# Security and Mobility Support

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREFACE</strong></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1 SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Security and Mobility Support Discipline</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police View of the Operational Environment</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Across the Conflict Continuum</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Decisive Action</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enablers for Security and Mobility Support</td>
<td>1-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2 SUPPORT TO MOBILITY OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement and Maneuver</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility Operations</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaching Operations</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Operations</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap-Crossing Operations</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage of Lines</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main and Alternate Supply Route Regulation and Enforcement</td>
<td>2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3 SUPPORT TO SECURITY OPERATIONS</strong></td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Operations</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Security</td>
<td>3-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4 SUPPORT TO POPULACE CONTROL</strong></td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Populace Control</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Support to Dislocated Civilian Operations</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Support to Noncombatant Evacuation Operations</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 5 SUPPORT TO RESOURCES CONTROL</strong></td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of Resources Control</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and Private Property Control</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Security Support</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Operations Support</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Distribution Restriction:** Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Figures

Figure 1-1. Application of military police combat power ........................................ 1-4
Figure 1-2. Military police reconnaissance capabilities.......................................... 1-18
Figure 1-3. Example of military police support to a movement corridor ............... 1-24
Figure 2-1. Example of military police support to breaching.................................. 2-4
Figure 2-2. Example of military police support to clearing..................................... 2-5
Figure 2-3. Example of military police support to gap crossing............................... 2-7
Figure 2-4. Example of a DC collection plan overlay............................................. 2-11
Figure 2-5. Example collection point activities..................................................... 2-12
Figure 3-1. Example deliberate checkpoint.......................................................... 3-9
Figure 3-2. Example hasty checkpoint................................................................... 3-10
Figure 3-3. Combat outposts ............................................................................... 3-12
Figure 3-4. Framework for base camp security and defense................................. 3-14
Figure A-1. Example of a DC camp using tents.................................................... A-7
Figure A-2. Example of an 8,000-capacity designed and dedicated DC camp .......... A-9

Tables

Table 1-1. Military police capabilities associated with offense, defense, and stability .... 1-6
Table 1-2. Military police capabilities associated with defense support of civil authorities .......................................................... 1-15
Table 3-1. Levels I, II, and III threats ..................................................................... 3-16
Table A-1. Actions during in-processing ................................................................ A-11
ATP 3-39.30 is aligned with the Military Police Corps Regiment’s FM 3-39 and provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all echelons a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support in support of decisive action.

This manual is focused on the military police discipline of security and mobility support, and combines what were previously the military police functions of maneuver and mobility support and area security. It also incorporates those tasks previously addressed under the resettlement portion of the rescinded function of internment and resettlement and aligns them as military police support to populace and resources control (PRC) (see ATP 3-57.10). The tasks in this discipline are focused on those military police tasks that are typically performed in a tactical environment, and while military police are the proponent for many of these tasks, some of these tasks may also be performed by other members of the combined arms team.

Military police conducting tasks within the security and mobility support discipline are typically in a support role. These tasks are primarily focused on applying military police combat power in support of the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions; security and mobility support tasks also support the conduct of PRC. Military police perform many security and mobility support tasks and activities in the support area, making them a significant enabler to the sustainment warfighting function. Security and mobility support is enabled and facilitated by the technical tasks embodied in the military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. The application of technical capabilities residents within the discipline of police and detention operations, as well as police information and police intelligence products developed through the integrated function of police intelligence operations, form the foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support tasks. These disciplines and the integrating function of police intelligence operations are described in-depth in other military police manuals and will be referred to when they are critical to discussions supporting the discipline of security and mobility support.

The principal audience for ATP 3-39.30 is military police commanders and staff, but all members of the profession of arms may use this manual to facilitate an understanding of the capabilities of military police and the application of their proponent tasks. Commanders and staffs of a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States (U.S.), international and, in some cases, host-nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (ROE). (See FM 27-10).

ATP 3-39.30 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-39.30 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-39.30 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-39.30 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-39.30 is the United States Army Military Police School. The preparing agency is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID); Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division (CODDDD); Doctrine Branch. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO...
65473-8929; by e-mail to usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdideodddmpdoc@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
Introduction

ATP 3-39.30 was developed to focus on the military police discipline of security and mobility support and how military police support Army, joint, and multinational forces by conducting the key tactical tasks and activities associated with security and mobility support. ATP 3-39.30 provides military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers with a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support across the range of military operations. The focus is primarily on those tactical tasks and activities (facilitated by military police technical capabilities) that enable the elements of combat power. It describes how military police are employed to protect the force and noncombatants, and facilitate the preservation of the commander’s freedom of action.

The security and mobility support discipline enables and is enabled by the other military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. Each discipline is seen through a policing or corrections lens, and facilitated by the integrating function of police intelligence. Police intelligence operations support commanders at all levels through the integration of police intelligence activities within all military police operations. The disciplines are interdependent areas of expertise within the Military Police Corps Regiment.

This manual is organized into five chapters with one appendix to provide additional depth on facilities that may be used in support of populace control. The following is a brief description of each chapter and appendix:

- Chapter 1 describes the military police discipline of security and mobility support and how it is affected by and affects the operational environment. While focused on the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions, this discipline finds application among other warfighting functions and provides support across the range of military operations.
- Chapter 2 focuses on military police support to mobility operations as part of the movement and maneuver warfighting function.
- Chapter 3 focuses on military police support to security operations as part of the protection warfighting function. Military police security and mobility tasks and activities associated with security operations are focused on area and local security and associated tasks and activities.
- Chapter 4 provides a brief description of PRC and its linkage to civil affairs (CA) operations. The chapter then focuses on the populace control portion of PRC. The military police role in populace control focuses on support to dislocated civilians (DCs) while minimizing civilian effect on military operations and supporting noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
- Chapter 5 continues the discussion of PRC with a focus on those military police activities that support resources control. This includes the specifics associated with logistics security (LOGSEC) and associated crime prevention typically performed by criminal investigation division (CID) personnel.
- Appendix A discusses the options for DC camps and the role of military police in this portion of PRC.
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 1

Security and Mobility Support in the Operational Environment

The military police discipline of security and mobility support is focused on protecting the force and noncombatants, and preserving the commander’s freedom of action. It combines and replaces the previous military police functions of maneuver and mobility support and area security. It also incorporates those tasks previously addressed under the resettlement portion of the rescinded function of internment and resettlement, and aligns them as military police support to PRC (see ATP 3-57.10). This chapter describes the role of security and mobility support and selected enablers that support mobility operations, security operations, and PRC. All of the military police disciplines and their relationships and support to decisive action are detailed in FM 3-39.

THE SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT DISCIPLINE

1-1. The security and mobility support discipline is primarily comprised of the military police technical capabilities and tactical tasks that support mobility operations (with a focus on movement over maneuver), security operations (with a focus on area and local security that includes the significant tasks of antiterrorism [AT] and physical security), and PRC operations (with a focus on the control and security of DCs and infrastructure). Mobility operations are a part of the movement and maneuver warfighting function and security operations are a part of the protection warfighting function. PRC is a stability task and is not directly assigned to any warfighting function.

1-2. The security and mobility support discipline enables and is enabled by the other military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. Each discipline is seen through a policing or corrections lens, and is facilitated by the integrating function of police intelligence. Police intelligence operations support commanders at all levels through the integration of police intelligence activities within all military police operations. See ATTP 3-39.20 for more information on police intelligence operations.

1-3. Missions or tasks grouped under the security and mobility support discipline have applicability across the range of military operations in support of decisive action as described in FM 3-39. While many of these missions and subordinate tasks may also be performed by other members of the combined arms team, they are often best performed by military police Soldiers, especially as operations are characterized less by major combat and move towards the peace end of the conflict continuum. This is due to the skills and technical abilities gained through their policing and corrections missions and associated with the police operations and detention operations disciplines.

1-4. Enablers that are critical to the primary missions associated with the security and mobility support discipline include—

- The framework of assured mobility.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).
- Military working dogs (MWDs).
- The technique of a movement corridor.
MILITARY POLICE VIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-5. Understanding the operational environment is essential to the successful execution of operations. To gain this understanding, commanders will normally consult with specialists in each area. Military police are one of the specialists available to add breadth and depth to the overall understanding of the operational environment. The skills and technical abilities honed through the performance of policing and corrections missions give military police a unique perspective of the operational environment as seen through a policing and corrections lens.

1-6. Military police operations are guided by six principles. These principles are not a rigid checklist; however, they represent dominant characteristics of police activities that are generally found in modern societies. Military police Soldiers and leaders use these principles to develop operational concepts and guide the employment of police formations as they shape the operational environment. The policing principles are—

- Prevention.
- Public support.
- Restraint.
- Legitimacy.
- Transparency.
- Assessment.

1-7. The military police view of the operational environment is described in FM 3-39. Guided by the common understanding and complemented by a policing mind-set, the military police approach seeks to identify potential challenges and opportunities that are associated with the operational and mission variables of the operational environment. This includes identifying and meeting the challenges associated with law enforcement and other policing or security-related missions; detention tasks; and other mission sets not typically associated with close combat.

1-8. Similar to the analysis of the operational environment using the operational variables as demonstrated in FM 3-39, military police at the tactical level use the mission variables to seek the shared common understanding from a military police perspective. The following are some examples of the military police perspective for each of the mission variables:

- **Mission.** Commanders analyze a mission in terms of specified tasks, implied tasks, and the commander’s intent (two echelons up) to determine their essential tasks. Military police conduct the same analysis, with added focus on the military police requirements, to determine the essential tasks for military police. Early identification of the essential tasks for military police support enables the maneuver commander to request military police augmentation (or in selected cases to designate other assets to perform those roles) early on in the planning process.

- **Enemy.** Military police view of the enemy (or criminal element) concentrates on enemy (or criminal element) tactics, equipment, and capabilities that could threaten friendly operations. This may include an analysis of other factors within the area of operations (AO) or the area of interest that could have an impact on mission success.

- **Terrain and weather.** Military police analyze terrain (manmade and natural) to determine the effects on friendly and enemy operations. Like other Soldiers, military police analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment). Military police use geospatial products to help commanders and staffs visualize aspects of the terrain to facilitate decisionmaking.

- **Troops and support available.** Military police consider the number, type, capabilities, and level of training of available military police troops and support (joint, multinational, and interagency) forces. A full listing of military police technical capabilities and tactical tasks is found in FM 3-39.

- **Time available.** Military police must understand the time needed for planning military police operations and the importance of collaborative and parallel planning. Military police realize the time needed for positioning critical assets and the time associated with setting conditions for performing military police tasks or projects.
Civil considerations. Military police must understand the impacts that manmade infrastructure; civilian institutions; and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within the AO will have on the conduct of military operations. At the tactical level, they consider key civilian areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. The military police view is focused on systems and infrastructure that pertains to police and prison structures, organized criminal networks, legal systems, investigations and interviews, crime-conducive conditions, and enforcement gaps and mechanisms.

SUPPORT ACROSS THE CONFLICT CONTINUUM

1-9. The technical capabilities and tactical tasks associated with the security and mobility support discipline can be applied across the range of military operations. Major operations, crisis response, and contingency operations have the potential for close combat. These operations rely on the integration of military police and other enablers to ensure the movement and maneuver of friendly forces while denying freedom of action to adversaries.

1-10. Support to HN policing and the establishment of a corrections institution (which may include training, development, or mentorship) may be critical capabilities to enable the maneuver commander at the tactical level during stability activities. Military police facilitate the ability to discern and identify patterns, plan specific strategies based on the criminal threat, and provide specific threat information in the form of police intelligence. The proliferation of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) requires military police security elements to continuously develop new procedures to counter the threat. The tactical integration of engineer; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and newly developed technology becomes part of an increasing requirement to remain adaptive.

1-11. The need to balance protection requirements and the need for restraint in dealing with the population, especially during stability activities, is critical in minimizing unintended consequences in the application of force. Military police Soldiers are trained on graduated-response measures when dealing with the public during potentially volatile situations. This training includes integration of nonlethal and lethal tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. It is imperative that military police and other Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty, understand and correctly apply escalation-of-force procedures. These procedures enable alternatives to the use of lethal force.

1-12. Understanding and properly employing the ROE are critical to the application of security and mobility support. The application of the sequential actions of the escalation of force requires an understanding of the guideline of proportionality, performed with responses that are reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on the totality of circumstances. Lethal force must not be the default option. Other options, including nonlethal weapons and capabilities, should be available and used when appropriate. Escalation-of-force guidelines direct the application of lower levels of force when they can achieve the desired effects without endangering the lives of Soldiers or noncombatants. Escalation-of-force procedures may be applied at static locations (such as checkpoints and entry control points) or while moving and engaging with populations and potential mounted or dismounted threats. Escalation-of-force procedures do not limit the right of self-defense, including the use of deadly force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Commanders must ensure that personnel are properly trained in escalation-of-force procedures and scenarios, and in methods of shaping the environment to gain time and space when applicable and to reduce the requirement for split-second, life-or-death decisions.

1-13. The application of escalation-of-force criteria is critical across the range of military operations, but probably more so during stability activities. The ability to leverage well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led forces with the capability of applying a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions can greatly enhance a commander’s influence on the population and potential threats. Even though stability activities emphasize nonlethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a sound deterrent and is often a key to success. The successful application of lethal capabilities in stability activities requires a thorough understanding of when the escalation of force is necessary and when it might be counterproductive. Threat elements may limit their activities if they perceive that those forces are capable
Chapter 1

and willing to use lethal force. This provides military forces with the opportunity to extend the scope and tempo of nonlethal actions.

SUPPORT TO DECISIVE ACTION

1-14. The military police approach to the operational environment facilitates the synchronization of military police operations in support of combined arms through the framework of the warfighting functions. Figure 1-1 highlights the primary and secondary relationship of the military police disciplines to each warfighting function. The focus of security and mobility support is on the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions, although it does have a role in the other warfighting functions as well. The fundamental relationships depicted in this graphic lay the framework to look at its application in supporting decisive action.

![Figure 1-1. Application of military police combat power](image)

1-15. Decisive action requires the simultaneous combination of three elements—offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) (see ADRP 3-0). Similarly, military police support to decisive action requires the performance of all three military police disciplines when assisting the commander by providing a lethal, mobile, and flexible force that permits the commander to quickly concentrate efforts and resources to counter the enemy. Planning military police support to decisive action is complex and requires an in-depth understanding of the operational environment, the commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and the capabilities and limitations of military police in support of the operation. While the tasks of decisive action are discussed separately in the following paragraphs, the tasks are executed simultaneously. The relative weight of any one task in relation to the others is determined by the mission. Military police planners must continually assess and predict shifts in mission requirements and required military police capability as operations transition between phases or as conditions change within the operational environment.
Tasks associated with the security and mobility support discipline are the primary means through which military police support the movement and maneuver warfighting function. Typically, military police are focused on supporting the movement that supports or enables maneuver at the tactical level. Although they may maneuver while doing so, their focus for the support they provide to mobility operations is on enhancing the movement of other forces — whether that is a convoy or a maneuver unit — as it moves through routes as a part of a breaching or gap-crossing operation or some other mobility-related mission. Military police units enhance force momentum by controlling the movement of forces across the AO to make the most efficient use of the space and time necessary to generate mass and speed, while denying enemy maneuver. By enhancing the ability to maneuver, military police units accelerate the concentration of combat power, increasing the velocity and tempo of the force necessary to exploit critical enemy vulnerabilities. Military police units limit enemy ability to generate harassing attacks and help preserve the combat force for the main effort by preventing the enemy disruption of movement that would cause a tactical commander to divert combat forces. Police intelligence operations integrated within the security and mobility support discipline support movement and maneuver through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of police information and intelligence gathered by military police teams and military police staff. The results of police intelligence operations can provide critical and timely information regarding criminal activity or conditions within the operational environment that can threaten friendly operations or impede the freedom of movement.

Tasks associated with the security and mobility support discipline are also linked in a primary relationship with the protection warfighting function. The protection concept in an operational environment includes protecting personnel (U.S. forces, unified action partners, and noncombatants) and physical assets. In addition to safeguarding bases, base camps, and other critical fixed sites; securing routes; and protecting forces within sustainment areas, protection considerations are applied in support of battle positions, combat outposts, forward operating bases, and the HN and other infrastructure support. Today’s battlefield requires that commanders know survivability tactics and techniques that provide this protection. See ADRP 3-37 for additional information on the protection warfighting function.

Security and mobility support operations provide a distribution of military police forces throughout the AO, conducting aggressive patrolling and military police reconnaissance to protect units, critical facilities, and high-risk personnel, and to control civilian populations. These patrols bring military police Soldiers into contact with a host of friendly units, civilians on the battlefield, and other governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The information obtained from these contacts, whether passively or actively collected, contributes significantly to the collection effort. Military police provide intensive support to the protection warfighting function beyond the tasks associated with the security and mobility support discipline that flavor and enable the accomplishment of those missions as they provide policing and associated law enforcement activities to control and protect populations and resources and facilitate the existence of a lawful and orderly environment (see chapters 4 and 5). Police operations (see ATTP 3-39.10) and associated skills and capabilities inherent in that function provide the fundamental base upon which military police functions are framed and conducted.

Planning is essential to the proper application of military police combat power. Understanding how the security and mobility support discipline and its tasks and capabilities typically align with the elements of decisive action will assist planners in arraying military police forces to support mission accomplishment. The ability to rapidly transition between the elements of decisive action is essential. Military police planners provide for the integration of military police-focused considerations within the supported commander’s staff at each echelon and advise supported commanders and their staffs about military police capabilities, methods of employment, and additional capabilities and depth of the military police force pool. See FM 3-39 for a more in-depth discussion of military police participation in the planning process.

Military police units provide the commander with an agile, versatile, and capable force ready to contribute to the overall mission success. Table 1-1, page 1-6, shows those military police capabilities typically associated with security and mobility support during offense, defense, and stability activities.
Table 1-1. Military police capabilities associated with offense, defense, and stability

- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Provide military working dog support.
- Conduct movement support to mobility operations to include—
  - Breaching operations.
  - Clearing operations.
  - Gap-crossing operations.
  - Traffic control plan development.
  - Main and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement.
  - Passage of lines.
  - Straggler movement control.
- Conduct security operations.
- Conduct area security to include—
  - Base and base camp security and defense.
  - Critical asset security.
  - Protective services.
  - Response force operations.
  - Lines of communication security.
  - Checkpoints.
  - Route security.
  - Convoy security.
  - Area damage control.
- Implement local security to include—
  - Antiterrorism measures.
  - Physical security procedures.
- Provide support to populace and resources control to include—
  - Dislocated civilian operations.
  - Noncombatant evacuation operations.
  - Logistics security.

Offensive Tasks and Capabilities

1-21. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical advantages and achieve definitive results is the essence of the offense. For a deeper discussion of the offense and the conduct of offensive tasks see FM 3-90-1. For a deeper discussion of security operations see FM 3-90-2. The military police discipline of security and mobility support is primarily focused on those military police capabilities that enable movement and maneuver (mobility operations), provide protection (security operations), and support PRC.

1-22. The primary tasks of the offense are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. The purposes of the offense are to—
- Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces.
- Seize key terrain.
- Deprive the enemy of resources.
- Develop intelligence.
- Deceive and divert the enemy.
- Create a secure environment for stability activities.
1-23. Military police units supporting the offense perform a wide range of tasks within the context of the security and mobility support discipline. For information regarding the military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations refer to ATTP 3-39.10, ATTP 3-39.20, FM 3-39, FM 3-63, and other supporting military police doctrine. Military police leaders conducting security and mobility support tasks supporting the offense must—

- Exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent.
- Anticipate selective elements of the offensive force to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute while other forces attack.
- Anticipate changes in the tempo of the operation and prepare the military police effort toward that action.
- Understand how operations affect security functions in a joint security area or along lines of communication (LOC); this translates to the protection of mission command and the sustainment of information systems.
- Consider the type and size of the area of responsibility, the LOC security requirements, the threat, and the plans for detainee operations (to include how DC presence may affect the movement of forces).
- Understand the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), and the priority intelligence requirements; and integrate police intelligence activities in all military police operations to support those requirements.
- Coordinate the treatment of DCs with the HN or multinational forces during PRC.
- Assist the commander in speeding the shift of forces to support the main effort and enhance overall trafficability.
- Anticipate transition to a pursuit or exploitation by positioning military police forces to support follow-on forces.
- Support the movement of maneuver forces, enabling their ability to mass and maintain momentum. Military police protect mission command nodes such as the main command post and the tactical command post. The security and mobility support tasks assist in orchestrating the efforts to mass, sustaining the offensive move. Military police quickly attack enemy reconnaissance forces in the area of responsibility. Likewise, military police maintain surveillance, provide early warning, and attack the enemy with supporting and organic fires, ensuring the freedom of action of the force.
- Know the location and composition of probable response forces or tactical combat forces to coordinate and assist in securing the joint security area against area threats.

1-24. Typical military police missions associated with security and mobility support conducted during the offense may include—

- Conducting police operations to develop a greater situational understanding of the police and criminal environment, shaping the future stability effort and civil security and civil control lines of effort.
- Conducting detention operations to reduce the impact of detainees on operations.
- Supporting PRC to reduce the impact of DCs on operations.
- Conducting security and mobility support tasks, such as support for gap crossings (including river-crossing), passage-of-lines, breaching operations, convoys, and high-risk personnel security.
- Integrating police intelligence activities throughout military police operations to enhance situational understanding and provide a holistic common operational picture.
- Supporting forcible-entry operations (plan for detainee operations).
- Supporting cordon-and-search tasks (outer cordon security and detainee operations).

1-25. The provost marshal (PM) at the appropriate echelon integrates military police capabilities focused to support offensive tasks. Military police units use preparation activities to implement the task organization of military police assets for offensive operations within supported units by conducting early linkups with the maneuver units they will support. As military police units prepare for offensive tasks, they focus on
inspections, combined arms rehearsals, supporting the movement of the combined arms force into position for the attack, and the evacuation and control of captured and detained individuals. Military police units also join combined arms breaching and gap-crossing forces to conduct rehearsals for the breach, assault, and support forces. Preparation may include establishing protection measures and holding areas for tactical units moving across main supply routes (MSRs) to assembly areas. If route clearance operations are anticipated, military police units join with engineer, CBRN, EOD, and other forces focused on route reconnaissance, inspections, clearance activities, and the establishment of movement corridors. Military police unit preparation activities are closely aligned and integrated with maneuver force preparations.

DEFENSIVE TASKS AND CAPABILITIES

1-26. A **defensive task** is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). Defensive tasks counter enemy offensive tasks. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. They can be used to gain time and economize forces so that offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that lets Army forces regain the initiative. Defensive tasks can also establish a shield behind which stability tasks can progress. For an in-depth discussion of the defense see FM 3-90-1. For a discussion of security operations see FM 3-90-2.

1-27. The primary tasks of the defense are mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. The purposes of the defense are listed as—

- Deter or defeat the enemy offense.
- Gain time.
- Achieve the economy of force.
- Retain the key terrain.
- Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure.
- Develop intelligence.

1-28. Military police units supporting the defense perform a wide range of tasks within the context of the security and mobility support discipline. Military police leaders conducting security and mobility support tasks supporting the offense must—

- Exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent.
- Anticipate operational changes or transitions and prepare the military police effort toward that action.
- Understand how operations affect security functions in a joint security area or along LOC; this translates to mission command protection and information system sustainment.
- Understand the IPB process, the CCIR, and priority intelligence requirements to facilitate the integration of police intelligence activities within all military police operations to support those requirements.
- Consider the type and size of the area of responsibility, the LOC security requirements, and the threat and plan for detainee operations and DCs to determine how their presence may affect the movement of forces.
- Coordinate the security and treatment of DCs with the HN or multinational forces.
- Conduct security and mobility support to aid a force to maneuver and mass. Military police anticipate transitions from the defense to the offense and assist the movement of reserves or reaction forces.
- Conduct security and mobility support to deny information to enemy reconnaissance elements seeking the location of the defending force. Military police units are positioned where they can control key terrain or improve the defensive capability of bases and base clusters. Military police conduct aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance to deny enemy access to critical logistics and sustainment facilities.
Security and Mobility Support in the Operational Environment

- Know the location and composition of probable response forces or tactical combat forces to coordinate and assist in securing the joint security area against area threats.
- Protect sustainment resources while supporting the lateral, forward, and rearward movement of combat forces.

1-29. Successful military police operations in the defense depend on the leader’s understanding of the commander’s intent and the ability to properly employ military police capabilities and assets. Refer to table 1-1, page 1-6, for a list of military police capabilities typically associated with security and mobility support of the defense.

1-30. In all three types of defensive primary tasks, the main focus for the military police force is to support the movement of repositioning or counterattacking forces and to provide and support the evacuation of captured or detained individuals. Defensive missions demand focused effort to provide the freedom of movement for repositioning forces and the reserve when it is committed. These units are provided the priority of movement along MSRs. Additional activities in the defense include providing protection to sustainment activities (including critical headquarters, communications facilities, convoys, and supply sites). Examples of typical missions include—

- Conducting detention operations.
- Supporting movement corridor operations.
- Conducting convoy escorts.
- Conducting area security to include response force operations.
- Supporting PRC to reduce the impact of DCs on combat forces.

