section begins with discussion of the legal authorities available for initiating the military manpower acquisition process upon mobilization. Roles played by the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Army in planning and implementing the process follow. Remaining discussion covers procedures used by the Army to notify the personnel in each manpower category, move them to a mobilization site and, as appropriate, access them into the Active Army.


(1) Legal authorities to order mobilization give the President and the Congress several options to tailor the level of response to domestic or national security emergencies (fig 4–1). There is no prescribed sequence for invoking these authorities. In a slowly escalating crisis, the President could order a gradually escalating response beginning with a call for volunteers or call-up of up to 200,000 Selected Reservists. These call-ups could be followed eventually by a declaration of national emergency for partial mobilization and then, with congressional support, full mobilization or total mobilization. If the situation called for a faster, stronger response, the President could immediately declare a national emergency to invoke his partial mobilization authority to seek a congressional declaration of national emergency for full or total mobilization.

(2) Prior to a declaration of national emergency, only Reserve Component volunteers, Regular Retirees, Reserve Retirees with more than 20 years of active service, and Selected Reserves may be called to active duty. Remaining Ready Reserve categories become available at a Presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency. A congressional declaration of national emergency is required to authorize the call-up of the Standby Reserve and other Reserve Retirees.

(3) Involuntary induction of nonprior service personnel into the Armed Forces requires congressional action to repeal Section 17C of the Military Selective Service Act. In peacetime, this law only provides authority to register males within 30 days of their 18th birthday.

(4) The President also has the authority to suspend separation from the Active Service of all military personnel deemed essential to the national security during any period when Reserve Component personnel have been involuntarily ordered to active duty. This so-called “stop-loss” authority may be invoked with a Presidential 200,000 Selected Reserve call-up, or at partial or full mobilization, to retain trained and experienced soldiers who would otherwise be lost as the force was being expanded.

c. The Role of the OSD.

(1) During peacetime, the OSD develops policies, plans, procedures, and guidance for the accession of mobilization manpower to augment and sustain military forces. Included in these tasks are establishment of wartime accession standards and development of concepts for managing the flow of volunteers and inductees into the military service.

(2) Once a Presidential or congressional action for a call-up or mobilization is taken, authority to implement is delegated to the Secretary of Defense and, in many instances, further delegated to the Military Department. If the President invoked his partial mobilization authority, for example, the Secretary would direct the Services to execute their portions of the call-up.

d. The Role of the Joint Staff.

(1) The Joint Staff supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the role of providing military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense and, based on threat assessments and input from Theater Commanders in Chief, recommends mobilization actions required to support implementation of OPLANS. For manpower mobilization the Joint Staff recommend required levels of mobilization, emergency authorities, and commencement of involuntary inductions.

(2) In situations calling for less-than-full mobilization, the Joint Staff allocate the military manpower call-up between the Military Services and other claimants for military manpower such as the Selective Service System (SSS)
and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These organizations expand their staffs with IMA upon mobilization. Allocations of the 200,000 spaces in the Presidential call-up authority have been preplanned by the Joint Staff to support contingencies in the European, Pacific, Southwest Asia, and Central and South American theaters.

e. The Role of the Army.

(1) Army actions for acquiring military manpower are triggered by receipt of a message or memorandum from the Secretary of Defense ordering a Presidential call-up or mobilization. The legal authority, type of mobilization, effective date and time, and the Army’s manpower allocation will be included in the order. Army mobilization orders are then dispatched in messages released by HQDA, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), through mobilization execution channels to units and organizations affected. In a 200,000 call-up, selective, or partial mobilization, each Reserve Component unit to be mobilized will be listed in the mobilization order. Full mobilization orders will specify that all Reserve units and individuals will be mobilized.

(2) Notification of the ARNG and the USAR unit members will be accomplished by transmission of the Army mobilization order through wartime command channels to individual units. Units will implement their alert notification procedures to contact each unit member individually. Individuals in the various pretrained individual manpower pools will be notified by Western Union Mailgram, media announcements directing compliance with preassignment orders, or a combination of these two methods. Persons in the DEP will be contacted by their recruiters.

(3) Movement of individuals to mobilization sites is the responsibility of each individual, but the U.S. Government will pay the costs of transportation. Travel warrants for the purchase of plane, train, or bus tickets are included in mailgram orders. Individuals (such as IMAs and preassigned retirees) arrange their own transportation and are reimbursed at the mobilization stations.

(4) Accession of all reservists into the Active Army takes place during in-processing at mobilization stations or U.S. Army Reception Battalions. Individual reservists are considered accessed into the Active Army upon arrival at the mobilization station. Active Army status is confirmed when their personnel files have been established on the SIDPERS–USA.

(5) Individuals in the Active Army, subject to immediate reassignment against mobilization priorities, must be informed of their impending reassignments. For all but Army Medical Department (AMEDD) officers, this is done by the ODCSPER in stop-loss, stop-movement, and bulk levy actions. Active AMEDD officers preassigned to fill forward deployed or early deploying medical units are notified according to the Office of the Surgeon General’s (OTSG) Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS).

(6) Notification, movement, and accession procedures differ in some respects for the various categories of military mobilization manpower assets. These procedures are summarized below for each manpower category.

f. Active Manpower.

(1) Stop-loss Action.

(a) During mobilization, stop-loss actions result in the retention of trained, experienced, and skilled manpower by suspending voluntary and involuntary separations from active duty. Authority for these actions is vested in the President by section 673c, title 10, United States Code (10 USC 673c), and delegated to the Secretary of Defense by Executive order. The ODCSPER initiates stop-loss actions for the Army upon receipt of authority from OSD. The ODCSPER implements the authority by announcing initiation of stop-loss in a message to the field and providing policy guidelines to PERSCOM. PERSCOM will send implementing instructions to the field, highlighting exceptions such as Uniform code of Military Justice (UCMJ) discharges, elimination for moral turpitude, and selected medical retirements.

(b) For a 200,000 call-up, stop-loss authority is valid for up to 90 days with an option for a 90-day extension. For a partial mobilization declared by the President, stop-loss can be valid for up to 24 months and, in a full or total mobilization, up to 6 months beyond the duration of the national emergency or war declared by the Congress.

(2) Stop-movement Actions. Implementation of stop-movement policies is undertaken to stabilize active personnel so that the maximum number will be available for reassignment to wartime theaters or other high-priority mobilization requirements. Policies are included for changing tour stabilization, tour length, movement incident to temporary duty, permanent change of station, suspension of dependent travel, and attendance at Service schools. The degree to which these policies are changed or adjusted is dependent on the type of mobilization and guidance from the Joint Staff impacting on personnel distribution priorities. The ODCSPER implements these policy changes in messages to the field. Commanders in the field are responsible for disseminating these changes and notifying the affected soldiers.

(3) Bulk Personnel Levies.

(a) The TTHS Account will be an early source of fillers for OPLAN support. According to current policy, portions of the account are initially available at partial mobilization (depending upon implementation of stop-loss and stop-movement actions). Full mobilization provides nearly unrestricted availability of the account. Figure 4–2 shows a notional TTHS account to illustrate the relative size of each category. In fiscal year (FY) 1989, the average size of the TTHS account was slightly more than 90,000 soldiers. About half of this number would be available for immediate levy.

(b) PERSCOM will assign graduating trainees and students to units based on ODCSPER guidance and OPLAN
support procedures. By-name instructions will be sent via existing automated systems. Upon receipt of assignment instructions, installations identify individuals named and notify them of their impending reassignments.

(c) Levies for personnel in units may also be required to fill OPLAN shelf requisition requirements when the TTHS account and RT–12 pool are inadequate. PERSCOM informs major commands of levy requirements by message. MACOMs determine the availability and location of needed personnel and warn subordinate installations of the impending levy. Installation commanders are responsible for selecting and notifying individuals levied.

(d) When a levy is required for medical personnel, HSC warns subordinate medical treatment facilities (MTF). The MTF commander selects and notifies individuals levied.

(4) Medical Professionals. Active Army medical professionals, predesignated as part of the filler shelf requisition to bring theater medical units to required wartime strength, are notified upon execution of the PROFIS. Execution is triggered at the request of a theater Commander in Chief or by OPLAN implementation. A PERSCOM message to HSC directs fillers preassigned to forward deployed units to report to an aerial port of embarkation (APOE). The OTSG will dispatch a message to HSC directing fillers preassigned to CONUS deploying units to report to their wartime units.

g. Reserve Manpower.

(1) Notification of Reserve Component personnel for mobilization depends on the level of mobilization and Reserve manpower category. Methods include telephonic notification according to unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), Western Union Mailgram, media announcement triggering compliance with preassignment orders, or a combination of these. Individuals not at home to receive a phone call, for example, could respond to a media announcement instructing them to report to their units.

(2) Notification actions are triggered by transmission of a mobilization order by HQDA, ODCSOPS to Army MACOMs. FORSCOM (U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. Western Command (WESTCOM) in their respective theaters) is responsible for disseminating the order through its mobilization chain of command to numbered armies in the continental USA (CONUSAs), Major U.S. Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs), State Area Commands (STARCS), and installations to cause them to implement their alert notification systems. ARPERCEN manages the notification of the IRR, the standby Reserve and Retirees. Methods of notification for the various categories of Reserve personnel are explained below.

(3) At a 200,000 call-up, partial or full mobilization, unit personnel of the Selected Reserve would be notified by their units. Affected IMA and AGR personnel would be included in the unit notification process. At full mobilization they could also be notified when to report to their units by media announcement prepared by ODCSPER and approved by the Secretary of the Army.

(4) Selected Reservists in the training pipeline would be notified through the alert notification system of the school they are attending. Those in Army school attending various professional development courses would return to their units. Those who had not completed IET would remain in training and be reassigned by PERSCOM at graduation.

(5) ARPERCEN uses automated notification orders systems to order nonunit personnel to active duty. These systems receive input data from the MOBPERS, enabling mobilization orders to be produced for IRR, Standby Reserve, and retirees.

(a) Mailgram Mobilization Orders Subsystem (Figure 4–3.) This system provides a rapid means of notifying individuals of mobilization via Western Union Mailgram. The mailgram order is transmitted electronically to a postal facility located near the mobilized individual’s home, where it is printed and delivered by postal carrier to the soldier’s address. There is also an automated backup to mailgram orders when electronic transmission capabilities are inoperative. This system provides orders packages for delivery to the soldier by U.S. Postal Service first-class mail.

(b) Contingency Mobilization Orders (Fig 4–4). These orders provide the flexibility for ordering individuals, like retirees without preassignment orders, to active duty with a media announcement or follow-up order specifying a reporting date. Contingency orders do not contain extensive additional instructions included as part of the other orders packages, only essential information. Packages are transmitted and delivered in the same manner as Mailgram Mobilization Orders, but more rapidly because of the reduced transmission time.

(h) Retired preassigned Mobilization Verification Orders. If circumstances of the mobilization require changes to retiree preassignments, ARPERCEN’s Orders Systems are programmed to provide retired personnel with Mobilization Verification Orders. Verification Orders are processed in the same manner as Mailgram Orders. They will be used primarily to change key elements of the preassignment orders like reporting date or station of assignment.

i. Nonprior Service Personnel.

(1) Delayed Entry Program (DEP).

(a) Personnel enlisted in the DEP may be mobilized upon congressional declaration of national emergency for full mobilization. When this condition is met, an ODCSPER message, approved by the Secretary of the Army, will direct U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to call-up DEP members.

(b) As a matter of policy (AR 601–210), the Army will not order to active duty high school students making normal progress and persons less than 18 years of age. Women will be activated when their accession processing and training will not delay the accession and training of men who are needed for essential combat skills.

(c) DEP personnel selected for call-up will be notified by their recruiters who will normally contact them by
telephone and instruct them to report to the nearest MEPS for revised orders to an Army training center for initial-entry training.

(2) Draftees.

(a) Involuntary induction of nonprior service personnel cannot begin until the Congress has amended the Military Selective Service Act to permit registrant induction. Although a declaration of national emergency and mobilization are not necessary prerequisites for a draft, it is not likely that the Secretary of Defense would recommend to the President, or that the President would request involuntary induction authority from the Congress, without a national emergency.

(b) When a draft is authorized, USAR officers who are IMAs will be called to active duty to augment SSS Headquarters, establish State Headquarters and area offices at predetermined locations. At the same time, local and appeal boards, staffed by volunteers selected and trained in peacetime, would be activated. About 400 recruiting stations, belonging to the USAREC in peacetime, would be turned over to the SSS in this process to house area offices.

(c) To resume involuntary inductions, the SSS holds a random sequence lottery, based on dates of birth, to determine the order in which men would be called. A man is in first priority for a possible draft during the calendar year of his 20th birthday. The next year he drops into the second priority, and men born a year later move into the first-priority group. Each succeeding year the individual drops into a lower-priority group until his 26th birthday, when generally he is over the age of liability for the draft.

(d) Once a drawing has been held to establish the order of call, mailgram induction orders are issued in random sequence number order. Registrants notified are ordered to report to a MEPS for possible immediate induction, or they may file a claim for postponement or reclassification with their area offices. Once a registrant files a claim, his induction is delayed until the claim has been decided.

(3) Volunteers. USAREC will continue to operate about 500 offices in the larger metropolitan areas to provide an opportunity for prior and nonprior service individuals to volunteer for military service. USAREC will only actively recruit individuals with needed, hard-to-find skills (not subject to the draft). Prospects will be instructed to report to a MEPS for examination to determine their eligibility to serve, and possible enlistment.

j. Movement to Mobilization Sites.

(1) Overview.

(a) Movement of personnel during mobilization is accomplished at Government expense. Military personnel in units will move to the unit mobilization station according to movement plans. Individuals with travel warrants included in their orders package will use these to purchase tickets on commercial carriers and file claims for additional authorized expenses subsequent to arrival at their first destinations. Those whose orders do not include a travel warrant will travel at their own expense and be reimbursed at their mobilization sites. Civilian employees relocated to meet mobilization needs will travel on Government orders and receive reimbursement as in peacetime. Contractor employees required to travel will be reimbursed under the terms of the contracts.

