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Pamphlet 190-51

Military Police

Risk Analysis for Army Property

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SUMMARY of CHANGE

DA PAM 190-51

Risk Analysis for Army Property

This revision--

- o Clarifies and simplifies procedural aspects of the risk analysis procedure (para 2-3).
- o Adds new asset types--industrial and utility equipment sometimes targeted by terrorist and extremist protest groups and controlled cryptographic items (table 3-1).
- o Clarifies terminology concerning asset types (table 3-1).
- o Adds reference tables to enable users to determine quickly which value rating and likelihood rating tables should be used for a given asset (chaps 3 and 4).
- o Removes reference to specific terrorist groups to clarify the reason for the difference between two categories of outside continental United States terrorists (table 4-1).
- o Changes the quantities of aircraft and vehicles so minimum numbers correspond to the number assigned a company (table 4-11).
- o Changes petroleum, oil, and lubricant quantities to reflect designated storage quantities for various sizes of support units (table 4-12).
- o Authorizes exact replication of any DA or DD forms prescribed in this pamphlet generated by the automated Military Police Management Information System in place of the official printed version of the form (app A, sec III).


Military Police

Risk Analysis for Army Property

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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History. This UPDATE printing publishes a revision of this publication. Because the structure of the entire revised text has been reorganized, no attempt has been made to highlight changes from the earlier pamphlet dated 31 March 1986.

Summary. This pamphlet presents a risk analysis method designed to assist commanders in meeting local needs and enhancing security using available resources, by use of the new DA Form 7278-R, Risk Level Worksheet. The results of the risk analysis

can be used to determine the minimum level of protection needed to safeguard resources adequately and economically. The level of security adopted will be based upon physical security measures and procedures contained in AR 190-11, AR 190-16, and AR 190-51.

Applicability. This pamphlet applies to elements of the Active Army, the Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and U.S. Army contractors that control, store, maintain, or secure Army material, equipment, and personal property unless these organizations are exempted by other regulations. This publication applies during partial and full mobilization.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this pamphlet is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans has the authority to approve exceptions to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulation. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans may delegate this authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. The approval authority will coordinate all

questions regarding the scope of authority to approve exceptions with HQDA (DAJA-AL), Washington, DC 20310-2200.

Interim changes. Interim changes to this pamphlet are not official unless authenticated by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to the HQDA (DAMO-ODL-S), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-0400.

Distribution. Distribution of this publication is made in accordance with the requirements on DA Form 12-09E, block 2568, intended for all command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1-1. Purpose

This pamphlet provides guidance for conducting risk analyses for Army assets except for sensitive or classified information and nuclear and chemical materials. The risk analysis procedure supports the local commander in meeting the responsibility of protecting assets against criminal and terrorist threats in a cost effective manner. It is designed to help security specialists carry out their responsibilities in support of the local commander. It also provides a basis for developing the information required by engineers to provide comprehensive protection for assets based on security engineering principles.

1-2. References

Required and related publications and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms

Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.

1-4. How to use this pamphlet

a. Establish risk levels for each asset being considered for protection and for each asset associated with a mission-essential or vulnerable area (MEVA). Refer to the instructions in chapter 2 and the risk factor evaluation tables in chapters 3 and 4 to evaluate risk levels.

b. Refer to AR 190-11 for arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) and to AR 190-51 for other assets to determine the appropriate minimum levels of security to implement for the asset to be protected based on the risk level for that asset.

c. Provide the information derived from the risk analysis to the supporting facilities engineering organization for them to design and program construction or equipment installation for comprehensive security of the asset in new or existing facilities.

Chapter 2 Risk analysis

2-1. Purpose of risk analysis

Not all Army assets at all locations require the same degree of protection. Protection of assets must be based on a realistic assessment of the risks associated with the criminal and terrorist threats likely to be directed at the assets in their actual locations. Performing risk analyses for assets allows commanders to establish asset protection appropriate for their value and the likelihood of an attempt to compromise them. The risk analysis allows the commander to prioritize assets so that physical security resources can be applied in the most efficient and cost effective manner possible. The commander should ensure insider threat is included in the threat analysis. Risk analysis also provides the supporting facilities engineering organization with the information required to develop design criteria for construction or equipment installation to provide comprehensive security for an asset.

2-2. Risk

Risk indicates both the impact of the compromise of an asset and the potential for it being compromised. Risk is associated with individual assets and with different types of aggressors.

a. Assets. Risk concerns assets rather than facilities. Facilities are not normally the targets of aggressors, and they should not be the focus of security. Security should be based upon protecting the assets in the facilities. The risk analysis procedure in this pamphlet applies to all of the asset types included in AR 190-11 and AR 190-51 and to other asset types not included in those regulations but which may warrant protection.

b. Components of risk. Risk is composed of the two factors of asset value and likelihood of aggressor activity.

(1) *Asset value.* This risk factor indicates the value or importance of the asset to its user and to the Army. The risk level increases with increasing asset value in this risk analysis model. Chapter 3 addresses asset value in more detail.

(2) *Likelihood.* This factor indicates the attractiveness of the asset to the aggressor and the likelihood that an aggressor will attempt to compromise the asset based on its attractiveness. Risk increases with increasing likelihood of aggression. Chapter 4 addresses likelihood in more detail.

c. Aggressors. The risk analysis procedure in this pamphlet considers criminals, protesters, and terrorists as potential aggressors against Army assets. A risk analysis must consider each potential aggressor category likely to be interested in an asset separately. The different aggressor categories and the different groups of aggressors within each category are necessary for developing the threat definition used by security specialists and engineers to compensate for or design for comprehensive security for assets. In the threat analysis developed from elements of this risk analysis, different tactics, weapons, tools, and explosives are assigned to each aggressor type. Risk levels are established only for the broad categories of criminals and terrorists in this risk analysis. For this analysis, protesters are divided into vandals/activists and extremist protesters which are incorporated into the categories of criminals and terrorists defined below.

(1) *Criminals.* Criminals are divided into unsophisticated criminals, sophisticated criminals, and organized criminal groups for this analysis. Vandals/activists are also included under the category of criminals.

(2) *Terrorists.* Terrorists are divided into continental United States (CONUS), outside continental United States (OCONUS), and paramilitary OCONUS terrorists for this analysis. The paramilitary OCONUS terrorists are separated from other OCONUS terrorists based on the severity of their attacks and their demonstrated state-sponsored, transitional, and paramilitary character. Paramilitary OCONUS terrorist groups have historically included Middle Eastern and Northern Irish terrorists. Extremist protesters are also included under the category of terrorists.

2-3. Risk analysis procedure

The following procedure will be applied to all Army assets being considered for protection, including those in existing facilities and those in facilities yet to be constructed or under major renovation. The risk analysis for assets to be located in new or renovated facilities will be performed during the planning stages of the projects. Including required security features during initial facility planning will result in long-term cost savings and improved security system integration. Consult with operations and intelligence personnel, operation security personnel (OPSEC), the provost marshal, the facility engineer, and the users of the assets being analyzed as necessary in performing this analysis.

a. STEP 1: Identify the unit or organization to which the asset belongs and the inspectable area in which the asset is located. Enter this information in the spaces provided on DA Form 7278-R (Risk Level Worksheet). A blank copy of DA Form 7278-R is located at the back of this handbook for reproduction purposes.

b. STEP 2: Identify the asset for which the analysis is being performed. Enter the category of the asset from table 2-1 and enter a brief description to further identify it. If the identified asset does not fall within one of the categories listed in table 2-1 or if it falls within more than one category, select the category which most closely describes the asset and note the difference in the asset description. Enter each asset category and its description in the space provided on DA Form 7278-R. Analyze each asset separately.

Table 2-1
Asset Categories

Category	Description
A	Aircraft and components at Army aviation facilities.

Table 2-1
Asset Categories—Continued

Category	Description
B	Vehicles and carriage-mounted or towed weapon systems and components at Army motor pools.
C	Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.
D	Arms, ammunition, and explosives.
E	Controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items.
F	Communications/electronics; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment; night vision devices; and other high-value precision equipment and tool kits.
G	Organizational clothing and individual equipment stored at central issue facilities.
H	Subsistence items at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence facilities.
I	Repair parts at installation level supply activities and direct support units with authorized stockage lists.
J	Facilities engineering supplies and construction material.
K	Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices.
L	Miscellaneous pilferable assets.
M	Mission-critical or high-risk personnel.
N	General military/civilian population.
O	Industrial and utility equipment.
P	Controlled cryptographic items.

c. *STEP 3*: Determine asset value. Evaluate the appropriate asset

value rating factors and determine the asset value rating for each asset as described in chapter 3.

d. *STEP 4*: Determine likelihood of aggression. For each applicable aggressor type and for each asset, evaluate the appropriate likelihood rating factors as described in chapter 4. Determine the highest likelihood ratings for criminals and terrorists as described in chapter 4.

e. *STEP 5*: Determine the risk levels for assets. Use table 2-2 to determine risk levels for each asset based on its value rating and the likelihood ratings for criminals and terrorists as determined in chapters 3 and 4. Read the matrix (table 2-2) across from the applicable value rating and down from the applicable likelihood rating. The risk level is at the intersection of the two ratings. Enter the risk levels for criminals and terrorists in the spaces provided on DA Form 7278-R. Figure 2-1 is an example of a completed analysis.

f. *STEP 6*: Refer to AR 190-11 or AR 190-51 as appropriate, using the risk levels to determine required protective measures.

Table 2-2
Risk Level Matrix

Value Rating	Low	Low	Very Medium	High	High
Very Low	I	I	I	II	II
Low	I	I	II	II	II
Medium	I	II	II	II	III
High	II	II	II	III	III
Very High	II	II	III	III	III

**Table 3-1
Asset Value Rating Factor Table Applicability—Continued**

Asset Category	Applicable Table Numbers			
I. Repair parts at installation level supply activities and direct support units with authorized stock-age lists	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-10
J. Facilities engineering supplies and construction material	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-10
K. Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-10
L. Miscellaneous pilferable assets	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-10
M. Mission-critical or high-risk personnel	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-11
N. General civilian/military population	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-11
O. Industrial/utility equipment	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-10
P. Controlled cryptographic items	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-12

3-3. Value rating factors

a. Criticality to Army's mission. This factor addresses the criticality of the asset in its support of the Army's capability to mobilize and fight a war. Considering this factor ensures that assets which are critical to Army readiness receive highest priority. Evaluate this factor using table 3-2.

**Table 3-2
Criticality to Army's Mission**

Criticality	Value Rating Factor
Asset's loss would have negligible impact on Army's mission.	0
Asset's loss would have minor impact on Army's mission	1
Asset's loss would have moderate impact on Army's mission	2
Asset's loss would have significant impact on Army's mission.	3
Asset is mission-critical to the Army. Loss would have serious impact on the Army's mission.	4
Asset is mission-essential to the Army. Loss cannot be tolerated.	5

b. Criticality to user's mission. This factor addresses the criticality of the asset in its support of its user's mission. It accounts for the fact that some assets may be critical to their user's mission, but not to the overall Army mission. An example of such an asset would be kitchen equipment in an officers' club. The equipment may be critical to the club's mission, but is unlikely to be critical to the war fighting mission of the installation's tenant units. Evaluate this factor using table 3-3.

**Table 3-3
Criticality to User's Mission**

Criticality	Value Rating Factor
Asset's loss would have negligible impact on user's mission.	0
Asset's loss would have minor impact on user's mission.	1
Asset's loss would have moderate impact on user's mission.	2
Asset's loss would have significant impact on user's mission.	3
Asset is mission-critical to the user. Loss would have serious impact on user's mission.	4
Asset is mission-essential to the user. User could not carry out mission without it.	5

c. Asset replaceability. This factor addresses the time required to replace assets which have been compromised. Replacement can be either in-kind or with a reasonable substitute and can be either temporary or permanent. This factor accounts for the impact of delay in replacement of assets on the user's mission. Evaluate this factor using table 3-4.