1-31. Similar to offensive tasks, military police units use preparation activities to implement the task organization of military police assets within their supported units. Military police units coordinate with AO and base camp commanders to establish proper command and support relationships. Establishment of a movement corridor may require intensive and broad coordination. The PM or military police commander at the appropriate echelon coordinates military police capabilities focused to support defensive tasks. Preparation may include establishing protection control measures. Military police unit preparation activities occur in close proximity and are closely aligned and integrated with maneuver force preparations.

STABILITY TASKS AND CAPABILITIES

1-32. Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. See ADP 3-07, ADRP 3-07, and JP 3-0 for more information. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. For any organization assigned an AO, there will always be implied or even specified essential stability tasks to perform.

1-33. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance; effect behavioral change; or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through synchronizing information-related capabilities, presence, and conduct. Support is to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

1-34. It is essential to maintain the initiative during stability activities by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. The combination of tasks conducted during stability activities depends on the situation. Stability consists of five primary tasks—maintain civil security, maintain civil control, restore essential services, provide support to governance, and provide support to economic and infrastructure development. See FM 3-07 for details. The purposes of stability are listed as—
Chapter 1

- Provide a secure environment.
- Secure land areas.
- Meet the critical needs of the populace.
- Gain support for the HN government.
- Shape the environment for interagency and HN success.

1-35. Planning and preparing for stability activities can be extremely difficult because of the technical nature of requirements and the broad range of potential military police missions associated with them. An early on-the-ground assessment can be critical to tailor the military police force with required specialties and military police resources. The results of this assessment are passed to planners to ensure that an adequate military police force arrives in the AO in a timely manner. This early, on-the-ground military police reconnaissance and associated assessment or survey identifies—

- Basic security requirements and establishes police intelligence within the AO.
- The needs of the HN and necessary military police capabilities to address specific requirements.
- Other special considerations that will affect the military police force.

1-36. Military police capabilities may be applied to provide specific technical support integrated within the CA plan with a focus on PRC. (See ATP 3-57.60 for information on CA planning.) This may be especially true for security and mobility support. Integration occurs through the operations process activities and is facilitated by coordination between military police planners and CA staff (at the civil-military operations [CMO] center or some other location). (See ATP 3-57.70 for information on the CMO center.) For additional information on CA operations and PRC see ATP 3-57.10 and FM 3-57.

1-37. Military police tasks must be prioritized to achieve the greatest mission effect. The specific discipline performed at a given time is determined by the supported commander’s needs and the availability of military police resources. The supported commander, taking into consideration the recommendations of the PM, sets the functional priorities for military police operations. The PM will often need to prioritize tasks to optimize military police support.

1-38. Stability tasks tend to be of long duration compared to the other tasks of decisive action. As such, the military police level of effort is very high at the onset and decreases as the theater and HN capabilities mature. Preparation activities include determining the level of the civil rule of law in the policing and corrections services and identifying significant infrastructure and base development construction projects for police stations, training centers, and corrections institutions. The highest priority projects may be executed using general engineering capabilities, while others may compete for contingency funding and execution through a contract capability. Military police forces may be engaged in counterinsurgency-type operations as the security structure of the HN evolves.

1-39. The military police capabilities and their operational and supporting tasks are integral to stability tasks. Military police-related skills are highly compatible and essential to the end state of stability tasks, and the military police force provides a highly capable, politically acceptable force suitable for a variety of stability tasks. They possess robust capabilities to shoot, move, and communicate, but are trained to exercise judgment and resolve issues using the lowest level of force possible according to the use-of-force continuum. Military police are trained to transition to deadly force only when all other options have been exhausted. Military police units must project a professional law enforcement and policing image. This presence is extremely important when tailoring a force that requires significant capabilities with a low political profile.

1-40. Like offense and defense, military police support for stability tasks includes the simultaneous application of capabilities. Military police disciplines supporting the restoration of essential policing and corrections services in support of civil security and civil order lines of effort are the primary military police focus in stability tasks; however, all three of the military police disciplines are applied simultaneously to some degree.

1-41. Military police can support stability tasks through all three disciplines. Conducting policing activities in support of civil security and civil control lines of effort is critical in establishing the rule of law. Police intelligence operations are integrated and executed continuously throughout all military police operations;
this includes potentially establishing, using, and transferring HN police intelligence operations. Generally this includes a variety of support to establish or reestablish the rule of law and the breadth of activities necessary for handing over responsibilities to a HN for performing those same activities. See ATTP 3-39.10 and FM 3-39 more information on police operations and support to stability.

1-42. Military police detention operations support to a HN during stability activities is critical. Detainees must be effectively managed and transferred to appropriately trained and disciplined HN police. Again, military police may need to establish or reestablish an indigenous corrections system and activities that are connected to the operation and sustainment of that system to support the rule of law. See FM 3-39 and FM 3-63 for more information on detainee operations and support to stability.

1-43. Military police security and mobility support to stability is often linked to police operations and detention operations, but it also tends to be similar to the tasks performed in support of offense and defense. Security and mobility tasks will support many of the police operations activities and potentially selected detention operations as well in their support of each of the stability primary tasks. However, the overall focus for security and mobility will likely be on establishing civil control and restoring essential services. Police operation and detention operation support most likely to require activities and skills associated with security and mobility support includes the following:

- Establishing, operating, and transferring police stations to trained and skilled HN police. This contributes to and should be linked to other local and area security tasks discussed primarily in the chapter 3 discussion of security operations.
- Controlling the movement of civilians and providing relief to human suffering. The discussion of DC operations is part of PRC and discussed primarily in the chapter 2 discussion of mobility operations and the chapter 4 discussion of DC operations.
- Establishing and training regional and urban police patrol operations (traffic control management and emergency first responder operations). This is related primarily to mobility operations as discussed in chapter 2.
- Establishing indigenous highway patrol capabilities. This is related primarily to mobility operations as discussed in chapter 2.
- Conducting facility security and protection efforts. This contributes to and should be linked to other local and area security tasks discussed primarily in the chapter 3 discussion of security operations.
- Establishing and supporting DC camps in support of the commander’s CMO plan. This is included in the discussion of PRC operations in chapters 4 and 5 and highlighted in the discussion of DC camps in appendix A.
- Establishing a movement corridor. This is a combined arms task that requires a series of activities that support mobility operations (chapter 2) and security operations (chapter 3). It may also include activities that support PRC (chapters 4 and 5).

1-44. Refer to table 1-1, page 1-6, for a list of those military police capabilities typically associated with security and mobility support of stability tasks. Within the framework of stability activities, security and mobility support tends to be focused on the primary subtasks of establish civil control and restore essential services. Much of the support may be linked to PRC operations.

Establish Civil Control

1-45. Conducting border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement are subcategories of establish civil control. Each will draw on activities and technical capabilities associated with security and mobility support. While portions of this are part of police operations, the tactical aspects of military police support are often addressed as support to mobility operations (chapter 2) and security operations (chapter 3). Activities supporting PRC are discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

1-46. A central component of civil security is the ability of the state to monitor and regulate its borders. Generally, border and coast guard forces secure national boundaries while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals, and goods across state borders. These border controls are necessary to regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling,
Chapter 1

and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine. In cases where these capabilities have broken down or cease to exist, U.S. forces may be required to fill this capability gap to establish or maintain the security of the nation in question. Military police may play a significant role in this effort. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Establish border control and boundary security.
  - Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement.
  - Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints.
  - Ensure freedom of movement.

- A transformation in which military forces train and equip border control and boundary security forces.

Protect Key Personnel and Facilities

1-47. When required, military forces may extend protection and support to key civilian personnel to ensure their continued contribution to the overall operation. In the interest of transparency, military forces specifically request and carefully negotiate this protection. Similarly, the long-term success of any intervention often relies on the ability of external actors to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Protection of key facilities may be either an immediate or long-term requirement. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Protect government-sponsored civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
  - Protect contractor and civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel and resources.
  - Provide emergency logistic support, as required.
  - Protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites.
  - Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, and property ownership documents.
  - Protect and secure strategically important institutions (such as government buildings; medical treatment facilities and public health infrastructure; the central bank, national treasury, and integral commercial banks; museums; and religious sites).
  - Protect and secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps, and means of communications.
  - Identify, secure, protect, and coordinate disposition for stockpiles of munitions and CBRN materiel and precursors, facilities, and adversaries with technical expertise.

- A transformation in which military forces build HN capacity to protect—
  - Civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
  - Public infrastructure and institutions.
  - Military infrastructure.

Restore Essential Services

1-48. The activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center efforts on the initial response tasks for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Transformation tasks establish the foundation for long-term development, resolving the root causes of conflict that lead to events such as famine, DCs, refugee flows, and human trafficking. Fostering sustainability tasks ensures the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society.

1-49. Normally, military forces support HN and civilian relief agencies with these efforts. However, when the HN cannot perform its roles, military forces may execute these tasks directly or to support other civilian agencies and organizations. It is imperative that these activities are properly scaled to local capacity for
sustainment. Proper scaling also creates the best opportunity for the local populace to create small-scale enterprises to provide as many of these essential services as possible through the private economy. Large-scale projects that require complicated HN efforts to sustain should not be initiated until the necessary infrastructure is in place to support such effort.

1-50. Military police may support restoration of essential services in a variety of fashions. Those that are supported by activities and capabilities associated with security and mobility support are focused on civilian dislocation as well as support to convoy and personnel security and the necessary control associated with missions focused on famine prevention and emergency food relief programs, nonfood relief programs, and public health programs to name a few. PRC is focused on support of DCs and provides specifics for planning and executing these sorts of missions. See chapter 4 and ATP 3-57.10 for more information. For information on those mobility activities associated with DC control see chapter 2.

1-51. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs, as well as other humanitarian actors, are best equipped and trained to manage the human crises associated with DCs. IGOs may include the United Nations (UN) and the International Organization for Migration. NGOs may include groups such as Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere (known as CARE). Humanitarian actors may include the International Committee of the Red Cross, a well-known international organization.

1-52. The presence and uncontrolled flow of DCs can threaten the success of any operation. DCs are symptoms of broader issues such as conflict, insecurity, and disparities among the population. How displaced populations are treated can either foster trust and confidence—laying the foundation for stabilization and reconstruction among a traumatized population—or create resentment and further chaos. Local and international aid organizations are most often best equipped to deal with the needs of the local populace but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, military forces can enable the success of these organizations by providing critical assistance to the populace.

1-53. DCs typically contain a high percentage of women or children. Many may suffer from some form of posttraumatic stress, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. Following a major disaster, humanitarian crisis, or conflict, providing adequate support to DCs often presents a challenge beyond the capability of available military forces. Therefore, military forces offer vital support—coordinated with the efforts of other agencies and organizations—to provide humanitarian assistance to the general population. The list of essential tasks includes—

- Assisting DCs.
- Supporting assistance to DCs.
- Supporting security to DC camps.

1-54. Military police will be essential to the performance of each of these essential tasks, at times leading the activities but most commonly in support of other Army or joint forces and civilian organizations. The dislocation of civilians may require significant effort and military police resources to bring control to DCs as well as provide security for them from the point of discovery, to DC collection points and camps, and ultimately to their subsequent resettlement or return to their homes.

**Assist Dislocated Civilians**

1-55. When assisting DCs, military forces—

- Ensure humanitarian aid organizations have access to populations in need.
- Estimate food and other aid needs for affected populations.
- Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.

**Support Assistance to Dislocated Civilians**

1-56. When supporting efforts to assist DCs, the list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Estimate food aid needs for DCs.
  - Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.
Chapter 1

- Establish camps for DCs.
- Provide emergency food, water, shelter, sanitation, and medical care to DCs.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Ensure access to basic services, including education and health care.
  - Clear damaged and destroyed housing and assess damage.

Support Security to Dislocated Civilian Camps

1-57. When supporting DC camp security, the list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Assess conditions of temporary shelters and camps for DCs.
  - Ensure adequate protection and monitoring of camps.
  - Ensure access of humanitarian aid organizations and security forces to camps.
- Transformation in which military forces assist in establishing and maintaining order in camps.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks and Capabilities

1-58. Military police first responder capabilities are key aspects to the DSCA mission. Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by U.S. federal military forces, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the state governors, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 10, United States Code [10 USC] status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. DSCA missions are also known as civil support missions (DODD 3025.18). Military police support to domestic operations is constrained by various laws. See ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA. It is accurate to say that most military police tasks performed in domestic support are common to overseas operations; however, military police conduct them under very different conditions. The core tasks of DSCA are—

- Provide support for domestic disasters.
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement.
- Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents.
- Provide other designated domestic support.

1-59. The list of activities associated with security and mobility support is only slightly reduced from those performed in the other three elements of decisive action. Intensive support to mobility operations and potentially to security operations will likely be necessary to support civil authorities and will be only minimally affected by DSCA restrictions that may have a greater effect on the other military police disciplines. Table 1-2 identifies typical military police security and mobility support capabilities that are conducted in DSCA if authorized by law.

1-60. Numerous features of DSCA are distinct from other decisive action tasks. DSCA tasks stress the employment of nondestructive means to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Typically, the Army National Guard is the first military force to respond to domestic emergencies. Federal military forces normally respond to support another federal agency, often after a Presidential declaration, to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments. Each state governor has the authority to call up his state National Guard forces (Army National Guard and Air National Guard) to respond to an incident, paid for by state funds and under the command and control of the governor. These forces are in State Active Duty status. State Active Duty forces conduct missions in accordance with the needs of the state and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes. Such a response is defined as National Guard Civil Support, not DSCA. Army National Guard (in 10 USC or 32 USC status), Army Reserve, and Active Duty Army forces perform DSCA.
Table 1-2. Military police capabilities associated with defense support of civil authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide military working dog support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct movement support to mobility operations to include—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Traffic control plan development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Main and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct security operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct area security to include—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Base and base camp security and defense.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Critical asset security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Protective services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Lines of communications security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Checkpoints.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Route security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Convoy security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Area damage control.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement local security to include—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Antiterrorism measures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Physical security procedures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide support to populace and resource control to include—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Dislocated civilian operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Logistics security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1-61. Military police operations in DSCA may include the simultaneous application of all military police disciplines. Specialized military police capabilities also have the potential to be employed. Military police support may be required for Army forces providing movement and maneuver, mission command, protection, and sustainment to government agencies at all levels until they can function normally. In a martial law situation, extensive military police support may be required. Military police Soldiers have the essential training and technical capabilities needed for relief operations, focusing on restoring civil order (and including support to mobility operations and security operations). The restoration of civil order requires—

- Operational unity.
- Effective coordination.
- Public acceptance.
- Threat awareness.
- Minimal use of force.

1-62. There are few unique military police missions performed in DSCA that are not performed during other operations. The difference is the context in which they are performed. Section 1385, Title 18, United States Code (18 USC 1385) (The Posse Comitatus Act) carefully limits the actions that military forces, particularly Regular Army units (to include federalized National Guard units), can conduct within the United States and its territories. National Guard units, remaining under the control of their respective state governors, are not restricted in the manner that federal (active duty) forces are restricted. Army forces cooperate and synchronize their efforts closely with them. These agencies are trained, resourced, and equipped more extensively than similar agencies involved in stability activities overseas. Policies issued by the federal government govern the essential services that Army forces provide in response to a disaster. Within this context of support to federal agencies, the focus for military police during DSCA support operations is to support federal agencies restoring essential services. Essential services of concern for military police include—

- Rescues.
Chapter 1

- Food and water.
- Emergency shelter.
- Basic sanitation, including sewage and garbage disposal.
- Minimum-essential access to affected areas.

ENABLERS FOR SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT

1-63. Enablers are employed to facilitate the planning and execution of tactical tasks and missions within the security and mobility support discipline. These enablers include applying the framework of assured mobility in planning and execution, employing the activities and capabilities associated with both reconnaissance and surveillance, employing the latest technologies to include UASs, applying the specialized capabilities associated with MWDs, and employing the technique of the movement corridor. Each of these enablers can play a major role in security and mobility support.

FRAMEWORK OF ASSURED MOBILITY

1-64. Assured mobility is a framework—of processes, actions, and capabilities—that assures the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, without interruption or delay, to achieve the mission (ATTP 3-90.4). The assured mobility fundamentals—predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect—support the implementation of the assured mobility framework. This construct is one means of enabling a force to achieve the commander’s intent. Assured mobility emphasizes proactive mobility and countermobility (and supporting protection) actions and integrates them in accomplishing this. Although primarily aligned with the movement and maneuver warfighting function, assured mobility has linkages to each of the warfighting functions and both enables and is enabled by those functions. The fundamentals of assured mobility are described in ATTP 3-90.4.

1-65. The assured mobility framework is applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to facilitate the commander’s view of the freedom to move and maneuver. While engineers are the principal staff integrator for assured mobility, other staff sections play critical roles in ensuring the effective application of mobility, countermobility, and associated protection tasks. Examples would include the regulation of traffic in an AO or the handling of DCs to enable movement or maneuver. While primarily used to facilitate protection, a movement corridor (see FM 3-81) is also a tool to facilitate movement and maneuver. The senior engineer staff officer’s role within assured mobility is to integrate the warfighting functions within the framework of assured mobility. Military police commanders and PMs understand and use the framework to assist in the planning and execution of missions performed as part of support to mobility operations and security operations.

1-66. The framework of assured mobility follows a continuous cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; it hinges on the application of six fundamentals that enable friendly forces to move and maneuver while denying the enemy the ability to do so. Commanders and staffs implement assured mobility by applying the six fundamentals within the planning process, integrating processes, and continuing activities. The military police focus within the fundamentals of assured mobility includes—

- **Predict.** This includes integration of police intelligence activities, a military police special capability, as part of the continuing activity of IPB. Understanding that the effects of combat (or natural disasters) means providing a focus on humans as potential obstacles to movement as well as a prediction of necessary assets (military police and otherwise) that will need to be planned for to address DCs, straggler control, and other mobility and security related issues.

- **Detect.** This is simply to play the unique military police role in the collection plan. Military police see things through a different lens than many of the other collection assets and provide valuable insights into the synchronization and integration of surveillance assets and reconnaissance missions. Being linked to CCIR is critical, and military police may be able to offer information requirements that would otherwise not be considered and accepted as CCIR.

- **Prevent.** This fundamental aims at countering an adversary’s ability to affect the movement and maneuver of friendly forces. While this is a broad requirement, mitigating the effects of human
obstacles on movement or maneuver, such as those caused by civilian populations residing in or transiting the AO, is also included as part of prevention. Increased awareness of the population’s activities and movement patterns allows prevention through the mitigation of the effects of human obstacles to movement and enforcement of movement control priorities and traffic control plans.

- **Avoid.** This fundamental is used if prevention fails; it includes development of branches and sequels to plans to avoid impediments to mobility (to include traffic congestion, crowds, and DCs). Adjusting movement and traffic control plans and rerouting of traffic may be necessary to avoid, or at least mitigate, the effects of human (and other) obstacles.

- **Neutralize.** Human obstacles (such as traffic congestion, crowds, and DCs) are mitigated by the employment of military police, CA, and other assets and capabilities. This could include establishing alternate routes and creating bypasses (including the employment of tactical bridging) to enhance traffic flow, persuading the populace to avoid certain areas at certain times, and providing public information to facilitate a controlled response to a catastrophic event or counter adversary efforts to manipulate the population.

- **Protect.** Many of the aspects of protection are captured in the discussion of security operations in chapter 3. This could include employing techniques such as the movement corridor (see FM 3-81) to facilitate trafficability and movement through a given AO. Identifying and ensuring the protection of critical sites (such as bridges on an MSR) which would have a significant effect on mobility operations and establishing convoy support centers, patrol bases, or other friendly safe havens at critical locations along MSRs, routes, or other road networks could also be included. For military police, this may also include applications of countermobility and survivability as they apply to area and local security.

**Reconnaissance and Surveillance**

1-67. Reconnaissance and surveillance are part of information collection. (For more information on all aspects of information collection see FM 3-55.) To effectively support mobility operations, security operations, and PRC, military police focus specifically on applying the techniques associated with reconnaissance and surveillance. Military police performing reconnaissance and surveillance do so with policing capabilities and the application of police intelligence operations (see ATTP 3-39.20) that enables and enhances their ability to perform these activities. Military police serve as the eyes and ears of the commander, especially in support areas, by seeking out the enemy and reporting information obtained by reconnaissance patrols. Their units and Soldiers conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor likely high-speed avenues of approach and potential landing zones and drop zones. Military police units become familiar with towns and other populated areas, ridgelines, woods, and critical terrain features from which the enemy can influence movements along road networks. These units pay close attention to areas near facilities designated as critical by the commander. Included in these areas are MSRs, bridges, tunnels, depots, terminals, sustainment bases, ammunition supply points, communications centers or nodes, critical routes, and command posts. See FM 3-34.170 for those tasks typically associated with engineer reconnaissance that military police may also perform as part of their reconnaissance and surveillance.

1-68. The Army established the every Soldier is a sensor program which is accomplished through Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance. The Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance Army universal task list task is designed to help units more effectively collect useful information in their AO. This task is critical because units often operate in an AO characterized by violence, uncertainty, and complex threats. See FM 2-91.6 for a detailed discussion about Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance.

**Reconnaissance**

1-69. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilian populations so the commander can maneuver his forces freely and rapidly. It is a focused collection effort performed before, during, and after operations to provide information used in the IPB process, as well as by the military police leader in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action. **Reconnaissance** is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to
Chapter 1

secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). See ADRP 3-90, ATP 3-55.6, and FM 3-90-2.

1-70. Military police perform reconnaissance to fulfill general and specific information requirements in support of the overall collection effort. Military police units play a major role in this effort by anticipating and providing route reconnaissance information for main and alternate supply routes, airfields, seaports, and likely landing zones within the operational area. Military police reconnaissance capabilities range from these tactical reconnaissance tasks, to highly technical assessments regarding investigative and forensic capabilities (see figure 1-2). During stability tasks, reconnaissance conducted by military police is normally conducted with a specialized, technical focus on policing and investigative aspects of the environment. As requirements for technical capabilities provided by military police increase (generally as stability tasks become dominant), the consolidation of military police assets and capabilities under the command of military police battalions and brigades within the division, corps, and theater echelon may be required to ensure the integration and synchronization of military police technical capabilities across the AO. See FM 3-39 for more information on military police reconnaissance and ATTP 3-39.20 for information on police information operations.

Figure 1-2. Military police reconnaissance capabilities

1-71. There are seven fundamentals common to all successful reconnaissance operations. Leaders must ensure that planning, preparation, and execution of reconnaissance missions adhere to these principles which include—

- Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
- Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
- Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
- Report all information rapidly and accurately.
Security and Mobility Support in the Operational Environment

- Retain freedom of maneuver.
- Gain and maintain threat contact.
- Develop the situation rapidly.

1-72. The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not reside solely with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. This is regardless of its location and primary function. Troops in close combat and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect information on enemy units that they are in contact with. In echelon support areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance tasks are aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, long-range reconnaissance units, and Special Forces. Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers, Civil Affairs, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps, have specific reconnaissance tasks to perform that complement the force’s overall reconnaissance effort. However, brigade combat teams (BCTs), division, and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached reconnaissance elements—ground or air—and intelligence elements to conduct reconnaissance.

1-73. Regardless of the type or form of reconnaissance (see ADRP 3-90, FM 3-19.4, FM 3-34.170, and FM 3-90-2, for specifics), the unit consists of the following three elements: command element, reconnaissance element, and security element. Upon receipt of a reconnaissance mission, the mission leader develops an estimate of the situation and task-organizes the size of the reconnaissance force based on the mission variables. The mission leader develops the plan, based on the following considerations:

- Obtaining accurate intelligence.
- Conducting rehearsals.
- Conducting inspections.
- Using deception measures.
- Using the smallest possible unit to accomplish the mission.
- Minimizing audio and electronic communications.
- Using surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation devices.
- Remaining undetected.

1-74. This manual focuses on three of the forms of reconnaissance—route, area, and zone. It also discusses the special focus of civil reconnaissance and some of the specifics associated with reconnaissance and presence patrols while conducting reconnaissance. Military police typically use two types of patrols when performing reconnaissance—the reconnaissance patrol and the presence patrol. When performed in a tactical environment, the guidelines for patrol operations in ATTP 3-39.10 remain valid.

**Route Reconnaissance**

1-75. *Route reconnaissance* is a directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADRP 3-90). That route may be a cross-country mobility corridor. It provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy and civilian activity along the route. The commander normally assigns this mission when wanting to use a specific route for friendly movement.

1-76. The commander assigns a route reconnaissance as a separate mission or as a specified task for a unit conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. Typically a platoon-sized unit (scout platoon or otherwise) conducts a route reconnaissance over only one route at a time. For larger organizations, the number of scout platoons (or other designated reconnaissance assets) available directly influences the number of routes that can be covered at one time. Integrating ground, air, and technical assets assures a faster and more complete route reconnaissance. See FM 3-34.170 and FM 3-90-1 for additional information concerning route reconnaissance.