(b) To facilitate the movement of DOD personnel in emergencies, an Interstate Commerce Commission general order establishes preference and priority control over the transportation of passengers by commercial carriers. Uniformed or civilian personnel of the Armed Forces in official travel status and military recruits in travel status are given transportation preference and priority under this order.

(2) Military Emergency Travel Warrants (METW). METW are included in mailgram orders packages for IRR (See fig 4–3a). These allow travel to mobilization stations via the three modes of commercial transportation (air, rail, and bus). The National Emergency Travel Warrant (SSS Form 252W) attached to the mailgram order for induction is used by a registrant to purchase a bus or train coach ticket for travel to a MEPS (See fig 4–5). Transportation costs for travel of IRR members will come out of Army funds and the SSS will pay for transportation from the registrant’s home to the MEPS.

(3) Movement of Other Individual Military Mobilization Assets. Individual military mobilization assets who do not receive mailgram orders move by Government Travel Request (GTR) or at their own expense, with the understanding that they will be reimbursed at their final destinations. IMA and retirees will normally move at their own expense, although they will have the option of reporting to a nearby military installation for a GTR supporting travel to the mobilization site specified on their orders. Volunteers will be issued a GTR by the recruiter to enable them to travel to a MEPS for entrance processing. Onward movement of inducted volunteers to an Army Training Center (ATC) will be arranged by the processing MEPS.

k. Accession Procedures.

(1) The accession process includes administration of the oath of induction/enlistment and the subsequent creation of a personnel management file in the SIDPERS–USA. For SSS registrants and volunteers, the accession process is begun at the recruiting station or the MEPS where the oath is administered and initial personnel, medical, and vocational aptitude information is entered in the ADP systems supporting recruiting and entrance processing. Once an individual is determined to be qualified for military service, these data are transferred to the ATC where the new inductee will begin IET. The accession transaction will be made in SIDPERS at the ATC. See chapter 7 for a more comprehensive description of how the accession process is supported by interacting ADP systems at recruiting stations, MEPS, and reception battalions at ATCs.

(2) Accession of individual USAR personnel requires the transfer of their personnel management information files,
A. Overview.

(1) The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the central civilian personnel management agency of the executive branch. It administers Federal laws and Executive orders dealing with all aspects of civilian personnel administration. Its primary responsibility in this environment is developing the Federal Civil Service System in peacetime and wartime. For mobilization and emergencies, it establishes emergency employment, recruitment, and management policies in coordination with the other agencies of the executive branch.

(2) The OSD plans and coordinates the development of policy and procedures to expand civilian strength rapidly during mobilization. Included in this role are policy and guidance to the Services for reassigning DOD civilians evacuated from theaters of operation, and continuing the services of civilian employees overseas where the continuity of such services is essential to the war effort.

(3) The Department of Labor (DOL) monitors national work force activities through its regional offices and affiliated State employment agencies. These agencies operate the local offices of the U.S. Employment Service (USES) with Federal funding support. Local USES offices form a national network and have the principal responsibility for recruiting workers to fill mobilization vacancies at installations and in defense industries. Some USES offices have state-wide data links for screening applicants, and some are tied to a national labor data system.

c. Role of the Army.

(1) Overview.

(a) Civilian personnel management is largely decentralized to installation level where civilian personnel offices obtain the requisite civilian skills and continuity to perform virtually every installation function. In a mobilization, a substantial expansion of many installation activities will be required and new installations and activities will be activated to meet greatly expanded workloads. Thorough peacetime planning will facilitate quick local action to recruit and hire the civilian manpower required to staff these expanded activities.

(b) Installation plans for enlarging the civilian workforce during mobilization are based on assessment of the number of employees and skills required to perform mobilization missions. Requirements based on these assessments will be recorded in authorization documents (MOBTDA). Civilian manpower mobilization plans will include provisions for the loss of employees who are reservists or retirees recalled to active duty, and those who may be drafted into military service.

(c) Planning must also include procedures for tapping all sources of civilian manpower that will be available after M-day. Because it will take time to recruit and hire new employees after mobilization, the highest priority mobilization missions should be performed by incumbent civilian employees who have been trained and preassigned against mobilization requirements.
d. Emergency Authorities.

(1) In a national emergency, OPM has delegated the authority to make emergency-indefinite appointments of civilian personnel to Federal agencies in an emergency that meets all of the following conditions:

- The emergency was declared by the President or Congress.
- The emergency involves a danger to the United States' safety, security, or stability that is a result of specific circumstances or conditions.
- The emergency requires a national program to combat the threat.

(2) This authority has been redelegated through the chain of command down to MACOMs and further delegation is authorized. Servicing CPOs may use this authority when the installation commander determines that the emergency meets the specified conditions.

(3) Under emergency conditions (short of a national emergency) Army commanders may begin to transition their civilian workforce through the judicious use of the following authorities:

- Authority to reassign or detail employees involuntarily to essential positions for up to 1 year.
- Authority to relocate employees involuntarily, either permanently or temporarily, to essential work sites within the United States or its territories and possessions.
- Listed in detail in AR 690–11 are other authorities to implement, suspend, or modify certain civilian personnel administrative procedures at predetermined times to facilitate recruitment, hiring, and management of personnel during emergencies.

e. Recruitment Planning.

(1) To ensure proper planning and preparedness to expand the civilian workforce, installation commanders and civilian personnel offices must consider many factors that affect their ability to recruit needed skilled and unskilled employees. These factors include competition for available civilian manpower due to the proximity of other DOD installations, DOD contractors, and large private sector employers. In areas that include two or more DOD installations, recruiting area staffing committees (RASCs) are established to avoid counterproductive competition during mobilization. Through the RASC, installations will coordinate civilian recruitment efforts among committee members and with regional offices of the OPM and DOL. RASCs meet periodically in peacetime to establish emergency operating procedures and coordinate planning for the postmobilization expansion of the civilian work force. They establish their own rules, schedules, and agenda for planning based on local needs and conditions. RASC actions will include the following:

- Allocation of scarce skills to the highest priority mobilization missions.
- Reassignment or detail of excess employees from one installation to another where they are needed.
- Planning and sharing of paid advertising.
- Sharing applicant supply files, including lists of former employees who may have an interest in returning to Government service.
- Recruitment through private sector labor unions and professional organizations.
- Utilization of DOD civilian retirees in the area.
- Developing agreements to borrow employees from non-DOD Federal agencies.

(2) Planning for an emergency also includes advance preparation to conserve predicted shortage skills. Personnel managers should, therefore, restructure jobs to decrease the need for scarce skills.

f. Recruitment Sources. Sources of civilian manpower are discussed in chapter 3. Before resorting to outside recruitment, civilian personnel managers should take maximum advantage of the in-house and potentially re-employable sources of civilian manpower. These include excess local permanent employees, overseas returnees, unassigned military, and Federal civilian retirees.

g. Processing New Hires. CPOs should include step-by-step procedures for in-processing new employees rapidly upon mobilization. Processing teams should be predesignated and trained in peacetime. In-processing steps may be omitted to permit timely reporting of new employees for duty. As a minimum, processing teams should record the new employee’s name on the Standard Form 52 (Request for Personnel Action) to document the hiring action, administer the oath of office, and have the employee sign an appointment affidavit. Omitted steps in processing can be completed later.

h. Contracting During Mobilization. Contracting is another way of meeting workload requirements during mobilization. Using contractors to perform essential functions should be considered if it would be more practical or effective than recruiting civilian employees to perform the functions. Planning for contractor services should include considering expansion of peacetime contracts or securing new contracts upon mobilization. While the capability of each local market varies, a current contractor (whose performance is known) may offer greater assurance of adequate performance.
during an emergency than a new contractor. The key to planning mobilization contracting is the ability of functional managers to anticipate and identify specific requirements.

4–4. ACQUISITION OF HOST NATION SUPPORT (HNS)

The mechanisms for initiating wartime HNS are written into each bilateral agreement between the United States and the nations that have agreed to provide wartime service support to United States Forces. For direct HNS initiation of the agreed services requires the mobilization of the host country reserve units missioned to provide the support. Indirect HNS is provided from the civil sector of each host nation and implementation of these agreements is, in general, tied to a general mobilization in the host country.

4–5. SUMMARY

a. Procedures for acquiring mobilization manpower depend on the manpower category. For military manpower in the RC, draftees, and volunteers, the acquisition process includes some form of notification, movement to mobilization or training site, and entry of a personnel management file in the SIDPERS–USA database. Western Union mailgrams and preassignment orders are the usual means of notification for non unit related individuals. Unit members, in most cases, will be notified according to unit alert procedures. Media announcements will be used to supplement the other means of notification. Active component manpower is already mobilized, but stop loss and stop movement actions will be implemented to ensure that the maximum number of active component soldiers are available for utilization according to wartime or emergency priorities. Civilian manpower requirements will be met by reassigning, promoting, and detailing qualified civilian personnel to meet emergency needs and by hiring new employees. Civilian personnel offices will be assisted in their recruiting duties by RASC and by regional offices of the OPM and the DOL. Emergency authorities relaxing peacetime administrative procedures for civilian personnel management will facilitate the hiring process.

b. Army commanders will also have the option of contracting for essential postmobilization functions. Where contracting a function is preferred, the commander may expand existing contract agreements or negotiate new ones.

c. Mobilization manpower provided by host nations will be acquired by the means specified in the various HNS agreements. Additional HNS may also be acquired in the postmobilization period either directly through negotiation with host governments or by contracting with host nation providers in the private sector.
### AUTHORITY TO ORDER MOBILIZATION/CALL-UP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Action Required</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Personnel Involved</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Publish order calling volunteer reservants to active duty</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 672(e) 10 U.S.C. 688(a)</td>
<td>Volunteers from National Guard and Reserve. Regular Army Reserves and Reserve Reservists with 20+ years of active duty</td>
<td>May be used for any lawful purpose. Consent of the governor is required for NG members serving under 10 U.S.C. 672(d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force (200K Callup)</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 673b PI 96-544 National Defense Auth Act of FY 87 (200K)</td>
<td>Units and individuals of Selected Reserve; limited to 200,000 (all services) for up to 90 days. May be extended additional 90 days if desired</td>
<td>President must report to Congress within 24-hours on circumstances and anticipated use of forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contingency operation, war plan, National emergency (Partial mobilization)</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation of a national emergency &amp; an Executive Order (or congressional declaration of national emergency)</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 673(e)</td>
<td>Ready Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve; limited to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to 2 years (other limits can be established by congressional action)</td>
<td>President may extend appointments and terms of enlistment when Congress is not in session (10 U.S.C. 671b and 673c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. War or national emergency (Full or total mobilization)</td>
<td>Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency</td>
<td>10 U.S.C. 671(e) 10 U.S.C. 672</td>
<td>All of the above plus other National Guard &amp; Reserve units, IRR Standby Reserve, members of Retired Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress. Reserve Reservists and the Standby Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress.</td>
<td>May extend enlistments in Regular and Reserve &amp; extend period of active service for, duration of the war plus 6 months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4–1. Authority to Order Mobilization/Call-Up**

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### TTTHS ACCOUNT (NOTIONAL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>AVAILABLE FOR OPLAN SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>TRAINEES</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>TRANSIENTS</td>
<td>9,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>HOLDEES</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>STUDENTS</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103,200</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4–2. TTTHS Account**
YOU ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AS SHOWN BELOW FOR THE PERIOD INDICATED IN ACTIVE DUTY COMMITMENT BELOW. YOU ARE RELIEVED FROM YOUR PRESENT RESERVE COMPONENT STATUS. PROCEED FROM YOUR CURRENT LOCATION IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO REPORT ON THE DATE SPECIFIED BELOW.
REPORT TO: 3397TH USAG BLDG 622 UIC: W4MOAA 7UT51 CAMP SHELBY HATTIESBURG MS 39401 REPORTING DATE: 20 JAN 90

ACTIVE DUTY COMMITMENT: DURATION OR WAR PLUS 6 MONTHS
ORDER NUMBER: M-01-000002 DATE PREPARED: 13 JAN 90
PURPOSE: MOBILIZATION COMPONENT: INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE
AUTH: 10 USC 672-675,677,688 MOS/SSI: 95B40 HE
FORMAT: 172 GRADE: SFC PEBD: 6511018
SSN: 123456789 MDC: 1AE DOR: 870517

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: REPORT ON DATE INDICATED. A DETERMINATION TO BE LAY OR EXEMPT YOU FROM SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY CAN BE MADE ONLY AFTER YOU REPORT AS DIRECTED. FAILURE TO REPORT MAY BE CONSIDERED ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL) AND MAY SUBJECT YOU TO UCMJ ACTION UNDER TITLE 10 USC 886. BRING WITH YOU: ALL SERVICEABLE UNIFORMS; PROOF OF MARRIAGE; BIRTH CERTIFICATES OF CHILDREN; DOCTOR’S STATEMENT FOR CHILDREN OVER 21 INCAPABLE OF SELF SUPPORT; COURT ORDERS GOVERNING LEGAL CUSTODY; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OR CHILD SUPPORT; YOUR IMMUNIZATION RECORDS; DD214; ID CARD & TAGS. ENCLOSED TRAVEL WARRANT SHOULD BE USED TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION. TRAVEL BY PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE IS NOT AUTHORIZED. LEAVE COPIES OF THIS WITH YOUR DEPENDENTS / NEXT OF KIN.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

***************
* * *
* ARPERCEN * CURRENT COMMANDER
* OFFICIAL * BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA
* * COMMANDING
***************
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MILITARY EMERGENCY TRAVEL WARRANT

INFO FOR CARRIER AGENTS: CERTIFIED AS ESSENTIAL TRAVEL. UPON PRESENTATION OF THE MOBILIZATION ORDER, WITH MILITARY EMERGENCY TRAVEL WARRANT ATTACHED, AND UPON VERIFICATION OF TRAVELER'S IDENTITY, THIS WARRANT AUTHORIZES YOU TO ISSUE A BUS, TRAIN, OR PLANE COACH TICKET TO THE PERSON NAMED BELOW FROM YOUR LOCATION TO OR TOWARD THE Designated DESTINATION. THROUGH TICKETING IS REQUESTED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. DO NOT HONOR EXPIRED OR ALTERED WARRANTS. WARRANT EXPIRES 30 DAYS FROM REPORTING DATE SHOWN ON THE ORDER. PLEASE COMPETE APPROPRIATE SECTION BELOW AND RETAIN FIRST OR SECOND CARRIER RECEIPT.