**Table 3-4
Asset Replaceability**

Replaceability	Value Rating Factor
Asset can be replaced within 0 to 5 days.	0
Asset can be replaced within 6 to 30 days.	1
Asset can be replaced within 31 to 90 days.	2
Asset can be replaced within 91 to 180 days.	3
Asset replacement will require more than 180 days.	4
Asset replacement is inapplicable. Possession by other than user would harm U.S. interests far beyond immediate user or asset cannot be replaced.	5

d. Relative asset value. This factor provides a measure of the relative value of an asset based on the cost of the asset or other measures of value appropriate for particular asset categories. Different tables are used to evaluate the relative values of different asset categories in the most appropriate ways of measuring value for the various asset categories. The applicable tables are indicated in table 3-1. Write the number of the table chosen in the space provided on DA Form 7278-R

(1) *Relative value of aircraft.* The relative value of aircraft and components at Army aviation facilities is measured based on the number of aircraft and the presence of attack aircraft. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-5.

**Table 3-5
Relative Value of Aircraft**

Asset Characteristics	Value Rating Factor
Fewer than 10 aircraft are assigned to the aviation facility. No attack aircraft are assigned.	1
Fewer than 10 aircraft are assigned to the aviation facility. Aircraft include attack aircraft.	2
Ten or more aircraft are assigned to the aviation facility. No attack aircraft are assigned.	4
Ten or more aircraft are assigned to the aviation facility. Aircraft include attack aircraft.	5

(2) *Relative value of vehicles.* The relative value of vehicles and

carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems and components at Army motor pools is based on the number of vehicles and the presence of tactical vehicles and vehicles with carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-6.

**Table 3-6
Relative Value of Vehicles**

Asset Characteristics	Value Rating Factor
Fewer than 20 vehicles are parked in the motor pool. Vehicles do not include tactical vehicles or carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems.	1
Fewer than 20 vehicles are parked in the motor pool. Vehicles include tactical vehicles but do not include carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems.	2
Fewer than 20 vehicles are parked in the motor pool. Vehicles include carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems.	3
Twenty or more vehicles are parked in the motor pool. Vehicles do not include tactical vehicles or carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems.	3
Twenty or more vehicles are parked in the motor pool. Vehicles include tactical vehicles but do not include carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems.	4
Twenty or more vehicles are parked in the motor pool. Vehicles include carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems.	5

(3) *Relative value of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)*. The relative value of POL is based on the quantity being stored. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-7.

**Table 3-7
Relative Value of Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL)**

Asset Characteristics	Value Rating Factor
Quantity of POL stored at facility is less than 50,000 gallons.	1
Quantity of POL stored at facility is greater than or equal to 50,000 gallons and less than 150,000 gallons.	2
Quantity of POL stored at facility is greater than or equal to 150,000 gallons and less than 500,000 gallons.	3
Quantity of POL stored at facility is greater than or equal to 500,000 gallons and less than 1 million gallons.	4
Quantity of POL stored at facility is greater than or equal to 1 million gallons.	5

(4) *Relative value of arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E)*. The relative value of AA&E in bulk or unit level storage is based on the risk category of the AA&E as identified in AR 190-11. Quantity is accounted for in considering the mission criticality of the asset to the Army and the user. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-8.

**Table 3-8
Relative Value of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)**

Asset Category	Value Rating Factor
Uncategorized	1
Category IV	2
Category III	3
Category II	4

**Table 3-8
Relative Value of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)—Continued**

Asset Category	Value Rating Factor
Category I	5

(5) *Relative value of controlled substances*. Relative value of controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items is measured by their Drug Enforcement Agency designations, their designation as sensitive items, and whether they are stored in a pharmacy, ward, or clinic; research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E) facility; or in bulk storage. Contact the appropriate medical personnel to determine their sensitivities. Quantity is accounted for in considering the mission criticality of the asset to the Army and the user. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-9.

**Table 3-9
Relative Value of Controlled Medical Substances and Other Medical Sensitive Items**

Asset Description	Value Rating Factor
Non-sensitive pharmaceuticals and medical items.	1
Medically sensitive items in pharmacy, ward, clinic, or RDT&E facilities.	2
Medically sensitive items in bulk storage facilities.	3
Note R controlled substances (includes Schedule I drugs) or note Q controlled substances in pharmacy, ward, clinic, or RDT&E facilities.	4
Note R controlled substances (includes Schedule I drugs) or note Q controlled substances in bulk storage facilities.	5

(6) *Relative value of other assets*. Relative value of assets not included in the tables above (except people as assets) is evaluated based upon the monetary value of the asset. The monetary value may be determined for an inventory of assets or for individual assets, whichever is most appropriate for the quantity of the assets present in the inspectable area being analyzed. Actual quantity of the assets is accounted for in considering the mission criticality of the assets to the Army and the user. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-10.

**Table 3-10
Relative Value of Other Assets**

Asset Characteristics	Value Rating Factor
Value of asset inventory is less than \$50,000 or value of individual asset is less than \$5,000.	0
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$50,000 and less than \$100,000 or value of individual asset is greater than or equal to \$5,000 and less than \$10,000.	1
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$100,000 and less than \$250,000 or value of individual asset is greater than or equal to \$10,000 and less than \$25,000.	2
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$250,000 and less than \$500,000 or value of individual asset is greater than or equal to \$25,000 and less than \$50,000.	3
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$500,000 and less than \$1,000,000 or value of individual asset is greater than or equal to \$50,000 and less than \$100,000.	4

Table 3-10
Relative Value of Other Assets—Continued

Asset Characteristics	Value Rating Factor
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$1,000,000 or value of individual asset is greater than or equal to \$100,000.	5

(7) *Relative value of people as assets.* Relative value of people as assets is evaluated based on the number of people present in the area being analyzed because establishing a monetary value for human lives is impractical. Separate scales are provided for mission-critical and high-risk personnel and the general military and civilian population to account for basic differences in their relative value. Further consideration of relative importance of people is accounted for in their mission criticality to the Army and the user. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-11 and using the most appropriate scale for the asset being analyzed.

Table 3-11
Relative Value of People as Assets

Probable Level of Occupancy	Value Rating Factor
Number of mission-critical or high-risk personnel in facility is likely to be fewer than three or general population in facility is likely to be fewer than 10.	1
Number of mission-critical or high-risk personnel in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 3 and fewer than 10 or general population in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 10 and fewer than 30.	2
Number of mission-critical or high-risk personnel in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 10 and fewer than 20 or general population in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 30 and fewer than 60.	3
Number of mission-critical or high-risk personnel in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 20 and fewer than 30 or general population in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 60 and fewer than 100.	4
Number of mission-critical or high-risk personnel in facility is likely to be greater than or equal to 30 or general population in facility is likely to be greater than 100.	5

(8) *Relative value of controlled cryptographic items.* The relative value of controlled cryptographic items is determined based on the degree of sensitivity of the information processed with the equipment. Evaluate relative value of these assets using table 3-12.

Table 3-12
Relative Value of Controlled Cryptographic Items

Information Sensitivity	Value Rating Factor
For Official Use Only	1
Confidential	2
Secret	3
Top Secret	4
Sensitive Compartmented Information	5

3-4. Establishing asset value rating

Establish the value rating for assets using the results of evaluating the individual value rating factors. Sum the numerical values associated with the four applicable factors (Army mission criticality, user mission criticality, replaceability, and relative value) and compare the sum to the ranges of sums in table 3-13. Select a resultant value

rating of very low, low, medium, high, or very high. Enter the applicable sum and value rating in the spaces provided on DA Form 7278-R. Continue this procedure by proceeding to chapter 4.

Table 3-13
Asset Value Rating

Sum of Value Rating Factors	Value Rating
0 to 5	Very Low (VL)
6 to 9	Low (L)
10 to 13	Medium (M)
14 to 17	High (H)
18 to 20	Very High (VH)

Chapter 4

Likelihood determination

4-1. Measurement of likelihood

a. The likelihood that a given aggressor will attempt to compromise an asset is evaluated using the likelihood rating factors below. These factors measure the value of the asset to the aggressor. The first three factors are:

- (1) Asset profile.
- (2) Asset usefulness to aggressor.
- (3) Asset availability.

b. The second three factors measure the history of or potential for incidents. These factors are:

- (1) Local incidents in the past.
- (2) Nearby incidents in the past.
- (3) Potential for future incidents.

c. The last three factors measure the vulnerability of the asset. These factors are weighted to emphasize vulnerability because usually only the vulnerability of an asset can be changed through security measures. The asset's value to an aggressor and the history of or potential for incidents are difficult to control. Weighing the likelihood factors related to vulnerability allows the user of this procedure to decrease the risk level through applying security measures. These vulnerability factors are:

- (1) Asset accessibility.
- (2) Effectiveness of law enforcement.
- (3) Deterrence.

4-2. Evaluation procedure

a. *Select applicable aggressors.* Use table 4-1 to determine the aggressors that have the potential to be a threat to the asset. Eliminate those that are known not to be a threat at the location being analyzed. Enter a check mark for each applicable aggressor in the spaces provided on DA Form 7278-R.

b. *Evaluate likelihood of aggression.* For each potential aggressor, evaluate each of the nine likelihood rating factors using the applicable likelihood rating tables in paragraph 4-3. Use table 4-2 to determine which likelihood rating tables apply for each asset category. Select the entry from each of the applicable likelihood rating tables which most closely applies to the aggressor and the asset. Record the numerical values for the likelihood rating factors for each aggressor in the appropriate spaces on DA Form 7278-R.

c. *Establish likelihood ratings.* Refer to guidance in paragraph 4-4.

**Table 4-1
Potential Aggressors Selection Table**

Asset Category	Aggressor							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
A. Aircraft and components at Army aviation facilities.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
B. Vehicles and carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems and components at Army motor pools.	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
C. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.	X	X			X	X	X	X
D. Arms, ammunition, and explosives.	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
E. Controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items.	X	X	X					
F. Communications or electronics; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment; night vision devices; and other high value precision equipment; and tool kits.	X	X	X					
G. Organizational clothing and individual equipment stored at central issue facilities.	X	X						
H. Subsistence items at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence facilities.	X	X						
I. Repair parts at installation level supply activities and direct support units with authorized stockage units.	X	X						
J. Facilities engineering supplies and construction devices.	X	X						
K. Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices.	X	X						
L. Miscellaneous pilferable assets.	X	X	X					
M. Mission-critical or high risk personnel.					X	X	X	X
N. General civilian or military population.					X	X	X	X
O. Industrial or utility equipment.				X	X	X	X	X
P. Controlled cryptographic equipment.		X	X					

Key:
8. Paramilitary OCONUS terrorists.

**Table 4-2
Likelihood Rating Factor Table Applicability**

Asset	Applicable Table Numbers				
	1	2	3	4	5
A. Aircraft and components at Army aviation facilities.	4-3 4-10	a* 4-11	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-18	4-9
B. Vehicles and carriage-mounted or towed weapons systems and components at Army motor pools.	4-3 4-10	a* 4-11	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-18	4-9
C. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.	4-3 4-10	a* 4-12	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-18	4-9
D. Arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E).	4-3 4-10	b* c*	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
E. Controlled medical substances and other medically sensitive items.	4-3 4-10	4-4 4-15	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
F. Communications or electronics; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment; night vision devices; and other high value precision equipment and tool kits.	4-3 4-10	4-4 4-15	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
G. Organizational clothing and individual equipment stored at central issue facilities.	4-3 4-10	4-4 4-15	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
H. Subsistence items at commissaries, commissary warehouses, and troop issue subsistence facilities.	4-3 4-10	4-4 4-15	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
I. Repair parts at installation level supply activities and direct support units with authorized stockage lists.	4-3 4-10	4-4 4-15	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
J. Facilities engineering supplies and construction material.	4-3 4-10	4-4 d*	4-7 4-17	4-8 e*	4-9
K. Audiovisual equipment, training devices, and subcaliber devices.	4-3 4-10	4-4 4-15	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
L. Miscellaneous pilferable assets.	4-3 4-10	4-4 d*	4-7 4-17	4-8 e*	4-9
M. Mission-critical or high-risk personnel.	4-3 4-10	4-6 4-16	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9
N. General civilian or military population.	4-3 4-10	4-6 4-16	4-7 4-17	4-8 4-19	4-9

**Table 4-2
Likelihood Rating Factor Table Applicability—Continued**

Asset	Applicable Table Numbers				
O. Industrial or utility equipment.	4-3	4-6	4-7	4-8	4-9
	4-10	4-16	4-17	e*	
P. Controlled cryptographic items.	4-3	4-4	4-7	4-8	4-9
	4-10	4-15	4-17	4-19	

Notes:

- A* Select table 4-4 for criminals and table 4-6 for terrorists, vandals or activists, and extremist protest groups.
- B* Select table 4-4 if the aggressor's goal is likely to be to sell the AA&E and select table 4-5 if the aggressor's goal is likely to be to use the AA&E in future activities.
- C* Select table 4-13 where the AA&E is in bulk storage and select table 4-14 where the AA&E is in unit level storage.
- D* Select table 4-12 where the asset is stored outside and select table 4-15 where the asset is stored inside.
- E* Select table 4-18 where the asset is stored outside and select table 4-19 where the asset is stored inside.