1-77. Route reconnaissance tasks include the following:
• Find, report, and—based on engagement criteria—clear within capabilities all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route.
• Determine the trafficability of the route; can it support the friendly force?
• Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement along the route, such as choke points; ambush sites; and pickup zones, landing zones, and drop zones.
• Reconnoiter all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes along the route.
• Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts along the route.
• Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles (including built-up areas) along the route.
• Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders.
• Report the above route information to the headquarters initiating the route reconnaissance mission, to include providing a sketch map or a route overlay.

Area Reconnaissance

1-78. Area reconnaissance focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADRP 3-90). Area reconnaissance is vital to maintaining area security and contributes to the commander’s information collection plan.

1-79. Military police area reconnaissance is a composite of actions; it is initiated from observations and reports gathered over time by military police patrols and information gained through coordination with HN police and other friendly forces. Military police area reconnaissance plans include areas near facilities that are designated as critical by the commander, such as—

• Named areas of interest.
• Airbases.
• Bases and base clusters.
• Communications centers.
• Logistic support clusters.
• Key terminals, depots, and bridges.
• Critical terrain features.
• High-value assets.

Zone Reconnaissance

1-80. Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADRP 3-90). The commander assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when he needs additional information on a zone before committing other forces in the zone. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing knowledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain. Zone reconnaissance techniques include the use of moving elements, stationary teams, or a series of area reconnaissance actions. The three methods military police use to conduct a zone reconnaissance are fan, converging routes, and successive sector (see FM 3-19.4). Military police do not typically perform this type of reconnaissance, but may do so as part of establishing a movement corridor (see the discussion beginning at paragraph 1-95).

Civil Reconnaissance

1-81. Civil reconnaissance is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structure, capabilities, organizations, people, or events (FM 3-57). Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by CA or by other forces, as required. Like CBRN or engineer reconnaissance, it is not a form of reconnaissance, but has specific reconnaissance tasks that
complement the force’s overall reconnaissance efforts. See FM 3-57 for additional information on civil reconnaissance.

1-82. Military police may also be involved in civil reconnaissance, a focused type of reconnaissance that is performed leveraging the specifics of police intelligence operations (see ATTP 3-39.20), police operations (see ATTP 3-39.10), and other skills and capabilities typically associated with the policeman on the beat. Military police presence patrols are well suited for many civil reconnaissance missions.

**Reconnaissance Patrols**

1-83. A reconnaissance patrol is most often performed when military police perform reconnaissance in a tactical role. A reconnaissance patrol collects information to confirm or disprove the accuracy of information previously gained. The intent for this type of patrol is to move stealthily, avoid enemy contact, and accomplish the tactical task without engaging in close combat. Reconnaissance patrols always try to accomplish their mission without being detected or observed. Because detection cannot always be avoided, a reconnaissance patrol carries the necessary arms and equipment to protect itself and break contact with the enemy.

1-84. A reconnaissance patrol normally travels light, with as few personnel, arms, ammunition, and equipment as possible. This increases stealth and cross-country mobility in close terrain. Regardless of how the patrol is armed and equipped, the leader always plans for the potential of direct-fire contact with a hostile force. Military police leaders must anticipate where they may possibly be observed and control the hazard by employing measures to lessen their level of risk (see ATP 5-19). If detected or if unanticipated opportunities arise, reconnaissance patrols must be able to rapidly transition to combat.

**Presence Patrols**

1-85. A presence patrol is a form of reconnaissance typically used in stability or DSCA activities. Its primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit’s AO. To do this, the patrol gathers specific and general critical information (as determined by the commander). The patrol seeks out this information and then observes and reports. Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander’s intent. In addition to reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols demonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of the U.S. forces. Presence patrols are intended to clearly demonstrate the determination, competency, confidence, concern and, when appropriate, the overwhelming power of the force.

1-86. Before sending out presence patrols, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader. A presence patrol takes deliberate steps to visibly reinforce the impression the commander wants to convey to the populace. Where the patrol goes, what it does there, how it handles its weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the populace are all part of that impression. When the presence patrol returns to the main body, the commander thoroughly debriefs it, not only for hard information but also for the patrol leader’s impressions of the effects of the patrol on the populace. This allows the commander to determine whether to modify the actions of subsequent patrols. Considerations include—

- Planning for and rehearsing actions in and around large crowds of civilians or noncombatants. (See ATP 3-39.33 and FM 3-19.4 for additional information regarding civil disturbances.) Even though U.S. forces or the indigenous population may have a basic language capability, interpreters are a critical asset for all but the most rudimentary interactions.
- Briefing the element conducting the patrol on information and intelligence collection priorities.
- Assigning responsibility to specific Soldiers for maintaining all-around and high-low security on each floor and the roof of buildings.
- Periodically occupying rooftops during the course of the patrol to increase observation and security.
- Using urban city maps, as navigation by grid in an urban area can be difficult. Maps showing street names, neighborhoods, and so on are much more useful.
Chapter 1

- Knowing the numbers and locations of translators or interpreters in the patrol. Also know the ethnicity of the translators and how that might affect the population in the patrol area or route. (See FM 3-19.4 for additional guidance on translator employment considerations.)
- Checking recent activity or trends in the local population or urban areas.

Surveillance

1-87. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the commitment of reconnaissance assets against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units. Military police surveillance focuses on providing early warning of enemy reconnaissance elements rather than gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy’s main body or destroying it. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). See ATP 3-55.6, FM 2-91.6, and FM 3-55 for more information. For the specialized, but related, aspects associated with law enforcement investigation see ATP 3-39.12.

1-88. Military police maintain continuous surveillance of all the assigned named areas of interest or enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach in an assigned AO. Units accomplish this by establishing a series of listening posts (LPs) or observation posts (OPs). LPs or OPs may be either mounted or dismounted. Military police conduct active mounted patrols to extend their observation limits or to cover dead space and the area between LPs or OPs. When establishing LPs or OPs in urban areas, special considerations are involved. See FM 3-19.4 for more information on LPs and OPs.

1-89. A unit’s ability to report is critical during surveillance. Effective early warning requires detailed planning for uninterrupted communications. The mission leader considers communication distances and significant terrain features to identify potential wireless communication problems. If problems exist, support is requested from the higher headquarters.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1-90. Small UASs are designed for reconnaissance, surveillance, and remote monitoring and are capable of locating and recognizing enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems, and other targets that contrast with their surroundings. Small UASs are also capable of locating and confirming the position of friendly forces and the presence of noncombatant civilians, monitoring detainee operations, supporting border operations, or searching for missing persons.

1-91. Military police commanders and their staffs may integrate small UASs to perform the reconnaissance and surveillance of specific locations and routes during military police tactical or law enforcement operations in support of posts, camps, and stations to help clarify and verify facts and assumptions in the operational environment. Military police can launch and recover a small UAS from unprepared terrain in minutes without special equipment. The system can be remotely controlled from the ground control unit or can fly completely autonomous missions using Global Positioning System waypoint navigation for launch and recovery. See FM 3-04.155 for more information on UASs.

Military Working Dogs

1-92. MWDs provide a variety of unique capabilities that may contribute to security and mobility operations. MWDs range from single-purpose canines that are trained on one specialized task to dual-purpose canines that are capable of performing several complex tasks (scouting, patrolling, or detecting explosive and narcotic scents). Those missions that include reconnaissance should find them to be a valued asset, although their value to surveillance missions may be limited. MWD teams provide patrol and explosive detection and tracking capabilities that enhance reconnaissance operations. Commanders can integrate MWD teams to clear routes and roadways of hazards during most operations.

1-93. When in support of mobility operations, the focus for support would be MWD teams providing patrol and explosive detection and tracking capabilities that enhance reconnaissance operations. Commanders can integrate MWD teams to clear routes and roadways of hazards during mobile defense operations. Mine detection dogs are especially appropriate for inclusion in clearing operations.
Security and Mobility Support in the Operational Environment

1-94. Those capabilities associated with MWDs, such as detection and tracking, may be more focused on support to area and local security. MWD teams are employed with security forces and integrated and layered with other sensors to identify threats, provide early warning, and cover gaps in defensive cover or among defensive positions. Commanders may integrate MWD teams to control the freedom of movement in an AO at checkpoints and for traffic or access control points to detect, deter, and prevent the illicit movement of people or materials. They may also be used in support of high-risk personnel security missions. MWD teams can assist HN security forces who are conducting civil control missions or supporting governance and the election process. They may also assist at border control points to detect contraband (such as unlawful human traffic, narcotics, or explosives) and protect HN economic systems. Either single- or dual-purpose MWDs may be used in this role, depending on the situation. Dual-purpose MWDs are versatile resources because of their unique ability to seamlessly transition between patrol and detection modes. See ATTP 3-39.34 for more information on capabilities and limitations of MWD teams and the planning factors used to optimize their performance. GTAs 19-01-003 and 90-01-037 may also be useful references.

MOVEMENT CORRIDOR

1-95. Establishment of a movement corridor is by necessity a combined arms technique that could be listed as both a mobility operation and a security operation, since it draws many supporting tasks and activities from both. In many ways this is simply a special area security mission. It is potentially one of the most difficult tactical missions performed by military police—especially if a military police battalion is designated as the task force commander for the mission. Those subordinate tasks that fall under mobility operations are discussed in chapter 2, and those that are part of security operations are discussed in chapter 3. A movement corridor may also have application as a technique to be used during PRC operations (to include NEO), which are discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

1-96. A movement corridor is a designated area established to protect and enable ground movement along a route (FM 3-81). Units establish a movement corridor to set the conditions to protect and enable movement of traffic along a designated surface route. Units conduct synchronized operations within the movement corridor such as reconnaissance, security, mobility, and information collection for forces that require additional control, protection, and support to enable their movement.

1-97. A movement corridor may be established to facilitate the movement of a single element or be established for a longer period of time to facilitate the movement of a number of elements along a given route. The owner of an AO may establish a movement corridor within their AO along an established MSR or a route designated for unit movement. The movement corridor would typically include the airspace above it to allow the establishing unit to conduct aerial reconnaissance and fires.

1-98. One technique to synchronizing movement and security is by planning for a movement corridor during the operations process. The unit commander or convoy commander is responsible for a basic level of security during movement. Most support brigades and functional units have a need for more security than they can organically provide during their movement, and receive little support from maneuver units for additional required security. Military police units may be given the mission of providing some of that additional security. Units owning an AO may provide additional security support to units moving through or present in their AOs to include the ability to provide fires. Several tasks and tactics, techniques, and procedures can be integrated within an AO to set conditions to help secure individual unit movement, to include—

- Providing support to situational understanding.
- Conducting tactical maneuver (performed by the AO owner or assigned maneuver unit).
- Conducting route and convoy security operations.
- Conducting AT activities.
- Conducting CBRN operations.
- Conducting survivability operations.
- Handing off security responsibility when crossing AO borders or at nearest secure area, facility, or base.
- Integrating fires.
1-99. Figure 1-3 is an example of a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) that has the responsibility for assuring mobility along MSR OMAHA. (See FM 3-81 for a discussion of the MEB and mobility support operations.) It establishes a movement corridor to protect and enable ground movement. It assigns the mission to a task force built around a military police battalion headquarters with the mission of establishing a movement corridor within the context of a larger area security mission by an MEB in the support area, but it could just as easily be shifted to a scenario where a movement corridor has been established between a major base camp and one of its spoke base camps and be performed under the control of a BCT. (See ATP 3-37.10 for more information on base camps.) The specific organization of the task force is not critical for this example, but it would likely include at least one military police company, an engineer company, a CBRN platoon, and an EOD detachment. A sampling of the tasks that would be performed by the subordinate military police elements would typically include—

- Operate traffic control posts (TCPs) to control access to the MSR.
- Conduct route and convoy security activities.
- Conduct route reconnaissance to identify potential threats and obstacles.
- Provide area and selected local security for route clearance, improvement, and maintenance activities.
- Conduct mobile patrols along the route to control traffic, spot problems, and reroute traffic when necessary.
- Establish checkpoints and perhaps even a combat outpost at a critical site.
Chapter 2

Support to Mobility Operations

Military police support to the movement and maneuver warfighting function is primarily focused on support to mobility operations. As part of this focus, military police draw on technical capabilities and tasks used in the performance of police intelligence operations, traffic management and enforcement, restore and maintain order, support to civil security and civil control (support to border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement), detention operations, and the specialized application of maneuver support to include the establishment of a movement corridor (see chapter 1 and FM 3-81)—all performed in a tactical environment. Military police units expedite the secure movement of theater resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment needed to support the operational plan and changing tactical situations. Rarely are military police not also involved in security when they perform support to mobility operations as they conduct proactive measures to detect, deter, and defeat threat forces operating within the AO. Military police provide movement support to mobility operations, ensuring orderly and safe movement of U.S. forces and enabling freedom of movement for the maneuver commander. Movement control support also facilitates the movement of follow-on forces in support of the operational plan. The framework of assured mobility (see ATTP 3-90.4) is helpful in understanding the role that military police have in supporting mobility operations.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

2-1. Military police must understand the framework in which support to mobility operations is conducted. It is a combination of both movement and maneuver and, depending on how it is viewed, it may be focused on either movement or maneuver.

2-2. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADRP 3-90). Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. The function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a positional advantage over an enemy.

2-3. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (JP 3-0). Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering.

2-4. Typically, military police are focused on supporting the movement supporting or enabling the maneuver at the tactical level. Although they may maneuver while doing so, their focus for the support they provide to mobility operations is on enhancing the movement of other forces—whether that is a convoy or a maneuver unit—as it moves through routes as a part of a breaching or gap-crossing operation or some other mobility-related mission.

MOBILITY OPERATIONS

2-5. Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 1-02). As described in ADRP 3-90 and
FM 3-90-1, mobility is essential to successful operations. Its major focus is to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield or a given AO. The commander wants the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a wide front. When attacking, the commander wants to concentrate the effects of combat power at selected locations. This may require the unit to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes do not exist. The surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort expended in constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles identified before starting the offensive operation instead of breaching them whenever possible. However, this must be done with caution because it might play into the enemy’s hand. Bypassed obstacles are reported to higher headquarters and are marked whenever the situation allows.

2-6. Mobility operations are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of natural and manmade obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (ATTP 3-90.4). They are conducted to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield. They are heavily dependent upon intelligence gained from surveillance and reconnaissance. Mobility operations include the following six primary tasks:

- Conduct breaching operations.
- Conduct clearing operations.
- Conduct gap-crossing operations.
- Construct and maintain combat roads and trails.
- Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones.
- Conduct traffic management and control.

2-7. Military police are mostly focused on support to the first three primary tasks and the last primary task of conduct traffic management and control. These four primary tasks provide a tactical focus for military police support to mobility operations.

BREACHING OPERATIONS

2-8. Breaching operations are conducted to allow maneuver despite the presence of enemy reinforcing obstacles that are covered by fire and used to shape engagement areas. Breaching is an inherent part of maneuver and is one of the most difficult combat tasks to perform. Breaching activities are characterized by thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning, extensive preparation and rehearsal, and a massing of combat power.

2-9. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the farside of an obstacle that is covered by fire. Breaching is a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of a maneuver commander. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces detect an obstacle, and they end when the operational handover has occurred between the unit conducting the breaching operation and follow-on forces. Combined arms breaching operations are discussed in ATTP 3-90.4.

2-10. The three types of breaching operations are the deliberate breach, the hasty breach, and the covert breach. Amphibious breaching is an adaption of the deliberate breach. An in-stride breach is a type of hasty breach. Basic information includes the following:

- **Deliberate breach.** Deliberate breaching is the creation of a lane through a minefield or a clear route through a barrier or fortification, which is systematically planned and carried out. A deliberate breach is used against a strong defense or a complex obstacle system. It is similar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailed knowledge of both the defense and the obstacle systems. It is characterized by the most prior planning, preparation, and buildup of combat power on the nearside of obstacles. Subordinate units are task-organized to accomplish the breach. The breach often requires securing the farside of the obstacle with an assault force before or during reduction.

- **Hasty breach.** Hasty breaching (land mine warfare) is the creation of lanes through enemy minefields by expedient methods such as blasting with demolitions, pushing rollers or disabled vehicles through the minefields when the time factor does not permit detailed reconnaissance, deliberate breaching, or bypassing the obstacle (JP 3-15). A hasty breach is an adaptation to the
deliberate breach and is conducted when less time is available. It may be conducted during a deliberate or hasty attack due to lack of clarity on enemy obstacles or changing enemy situations, to include the emplacement of scatterable mines.

- **Covert breach.** Covert breaching is the creation of lanes through minefields or other obstacles that is planned and intended to be executed without detection by an adversary. Its primary purpose is to reduce obstacles in an undetected fashion to facilitate the passage of maneuver forces. A covert breach is conducted when surprise is necessary or desirable and when limited visibility and terrain present the opportunity to reduce enemy obstacles without being seen. It uses elements of deliberate and hasty breaching as required.

2-11. Military police support to breaching operations provides an efficient and orderly flow of the movement of forces into and through the breach area. While breaching operations are typically focused on the support of maneuver, the military police role is typically focused on support of movement within maneuver. Military police support to breaching operations (deliberate, hasty, or covert) is based on an analysis of the mission variables. As a minimum, military police support typically includes—

- Establishing TCPs along routes leading to or departing from the breach lanes to expedite traffic flow.
- Establishing holding areas.
- Working with engineers to emplace temporary route signage.
- Performing straggler-control activities.
- Conducting area and local security to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces.
- Broadening area and local security around the reduction area after the assault force has moved through.
- Performing hand-off of security and movement control of routes and lanes to follow-on forces.

2-12. The commander of the force conducting the breaching operation organizes into three forces to conduct breaching—support, breach, and assault forces. Military police are typically part of the breach force (part of the security element) or the support force in a breaching operation. As part of the breach force, they specifically focus on facilitating the passage of the assault force and follow-on forces. As in other operations, they ensure that DCs do not degrade the breaching activities or movement throughout the breach area. As part of the support force, their role focuses more on simply follow-on forces. In either case, their role is to facilitate movement to and ultimately out of the breach lanes. Their involvement is directly proportional to the echelon conducting the breach and the number of lanes required to support the number of vehicles that will be passing through those lanes. Military police units conduct close coordination with the support, breach, and assault force commanders and the breaching force commander executing the breaching operation.

2-13. The most critical military police support is to provide the necessary traffic control for the breach area, where military police units provide the commander with a means to control traffic flow to appropriate cleared lanes. When multiple lanes branch off from a single far-recognition marker, military police may provide a guide or establish a TCP to direct the formation to the appropriate lanes. They also assist in modifying the traffic flow when lanes are closed for maintenance or improvement. Military police units enable the commander to make adjustments in traffic flow due to the tactical situation to include disabled vehicles or artillery fires.

2-14. Figure 2-1, page 2-4, provides an example of military police support to breaching operations. In this example, 1st BCT conducts a breaching operation to seize OBJECTIVE DOG and pass 2nd BCT along ROUTES AUSTIN and DALLAS. The breach force (1-52 Combined Arms Battalion) creates breach lanes 2 and 3 to allow the assault force (1-50 Combined Arms Battalion) to seize OBJECTIVE DOG. After the farside objective is seized, the breach force creates an additional lane (Lane 1) to allow 2nd BCT to pass through the breach area along two passage routes to continue to the attack. Typically, as shown in this example, military police are assigned to the security element within the breach force to assist in providing local security for the reduction element and guiding the assault force to the far-recognition markers. They are poised to reroute traffic based on changes in the tactical situation. Military police efforts on the nearside of the breach area are focused on directing 2nd BCT and other follow-on forces toward the routes leading up to the reduction area and optimizing the flow of traffic up to and through the breach lanes to maintain...
momentum. Engineers in the breach force would create and mark the lanes through the obstacles to get the assault force through. While not necessarily being collocated with the breach force, military police would provide traffic control through the reduction area. The military police force may even remain under BCT control while doing this. Military police may be organized within the assault force as well, to be able to rapidly establish traffic control on the farside of the obstacle. This example depicts the establishment of two lanes by the breach force—enough to get the assault force of 1st BCT through. Follow-on engineers would likely improve ROUTES AUSTIN and DALLAS and military police would potentially adjust the number of TCPs necessary to support this. Follow-on engineers may also open more lanes to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces with a corresponding requirement for military police support for movement control. 1st BCT is responsible for route maintenance and traffic control throughout the breach area until handed off to follow-on forces.

CLEARING OPERATIONS

2-15. Clearing operations are conducted to completely eliminate the enemy’s obstacle effort or residual obstacles affecting the operational area. Commanders may order clearing operations to facilitate mobility within an AO based on an analysis of the mission variables. They may also order a critical route or area cleared of mines, explosive hazards (EHs), or other obstacles. The operation could be conducted as a single
Support to Mobility Operations

mission to open or reopen a route or area, or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of efforts to defeat a sustained threat to a critical route. A clearing operation is often performed by a combined arms force built around an engineer-based force (to potentially include MWDs).

2-16. Clearing in the context of this description is not directly related to the tactical task of clear. Military police support to clearing operations is mostly focused on route clearance missions. Route clearance is the detection, investigation, marking and reporting, and neutralization of EHs and other obstacles along a defined route to enable assured mobility for the maneuver commander. It is a combined arms operation that relies on a reconnaissance of the route to be cleared (FM 3-34.210). Route clearance may be conducted to open a route for the necessary traffic or on a recurring basis to minimize the risk level along selected routes. Route clearance teams are generally comprised of engineers, EOD personnel, a security element (infantry, military police, or an aviation unit), medical personnel, and a special operations team. MWDs may be a capability or tool used during the detection phase of the route clearance operation.

2-17. Military police support to route clearance is typically limited to providing reconnaissance information on routes in the AO and providing security for detection and clearing assets. Providing security may include observing oncoming traffic for threats, identifying hazards or obstacles in the route, containing suspect vehicles identified by other elements within the route-clearing team, and providing traffic control. See ATTP 3-90.4 for detailed information on conducting route clearance. Clearing operations are often linked to route security and convoy security (discussed in chapter 2 of ATTP 3-90.4).

2-18. Figure 2-2 shows an example of a combat clearance mission along an MSR. This type of route clearance operation focuses on specific points along a route where there is a high threat for obstacles or ambush. In this example, military police may be tasked as the security element. During the sweep, the security element would position itself where it can best overwatch the detection, clearance, and improvement elements while they perform their assigned tasks. The security element may be to the front, flank, or rear of the detection, clearance, and improvement elements, depending on the situation. As part of a security force, military police would also be poised to respond to the presence of civilians to ensure that they do not interfere with the clearance mission. This might include diverting civilian traffic or establishing a hasty checkpoint or roadblock. The clearing element may include a specialized search dog or patrol explosive detection dog team.

**Figure 2-2. Example of military police support to clearing**

**GAP-CROSSING OPERATIONS**

2-19. Gaps such as ravines, mountain passes, and rivers will exist in the operational area and present a significant challenge to both movement and maneuver. Gap-crossing operations are a mobility operation consisting of river crossing, brigade-level crossing, and special gap-crossing operations conducted to project combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap) (ATTP 3-90.4). (Gap-crossing operations in
support of both maneuver and movement are discussed in detail in ATTP 3-90.4.) Similar to breaching operations, the three types of gap crossings are deliberate, hasty, and covert.

2-20. Gap crossings force units to move in column formations along a few routes that come together at the crossing sites. Military police units play a vital role in helping the commander control traffic at gap-crossing sites and along routes leading into and out of the crossing area, to ensure that units cross the gap as quickly and efficiently as possible to maintain momentum. Controlling traffic is essential for ensuring that the crossing plan remains flexible to changes in the situation that may require adjustments to the routing and sequencing of crossing units. Effective traffic control also prevents congestion and the pooling of vehicles that offer lucrative targets for artillery and air strikes.

2-21. The crossing is usually planned and conducted by the headquarters directing the crossing. A division gap-crossing operation is conducted by a joint force commander or corps, depending on how the area of responsibility is structured. A BCT deliberate crossing is controlled by a division or corps, depending on how the area of responsibility is structured. Whenever a BCT is crossing, the military police assets task-organized to the BCT may also cross to provide uninterrupted support to the BCT after being relieved by follow-on military police forces. In these instances, there is typically a reliance on an engineer headquarters or an MEB in the area of responsibility to support the crossing. Commanders conducting a deliberate gap crossing typically organize their forces into assault, assured mobility, bridgehead, and breakout forces as follows:

- **Assault forces** seize the farside objective to eliminate direct fire on the crossing sites.
- **Assured mobility forces** (such as combat engineer companies, mobility augmentation companies, bridge companies, military police, and CBRN units) provide crossing means, traffic control, and obscuration. These supporting units are task-organized to perform specific tasks and are controlled using specified procedures that are clear, simple, and rehearsed by all elements to ensure responsive support of the plan and unity of command and effort.
- **Bridgehead forces** assault across a gap to secure the enemy side (the bridgehead) to allow the buildup and passage of a breakout force during gap crossing. The bridgehead is an area on the enemy side of the linear obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security of crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack. The bridgehead line is the limit of the objective area in the development of the bridgehead.
- **Breakout forces** attack to seize objectives beyond the bridgehead as a continuation of offensive operations.