TRAVELER: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SSN: XXXXXXXX RANK: XXX, U.S. ARMY

FROM: XXXXXXXXXXXX

DESTINATION: XXXXXXXXXXXX

FIRST CARRIER'S NAME: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TICKET NO: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TICKET VALUE: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FROM: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TO: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FROM: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TO: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

***TRAVELER: RETAIN ABOVE SECTION FOR FILING WITH TRAVEL VOUCHER*****

SECOND CARRIER AGENT DETACH HERE******************************

DOD MILITARY EMERGENCY TRAVEL WARRANT
CARRIER SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR TICKETING AND BILLING ORDER # XXXXXXXXXXX
TRAVELER: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SSN: XXXXXXXX RANK: XXX, U.S. ARMY
SECOND CARRIER'S NAME: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TICKET NO: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TICKET VALUE: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

BILL TO: USAFAC, ATTN: FINCH, INDIANAPOLIS, IN 45249 FISCAL DATA 1A04

SIGNATURE OF TRAVELER

SECOND CARRIER AGENT: FOLLOW ABOVE DIRECTIONS & RETAIN THIS SECTION

FIRST CARRIER AGENT DETACH HERE******************************

DOD MILITARY EMERGENCY TRAVEL WARRANT
CARRIER SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR TICKETING AND BILLING ORDER # XXXXXXXXXXX
TRAVELER: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SSN: XXXXXXXX RANK: XXX, U.S. ARMY
FIRST CARRIER'S NAME: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TICKET NO: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TICKET VALUE: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

BILL TO: USAFAC, ATTN: FINCH, INDIANAPOLIS, IN 45249 FISCAL DATA 1A04

SIGNATURE OF TRAVELER

FIRST CARRIER AGENT: FOLLOW ABOVE DIRECTIONS & RETAIN THIS SECTION

Figure 4–3A. Military Emergency Travel Warrant
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. ARMY RESERVE PERSONNEL CENTER
9700 RAGE BLVD.
ST. LOUIS, MO. 63132-5200

DARP-PAR-M
ORDERS F-XX-XXXXXX (CONTINGENT) DD MMM YY

DARP-PAR-M
JOHN E. DOE XXX-XX-XXXX GRD PMOS
1234 MAIN STREET RETIRED
METROPOLIS, STATE 12345

EFFECTIVE UPON DECLARATION OF FULL MOBILIZATION, YOU ARE ORDERED TO
ACTIVE DUTY FROM RETRIRED STATUS AND ASSIGNED AS SHOWN BELOW. WHEN
FULL MOBILIZATION IS ANNOUNCED BY THE NEWS MEDIA, YOU WILL PROCEED
FROM YOUR CURRENT LOCATION TO THE REPORTING STATION SHOWN BELOW.

ASSIGNED TO: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
REPORTING STATION: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XX XXXX

REPORTING DATE: TO BE ANNOUNCED
AUTHORITY: SECTION OF TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE
PURPOSE: MOBILIZATION
ACTIVE DUTY COMMITMENT: DURATION OF WAR OR EMERGENCY AND SIX MONTHS
MOVEMENT DESIGNATION CODE: 1A
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: (A) DO NOT REPORT AT THIS TIME. YOU DO
NOT COMPLY WITH THIS ORDER UNTIL THERE IS A NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND
FULL MOBILIZATION IS ANNOUNCED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON TV,
RADIO, OR OTHER NEWS MEDIA. FAILURE TO REPORT WHEN AN EMERGENCY IS
ANNOUNCED MAY BE CONSIDERED ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL) AND MAY
SUBJECT YOU TO ACTION UNDER TITLE 10 USC 886.
(B) UPON REACHING YOUR XXX BIRTHDAY, THIS ORDER IS RESCINDED. DO NOT
REPORT IF YOU ARE PAST YOUR XXXX BIRTHDAY.
(C) YOU WILL PROCEED TO YOUR REPORTING STATION BY THE MOST
EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAILABLE USING YOUR OWN FUNDS TO PAY FOR THIS
TRAVEL. A COPY OF THIS ORDER AND APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION
PRESENTED AT ANY MILITARY INSTALLATION WILL ENABLE YOU TO RECEIVE
TRANSPORTATION FROM THAT INSTALLATION TO YOUR REPORTING STATION STATED
ON THIS ORDER. THIS ORDER WILL SERVE AS AUTHORITY TO PROCEED THROUGH
CIVIL DEFENSE CHECKPOINTS.
(D) YOU WILL REVERT TO YOUR PREVIOUS STATUS UPON RELEASE
FORMAT: 120

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*************
* *
* ARPERGEN *
* OFFICIAL *
* *
*************

CURRENT COMMANDER
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA
COMMANDING

DISTRIBUTION: INDIV(1) DARP-IMG-AL(1) DARP-SPR-PČ(OMPF)(1)
Contingent for USAR or Gray Area Retirees

Figure 4-4. Contingency Mobilization Order
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM  
NATIONAL EMERGENCY TRAVEL WARRANT

INFORMATION FOR CARRIER AGENT:

THIS SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM NATIONAL EMERGENCY WARRANT AUTHORIZES YOU TO ISSUE A BUS OR TRAIN COACH TICKET TO THE REGISTRANT NAMES FOR CERTIFIED ESSENTIAL TRAVEL FROM YOUR LOCATION TO THE MILITARY ENTRANCE PROCESSING STATION (MEPS) CITY SHOWN. IF YOUR LOCATION IS NOT THE CITY NAMED IN THE WARRANT, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE A TICKET TO THE MEPS CITY CLOSEST TO YOUR LOCATION, IN WHICH CASE YOU SHOULD LINE THROUGH THE CITY OR CITIES IN ITEM 1 AND ENTER THE CORRECT CITY OR CITIES. SEA OR AIR COACH TRAVEL IN ADDITION TO BUS OR TRAIN IS AUTHORIZED FOR REGISTRANTS FROM U.S. TERRITORY OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES.

DO NOT HONOR EXPIRED OR ALTERED TRAVEL WARRANTS.

COMPLETE THE FORM BY FILLING IN ITEMS 2 THROUGH 6 AND SEND IT TO YOUR COMPANY, WHO WILL SUBMIT IT FOR PAYMENT. ITEM 1 MAY BE CHANGED BY THE CARRIER AGENT IF POINT OF ORIGIN/DESTINATION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT SHOWN.

REMEMBER, ONLY COACH TICKETS MAY BE ISSUED.

BILL CHARGES TO: SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, ATTN: REGISTRANT TRAVEL WASHINGTON, DC 20435

FISCAL DATA: 88-0-4000-2171-2-0300  ISSUE DATE:  EXPIRATION DATE:

TRAVELER: REGISTRANT'S NAME

SSS NO:

(1) FROM CITY:
(2) TO MEPS CITY AND STATE:
(3) CARRIER
(4) FORM & TICKET NUMBER
(5) TICKET VALUE:
(6) DATE TICKET ISSUED:
(7) CARRIER AGENT VALIDATION

STAMP OR SIGNATURE:

NONTRANSFERABLE - PENALTY FOR FRAUDULENT OR PRIVATE USE

SSS FORM 252W

Figure 4–5. National Emergency Travel Warrant
Chapter 5
Qualification of Mobilized Manpower

5–1. INTRODUCTION

a. Before serving overseas in wartime, soldiers must meet eligibility criteria for Army service movement overseas, demonstrate proficiency in a needed military skill, and complete personnel processing for movement overseas. These actions are included in the scope of the term “qualification,” as used in this text. Civilian employees of the Army must also be “qualified,” in that they must be proficient in the skills required by their positions and meet other conditions of employment which may be specified for their positions.

b. This chapter discusses policy, planning, and activities for qualifying, or “verifying” the qualifications of Army manpower during mobilization. It is divided into sections on military skill qualification, personnel processing for movement overseas, and qualification of civilian personnel. The focus is on policy and activities pertaining to the qualification of nonunit-related personnel, because Active Army and RC unit members and career civilian employees generally maintain, during peacetime, the qualifications necessary to serve in wartime.

5–2. QUALIFICATION OF MOBILIZED MILITARY MANPOWER

Eligibility criteria for service in the Armed Forces were developed to provide a reasonable assurance that volunteers (and individuals called involuntarily) would be unencumbered by physical, emotional, moral, or legal circumstances likely to inhibit successful performance of duty. These criteria include standards and rules for age, citizenship, trainability, and education, as well as physical, moral, and administrative factors. Additional criteria governing eligibility for movement overseas during mobilization have also been established. These are listed in figure 5–1. They include skill qualification and other criteria that provide assurance that soldiers with conditions or circumstances that could affect their performance or reliability under wartime stress will not serve in combat, at least until disqualifying conditions are eliminated.

a. Skill Qualification.

(1) Overview. The Congress has established a minimum training standard as a precondition for overseas assignment of any member of the Armed Forces in wartime. Section 671 of title 10, United States Code (10 USC 671), provides that no member of the Armed Forces may be assigned to active duty on land outside the United States or its possessions until the member has completed basic training (BT). In time of war or national emergency, the period of required BT or its equivalent may not be less than 12 weeks. The intent of Congress and the principal objective of the Army’s postmobilization skill qualification activities are to ensure that soldiers are fully combat capable; that they possess skills essential for survival under combat conditions; and, are proficient in all critical tasks associated with their MOS, grade, and skill level. To comply with the law and achieve this objective, the Army has defined “BT or its equivalent” as follows:

(a) Officers. Commissioned officers (including AMEDD) must complete a branch officer basic course (OBC) or branch material Officer Candidate School (OCS). Special branch officers (Judge Advocate, Chaplain) must complete Phase II of the Officer Basic Orientation. Warrant officers must complete BT, the Warrant Officer Entry Course, and a Warrant Officer Technical Certification course.

(b) Enlisted. Selective Service System inductees and volunteers must complete IET of not less than 12 weeks by: BT/advanced individual training (AIT), one-station unit training (OSUT), or formal on-the-job training (OJT). All others must complete BT plus initial skill training to MOS standards by completing the following:

- A TRADOC MOS producing school.
- A TRADOC accredited RC school.
- A TRADOC accredited civilian contractor.
- Qualification under the provisions of the Civilian Acquired Skills Program (AR 611–201).

(c) Responsibility. During mobilization, responsibility for ensuring that soldiers meet the Army’s skill qualification objective is shared by unit commanders, mobilization station commanders, commanders of CONUS replacement centers (CRC), and commanders of the institutional training base. Unit commanders endeavor to maintain the highest possible level of MOS qualification in peacetime. Upon mobilization, unit members not MOS-qualified will move to mobilization stations with their units, but will then be ordered into the training base for IET after they are accessed into the Active Army. All IRRs and retirees assigned to mobilization stations will be evaluated by the mobilization station commander to determine if they are qualified for immediate assignment to a unit; need some additional training beyond the unit’s capability and require assignment to the training base; or, should be assigned to the training base for reclassification training in a new skill. IRR who have been ordered to a CRC for immediate deployment as an overseas filler or replacement, will have their MOS qualification verified by the CRC commander. Those found not qualified will be immediately reassigned to the host installation for further assignment as appropriate. Nonprior service personnel
and those prior service personnel needing additional or reclassification training will receive training at the appropriate training center or school.

(2) **Training Base Expansion.**

(a) In order to accommodate expected postmobilization workloads, TRADOC expands the peacetime training base by augmenting existing reception battalions and ATCs and establishing additional reception battalions and ATCs. The objective is to provide the capacity to train enough personnel to sustain the Army’s force structure in wartime.

(b) The basic workload data for development of all training base expansion plans and documentation of the needed resources are contained in the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOBARPRINT). The MOBARPRINT, developed by the ODSCSPER, HQDA in coordination with TRADOC, is a time-phased, requirements-driven plan for expansion, continuation, or phase-out of training base courses upon mobilization. It is based on Post Mobilization Training Base Output Requirements (PMTBOR), a product of the MOBMAN System, described in chapter 3. The PMTBOR represents the number of graduates from the training base required to meet the Army’s need for fillers and replacements to sustain a given force structure in wartime, as shown in figure 5–2. It is determined for each fiscal year in a detailed combat simulation and analysis of the total force structure requirements for trained personnel, projected casualties, and the projected available manpower supply. This analysis produces a time-phased trained manpower shortfall, by MOS and skill level, that becomes the PMTBOR. Detailed plans for training base expansion are contained in the TMOPS, Volume III, Training Base Expansion Plan.

(3) **Enlisted IET.** Combat arms enlisted IET will be conducted with OSUT procedures as the primary method. Other enlisted IET will be conducted using the BT and AIT method.

(4) **Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Training.**

(a) The objective of NCO training upon mobilization will be to provide the required number of trained NCOs. The strategy for accomplishing this is to terminate senior NCO professional development training and concentrate efforts on sustaining the flow of trained junior NCO candidates who are deployable directly from the training base to an overseas theater.

(b) The existing Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) structure will be modified as follows to implement this strategy:

- The U.S. Army Sergeant Major course, First Sergeant courses, and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer courses (ANCOCs) will be terminated immediately upon full mobilization. In this circumstance, Senior NCO requirements will be met by promotion from within the NCO ranks. Under conditions of less-than-full mobilization, these courses will continue until demand for senior NCOs requires that courses be accelerated or terminated to make needed individuals available for reassignment against operational priorities.
- Selected peacetime Basic Noncommissioned Officer Courses (BNCOC) will be conducted as mobilization BNCOC to train selected IET graduates for duty positions at skill level 3. These courses will be reconfigured to Mobilization Programs of Instruction (MOBPOI) upon full mobilization.
- The Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) will be accelerated at full mobilization and the students graduated. Thereafter, the course will be terminated.
- TRADOC’s Drill Sergeant School and Cadre Training Course will be accelerated and student graduated. Subsequent courses will be conducted using MOBPOI.