4-3. Likelihood rating factors

a. Asset profile. This factor addresses the public's likely awareness of the asset's existence and its visibility to them in terms of their perception of its importance or value. Evaluate this factor for each aggressor using table 4-3.

**Table 4-3
Asset Profile**

Level of Visibility	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset has very low visibility. Aggressor is probably not aware of its existence.	1
Asset has low visibility. Existence of asset is probably not well known to aggressor.	2
Asset has medium visibility. Existence of asset is probably known to aggressor.	3
Asset has high visibility. Existence of asset is probably well known to aggressor.	4

**Table 4-3
Asset Profile—Continued**

Level of Visibility	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset has very high visibility. Existence of asset is obvious to aggressor.	5

b. Asset usefulness to aggressor. This factor assesses the usefulness of the asset to potential aggressors. Usefulness is measured based on the asset's cash value, its direct applicability to the aggressor's goals, or its publicity value. Apply likelihood rating tables 4-4 through 4-6 as indicated in table 4-2 or as appropriate according to the likely goals of each aggressor type toward the asset. Enter the number of the table selected in the space provided on DA Form 7278-R.

(1) *Usefulness for assets with cash value.* Use table 4-4 to evaluate asset usefulness where aggressors are most likely to attempt to compromise the asset because of its potential monetary value to them. Note that the numerical values differ for different aggressor types.

**Table 4-4
Usefulness for Assets With Cash Value**

Asset Characteristics	Likelihood Rating Factor			Terrorists
	Unsophisticated Criminals	Sophisticated Criminals	Organized Criminal Groups	
Value of asset inventory is less than \$50,000 or individual asset value is less than \$5,000.	3	1	0	1
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$50,000 and less than \$100,000 or individual asset value is greater than or equal to \$5,000 and less than \$10,000.	4	2	1	2
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$100,000 and less than \$250,000 or individual asset value is greater than or equal to \$10,000 and less than \$25,000.	5	3	2	3
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$250,000 and less than \$500,000 or individual asset value is greater than or equal to \$25,000 and less than \$50,000.	5	4	3	4
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$500,000 and less than \$1,000,000 or individual asset value is greater than or equal to \$50,000 and less than \$100,000.	4	5	4	5
Value of asset inventory is greater than or equal to \$1,000,000 or individual asset value is greater than or equal to \$100,000.	3	5	5	5

(2) *Usefulness for assets with direct application to aggressor's goals.* Use table 4-5 to evaluate usefulness where aggressors are most likely to attempt to compromise the asset to use it directly in

future activities. An example of this would be stealing arms to use them in a future terrorist act.

**Table 4-5
Usefulness for Assets with Direct Application to Aggressor's Goals**

Level of Usefulness to Aggressor	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset has no usefulness to aggressor's immediate or future goals.	0

**Table 4-5
Usefulness for Assets with Direct Application to Aggressor's Goals—Continued**

Level of Usefulness to Aggressor	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset has minor usefulness to aggressor's immediate or future goals.	1
Asset has moderate usefulness to aggressor's immediate or future goals.	2
Asset has significant usefulness to aggressor's immediate or future goals.	3
Asset is highly useful to aggressor's immediate or future goals.	4
Asset is critical to aggressor's immediate or future goals.	5

(3) *Usefulness for assets with publicity value.* Use table 4-6 to evaluate usefulness where aggressors are most likely to attempt to compromise an asset because of the potential publicity its compromise would generate.

**Table 4-6
Usefulness for Assets with Publicity Value**

Aggressor's Estimation of Asset's Publicity Value	Likelihood Rating Factor
Aggressor is likely to believe asset's loss would result in insignificant publicity.	0
Aggressor is likely to believe asset's loss would result in minor publicity.	1
Aggressor is likely to believe asset's loss would result in moderate publicity.	2
Aggressor is likely to believe asset's loss would result in significant publicity.	3
Aggressor is likely to believe asset's loss would result in considerable publicity.	4
Aggressor is likely to believe asset's loss would result in worldwide publicity.	5

c. *Asset availability.* This factor addresses the availability of the asset or similar assets at places other than in the inspectable area under consideration. Evaluate this factor for each aggressor using table 4-7.

**Table 4-7
Asset Availability**

Determination of Availability	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset is widely available off the installation.	1
Asset has limited availability off the installation.	2
Asset is widely available on the installation but is not available off the installation.	3
Asset has limited availability on the installation but is not available off the installation.	4
Asset is only available at this location on or off the installation.	5

d. *Local incidents in the past.* This factor addresses the history of attempts by the applicable aggressor to compromise similar assets at the installation on which the asset is located or in the immediate

vicinity of the installation. Evaluate this factor for each aggressor using table 4-8.

**Table 4-8
Local Incidents in the Past**

Number of Incidents at the Same Installation in the Past	Likelihood Rating Factor
There were no incidents involving similar assets on this installation or in its immediate vicinity in the past 3 years.	1
There was one incident involving similar assets on this installation or in its immediate vicinity in the past 3 years.	2
There were two or three incidents involving similar assets on this installation or in its immediate vicinity in the past three years.	3
There were four or five incidents involving similar assets on this installation or in its immediate vicinity in the past three years.	4
There were more than five incidents involving similar assets at this installation or in its immediate vicinity in the past 3 years.	5

e. *Nearby incidents in the past.* This factor addresses the history of attempts by the applicable aggressor to compromise similar assets on or around other installations in the same general geographic area as the installation on which the asset is located. Establish the general geographic area appropriate for the installation. Unless otherwise indicated, use the numbered armies in the continental United States (CONUSA) areas to indicate the geographic areas within CONUS. However, when an installation is located near the boundary of an Army area, include part of the adjacent Army area as the applicable geographic area. Use national boundaries to determine geographic areas OCONUS. Evaluate this factor for each aggressor using table 4-9.

**Table 4-9
Nearby Incidents in the Past**

Number of Incidents in the Same Geographic Area in the Past	Likelihood Rating Factor
There were no incidents involving similar assets on or around installations in the geographic area in the past 3 years.	1
There was one incident involving similar assets on or around installations in the geographic area in the past 3 years.	2
There were two or three incidents involving similar assets on or around installations in the geographic area in the past 3 years.	3
There were four or five incidents involving similar assets on or around installations in the geographic area in the past 3 years.	4
There were more than five incidents involving similar assets on or around installations in the geographic area in the past 3 years.	5

f. *Potential for future incidents.* This factor addresses the probability that aggressors will attempt to compromise the asset in the future. Evaluate this factor for each aggressor using table 4-10.

**Table 4-10
Potential for Future Incidents**

Determination of Probability for Future Incidents	Likelihood Rating Factors
It is unlikely there will be any future incidents involving this asset on this installation.	1
There is some possibility there will be a future incident involving this asset at this installation.	2

**Table 4-10
Potential for Future Incidents—Continued**

Determination of Probability for Future Incidents	Likelihood Rating Factors
It is probable there will be a future incident involving this asset at this installation.	3
It is likely there will be a future incident involving this asset at this installation.	4
It is very likely there will be a future incident involving this asset at this installation.	5

g. Asset accessibility. This factor addresses any protective measures which are in place for existing facilities or planned for new facilities. Accessibility is assessed differently depending on the asset category and either how the assets are usually stored or upon the effectiveness of protective layers. Where referenced, installing intrusion detection systems (IDS) to facilitate delay is accomplished by detecting the aggressor outside the barriers that provide delay. Lightweight construction refers to construction other than reinforced concrete or masonry (concrete block or clay brick) such as wood or metal siding. Apply likelihood rating tables 4-11 through 4-16 as indicated in table 4-2. Enter the number of the selected table in the space provided on DA Form 7278-R.

**Table 4-11
Accessibility of Aircraft and Vehicles**

Type of Storage Area	Likelihood Rating Factors
Aircraft or vehicles are stored within locked hangars or garages with IDS or on-site guards, a perimeter fence or wall, and security lighting.	0
Aircraft or vehicles are stored within a fenced or walled area with security lighting and IDS or on-site guards.	2
Aircraft or vehicles are not stored within a fenced or walled area but are guarded by on-site guards.	4
Aircraft or vehicles are stored within a fenced or walled area with security lighting. Roving patrols check the area hourly.	4
Aircraft or vehicles are stored within a fenced or walled area with security lighting.	6
Aircraft or vehicles are stored within a fenced or walled area.	8
Aircraft or vehicles are not stored within a fenced or walled area and have no on-site guards.	10

**Table 4-12
Accessibility of Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL) and Assets in Outside Storage Areas**

Type of Storage Area	Likelihood Rating Factor
Storage is within a fenced or walled area with security lighting and IDS or on-site guards.	2
Storage is within a fenced or walled area with security lighting. Roving patrols check the area hourly.	4
Storage is within a fenced or walled area with security lighting.	6
Storage is within a fenced or walled area.	8
Storage area is not fenced or walled.	10

**Table 4-13
Accessibility of Bulk Storage of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)**

Type of Storage	Likelihood Rating Factor
AA&E is stored in standard magazines within a fenced or walled area with security lighting and is monitored by IDS installed to facilitate delay after detection or is under constant surveillance.	2
AA&E is stored in standard magazines within a fenced or walled area and is monitored with IDS installed to facilitate delay after detection or is under constant surveillance.	4
AA&E is stored in standard magazines within a fenced or walled area with security lighting. Roving patrols check the area hourly.	6
AA&E is not stored in standard magazines. The area is fenced or walled with security lighting. AA&E is monitored by IDS or is under constant surveillance.	8
AA&E is not stored in standard magazines. The area is fenced or walled with security lighting. Roving patrols check the area hourly.	10

**Table 4-14
Accessibility of Unit Level Storage of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)**

Type of Storage	Likelihood Rating Factor
AA&E is stored in a standard magazine or arms room and is monitored by IDS installed to facilitate delay after detection or is under constant surveillance. The facility or magazine is within a fenced or walled area with security lighting or building exterior lighting.	2
AA&E is stored in a standard magazine within a fenced or walled area or in a standard arms room and is monitored with IDS installed to facilitate delay after detection or is under constant surveillance.	4
AA&E is stored in a standard magazine within a fenced or walled area with security lighting or in a standard arms room in a facility with exterior lighting. The area is checked hourly by a roving patrol.	6
AA&E is not stored in a standard magazine or arms room. It is stored within a fenced or walled area with perimeter lighting or in a facility with exterior lighting. The area is checked hourly by a roving patrol.	8
AA&E is not stored in a standard magazine or arms room. The area is checked by a roving patrol.	10

**Table 4-15
Accessibility of Other Assets Stored Inside Facilities**

Type of Storage	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset is located within multiple protective layers capable of providing delay. One of the protective layers is a safe or vault. IDS is installed to facilitate delay after detection or there is an on-site guard.	2
Asset is located within multiple protective layers capable of providing delay. IDS is installed to facilitate delay after detection or there is an on-site guard.	4
Asset is located within only one protective layer capable of providing delay and is monitored by IDS or an on-site guard.	6
Asset is located within only one protective layer capable of providing delay. The facility is checked hourly by a roving patrol.	8

Table 4-15
Accessibility of Other Assets Stored Inside Facilities—Continued

Type of Storage	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset is located within only one protective layer capable of providing delay.	10

Table 4-16
Accessibility of Assets Subject to Destruction, Death, or Injury

Location of Asset	Likelihood Rating Factor
Asset is located within the interior of a reinforced concrete or masonry building within a fenced or walled area with perimeter IDS or on-site guards.	2
Asset is located within the interior of a reinforced concrete or masonry building within a fenced or walled area.	4
Asset is located within a reinforced concrete or masonry building.	6
Asset is located within a building of lightweight construction.	8
Asset is located within a fenced or walled area.	10

h. Effectiveness of law enforcement. This factor addresses the general attitude of the local populace regarding their respect for and cooperation with the law enforcement community and the effectiveness of local law enforcement. Effectiveness of law enforcement includes the quality of law enforcement personnel and the presence of an effective response force. Evaluate this factor for each aggressor using table 4-17.