2-22. The PM section is responsible for developing the traffic control plan. The employment of military police for gap crossing is influenced by the mission variables. The number and placement of military police units supporting a gap-crossing operation vary with the size of the crossing force, the direction of the crossing (forward or retrograde), and the degree of enemy resistance expected and the number of DCs that may be encountered. Military police units are placed where they can best expedite and enforce movement tables along the routes leading into the crossing area.

2-23. The main thrust of military police support to gap-crossing operations is within the immediate gap-crossing site and routes leading to and from the site. Military police direct the crossing units to their proper locations using holding and staging areas, TCPs, and temporary signs (and subsequent signage [see GTA 19-08-002]) to ensure that units move through the area according to the crossing and traffic circulation plans. This is a highly critical aspect of gap- (and especially river-) crossing operations because the number of crossing sites are limited. Military police also provide mobile patrols along primary routes to control traffic, spot problems, guide and escort vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary. In most gap-crossing operations, TCPs are located on both sides of the gap to improve communication and coordination between the units.

2-24. Military police unit support to gap-crossing operations reduces the crossing time and promotes the efficient movement of vehicles. It reduces congestion, speeds the crossing, and enables the crossing units to maintain momentum. Military police units may operate collection points or holding areas to temporarily secure DCs and detainees until they can be evacuated to the next higher echelon’s holding area to ensure that they do not impede the gap-crossing operation. Additional military police augmentation may be needed.
Support to Mobility Operations

from a higher military police headquarters, depending on the amount of traffic and numbers of detainees and DCs in the area. In restrictive terrain, military police platoons and squads may operate defiles which are special circulation control measures conducted to keep traffic moving smoothly through a narrow passageway (see FM 3-39). Military police can also conduct area security to the rear and flanks of crossing forces to enhance security (see chapter 3 and FM 3-19.4).

2-25. Military police units operating inside the crossing areas are typically under the operational control of the crossing area commander for the duration of the operation. The military police unit operating outside of the crossing area is under the command of its appropriate echelon commander.

2-26. Figure 2-3 provides an example of military police using holding areas, staging areas, and TCPs to facilitate traffic control during a gap crossing. This would correspond to Phase I (Advance to the Gap) of a deliberate gap crossing. While military police may also be organized as part of the assault, bridgehead, or breakout forces, this example is focused on those military police organized as part of the assured mobility force. Those military police organic or task-organized to the other forces will be performing missions or tasks for those units. See ATTP 3-90.4 for specifics on the type of activities military police may perform at holding areas, staging areas, and TCPs and an example of a deliberate wet-gap crossing.

![Figure 2-3. Example of military police support to gap crossing](image)

2-27. Retrograde gap crossings have the potential to be more difficult than forward crossings, especially when the force is under pressure by enemy forces. ATTP 3-90.4 highlights special planning considerations and techniques to consider for situations involving significant number of DCs.

**PASSAGE OF LINES**

2-28. Although not one of the primary tasks of mobility operations, support to a passage of lines is frequently linked to military support to mobility operations. During a passage of lines, forces move forward or rearward through the combat positions of another force with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. A passage of lines is a high-risk military operation that requires close coordination.
between the passing unit, the stationary unit, and supporting forces. Passage of lines is one of the tactical enabling tasks and a tactical shaping task. See FM 3-90-2 for more information.

2-29. Military police units support a passage of lines by reducing confusion and congestion of units into and out of the passage area. Military police units provide traffic regulation and enforcement in areas surrounding passage points and passage lanes to ensure that passing units have priority for using routes to and through the areas. The headquarters directing the operation sets the priority of route use. Before the operation, military police units assigned to support the passage of lines conduct route reconnaissance and become familiar with the routes to, through, and beyond the area of passage. Maintaining unit integrity and reducing incidents of stragglers is vital to maintaining the passing unit’s momentum in a forward passage of lines. Military police units perform aggressive straggler and DC control operations to return individuals to positive control and prevent enemy personnel mixed in with DCs from being able to infiltrate into the sustainment area.

MAIN AND ALTERNATE SUPPLY ROUTE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

2-30. Main and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement (see ATTP 3-90.4) is the military police focused portion of the mobility operations task of traffic management and control along with the logistics focused portion of movement control (see ATP 4-16) and is integrated with the military police focused activity of traffic management and control (see ATP 3-39.12 and ATP 3-39.10). Traffic management and control is conducted to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel and resources along road networks in the most efficient manner possible. Although focused on supporting movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Traffic management and control also contributes to the commander’s protection efforts. Reconnaissance is an essential component of effective traffic management and control. Traffic management holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. Four of the key activities supporting main and alternate route regulation and enforcement are route reconnaissance, traffic control plan development, DC control measures (see ATP 3-57.10), and straggler control. These activities typically overlap and are linked even as each activity accomplishes their own focused responsibilities.

2-31. Traffic management and enforcement and main and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement collectively include all active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations, investigate traffic collisions, and enable safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic management and enforcement focuses on mitigating traffic disruptions created by threats, DCs, and congestion due to breakdowns, weather, and degradation of road surfaces. Military police conduct route regulation enforcement consistent with the traffic control plan.

2-32. Traffic management and enforcement activities are part of the police operations discipline and include the control of traffic circulation, enforcement of traffic regulations, and investigation of traffic incidents. These technical skills provide enablers for military police in the broader performance of their tactical mission during main and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement.

2-33. Military police units provide main and alternate route regulation and enforcement to enhance movement and maneuver, keeping the routes within controlled spaces free for priority tactical and sustainment operations. Military police units support the command MSR regulation measures as stated in the traffic regulation plan. The traffic regulation plan contains specific measures to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the road network. It assigns military route numbers or names, the direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned military police TCPs.

2-34. A traffic control post is a manned post that is used to preclude the interruption of traffic flow or movement along a designated route (FM 3-39). Most important to military police, it gives the route control classification. Military police units ensure that classified routes are only used by authorized traffic within their timetable schedule. Military police TCPs prevent vehicles from traveling on roads that are too narrow for their passage or unable to support their weight to ensure that they do not obstruct the route. Many of these same skills are applicable to military police support to breaching, clearing, and gap-crossing.
movement (traffic control posts, defiles, temporary route signing, and so forth). While focused on support to movement, these may also support maneuver.

2-35. To expedite traffic on MSRs, military police units apply special circulation control measures, such as—

- Temporary route signing.
- Static posts (TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, or defiles at critical points).
- Mobile patrolling between static posts.
- Traffic and road conditions monitoring.

2-36. Military police units also gather information on friendly and enemy activities and help stranded vehicles and crews. They place temporary route signs to warn of hazards or to guide drivers unfamiliar with routes. Using these measures, military police units exercise jurisdiction over the road network in the AO and coordinate with the HN (whenever possible) to expedite movement on MSRs.

2-37. The movement corridor opens and closes for specified time periods to meet the movement table requirements. Military police units employed with engineer, logistics, EOD, aviation, and other forces may establish movement corridors to provide the secure movement of military traffic through vulnerable areas. Establishing a movement corridor is a technique to protect and enable ground movement along a route (see chapter 1 and FM 3-81). Based on published movement tables, the unit establishing the movement corridor forces will open and maintain a safe passage route through uncontrolled terrain. The opening of the route requires a combined-arms effort, with each branch providing their unique mobility skills to the route. The sequence and the accompanying synchronized effort may include engineer route clearance and maintenance activities that are integrated with area security implementation along the corridor. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to determine problems along the route. Sustainment forces may then establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along the corridor as the tactical situation dictates. A protected holding area (such as an assembly area, an intermediate staging base, or a convoy support center) may be required as a waiting area for forces to use during traffic interruptions or deployment from an aerial port or seaport of embarkation. Finally, military police TCPs and convoy escorts of critical commodities of supplies are established and, with aviation convoy security in place, the convoys move along the protected route to their final destination.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

2-38. Military police units conduct hasty and deliberate route reconnaissance to obtain information on a route and nearby terrain where the enemy can influence troop movement. Route reconnaissance focuses on continually monitoring the condition of main and alternate supply routes and specified key terrain along routes, and reporting to the tactical commander. Military police patrols look for restricting terrain, effects of weather on the route, damage to the route, CBRN contamination, and enemy presence or absence.

2-39. When enemy activity is spotted, military police patrols report it, maintain surveillance, and develop the situation according to the commander’s plan and intent. To gather information for proposed traffic plans, military police units look at the type and number of available routes, load classifications, route widths, obstructions, and restrictions. All of this information is critical to the commander’s situational understanding and the development of the common operational picture. Route reconnaissance may be conducted as part of a multifunctional team with engineer, CBRN, and other specialties. See chapter 1, FM 3-90-2, and FM 3-34.170 for more information on route, area, and zone reconnaissance.

TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN DEVELOPMENT

2-40. Movement control measures are supported with a traffic control plan that addresses military police support in controlling the use of main and alternate supply routes (names, direction of travel, size, and weight restrictions), checkpoints, rest and refuel areas, TCPs, highway regulation points, and mobile patrols. The traffic control plan identifies major routes to bear most of the traffic load. It also reflects any route restrictions such as direction of travel, size and weight restrictions, and critical points.
2-41. A traffic control plan is developed by military police to complement the movement control and highway regulation plan and includes traffic enforcement measures that support movement control and highway traffic regulations, addresses speed control, establishes safety inspection checkpoints that assist in protecting the force, and ensures that only authorized traffic uses controlled routes. The traffic control plan contains specific measures to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the road network to include route designations, restrictions, priority of movement, direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned military police traffic control posts. The traffic control plan supports the task of providing movement control. See ATP 4-16 for a discussion of this and other control measures. See GTA 90-01-005 for insights on traffic control post operations.

2-42. Critical points may include facilities, terminals, ports, railheads, and cargo transfer points that, if congested, will limit the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire transportation network. The traffic control plan includes efforts to address high-volume traffic conditions and mitigate or prevent excessive traffic on highways, high volume primary routes, and urban streets including secondary routes and residential streets.

**Dislocated Civilian Control**

2-43. DC operations are a special category of PRC (see chapter 4 and ATP 3-57.10). The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and protect them from the effects of combat operations and natural or manmade disasters. Military police units providing traffic regulation and enforcement on routes may encounter DCs that could hinder military traffic flow. These units ensure priority to military traffic by diverting DCs from MSRs and other areas to refugee routes or DC camps. They deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions may be a threat to themselves, tactical operations, or sustainment operations. If functioning, the HN government is responsible for identifying routes for the safe movement of DCs out of an AO. If needed, military police units assist the CA unit and HN assets in redirecting DCs to alternate routes. DC control may be focused on tactical routes (linked to the support of maneuver in mobility operations) and responding to immediate needs of tactical commanders, or in support of main and alternate supply routes (linked to support of movement in mobility operations—typically focused on the support area).

2-44. Planning for DC control requires both bottom-up and top-down information to be included in the formulation of the plan to ensure its viability and effectiveness. Minimizing interference caused by DCs may include blocking, clearing, or collecting techniques (discussed in chapter 4).

2-45. Military police (and other U.S. forces) do not assume control of DCs unless they are requested to do so by the HN or are operating in an environment with a hostile or nonfunctioning government. When the joint force commander or geographic combatant commander assumes responsibility, military police elements coordinate with CA elements to set up TCPs at critical points along the route to direct DCs to secondary roadways and areas not used by military forces. When directed, DCs may be housed within DC camps operated by U.S. forces and supported by military police. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC operations, DC planners should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans. Figure 2-4 shows an example of an overlay for a DC collection plan in support of an offensive operation. Plans include collection points, selected DC routes (and perhaps time windows), assembly areas or holding areas, and projected location of DC camps. See appendix A for more information on DC camps and ATP 3-57.10 for more information on DC planning and techniques.
2-46. Straggler control refers to operations conducted to regulate friendly forces that have become separated from their commands by events in the AO. Straggler control is conducted by military police units using mobile patrols, TCPs, and checkpoint teams to return stragglers to their parent units. Most stragglers are simply Soldiers who become separated from their command as the result of a tactical operation. Forced marches and movements may result in disabled vehicles and stragglers. Military police units direct Soldiers to their parent unit or to a replacement unit according to command policies. They also provide basic first aid and initiate the medical evacuation of wounded stragglers.

2-47. Military police units can set up special posts and collection points for straggler control following CBRN attacks or major enemy actions that result in large numbers of lost, dazed, or confused military personnel. Mobile military police patrols operate between posts and direct or collect stragglers. Straggler collection points may be needed if many stragglers are present in the AO. If multinational forces are
present in the theater, each nation establishes a collection point for its own personnel. Military police units must be aware of allied straggler collection locations and assist allied Soldiers in returning to their respective commands. Military police units use available theater transportation assets to transfer stragglers from TCPs and checkpoints to straggler collection points. At the collection points, they are screened and sorted for removal to a medical treatment facility, return to their units, or movement as directed by the controlling headquarters. The designation of a hasty collection point is highlighted in figure 2-5. This is one technique to support straggler control using a quadrant system to rapidly facilitate separation of the various activities that may all be performed at a collection point. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose. Each control point is located 55 to 110 yards (50 to 100 meters) from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. Establishing the various collection points that are needed within the same vicinity consolidates common requirements for such things as food and water, medical treatment, and protection while maximizing the use of available resources.

Figure 2-5. Example collection point activities

2-48. Military police units report information about stragglers they come in contact with. This information is compiled by the military police unit headquarters and forwarded through appropriate channels to the higher command. Information obtained from stragglers that has immediate tactical value is reported immediately through command channels. Stragglers who are also identified as deserters are placed into detention channels.
Chapter 3

Support to Security Operations

Military police provide support to security operations primarily through tasks and activities aligned with area and local security, which are the last two tasks of the five subordinate tasks of security operations identified in ADRP 3-90 and further explained in FM 3-90-2. Area and local security tasks are focused on protecting friendly forces, assets, and operations in an AO, typically in support areas. Within the context of area security, military police specifically support the area security efforts of the sustainment base and support units through the execution of a number of key tasks and activities. They are also key participants in local area security efforts that include aspects of AT and physical security. See ADRP 3-37 for an in-depth discussion of area and local security.

SECURITY OPERATIONS

3-1. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). Security operations encompass five primary tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. While the first three tasks are linked to the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the last two are linked to the protection warfighting function. These last two security tasks are focused on providing protection, although they may also enhance the movement and maneuver of the force. The focus of military police performing security operations may be either on a force (convoy operations for example) or a facility (base camp, DC camp, detention site, or other example) for which they are providing security.

3-2. Military police may also conduct counterreconnaissance in the performance of area and local security as a supporting tactical mission task. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations (FM 3-90-1).

3-3. In their performance of security operations, military police are linked (integrated and synchronized) to the broader reconnaissance and surveillance effort and the information collection plan. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55).

3-4. Military police apply their technical capabilities and selected specialized activities in the performance of their role in supporting security operations. These include but are not limited to those associated with reconnaissance and surveillance, the use of UASs, and the employment of MWDs. See chapter 1 for more information.

AREA SECURITY

3-5. Area security is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90). It preserves the commander’s freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, exercise mission command, and conduct sustaining operations.
3-6. Forces engaged in area security protect the force, installation, route, area, or asset and are integrated with other local security assets and efforts. Although vital to the success of military operations, area security is normally an economy-of-force mission, often designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

3-7. Area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security is often an effective method of providing civil security and control during some stability activities. Forces engaged in area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. This early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance may come from ground- and space-based sensors. Area security often focuses on named areas of interest in an effort to answer CCIR, confirm or deny threat intentions, and facilitate decisionmaking. The MEB and some military police units are specifically equipped and trained to conduct area security and may constitute the only available force during some phases of an operation. However, area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the AO. Military police forces engage in area security missions in a manner emphasizing mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities.

3-8. During offense, defense, and stability activities, various military organizations may be involved in conducting area security in an economy-of-force role to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts; create standoff distances from enemy direct- and indirect-fire systems; enhance movement and maneuver; and protect LOCs, convoys, various collection points, supply points, and other critical fixed sites without a significant diversion of combat power. Many of the same tasks may be performed in DSCA, but they are typically not in an economy-of-force role or with the same type of enemy. Bases and base camps employ local security measures (including EOD, assessments and recommendations, random AT measures, and increased force protection condition), but may be vulnerable to enemy or adversary remnant forces requiring a response that is beyond base camp capabilities. Area security supports offensive operations by providing a response capability to base clusters and sustainment areas and to designated geographical areas such as routes, bridge sites, or lodgments. In support areas, commanders conduct area damage control (ADC) to prevent and respond to the negative effects of enemy or adversary action that can diminish combat power.

3-9. For a discussion of critical asset security and the methodology associated with vulnerability assessments of units, installations, facilities, and bases or base camps see ADRP 3-37. This reference includes the staff planning associated with developing a critical asset list and subsequently identifying assets that will be applied to support the critical assets on the defended asset list. The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is—

- **Step 1.** List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.
- **Step 2.** Determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
- **Step 3.** Evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities.

3-10. All commanders apportion combat power and dedicate assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the operational environment, the likelihood of threat action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on their assessments, joint force commanders may designate the Army to provide a joint security coordinator to be responsible for designated joint security areas. Although all resources have value, an analysis of the mission variables may identify some resources, assets, or locations more significant to successful mission accomplishment from enemy or adversary and friendly perspectives. Commanders rely on risk management (threat, critical asset, and vulnerability assessments of units, installations, facilities, and bases or base camps) to facilitate decisionmaking, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of commander guidance and the focus of area security. Area security often focuses on the following activities:

- Route and convoy security.
- Checkpoints and combat outposts.
- DC control.
Support to Security Operations

- ADC.
- Base and base camp security and defense.
- Node protection.
- Protective services.
- Air, sea, and rail ports and terminals security.
- Response force operations.

ROUTE AND CONVOY SECURITY

3-11. The protection of LOCs and friendly forces moving along them is critical to military operations. Plans to provide route security may include establishing a movement corridor for all or a portion of a route, designating units for convoy security, providing guidance for units to provide their own security during convoys, or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. While a separate focused task, convoy security is always linked to the security of routes or LOCs and depends upon the broader area security to support the specific local security activities associated with the security of the convoy. The security of LOCs and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, and waterway) presents one of the greatest security challenges in an AO. Route and convoy security operations are typically viewed as being defensive in nature and being terrain-oriented. See ADRP 3-37 for additional information.

3-12. Movement control is a critical component to the control of LOCs, routes, and area security, but it is focused on control rather than security of the movement. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications (JP 4-01.5). Security considerations should always be a part of movement control. Mobility considerations are also critical to providing security. See chapter 2 and ATTP 3-90.4 for a discussion of the role of mobility operations in LOCs and route and convoy security.

3-13. Military police units are capable of providing security for LOCs and routes that are identified as critical to military operations. They also provide convoy security for high-priority designated units transporting joint force commander- or geographic combatant commander-designated critical supplies to combat forces. Military police teams moving with, or imbedded within, a convoy are typically the least effective method for securing convoys. It is often most efficient to employ military police units on aggressive patrolling, route, area, and zone reconnaissance measures that would create a safe and secure environment for all types of unit movement. The security provided by military police relies on the convoy being trained and applying appropriate convoy self-protection techniques as highlighted in ATP 4-01.45.

Route Security

3-14. Route security operations protect LOCs (including highway, pipeline, rail, and water) and friendly forces moving along them. Units conduct route security missions to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire range of the protected route. This also prevents or mitigates other threat efforts tointerdicting traffic along the route. Route security operations are typically defensive in nature and terrain-oriented.

3-15. Threat forces will attempt to sever supply routes and LOCs by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways may be obstructed by mines, IEDs, or some other type of obstacle; ambush sites may be located adjacent to the route being secured; or bridges and tunnels may be destroyed by demolitions causing diversions, delays, or further actions against traffic using the route. Because of the nature of this mission, long routes may be extremely difficult to secure; however, measures can be enforced to reduce the effect of threat forces on the routes.

Tasks

3-16. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route. Route security is often used in an economy-of-force role to secure critical MSRs or other routes. To accomplish the route security mission, the force performs the following functions:

- Conduct continuous mounted and dismounted reconnaissance of the route and key locations along it to ensure that the route is trafficable.
Chapter 3

- Conduct route clearance at irregular intervals to prevent the emplacement of EHS and other obstacles along the route.
- Identify sections of the route to be searched and specific locations likely to support threat activities.
- Establish roadblocks and checkpoints along the route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and persons on the route and entering the route.
- Occupy key locations and terrain along or near the route. If possible, establish a screen that is oriented to prevent threat direct-fire weapons and observation from influencing the route.
- Conduct ground and aerial patrols and surveillance aggressively to maintain route security.
- Establish OPs (covert, overt) or ambushes at critical points to watch for threat activity.

Methods

3-17. Route security is conducted using the following three methods:

- **Route reconnaissance.** Security forces conduct route reconnaissance at irregular intervals to avoid developing a pattern that the threat may exploit. If adequate resources are available, reconnoiter the route, including conducting zone reconnaissance, to a designated distance to either flank. Supporting aviation or intelligence assets may reconnoiter in advance ground elements or assist in screening the flanks. In addition to reconnaissance, security elements may escort engineers conducting route clearance, improvement, or maintenance; clearing terrain at choke points or other potential ambush sites; or repairing damage caused by threat actions.

- **Cordon security.** Cordon security uses an economy-of-force technique to protect only critical sections along the route. (Establishment of a movement corridor may be part of this.) The unit tasked to perform the mission establishes mutually supporting combat outposts and provides roving security between them. The combat outposts are typically established at critical choke points or on high ground to prevent sabotage and to defend against (or respond to) attacks to interdict the route between the combat outposts. It typically takes a troop- or company-sized element to establish one or two combat outposts while a battalion task force may establish up to six combat outposts, based on mission variables. A battalion task force can provide route security by combining cordon security at two or more locations with periodic route reconnaissance conducted along the rest of the route. Combat outposts should include or be supported by fire support assets (mortars, howitzer sections and, in select cases, close air or gunship support) that are capable of massing fires in support of the combat outposts and the operations between them. Patrols are conducted at irregular intervals between the outposts based on threat trends and recent activities. Patrols must be organized with sufficient combat power to destroy near ambushes and to survive initial threat contact from far ambushes. Each combat outpost maintains a quick response force (QRF) to respond to threat activity or reinforce patrols. These QRFs maneuver to destroy threat forces or extract friendly forces.

- **Combat security.** Combat security requires a battalion task force to take actions to seize or secure the terrain necessary to secure the entire route. This is the most difficult route security method because it requires more resources. The tasked unit conducts an initial route reconnaissance, while follow-on units screen either flank, establish checkpoints at access points to control access, and establish combat outposts at critical choke points. As time and forces allow, defensive positions are established on key terrain with subsequent positions prepared to support OPs on the screen line. Checkpoints are established at intersections, start points, and release points to monitor and control nonmilitary traffic. They may also be established at irregular intervals to stop and search vehicles and personnel. Checkpoints should be sited along the route or in terrain that does not allow travelers to observe them from a distance and thereby avoid the checkpoint holding area. As in cordon security, the combat outposts established at critical choke points include sensors to provide early warning from immediate and surrounding areas. All positions must be defensible with reinforced fighting positions that enable a defense until the element is relieved or reinforced.
**Military Police Duties**

3-18. Military police may be called upon to support route reconnaissance, route clearance, and route maintenance in support of route security missions. Typically, military police would provide a portion of the force performing route security. See chapter 2 for a discussion of reconnaissance and mobility support activities related to route security.

3-19. Military police may also require engineer support to assist with the hasty construction of checkpoints and for possibly constructing barriers that route traffic to designated search areas (see ATP 3-37.34). The priority of military police is typically to security that enhances mobility along the route. Engineer geospatial support may assist in the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of the mission (see ATP 3-34.80). This includes supporting the analysis of potential ambush sites or locations where the enemy could affect friendly forces or local civilian traffic with obstacles or the emplacement of IEDs and other EHs. See ATP 3-90.37 and ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.

**Convoy Security**

3-20. A convoy security operation is a specialized kind of area security operation conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes and other LOCs in an AO, and there is a significant danger of enemy or adversary ground action directed against the convoy. Commanders should conduct convoy security in conjunction with route security and integration with other support area activities. Local or theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive special support for security and protection.

3-21. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing or confirming guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for units to provide for their own security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Convoy security operations are typically defensive in nature and orient on the protected force, but that does not eliminate the need for aggressive reconnaissance as part of the mission. See ATP 4-01.45 for more information on convoy security training requirements and TTP.

3-22. Convoy security missions generate unique requirements that the commander must consider when formulating a plan. The convoy security commander and his subordinates are briefed on the latest information regarding the threat situation and the area through which the convoy will pass. The commander formulates his plans and issues his orders, including commander’s intent, assignment of troops as security force elements (reconnaissance, screen, escort, and response), the movement formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles, the rate of travel, and detailed plans for actions on contact. Immediate action drills (enemy ambush, obstacle, reaction to indirect fire) must be identified and rehearsed before movement and executed in case of contact.