(5) **Officer Training.**

(a) Newly commissioned officers must complete minimum essential branch training prior to deployment. In general, except for required position-related functional training, officers will receive no formal training after completion of their officer basic or branch specific officer candidate courses. Branch schools and the Command and General Staff College, however, will be prepared with MOBPOI to resume officer advanced and general staff courses within 60 days of orders to do so. For senior field grade officers, the Army War College will transition to a MOBPOI and the National Defense University will continue to operate without change. Warrant officer candidates must successfully complete the Warrant Officer Entry Course and the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Course. Except for required position-related training, warrant officers will receive no formal training after appointment.

(b) Upon full mobilization, peacetime precommissioning and preappointment military qualification standards will be modified as the Wartime Officer Training Program and the Warrant Officer Training System are implemented with the following activities:

- United States Military Academy and selected 4-year ROTC programs will be accelerated from 4 to 3 years.
- Warrant Officer Entry and Technical and Tactical Certification Courses will convert to MOBPOI.
- OBC and branch-material Officers Candidate Course (OCC) will transition to MOBPOI.
- A 2-phase branch immaterial Officers Candidate Course (BIOCC) will be implemented to provide selected BT graduates with six weeks of precommissioning training (Phase I), followed by 6 to 9 weeks of branch-specific training (Phase II).

(6) **Direct Appointments.** HQDA will procure qualified individuals, with or without prior military service, as
temporary active duty to meet mobilization officer personnel requirements which the Reserve Components cannot
provide. During full mobilization, HQDA will attempt to satisfy technical, as well as professional requirements,
through direct appointment.

(7) Functional Training for Officers During Mobilization. TRADOC will provide functional training under a
MOBPOI only to those officers whose next duty position requires such training, and when such training is critical to
wartime mission accomplishment.

b. Title not used. Paragraph not used.

5–3. PERSONNEL PROCESSING FOR MOVEMENT OVERSEAS

a. Overview.

(1) The purposes of personnel processing for movement overseas in time of war or other emergency are to ensure
the following:

• That soldiers are physically and mentally prepared to perform their duties.
• That in the event of the soldier’s death, the Army can identify remains, notify next of kin, and support claims for
survivor benefits.

(2) For soldiers in deploying units, the unit commander is responsible for ensuring that required processing is
completed prior to deployment. Nonunit-related personnel will be qualified by the commander of the CRC.

b. Personnel Readiness Processing Requirements. Prior to deployment, all soldiers will have the following:

• A current identification card (Department of Defense (DD Form 2a)).
• Identification tags (one pair).
• A current DD Form 93 (Record of Emergency Data).
• A current Veterans Affairs (VA) Form 29–8286 (Servicemans Group Life Insurance (SGLI Election)).
• A Geneva Convention Identification Card (DD Form 1934) (All AMEDD and Chaplain personnel).
• A personal affairs briefing to include use and advisability of wills, powers of attorney, and allotments and pay
options. The opportunity to take care of such personal affairs should be provided, but soldiers will not be considered
nondeployable solely because they have not elected to execute a will, power of attorney, allotment, or pay option.
• Inservice soldier couples with dependent family members, or single member spouses, will have a Department of the
Army (DA Form 5304–R (Family Care Counseling Checklist)) and DA Form 5305–R (Statement of Understanding
and Responsibility) prior to deployment. These documents will be retained in soldiers’ personnel records.

c. Medical Requirements.

(1) Medical processing will include the following:

• Determination of a negative Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) test not more than 24 months prior to deploy-
ment if the period of deployment will not exceed 179 days. If deployment is likely to exceed 179 days, the negative
test result must not be older than 6 months.
• Required immunizations.
• Two pairs of spectacles and two pairs of protective mask spectacle inserts (if appropriate).
• Hearing aid with extra batteries (if appropriate).
• Two medical warning tags (if appropriate).

(2) Height and weight standards are waived. If, in the opinion of the examining physician, the soldier is so
overweight that overseas deployment and the rigors inherent in the soldier’s MOS constitute a health hazard, the soldier
may be declared temporarily nondeployable. He or she will then be reassigned to the installation for an appropriate
physical conditioning program.

d. Dental Requirements.

(1) Panographic Radiograph. All soldiers will have an identification panographic radiograph on file at, or enroute
to, the Central Panographic Storage Facility.

(2) Dental Record. All soldiers will have a dental record.

e. Other Qualification Requirements.

• Each soldier must be individually weapons-qualified within the last 12 months prior to deployment.
• Each soldier must receive a Geneva/Hague Convention briefing sometime during the current enlistment/career.
• Soldiers must meet security clearance requirements for duty positions currently held and for the deployment area (if
required).

f. Disposition of Records.

(1) The immediate unit commander or CRC commander, as appropriate, is responsible for ensuring that individual
personnel and health records and survival packets (wills, powers of attorney, and other sensitive documents) do not
accompany soldiers overseas.
After deployment, individual personnel, medical, dental, and financial (if applicable) records will be combined and held at the installation Personnel Service Center for not less than 90 days. The records will then be forwarded for storage to the ARPERCEN on order of the commander, PERSCOM, after coordination with the commander of ARPERCEN.

5–4. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION

a. Overview. Like qualification requirements for military personnel upon mobilization, incumbent and newly hired civilian personnel must be proficient in the skills required of their postmobilization positions and meet or comply with job-related administrative requirements. Accordingly, the mobilization plans of each command and installation must provide for the training of incumbent personnel to serve as a nucleus for the postmobilization workforce, as well as the orientation and training of new personnel to be hired during force expansion. Likewise, civilian personnel managers must stay abreast of administrative actions that complement mobilization planning, such as annual screening of civilian employees to identify those who are reservists or military retirees subject to call-up (and will not be available).

b. Civilian Employee Qualification.

(1) Planning for and Conducting Training. Civilian personnel mobilization plans should include a training plan that will ensure adequate training of new employees and current employees designated to assume new or additional duties upon mobilization. The training plan should identify the type of training by occupational series that will be needed to develop skills that will be in short supply; the equipment and materials to be used; instructors needed; and on and off-post facilities to be used. It should also identify orientation and on-the-job training required for current employees, preassigned retirees, and employees that will be newly hired. Training plans should be reviewed periodically to ensure their overall adequacy and feasibility. Training for employees who are identified to fill key, EEC, and cadre positions should be conducted frequently enough to ensure that incumbents are qualified for their mobilization assignments.

(2) Title not used. Paragraph not used.

c. Other Civilian Qualification Considerations.

(1) Commanders must conduct an annual screening of civilians to identify reservists and military retirees and inform them that their civilian employment does not exempt them from their military mobilization obligation. Reservists, subject to military recall and who occupy key, EEC, or cadre positions, must be transferred to less critical positions; designated for replacement in the event of call up; or removed from their military recall status.

(2) Commanders overseas must ensure that persons selected for EEC positions sign an agreement to remain in their jobs in the event of hostilities or mobilization until relieved by proper authority. Prior to accepting an EEC position, the selectee must sign this agreement.

(3) In addition, certain peacetime controls and procedures outlined in AR 570–4 and AR 690–11, will be suspended and additional authorities will be granted. These actions streamline the hiring, training, and assignment of civilian personnel during an emergency.

5–5. SUMMARY

a. This chapter has covered policy, planning, and actions for qualifying (or verifying the qualifications of) military and civilian personnel during mobilization. Soldiers must be proficient in the skills required of their MOS and qualified for movement overseas. These two elements of qualification provide a reasonable assurance that soldiers will perform as productive members of a unit and survive on the battlefield unencumbered by circumstances or conditions that might affect their performance under the stress of combat.

b. Commanders are responsible for verifying the skill qualification of soldiers or conducting the activities necessary to ensure that soldiers meet skill qualification standards. Those who do not are assigned to the training base, along with inductees and volunteer enlistees, to get the required training.

c. Personnel processing for movement overseas ensures that soldiers are physically and mentally prepared for the rigors of combat, and that they have made arrangements to care for dependents while they are overseas. Unit commanders and commanders of CRCs are responsible for verifying that these requirements have been met prior to deployment.

d. Civilian employee qualification also implies that civilian employees possess the requisite skills to serve in their positions. Because the civilian workforce must be greatly expanded in wartime, commanders must be prepared to train incumbents in peacetime to fill their wartime positions, train new hires during mobilization, and reengineer jobs to compensate for shortages of personnel with scarce skills.
ELIGIBILITY FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND M-DAY

A soldier is eligible for overseas service unless he/she

- is medically disqualified due to:
  - hospitalization/convalescence
  - permanent/temporary profile
  - need for emergency dental treatment
  - pregnancy
  - a finding of HIV positive

- is not MOS qualified

- is under arrest, confined, or pending criminal court action

- is under investigation for subversion, disaffection, or criminal activity

- has 7 days or less to ETS and no Stop-Loss action is approved

- is pending administrative separation for incompetence, dereliction of duty, hardship, chronic misconduct, fraudulent entry, etc.

- has submitted a formal claim for conscientious objector status

- * is a former prisoner of war or hostage in the country of assignment

- * is a sole surviving son/daughter

- * has a family member assigned to same unit

* May be waivered/eliminated by soldier or command action.

Figure 5–1. Eligibility for Overseas Service
Chapter 6
Distribution of Mobilized Manpower

6–1. INTRODUCTION

a. Manpower distribution is concerned with the allocation and apportionment of manpower resources to various claimants. Personnel distribution, on the other hand, involves the actual movement and assignment of individuals to comply with the allocation and apportionment decisions of the manpower managers.

b. The objectives of the Army’s manpower and personnel distribution activities during mobilization are to achieve and sustain optimal mission capability among units and organizations. If the peacetime Active Army were manned at its wartime required strength, this could be accomplished simply by finding the overages to fill shortages, and then acquiring and qualifying enough draftees and volunteers to replace battle casualties and other losses. In reality, the Active Army’s peacetime strength is less than the wartime required level; many skills are over or under strength, premobilization asset distribution reflects peacetime priorities and policies, and a substantial number of peacetime soldiers do not meet deployability criteria. These realities define the mobilization manpower and personnel manager’s distribution challenge.

c. This chapter discusses how the Army intends to allocate its manpower resources and distribute personnel upon mobilization. It begins with an overview that includes the roles played by agencies above the Department of the Army in the allocation of national manpower resources, and a synopsis of the Army’s manpower and personnel distribution activities. Following the overview are sections covering military and civilian personnel distribution in greater depth.

6–2. OVERVIEW

a. Manpower Distribution During Mobilization.

(1) Manpower management during war or extended national emergency must begin at the highest levels of
Government because intense competition for available manpower resources (especially skilled manpower) is virtually inevitable under such conditions. The DOD must expand its Military Components and civilian strength in order to man and support larger Armed Forces. Defense-related industry will expand rapidly and seek more workers. At the same time, non-defense-related sectors of the civilian economy must continue to provide essential goods and services to the nation at large and will have to replace workers lost to the expanding Armed Forces and defense industrial base.

(2) At the national level, the FEMA establishes a cabinet-level Office of Defense Resources (ODR) to coordinate the activities of non-DOD agencies and allocate resources between the military and civil sectors of the economy in wartime. The OSD allocates both military and civilian manpower resources between the Military Departments via the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) in peacetime. During a national emergency, OSD apportions draftees between the Services once the draft has been authorized. Under conditions of less-than-full mobilization (200,000 call-up, partial mobilization), the Joint Staff allocates the military call-up among the Services. The Army and the other Services then apportion their share of these call-ups, in priority, among various claimants (forward deployed units, deploying units, the CONUS sustaining base, and the training base). Civilian manpower distribution outside DOD is monitored at national level by the DOL, which develops and administers policy and controls necessary to ensure the nation’s civilian manpower pool is properly distributed to meet defense needs.


(1) In the Army, personnel distribution is largely decentralized to installation level where mobilization station commanders cross-level military personnel (except those in units of HSC and 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM)) between units and assign mobilized individual reservists, retirees, and unit personnel to fill shortages. Filler requirements beyond the installation’s capability are raised to CONUSA or MACOM level where personnel managers have visibility over the assets of subordinate installations and can redistribute military personnel by assignments or transfers between installations. Requirements that cannot be met by redistribution between installations are raised to the PERSCOM. PERSCOM then distributes military personnel to meet these requirements according to priorities specified in AMOPS, Vol. III. Special distribution policies for medical and special operations personnel are covered in the next section.

(2) Army civilian personnel distribution activities are focused also at installation level where the installation commander establishes priorities for the fill of civilian workforce requirements, reassigns incumbent employees, and hires new employees against wartime priorities. Civilian personnel distribution issues may be caused by competition between local DOD installations, other Federal agencies, or the private sector. These are revolved through the efforts of DOD RASC, negotiation between agencies concerned, or mediation by local offices of the DOL, as appropriate.

6–3. DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILIZED MILITARY PERSONNEL

a. Overview. This section describes the Army’s mobilized military personnel distribution process. Included are distribution priorities and level-of-fill guidelines, distribution planning, general policies for utilization of the various mobilization manpower sources, and personnel distribution procedures at installation through PERSCOM levels.

b. Distribution Priorities and Level of Fill.

(1) Priority and fill guidance for mobilized military personnel distribution are developed by the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in coordination with the ODSPER, and published in the AMOPS, Volume III. This guidance is used in peacetime planning and for postmobilization personnel distribution. ODCSOPS and ODSPER review these guidelines during the course of mobilization execution and modify them as necessary, based on the evolving situation.

(2) Determination of wartime distribution priorities is based on the principle that the first to fight will be the first resourced. This means that forward deployed units in fighting theaters will normally enjoy top priority. Units scheduled to deploy according to OPLANS come next, with early deployers taking precedence over later deployers. If more than one OPLAN is involved, ODCSOPS establishes the priority of OPLAN support. Units in the CONUS support base generally follow, in priority after OPLAN deployers, with those organizations involved in supporting deployment at the top.