Table 4-17
Effectiveness of Law Enforcement

Perceived Regard for Law Enforcement	Likelihood Rating Factor
Law enforcement is extremely effective. Local populace has very high respect for law and police.	2
Law enforcement is highly effective. Local populace has high respect for law and police.	4
Law enforcement is moderately effective. Local populace has moderate respect for law and police.	6
Law enforcement is mostly ineffective. Local populace has low respect for law and police.	8
Law enforcement is ineffective. Local populace has very little respect for law and police.	10

i. Deterrence. This factor addresses the aggressors' perception of the possibility that they will successfully compromise the asset and escape based upon obvious protective measures which tend to have a deterrent effect. Use table 4-18 or 4-19 for each aggressor as indicated in table 4-2 or depending upon whether the asset is stored

outside or inside. Enter the number of the table selected in the space provided on DA Form 7278-R.

Table 4-18
Deterrence for Aircraft, Vehicles, POL, and Assets in Outside Storage

Aggressor's Perception of the Possibility of Success	Likelihood Rating Factor
Aggressor would perceive a very low possibility of success and escape. Asset appears to be heavily protected. Asset is stored within a storage structure. Obvious protective measures include fencing or a perimeter wall, security lighting, access control, and either guards or IDS and closed-circuit television (CCTV).	2
Aggressor would perceive a low possibility of success and escape. Asset appears to be well protected. Obvious protective measures include fencing or a perimeter wall, security lighting, access control, and either guards or IDS and CCTV.	4
Aggressor would perceive a medium possibility of success and escape. There are some visible protective measures, including fencing or a perimeter wall, security lighting, and guard patrols at hourly intervals.	6
Aggressor would perceive a high possibility of success and escape. There are few visible protective measures. Storage area is fenced or walled.	8
Aggressor would perceive a very high possibility of success and escape. There are no visible protective measures.	10

Table 4-19
Deterrence for Assets Stored Inside Facilities

Aggressor's Perception of the Possibility of Success	Likelihood Rating Factor
Aggressor would perceive a very low possibility of success and escape. Asset appears to be heavily protected. The building housing the asset is constructed of reinforced concrete or masonry, it has window barriers or is windowless, and has heavy steel doors. Obvious protective measures include fencing or a perimeter wall, security lighting, access control, and guards or IDS and CCTV.	2
Aggressor would perceive a low possibility of success and escape. Asset appears to be well protected. The building housing the asset is constructed of reinforced concrete or masonry, it has window barriers or is windowless, and has heavy steel doors. Obvious protective measures include fencing or a perimeter wall, security lighting, and IDS.	4
Aggressor would perceive a moderate possibility of success and escape. The building housing the asset is constructed of reinforced concrete or masonry, it has window barriers or is windowless, and has heavy steel doors. There are some visible protective measures, including exterior lighting and hourly guard patrols.	6
Aggressor would perceive a high possibility of success and escape. The building housing the asset is of lightweight construction and has window barriers or is windowless. There are few visible protective measures. Only building entrances are lit.	8
Aggressors would perceive a very high possibility of success and escape. The building housing the asset is of lightweight construction without window barriers. There are no visible protective measures.	10

4-4. Establishing likelihood rating

Establish the likelihood rating for each aggressor using the results of evaluating the individual likelihood rating factors.

a. *Determine overall likelihood ratings.* Sum the numerical values associated with the nine likelihood factors for each applicable aggressor and compare the sums with the ranges of sums in table 4–20 to determine the overall likelihood ratings. Select a likelihood rating for each aggressor of very low, low, medium, high, or very high. Enter the applicable sums and likelihood ratings in the spaces provided in DA Form 7278–R.

b. *Determine highest likelihood ratings.* Determine the highest likelihood ratings among vandals/activists and the three types of criminals. Also determine the highest likelihood ratings among extremist protesters and the three types of terrorists. Enter the likelihood ratings for criminals and terrorists in the spaces provided on DA Form 7278–R. Return to step 5 as discussed in paragraph 2–3 to complete this procedure.

Table 4–20
Likelihood Rating

Sum of Likelihood Rating Factors	Likelihood Rating
11 to 17	Very Low (VL)
18 to 29	Low (L)
30 to 41	Medium (M)
42 to 53	High (H)
54 to 60	Very High (VH)

Appendix A References

Section I Required Publications

AR 190-11

Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (Cited in paras 1-4*b*, 2-2*a*, 2-3*f*, and 3-3*d*(4).)

AR 190-51

Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive) (Cited in paras 1-4*b*, 2-2*a*, and 2-3*f*.)

Section II Related Publications

AR 190-13

The Army Physical Security Program

AR 190-16

Physical Security

Section III Prescribed Forms

Forms that have been designated “approved for electronic generation (EG)” must replicate exactly the content (wording), format (layout), and sequence (arrangement) of the official printed form. The form number of the electronically generated form will be shown as -R-E and the date will be the same as the date of the current edition of the printed form.

Exact replication of any DA or DD forms prescribed in this pamphlet that are generated by the automated Military Police Management Information System may be used in place of the official printed version of the form.

DA Form 7278-R

Risk Level Worksheet (approved for EG)

Section IV Referenced Forms

This section contains no entries.

Glossary

This is the consolidated glossary for the Physical Security Handbook.

Section I

Abbreviations

AA&E

arms, ammunition, and explosives

AC

Active Component

ACSI

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

ADP

automatic data processing

AE

ammunition and explosives

AFB

Air Force Base

AFH

Army family housing

AFI

annual formal inspection

AFSPA

Air Force Security Police Agency

AG

Adjutant General

AGS

Armed Guard Surveillance

AIF

Army Industrial Funds

AMC

U.S. Army Material Command

AMDF

Army Master Data File

AP

acquisition plan

APSEAG

Army Physical Security Equipment Action Group

AR

Army regulation

ARDEC

U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center

ARNG

Army National Guard

ARSTAF

Army Staff

ASA (IL&E)

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

ASA (RDA)

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition)

ASI

additional skill identifier

ASI H3

ASI for physical security inspector

ASI P7

ASI for patrol/narcotics or contraband detector dog handler

ASI Z6

ASI for patrol/explosives detector dog handler

ASL

authorized stockage list

ASP

ammunition supply point

AT

antiterrorism

ATC

Air Training Command

ATCOM

U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command

BASOPS

base operations

BATF

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

BCU

battery coolant unit

BRDEC

Belvoir Research & Development Engineering Center

CB

close boundary

CBT/T

combatting terrorism

CCI

controlled cryptographic items

CCP

circulation control point

CCTV

closed circuit television

CDR

commander

CE

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

CECOM

U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command

C-E

communications-electronics

CFM

cubic feet per minute

CG

commanding general

CL

carload

CMP

Civilian Marksmanship Program

COA

Comptroller of the Army

COCO

contractor-owned, contractor-operated

COE

Chief of Engineers

COFC

container-on-flatcar

COMDT

commandant

COMSEC

communications security

CONEX

container express

CONUS

continental United States

CONUSA

the numbered armies in the Continental United States

CPA

Chief of Public Affairs

CPCO

Central Port Call Office

CPR

civilian personnel regulation

CQ

charge of quarters

CRC

U.S. Army Crime Records Center

CSS

Constant Surveillance Service

CT

counterterrorism

CUCV

commercial utility and cargo vehicle

DA

Department of the Army

DAPSRB

Department of the Army Physical Security Review Board

DCSINT

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

DCSLOG

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

DCSOPS

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

DCSPER

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DDPS

Dual Driver Protective Service

DEA

Drug Enforcement Administration

DEFCON

defense readiness condition

DEH

Director of Engineering and Housing

DLA

Defense Logistics Agency

DNA

Defense Nuclear Agency

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD

Department of Defense directive

DOL

Director of Logistics

DPDO

Defense Property Disposal Office

DRMO

Defense Reutilization Marketing Offices

DTS

Defense Transportation System

DUSD(P)

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

EDD

explosives detector dog

ENTNAC

Entrance National Agency Check

EOC

Emergency Operations Center

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FISO

Force Integration Staff Officer

FM

field manual

FMS

foreign military sales

FOA

field operating agency

FOB

free on board

FSC

Federal supply classification

FY

fiscal year

GBL

Government bill of lading

GOCO

Government-owned, contractor-operated

GOGO

Government-owned, Government-operated

GS

greater security

GSA

General Services Administration

GT

general technical aptitude area

GTR

Government transportation request

HQDA

Headquarters, Department of the Army

HQMC

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

HSP

high security padlock

HUMINT

human intelligence

ID

identification

IDS

intrusion detection system

IED

improvised explosive device

IES

Illuminating Engineering Society

ILS

integrated logistic support

INSCOM

U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

ITO

installation transportation office(r)

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JMSNS

Justification for Major System New Start

JROTC

Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

JRWG

Joint Requirements Working Group

J-SIDS

Joint-Service Interior Intrusion Detection System

JTAG

Joint Test Advisory Group

LAW

light antitank weapon

LCC

life cycle cost

LEA

law enforcement activity

LEC

law enforcement command

LIN

line item number

LOA

letter of agreement

LOI

Letter of Instruction

LR

letter requirement

LTC

lieutenant colonel

LTL

less than truckload

MAC

Military Airlift Command

MACOM

major Army command

MAJ

major

MATCU

military air traffic coordinating unit

MCA

major construction, Army

MEDCEN

U.S. Army Medical Center

MEDDAC

medical department activity

MEVA

mission essential or vulnerable area

MHE

materials handling equipment

MI

military intelligence

MILPO

military personnel office

MILSPEC

military specification

MILSTRIP

military standard requisitioning and issue procedures

MILVAN

military-owned demountable container

MIPR

military interdepartmental purchase request

MOS

military occupational specialty

MP

military police

MPA

military personnel, Army

MPI

Military Police Investigator

MSC

major subordinate command; Military Sealift Command

MSD

maximum stress diet

MSR

main supply route

MTOE/TDA

modified table of organization and equipment/table of distribution and allowances

MTMC

Military Traffic Management Command

MTX

Military Traffic Expediting Service

MUSAREC

major U.S. Army Reserve command

MWD

military working dog

NAF

non-appropriated fund

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC

nuclear, biological, and chemical

NBS

National Bureau of Standards

NCDD

narcotics/contraband detector dog

NCEL

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory

NCIC

National Crime Information Center

NCO

noncommissioned officer

NCOIC

noncommissioned officer in charge

NDA

National Defense Area

NDI

nondevelopmental item

NGR

National Guard regulation

NIS

Naval Investigative Service

NSN

national stock number

OACSI

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

OCE

Office of the Chief of Engineers

OCIE

organizational clothing and individual equipment

OCONUS

outside continental United States

OCPA

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

ODCSLOG

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

ODCSOPS

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

ODCSPER

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

ODUSDP

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

OJT

on-the-job training

OMA

Operation and Maintenance, Army

OMAR

Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve

OPA

Other Procurement, Army

OPLAN

operation plan

OPM

Office of Personnel Management

OPSEC

operations security

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

pam

pamphlet

PAO

public affairs officer

PAP

personnel assistance point

PARR

Program Analysis Resource Review

PCP

phencyclidine

PCS

permanent change of station

PDIP

Program Development Increment Package

PECIP

Productivity Enhancing Capitol Investment Program

PERSCOM

U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

PIF

productivity investment funding

PM

product manager; program manager; project manager; provost marshal

POC

point of contact

POD

port of debarkation

POE

port of embarkation

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

POV

privately-owned vehicle

PPBES

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System

PS

physical security

psi

pounds per square inch

PSC

physical security councils

PSE

physical security equipment

PSEAG

Physical Security Equipment Action Group

PSI

physical security inspector

PSS

Protective Security Service

PT

physical training

QPL

qualified products list

QRIP

Quick Return on Investment Program

RAM

reliability, availability, and maintainability

RAM-D

reliability, availability, maintainability, and durability

RC

Reserve component

RCS

reports control symbol

RDA

research, development, and acquisition

RDT&E

research, development, test, and evaluation

RDX

research department explosive

RESHIP

report of shipment

RF

radio frequency, response forces

RFP

request for proposal

ROC

required operational capability

ROTC

Reserve Officers' Training Corps

RSS

Rail Surveillance System

SCIF

sensitive compartmented information facilities

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

SF

standard form

SFC

sergeant first class

SGA

standards of grade authorization

SJA

Staff Judge Advocate

SIR

serious incident report

SOFA

Status of Forces Agreement

SOP

standing operating procedure

SQT

skills qualification test

SRT

special reaction team

SSG

staff sergeant

SSN

social security number

SSS

Signature Security Service

SSSC

self-service supply center

TAADS

The Army Authorization Documents System

TAG

The Adjutant General

TASA

television audio support activity

TASC

training and audiovisual support center

TB

technical bulletin

TC

training circular

TCE

Technical Center of Expertise

TCP

traffic control point

TDA

tables of distribution and allowances

TDP

technical data package

TDY

temporary duty

THC

tetrahydrocannabinol

THREATCON

terrorist threat condition

TISA

Troop Issue Subsistence Activity

tl

truckload

TM

technical manual

TMDE

test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment

TMF

threat management force

TNT

trinitrotoluene

TOFC

trailer-on-flatcar

TOVEX

water gel (explosive)