**Critical Tasks**

3-23. A convoy security mission has certain critical tasks that guide planning and execution. To protect a convoy, the security force must accomplish the following:

- Reconnoiter the convoy route.
- Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the threat could influence movement along the route.
- Provide early warning and prevent the threat from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the convoy.

**Organization**

3-24. The convoy security force typically consists of the following four elements:

- **Reconnaissance.** The reconnaissance element performs tasks associated with route reconnaissance forward of the convoy. It may also perform duties of the screen element.
- **Screen.** The screen element provides early warning and security to the convoy flanks and rear. It may also perform duties of the reconnaissance element.
Escort. The escort element provides local protection to the convoy. It may also provide a response force to assist in repelling or destroying threat contact.

Response. The response force provides firepower and support to assist the other elements in developing the situation or conducting a hasty attack. It may also perform duties of the escort element.

Procedures

3-25. Commanders plan and execute all troop and supply movement as tactical operations. Because of the inherent dangers of convoy operations, emphasis is on extensive security measures. These measures include—

- Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strict noise and light discipline during movement, and varying routes and schedules.
- Coordination with fire support or aerial support units to ensure that they understand how support is used to assist movement in enforcing preventive measures and in conducting close, continuous support of combat operations.
- Maneuver for counterambush actions, including contingency plans for immediate actions against an ambush and the use of formations, which allow part of the column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush force.
- Communications and coordination with supporting units and units along the route, adjacent HN forces, and higher headquarters (airborne radio relay assets).
- Coordination with the supported unit moving in the formation, including control measures, locations for leaders, communications, medical support, and weapon systems.
- Gathering of information from local civilians along the movement route (possible enemy ambush sites).

Military Police Duties

3-26. Military police are often selected to conduct convoy security operations; these tend to be performed primarily in the support area. They are typically best suited for the reconnaissance or escort element. Limited additional training may be required to fulfill any or all of the tasks associated with convoy security when properly equipped. Commanders may have geospatial support to help identify choke points, potential ambush locations, or potential road condition concerns during the IPB. Many of the tasks associated with route security may also be appropriate to or linked to the performance of this mission.

3-27. Military police units are capable of providing convoy security for high-priority designated units transporting joint force- or geographic combatant commander-designated critical supplies to combat forces. Military police teams moving with a convoy are typically the least effective method for securing convoys. It is often effective to employ military police units on aggressive patrolling and route, area, and potentially zone reconnaissance missions that create a safe and secure environment for all types of unit movement. This may include performing as the forward security element discussed in ATP 4-01.45.

3-28. During execution of convoy security missions, military police implement the following four principles of mounted movement for tactical convoys:

- **360-degree security.** Combine maximum all-around visibility for situational awareness with interlocking sectors of fire and mutual support. Convoy personnel should also be aware of what is above and below their position. Situational awareness should focus on approaching vehicles, potential IEDs or other EHs, suspicious wires and antennas, canalizing terrain, bridges, overpasses, and suspicious individuals or groups.
- **Deterrence.** Present an aggressive and professional posture that demonstrates readiness and willingness to engage. An aggressive posture may deter the enemy from approaching or engaging the convoy.
- **Agility.** Adapt to conditions set by the environment or the enemy.
- **Unpredictability.** Minimize the enemy’s ability to predict time, route, composition, or purpose of the convoy.
3-29. Military police leaders assigned a convoy security mission develop the security plan, provide guidance on TTP for units to provide for their own security during convoys, or establish protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. The mission leader plans for security of the convoy by developing a strategy that includes all required considerations for the specific mission including coordination with appropriate units for required support, obtaining necessary equipment and supplies, and preparing mission briefings for security personnel. Convoy security may also be performed as part of a movement corridor. (See chapter 1 and FM 3-81 for the additional considerations and specifics associated with this). When planning convoy security operations, the mission leader completes the following tasks:

- Coordinate with HN security personnel (when necessary).
- Consult with all sources (intelligence, engineers, highway traffic division, and other units) to obtain as much information as possible about current and past activity and other information affecting the convoy route (and alternate routes) and projected timeframes.
- Apply mobility considerations (see chapter 2 and ATTP 3-90.4).
- Reconnoiter the convoy route to—
  - Identify likely trouble spots and ambush sites.
  - Determine possible locations for TCPs or checkpoints.
  - Identify route conditions.
  - Determine the location of friendly units in the area.
- Coordinate with the convoy commander.
- Determine actions to take if—
  - Attacked by an IED or other EH.
  - Attacked by a sniper.
  - Ambushed with the road blocked.
  - Ambushed with the road not blocked.
  - Attacked from the air.
  - Attacked by indirect fires.
  - Encountering civilians on the route.

**Note.** The reaction to an enemy attack while providing convoy security varies based on the mission and/or the type of cargo. When carrying special weapons or ammunition, ensure that procedures are addressed in the special orders on exactly how to react to enemy contact.

- Determine convoy organization, to include the location of critical cargo vehicles, command vehicles, armored vehicles, maintenance and recovery vehicles, and those with crew-served weapons.
- Determine the location where military police vehicles and Soldiers will be positioned within or in proximity to the convoy.
- Determine primary and backup radio frequencies and emergency communications procedures.
- Determine the timetable for movements.
- Determine start points and release points.
- Determine security measures to be used at halts and rest stops.
- Determine the time and place that military police support begins and ends.
- Determine road conditions.
- Determine available support from indirect fires, mobility assets, aviation assets (to include UAS), HN police support, or any other friendly assets that may affect the convoy routes.
- Identify primary and alternate routes.
- Determine the method of escort for the convoy.
- Brief the personnel on the mission, the enemy situation, and specific individual duties to be performed.
• Coordinate with friendly units in the area where the convoy will pass, and identify the support the friendly units can provide.
• Coordinate with aviation assets, if available.
• Ensure leaders conduct thorough precombat checks or precombat inspections and rehearsals. See FM 3-19.4 for a description and examples of precombat checks or precombat inspections.

CHECKPOINTS AND COMBAT OUTPOSTS

3-30. It is often necessary to control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period of time or as a long-term operation. This may be accomplished by placing checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through mission variables.

3-31. Checkpoints are used for controlling, regulating, and verifying movement; combat outposts are used for sanctuary, support, information collection, or area denial. Most checkpoints will never become a combat outpost, but a high density of other activities at a checkpoint (such as a series of collocated collection points [as highlighted in figure 2-5, page 2-12], the requirement to maintain a checkpoint for an extended period of time, or significant enemy activity) may cause a checkpoint to grow into a combat outpost.

Checkpoints

3-32. It is often necessary for commanders to control the freedom of movement in an AO. Military police accomplish this by placing short- or long-duration checkpoints along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through an analysis of the mission variables. Checkpoints monitor and control movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information. They may also be used simply to coordinate movement and surveillance activities.

3-33. Establishing checkpoints is a critical measure in a commander’s overall protection efforts. A commander designates checkpoints along a movement route to assist marching units in complying with the timetable. The movement overlay identifies critical points along the route where interference with movement might occur. The commander positions TCPs along the route to prevent congestion and confusion. They may be manned by military police or other unit personnel. These Soldiers report to the appropriate area movement control organization when each convoy, march column, and march serial arrives at and completes passage of their location. Checkpoints may also indicate critical terrain features and help to coordinate air-ground integration and enable effective civil control. See ATP 3-39.33 and FM 3-19.4 for information regarding civil disturbance.

3-34. Military police provide expertise to commanders on the construction and procedures involved in checkpoint operations. They also operate critical checkpoints to control traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at critical locations, such as border crossing sites or access to critical facilities. (See chapter 5 for more on border operations.) Military police establish and operate two types of checkpoints: deliberate and hasty.

Deliberate Checkpoint

3-35. A deliberate checkpoint is a fixed position constructed and employed to protect an operating base camp, a well-established MSR, or a main road in a rural or built-up area. A deliberate checkpoint is typically a preplanned location linked to a larger tactical plan and intended for a longer period of time than a hasty checkpoint. A deliberate checkpoint may even require rehearsals to be conducted.

3-36. Survivability considerations may be significant in comparison to a hasty checkpoint. See ATP 3-37.34 for specifics on obstacle creation and use, to include a discussion of access or entry control points. See FM 3-19.4 for specifics associated with all access control points. Figure 3-1 illustrates an example of a deliberate checkpoint.
3-37. Deliberate checkpoints are typically used to—
- Control all vehicles and pedestrian traffic so crowds cannot assemble.
- Identify and detain known offenders or suspected enemy or insurgent personnel.
- Provide straggler control collection.
- Enforce curfews.
- Deter illegal movement.
- Prevent the movement of supplies to the enemy.
- Deny the enemy contact with or prevent insurgents from hiding within the local inhabitants.
- Dominate the area around the checkpoint.
- Collect information.

3-38. Checkpoints are generally categorized by how much traffic is expected to pass through them. A heavy-traffic checkpoint normally requires a platoon to operate it. Although not optimal, a military police (or other type) squad can operate a light-traffic checkpoint for a short duration (12 hours or less). Checkpoints may also be classified by the number of other activities that are collocated or occurring in the same vicinity.

**Hasty Checkpoint**

3-39. Units activate a hasty checkpoint as part of a larger tactical plan or in reaction to hostile activities (for example, bomb, mine incident, or sniper attack) and can close the checkpoint on the command of the controlling headquarters. A hasty checkpoint will always have a specific task and purpose. Hasty checkpoints may grow to be a deliberate checkpoint. Figure 3-2, page 3-10, illustrates an example of a hasty checkpoint.
Units set up hasty checkpoints to achieve surprise. Leaders avoid setting patterns by moving the checkpoint location and changing the method of operation at random. Units establish hasty checkpoints where they cannot be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late for approaching traffic to unobtrusively withdraw. Good locations to set up hasty checkpoints include bridges, defiles, highway intersections, the reverse slope of a hill, and just beyond a sharp curve. Characteristics of a hasty checkpoint include—

- Using vehicles, reinforced with concertina wire, as the obstacle. Soldiers may employ tire deflation devices or road spike strips. These devices are more effective than concertina wire and may be less intrusive in stability activities.
- Positioning vehicles at each end of the checkpoint to partially block the route.
- Conducting the search in the area between the vehicles.
- Concealing a reaction force (at least one team) nearby to react in case the site is attacked.

**Organization of Checkpoint Forces**

The basic organization of a checkpoint includes a headquarters element, a security element, a search element, and an assault element. While checkpoint forces may vary in size, typical sizes are shown below. To operate a checkpoint, task-organize the unit as follows:

- **Headquarters element.** This element is responsible for—
  - Exercising mission command.
  - Maintaining a log of all activities.
  - Maintaining communication with its higher headquarters.
  - Coordinating local patrols.
  - Coordinating the role of civil authorities, as required.
  - Coordinating linkups, as required.
  - Coordinating relief in place, as required.
Support to Security Operations

- Integrating a reserve force or a QRF.
- **Security element.** This element consists of a military police squad responsible for—
  - Monitoring traffic flow up to and through the checkpoint.
  - Watching for and reporting suspicious activity.
  - Providing early warning to the search and assault elements.
  - Preventing enemy ambush.
- **Search element.** This element consists of a military police squad and is responsible for—
  - Halting vehicles at the checkpoint.
  - Guiding vehicles to the designated search point.
  - Conducting personnel and vehicle searches.
  - Directing cleared vehicles to continue through the checkpoint.
  - Detaining personnel as directed.
- **Assault element.** This element is responsible for—
  - Preparing and occupying fortified fighting positions.
  - Eliminating any hostile element that forces its way past the search team, in accordance with the ROE.

*Note.* Checkpoints are part of a police action. As such, all Soldiers participating in the operation must clearly understand the ROE and the use of deadly force.

**Organization of a Checkpoint**

3-42. Checkpoint layout, construction, and operation are based on an analysis of the mission variables. The following procedures and considerations typically apply:

- Position the checkpoint where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass the checkpoint without being observed.
- Position vehicles and crew-served weapons off the road but within sight of the checkpoint. This helps deter resistance toward Soldiers operating the checkpoint. Place vehicles in a hull-down position that allows for Soldiers to engage vehicles trying to break through or bypass the checkpoint.
- Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area. Traffic enters the checkpoint single file.
- Place signs written in the HN language that explain the checkpoint and include instructions for passing through it.
- Establish communications according to the unit standard operating procedures (SOP).
- Designate the search area for vehicles and personnel. If possible, surround the search area with barriers that protect against such threats as a booby-trapped vehicle or suicide bomber. Women are normally only checked with a metal detector or searched by female personnel. However, this depends on the ROE and mission variables. FM 3-19.4 provides additional information regarding vehicle and personnel searches.
- If applicable, checkpoint personnel should include linguists.

**Combat Outposts**

3-43. A *combat outpost* is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations (FM 3-90-2). Using combat outposts is a technique for employing security forces in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted security forces from covering the area. They are also used when smaller OPs (or potentially checkpoint and TCPs) are in danger of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating into and through the security area. The commander uses a combat outpost to extend the depth of the security area, keep friendly forward OPs in place until they can observe the enemy’s main body, or secure friendly forward OPs that will be encircled by enemy forces. Both mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts. Combat outposts may also be used in conjunction with establishment of a movement.
corridor (see chapter 1 and FM 3-81). See figure 3-3 for an example of combat outposts supporting a guard mission.

![Figure 3-3. Combat outposts](image)

3-44. While an analysis of the mission variables determines the size, location, and number of combat outposts a unit establishes, a reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat outpost. A combat outpost must have sufficient resources to accomplish its designated missions, but not so much as to seriously deplete the strength of the main body. It is usually located far enough forward of the protected force to preclude enemy ground reconnaissance elements from observing the actions of the protected force.

3-45. The commander organizes a combat outpost to provide an all-around defense to withstand a superior enemy force. When the enemy has significant armored capability, the commander may give a combat outpost more than the standard allocation of antitank weapons. Forces manning combat outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and engage the enemy main body before their extraction. The commander plans to extract friendly forces from the outpost before the enemy overruns them.

3-46. Perhaps the most likely use of a combat outpost by military police would be in the conduct of a movement corridor (see chapter 1 and FM 3-81). Another likely situation might be when multiple activities are collocated at a specific site (see figure 2-5, page 2-12) and the likelihood of enemy activity against that site increases to where the security level of a combat outpost may be needed.

**DISLOCATED CIVILIAN CONTROL**

3-47. Control of DCs has a security component to it, but in general, the primary focus has to do with enabling movement and maneuver for other forces. This is accomplished by minimizing civilian interference with military operations. Control of DCs is also conducted to protect civilians from the effects of combat operations and natural or manmade disasters. Chapter 2 is focused on control of DCs as a factor for enabling the movement and maneuver of friendly forces. Additional considerations, while in support of security operations, include a requirement to ensure that enemy forces and threats are not hidden within DC populations.
Chapter 4 discusses the relevance of DC control to PRC operations with additional information provided in appendix A on camps associated with DC operations. Military police support to populace control is largely focused on DC control.

**Area Damage Control**

3-49. *Area damage control* is the measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or man-made disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects (JP 3-10). It is performed to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. Commanders conduct ADC when the damage and scope of the attack are limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. In support areas, commanders conduct ADC to prevent and respond to the negative effects of enemy or adversary action that can diminish combat power. Although engineers may perform many of the activities associated with ADC, military police play a critical role as well. See ADRP 3-37, FM 3-39, and FM 3-81 for more information on ADC.

3-50. Military police facilitate the reestablishment of order and control and minimize the effects from the often catastrophic effects of disasters. There are probably few if any new activities or capabilities required for military police to perform support to area damage, and many of them may not be specific to the security and mobility discipline. Those associated with security and mobility support may include the list provided in table 1-1, page 1-6.

3-51. When performed as part of DSCA, ADC is typically referred to as incident management. Some of these incidents may rise to the level of national significance and require additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation. Incident management and ADC follow established battle drills and SOPs. These drills allow effective action against fear, panic, and confusion that follows an attack. Military police typically perform the activities listed in table 1-2, page 1-15. They may perform these activities as part of an MEB. See ADRP 3-28, ADRP 3-37, FM 3-81, and JP 3-10 for more information on incident management.

**Base and Base Camp Security and Defense**

3-52. *Base defense* is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces (JP 3-10). Although generally aligned under the protection warfighting function, base security and defense integrate tasks from both the protection and movement and maneuver warfighting functions as articulated in ADRP 3-37 and ADRP 3-90, respectively. ATP 3-37.2, FM 3-90-1, GTA 90-01-011, JP 3-07.2, and JP 3-10 are additional key references for base security and defense operations. A division or corps may be required to protect multiple bases or base camps. They may choose to establish one or more base cluster. A base cluster, in base defense operations, is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10). Base commanders are responsible for establishing base defense procedures for their AO. Units may be assigned base defense operations on a permanent or rotating basis, depending on the mission variables. See ATP 3-37.10 for a focused discussion of security and defense of bases and base camps.

3-53. The framework for base camp security and defense consists of three primary areas (see figure 3-4, page 3-14). This structuring provides a means for organizing protection and defense information and requirements and focusing efforts. These three areas are—

- **Outer security area.** This is the area outside the perimeter that extends out to the limit of the base camp commander’s AO. Commanders establish an outer security area to provide early warning and reaction time, and deny enemy reconnaissance efforts and vantage points for conducting standoff attacks. The outer security area is typically patrolled by mobile security elements. Establishing check points or other LOC security measures are potential examples of limited operations beyond the base camp boundary and may even call for the establishment of a movement corridor (see FM 3-81) in selected situations.

- **Perimeter zone.** This zone includes the base camp perimeter and area immediately in front or behind it that is needed for OPs, fighting positions, and entry control points. Selected base camps may have designated inner and outer perimeters. Larger base camps will seldom employ
this double layer of perimeters, and will rely more on a single perimeter supplemented with inner barriers and access control measures around critical facilities. Creation of a double perimeter is extremely resource intensive.

- **Inner security area.** This is the area inside the base camp perimeter. Interior barrier plans can be used around individual unit locations and critical assets, and as traffic control measures to add depth to the base camp security plan and to halt or impede the progress of threat penetrations of the perimeter zone.

![Figure 3-4. Framework for base camp security and defense](image)

3-54. Collectively, these three areas form the base camp AO. Commanders assigned an AO have inherent responsibilities that are described in FM 3-90-1. Not all commanders that may serve as base camp commanders will have the organic capabilities within their units to perform all of these responsibilities. In those situations, the higher commander must clearly articulate in the order which AO responsibilities will not be performed by the base camp commander (and who will perform them) or provide the necessary augmented capabilities to perform them.

3-55. Base camp commanders and their staffs apply the framework for base security and defense to focus their planning activities and ensure that all critical elements of base security and defense are addressed. The framework is not intended as an all-inclusive solution to base security and defense, but is intended to provide a general template for planning.

3-56. Military police conduct area and base security operations to protect friendly forces, bases and base camps, and actions in the support area. As part of area security, military police units provide protection for bases and base camps (to include airbases) in the AO. In this role, military police units are capable of detecting, providing early warning of, and engaging enemy forces in the outer security area. Using military police skills, they may interface with the local population and apply police intelligence techniques to further facilitate the security of the base camp. Military police units provide in-depth security by operating outside the perimeter of the base camp beyond the range of threat weapons to the base camp as well as on the perimeter and internal to the base camp. This facilitates early detection and engagement of threat forces at a sufficient standoff distance to allow for their destruction or disruption before they can effectively engage the base camp. However, they may well perform roles within the perimeter zone and inner security zone, to include performing as the QRF, or in selected cases, as a tactical combat force (TCF).

3-57. Airbase protection and defense are key components of military police area security. When the threat exceeds the airbase capabilities, the engaged commander requests military police assistance. Airbase
defense requires special military police coordination with the U.S. Air Force security forces and other security forces responsible for base defense. Air Force security force units are responsible for internal airbase security and defense. Military police units are typically responsible for the airbase’s external defense. Air Force and Army forces must coordinate their defensive efforts. This includes boundaries, fire control measures, and contact points. Combining the Air Force security forces with military police units provides an in-depth defense for weapon systems, aircraft, command centers, personnel, and other priority resources established by the airbase commander. See AFPD 31-1 for more information on Air Force security operations.

3-58. In developing a base defense strategy, a simple, flexible defensive plan is essential. The plan should maximize the use of SOPs and battle drills at the user level. The base defense plan should also integrate the following fundamentals:

- **Understand the enemy.** Defenders must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and tactics.
- **Create situational awareness.** Intelligence operations are essential to assembling an accurate picture of the operational environment.
- **Use the defender’s advantages.** The defender’s advantages may permit a numerically inferior force to defeat a much larger one. These advantages include—
  - The ability to fight from cover.
  - A more detailed knowledge of the local terrain and environment.
  - The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and fields of fire in advance.
  - The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires, and logistics support for contingency operations.
  - The ability to deceive enemy forces about friendly defensive capabilities, dispositions, and execution of operations.
- **Concentrate at critical times and places.** Defense of a base or base camp should be conducted taking advantage of interior lines, permitting the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most critical threats. The commander must mass combat power at points of decision by economizing in some areas, retaining a reserve, and maneuvering to gain local superiority at critical points.
- **Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks.** Fixed bases usually have well-established perimeters with limited depth. Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add depth to the battle outside the perimeter, allowing the base or base camp to continue its primary mission with minimal interference. (Counterreconnaissance patrols should be extended 2 to 3 miles [about 3 to 5 kilometers] beyond the perimeter, based on terrain, to reduce the risk of fratricide, especially at night.)
- **Coordinate critical defense assets.** Synchronization of indirect fires, air defense resources, tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters can produce a combined-arms effect.
- **Balance base security with political and legal constraints.** This fundamental is especially critical in a low-intensity conflict environment.
- **Know the law of war and ROE.** Base and base camp commanders and their subordinates must comply with ROE. In joint-service (or multinational) operations, reconcile inconsistencies with ROE.

3-59. Emphasis on specific base defense and security measures depends on the anticipated threat level. Any or all levels shown in table 3-1, page 3-16, may exist simultaneously.
Table 3-1. Levels I, II, and III threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Definition or Description</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>A <em>Level I threat</em> is a small enemy force that can be defeated by maneuver units operating in the rear area or by the perimeter defenses (JP 3-10). A Level I threat for a typical base or base camp consists of a squad-size unit or smaller group of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly mission command, logistics, and facilities; and interdicting friendly LOCs.</td>
<td>A traditional response force for a Level I threat is a maneuver unit or perimeter defenses established by friendly base camps and base clusters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>A <em>Level II threat</em> is represented by enemy activities that can be defeated by a base camp or base cluster augmented by a response force (JP 3-10). Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat include the disruption and destruction of friendly mission command, logistics, and commercial facilities, and the interdiction of friendly LOCs.</td>
<td>A typical response force for a Level II threat is a military police platoon; however, it can be a combat arms maneuver element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>A <em>Level III threat</em> is a threat beyond the defensive capability of both the base camp and base cluster and any local reserve or response force (JP 3-10). Level III threats normally consist of a mobile enemy force. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Additional objectives could also include destroying friendly facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation assembly areas, arming and refueling points, and interdicting LOCs and major supply routes.</td>
<td>The response to a Level III threat is a tactical combat force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP</th>
<th>LOC</th>
<th>lines of communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>joint publication</td>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-60. A base defense force is a security element established to provide local security to a base and augment armed personnel available to the base commander for base defense from units performing primary missions other than base defense (JP 3-10). The mission of the base defense force is to conduct reaction operations to deter, resist, or destroy an enemy Level I force (see table 3-1) attacking the base or base camp. The base defense force consists of combined security assets provided by units contained on the base camp. The base camp commander considers all available Army, joint, and multinational resources and forces in determining the exact organization of the base defense force. If the base camp comes under attack, the base camp commander responds within the capability of the base defense force.

3-61. A base defense force should have a significant amount of direct-fire lethality provided by a mixture of small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank systems. It should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of control. It should be capable of—

- Conducting reconnaissance patrols for detecting and reporting the location, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces located near the base camp.
- Developing positions within and outside the base camp from which enemy advances can be stopped or destroyed.
Support to Security Operations

- Using reserve elements to attack relatively small enemy units that threaten to penetrate the base camp perimeter.
- Providing internal security for critical capabilities located on the base camp.

3-62. To streamline mission command of the base defense force in the event of an attack, the base commander may designate a base defense force commander and establish a base defense operations center to ensure the integration of defense plans and maximum effectiveness of the total base defense effort. A base defense operations center is a command and control facility, with responsibilities similar to a base cluster operations center, established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center (JP 3-10). The nature of the base defense operations center depends on the combination of forces involved and may be joint, interagency, or multinational.

3-63. Military police leaders anticipate the integration of their capabilities into the base defense plan; therefore, they know their roles, capabilities, and dependencies and have the ability to articulate the information to nonmilitary police leaders or battle staff. Police intelligence operations can be used to provide essential early warnings of enemy activity allowing early prediction and potentially preventing a threat from affecting base operations. Additional base defense tasks may include patrols, access control, critical base facility security, LPs or OPs, and QRP or initial response force.