(3) Fill level guidance is based on the availability of personnel with the requisite skills to match unit vacancies. Although pretrained individual manpower pools are large enough in the aggregate to fill units to wartime authorized levels, the skill mix does not match actual skill shortages. Because of these initial shortages in several MOS, guidance for distributing shortages is required. The objective of this guidance is to make as many units as possible mission-capable. Fill level guidance will normally be expressed as a percentage of unit wartime required strength (for example, 90%, 80%, etc.). Shortages that cannot be filled from pretrained manpower pools may be overcome eventually by reclassifying pretrained individuals from overage to shortage MOSs, and by the qualification and assignment of draftees and volunteers to fill and sustain the force.


(1) Planning for the distribution of pretrained individuals is supported by the MOBPERS operated by the ARPER-CEN. The MOBPERS role in the acquisition of personnel is discussed in chapter 4. MOBPERS supports distribution by “earmarking” IRR and prepositioning IRR and retiree accession data at installations for Active Army and Reserve Component unit requirements. These requirements are determined monthly by comparing wartime required with assigned strengths, and identifying shortages by skill and grade. IRR and retiree personnel skill qualifications are then
matched with unit vacancies. “Earmarking” IRR and preassigning retirees at installation level give assignment flexibility to installation commanders faced with uncertainties (such as IRR and retiree show rates and actual unit personnel status at mobilization).

(2) Shelf requisitions for distribution of nonunit-related personnel support of JCS-approved OPLANs are prepared by the Army Component Commanders of Joint Commands according to AMOPS guidance. These OPLAN-specific requisitions represent actual theater filler requirements and a 90–120 day estimate of casualty replacement requirements by MOS and grade. Shelf requisitions are submitted and maintained at PERSCOM for fill from pretrained individual manpower sources available to the Commander, PERSCOM, upon OPLAN execution.

d. Mobilized Military Personnel Distribution Policy.

(1) Overview. Claimants for mobilized military manpower can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) OPLAN support; (2) the CONUS base; and, (3) theaters of operation outside of the CONUS (OCONUS theaters). Claimants in the OPLAN support category are the filler and casualty shelf requisitions associated with major OPLANs and units scheduled to deploy according to OPLAN TPFDD. The CONUS base consists of the forces required for the defense of CONUS, the training base, and the CONUS sustaining base (nondeploying units and organizations belonging to the Army Materiel Command, Health Services Command, Intelligence and Security Command, and the Military Traffic Management Command). OCONUS theaters are those in which the Army is fighting or maintaining forward deployed units in support of the nation’s national security interests. These claimants are depicted in figures 6–1, 6–2, and 6–3, along with the various sources of mobilized manpower. Discussion that follows covers the policy basis for using the various sources of mobilized manpower to meet the manpower demands for each claimant.

(2) OPLAN Support.

(a) Figure 6–1 highlights the six sources of personnel fillers or replacements for OPLAN shelf requisitions and filler personnel for units scheduled to deploy according to OPLAN TPFDD.

(b) Soldiers in units are a source for cross-leveling by installation commanders to make as many units as possible mission-capable prior to scheduled deployment dates. They are also available for redistribution between installations and for levies to meet shelf requisition requirements. Their use for redistribution or levies, however, will normally be limited to critical requirements in high-priority units.

(c) The TTSH Account, managed by PERSCOM, is an initial source of personnel used for theater fillers and casualty replacements in OPLAN shelf requisitions. TTSH personnel excess to shelf requisition requirements are distributed by PERSCOM in priority order to other claimants. Distribution policy for the categories of this account is explained below.

- **Trainees.** This category is available for assignment as fillers or replacements in shelf requisitions upon graduation from their skill-producing courses.

- **Transients.** Personnel enroute from CONUS to overseas assignments are the only portion of this category used for fillers or replacements. These personnel become available upon initiation of stop movement in conjunction with OPLAN execution. Personnel in this category enroute to a CONUS assignment will be directed to continue to that assignment.

- **Holdees.** Personnel in this category can be used as fillers and casualty replacements when they become available. Medical and disciplinary holdees become available after being released from patient or prisoner status and reporting to PERSCOM for assignment. Preseparation holdees become available upon declaration of stop loss.

- **Students.** These personnel become available for use as filler and replacements upon termination or completion of the courses they are attending.

(d) Judge Advocate General (JAG) and Chaplain Corps officers are distributed and redistributed under “stove pipe” systems operated in JAG and Chief of Chaplain’s channels. AMEDD commissioned and warrant officers are distributed through a modified-decentralized system during mobilization. AMEDD officer distribution will be managed centrally by PERSCOM in coordination with the OTSG. Redistribution of AMEDD assets within a MACOM will be controlled by the MACOM or subordinate CONUSA in coordination with HSC. The installation commander is the authority for cross-leveling AMEDD personnel assets (within MACOMs), both officer and enlisted. The Director of Health Services (DHS) as the special staff advisor to the installation commander, provides advice in the accomplishment of AMEDD cross-leveling. Exchange of FORSCOM nondeployable MOS-qualified medical personnel for deployable HSC medical personnel to fill deploying FORSCOM units during mobilization can be accomplished by recommendation of the installation medical treatment facility (MTF) commander and approval of the Commander, HSC.

(e) IRR may be assigned to deploying units, but in some cases their skills may have diminished to the extent that some form of additional training is required to qualify them for deployment. Their skills may have also become obsolete (for example, mechanics for an obsolete weapon system) and they may require reclassification in another MOS. Through the MOBPERS earmarking process, they will be mobilized at installations for validation of their skills and assignment to deploying or sustaining base units, or to the training base as appropriate.

(f) RT–12 personnel are assumed to be fully qualified in their military skills, and are considered immediately available for direct deployment through CRC as fillers or casualty replacements. Those not deployed directly will be assigned to mobilization stations for cross leveling like the rest of the IRR.
(g) About 125,000 retirees have been reassigned to fill positions in nondeploying CONUS base units, displacing active duty soldiers who would then become available for deployment as fillers or replacements. There is, however, nothing that precludes the subsequent reassignment of retirees to deploying units or shelf requisitions if their skills are required and they qualify for overseas movement.

(3) CONUS Base Expansion. As shown in figure 6–2, filler personnel for units in the CONUS base may also be drawn from the same six sources as those used for OPLAN support. Requirements for OPLAN support will normally take precedence. Contractor personnel in base operations functions and new civilian hires will be used to meet support requirements in the CONUS base. These categories will be discussed further in the civilian personnel section of this chapter.

(4) Sustainment.

(a) After the OCONUS theaters of operation and the CONUS support base exhaust the available supply of pretrained manpower, the Army must use nonprior service personnel, its civilian personnel sources, and HNS to sustain itself. These sources are shown in figure 6–3.

(b) DEP personnel and zero-skill IRR will be ordered to the training base for initial entry training as training base seats become available. Seats in the training base will generally go first to untrained unit members, then to IRR and retirees requiring reclassification, and finally to DEP and zero-skill IRR personnel. Volunteers without prior service and drafees will normally be ordered to the training base after prior-service personnel who need training. Upon successful completion of training, these personnel will be distributed by PERSCOM, as priorities dictate, to sustain the Army.

(c) Contractors will be responsible for expanding their workforces so that they can continue to perform according to their contracts. Civilian personnel offices will continue to sustain installation workforces by promotions, redistribution of incumbent employees, and by hiring new employees. The Army will depend on host governments in OCONUS theaters to man and sustain units providing support to U.S. forces so that they continue to perform as specified in host nation support agreements.

(e) Military Personnel Distribution Procedures.

(1) Overview. Distribution of individuals is conducted by PERSCOM, in coordination with ARPERCEN, to fill shelf requisitions and to move individuals between MACOMs to meet critical, high-priority, personnel requirements raised to PERSCOM level by MACOM commanders. Cross-leveling and redistribution of mobilized personnel are conducted at installation and MACOM/CONUSA levels, respectively, and supported by the Mobilization Cross-Leveling System (MCL). These activities will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

(2) Distributing Activities at PERSCOM. Based on planning guidance, PERSCOM determines the capability of filling OPLAN shelf requisitions from the TTHS Account and provides unfilled requirements to ARPERCEN for fill from RT–12 resources. Upon OPLAN execution, PERSCOM provides assignment instructions directly to training centers for the distribution and assignment of trainees and students and to installations for RT–12 personnel earmarked by ARPERCEN for filler shelf requisitions. If shelf requirements cannot be filled from the TTHS and RT–12 accounts, CONUS and MACOM levies, and USAREC excess, PERSCOM will develop recommendations (for consideration by ODCSPER) concerning the use of other manpower sources.

(3) Distribution Procedures at CONUS MACOMs.

(a) MACOMs manage by exception. The MACOM manager monitors subordinate activities and maintains awareness of the overall personnel situation, but only acts to fill requirements identified by higher or lower headquarters.

(b) Upon receipt of OPLAN warning or alert orders, MACOMs obtain the latest unit and personnel status. MCL is brought online to give a general indication of shortages and overages within the command.

(c) Upon OPLAN execution, MACOMs act to fill shortages identified by subordinate installations, levy subordinate installations for assets required by PERSCOM, and redistribute assets provided by PERSCOM. MCL is used to find assets, provide information used to levy subordinate installations, and inform PERSCOM of sources of personnel for levy. MCL is also used to support PERSCOM’s development of distribution plans and levies.

(4) Distribution Activities at Installation Level.

(a) Personnel available for cross-leveling at installation level include Active Army and mobilized Reserve Component unit members, mobilized pretrained individual reservists and retirees, and others assigned by higher headquarters. As units arrive at their mobilization stations, they are “mobilized” in MCL and accessed in SIDPERS as explained in chapter 4. If a unit is a deployer, nondeployable personnel (those who cannot be qualified as explained in chap 5) are reassigned prior to the unit’s deployment date. Unskilled enlisted personnel are identified and assigned to a nondeploying unit or a holding activity until a training seat is available. Officers not branch-qualified are reported to PERSCOM for training reservations. Then, in conjunction with the unit commander, the installation personnel manager identifies excess individuals and either reassigns them to fill shortages identified in other units or reports them to PERSCOM for reassignment.

(b) Individual records are updated or added to the MCL data base as personnel report for duty. These personnel, except for selected RT–12s, will be assigned, according to established priorities and fill-level guidance, to fill units. Excess personnel are reported to CONUSA level for reassignment. Selected RT–12s are assigned to CRC installations for direct deployment.
(c) During mobilization, personnel may be cross-leveled between MACOM units on an installation provided a unit is not brought below a mission-capable status. Exceptions to this rule are CONUS training base, HSC, and SOCOM units. Drill sergeants or instructor personnel will not be cross-leveled or redistributed during the first 90 days of mobilization, except within the TRADOC Training Base. The HSC and SOCOM chains of command, respectively, must approve actions reassigning medical and special forces personnel. Any cross-leveling or redistribution action that draws a unit down below mission-capable status must be approved by HQDA.

(d) Reassignment of personnel during cross-leveling is normally accomplished through unit levy. Installation personnel managers task units or organizations to fill the requirement. Units identify personnel (by name) to the manager. The reassignment is then processed on MCL. Orders are then produced by the appropriate Personnel Services organization and documented in SIDPERS.

(e) The personnel manager uses the same procedures for complying with levies for assets from higher headquarters. The location of assets is identified using MCL, and units and organizations are levied as explained above.

(f) The installation will also receive assets from higher headquarters. The personnel manager plans to distribute these assets in the cross-leveling process prior their arrival based on needs and priorities.

6–4. DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

a. Overview.

(1) Army civilian workforce distribution activities, upon mobilization, are focused locally. Civilian personnel officers, in coordination with their supported functional managers, fill civilian personnel requirements in MOBTDA by reassigning, promoting, or detailing incumbent civilian employees to wartime positions (as specified in installation mobilization plans) and hiring new employees from local resources. Department of the Army civilian employees may also be reassigned outside of their locality to fill critical skill shortfalls elsewhere. Monetary and other incentives may be offered to encourage employees with critical skills to relocate, as authorized by law.

(2) Army civilian personnel managers must be aware of the potential for competition from several claimants for civilian manpower during mobilization and take part in efforts to minimize the adverse affects of competition. Competition may occur in several ways. There may be competing claims among commands or installations of the Army, among the Army and other military departments, or between DOD installations and other Federal agencies or private sector defense contractors. The remainder of this section describes planning actions for minimizing hiring competition at each level.

b. Competition Among Commands or Installations Within the Army. The Army is responsible for resolving conflicting workforce claims among its own commands and installations. If, after establishing priorities, local agreement cannot be reached among competing organizations, the problem will be referred for resolution to parent commands or HQDA as necessary.

c. Competition Among the Army and Other Military Departments.

(1) RASC have been established locally, with representatives from each concerned department, to resolve conflicts. In supporting its claims before a RASC, an installation should be prepared to do the following:

- Justify, according to established priorities, the criticality of missions and specific skills expected to be short during the period of competition.
- Demonstrate that all reasonable steps have been taken to avoid the particular shortfall.

(2) Mobilization recruiting conflicts involving high-priority functions of two or more Military Departments that cannot be resolved by RASC should be resolved at the lowest organizational level possible.

d. Competition With Other Federal Agencies. While other Federal agencies are not expected to pose major competition problems during a national emergency, installations should consider the possibility in view of their local circumstances and, if warranted, try to resolve potential conflicts with the agencies concerned (through RASC where established), and refer unresolved issues to higher headquarters.

e. Competition With the Private Sector. Competition between Army installations and the private sector is likely in areas where defense contractors draw from the same labor market. Negative effects of such competition may be avoided or minimized through local U.S. Employment Services offices of the DOL, which have the principal responsibility for recruiting workers to fill mobilization openings at DOD installations and at private sector defense plants. Each DOL regional director coordinates the planning of mobilization activities in the region and is guided by priorities and allocations of resources governed by the Defense Priority System. In addition, planning documents issued by the FEMA provide for the establishment of a system of State, regional area, and national committees, under DOL executive work force rules. Because these planned committees are to be formed when needed, there is no uniform mechanism for resolving, in advance, potential competition between DOD installations and the private sector. Nevertheless, there are prudent steps that the installations should take in peacetime to help avoid or mitigate the effects of anticipated conflicts. For example:

- Extend RASC membership to other Federal agencies, contractors, and private sector industrial activities within the recruiting area.
• Develop an appreciation for potential competition for the same skills, based on knowledge of current defense contractors and the local labor market.
• Open a dialogue with defense plants that could pose a serious threat of competition.
• Try to determine if there would be likely competition.
• Determine if a mutually acceptable solution can be found. (Installations should be aware that when military contracts might be jeopardized by worker shortages, Military Departments are required to support the contractor in obtaining appropriate workforce priorities.)
• Establish procedures for ensuring that agreed solutions will be implemented during mobilization.
• Refer major unresolved conflicts to higher headquarters for assistance.