TRADOC

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSG

The Surgeon General

TSRWG

Tri-Service Requirements Working Group

TTS

technical training squadron

TTG

technical training group

TTW

technical training wing

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

UL

Underwriter Laboratories

USACE

U.S. Army Corps of Engineering

USACIDC

United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

USAF

United States Air Force

USAISC

U.S. Army Information Systems Command

USAMPS

U.S. Army Military Police School

USAR

U.S. Army Reserve

USAREUR

U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army

USC

United States Code

USMA

United States Military Academy

USS

United States standard

WSM-PSE

Weapons Systems Manager-Physical Security Equipment

WSN

weapon serial number

WTCA

Water Terminal Clearance Authority

Section II**Terms****Access (when pertaining to a restricted area or CCI)**

Personnel movement within a restricted area that allows the chance for visual observation of, or physical proximity to, either classified or protected materiel. It is also the ability and opportunity to obtain detailed knowledge of CCI through uncontrolled physical possession. External viewing or escorted proximity to CCI does not constitute access.

Aggressor

Any person seeking to compromise an asset. Aggressor categories include criminals, terrorists and protestors.

Ammunition

A device charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, riot control agents, chemical herbicides, smoke and flame, for use in connection with defense or offense, including demolition. Excluded from this definition are devices charged with chemical agents defined in JCS Pub. 1 and nuclear or biological materiel. Ammunition includes cartridges, projectiles, including missile rounds, grenades, mines, and pyrotechnics together with bullets, shot and their necessary primers, propellants, fuses, and detonators individually or having a unit of issue, container, or package weight of 100 pounds or less. Blank, inert training ammunition and caliber .22 ammunition are excluded.

Antiterrorism

Defensive measure used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by military forces.

Armed Guard Surveillance

A service that provides armed guards to maintain constant and specific surveillance of shipments for which the service is requested. "Armed" is defined as having a firearm and appropriate ammunition readily available for immediate use. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Arms

A weapon included in AR 190-11, appendix A, that will or is designated to expel a projectile or flame by the action of the explosive, and the frame or receiver of any such weapon.

Asset

Any resource requiring protection.

Aviation Facility

A department of the Army activity or area collocated with facilities for the takeoff and landing of aircraft. The facility has the mission of command and control of administrative, operational, training, and/or logistical support of Army aviation.

Badge

A security credential that is worn on the possessor's outer garment and validates (his or her) authority for access to a restricted area.

Bulk Storage

Storage in a facility above the using or dispensing level specifically applicable to logistics warehouse and depot stocks. This applies to activities using controlled medical substances and items (such as pharmacies, wards, or clinics) only when a separate facility (building or room) is used to store quantities that exceed normal operating stocks.

Cable Seal Lock

A seal in which the cable is passed through the locking hardware of a truck trailer or railcar door and the bullet nose is inserted into the barrel and the end of the cable until securely anchored. Once locked any force exerted to separate the lockpoint from the lockbody will strengthen its connection. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Carrier Custodian

An employee who has been assigned responsibility for controlled shipments containing SECRET material by the carrier and who has been issued a personnel security clearance by the Government. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Certification

The process whereby a patrol or detector dog's and handler's proficiency is verified to be in compliance with minimum training standards.

Chains

Chains used to secure racks or containers will be of heavy-duty, hardened steel chain, welded, straight-link steel. The steel will be galvanized of at least 5/16-inch thickness or of equal resistance required to force, to cut, or break an approved low security padlock. An example of such a chain is Type 1, Grade C, Class 4 NSN 4010-0-149-5583, NSN 4010-00-149-5575, or NSN 4010-00-171-4427.

Closed Circuit Television

Television that serves a number of different functions, one of which is physical security. As it pertains to the field of physical security, CCTV is used to augment, not replace, existing intrusion detection systems (IDS) or security patrols. It is not used as a primary sensor, but rather as a means of assessing alarms. CCTV also may be used as a surveillance means, but if used in this way, it will augment, not replace, existing IDS.

Closed post

An army installation or activity to which ground and water access is controlled at all times by perimeter barriers with limited, manned entry control points.

Closed vehicle or equipment

A conveyance that is fully enclosed with permanent sides and a permanent top, with installed doors that can be locked and sealed. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Combatting Terrorism

Actions, including AT and CT, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Commercial-type vehicle

A vehicle designed to meet civilian requirements, and used without major modifications, for routine purposes in connection with the transportation of supplies, personnel, or equipment.

Constant Surveillance Service

A service that is an integral part of the provisions of 49 CFR 397 (reference (b)) that a carrier must apply when transporting hazardous or Class A and B explosive materials. It provides constant surveillance over a shipment. The transporting conveyance containing the shipment must be attended at all times by a qualified representative of the carrier. A motor vehicle is "attended" when the person in charge of the vehicle is awake and not in a sleeper berth and

is within 100 feet of the vehicle, provided the vehicle is within the person's obstructed field of vision. The qualified representative "attending" the vehicle must:

- a. Be aware of the nature of the material contained in the vehicle.
- b. Have been instructed on procedures to follow in case of emergency.
- c. Be authorized to move the vehicle and have the means and capability to do so.

Note. CSS does not include a signature and tally service as provided under Signature Security Service (SSS). (DOD 5100.76-M)

Container Express

A reusable container for shipment of troop support cargo, quasi-military cargo, household goods, and personal baggage.

Containerization

A box or other device in which a number of packages are stored, protected, and handled as a unit in transit; for example, CONEX, MILVAN, and SEAVAN. This term also refers to the shipping system based on large cargo-carrying containers that can be easily interchanged between trucks, trains, and ships, without rehandling of contents. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Container on a flat car

A large box-like demountable body without undercarriage used to transport cargo that is mounted on a railroad flat car. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Constant Surveillance

Observing or protecting a storage facility containing AA&E by a human, intrusion detection system, closed circuit television, or combination, to prevent unobserved access, or make known any unauthorized access to the protected facility.

Continuous Surveillance

Constant unobstructed observance of items or an area to prevent unauthorized access. Continuous surveillance may be maintained by dedicated guards, other on-duty personnel, or intrusion detection systems and those enhanced by closed-circuit television.

Controlled Area

See restricted area.

Controlled cryptographic item

A secure telecommunications or information handling equipment ancillary device, or associated cryptographic component, which is unclassified but is controlled.

Controlled medical substance

A drug or other substance, or its immediate precursor, listed in current schedules of 21 USC 812 in medical facilities for the purpose of military treatment, therapy, or research. Categories listed in this section are narcotics, amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens.

Counterterrorism

Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Crime analysis

The process used to determine the essential features of a criminal act. It is a mandatory part of any crime prevention program.

Crime prevention

The anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk, and initiation of some action to remove or reduce it. Crime prevention is a direct crime control method that applies to before-the-fact efforts to reduce criminal opportunity, protect potential human victims, and prevent property loss.

Crime prevention inspection

An on-site evaluation of the crime prevention program of a unit, section, office, or other facility.

Crime risk management

The development of systematic approaches to reduce crime risks.

Crisis management team

A team found at a major command or installation level. A crisis management team is concerned with plan, procedures, techniques, policies, and controls for dealing with terrorism, special threats, or other major disruptions occurring on Government installations and facilities. A crisis management team considers all aspects of the incident and establishes contact with the AOC.

Critical communications facility

A communications facility that is essential to the continuity of operations of the National Command Authority during the initial phases of national emergencies, and other nodal points or elements designated as crucial to mission accomplishment.

Cryptographic component

The embodiment of a cryptographic logic in either hardware or firmware form, such as a modular assembly, a printed circuit board, a microcircuit, or any combination of these.

Cryptographic equipment

Any equipment employing a cryptographic logic.

Cryptographic logic

A deterministic logic by which information may be converted to an unintelligible form and reconverted to an intelligible form. Logic may take the form of engineering drawings, schematics, hardware, or firmware circuitry.

Day gate

Any barriers, used in a doorway or entrance to pharmacy or medically sensitive item storage areas, that prevents unauthorized personnel access during operating hours. Such barriers normally are not the sole protection afforded the entrance during nonoperating hours; however, during operating hours, the barrier ensures positive entry control by on-duty personnel (for example, electronic buzzer control entry to the area after positive identification by receptionist or on-duty personnel).

Dedicated guards

Individuals charged with performing the primary task of safeguarding designated facilities, material, and personnel within a defined area during a tour of duty. A dedicated guard may perform this function as a static post. He or she remains within or on the perimeter of a protected area and maintains continuous surveillance over that which is being protected during the tour of duty.

Defense Transportation System

Consists of military controlled terminal facilities, Military Airlift Command (MAC) controlled airlift, Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled or arranged sealift, and Government controlled air or land transportation. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Demilitarization

The act of destroying the offensive or defensive characteristics inherent in certain types of equipment and materiel. The term comprehends mutilation, scrapping, burning, or alteration designed so as to prevent the further use of such equipment and materiel for its originally intended military or lethal purpose.

Double-locked container

A steel container of not less than 26 gauge which is secured by an approved locking device and which encases an inner container that also is equipped with an approved locking device. Cabinet, medicine, combination with narcotic locker, NSN 6530-00-702-9240, or equivalent, meets requirements for a double-locked container.

Dromedary

A freight box carried on and securely fastened to the chassis of the tractor or on a flat-bed trailer. The dromedary is demountable by the use of a forklift truck, is protected by a plymetal shield, and is equipped with doors on each side that may be locked with seals or padlocks. All explosive items carried in the dromedary must be compatible and in compliance with 49 CFR 177 (ref (c)) or host nation regulations. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Dual Driver Protective Service

A service requiring SSS plus continuous attendance and surveillance of the shipment through the use of two drivers.

- a. The vehicle containing the shipment must be attended at all times by one of the drivers. A vehicle is attended

when at least one of the drivers is in the cab of the vehicle, awake, and not in a sleeper berth or is within 10 feet of the vehicle.

b. SSS signature and tally requirements are not required between the same pair of drivers for a particular movement. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Duress alarm system

A method by which authorized personnel can covertly communicate a situation of duress to a security control center or to other personnel in a position to notify a security control center. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Duress or holdup alarms

Devices which allow personnel on duty to transmit a signal to the alarm monitoring station from which an armed response force can be dispatched if a holdup or a duress situation occurs.

Emergency Aircraft

An aircraft designated by the commander to respond to emergency situations and provide life-saving and property-saving services. Normally, such aircraft has special equipment and markings. Air Ambulances and firefighting aircraft are examples.

Emergency vehicle

A vehicle designated by the commander to respond to emergency situations and provide life-saving and property-saving services. Normally, the vehicle has special equipment and markings. Ambulances and firefighting and military or security police vehicles are examples.