NODE PROTECTION

3-64. Command posts and operations centers are often protected through area security techniques that involve the employment of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner. This can often keep hostile threats at a distance by maximizing the standoff distance from explosive effects, while keeping the protected asset outside the range of enemy or adversary direct-fire weapons and observation.

3-65. Military police understand the elements of the movement order to include the possible activation of alternate command post nodes. Providing security for key nodes is potentially a very fluid requirement. Military police must be proactive in accomplishing this mission. This mission is often linked to the mission of high-risk personnel (HRP) security. Nodes may be mobile rather than static sites, and part of the military police requirement is reconnaissance of new sites prior to that site being established as a node. In those cases military police may be part of the reconnaissance element or a quartering party to facilitate the movement and continuing security of the node—and potentially the HRP associated with it.

PROTECTIVE SERVICES

3-66. High-risk personnel are personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (JP 3-07.2). Special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals and their family members from terrorist or criminal elements. When units identify a significant risk to selected personnel, the local commander normally organizes security details from organic resources. However, under certain circumstances, designated personnel may require protective service details by specially trained units. See ATP 3-39.35 for more information on the military police specific application of protective services. There are four levels of HRP as follows:

- Level 1 and 2 HRP require significant protection, to include dedicated personal security details and other security measures as outlined in DODI O-2000.22.
- Level 2.5 authorizes the designation of a CID personal security advisor who coordinates travel security for the assigned HRP and may be armed only if acting as part of a larger (temporary) protective detail.
- Level 3 personnel are not authorized protective services; however, they should receive additional AT and personal protective measure training.
3-67. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for all HRP levels. Approval authority for HRP level 2.5 for outside the continental United States travel is delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

3-68. Specially trained United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) special agents provide continuous executive-level protective service to designated Level 1 and 2 HRP. USACIDC personnel typically provide all close-in protection for Level 1 and 2 HRP but often require the augmentation of military police teams assigned or attached to USACIDC and trained in protective service tasks. Military police coordinate with USACIDC when augmenting personal security details. MWD teams may be employed to enhance military police and USACIDC detection and protection capabilities.

3-69. The goal of a protective services detail mission is to protect HRP from all hazards, whether caused by personal design, accident, or negligence. Although absolute protection is never possible, following certain well-established protective services detail basic principles will increase the probability of a successful mission. There are five essential fundamentals necessary to the success of protective services detail missions. They include—

- **Planning and coordination.** Planning is critical to a successful mission. Meticulously plan every element of protection; scrutinize every act or movement of the principal and the protective services detail to ensure maximum security. Mission leaders must thoroughly brief and rehearse emergency procedures to ensure that personnel instinctively react instantly and correctly.
- **Ensuring the availability of resources.** There are many factors that determine the number of personnel assigned, as well as the equipment used, to a protection detail, with none being more important than the availability of resources. Pay special consideration to the principal’s position, the threat level at the location being visited, and the complexity of the mission. Consider all of these factors when requesting and making available resources for a mission.
- **Assigning responsibilities.** Assigning individual responsibilities ensures successful completion of all facets of the mission.
- **Controlling information.** Closely control the release of personal information pertaining to the principal and other members of the party, details of the itinerary, and the security procedures to be employed. Make certain protective services detail personnel understand they are prohibited from discussing or releasing any of this information with anyone other than authorized personnel. Release of any information to other than authorized persons adversely affects the integrity of the security mission.
- **Being flexible.** Unexpected changes to the itinerary require that flexibility be the keynote factor in planning protective services detail missions. Prepare alternate and contingency plans to cover circumstances such as inclement weather, possible threats, or any other actions that may affect the security of HRP. Good preventive measures and thorough backup plans are critical.

**AIR, SEA, AND RAIL PORTS AND TERMINALS**

3-70. Military police are often required to provide security support to ports and terminals (terminal operations). While there are similarities, each port or terminal environment is unique and requires specific knowledge of the nature of that port or terminal to properly apply security fundamentals and basic military police capabilities and skills. While the other military police disciplines potentially have linkages to ports and terminals, mobility and security support provide the focus for military police support.

3-71. Aerial ports and terminals often find military police supporting either Air Force or civilian organizations and focusing on the transition from air to land or land to air shipment and transport. Seaports and terminals typically require support of Navy and Marine Corps or civilian organizations with a focus on the transition from water to land or land to water. Railheads are potentially linked to aerial ports or seaports and terminals but are also unique in the potential requirement for military police to support security along the length of the railway as well as at fixed sites that are part of the rail system. LOGSEC provides a focused set of specialized capabilities that enable security for ports and terminals (see chapter 5).

3-72. Army expeditionary intermodal operations include all of the areas discussed below. The fundamentals of Army expeditionary intermodal operations and general terminal operation techniques tie together various transportation competencies to enhance deployment, redeployment, and distribution.
operations for the end-to-end movement of personnel, equipment, or forces. For a better understanding of how military police may support intermodal operations, see ATP 4-13 or the specific manuals associated with the intermodal components and transportation competencies.

Aerial Port and Terminal Security

3-73. Military police may be required to support the security of airfields or landing zones. When linked to a base, base camp, or base camp cluster, those requirements will be articulated by the respective commanders. When the base is primarily an air base, it is likely that the Air Force will be the commander of the base. In any case, the senior airfield authority will be an important player in this type of a mission.

3-74. Most base camps will likely need a minimum of a landing zone to facilitate resupply operations and casualty evacuation. When performed in relationship to a base camp with active airfields and landing zones, it is necessary to consider vulnerabilities to approaching and departing aircraft and implement the necessary protection measures to counter threats to include shoulder-launched and surface-to-air weapons and heavy machine guns. See JP 3-10 for more information.

3-75. Military police may have to integrate their security efforts with Air Force security forces when an airbase is linked with or included inside a base camp. The Air Force approach to security of an airbase is very similar to the doctrine for providing security to a base camp, but terminology and specifics do vary. See AFPD 31-1 for more Air Force information on integrated defense operations.

3-76. Military police may be required to support the security of airports and airfields within the United States and its territories at the request of other federal agencies. When this occurs, it is part of DSCA tasks and ADRP 3-28, JP 3-27, and JP 3-28 should be reviewed for more information. The only real change in performing in the domestic operational environment is the related legal restrictions that may apply.

Seaport and Terminal Security

3-77. Military police typically provide area and local security for port and pier areas. The joint force commander and subordinate joint force commanders ensure that port security plans and responsibilities are clearly delineated and assigned. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command is charged by the United States Transportation Command as the single port manager for all ports. Area commanders (and subordinate military police) assigned a port area as part of their AO must develop and organize plans (in conjunction with the appropriate Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command brigade or battalion) to ensure that Soldiers are trained and equipped to protect or secure port areas and cargo as necessary. The patrol of harbors and anchorages is generally the mission of a dedicated port security unit and may include waterfront security operations. See JP 3-10 for more information on port security units and ATTP 4-15 for information on Army water transportation operations.

3-78. In a wartime environment, military police and USACIDC will implement LOGSEC measures (see chapter 5) at the continental United States and outside the Continental United States terminals. Teams located at the ports of debarkation (PODs) are cognizant of sensitive cargo shipments inbound to their location. This is a critical requirement to minimize or eliminate the risk of criminal activity directed against military equipment moving into the theater of operations. During redeployment the same procedures must be used to protect military equipment returning to its home station.

3-79. Base camps may be collocated with military ports and terminals. The combatant commander (CCDR) or the joint force commander delineates responsibilities between the base camp commander, the military port commander, and the senior airfield authority (if one is included in the port area) to ensure unity of effort.

Railway and Railhead Security

3-80. Military police and USACIDC agents support the security of railheads, terminals, and railways with LOGSEC, providing a special capability to facilitate this (see chapter 5). As with air and sea ports and terminals, railheads and terminals may be collocated with a base camp.
3-81. Military police support Army rail operations through local and area security and provide the specialized capability of LOGSEC to facilitate these operations as well. As with planning to support other intermodal operations, military police need to understand the basics of those operations. (See ATP 4-14 for more information on Army rail operations.) It is important to understand the critical assets associated with rail operations (tracks, locomotives and rolling stock, switching modes, tunnels and bridges, marshalling yards, and so forth) and the items (materiel and personnel) that are being transported. The basics associated with route security apply to the tracks, while those associated with local security will apply to the protection of sites and specific points within the rail system. Military police may also be involved in providing security as part of the security force on the rolling stock itself (to include armored trains and cars), and many of the basics associated with convoy security will apply.

RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS

3-82. Response force operations include the planning for defeat of Levels I and II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until the designated tactical combat force arrives for decisive operations. Response force operations use a mobile force with appropriate fire support to deal with Level II threats in the AO. Key to the performance of these activities is battle handover from a base camp or base cluster and their security forces to a TCF. A tactical combat force is a combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats (JP 3-10).

3-83. Response force operations expediently reinforce unit organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Response force operations include planning for the defeat of Level I and II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until a designated TCF arrives for decisive operations. Response force operations use a QRF with appropriate fire support (usually designated by the area commander) to deal with Level II threats in the AO. See ATP 3-37.10, FM 3-39, and JP 3-10 for more information on response force operations.

3-84. A response force is a mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the area commander, to handle Level II threats in the operation area (JP 3-10). Military police units may be designated as the base camp or critical facility commander’s response force against Level I and Level II threat attacks. Military police units gather police information about the enemy while performing security and mobility support missions throughout the AO. This information updates the commander’s common operational picture with enemy and criminal activity near base camps and throughout the AO. When needed, military police units provide wheeled armor response forces to respond to base camps and critical facilities under attack and to destroy the enemy. A base camp commander’s defense plan is the cornerstone for protecting units and sustainment operations.

3-85. Military police may be identified as the QRF for a base camp or other location. Being designated as a QRF is similar to the creation of a reserve in that the QRF may only be used for the performance of activities associated with being the QRF—it is a dedicated force. A quick response force is a dedicated force on a base with adequate tactical mobility and fire support designated to defeat Level I and Level II threats and shape Level III threats until they can be defeated by a tactical combat force or other available response forces (ATP 3-37.10). The QRF provides the base camp or base cluster commander with a depth for security and defense. Once committed, the commander will be prepared to reconstitute a QRF. The base camp commander may assign the QRF a wide variety of tasks, both within the base camp security area and within the base camp perimeter, to—

- Reinforce a threatened area or respond to a penetration of the perimeter.
- Establish contact with potential threats and engage those threats as required within the base camp security area, defeating Level II threats, and delaying Level III threats until they can be defeated by a TCF.
- Reinforce engaged units outside the perimeter.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
- Respond to threats on critical assets, infrastructure, or HRP.
- Conduct security checks and random patrolling within the base camp perimeter.
3-86. The size and composition of the QRF is based on a threat assessment and the levels of uncertainty and risk, and is adjusted based on changes in the situation. The level of responsiveness (readiness condition) of the QRF is also a variable that is adjusted based on threat conditions. The QRF should be mounted to ensure adequate protection and tactical mobility.

3-87. When the threat exceeds a base camp or critical facility capabilities, the commander requests response force support. When military police are the designated response force, military police units that are near base camps, on patrol, or conducting area security will consolidate their forces, respond as quickly as possible, and conduct combat operations to destroy the enemy. When the threat exceeds military police capabilities, the military police response force may conduct a battle handover to a TCF. Military police forces performing or tasked as a response may conduct a—

- Movement to contact.
- Hasty ambush.
- Hasty attack.
- Delay.
- Call for fire (indirect fire or close air support).
- Critical site defense.

3-88. If military police are the designated response force, they must—

- Review base defense plans.
- Coordinate with the supported base commanders to synchronize response plans.
- Exchange communications frequencies to ensure communications capability between security elements.
- Identify military police contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.
- Integrate air defense artillery, engineer, CBRN, indirect-fire, and close air support into their plans (if available).

3-89. Although the current intelligence and the base or critical facility commander’s risk assessment and stated needs will be the driving factors, the military police commander should assist in determining the size and composition of the response force. The military police commander considers the following when developing his plan when designated as the QRF commander:

- The current base defense plans and the commander’s guidance.
- The priority of ongoing operations.
- The criticality of the base under attack.
- The amount of time needed for given elements to consolidate.
- The ability to communicate between security elements.
- The identification of contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.
- The availability of additional forces to supplement the response force element, if required.
- The integration of engineer, CBRN, fire support, and close air support.

3-90. Military police consolidate into squads or platoons to delay, defeat, or defend against Level I and Level II threats. Military police response forces also shape and delay Level III threats until a designated combined arms TCF arrives for decisive operations. Military police forces performing as a response force must be capable of conducting the following tasks:

- Movement to contact.
- Hasty ambush.
- Hasty attack.
- Delay.
- Call for fire.
- Defense of critical sites and assets.
- Establishment of a fighting or survivability position (see ATP 3-37.34 and FM 3-19.4).
LOCAL SECURITY

3-91. Local security is a security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADRP 3-90). It provides immediate protection to the friendly force and is typically performed by a unit for itself, but may also be provided by another unit when the security requirement is greater than the unit or facility can provide for itself or may require specialized security capabilities that the unit or facility does not possess. Local security may include countermobility and survivability activities. All area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units regardless of their location in the AO, and all local security should be linked to the broader area security activities.

3-92. Local security includes any local measure taken by units against enemy actions. It involves avoiding enemy detection or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. It also includes finding any enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible. Local security prevents a unit from being surprised, and it is an important part of maintaining the initiative. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations. Units perform local security when conducting all operations, including tactical enabling operations. Military police training and capabilities make them a critical component of AT and physical security activities. LOGSEC is one specialized capability that military police provide to both of these tasks (see chapter 5).

3-93. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures include—

- Using OPs and patrols.
- Establishing specific levels of alert in the unit. The commander adjusts those levels based on the mission variables.
- Establishing stand-to times. A unit’s SOPs detail its activities during the conduct of a stand-to.

3-94. Passive local security measures include using camouflage, movement control, noise and light discipline, and proper communications procedures. They also include employing available sensors, night-vision devices, and daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.

3-95. When military police provide protection around a critical site or asset, they typically conduct mobile security patrols, taking advantage of wheeled, armored vehicles with crew-served weapons and communications platforms manned by three military police Soldiers organic to the military police team and grouped in squad-, platoon-, or company-size elements. This standoff protection is capable of detecting and defeating Level I and Level II enemy threats as the enemy attempts to maneuver within direct-fire range of facilities or assets. Requirements may include establishing checkpoints and LPs or OPs. They may also include control of internal access points to facilities or sites and performing as an initial response force. Finally, military police may provide in-transit security protection as a critical asset moves between locations.

3-96. Military police may also be used to assist HN forces by establishing security measures or identifying gaps in existing security for critical facilities. Facilities having national, cultural, religious, or military significance may require dedicated security forces. Examples of HN critical assets include power generation, water treatment, hospitals, police stations, religious structures, and armories.

3-97. A military police unit executing security of a critical facility or site typically conducts the following tasks:

- Receive and review the security mission directive and initiate troop leading procedures.
- Gather information from previous reconnaissance reports, other units, or an element being relieved at a static post.
- Ensure that all squad members know the following information before executing the mission:
  - The ROE, such as actions on contact.
  - The tactical situation and the security defense plan.
  - General orders.
  - Special orders detailing duties, responsibilities, and procedures.
• Determine the security method—static posts or mobile patrols—and assign teams to specific mission tasks. If specific orders are not provided, the squad leader determines the best method to use or uses a combination of both.

• Enforce situational awareness and ensure that certain squad members understand the procedures for reporting any unusual activity. Soldiers must be familiar with the surrounding areas and the local populace, both civilian and military.

• Act as a response force by responding (as quickly as possible) to conduct combat operations to destroy the enemy.

**ANTITERRORISM**

3-98. *Antiterrorism* consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces (JP 3-07.2). It is an element of protection and part of the broader mission of combating terrorism. AT is a consideration for all forces during all military operations. Military police are trained extensively in AT measures and methods for assessing the threat, implementing preventive measures, and responding to terrorist incidents in a law enforcement capacity and in general terms. Military police can advise leaders and staffs from other units on AT requirements, measures, and response requirements. They should also be experts at applying many of the AT measures and activities. See ATP 3-37.2 for more information.

3-99. Military police identify potential terrorist threats and other threat activities to enhance the freedom of action by U.S. forces. The identification of threats is necessary to establish measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. Identification of threats enables U.S. forces to take actions and implement procedures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts or attacks. These actions reduce personnel vulnerability to terrorism through education to enhance an understanding of the nature of terrorism, the maintenance of heightened situational understanding regarding current threats, and the mitigation of vulnerabilities to terrorist acts by implementing appropriate protective measures.

3-100. Military police are also trained and prepared to rapidly respond to terrorist attacks when prevention efforts fail. These emergency response actions incorporate measures to treat casualties, apprehend perpetrators, preserve evidence, minimize property damage, restore operations, and expedite the criminal investigation and collection of lessons learned from a terrorist incident. See AR 525-13 and ATP 3-37.2 for more information regarding AT.

3-101. *Counterterrorism* consists in operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism (JP 3-07.2). Counterterrorism actions include strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the United States and its territories. Although counterterrorism is a specified mission for selected special operations forces, conventional Army forces may also contribute. Commanders who employ conventional forces against terrorists are conducting offensive operations, not counterterrorism operations. While linked to AT, counterterrorism is not typically part of protection since it is focused on offensive measures.

**PHYSICAL SECURITY**

3-102. *Physical security* is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). The Army employs physical security measures in-depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. This total system approach is based on the continuing analysis and employment of protective measures, to include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, biometrics-capable access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. See AR 190-13 and ATP 3-39.32 for more information regarding physical security requirements and procedures. GTA 19-08-004 may be a useful reference for nonlethal munitions.
3-103. Physical security measures are applied in-depth as a critical aspect in applying security and AT measures on static locations. They are critical in preventing unauthorized access to restricted, controlled, or vulnerable areas. Physical security measures must be prioritized based on vulnerability and threat assessments to protect critical sites, personnel, and equipment. They should be used in conjunction with other security measures, such as mobile patrols, operations, and information security measures, as part of a holistic security program. Critical areas requiring extensive physical security measures may include—

- Bases or installations and base camps.
- Troop housing areas (especially high-concentration areas).
- Arms, ammunition, and explosives storage areas.
- Key command posts.
- Aerial PODs, aerial ports of embarkation, seaports of debarkations, and seaports of embarkation.
- Critical sustainment hubs.
- Access points and entry control points.

3-104. Physical security policies, programs, and goals are approved by the Provost Marshal General under the authority of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The United States Army Military Police School provides the Physical Security Course to train physical security inspectors and subject matter experts; the course provides military police Soldiers with an H3 (Physical Security) identifier. The course is a requirement for physical security inspectors on Army installations, posts, camps, and stations. Installation PMs are typically responsible for providing physical security expertise, to include periodic inspections to ensure compliance with physical security directives.

3-105. Military police are well versed in physical security applications and procedures and can provide commanders and staffs with subject matter expertise regarding the physical security of their personnel and assets. In an operational environment where strict adherence to physical security standards is not possible, military police personnel trained in physical security can assist commanders and staffs in developing measures to mitigate gaps in physical security requirements. While military police employ significant physical security measures in the course of military police operations, physical security measures are required by all Army units. Physical security measures employed to protect personnel and equipment may include—

- Establishing checkpoints. Checkpoints are established to monitor and control the movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information. Establishing checkpoints can be a critical measure in a commander’s overall protection efforts. Checkpoints can also enable effective civil control operations. Military police can provide expertise to commanders on the construction and procedures involved in checkpoint operations. They may also be used to operate critical checkpoints, control traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at critical locations (such as border crossing sites), or control access to critical facilities. See the section on checkpoints at paragraph 3-32. ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210 provides additional information on access control and checkpoint operations.

- Controlling access to equipment, installation, material, and documents. Access control involves the establishment of a system of complementary, overlapping security measures to control access to critical resources and information. Measures may include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, access and key control, the use of security badges, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210 provide additional information on access control and checkpoint operations; AR 190-11 covers physical security requirements, to include access control requirements for arms, ammunition, and explosives; and AR 190-13 covers physical security requirements, to include access control requirements for Army assets other than arms, ammunition, and explosives.

- Employing intrusion detection devices. The employment of intrusion detection devices includes conducting site surveys and installing and operating intrusion detection systems to protect Army installations, personnel, operations, and critical resources in tactical and nontactical situations. See ATP 3-39.32 for more information on employment of intrusion detection devices.
• **Coordinating for the employment of countermobility and survivability measures.** Countermobility (see ATP 3-90.8) and survivability (see ATP 3-37.34) measures enhance the physical security of facilities and sites and are often related to specialized entry control measures and checkpoint operations. These include a variety of barrier types and measures. See ATP 3-37.34 for camouflage and concealment considerations that may apply to physical security.
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 4
Support to Populace Control

PRC is conducted in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations. PRC consist of two components: populace control and resources control. Although these two components are linked, they are distinct and worthy of two separate chapters. This chapter is focused on military police support to populace control, while chapter 5 is focused on support to resources control. Military police support to PRC is typically first aimed at minimizing civilian interference with military operations, but the security of DCs is always an integrated part of the military police mission as well. Many of the activities performed as part of support to mobility operations (chapter 2) and security operations (chapter 3) may also be performed as part of military police support to PRC. Whether facing uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within the operational environment or the illegal activities of sectors of the population (and its effect on resources control), military police must understand and consider PRC measures in the planning and execution of operations. ATP 3-57.10 and JP 3-57 are key references for PRC.

OVERVIEW OF POPULACE CONTROL

4-1. Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. It involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, protecting population centers and people, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, controlling the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that support stability through unity of effort. Populace control may become necessary as a result of military operations or manmade or natural disasters.

4-2. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Determining what populace control measures to employ requires a framework that applies across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. DC operations and NEO are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

4-3. The term dislocated civilian, or DC, refers to several categories of civilians, such as a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Legal and political considerations define these categories. DCs are removed from or leave their homes or places of habitual residence for reasons such as fear of persecution or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or manmade disasters, or economic privation. Categories of DCs include—

- **Displaced person.** Displaced person is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally displaced persons collectively (JP 3-29).
- **Refugee.** A refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (JP 3-29).

- **Evacuee.** An evacuee is a civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 3-57).

- ** Stateless person.** A stateless person is a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law (JP 3-29).

- **War victim.** This is a classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.

- **Migrants.** A migrant is a person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution (JP 3-29).

- **Internally displaced persons.** An internally displaced person is any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

- **Returnee.** A returnee is a displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence (JP 3-29).

- **Resettled person.** A resettled person is a refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to return somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement (JP 3-29).

4-4. The goals of DC operations are to protect civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian interference with military operations. DC activities typically include controlling the movement of civilians (see chapter 2). DC activities are performed throughout unified land operations, but most frequently in support of stability and DSCA. The authority to approve conduct of such operations within U.S. territories lies with the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and may require a special exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits 10 USC (federal status) U.S. military from enforcing civilian laws within the United States or its territories without specific authorization. The U.S. Constitution and other federal, state, and local laws may directly, and perhaps significantly, affect operations in the United States and its territories if enforcement of civilian law is required. Using 10 USC U.S. military forces to conduct law enforcement functions in these cases requires either an authorization by Congress (for example, the Insurrection Statutes, 10 USC 331-334) or a Constitutional authorization (for example, the President invoking his Executive Authority under Article 2 of the Constitution). National Guard Soldiers operating in a nonfederal status (32 USC or state active duty status) are not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). See ADRP 3-28 and JP 3-28 for more information.

4-5. Planning and conducting DC activities is the most basic collective task performed by CA forces, and military police are a key component to that effort. Typically, the UN or other IGOs and NGOs provide basic assistance and services to the affected population. However, when needed, the U.S. military may be requested to provide support to include establishing and operating DC camps, providing care (food, medical treatment, protection), and assisting with the movement or relocation of DCs. Because many of the talents needed for efficient and effective DC camps are linked to the disciplines of policing operations and detention operations (such as enforcing curfews, movement restrictions, use of travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, amnesty programs, and inspections), military police units are well suited for this mission. DC camps are discussed in appendix A.

**NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS**

4-6. NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the Department of State (DOS), the DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although the United States usually considers NEOs in connection with combat operations, it may also conduct a NEO in anticipation of or in
Support to Populace Control

response to any natural or manmade disaster in a foreign country. Civil unrest in a country may warrant evacuation to the United States or other safe haven.

**Note.** Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the SecDef to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

4-7. DOD defines the following two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

- U.S. citizens that competent authority can order to evacuate. This includes—
  - Civilian employees of all agencies of the United States Government (USG) and their dependents.
  - Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
  - Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
- U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens that competent authority may authorize or assist (but not necessarily order) to evacuate. This includes—
  - Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country but are willing to evacuate.
  - Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
  - Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.
  - Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military.
  - Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

**Note.** JP 3-68 provides additional information on NEO.

**ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR POPULACE CONTROL**

4-8. Populace control is normally a responsibility of HN civilian governments. U.S. forces may implement populace control when HN civilian authorities or agencies are unable or unwilling to control the civilian population. Populace control, as well as resources control, is escalated during civilian or military emergencies. In a permissive environment, U.S. forces implement populace control measures with the consent of the local government. In a hostile environment, those measures are applied in accordance with international law and the law of war.