6–5. SUMMARY

Because of the likelihood of intense competition for available manpower resources during mobilization, distribution management must begin at the highest levels of government to ensure the optimal allocation of resources for defense and nondefense needs. Military manpower resources thus allocated to the Army are distributed by Army personnel managers on three levels. At Department of the Army level, PERSCOM, in coordination with ARPERCEN, distributes mobilized personnel across the Army’s MACOMs in compliance with priority and level-of-fill guidance from HQDA. MACOMs monitor the personnel status of their subordinate installations and other organizations, and redistribute personnel among them to ensure optimal use of personnel with critically short skills. The focus of distribution activities for military personnel, however, is at installation level where installation commanders cross-level personnel to make as many organizations as possible mission-capable.

Distribution of civilian manpower is also centered at installation level where installation commanders realign the peacetime civilian workforce and hire new employees to accommodate increased workloads. In areas where intense competition for manpower is expected, substantial peacetime planning and coordination are required to minimize adverse effects. Affected installation, agencies of the Federal Government, and private sector firms must work closely together, guided by national defense priorities and allocations, to ensure the optimal distribution of the available workforce.
Figure 6–1. Mobilized Manpower Distribution OPLAN Support
Figure 6–2. Mobilized Manpower Distribution CONUS Base Expansion
Chapter 7
The Army Manpower Mobilization Automation Network

7–1. INTRODUCTION

a. Overview.

(1) Army manpower mobilization is supported extensively by automation. ADP systems support the analyses conducted to determine mobilization manpower requirements and supply. Other systems record and maintain the personnel management information needed to support the acquisition, qualification, and distribution of the Army’s soldiers and civilian employees during mobilization.

(2) This chapter describes the ADP systems that support Army manpower mobilization. It explains how they support the manpower mobilization process, where they operate in the Army or DOD organizational structure, and how they interface with other systems in the network. Figures 7–1 through 7–5 illustrate the network and its component parts. Figure 7–1 shows the total network. The remaining figures isolate the parts of the network that support determination of manpower mobilization requirements and supply (fig 7–2) and the three functional activities; acquisition (fig 7–3), qualification (fig 7–4), and distribution (fig 7–5).

(3) The systems operate on one or more of six organizational levels. Using figure 7–1, for example, note that the SSS and MEPCOM are shown above HQDA. This is because the systems that operate at these organizations support mobilization in all the Military Services. Immediately below HQDA are systems that operate at HQDA’s field
operating agencies (FOA); for example, PERSCOM, ARPERCEN, and USAREC. The Army’s MACOMs and CON-
USA are shown below the FOA. Although only one system, MCL, is shown operating at this level, MACOMs and
CONUSAs do have access to needed data from other systems to support planning and monitor activities at subordinate
installations, ATC, and schools. Systems that operate at MEPS and Army recruiting stations are shown at the lowest
level on the diagram. The systems at this level support the accessioning process for volunteers and draftees.

(4) The hub of the network is the Total Army Personnel Data Base—Mobilization (TAPDB–MOB). TAPDB–MOB
is a distributed data base, not a system. It provides a single repository of standardized data on Total Army personnel
resources that include personal, skill, and unit strength data. It is used by Army mobilization planners and personnel
managers to support mobilization and deployment planning, and to expedite personnel management decision making
across all four components of the Total Army.

(5) The following sections of this chapter describe each functional part of the total network. Systems that support
determination of mobilization requirements and supply are discussed first. Systems supporting the three functional
activities: acquisition, qualification, and distribution are then covered in-turn. Use the diagram accompanying each
discussion to help visualize how each system contributes to and fits into the total network.

7–2. DETERMINATION OF MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY

a. Overview.

(1) As shown in figure 7–2, there are two systems that support determination of mobilization manpower require-
ments and supply:

• Personnel Decision Support System (PER–DSS)
• Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS)

(2) The PER–DSS resides on the U.S. Army Information Systems Command’s mainframe computer in the Pentagon
and consists of several applications used to support planning and programming at HQDA. The MOBMAN system,
discussed in chapter 3, is one of the PER–DSS applications. MOBPERS, discussed previously in chapters 3, 4, and 6,
is resident at ARPERCEN.

b. HQDA Level. MOBMAN is used at HQDA to determine mobilization manpower requirements and supply as
discussed in chapter 3. It uses information drawn from other PER–DSS applications and TAPDB to produce several
reports. One of these reports is provided annually to OSD to support DOD manpower planning. Other reports are
analyzed and used at HQDA to develop manpower policies and programs aimed at reducing estimated mobilization
manpower shortages and correcting skill imbalances in the mobilization manpower supply.

c. Below HQDA Level. As discussed in chapter 3, MOBPERS determines monthly, specific personnel requirements,
by MOS and grade, to fill CONUS active Army and RC units during mobilization. It then searches the available supply
of IRR to find skill and grade matches for the requirements, and prepositions these data at installations to support
planning. MOBPERS also supports acquisition and distribution of personnel during mobilization. These applications
will be covered below in the acquisition and distribution sections of this chapter.

7–3. ACQUISITION

a. Overview. As shown in figure 7–3, there are nine systems that support the acquisition of mobilization manpower.
These are listed below in the order that they are mentioned in the subsequent discussion:

• Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS)
• Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS)
• Joint Optical Information Network (JOIN)
• Army Recruiting and Accession Data System (ARADS)
• Military Entrance Processing Reporting System (MEPRS)
• Registrant Information Management System (RIMS)
• Reception Battalion Automated Support System (RECBASS)
• Accession Management Information System (AMIS)
• Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS)

b. Prior Service Personnel Acquisition Support. As discussed in chapter 4, MOBPERS supports the acquisition of
RC unit personnel and IRR by prepositioning accessioning data on IRR and members of RC units at designated
mobilization installations. As units and individuals report for duty during mobilization, the prepositioned personnel
management information is updated, as required, and entered into SIDPERS, thus confirming the accession of RC
soldiers into the active Army. MOBPERS also prepositions accessioning data on preassigned retirees at their desig-
nated mobilization stations. These data are also updated as necessary and entered into SIDPERS when the individuals
report for duty.

c. Nonprior Service Enlisted Acquisition Support.

(1) The process for accessing nonprior service enlisted personnel during mobilization is essentially the same as in
peacetime. Volunteers begin at a recruiting station where they are given an appointment to report to a MEPS. Draftees begin the process upon receipt of mailgram orders to report to a MEPS.

(2) A volunteer’s initial personnel management file is started at the recruiting station with the entry of basic personnel accession data into the Joint Optical Information Network (JOIN). These data are sent to the Army Recruiting and Accession Data System (ARADS) at the USAREC Headquarters. ARADS links several accession management systems and eliminates the need to key in the same information at each step in the accession process. The recruiter arranges an appointment for the prospective recruit at a MEPS and transmits data from ARADS to the Military Entrance Processing Reporting System (MEPRS) at the MEPS before the scheduled arrival of the recruit.

(3) Mailgram orders issued by the DSS from the Registrant Information Management System (RIMS) order draftees to report to a MEPS. Registrant personnel data are also provided by RIMS to the MEPRS before the draftee’s scheduled reporting date. RIMS and MEPRS both reside at the Joint Computer Center at the Great Lakes Navel Training Center in Illinois.

(4) MEPRS supports activities at the MEPS such as vocational aptitude testing and physical examination. Results of testing, skill selection, and training seat information are added to the initial personnel information form ARADS and transmitted to the TAPDB-MOB and Reception Battalion Automated Support System (RECBASS) at the Army Training Center (ATC) prior to an individual’s scheduled reporting date for IET.

(5) After the individual reports to the reception battalion, RECBASS supports the creation of the initial hard copy military personnel record jacket (MPRJ), finance, and medical records. Before an individual’s departure from the reception battalion to a training unit, a SIDPERS transaction confirms accession of the individual into the Army.

d. Nonprior Service Officer Acquisition Support.

(1) Acquisition of new officers into the Active Army during peacetime and mobilization is supported by the Accession Management Information System (AMIS). This system accepts personnel management data for cadets, officer candidates, and appointees from institutions that train officers. Included are college ROTC and USMA senior cadets; enlisted personnel attending OCS or warrant officer training; OCS personnel from USAR and ARNG “college options;” and officer personnel recalled to active duty. Direct appointments, especially Chaplains, Judge Advocate, and Medical Officers are also included.

(2) AMIS data facilitates preparation of initial assignment instructions and other personnel actions. It is a major source of information used to create and update officer records at PERSCOM. Confirmation of officer accessioning is completed when the initial SIDPERS file is created at the officer’s initial duty station.

e. Civilian Personnel Acquisition Support. Acquisition of civilian personnel is conducted by CPOs worldwide. At the installation level, the Army Civilian Personnel Data System—Field (ACPERS-Field) provides data to support hiring and other personnel management functions at each CPO. These functions include recruitment, training, career development, distribution, sustainment, retention, and separation. In addition to satisfying peacetime personnel administration needs, this system will adjust to requirements for mobilization. Upon mobilization, system emphasis will immediately shift from supporting areas, such as incentive awards and program evaluation, to the rapid hiring and processing of additional civilians. CPOs worldwide report their data from ACPERS-Field to the HQDA Civilian Personnel System (HQ ACPERS), located at PERSCOM. HQ ACPERS maintains all the data for civilian personnel management activities at HQDA level.

7-4. QUALIFICATION

a. Overview.

(1) As reflected in figure 7-4, there are six systems that support the skill qualification of mobilized manpower. These are listed below in the order they are mentioned in the subsequent discussion:

- Personal Decision Support System (PER–DSS)
- Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS)
- Keystone—REQUEST Mobilization System (RMS)
- Automated Instructional Management System (AIMS)
- Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS)
- Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS)

(2) There are currently no systems that directly support activities for qualifying personnel for overseas movement. The SIDPERS, however, is updated to reflect completion of overseas processing actions such as weapons qualification and changes in an individual’s medical profile.

b. Mobilization Training Base Planning. Planning for rapid training base expansion upon mobilization is supported by the PER–DSS and ATRRS. The principal products of this planning are the Post Mobilization Training Base Output Requirements (PMTBOR) and the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOBARPRINT). The PMTBOR is produced by the PER–DSS MOBMAN module and provides the number of soldiers, by occupational specialty, that must be graduated from the training base during the first 6 months of full mobilization. The PMTBOR is a primary input to the ATRRS, which produces the MOBARPRINT and calculates the weekly trainee input based on the capacity of each school and course. The PMTBOR provides the basis for determining the resources needed to
expand and operate the postmobilization training base. The MOBARPRINT provides a blueprint for mobilization training base expansion and reflects the actual capacity of the training base to accept trainees.

c. Managing and Operating the Training Base during Mobilization.

(1) Individuals entering the Army during mobilization are assigned a training seat for IET during processing at the MEPS. Keystone—REQUEST Mobilization System (RMS), operated at the MEPS, provides the capability to assign draftees, volunteers, and DEP personnel to a training seat. RMS assigns Reserve enlistees who have not completed IET to training seats. RMS identifies the jobs for which an individual is best qualified by comparing the applicant’s qualifications and preferences (based on test scores and interviews at the MEPS) with mobilization priorities and requirements. RMS allows selection of training only for required skills for which applicants qualify (unlike the peacetime Recruit Quota System (REQUEST) which provides greater latitude for skill selection). RMS interacts with ATRRS to determine when training seats will be available.

(2) Progress of soldiers in the training base is monitored and managed by the Army Instructional Management System (AIMS). AIMS draws information from files in ATRRS and RECBASS to support enrollment, testing, grading, scheduling, and graduation of students. It provides class schedules, to ATRRS to support the training seat reservation process, as well as completion and attrition data on trainees who graduate or wash out of training. AIMS also interacts with SIDPERS to update skill qualification entries on individual personnel management files.

d. Civilian Personnel Qualification. For civilian personnel, training and skill qualification information is recorded in ACPERS-Field at CPO level and transmitted to the HQ–ACPERS. HQ–ACPERS facilitates HQDA planning for any additional training that may be required during a civilian employee’s career.

7–5. DISTRIBUTION

a. Overview.

(1) As shown in figure 7–5, there are four systems that support the distribution of mobilization manpower. These are listed below in the order they are mentioned in the subsequent discussion.

• Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS)
• Keystone—Mobilization Cross-Leveling System (MCL)
• Personnel Decision Support System (PER–DSS)
• Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS)

(2) Automation support is essential to the planning and management of personnel distribution because of the large numbers of personnel to be distributed during mobilization. Planning for the postmobilization distribution of IRR and retirees to installations is supported by MOBPERS. Cross-leveling of personnel between organizations and units to optimize unit readiness is supported by the Keystone—Mobilization Cross Leveling System (MCL). MOBPERS and MCL interact with TAPDB–MOB and PER–DSS for unit strength and personnel data needed to manage distribution planning and cross-leveling. HQ ACPERS and ACPERS-Field provide skill qualification and other personnel management information to identify civilian employees with critical skills who might be available to relocate if their skills are required elsewhere.

b. Military Personnel Distribution Planning and Execution.

(1) MOBPERS, in addition to supporting accessioning of IRR and retirees into the Active Army, supports distribution planning by earmarking IRR for mobilization stations. Once a month, MOBPERS uses personnel and unit data available through TAPDB–MOB to determine Active and RC unit fill requirements. It then scans the IRR data base to select personnel with appropriate skills and grade to fill vacancies. These data, which constitute a plan for the initial distribution of IRR, are then prepositioned at mobilization stations.