Enclosed vehicle or equipment

A conveyance that is fully enclosed with permanent sides and permanent top, with installed doors that can be locked and sealed.

Entry control (when pertaining to a restricted area)

Security actions, procedures, equipment, and techniques, employed within restricted areas to ensure that persons who are present in the areas at any time have authority and official reason for being there.

Escorted personnel (when pertaining to a restricted area)

Those persons authorized access to a restricted areas who are escorted at all times by a designated person.

Escorts and couriers

Military members, U.S. civilian employees, or DOD contractor employees responsible for the continuous surveillance and control over movements of classified material. Individuals designated as escorts and couriers must possess a Government-issued security clearance at least equal to that of the material being transported.

Exception

An approved permanent exclusion from specific requirements of this regulation. Exceptions will be based on a case-by-case determination and involve unique circumstances which make conformance to security standards impossible or highly impractical. An exception can also be an approved permanent deviation from the provisions of this regulation. There are two types of exceptions:

a. *Compensatory Measures Exception.* This is a deviation in which the standards are not being met, but the DOD component (HQDA(DAMO–ODL–S) concerned determines it is appropriate, because of physical factors and operational requirements. Compensatory measures are normally required.

b. *Equivalent Protection Exception.* This is a deviation in which nonstandard conditions exist, but the totality of protection afforded is equivalent to or better than that provided under standard criteria.

Exclusion area

See restricted area.

Exclusive use

A conveyance unit or vehicle that is used only for a shipment from origin to destination without transfer of lading, and that permits locking of the unit and use of seals. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Explosives

Any chemical compound, mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term includes, but is not limited to, individual land mines, demolition charges, blocks of explosives (dynamite,

trinitrotoluene (TNT), C-4, and other high explosives), and other explosives consisting of 10 pounds or more; for example, gunpowder or nitroguanidine.

Facility

Any single building, project, or site.

Force Protection

Security program developed to protect soldiers, civilian employees and family members, facilities and equipment, in all locations and situations. This is accomplished through the planned integration of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, protective services and law enforcement operations, all supported by foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.

Greater security (GS)

A seal tracing and inspection rail service for unclassified sensitive cargo that includes a military traffic expending (MTX) service and provides:

- a. Inspection of railcars at major terminals by railroad personnel for evidence of forced entry or tampering with seals or security devices.
- b. Name of carrier reporting.
- c. Time of inspection; that is, a.m. or p.m.
- d. Actual arrival and actual departure time from inspection terminal. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Handler

A military police person or DOD civilian guard or police person who has been qualified by training and certification to care for, train, and employ a military working dog.

Handling

Controlled physical possession without access.

High risk personnel

Personnel who, by their grade, assignment, value, location, or specific threat, are more likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets.

Independent power source

A power source, normally battery, independent of any other source (DOD 5100.76-M)

Industrial and utility equipment

Equipment used in the manufacture or in support of the manufacture of goods and equipment used to support the operation of utilities such as power and water distribution and treatment.

In flight

The condition of an aircraft from the moment when all external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened for disembarkation.

Installations

Such real properties as reserve centers, depots, arsenals, ammunition plants (both contractor- and Government-operated, hospitals, terminals, and other special mission facilities, as well as those used primarily by troops. (See also JCS Pub. 1)

Internal controls (when pertaining to a restricted area)

Security actions, procedures, and techniques employed within restricted areas to ensure persons who are present in these areas at any time have authority and official reason.

Intrusion detection system

The combination of electronic components, including sensors, control units, transmission lines, and monitoring units integrated to be capable of detecting one or more types of intrusion into the area protected by the system and reporting directly to an alarm monitoring station. The IDS will be an approved DOD standardized system, such as the Joint Service Interior Intrusion Detection System or MACOM-approved commercial equipment.

Justification for Major System New Start

A requirement document that the combat developer prepares with the material developer, training developer, manpower

and personnel planner, and logistician. A JMSNS is prepared to describe the mission need and justifies the acquisition of a major new system at program initiation in the acquisition cycle.

Kennel facilities

The buildings, the kennels, the runs, and the exercise and training areas which are used to house, care for, and train military working dogs.

Key and lock control system

A system of identifying both locks and their locations and personnel in possession of keys and/or combinations.

Keying

The process of establishing a sequence of random binary digits used to initially set up and periodically change permutations in cryptographic equipment for purpose of encrypting or decrypting electronic signals, for controlling transmission security processes, or for producing other keys.

King Tut block

A King Tut block is a specially designed large concrete block. It is placed in front of an igloo or magazine entrance with a fork lift. Access to the igloo or magazine therefore requires a fork lift to move the block. The King Tut block is of sufficient weight to prevent removal without a fork lift.

Letter of agreement

A document jointly prepared and signed by the combat and materiel developers when a potential materiel system need has been identified and it has been determined that one or more technological approaches may satisfy the need. Even though it may be in an early stage of development, the LOA will address the materiel system from the Total System Management standpoint. The LOA describes operational, technical, training, personnel, and logistical system unique events that must be undertaken to produce the total system.

Letter requirement

An abbreviated procedure for acquisition of low-unit cost, low-risk developmental, or commercial items. It will be used instead of the ROC when applicable. The total system definitive requirements for training, personnel, and logistics requirements are the same for the LR as for the ROC. The LR is jointly prepared by TRADOC and AMC.

Lightweight construction

Building construction other than reinforced concrete or masonry (concrete block or clay brick) such as wood or metal siding.

Limited access post

An Army installation or activity that meets one of the criteria below:

- a.* No permanent fences or other physical barriers exist, but entry can be temporarily closed to vehicular traffic and other movements using roads and other conventional points of entry.
- b.* Permanent perimeter barriers exist and access is controlled only after normal duty hours; for example, gates are secured or manned with guards after dark.
- c.* No permanent perimeter barriers exist, but vehicular traffic and other movements using roads and other conventional points of entry are continuously controlled.

Limited area

See restricted area.

Locked container

A container or room of substantial construction secured with an approved locking device. For pharmacy operating stocks, lockable automated counting systems meet requirements for a locked container.

Locking devices

- a.* Padlocks, military specifications MIL-P-43607 (High Security Padlock); shrouded shackle, NSN

5340-01-217-5068 or horizontal sliding bolt, NSN 5340-00-799-8248) or MIL-P-43951 (medium security padlock; regular shackle, NSN 5340-00-799-8016).

b. Padlocks, Commercial Item Description A-A-1927 (low security padlock) having a hardened steel shackle and body; NSN 5340-00-158-3807 (with chain), NSN 5340-00-158-3805 (without chain).

c. GSA-approved changeable three-position padlock, Federal Specification FF-P-110.

d. High security hasps. Military Specifications MIL-H-43905 or MIL-H-29181A.

e. Hasps and staples for low-security padlocks which are of heavy pattern steel, securely fastened to the structure with smooth-headed bolts, rivets, or welding to prevent removal.

Locks

Locks should be considered as delay devices only, not as positive bars to unauthorized entry, since any lock can be defeated by expert manipulation or force.

a. Padlocks

High security padlocks: Military Specification MIL-P-43607, shrouded shackle with clevis and chain, NSN 5340-01-217-5068 or NSN 5340-00-188-1560; horizontal sliding bolt with clevis and chain, NSN 5340-00-799-8248.

Medium security padlocks: Military Specification MIL-P-43951, open shackle with clevis and chain, NSN 5340-00-799-8016. Authorized for continued use to secure Categories III and IV AA&E only until stocks are depleted or replaced.

Low security padlocks: Commercial Item Description A-A-1927, hardened steel shackle and case, without chain: NSN 5340-00-158-3805; with chain: NSN 5340-00-158-3807.

(Any questions regarding the above specifications will be addressed to the DOD Lock Program Technical Manager, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Code C66, 560 Center Drive, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4328 (DSN 551-1567 or -1212).

b. Certain locks, such as high or medium security padlocks, provide excellent protection when used in conjunction with a high security hasp. Hasps installed for protection of AA&E will provide protection comparable to that given by the lock used. Determination of "comparable protection" will be addressed to the DOD Lock Program Technical Manager, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Code L56, 560 Center Drive, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4328 (DSN 551-1567 or -1212).

NAPEC high security shrouded hasp (MIL-H-29181A) is approved for use with the high security padlock to secure all categories of AA&E. The hasp has a cover that protects the lock from cutting or hammer tools and inclement weather. It should be used to secure Category I and II AA&E storage facilities. When replacement of a hasp on Category III, IV or uncategorized AA&E is necessary, this hasp should also be used. The Natick high security hasp (MIL-H-43905) is a high security hasp that also is approved for protection of Category III and IV AA&E when used with an approved high security padlock.

Hasp, pin-type, locking "T" is a hasp that was authorized previously to secure ammunition storage magazines. Magazines were secured using the installed locking bar in conjunction with a "T" pin and high security padlock. The locking "T" hasp does not provide adequate security for sensitive AA&E. It must be replaced with a high security hasp to enhance security. It will not be used to secure Category I and II ammunition storage facilities.

c. Another lock is the cable seal lock. Once locked, any force exerted to separate the lockpoint from the lockbody strengthens the connection. Such locks are not approved for use in securing storage facilities containing AA&E. The same restriction applies to d below.

d. A complementary device to locks is the No. 5 American Wire Gauge wire twist. This is a U-shaped wire placed in the hasp along with the shackle and twisted tightly in place. Another device is a wire cable of a thickness equivalent to or larger than No. 5 wire. This is placed through the hasp, a metal sleeve slipped over it, and crimped into place.

e. Built-in combination locks, meeting Underwriters Laboratories Standard 768, Group 1 (NSN 5340-01-375-7593) are approved for use on GSA-approved Class 5 vault doors and GSA-approved Class 5 weapons containers storing unclassified material and unclassified AA&E.

LOGAIR

Long-term contract airlift service within the continental United States for the movement of cargo in support of the logistics system of the Military Services (primarily the Army and Air Force) and Defense Agencies. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Major disruption on installations

Acts, threats, or attempts to commit such acts as kidnapping, extortion, bombings, hijackings, ambushing, major weapons thefts, arson, assassination, and hostage taking on a military installation. These acts that have potential for widespread publicity require special response, tactics, and management.

Medically sensitive items

Standard and nonstandard medical items designated by medical commanders to be sufficiently sensitive to warrant a

stringent degree of physical security and accountability in storage. Included within this definition are all items subject to misappropriation and/or misuse such as needles and syringes.

Military Traffic Expediting (MTX) Service

A service providing for movement from origin to destination in the shortest time possible for specifically identified rail shipments, and which is required for the shipment of firearms and other sensitive shipments. This service uses electrical communications between members of the Association of American Railroads, is available for either single line haul or jointline movements, and provides progress reports as required. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Military van (MILVAN)

Military-owned demountable container, conforming to U.S. and international standards, operated in a centrally controlled fleet for movement of military cargo. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Military working dog

Dogs required by the using DOD component for a specific purpose, mission, or combat capability. MWDs include patrol, patrol and narcotic/contraband, and patrol and explosive detector dogs.

Military working dog team

The MWD and its appropriately qualified, assigned handler.

Mission-critical personnel

Personnel who are essential to the operation of an organization of function.

Mission essential and vulnerable areas

Facilities or activities within the installation that, by virtue of their function, are evaluated by the commander as vital to the successful accomplishment of the installation's State National Guard, or MUSARC mission. This includes areas nonessential to the installation's/facility's operational mission but which, by nature of the activity, are considered vulnerable to theft, trespass, damage, or other criminal activity.

Motor pool

A group of motor vehicles used as needed by different organizations or individuals and parked in a common location when not in use. On an Army installation, a nontenant Army activity with 10 or less assigned commercial-type vehicles but no local organizational maintenance support does not have a motor pool, under this regulation, even though the vehicles are parked together.

Motor vehicle

A self-propelled, boosted, or towed conveyance used to transport a burden on land. This includes all Army wheeled and track vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers, but not railroad locomotives and rolling stock.

National Defense Area

An area set up on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, to safeguard classified defense information or DOD equipment or materiel. Establishment of a National Defense Area temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of DOD and results only from an emergency event.

Negotiations

A dialogue between authorities and offenders which has as the ultimate goal for the safe release of hostages and the surrender of the offenders.