4-9. Populace control typically requires integrated and synchronized CMO. CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the activities that commanders take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. The assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) or the battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9) is the primary staff integrator for CMO. The G-9 or S-9 develops plans that use U.S. and multinational forces and all available NGOs or resources to optimize CMO. CA forces have the inherent responsibility for PRC, due to the impact on the civilian population and the movement of HN assets and personnel. The role of the G-9 or S-9 with PRC is similar to the intelligence staff officer’s role and the staff integration of IPB.

4-10. The G-9 or S-9 enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO to ensure mission success. Responsibilities and functions of the G-9 or S-9 differ depending on the operational echelon. Military police units may be deployed and employed in support of CMO anywhere in the world, and those supporting CMO must be briefed and understand the intent of these operations. The function of police intelligence operations (see ATTP 3-39.20) is a significant enabler during CMO as is the proper treatment of all categories of detainees and DCs. Having a proper mindset and good situational awareness is critical. U.S. armed forces may be called upon to relieve human suffering (such as that encountered after a natural disaster), and appropriate discipline measures and controls are enacted to meet each situation.
Chapter 4

Supporting Organizations

4-11. PRC is conducted through coordination and synchronization of the activities of multiple civilian agencies and military organizations, to include extensive military police participation. Organizations supporting PRC include numerous participants (military and nonmilitary) with divergent missions. Agencies involved in PRC typically come from the joint community, interagency organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and HN or multinational organizations.

4-12. Because there are typically many different organizations involved, achieving a unified effort is critical to avoiding any duplication of effort. Achieving a unified effort requires close coordination, liaison, and common purpose for mission success. See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information on supporting organizations.

General Planning Considerations

4-13. The specific planning focus of PRC may differ at each level of command and will vary depending upon the type and nature of the operation being performed and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. All commands and national and international agencies involved must have clearly defined responsibilities. When planning and executing PRC, consider the following actions:

- Coordinate with the DOS, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and HN civil and military authorities to determine the appropriate levels and types of aid required and available.
- Minimize outside contributions (issue basic-needs items only) until DCs become self-sufficient, and encourage DCs to become as independent as possible.
- Review the effectiveness of humanitarian responses and adjust relief activities as necessary.
- Coordinate with CA units to ensure the use of the United States, the HN, and international organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere. Receiving assistance from these organizations not only capitalizes on their experience but also reduces the requirements placed on U.S. Armed Forces.
- Apply security restrictions as required for DCs. Under international laws, DCs have the right to freedom of movement; however, in the event of a mass influx of DCs, security considerations may require restrictions.

4-14. The planning scope for PRC and the actual task implementation typically differ, depending on the command level, and will vary depending upon the type and nature of the operation being performed and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Military police must have a basic understanding of the planning CA units conduct for PRC.

4-15. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs, and general guidance on how to deal with (mitigate) the DC problem. Potential ways for mitigating the DC situation may include: prevention of dislocations (for example, implementing a stay-put policy), DC avoidance, DC movement control, or any combination of those. The PRC operations plan—

- Includes migration and evacuation procedures.
- Establishes minimum standards of care.
- Defines the status and disposition of DCs.
- Designates routes and movement control measures.
- Identifies cultural and dietary considerations.
- Includes information on DC plans, routes, and areas of concentration that all concerned staff elements will need.
- Provides measures to relieve suffering.
- Establishes proper order and discipline measures within the facility for the security and safety of DCs and Soldiers.
- Provides an aggressive information program by using support agencies and DC leadership.
4-16. PRC measures may require large groups of civilians to be quartered temporarily (less than six months) or semipermanently (more than six months). Military police may be tasked to set up, administer, and operate DC camps in close coordination with CA forces, the HN or USG agencies, psychological operations units, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, international organizations, and other interested organizations. A military police unit commander may be designated as the DC camp commander. See appendix A for more information.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

4-17. The first aim of military police support to DC operations is typically controlling DC movement to ensure that DCs do not impede the movement and maneuver of military forces and to protect DCs from avoidable hazards. Controlling movement is especially critical when handling masses of DCs. Military police include the movement of DCs within the overall traffic control plan that is developed in close coordination with movement control and CA planners and other members of the staff. Additional tasks that support DC activities (conducted within the police operations discipline) include curfew enforcement, movement restriction, the use of travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, amnesty programs, and inspections. Military police may provide limited support to DCs at their first point of contact with them, but all efforts are made to expedite their movement to established CA-controlled sites for them to receive support.

4-18. When performing DC activities, the level of control is typically drastically different from that of the majority of those interned during detainee operations. During detainee operations, the level of control and supervision is high, based on the significant and evident security risks. During DC activities, civilians are allowed freedom of movement as long as such movement does not impede operations. Security risks will always be present and efforts must be made to mitigate them to an acceptable level. Counterinsurgency operations may affect, or be affected by, DC activities, and ongoing insurgency operations may tend to blur the lines between DCs and detainee activities. See FM 3-63 for more information on detainee operations.

4-19. Mitigation of casualties among civilians is always a consideration, and military police may apply a variety of techniques in attempting to achieve this while performing activities in support of DC operations (or NEO). See ATTP 3-37.31 for more information, to include specifics on nonlethal capabilities. A discussion of rules of interaction, rules for the use of force (RUF), and the rule of law are included below in the discussion of NEO.

DISLOCATED CIVILIAN SITUATION TEMPLATE

4-20. Military police planners consider several variables when creating a situation template for DC movements. DC movement factors include time and distance factors (including such things as length of a DC column), gaps between individual DCs and groups of DCs, traffic density (typically expressed in DCs per kilometer), and rate of march. Once these variables are known, they can be depicted in a DC movement graph which is a time-space diagram that visually depicts DC movements within an area. The DC situation template provides the basis for DC planning and a means for deconflicting route usage within the movement control plan for operational forces. See ATP 3-57.10 for more information.

ROUTE PLANNING

4-21. Military police and others involved in DC planning consider the following when developing movement routes for DCs:

- **Route selection.** When selecting routes for civilian movement, military police consider the types of transportation that are common to the area. The PM typically coordinates the proposed traffic control plan with the movement control officer and the G-9 or S-9. All DC movements take place on designated civilian evacuation routes.

- **Route identification.** After designating movement routes, plans are made to ensure that they are marked in languages and symbols that civilians and U.S. and multinational forces understand.
Chapter 4

Psychological operations units; military police units; and other joint, multinational, and HN military forces can help mark routes using agreed upon standards.

- **Control and assembly points.** After selecting and marking movement routes, control and assembly points are established at selected key intersections. These points are coordinated between military police, CA, transportation, and logistics planners and captured in the traffic control plan.

- **Emergency rest areas.** Emergency rest areas are established at congested points to provide immediate needs (water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical support) as necessary.

- **Local and national agencies.** Using local and national agencies conserves military resources and reduces the need for interpreters and translators. Civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people.

- **Routing fundamentals.** DC planners incorporate the following fundamentals when planning the routes for DCs:
  - **Balance.** The characteristics of the route must meet the needs of the supported traffic. Balance also includes identifying requirements for route maintenance and improvement, and implementation of protection measures.
  - **Separation.** Sufficient road space must be allocated to avoid conflicts and reduce the potential for congestion.
  - **Distribution.** The number of routes allocated must be able to meet the demand to avoid congestion. Distributing traffic over more than one route also offers passive security.

- **Routing principles.** DC planners consider the following principles when developing routes for DCs:
  - Assign highest-priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.
  - Consider sustainability of the route network when assigning movements.
  - Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.
  - Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

**CONTROLLING MOVEMENT**

4-22. Controlling movement is a typical military police mission. Military police may employ the techniques of blocking, clearing, and collecting to control DC movement. These techniques rely on detailed planning and assessment.

**Blocking**

4-23. Roadblocks may be supported by checkpoints to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route.

4-24. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position. The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:

- What is the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)
- Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?
- Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?
- Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

**Clearing**

4-25. Clearing directs DCs from main and alternate supply routes, and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Clearing is conducted at the small-unit level by assigned Soldiers or by small, specialized teams whose sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their
current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may be the shoulder of the road.

4-26. Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. It is not an effective method for a large-scale DC mission. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is merely intended to channel or direct DCs in specified directions away from military operations, installations, or encampments until assimilated by better-organized DC activities, such as collecting. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:

- The clearing technique is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or direct new or returning DCs.
- External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs understand.
- DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, the potential for terrorist acts such as car or suicide bombings).
- A unit’s resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need emergency assistance.

Collecting

4-27. Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Identifying DCs may not be necessary during collection; it depends on guidance from higher headquarters, CA units, the HN, and other agencies. The need to identify DCs varies from operation to operation. DC identification may be necessary for the following reasons:

- To verify rosters against the actual population.
- To provide timely reunification of family members.
- To match DCs with their medical records in case of a medical emergency or evacuation.
- To check the identities of DCs against the transfer roster.
- To identify personnel being sought by HN, multinational, or U.S. forces.

4-28. Whenever possible, existing HN facilities should be considered for use as collection points. Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities and nongovernmental and international governmental organization partners that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are—

- Collection points. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before moving onward along DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points provide minimal emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than one day to three or four days) immediate needs (for example, water and trauma first aid).
- DC routes. These are routes that offer protection to DCs by moving them away from the main effort of military, logistics, or humanitarian assistance operations.
- Assembly areas. These areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with emergency relief such as food, medical support, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel (military or civilians of the interagency, HN, and nongovernmental and international governmental partners) begin screening and registering DCs to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent information. They also begin to segregate enemy prisoners of war, hostile civilians, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically located in division security areas and may host DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide to send DCs from assembly areas to camps to allow them to continue to their intended destination or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.
- DC camps. These are areas with temporary and semipermanent facilities that support the effective and efficient provision of shelter and aid to DCs over a longer period of time. DC camps are discussed in appendix A.
Chapter 4

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

4-29. The primary support that military police units provide to NEOs centers on controlling the movement of evacuees, and providing security at departure locations and extraction sites and for convoys carrying evacuees. Military police are skilled in interpersonal communications and the graduated use of force from their law enforcement experiences. This skill set transfers well to working in direct contact with the evacuees and dealing with hostile incidents. Military police are a key member of marshalling teams that are responsible for locating evacuees and getting them to assembly areas and evacuation sites.

EVACUATION PLANNING

4-30. When the decision is made to evacuate a community, planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units, supplies, and first responders. Mass evacuation planning includes the following:

- **Transportation.** Planners should consider the maximum use of civilian transportation.
- **Movement control.** Planners identify natural and manmade obstacles that will hamper movement along designated routes and mitigate their effects as necessary. Checkpoints and signage are used to direct the flow of traffic, and measures are in place to redirect traffic to alternate routes as required, based on changes in the situation. Collection points should be established for vehicles that breakdown.
- **Security.** Military and HN security forces provide security for civilians after evacuation. These organizations also provide for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.
- **Documentation.** In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents to ensure that personnel are properly manifested and to ensure orderly movement.
- **Briefing.** Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. This can be accomplished by using leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other available means. This briefing explains the details of the move, restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and schedules.
- **Rations.** For a movement lasting no more than two days, planning should ensure that DCs are supplied with rations at the time of departure or at designated points en route.
- **Health care.** The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies may be used to supplement HN and civilian organization assets, if necessary and authorized. Before movement, proper steps should be taken by medical personnel to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
- **Return.** During planning, considerations should be taken to provide for the evacuees' eventual return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

RULES OF INTERACTION

4-31. Rules of interaction provide Soldiers with a guide for interacting with the civilian population. Rules of interaction include—

- Treating all DCs humanely and with respect.
- Avoiding discussion of politics and policies with DCs.
- Avoiding promises. If cornered, reply with, "I will see what I can do."
- Refraining from making obscene gestures. DCs may understand the meaning.
- Avoiding derogatory remarks. DCs may understand English, and the local linguists surely do.
- Treating all DCs equally. DCs may become offended if they do not receive the same treatment or resources as other DCs.
- Treating medical problems seriously and maintaining a professional relationship.
Support to Populace Control

- Greeting DCs in their native language.

RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

4-32. RUF used in PRC vary from operation to operation. The CCDR establishes RUF, in conjunction with the staff judge advocate and upon joint staff approval, and approves special RUF developed for use in resettlement facilities. The RUF evolves to fit the changing environment, ensuring continued protection and safety for the DC population and U.S. military personnel. RUF should remain simple and understandable so that Soldiers are not confused and do not have to memorize extensive checklists. Standing RUF apply to 10 USC military police conducting operations in the United States and its territories, absent any explicit additional guidance from the SecDef. Commanders may also submit supplemental RUF requests for the SecDef's approval.

4-33. Nonlethal measures can and may be authorized by the RUF anytime during an operation to protect Soldiers and DCs from injury. Nonlethal weapons may include riot batons, pepper spray, stun guns, and shotguns loaded with nonlethal munitions. The RUF may include less than lethal force to protect mission-essential equipment from damage or destruction. Mission-essential equipment includes tactical and nontactical vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, computers, and office and personal equipment.

RULE OF LAW

4-34. Planning for follow-on to major combat operations should begin in the early planning stages for war. Efforts to transition to the rule of law must start as soon as stability tasks begin, often simultaneously with major combat operations. First, security conditions must be established and political conditions initiated that support policing and judicial and corrections systems for fair and equitable treatment of citizens by the HN government. This is often easier said than accomplished. Many nations simply do not have the underpinnings of the rule of law to understand and implement the system and will require coaching, mentoring, training, and support along a continuum toward peaceful existence. Additionally, if efforts in combat operations do not include shaping the area for stability, criminals, insurgents, and organized crime will control the population and the developing government, making the rule-of-law plan efforts exponentially more difficult. Citizens must have the right to ownership, fair treatment by policing and judicial systems, and corrections systems that enforce compliance with the law in a manner that is equitable and uniformly fair to everyone. Military police forces are well-suited for providing HN assistance and training for principally two of the three legs of the rule of law—the policing and corrections aspects.

4-35. Military police units must cultivate relationships with HN police and local officials in the operational area, if they exist, early in the operation to maximize efficiencies later during the transition period. This process will provide valuable police intelligence that will aid the unit in planning and recommending courses of action to assist in establishing the rule of law.

4-36. Whether in a transitional military authority role or supporting a legitimate HN government, military police support the PRC plan for mitigating the impact of criminal activity through resources control measures. These actions may include—

- Securing stocks of critical commodities from theft or pillage.
- Supporting border security and customs enforcement.
- Identifying and mitigating black market activities dealing in critical commodities.
- Securing stockpiles of natural resources.

4-37. Military police support to transition to the rule of law may include—

- Helping establish and train local police officers in basic to advanced law enforcement skills and operating police stations.
- Assisting with developing requests for law enforcement equipment and sustainment items necessary for local law enforcement.
- Providing joint patrolling.
- Operating police stations.
- Mentoring HN personnel until the HN is capable of independent operations.
4-38. Military police detention units can assist with establishing corrections operations in a reopened or temporary facility. They can also train the guard forces and prison operations staffs to properly operate a facility.

4-39. All of these activities build confidence in the local population that law-abiding citizens will be treated fairly and equitably and that laws will be applied equally and uniformly to every citizen. Citizens must know they will not be unlawfully detained or imprisoned. They must also be confident that the unlawful activity of others will be policed and punished.

4-40. Rule of law cannot expand or be sustained in crime-ridden environments where citizens fear for their safety due to criminal activity. Resources control measures specifically targeted to deter criminal activity contribute toward building the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government or provisional authority.
Chapter 5
Support to Resources Control

Resources control provides security for the indigenous natural and manmade materiel resources of a nation-state, mobilizes economic resources, denies the enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy and criminal activity. It also includes protection of U.S. assets to deny them to the enemy and criminal activities. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, and border security to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Resources control, along with populace control (discussed in chapter 4), are the two components of PRC. This chapter is focused on military police support to resources control, which is aimed at enforcing resources control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security, civil control, and restoration of essential services. LOGSEC and associated crime prevention activities, which are typically performed by CID personnel, are key components of military police support to resources control.

OVERVIEW OF RESOURCES CONTROL

5-1. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilizes material resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources controls target specific sectors of a nation’s material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure. (See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information.) Military police and CID agents support to resources control may include—

- Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (such as food and fuel).
- Establishing border security, including customs procedures, to prevent arms smuggling, human trafficking, and other contraband such as drugs or currency.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
- Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.
- Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
- Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.

5-2. Military police may also be tasked to secure critical convoys to ensure safe transit. Functions in support of resources control operations include the following activities (see chapter 3):

- Protecting against enemy activities within movement corridors and along MSRs.
- Securing supply routes and critical convoys.
- Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Evaluating and recommending protective measures for high-risk facilities.
- Employing protective measures for high-risk individuals.
- Employing protective measures for designated supplies.
- Conducting area and local security.
Chapter 5

- Conducting response force operations.
- Applying AT measures.
- Implementing physical security measures.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY CONTROL

5-3. Resources control, to include control of public and private movable and unmovable property, is most prevalent during the occupation of a foreign territory by U.S. forces. However, control measures may be implemented across the range of military operations based on specific authorities granted to a commander for a particular mission. Effective resources control requires the combined efforts of all instruments of national power. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) for the protection of civilians in time of war set forth rules relating to property in occupied territories. Territory is considered occupied when it is taken over by a sovereign power following a military intervention. In most cases, the period of occupation is temporary, pending the signing of a peace treaty or the formation of a new government. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. (See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information). International law recognizes the following five basic powers that a military commander of an occupation force possesses in relation to property in enemy territory:

- Destruction.
- Confiscation.
- Seizure.
- Requisition.
- Control.

Note. The authority of an occupational force commander in the area of public and private property is situation-dependent. The treatment by the occupier of real and personal property is analyzed under a number of factors, including the nature of the property, the needs of the occupier, and whether it is owned by the state or privately. Legal review by the supporting staff judge advocate before the execution of any of the authorities granted to an occupational force is strongly recommended. For further information, see FM 27-10 and the Operational Law Handbook.

5-4. Resources control measures may be implemented in collaboration with a HN government during military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major operations. Authority for the execution of such measures originates from a formal agreement negotiated by the DOS, such as a status-of-forces agreement, a mutual defense treaty, or a security cooperation treaty ratified by the United States and the HN government.

5-5. The long-term success of any intervention often relies on the ability of military forces to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Critical infrastructure resources control measures directly support the primary stability task—establish civil security. The initial response aim is to establish a safe and secure environment to enable the HN to sustain and further develop infrastructure capability.

5-6. Military police also implement countermeasures which may include implementing vulnerability and threat assessments, developing procedures to predict and prevent terrorist actions before they occur, hardening likely targets, and conducting offensive operations to destroy an enemy. Military police units actively use checkpoints and roadblocks to control the movement of vehicles, personnel, and materiel and to prevent illegal actions that may aid the enemy (see chapter 3). These control measures serve as a deterrent to terrorist activities, saboteurs, and other threats.
CIVIL SECURITY SUPPORT

5-7. Key to the control of national resources is the primary stability task: establish civil security. An essential task of establish civil security is border control and boundary security of the nation’s borders and points of entry and embarkation. FM 3-07 for additional information.

5-8. Border controls regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, and limit smuggling. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal exportation of assets by means of smuggling or through the corruption of border officials.

5-9. Planning of resources control measures must consider illegal activity and the impact of such activities on the management of resources within the operational environment. Black market activities, smuggling, theft, and corruption of HN officials are examples of criminal activities that may have a detrimental impact on the availability of critical resources. Criminals dealing in contraband items, such as arms and ammunition, pose a security threat to the population, the HN government, and the deployed military force.

5-10. An essential element in controlling criminal activity in the area of resources is border security and control. Border security activities include managing land border areas, airspace, coastal and territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. The control of border areas and crossings deters smuggling, movement of irregular forces into HN territory, and uncontrolled flow of DCs. Border security forces monitor, detect, and prevent crime in border areas, including illegal entry and the illicit trafficking of goods, services, and human capital.

BORDER OPERATIONS SUPPORT

5-11. National Guard military police Soldiers may be periodically tasked to support border operations along the U.S. borders in support of DSCA. The support provided may include technical equipment (such as thermal imagery, night vision, and infrared detection) and the operation of the equipment to help with the detection of personnel illegally entering into the United States. The Posse Comitatus Act may prohibit Regular Army or Army Reserve Soldiers from enforcing civil law; unless granted an exemption, they may only respond to defend themselves or law enforcement officials from imminent danger. Nonfederalized National Guard military police performing missions under the control of their respective state governors are not prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. Upon mobilization (federalization), National Guard Soldiers are restricted under the Posse Comitatus Act.

5-12. Borders other than United States borders may also require support from military police units. Military police may be required to operate control posts, conduct border patrols, and supervise crossing points at international borders. Many countries control the movement of military personnel and civilians at their borders. Border control is maintained for reasons of security; customs and tariff enforcement; protection of the civilian economy; and apprehension of criminals, absentees, and persons of intelligence interest. Control is maintained through the establishment of authorized road or rail crossing points, border patrols, control posts, and liaison with authorities of neighboring countries (if feasible). Prohibited or restricted zones are often used to help control circulation at the borders.

5-13. In conducting border control, military police normally coordinate with indigenous police, counterintelligence units, and CA units. They watch for individuals or items that may be involved in criminal and customs offenses. They also establish the identity and purpose of U.S. forces crossing borders and examine vehicles and travel documents. Support to border control may be paramount to prevent adversaries from moving weapons, supplies, and personnel across borders to attack or disrupt friendly forces.

5-14. Military police may also be tasked to enforce customs laws and regulations in support of local government or HN officials. The U.S. military enforcement of customs laws of countries in which U.S. forces are stationed is often part of agreements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization status-of-forces agreement between the United States and the respective HN.

5-15. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal exportation of assets by means of smuggling or through the corruption of border officials. Ineffective border control and
management systems can frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized criminal activity. This often results in increased trafficking of illegal arms, goods, and human capital and impacts the ability of the HN to generate revenue through duties and import and export fees. Conventional military forces may be able to provide immediate border security; however, unless they are acting as an occupying force, they are an inappropriate law enforcement force.

LOGISTICS SECURITY SUPPORT

5-16. LOGSEC is concerned with the integrity of the logistics system through the prevention, identification, and investigation of criminal acts committed by terrorists, criminal elements, or insider threats ranging from the U.S. Army logistics provider to the military force on the ground. It includes any criminal or terrorist action intended to divert, steal, destroy, or substitute an inferior product or sabotage supplies delivered to or used by the U.S. military or to damage, destroy, or impede elements of the transportation infrastructure or conveyances within control of the U.S. Army. The LOGSEC mission is the responsibility of all CID field elements, and each echelon of CID should be involved, as required, to achieve a cohesive, effective support to the Army, whenever requested or required, that would enhance combat readiness, safety, and security or be a combat force multiplier.

5-17. LOGSEC encompasses security of the entire logistics system, from the acquisition of materials (procurement fraud operations are under the investigative purview of the Major Procurement Fraud Unit, 701st Military Police Group [CID]); through all modes of the transportation network and storage sites; retrograde cargo through the transportation system; and reutilization, disposal, or demilitarization operations. Supply diversion is normally encountered during in-transit movement of supplies or cargo and would fall to the investigative purview of the mainstream CID forces.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO LOGISTICS SECURITY

5-18. Criminal investigators, as required and assigned, provide battlefield investigative support and criminal intelligence to each echelon of command from battalion through echelons above corps. USACIDC will assess the threat, capabilities, and intent of the criminal and terrorist threats. USACIDC will also assist the supported command in actions to eliminate threat activities or minimize their effects.

5-19. The USACIDC LOGSEC mission is a critical factor in the successful accomplishment of the Army’s combat mission. LOGSEC sustains the integrity of the logistics pipeline from the manufacturer to the individual combat Soldier. It involves prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal and terrorist elements, HN or allied personnel, and even U.S. personnel. Operations in support of the USACIDC LOGSEC mission will prevent, detect, and investigate criminal intervention of the logistics pipeline that may adversely affect the Army's ability to maintain combat readiness or effectiveness by—

- Enhancing the readiness of the force.
- Increasing the effectiveness of CID LOGSEC-related activities.
- Creating an awareness of LOGSEC and the USACIDC role in the enhancement of the combat readiness of the Army.

5-20. Whatever the type of port, the principles for LOGSEC are constant, although the specifics change. A successful port LOGSEC program is based on the following three-pronged approach to enhance the security of military property as it is moved from the port of embarkation (POE) to the POD, and onto its final destination:

- Implementation of proactive crime prevention measures designed to eliminate crime-conducive conditions within the staging areas of the POE and the POD.
- Surveillance and visual inspection of the cargo and loading and unloading procedures.
- LOGSEC awareness briefings for supercargo personnel accompanying cargo shipments.