(2) Personnel managers at MACOMs, CONUSA, and installations use MCL to display the personnel status of units. They also use MCL to search for personnel qualified to fill vacancies, initiate action to reassign personnel, and “fence” units to stabilize them once cross-leveling actions are completed.

7–6. SUMMARY

This chapter has described briefly the automation network that supports Army manpower mobilization. The interrelationships between systems and the organizational levels at which systems operate have also been covered. TAPDB–MOB is the hub of the automation network. It provides a single source of personnel management data for the military and civilian components of the Total Army as well as essential unit strength data necessary to support determination of mobilization manpower requirements and supply; and the acquisition, qualification, and distribution of mobilization manpower.

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Figure 7–1. The Army’s Manpower Mobilization Automation Network
Figure 7–2. Determination of Mobilization Manpower Requirements and Supply

Figure 7–3. The Mobilization Manpower Acquisition Network
THE MOBILIZED MANPOWER QUALIFICATION NETWORK

Figure 7–4. The Mobilized Manpower Qualification Network
Chapter 8
Demobilization

8–1. INTRODUCTION

a. Following a major war or national emergency supported by full or total mobilization, defense manpower planners and personnel managers will be challenged to conduct what can be described as “mobilization in reverse.” Active military force structure and manning levels will be reduced. RC force structure will be reconstituted. Large numbers of soldiers will be separated from the Active Army and returned to civilian life. Civilian employees will be released from the Government work force as CONUS and overseas support bases are cut back to levels commensurate with the peacetime force structure. These former military and DOD civilian employees will seek employment in a national economy undergoing transition, as priorities and resources shift from wartime to peacetime needs.

b. Under conditions of less-than-full mobilization, with or without armed conflict, personnel managers must also be prepared to separate mobilized personnel or return them to reserve status soon after the emergency is over. Plans and procedures for these circumstances, together with those for full or total mobilization, should be tailored to accomplish demobilization tasks efficiently, while minimizing adverse impacts on soldiers, civilian employees, families, the national economy, and military readiness.

c. This chapter is intended to provide Army manpower and personnel managers with a guide for developing
demobilization plans. It is based on lessons drawn from past demobilizations, which can be applied to possible future demobilization scenarios. It does not attempt to promote policies or procedures adopted for past demobilizations as appropriate for the future; rather, it offers them as examples of demobilization problem-solving based on conditions that existed at the time.

d. Discussion begins with a definition of demobilization and an overview of the major demobilization tasks from the perspective of the National Command Authority and Army manpower and personnel managers. There follows some relevant demobilization history with lessons that should be heeded by the future demobilization planner. The final section identifies and discusses principles and planning considerations for future demobilization planners.

8–2. DEFINITION
Demobilization is the process of transitioning an expanded military establishment and defense-based economy (after a war or national emergency) to a lower level of forces and a peacetime economy, while maintaining national security and economic vitality. The major goals of a demobilization, maintaining national security and economic vitality, are included in the definition and provide measures of success for demobilization planning and execution.

8–3. OVERVIEW
a. To achieve the goals of demobilization, the National Command Authority will be challenged to define the nation’s vital national interests in the postwar period and provide the strategic framework for developing a peacetime force structure with the requisite capability to protect our national security. Once the peacetime force structure is determined, the manpower planner can establish a postwar framework for manpower planning and the policies, programs, and standards for manning and sustaining the force as depicted in the Model for Postwar Defense Manpower Management at figure 8–1. Except for the necessity of temporary transition policies and programs, the model is the same as that shown in figure 3–1. The manpower manager’s job does not change for demobilization; only the force structure and economic environment change. The manpower manager must respond with appropriate changes to policies, standards, and programs for manning the force structure and maintaining its personnel readiness.

b. For demobilization, extraordinary transition policies and programs are needed to reduce the size of the Active force, man and support a reorganized RC structure, and manage the return of veterans and former Army civilian employees to the private sector economy. If past history is any indicator, these tasks will be undertaken in a political environment characterized by public clamor to “bring the boys home” quickly and an economic environment of fiscal austerity for defense programs. There will also be the potential for substantial personnel turbulence that could threaten Army readiness, and an implicit responsibility for preparing separating soldiers (through counseling and/or vocational retraining) for entry into the civilian economy.

c. Personnel transition operations in a demobilization following a war or national emergency can be managed on a unit or individual basis. Transition policies and programs should include the following: separation; regulating the rate of return of soldiers and civilian employees to the private sector; and, assisting returnees in adjusting to the postwar domestic environment. As implied in figure 8–1, the collective package of transition policies and programs should be coordinated closely with retention and new accessions policies to maintain and sustain Army readiness through the demobilization and thereafter.

8–4. RELEVANT HISTORY
a. Policy.
(1) After World War I, the Army adopted a unit demobilization system, hastily implemented because hostilities ceased much sooner than expected. Units in CONUS were selected first for inactivation because they were immediately available and their personnel were separated quickly. Closeout of personnel records was careless and haphazard. Little thought was given to the rate at which former soldiers were dumped into the civilian economy. As units returned from overseas, they were also inactivated as soon as possible. There seemed to be an almost “laissez faire” attitude on the part of the Government as problems such as high unemployment, caused by the influx of former soldiers into the domestic work force, were viewed as transitory and self-correcting with the return of peacetime market forces.

(2) From an Army readiness perspective, however, the unit demobilization system was a good idea because complete combat-ready divisions remained in Europe until recalled for inactivation. The German Army, left intact by the terms of the initial armistice agreement, posed a substantial threat on the continent for a while after the armistice. Eventually, however, only a small standing Army was left in the United States as the result of a return of prewar isolationist attitudes and neglect of military matters in an environment of postwar domestic prosperity.

(3) After World War II, an individual, rather than a unit-based, transition policy was adopted. Unlike World War I, planning began well before the end of the hostilities, spurred by the fear of an economic depression caused by massive unemployment and an anticipated sluggish reconversion of the economy to domestic production. Political pressure, applied through public opinion and congressional attitudes, also greatly influenced the policies and programs adopted, some of which severely hindered Army readiness. These policies and programs are worthy of mention here, because political, economic, and social circumstances that led to their adoption could still exist in the contemporary environment.

(4) The principle of fairness, widely supported by public opinion, was the basis of a point system for determining
the eligibility of individuals for separation. Army personnel earned “points” determined by the number of months in the Service, measured from an arbitrarily selected mobilization day; the number of months overseas; number and type of combat medals; and, parenthood (number of children, up to three). Once a soldier earned enough points, he or she could be ordered to a separation center and discharged. The separation rate was controlled by a policy fixing the number of points that had to be accumulated for eligibility. There were some exceptions for personnel with “critical” skills, but these were kept at an absolute minimum.

(5) The point system generally satisfied demands for fairness, but together with public and congressional pressure for speedy discharges, severely degraded Army readiness. For the first time in history, the Army had significant postwar occupation missions in two theaters. The point system indiscriminately gutted occupation units of needed, experienced personnel. Combat and service support units suffered equally as officer and enlisted combat leaders and skilled supply and maintenance personnel were discharged. The draft continued to provide entry-level soldiers to replenish unit’s strength, but could not compensate for the untimely loss of experienced personnel.

(6) The point system was gradually replaced by a length-of-service system when the Army recognized the need to shore up readiness by decreasing personnel turbulence in units. Public, congressional, and soldier acceptance of the new system was readily obtained after most combat veterans with children had been discharged and the point system began to be perceived as “unfair” to single soldiers and those without overseas service or combat assignments.

(7) There were other forms of separation policy considered by Army planners for largely economic reasons. These were not used because fairness and the discharge rate turned out to be the dominant issues, but are included here because the impact of demobilization on the economy will always be a major planning consideration.

- Keyman discharges. Proposed giving separation preference to individuals with skills needed to accelerate postwar economic reconversion.
- Variable separation rate. Would have tied the separation rate with the availability of jobs in nonmilitary sectors of the economy. It included programs to promote vocational and college courses for soldiers awaiting discharge, or created a “holding work force” for public projects to avoid a great surge of excess labor in the civilian economy.

(8) The World War II manpower demobilization also gave special attention to the idea of easing the return of military men and women to civilian status, particularly to the productive work force. This attention consisted primarily of the following:

- Mustering out payments, unemployment compensation, and loans to bolster initial purchasing power.
- Job placement counseling and assistance from the Military Services, the USES, VA, and SSS.
- A “GI Bill” enabling unprecedented members of former military personnel to enroll in colleges and trade schools.

(9) These measures also reflected the determination on the part of the nation’s leadership to sustain full employment and prevent postwar depression, but the ulterior motive was to help individuals make the adjustment.

b. Procedural Factors.

(1) The conduct of transition processing after World War II also provides valuable insights for the modern military personnel manager. Transition planning began early (1943) and was quite detailed. Plans called for the establishment of regional separation centers, staffed and equipped to separate soldiers on a mass basis. They were established at existing military installations and commanded by brigadier generals with combat experience and proven administrative skills. Separation center workers (mostly experienced personnel, finance, and supply specialists) were carefully selected and trained in their duties. A test of separation center operating procedures was even conducted prior to Victory in Europe (VE) Day to refine the process. Separation centers used the following 8-step process similar to that used in modern Army transition points:

- **Arrival reception.** Administrative processing of official military personnel records initiated by an incoming records section.
- **Clothing shakedown.** Turn-in of clothing and equipment not authorized for retention; issue and fitting of uniform for the trip home; assignment to a separation company for control purposes.
- **Orientation Lecture.** An explanation of separation activities, sequence, and layout of separation center.
- **Medical examinations.** Final physical and dental exams to determine fitness for discharge and eligibility for veteran’s medical benefits.
- **Counseling.** Information and advice regarding entitlements, benefits, re-employment rights, and employment assistance.
- **Outgoing records.** Final check and closeout of personnel, medical, and finance records.
- **Final pay.** Disbursement of final pay and allowances.
- **Departure ceremony.** Presentation of any outstanding awards, and expression of appreciation for honorable service to the nation.

(2) The separation center system, in general, worked well. At the peak, many separation centers operated 24 hours a
day. Several million soldiers were separated in less than 2 years. Records closeout and disposition were generally well-done. The World War II separation center experience provided two important lessons for future personnel managers:

(a) Successful operations require a well-trained staff and minimal staff turnover. The point system often caused high turnover of skilled administrative and finance personnel on separation center staffs. Many were discharged when they were most needed and replaced by individuals often new to the Service with little training in administration. Until they gained experience, speed of processing slowed and the quality of records processing suffered.

(b) Idleness causes problems. Soldiers should be moved in, through, and out of separation centers in a specified period of time. Idleness due to excessive inactivity leads to boredom and discipline problems.

c. Political and Social Factors.

(1) There were also some stormy periods in which World War II demobilization policy and its execution engendered congressional, public, and soldier discontent and complaints. These problems centered on perceptions of unfairness in the point system, low rates of discharge, and differences in the application or implementation of policy at separation centers. It was discovered that many of these problems could have been avoided, minimized, or eliminated by timely and accurate public affairs information programs for keeping soldiers and the general public informed on the rationale underlying policies, policy changes, and implementing procedures.

(2) Although there was no extraordinary period of demobilization associated with the Vietnam conflict, one particular aspect of that experience, the postwar emotional trauma suffered by many of its veterans, should be considered in transition planning for future demobilizations. “Combat fatigue” and related emotional problems were not unique to Vietnam, but in the years following the end of our involvement there, much has been learned about them. Soldiers suffering from or susceptible to this form of mental illness should be identified prior to discharge, treated while still on active duty as appropriate, and closely followed by the VA after discharge. The payoff from such a program should result in more healthy soldiers returned from the military to civilian life to become productive members of society.

8–5. PRINCIPLES, POLICY, AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Guiding Principles for the Demobilization Planner. In order to benefit from the lessons of past demobilizations, the manpower planner and personnel manager should be guided by the following principles. These have been distilled from the experiences of past demobilizations and some familiar tenets for good staff work.

(1) Focus on the Army’s Mission. As a war or national emergency nears termination, the Army’s mission will reflect evolving postwar military strategy and objectives. Demobilization plans must support the mission as it evolves. The transition from war to peace will occur over time and may entail temporary occupation, civil affairs, and military government tasks that require specialized force structure. As the transition proceeds, longer range strategic considerations will drive other force structure changes. Manpower and personnel managers must be aware of and support both short- and longer-range manning requirements. The World War II demobilization process (owing largely to the pressure of politics and public opinion) created and perpetuated severe readiness deficiencies in units essential to the execution of postwar occupation duties and longer-term “cold war”-strategic tasks in Europe and Asia. The point system, together with the separation rate, drew down the Army too fast and with too little regard for skill requirements. The results were an Army poorly prepared to counter the “cold war” Soviet threat in Europe and North Korean aggression in Asia.

(2) Begin Planning as Soon as Possible. World War I demobilization planners got caught short and did not consider the impact of rapid demobilization on soldiers or the economy. World War II planners had plenty of time to conduct troop and public opinion surveys prior to implementing the point system and to test separation center procedures before full-scale demobilization began. Ideally, demobilization planning should begin soon after the announcement of mobilization.

(3) Understand the Political, Economic, and Social Environment. The planner must develop plans appropriate to circumstances extant at the time. Adopting policies and procedures on the sole basis that they were used in the past probably will not work. A unit demobilization policy, like that adopted for World War I, would not have worked in the political environment after World War II.

(4) Take Advantage of Existing Facilities and ADP Systems. The strong likelihood of fiscal austerity after a war will challenge demobilization planners to get the most out of each dollar appropriated for demobilization, CRCs and personnel and administration facilities at Army posts should be ideally suited for conducting mass personnel transition processing. Modern ADP systems will make records closeout and disposition tasks much easier than in the past.

(5) Consider the Impact of Proposed Policies Programs and Procedures on the Following:

• Army readiness.
• National and local economies.
• Soldiers, Army civilian employees, and their families.
• Allies and potential adversaries.