Note C controlled medical items

Sets, kits, and outfits containing one or more component Note Q or Note R items.

Note Q controlled medical items

All standard drug items identified as Note Q in the Federal Supply Catalog, Nonstandard Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Schedule III, IV, V Controlled Substances.

Note R controlled medical items

All items identified as Note R in the Federal Supply Catalog, Nonstandard DEA Schedule II Controlled Substances.

One dog-one handler

The concept that each MWD will have only one handler. Personnel shortages may necessitate assigning a handler responsibility for more than one dog. However, two or more handlers cannot handle the same dog.

Open post

Installations or activities that do not qualify as closed or limited access posts. Access to the installation or activity is not controlled during or after normal duty hours.

Perimeter fence

Fences for the security of unclassified, non-sensitive items that meet the requirements of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Drawing Code STD 872-90-00 Series. The minimum height will be 6 feet. Use of NATO Standard Design Fencing is also authorized.

Perimeter wall

Any wall over 6 feet tall which delineates a boundary and serves as a barrier to personnel and/or vehicles. These walls may be constructed of reinforced concrete, masonry, or stone.

Physical protective measures

Physical security measures used to counter risk factors that usually do not change over a period of time such as mission impact, cost, volume, and criticality of resources and vulnerabilities. The measures are usually permanent and involve expenditure of funds.

Physical security

That part of the Army security system, based on threat analysis, concerned with procedures and physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, property, and operations; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materiel, and information; and to protect against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, damage, misuse, and theft. Operations security (OPSEC) and security targeted against traditional criminal activity are included.

a. Physical security procedures include, but are not limited to, the application of physical measures to reduce vulnerability to the threat; integration of physical security into contingency, mobilization, and wartime plans; the testing of physical security procedures and measures during the exercise of these plans; the interface of installation OPSEC, crime prevention and physical security programs to protect against the traditional criminal; training of guards at sensitive or other storage sites in tactical defense against and response to attempted penetrations; and creating physical security awareness.

b. Physical security measures are physical systems, devices, personnel, animals, and procedures employed to protect security interests from possible threats and include, but are not limited to, security guards; military working dogs; lights and physical barriers; explosives and bomb detection equipment; protective vests and similar equipment; badging systems; electronic entry control systems and access control devices; security containers; locking devices; electronic intrusion detection systems; standardized command, control, and display subsystems; radio frequency data links used for physical security; security lighting; delay devices; artificial intelligence (robotics); and assessment and/or surveillance systems to include closed-circuit television. Depending on the circumstances of the particular situation, security specialists may have an interest in other items of equipment such as armored sedans.

Physical security equipment

A generic term for any item, device, or system that is used primarily to protect Government property, including nuclear, chemical, and other munitions, personnel, and installations, and to safeguard national security information and materiel, including the destruction of such information and materiel both by routine means and by emergency destruct measures.

a. Interior physical security equipment. Physical security equipment used internal to a structure to make that structure a secure area. Within DOD, DA is the proponent for those functions associated with development of interior physical security systems.

b. Exterior physical security equipment. Physical security equipment used external to a structure to make the structure a secure area. Within DOD, the Department of the Air Force is the proponent for those functions associated with the development of external physical security systems; however, the Army will develop lights, barriers, and robotics.

c. Intrusion detection system. See previous definition.

Physical security inspection

A formal, recorded assessment of physical procedures and measures implemented by a unit or activity to protect its assets.

Physical security measures

See physical security.

Physical security plan

A comprehensive written plan providing proper and economical use of personnel, land, and equipment to prevent or minimize loss or damage from theft, misuse, espionage, sabotage, and other criminal or disruptive activities.

Physical security procedures

See physical security.

Physical security program

The interrelationship of various components that complement each other to produce a comprehensive approach to security matters. These components include, as a minimum, the physical security plan; physical security inspections and surveys; participation in combatting terrorism committees and fusion cells; and a continuing assessment of the installation's physical security posture.

Physical security resource plan

Plan developed by the physical security officer that identifies physical security needs, and shows proposed programmed procurement of those needs.

Physical security survey

A formal, recorded assessment of the installation physical security program.

Physical security system architecture

A system ensuring that IDS components designed by the various services are compatible when used together. The Air Force is responsible for systems architecture.

Pier service

Ocean carrier booking is restricted over ocean movement from port of embarkation (POE) to port of debarkation (POD). It precludes prearranged-through-booking employing surface transportation to inland destinations. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Pilferable assets

Any asset which can be stolen and which does not fall under the other asset categories discussed in this publication.

Pilferage-coded items

Items with a code indicating that the material has a ready resale value or civilian application and, therefore, is especially subject to theft.

Portable

Capable of being carried in the hand or on the person. As a general rule, a single item weighing less than 100 pounds (45.34 kilograms) is considered portable.

Primary electrical power source

That source of power, either external (commercial) or internal, that provides power to site facilities on a daily basis. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Protection in depth

A system providing several supplementary security barriers. For example, a perimeter fence, a secure building, a vault, and a locked container provide four layers of protection. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Protective layer

Any envelope of building components which surrounds an asset and delays or prevents aggressor movement toward the asset or which shields the asset from weapons and explosives effects.

Protective Security Service

A service to protect shipments. PSS involves a transporting carrier that must be a "cleared carrier" under provisions of DOD 5220.22-R, paragraph 1-702.a (ref (d)). A shipment must be under the constant surveillance of designated carrier employees, unless it is stored in containers or an area approved by the cognizant Defense Investigative Service regional

office. The designated carrier employees providing constant surveillance when PSS is required must possess a Government-issued SECRET clearance and a carrier-issued identification. (DOD 5100.76–M)

QUICKTRANS

Long-term contract airlift service within the continental United States (CONUS) for the movement of cargo in support of the logistic system for the Military Services (primarily the Navy and Marine Corps) and Defense agencies. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Rail Surveillance Service

An inspection service of rail shipments. An inspection is made within one hour after each stop, if the trailer containing a shipment remains at a halt. Reinspection is made a minimum of once each hour, as long as the railcar containing the shipment remains at a halt. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Report of Shipment

An advanced report furnished by message or telephone immediately upon dispatch of a shipment within CONUS for domestic shipments. A report goes to both Water Terminal Clearance Authority (WTCA) and the water port transshipping facility for surface export shipments, or to the Military Air Traffic Coordinating Officer (MATCO) for air export shipments. The advance notice of shipments shall include the following applicable data:

a. For domestic shipments, see AR 55–355/NAVSUPINST 4600.70/AFM 75–2/MCO P4600.14A/DLAR 4500.3, Routing Instruction Note (RIN) 146, Appendix L (reference (e)).

b. For export shipments, see chapter 4, DOD 4500.32–R (reference (f)). (DOD 5100.76–M)

Required operational capability

A requirements document that the combat developer prepares with input from the training developer in coordination with the material developer, logistician, and manpower and personnel planner. The ROC is a concise statement of the minimum essential operational, RAM, technical, personnel and manpower, training, safety, health, human factors engineering, logistical, and cost information to start full scale development or procurement of a material system.

Restricted area

Any area to which entry is subject to special restrictions or control for security reasons or to safeguard property or material. This does not include those designated areas over which aircraft flight is restricted. Restricted areas may be of different types. The type depends on the nature and varying degree of importance, from a security standpoint, of the security interest or other matter contained therein.

a. *Exclusion area.* A restricted area containing—

(1) A security interest or other matter of such nature that access to the area constitutes, for all practical purposes, access to such security interests or matter; or—

(2) A security interest or other matter of such vital importance that proximity resulting from access to the area is treated equal to (1) above.

b. *Limited area.* A restricted area containing a security interest or other matter, in which uncontrolled movement will permit access to such security interest or matter; access within limited areas may be prevented by escort and other internal restrictions and controls.

c. *Controlled area.* That portion of a restricted area usually near or surrounding an exclusion or limited area. Entry to the controlled area is restricted to authorized personnel. However, movement of authorized personnel within this area is not necessarily controlled. Mere entry to the area does not provide access to the security interest or other matter within the exclusion or limited area. The controlled area is provided for administrative control, safety, or as a buffer zone for security in depth for the exclusion or limited area. The proper commander establishes the degree of control of movement.

Ride awhile-walk awhile method

A law enforcement or security patrolling technique. The MWD team patrols for a period of time in a vehicle and then dismounts for an appropriate period of time to patrol an area on foot. This method increases the potential area the team can cover, as well as allowing the team to concentrate their foot patrols in especially critical areas.

Risk

The degree or likelihood of loss of an asset. Factors that determine risk are the value of the asset to its user in terms of mission criticality, replaceability, and relative value and the likelihood of aggressor activity in terms of the attractiveness of the asset to the aggressor, the history of or potential for aggressor activity, and the vulnerability of the asset.

Risk analysis

Method of examining various risk factors to determine the risk value of likelihood of resource loss. This analysis will be used to decide the level of security warranted for protection of resources.

Risk factors

Elements that make up the total degree of resource loss liability. Factors to be considered in a risk analysis include the importance of the resource to mission accomplishment; the cost, volume, criticality and vulnerabilities of the resources; and the severity of threats to the resources.

Risk level

An indication of the degree of risk associated with an asset based on risk analysis. Risk levels may be Levels I, II, or III, which correspond to low, medium, and high.

Risk value

Degree of expectation or likelihood of resource loss. The value may be classified as low, medium, or high.

Safe

A GSA Class 5 Map and Plans Security Container, Class 6 Security Filing Cabinet or refrigerator or freezer, secured with an approved locking device and weighing 500 pounds or more, or secured to the structure to prevent removal.

Schedule I drug

Any drug or substance by whatever official name (common, usual, or brand name) listed by the DEA in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, chapter II, Section 308.11, intended for clinical or non-clinical use. A list of Schedule I drugs and substances is contained in AR 40-7, appendix A.

Seal

A device to show whether the integrity of a shipment has been compromised. Seals are numbered serially, are tamperproof, and shall be safeguarded while in storage. The serial number of a seal shall be shown on Government Bills of Lading (GBL). A cable seal lock provides both a seal and locking device.

Sealed containers

Wooden boxes, crates, metal containers, and fiber containers sealed in a way to show when the containers are tampered with after sealing. The method of sealing depends of the type of construction of the containers. Sealing may be by metal banding, nailing, airtight sealing, or wax dripping (for fiber containers). In key control, a sealed container is also a locked key container or a sealed envelope containing the key or combination to the key container.

Sealed protection

A container or an area enclosed by a plastic or soft metal device which is opened easily without the use of a key or combination.

SEAVAN

A commercial, Government-owned or leased shipping container and without bogey wheels attached that is moved by ocean transportation and must be lifted on and off the ship. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Security card

An official distinctive identification (pass or card) that identifies and authorizes the possessor to be physically present in a U.S. Army designated restricted area.

Security engineering

The application of engineering principles to the protection of assets against various threats through the application of construction and equipment application.

Security lighting

The amount of lighting necessary to permit visual surveillance by security police or by supervisory personnel.

Security procedural measures

Physical security measures to counter risk factors that will periodically change over a period of time such as criminal, terrorist, and hostile threats. The procedures can usually be changed within a short amount of time and involve manpower.

Sensitive conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives

See categorization of such items in appendix A, AR 190–11.

Sensitive items

Material requiring a high degree of protection to prevent unauthorized acquisition. This includes arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs, precious metals, or other substances determined by the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration to be designated Schedule Symbol II, III, IV, or V under the Controlled Substance Act of 1970.

Signal intelligence

Intelligence derived from communications means (such as telephone, telegraph, radio), electronic signal emitters (such as navigation radar, identification friend or foe, and weapons guidance devices) and instrumentation signals (such as telemetry and beaconry).

Signature Security Service

A service designed to provide continuous responsibility for the custody of shipments in transit. A signature and tally record is required from each person responsible for the proper handling of the shipment at specified stages of its transit from origin to destination.

a. The initial signature on the signature and tally record should be the same as that of the carrier's agent on the GBL. When SSS is used in conjunction with DDPS, both drivers in each pair of drivers shall sign the signature and tally record when that pair assumes responsibility for the shipment.

b. Commercial carriers offering SSS must be able to trace a shipment in less than 24 hours. The following forms shall be used to obtain SSS:

(1) *Surface shipments.* DD Form 1907 (Signature and Tally Record) shall accompany every surface shipment of classified or protected material accorded a signature and tally service by surface commercial carriers. Carrier tariffs and tenders may describe this type of service under different titles for example, Hand-to-Hand Signature Service or Signature Service.