The risks of adverse impacts due to controversy or misunderstanding of policy decisions can be minimized by following the last principle.

(6) Maintain Effective Communications with the Following:
• In-house staff agencies.
• The Congress.
• Other Federal agencies.
• The general public.
• Soldiers, civilian employees, and their families.

The demobilization policies, programs, and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been carefully developed with the help of other interested parties and thoroughly coordinated or tested prior to their implementation. Effective public relations campaigns (aimed at informing the right target audiences about demobilization policies and their supporting rationale) should be helpful for gaining and maintaining public support and cooperation.

b. Policy Considerations for the Manpower Demobilization Planner.

(1) Manpower planning will be accomplished as portrayed in figure 8–1. The manpower planner must work in concert with force developers and resource programmers, because manpower planning cannot begin without the objective peacetime force structure and an estimate of the resources that will be budgeted to man it. With these parameters, a framework for manpower planning can be developed. The key elements in this framework for a demobilization situation will be the Active RC mix and the extent of the reorganization required to achieve that mix. In the context of a long war and full or total mobilization, units from the prewar RC structure would soon lose regional and Reserve identities as the original complement of unit personnel turned over through attrition and assimilation of replacements. In this case, a RC structure would have to be reconstructed. Under conditions of less than total mobilization and short war, most mobilized units would not likely lose their Reserve or regional identities and be returned to their original home stations upon demobilization.

(2) Given an established framework for manpower planning, the demobilization manpower planner can then do the following:

(a) Determine transition policy. This includes the method and rate of separation and transfer of soldiers between Active and RC.

(b) Determine retention and new accessions policies. At the end of the war or emergency, what soldiers should the Army try to keep? How should the Army encourage soldiers to stay in and reenlist? What are appropriate and affordable retention programs? Will new accessions be acquired voluntarily or involuntarily through continuation of a draft? What are appropriate and affordable recruiting programs?

(c) Develop policy and programs to ease the transition of separating soldiers from military to civilian life. These programs should serve the dual purpose of minimizing adverse impacts of mass separations on both the soldier and the economy. Types of programs for consideration include the following: separation leave with pay and allowances; unemployment insurance; educational benefits; readjustment counseling; and, job retraining and placement. Such policies and programs should benefit all members of the Armed Forces and should be developed jointly by the Services and the OSD in cooperation with other executive agencies like the DOL and the Department of Health and Human Services.

c. Demobilization Planning Considerations for the Army Personnel Manager.

(1) Although the Army personnel manager’s role will not change because of demobilization, it will be more focused temporarily on transition management and assume greater relative significance in terms of maintaining Army readiness and the welfare of soldiers, veterans, and their families during a period of considerable turbulence. Personnel managers will be instrumental in maintaining Army readiness by persuading soldiers the Army wants to keep to reenlist in the Active Army or enlist in a RC unit. They will aid soldiers and their families by helping separating soldiers find good jobs, furthering their educations, or establishing their eligibility for various veterans’ benefits.

(2) The hubs of demobilization transition management should be transition points located at CONUS installations or even “CONUS Separation Centers,” established by reorganizing CRCs to conduct transition operations. Separation center organization should be standardized throughout the Army with tables of distribution and allowances (TDAs) based on analysis of the following considerations:

(a) Tasks to be performed. These must be known to determine the mix of administrative skills needed and should include records closeout and final disposition, clothing and equipment turn in, physical examinations, and counseling. (A more complete list of suggested functions will be provided below.)

(b) Workload. How many soldiers must be separated in a specified period of time? This information must be known to determine the number of spaces required in each skill to process the workload. Several World War II separation centers processed several thousand soldiers a week and operated 24 hours a day.

(c) Processing time. Used in conjunction with workload information to determine the number of spaces required in each skill. As indicated previously, a fixed processing time is important to maintaining morale, order, and discipline throughout the separation process.

(3) Planners should also consider the need for centralized training of personnel selected to man separation centers to ensure uniformity in the conduct of separation center operations. Rehearsal of procedures should also be included in the process of establishing separation centers. Because transition center activities will consist of clearly defined administrative, medical, educational, and finance skills, use of civilian employees may be preferred over military personnel in staffing some separation center positions.
The following is a listing of suggested separation center functions and activities. These are generally in keeping with current transition management doctrine. They should be planned to be accomplished within a period of not more than 5 days.

- **Initial receiving.** Meet incoming soldiers, assign them for command and control purposes, and orient them on separation center layout and the sequence of events they will follow while at the separation center. Use military personnel for this activity.
- **Initiate records processing.** Determine what needs to be accomplished to close out soldier’s active duty records and prepare them for reserve service or use in validating veterans’ benefits. Use either military or civilian employees for this activity.
- **Conduct medical examinations.** Make a tentative determination of soldiers’ eligibility for discharge or continued services in Active or RC. Civilian physicians may be preferred for this activity.
- **Conduct reenlistment counseling.** Provide a basis for good soldiers to make an informed decision on continued Army service in the Active or RC. Attempt to persuade selected soldiers to reenlist. Use qualified military counselors.
- **Conduct separation counseling.** Brief soldiers on job and career planning, civilian living expenses, civilian job-search activities, benefits of college or vocational school, and veterans’ benefits. Use qualified civilian counselors.
- **Accomplish clothing and equipment turn-in.** Provide separating soldiers with uniforms for the trip home. Allow reenlisting soldiers to retain uniform items needed for a future Active or RC assignment. Use either military or civilian employees for this activity.
- **Conduct final records review.** Close out personnel, medical, and finance records. Use either military or civilian employees for this activity.
- **Provide a suitable departure ceremony.** Express appreciation for a job well-done. Present final awards if appropriate. Use a field grade officer to preside over ceremonies.
- **Provide final pay and transportation authorization to a final destination.** Use either military or civilian employees for this activity.

(5) The objectives of the entire separation center experience should be to leave soldiers with a favorable impression of the Army and show interest in their future welfares. In order to meet these objectives, sufficient time, attention, and resources must be committed to separation center design, layout, sequence of events, living accommodations, recreation, and messing facilities. Recruiters and separation counselors must be carefully selected and trained to perform their duties. Automation should be used to the maximum extent to facilitate the administrative closeout of records and ensure accuracy and completeness.

8–6. SUMMARY

*a.* The foregoing discussion has drawn from the relevant history of twentieth-century demobilizations to provide lessons that might be useful to future demobilization planners in manpower and personnel management. It provides some principles to guide manpower and demobilization planning and offers some planning considerations for manpower and personnel managers.

*b.* Demobilization for the manpower and personnel manager should be considered no more than a special challenge for the management of change represented in the model at figure 8–1. Planning must be preceded by definition of the peacetime force structure and the resource level available to support it. These give the manpower and personnel managers parameters for establishing short-term transition policies and programs for reducing the size of the force, and longer-term policies and programs for manning and sustaining the force as it evolves to meet future national security needs.
A MODEL FOR POST WAR
DEFENSE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

Figure 8–1. A Model for Post War Defense Manpower Management
Appendix A
References

Section I
Required Publications
This section contains no entries.

Section II
Related Publications

AR 40–501
Standards of Medical Fitness

AR 135–133
Ready Reserve Screening, Qualification Records System and Change of Address Reports

AR 135–210
Order to Active Duty as Individuals During Peacetime

AR 140–1
Army Reserve Mission, Organization, and Training

AR 140–10
Army Reserve: Assignments, Attachments, Details and Transfers

AR 351–1
Individual Military Education and Training

AR 600–8–101 (Draft)
Personnel Processing

AR 601–10
Mobilization of Retired Members of the Army

AR 601–210
Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program

AR 601–270
Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS)

AR 611–201
Civilian Acquired Skills Program

AR 612–2
Preparation of Replacements for Overseas Movement

AR 612–201
Processing, Control, and Distribution of Personnel at US Army Reception Battalions and Training Centers

AR 614–30
Overseas Service

AR 690–11
Civilian Personnel Mobilization Planning and Execution

DA Pam 600–41
Military Personnel Manager’s Mobilization Handbook
DA Pam 20–210

**ARMY Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS)**
Volumes I and III

**TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning System (TMOPS)**
Volume III: Training Base Expansion Plan

**Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS): Information Handbook.**

**U.S. Army Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS)**
Volume I and Volume III, Parts 3, 4, and 5

**U.S. Total Army Personnel Agency Mobilization Plan**
Volumes I, II, and III

**DOD Directive 1400.31**

**DOD Instruction 1400.32**

**DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP)**

**DOD 1100.18–H**

**U.S. Department of Defense, Office the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)**

**The Anthropo Factor in Warfare; Conscripts, Volunteers and Reserves**

**Backgrounder**

**Information for Registrants**

**Ballard, Jack Stokes**

**Section III**
**Prescribed Forms**
This section contains no entries.

**Section IV**
**Referenced Forms**

**DA Form 5304–R**
(Family Care Counseling Checklist)

**DA Form 5305–R**
(Statement of Understanding and Responsibility)
DD Form 93
(Record of Emergency Data)

Standard Form 52
(Request for Personnel Action)

SSS Form 252W
(National Emergency Travel Warrant)

VA Form 29–8286
(Servicemans Group Life Insurance (SGLI Election))
### Glossary

#### Section I

**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPERS</td>
<td>Army Civilian Personnel System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Automatic data processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard and Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>Army Instructional Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIT</td>
<td>advanced individual training</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Materiel Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMEDD</td>
<td>Army Medical Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>Accession management information system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMOPS</td>
<td>Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOC</td>
<td>Advanced noncommissioned officers’ course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>aerial port of embarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARADS</td>
<td>Army Recruiting and Accession Data System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARPERCEN</td>
<td>Army Reserve Personnel Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Army Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATRRRS</td>
<td>Army Training Requirements and Resources System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>Absent without leave</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIOCC</td>
<td>branch immaterial officers’ candidate course</td>
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</table>
BNCOC
Basic NCO course

CINC
Commander in Chief

CONUS
continental United States

CONUSA
the numbered armies in the continental USA

CPO
civilian personnel office

CRC
CONUS replacement center

DA
Department of the Army

DCSOPS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

DCSPER
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DEP
delayed entry program

DHFN
Direct Hire Foreign National

DHS
Director of Health Services

DOD
Department of Defense

DOL
Department of Labor

EEC
Emergency Essential Civilian

ETS
Estimated Termination of Service

FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency

FORMDEPS
FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System

FORSCOM
U.S. Forces Command

FRG
Federal Republic of Germany
FY
fiscal year

GTR
Government Travel Request

GUARDPERCEN
Army National Guard Personnel Center

HIV
Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HNS
Host Nation Support

HQDA
Headquarters, Department of the Army

HSC
Health Services Command

HSDG
High School Diploma Graduate

IET
initial entry training

IHFN
Indirect Hire Foreign National

IMA
Individual Mobilization Agumentee

ING
inactive National Guard

IRR
Individual Ready Reserve

JAG
Judge Advocate General

JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOIN
Joint Optical Information Network

JOPS
Joint Operations Planning System

MACOM
Major Army Command

MCL
Mobilization Cross-Leveling System

MEDEVAC
medical evacuation
MEPRS
Military Entrance Processing Reporting System

MEPS
Military Entrance Processing Station

METW
Military Emergency Travel Warrant

MOBARPRINT
Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training

MOBMAN
Mobilization Manpower Planning System

MOBPERS
Mobilization Personnel Processing System

MOBPOI
Mobilization Program of Instruction

MOBTAADS
Mobilization The Army Authorization Documents System

MOBTDA
mobilization table of distribution and allowances

MOS
military occupational specialty

MPRJ
Military Personnel Records Jacket

MSO
military service obligation

MTF
medical treatment facility

MTOE
modification table of organization and equipment

MTPS
Mobilization Training Planning System

MUSARC
Major U.S. Army Reserve Command

NAF
nonappropriated fund

NCO
noncommissioned officer

NCOES
Noncommissioned Officer Education System

OBC
Officer Basic Course
OCC
Officer Candidate Course

OCONUS
outside continental United States

OCS
Officer Candidate School

ODCSOPS
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

ODCSPER
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

ODR
Office of Defense Resources

OJCS
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OJT
on-the-job training

OPLAN
operation plans

OPM
Office of Personnel Management

OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSUT
one station unit training

OTSG
Office of The Surgeon General

PCS
permanent change of station

PER-DSS
Personnel Decision Support System

PERSCOM
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

PIM
Pretrained Individual Manpower

PLDC
Primary Leadership Development Course

PMTBOR
Post Mobilization Training Base Output Requirements

POL
petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PPBS
planning, programming, and budgeting system

PROFIS
Professional Officer Filler System

PSC
Personnel Service Company

PX
Post exchange

RASC
Recruiting Area Staffing Committee

RC
Reserve Components

RECBASS
Reception Battalion Automated Support System

REQUEST
Recruit Quota System

RIMS
Registrant Information System

RMS
Request Mobilization System

ROTC
Reserve Officer Training Corps

RT-12
Recently Trained within 12 months

SGLI
Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance

SIDPERS
Standard Installation/Division Personnel System

SIDPERS-ARNG
SIDPERS Army National Guard

SIDPERS-USAR
SIDPERS U.S. Army Reserve

SOCOM
Special Operations Command

SOP
standing operating procedures

SSS
Selective Service System

STARC
State Area Command
TAADS
The Army Authorization Documents System

TAPDB
Total Army Personnel Database

TAPDB-MOB
TAPDB–Mobilization

TDA
Table of Distribution and Allowances

TMOPS
TRADOC Mobilization and Deployment Planning System

TPFDD
Time-Phased Force Deployment Data

TRADOC
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TTHS
Trainees, Transients, Holdees, Students

UCMJ
Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAR
United States Army Reserve

USAREC
U.S. Army Recruiting Command

USAREUR
U.S. Army Europe

USDH
U.S. Direct Hire

USES
U.S. Employment Services

USMA
U.S. Military Academy

VA
Veterans Administration

VE
Victory in Europe

WESTCOM
U.S. Army Western Command
Section II
Terms
This section contains no entries.

Section III
Special Abbreviations and Terms
This section contains no entries.