(2) *Commercial air shipments.* The air industry internal Form AC–10 (Airlines Signature Service Record) shall be used by regulated and nonscheduled airlines to obtain the signature and tally record. Air taxi operators and air freight forwarders providing SSS may use DD Form 1907 instead of AC–10. No receipt is required from the flight crew or attendants while the aircraft is in flight. A signature and tally record is required; however, from air carrier personnel whenever the aircraft is on the ground and access to the cargo compartment containing the sensitive arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) is available for any purpose. A signature and tally record is also required from pickup and delivery carriers used by the airlines for such purposes.

(3) *Military air shipments.* The AF Form 127 (Traffic Transfer Receipt) or similar document, will be used to provide hand-to-hand receipt control for sensitive and classified shipments being transferred in the DTS. (DOD 5100.76–M)

Steel bar

A flat bar, 3/8 inch by one inch minimum; or round bar 1/2 inch diameter minimum.

Steel mesh

High carbon, manganese steel not less than 15/100 inch (8-gauge) in thickness, and a grid of not more than two inches center to center.

Storage

Any area where AA&E are kept. Storage does not include items in process of manufacture, in use, or being transported to a place of storage or use.

Survivability

The ability to withstand or repel an attack, or other hostile action, to the extent that essential functions can continue or be resumed after the hostile action.

Tactics

The specific methods of achieving the aggressor's goals to injure personnel, destroy Army assets, or steal Army materiel.

Tactical vehicle

A vehicle with military characteristics designed primarily for use by forces in the field in direct connection with, or support of, combat or tactical operations, or the training of troops for such operations.

Tenant activity

A unit or activity of one Government agency, military department, or command that occupies facilities on an installation of another military department or command and that receives supplies or other support services from that installation.

Terrorism

The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals, that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Terrorism counteraction measures

Term used previously for combatting terrorism (see definition of this term).

Terrorist group

A politically, religious, or ideologically oriented group which uses terrorism as its prime mode of operations.

Threat management force

An action force from the installation that responds to major disruptions on installations. The TMF should be of sufficient size to manage the disruption and will usually involve a command element, security element, negotiation team, SRT, and logistical element.

TOW

A tube-launched, optically traced, wire-command missile designed as an antitank weapon system. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Upper rail loc

A set screw operated variation of a "C" clamp designed for gripping the upper sliding rail which supports or guides the weight of some styles of railroad boxcar doors. Gripping the upper sliding rail, the "loc" blocks and prevents the door's roller hangers or carriers from sliding past, thereby effectively preventing the door from being moved. (DOD 5100.76-M)

Waiver

Temporary relief from specific standards imposed by this manual (regulation) pending actions accomplishment of actions that will conform to the standards required. Compensatory measures are required.

Section III**Special Abbreviations and Terms**

There are no entries in this section.

Index

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PHYSICAL SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT
 For use of this form, see AR 190-13; proponent agency is ODCSOPS

*Requirement Control Symbol
CSGPA-1671*

1. REPORT NUMBER _____ 2. DATE OF INSPECTION _____

3. PREPARING AGENCY _____ 4. UNIT OR ACTIVITY INSPECTED _____

5. NAME AND RANK OF UNIT/ACTIVITY COMMANDER _____ 6. REPORT NUMBER AND DATE OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION _____

7. UNIT OR ACTIVITY MISSION _____

8. TYPE OF AREA INSPECTED _____

9. TYPE INSPECTION _____ ANNOUNCED _____ UNANNOUNCED

10. HAS THE UNIT BEEN PROVIDED THE:

	YES	NO	NA
a. INSTALLATION PHYSICAL SECURITY THREAT STATEMENT?			
b. INSTALLATION PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN?			

11. FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS _____

12. INSPECTING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION _____

13. RATING: THE SECURITY OF THIS UNIT/ACTIVITY IS: _____ ADEQUATE _____ NOT ADEQUATE
 TO PROTECT THE ARMY INTERESTS.

14. EXIT INTERVIEW (*Name, Grade or Rank, and Duty Position*) _____

15a. INSPECTOR (*Name and Rank*) _____ b. SIGNATURE _____ c. DATE _____

16a. APPROVING AUTHORITY (*Name, Rank, Title*) _____ b. SIGNATURE _____ c. DATE _____

17. DISTRIBUTION: _____

PHYSICAL SECURITY SURVEY REPORT

For use of this form, see AR 190-13; proponent agency is ODCSOPS

Requirement Control Symbol
CSGA-1672

1. REPORT NUMBER 2. DATE(S) OF SURVEY

3. NAME AND LOCATION OF INSTALLATION SURVEYED 4. PREPARING AGENCY

5. NAME AND RANK OF INSTALLATION COMMANDER 6. NAME AND RANK OF PROVOST MARSHAL/SECURITY OFFICER

7. NAME(S) OF SURVEY PERSONNEL (*Grade, Rank, Title, and Organization*) 8. REPORT NUMBER AND DATE OF LAST SURVEY

PART I - INSTALLATION DESCRIPTION

9. INSTALLATION ACREAGE 10. NUMBER OF MILITARY ASSIGNED 11. NUMBER OF CIVILIANS EMPLOYED

12. NUMBER OF TENANT ACTIVITIES 13. NUMBER OF BUILDINGS 14. TYPE INSTALLATION (*Check One*)

OPEN
 CLOSED
 LIMITED ACCESS (*Temporary*)

15. INSTALLATION MISSION

16. LIST AREAS CONSIDERED TO BE CRITICAL OR VULNERABLE:

a. CRITICAL OR VULNERABLE AREAS	b. PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS	c. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

PART II - PHYSICAL SECURITY PERSONNEL

17. SECTION A - GUARDS				18. SECTION B - PHYSICAL SECURITY INSPECTORS			
TYPE	AUTH	ASGD		TYPE	AUTH	ASGD	
a. MILITARY POLICE				a. MILITARY			
b. MILITARY (NON-MP)				b. CIVILIAN			
c. CONTRACT CIVILIAN GUARDS							
d. DOD CIVILIAN GUARDS							
e. GSA GUARDS							
f. FOREIGN DIRECT HIRE							
g. FOREIGN CONTRACT							
h. OTHER (<i>Specify</i>)							
i. TOTAL							

M
TAB

TAB

TAB

PART III - PHYSICAL SECURITY PLANNING

	YES	NO
19. HAS AN INSTALLATION PHYSICAL SECURITY THREAT STATEMENT BEEN PREPARED?		
20. HAVE SUBORDINATE UNITS OR TENANT ACTIVITIES BEEN PROVIDED A COPY?		
21. IS THERE AN INSTALLATION PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN?		
a. DOES THE PLAN COVER PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR PEACETIME, MOBILIZATION, AND WARTIME?		
b. DOES THE PLAN INCLUDE ANNEXES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, BOMB THREATS, ADP PLANS, AND WORK STOPPAGE PLANS AND INSTALLATION CLOSURE?		
22. DOES THE INSTALLATION PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM SUPPORT OPERATIONS SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS?		
23. IS PHYSICAL SECURITY INCLUDED IN INSTALLATION CONTINGENCY AND EXERCISE PLANS?		
24. BRIEFLY EXPLAIN "NO" ANSWERS OF ITEMS 19 THROUGH 23		

25. FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

26. SURVEYING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION

27. OVERALL EVALUATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

 EXCELLENT GOOD POOR

28a. SURVEY OFFICER (Name, Grade, Organization) b. SIGNATURE c. DATE

29a. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Name, Rank, Title) b. SIGNATURE d. DATE

30. DISTRIBUTION

31. DATE COMMANDER'S REPORT OF
CORRECTIVE ACTION RECEIVED

NARCOTICS OR EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR DOG TRAINING AND UTILIZATION RECORD

For use of this form, see AR 190-12; proponent agency is ODCSOPS

MONTH AND YEAR

NAME/TYPE OF DOG	TATTOO NUMBER	AGE	NAME OF HANDLER	GRADE	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DAY OF MONTH																															TOTAL HOURS
						1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
TRAINING																																					
BUILDINGS	PLANTS/ FINDS	/																																			
	SEARCH TIME	/																																			
CONTAINERS	PLANTS/ FINDS	/																																			
	SEARCH TIME	/																																			
VEHICLES	PLANTS/ FINDS	/																																			
	SEARCH TIME	/																																			
UTILIZATION																																					
BUILDINGS	FINDS	/																																			
	SEARCH TIME	/																																			
CONTAINERS	FINDS	/																																			
	SEARCH TIME	/																																			
VEHICLES	FINDS	/																																			
	SEARCH TIME	/																																			

EDITION OF 1 DEC 72 IS OBSOLETE.

DA FORM 3992-R, Oct 84

DETECTOR DOG SEARCH DATA

NO.	TIME	DATE	LOCATION	MFR NUMBER	SUBSTANCE	QUANTITY	REMARKS
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							
11							
12							
13							
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31							
32							
33							

DETECTOR DOG PROFICIENCY		DETECTOR DOG PROFICIENCY																															
(Alerts on training aids during training and actual searches)		(Alerts on training aids during training and actual searches)																															
DAY OF MONTH		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
a. TOTAL CORRECT ALERTS																																	
b. TOTAL FALSE/MISSED ALERTS																																	
PROFICIENCY =		$\frac{a}{a+b} \times 100$																															

SECURITY CONSTRUCTION STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-11; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

INSTRUCTIONS

This form will be prepared in three copies. The original will be maintained permanently in the files of the individual signing the form. The first copy will be maintained permanently in the using unit/organizational files. The second copy will be filed permanently in the arms/ammunition storage facility. All entries except item 7 will be typewritten.

1. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS FACILITY CONFORMS TO THE CRITERIA OF AR 190-11 WHICH IS IN EFFECT ON THIS DATE EXCEPT AS INDICATED HEREON

2. ROOM AND BUILDING NUMBER, STREET AND INSTALLATION ADDRESS

3. THIS APPLIES TO

- a. AN EXISTING STRUCTURE
- b. CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITY
- c. MODIFICATION OF EXISTING FACILITY (*Explain*)

4. NAME OF OFFICIAL SIGNING IN ITEM 7 BELOW	GRADE	6. ADDRESS OF OFFICIAL
5. ORGANIZATION		
7. SIGNATURE		DATE SIGNED

**COMMAND ORIENTED ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES (AA&E)
SECURITY SCREENING AND EVALUATION RECORD**

For use of this form, see AR 190-11; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

When completed, this form is considered personal in nature and should be protected by a For Official Use Only Cover Sheet.

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL BEING SCREENED	GRADE	SSN
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SECTION I - IMMEDIATE COMMANDER'S INTERVIEW

The interview required by AR 190-11 has been conducted.

NAME OF COMMANDER	GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE
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SECTION II - PERSONNEL RECORDS SCREENING

Personnel records have been reviewed in accordance with the AR 190-11.
Information is is not attached which may preclude assignment.

NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE
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SECTION III - MEDICAL RECORDS SCREENING

Medical records have been reviewed in accordance with the AR 190-11.
Information is is not attached which may preclude assignment.

NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE
----------------------------	-------	-----------	------

SECTION IV - PROVOST MARSHAL/SECURITY OFFICE RECORDS CHECK

A law enforcement/security records check has been conducted in accordance with AR 190-11.
Information is is not attached which may preclude assignment.

NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE
----------------------------	-------	-----------	------

**SECTION V - LOCAL CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY RECORDS CHECK
(If permitted by state, city, or local laws)**

Local civilian law enforcement agencies in the area of the individual's residence have been checked in accordance with AR 190-11.
Information is is not attached which may preclude assignment.

NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE
----------------------------	-------	-----------	------

SECTION VI - IMMEDIATE COMMANDER EVALUATION

Individual has been screened in accordance with AR 190-11.
After thorough review of all information provided, I find this individual suitable unsuitable to perform duties which involve responsibility for the control, accountability, and shipment of AA&E.

NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	GRADE	SIGNATURE	DATE
----------------------------	-------	-----------	------

Unclassified

PIN 006987-000