5-21. Shipment of major end items (tanks, trucks, and weapons systems) presents a significant LOGSEC challenge to USACIDC. Unlike containers, these items must be completely accessible to port personnel during the loading or discharge process.
5-22. Major end items are identified, accounted for, and processed by military terminals in the same manner as a container. This cargo is controlled by the logistics applications of automated marking and reading symbols (LOGMARS). With the LOGMARS label, the cargo is scanned into staging areas, scanned out, and then scanned for manifesting onto its designated vessel. During discharge, the process is reversed. Frequent problems exist in accountability due to inaccurate scanning or the loss or lack of LOGMARS labels. Major end items are frequently reported missing when not clearly shown on the final ship's manifest; however, in many cases it becomes frustrated cargo.

5-23. Secondary or nested cargo is not controlled by LOGMARS and is not accounted for on the ship manifest. In most instances, this cargo is readily accessible to criminal elements. Determining the exact circumstances surrounding the loss is virtually impossible. In their haste to move supplies and equipment, deploying units have historically ignored established security procedures. Only strong security measures and proactive threat assessments at the seaport of embarkation and the seaport of debarkation can prevent losses.

5-24. Formerly known as frustrated cargo, astray cargo can become a source of frustration. Unidentified cargo will ultimately end up in the astray cargo area. Frequently, reports of lost, missing, or stolen cargo can be resolved through a check with astray cargo. Careful examination should be made of the frustrated cargo procedures. Lack of security and inexperienced personnel will result in cargo being stolen, diverted, and reissued without accountability.

5-25. Immediately following the departure of a loaded vessel, a criminal information report will be prepared in message format and forwarded to the USACIDC activities responsible for the seaport of debarkation and the final destination of the cargo. A criminal information report should contain the following information:

- Date of departure.
- Cargo identification and inventory.
- Intermediate stops.
- Identity of supercargo personnel.
- Identify of LOGSEC issues.
- Estimated time of arrival at the seaport of debarkation.

**PHASES OF LOGISTICS SECURITY SUPPORT**

5-26. In the acquisition management phase, the investigative effort is directed at supporting user activities (user or end item user) and the acquisition program manager. This investigative support radiates from concept development, concept exploration, research and development, engineering, manufacturing, and delivery and acceptance by the U.S. Government. This segment of LOGSEC is normally engaged by the major procurement fraud units.

5-27. The materiel distribution phase is the most fluid aspect of the logistics pipeline since it is typically the most vulnerable to criminal activity. This phase includes materiel movement via land, rail, air, and sea modes of transportation; and material storage and warehousing (depot activities). (See ATP 4-13 and ATP 4-14 for more information on intermodal and rail center operations.) Depots release materiel to supply activities or deploying units. Materiel vulnerabilities are most prevalent in locations where there are changes in the modes of transportation. These locations are commonly referred to as the nodes of transportation. In the distribution phase of LOGSEC operations, CID field elements aid in investigating supply diversion. Investigations are routinely performed by field CID elements as assets move through the logistics pipeline.

5-28. Proactive investigative efforts performed in the materiel distribution phase of LOGSEC include LOGSEC awareness briefings and threat assessment support to deploying or redeploying commanders and their unit movement control officers; criminal activity threat estimates and criminal activity threat assessments along the transportation routes; economic crime threat assessments at transportation facilities, storage locations, or military installations; LOGSEC threat assessments at major transportation nodes; and port vulnerability assessments at PODs and POEs.
5-29. The materiel management phase of LOGSEC should focus on the security of materiel after it is delivered from depots or ports to the intermediate supply activities, installations, or forward-deployed operating bases. At an installation, investigative support is provided to accountable officers at supply support activities. This investigative support must be provided to forward-deployed operating bases where materiel is warehoused before it is issued to the user.

5-30. LOGSEC performed during deployment operations is typically joint in nature as CCDRs face a variety of missions. A forward-deployed LOGSEC mission should begin by establishing effective liaison with all interested organizations. This allows for a more comprehensive mission analysis. This mission analysis should consider the investigative assets of the other military criminal investigative organizations and the responsibilities, requirements, and capabilities of each agency and each branch of service. Because of the areas of focus, some Services may have LOGSEC capabilities that are better applied to a specific mission than another Service.

**THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS**

5-31. USACIDC and PM staffs provide police information and intelligence analysis to commanders that identify indicators of potential crimes and criminal threats against Army property, facilities, or personnel. USACIDC elements collect, consolidate, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence and terrorist counteraction operations aimed at U.S. and allied interests and activities on the battlefield.

5-32. The USACIDC LOGSEC effort is directed toward the proactive prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal activity that results in the loss or malfunction of logistics or sustainment materiel. The threat assessment process consists of the following four specific steps:

- **Step 1.** Identify the threat.
- **Step 2.** Identify targets vulnerable to the threat.
- **Step 3.** Prioritize identified targets.
- **Step 4.** Develop proactive plans of action.

5-33. To implement an effective LOGSEC program, USACIDC field activities should be included on the distribution list of installation activities that receive reports regarding the supported commander's logistics posture. These reports may be internal or external to the installation and are prepared by one or more of the following agencies:

- Army Audit Agency.
- Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs.
- Defense Finance and Accounting Services.
- Directorate of Contracting.
- Government Accounting Office.
- Internal Review and Compliance Office.
- Directorate of Logistics.
- Movement control team.
- Theater Movement Control Agency.

5-34. The review and analysis of audit reports in addition to coordination with the preparing activity can provide a **snapshot** of a specific logistics activity on the installation. Reports prepared by other agencies can identify specific issues that may adversely impact on the Army’s combat capabilities. These reports provide information on a wide range of subjects to include logistics systems and their use in support of combat operations. Other agencies preparing such reports may include the—

- Department of the Army Inspector General.
- Department of the Defense Inspector General.
- Installation inspector general.
Support to Resources Control

- Logistics Control Activity. Upon request, this activity can provide the ordering history of a specific class of supply or item and the requiring activity through the Logistics Information File. The Logistics Information File is accessible by computer modem.
- Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange. This information is also accessible by computer modem.

5-35. Reports on logistics systems are initiated based on either a cyclic requirement or as needed. These reports can be obtained from either the Department of Logistics Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics or accountable supply office and include the following:
- Unit status reports. These reports provide the status of Soldiers and their materials by unit.
- Material release denials.
- Report of discrepancies.
- Discrepancy in shipment reports.
- Quality deficiency reports.
- Inventory adjustment reports.
- Reports of survey.
- Sample data collection reports.

5-36. Other reports, such as AR 15-6 investigations and statement of charges reports, are generated by unit commanders. These reports are generally initiated whenever property is destroyed or lost, or accountability for an item has been lost, either at the installation, unit, or individual Soldier level.

5-37. Additional sources of information pertaining to the local criminal threat include the local police, HN police, military intelligence, and counterintelligence. Sources and informants used in the conduct of CID drug suppression team operations may also be used to cultivate intelligence in economic crimes and LOGSEC arenas. Both drug users and dealers commonly trade or steal government property in order to support their activity.

DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

5-38. The development of criminal intelligence at the operational level in support of LOGSEC must be directed at assessing the criminal threat of the adversary, whether it is an enemy military unit, terrorist elements, the HN, allied personnel, or U.S. personnel. The focus on the development of operational-level intelligence is broad and includes the following factors:
- Political.
- Economic.
- Sociological.
- Technological.

5-39. These factors may materially affect the nature of the threat at the operational level. This type of intelligence development requires access to information not normally developed or obtained by USACICD. To assist in the development of operational intelligence, whether in a peacetime or combat environment, the military police and special agent should—
- Assess the situation and identify the threats.
- Identify targets that may be vulnerable to the threat.
- Analyze and transform information into usable criminal intelligence.
- Target activities based on criminal intelligence.
- Identify and investigate or deter and prevent criminal activities.

5-40. Police engagement and the subsequent collection of information remains a primary focus for military police, and police intelligence operations are vital for proper situational understanding, given the linkage to criminal, terrorist, and insurgent threats. Some police intelligence may not be able to be shared with the intelligence community because of restrictions against intelligence personnel collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens, U.S. corporations, and non-U.S. citizen residents. See ATTP 3-39.20 for more information.
5-41. Initial collected information may be an indicator of a problem such as product substitution, a supply diversion, or other criminal activity. Sources of information may be the result of a commander’s situation or after action report that contains indicators of a problem, such as lack of fuel, spare parts, ammunition, or other critical items that delayed or prevented the completion of the mission. This information should be disseminated by the most expeditious means available to the widest audience possible to assist in further development of the information, even if it may still be fragmented, incomplete, or cryptic. Over-classification can limit the use of this information and should be avoided.

5-42. Agents assigned to support combat operations can only attempt to identify the conditions and indicators that may be indicative of criminal activity. Follow-up investigative activity on fragmentary information that involves work outside the area of combat operations will be conducted by USACIDC investigative assets in the continental United States or wherever the actual crime took place. Threat assessment instruments used within this arena include the following:

- **A LOGSEC threat assessment.** This assessment—
  - Is a crime prevention survey of a logistics activity.
  - Is performed in the same manner as a crime prevention survey.
  - Reports findings, and observations.
  - Provides recommendations.
  - Is initiated by CID or can be requested by commanders.

- **A criminal activity threat assessment.** This assessment—
  - Is performed separately from all other reports.
  - May be incorporated into a LOGSEC threat assessment or a port vulnerability assessment.
  - Reports on specific criminal threats to a specific installation or activity.
  - Identifies crime trends and threats.
  - Requires collection and correlation of information collected from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

- **A port vulnerability assessment.** This assessment—
  - Is a crime prevention survey of a sea or aerial POD or POE.
  - Is performed the same as a LOGSEC threat assessment.
  - Is formatted as prescribed by headquarters.
  - Incorporates information from the criminal activity threat assessment into the body of the report.

5-43. These assessments assist in identifying areas of criminal vulnerability based on the logistical flow of supplies leaving the wholesale activity and going to the most forward-deployed units. All traveled routes and stops should be considered, while focusing on security and safety of the following:

- Depots and supply nodes.
- Airports, railheads and terminals, and seaports.
- Air, land, and water transportation nodes.

**COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES**

5-44. A multitude of other federal, state, and local government agencies and activities have primary jurisdiction over the ports, waterways, railroad infrastructure, highways, and other interstate and international transportation facilities used by the military. Additionally, several DOD and Army commands perform transportation infrastructure vulnerability and physical security assessments. These include port integrated vulnerability assessments done by the United States Navy and the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security to U.S. Seaports. Other transportation security segment assessments can be found with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and their balanced survivability assessments and within the high-quality joint staff integrated vulnerability assessments conducted by DOD’s Joint Staff (J-34/Combating Terrorism). The United States Coast Guard has an Office of Investigations and Analysis that can be a highly valued resource when conducting LOGSEC assessments. The Area Maritime Security lead done by the U.S. Coast Guard captain of the port can be another good resource when conducting LOGSEC assessments.
assessments. Additional resources when conducting LOGSEC would be open sources such as the American Association of Port Authorities, the National Waterways Conference, the American Waterways Operators, the Texas Transportation Institute’s Center for Ports and Waterways, the International Maritime Organization, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

5-45. Past assessments give direction on what kind of expertise is required in formulating a team of experts to conduct a LOGSEC assessment. Past assessment teams have included those experts with background in terrorist options, structural engineering, emergency operations, information operations, security operations, utility operations, communications, and mission operations. Past port vulnerability assessments have been done of the Port of Baltimore, Maryland; Apra Harbor, Guam; Port of Honolulu, Hawaii; Port of Charleston, South Carolina; and Port of Savannah, Georgia. Since the inception of the Global War on Terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation-led joint terrorism task forces collect intelligence data on a wide-ranging scope of potential terrorist activity and targets. When CID receives a request for LOGSEC support from a senior Army commander, and when the scope of the mission is identified, CID field elements involved may find that the majority of the effort has already been done by one or more of the aforementioned agencies. Therefore, coordination with other agencies involved in transportation security is imperative.

5-46. LOGSEC support to military commanders includes logistics-related crime prevention efforts, LOGSEC awareness briefings, criminal activity threat estimates, and criminal activity threat assessments. These operations are directed toward enhancing the Army’s accountability, security, and visibility of materiel, personnel, and data in the logistics pipeline—a term used to denote the continuum in which military assets are acquired, produced, transported, and maintained. This process includes acquisition management, materiel distribution, materiel management, and property disposal.
This page intentionally left blank.
Appendix A

Dislocated Civilian Camps

The requirement to establish a DC camp may occur across the range of military operations. Although the UN or other IGOs and NGOs typically build and operate DC camps and provide basic assistance and services to the affected population, U.S. military forces may be tasked to perform this mission. Establishing DC camps requires a combined arms approach to harness the necessary expertise in a variety of fields such as logistics, engineering, protection, CA, environmental, preventive medicine, and resource management. Military police are a key component to this effort, since many of the tasks linked to the disciplines of policing operations and detention operations (such as curfew enforcement, movement restrictions, use of travel permits and registration cards, checkpoint operations, amnesty programs, and inspections) are essential for efficient and effective DC camps. These skill sets make military police well-suited for supporting DC camps. They may also be tasked with taking the lead on planning and integrating DC camps within the supported maneuver commander’s concept of operations, and operating them. A military police unit commander may be designated as a DC camp commander. Because a DC camp is simply a base camp with a unique purpose, the techniques and procedures for planning, establishing, and operating them are the same as those contained in ATP 3-37.10. The purpose of this appendix is to supplement the doctrine contained in that manual by focusing on the planning, design, and operational considerations that are specific to DC camps. Creating efficient and effective DC camps will help conserve resources, limit liabilities, and reduce the overall logistic burden during extended operations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A-1. The CCDR determines what facilities are needed to satisfy operational requirements. Planning identifies when, where, and why a DC camp is needed. It identifies the purpose and functional requirements of the camp and its linkages and interdependencies with other camps, operational forces, and agencies. It also generates the information that is needed for executing all aspects of the camp’s life cycle. The planning needed for DC camps occurs across all levels of war and command echelons. Planning activities cover a continuum that ranges from conceptual to fully detailed. Effective planning for DC camps relies on expertise in a variety of fields. Much of that expertise may only be available through reachback to higher headquarters and supporting organizations such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

A-2. The planning and construction of DC camps will likely be performed under intense time constraints to meet very aggressive construction schedules. This is mostly due to the unpredictability of those situations where DCs are present. Preplanning is critical to avoiding crisis; however, planners should expect very little preplanning time. DC operations are often long-term and require resourcing that is normally not immediately available through DOD sources.

A-3. Unlike base camps that are used solely for operational forces, many of the activities that occur within DC camps will involve participation from U.S. and international governmental organizations and NGOs such as the United States Agency for International Development, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Organization of Migration. International humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, carefully guard their neutrality and do not desire to be associated with or dependent upon the military for fear of losing their special status in the international
community that allows them to fulfill their mission. It is important that camp planners understand the interests and requirements of these stakeholders early during planning and gain their trust and support from the beginning. See JP 3-08 for more information on interorganizational coordination and JP 3-28 for situations where military police are responding to natural disasters within the United States and its territories as DSCA.

A-4. Effective DC camps begin with the accurate identification of requirements for each aspect of the camp’s life cycle and the generation of supporting estimates and schedules for each phase of the operation. Estimates include the resources (people with the necessary skills and units or organizations with the necessary capabilities, materials, and money) that are needed to fulfill identified requirements. Commanders and staffs use the planning process described in FM 6-0 to determine their requirements for DC camps and integrate them within the concept of operations, and the base camp development planning process. The planning process provides the framework for integrating the actions of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others. A DC camp is simply a type of base camp developed to serve a special purpose. A key ingredient for all DC camp planning and design activities is the incorporation of the base camp principles described in ATP 3-37.10.

A-5. In rare instances, Army forces may be called upon to establish DC camps. In these cases, the force must take into account any legal considerations regarding availability and ownership of land for camps; logistic factors connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; security and crime prevention with the DC camp; and possible contracting requirements for construction. In planning DC operations, the primary factor is transition planning for the care and transfer of responsibility for the DC population to a controlling agency. Controlling agencies (for example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization of Migration, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCs—food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and for the supporting military forces.

GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A-6. The primary objective of DC operations is to protect civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian interference with military operations. DC camps provide a means for consolidating DCs within a protected location from which aid can be effectively and efficiently rendered.

A-7. The specific planning focus of DC camps (to include duration and composition) may differ at each level of command and will vary depending upon the characteristics and disposition of the DC population and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Although military police are typically only in a supporting role to CA-led operations for DC camps and overall resettlement efforts, it is possible that in selected situations or for limited periods of time, military police organizations may be required to command and operate DC camps. All commands and national and international agencies involved must have clearly defined responsibilities. Planners consider the following when planning and projecting the establishment, operation, and management of DC camps:

- Coordinate with CA units to ensure the use of the United States, the HN, and other international organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere to determine the appropriate levels and types of aid required and available. Receiving assistance from these organizations not only capitalizes on their experience but also reduces the requirements placed on U.S. Armed Forces.
- Minimize outside contributions (issue basic needs items only) until DCs become self-sufficient, and encourage DCs to become as independent as possible.
- Review the effectiveness of humanitarian responses and adjust relief activities as necessary.
- Apply the appropriate security restrictions for DCs that comply with U.S., international, and HN laws and regulations. Under international laws, DCs have the right to freedom of movement, but in the event of a mass influx of DCs, security considerations may require restrictions.
CAMP STANDARDS

A-8. The CCDR specifies the facility allowances and the standards for construction, quality of life, design, environmental, and protection for base camps in the theater. These standards are based on the characteristics of the region (such as resource availability, local climate, and local labor market) and the anticipated duration of a mission. For DC camps, there may also be applicable international humanitarian standards. See JP 3-34 for more information on basic guidelines for facility allowances and construction standards.

SITE SELECTION

A-9. Site selection balances mission, sustainment, protection, environmental, and engineering requirements. The planning team determines possible locations for DC camps based on an analysis of operational and mission variables, with added emphasis on terrain, civil, and environmental considerations.

A-10. The location of a DC camp may range from a spontaneous settlement over a wide area, to an organized rural settlement, to a concentration in a very limited area. As part of an overall strategy for DC camps, planners must generally decide whether it is better to have a few larger camps or several smaller ones. Having several smaller camps requires an interconnected relationship between them to improve the use of limited resources. Generally, the smaller the camps the better from the standpoint of ease of control. Having a few larger camps reduces the aggregate number of dedicated personnel to command, operate, and manage the camps, and allows resources and capabilities to be consolidated. Often, the only differences in the effort required for a small and a large base camp are the amount and type of resources expended and the degree of technical expertise and engineering required.

A-11. The security of camps should be a major consideration during the early stages of site selection. A solution that maintains and fosters self-reliance among the dislocated population is always preferable. The CCDR must consider a plan for PRC operations and the construction of DC camps early in the operational plan. This provides the timely notification of engineers, selection and development of facility sites, and procurement of construction materials. Military police coordinate the location with engineers, sustainment units, higher headquarters, and the HN.

A-12. Existing structures, facilities, and infrastructure should be used whenever possible to reduce requirements for new construction, as long as they do not impose any health or environmental hazards that cannot be mitigated. There are multiple options for the construction of facilities and infrastructure that range from modifying preexisting structures; using preengineered metal or fabric buildings; using modular base camp kits; and constructing wood, steel, or concrete masonry unit framed and supported buildings.

A-13. If no immediate solutions arise to resolving the causes of dislocation, planning for DC needs should assume a long-term outlook. This includes planning for all seasons (winter and summer) as well as for rain and drought. Determining the weather extremes must be a primary design factor. Temporary arrangements can be very difficult and costly to change once established. Site selection, planning, and the types of shelter available all have a direct bearing on the level of assistance.

A-14. The command should analyze the wide array of logistics and operational requirements that will be necessary to establish DC camps. The first requirement is to ensure that the correct number and type of personnel and construction materials are on the ground to establish and operate DC camps, well in advance of the start of hostilities. The second requirement is to develop a long-term plan that will sustain the operations and maintenance of camps for their expected duration. Inaccurately assessing the logistics and operational requirements for each aspect of the DC camp life cycle, early on, will likely yield inefficiencies that waste valuable results and ultimately detract from the overall mission.

A-15. If a DC camp is improperly located, the entire DC population may require relocation when resources are depleted. Planners consider the following when selecting a site for a DC camp:

- Operational and mission variables.
- Accessibility and proximity to other organizations (military or civilian) that can provide additional sustainment and protection.
- The ability for civilian relief organizations to be able to access and operate the site.
Appendix A

- The viability of real estate acquisition.
- The threat and boldness of adversaries in the area.
- The attitude of the local population.
- Accessibility to support forces and transportation to the site for support elements.
- Proximity to potentially hazardous structures (such as dams and industrial chemical plants) if they are damaged or destroyed by a force of nature or an act of man.
- Proximity to communications centers, large military fixed sites, ammunition storage, or other potential military targets that should be avoided.
- Accessibility and proximity to MSRs, transportation hubs, and distribution centers.
- The availability of suitable existing facilities (to avoid unnecessary construction).
- Susceptibility to natural disasters such as flooding, earthquakes, and fire.
- The presence of swamps, vectors, and other factors (water drainage) that affect human health.
- Access to an adequate source of potable water. (The supply should meet the demands for consumption, food sanitation, and personal hygiene.)
- The availability of existing infrastructure such as power, sewer, water, and waste disposal.
- The availability of construction resources (labor and material).
- Soil drainage.
- Other environmental considerations as appropriate.

SECURITY

A-16. Security of U.S. forces, assets, and information is a high priority and no less important during DC operations than during offensive or defensive operations. Even in a stable environment, banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminal or unruly crowds can occur. During a humanitarian mission, there should be a balance between the security posture and the camp population’s right not to live in an armed camp. The appearance and use of stringent security tactics may be overwhelming and detrimental to the overall intent of the camp.

COMMUNICATIONS

A-17. Effective communications are vital to mission success. It is likely that interagency, IGOs, and NGOs will have their own communication networks. Planning must include procedures to provide for interoperable and compatible communications among all participants. The need for interoperability may necessitate using unclassified communications means, which can be extremely challenging for U.S. military forces.

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

A-18. Design is an extension of planning. During design, construction means; construction standards; quality of life standards; level of camp capabilities; on-site conditions; and adaptable, scalable designs are matched against facility and infrastructure requirements. Planning and design are interdependent. Effective design hinges on the accuracy of information generated during planning, particularly information related to facility and infrastructure requirements, available resources, construction means, and site location.

CONSTRUCTION MEANS

A-19. Construction may be performed by joint and multinational engineer units (troop construction), contractors, or a combination of both. See ATTP 3-34.23 for more information on contract construction.

A-20. Sustainable DC camps leverage resources that are readily available through local means, established supply channels, and operational contract support. (See ATTP 4-10 for more information on operational contract support.) Cost-effective use of materials and labor is achieved primarily through the use of local resources, including selected DCs as appropriate. Local resources are generally less expensive and avoid
the challenges associated with international shipments; however, the quality of materials and services rendered must be considered in the overall cost-benefit analysis.

CONSTRUCTION METHODS

A-21. There are multiple options for construction of facilities and infrastructure that range from modifying preexisting structures; using preengineered metal or fabric buildings; using modular base camp kits (such as the Force Provider system; and constructing wood, steel, or concrete masonry unit framed and supported buildings. The type of construction will depend on the climate, the anticipated life of the facility, the number of facilities to be established, and the availability of construction resources (labor and materials).

Preexisting Facilities and Infrastructure

A-22. Preexisting facilities and infrastructure should be used whenever possible to save time, conserve resources, and reduce the overall logistic footprint. Using preexisting structures assumes protection risks, in terms of survivability, safety, and force health protection, that must be mitigated through structural assessments and occupational and environmental health site assessments. Documenting the existing environmental conditions helps limit liabilities. In some cases, existing facilities with minor damage may be quickly repaired to make them immediately usable. For example, leaking roofs can be temporarily repaired with plastic sheeting.

A-23. Facilities are grouped into six broad categories that emphasize the use of existing assets over new construction. To the maximum extent possible, facilities or real estate requirements should be met from these categories in the following order of priority:

- U.S.-owned, -occupied, or -leased facilities (including captured facilities).
- U.S.-owned facility substitutes, pre-positioned in the theater.
- HN, multinational support where an agreement exists for the HN, multinational nations to provide specific types and quantities of facilities at specified times, in designated locations.
- Facilities available from commercial sources.
- U.S.-owned facility substitutes stored in the United States.
- Construction of facilities that are considered a shortfall after an assessment of the availability of existing assets.

A-24. Public buildings and community facilities, such as schools, barracks, hotels, gymnasiums, or warehouses, can be found in urban areas and offer an excellent temporary or transit accommodation. Using these type of existing facilities may offer the following advantages:

- They are not continuously inhabited during normal use and DCs can be accommodated immediately without disrupting accommodation in the hosting area.
- Services such as water and sanitation are immediately available, although these may be inadequate if the numbers are large.
- The need to construct additional structures specifically for the DCs is avoided.

A-25. Disadvantages associated with this option might include the following:

- The facilities can quickly become overcrowded.
- Sanitation and other services can become overburdened.
- Equipment and structures can be damaged.
- Facilities are no longer available for their original purpose, thus disrupting public services to the hosting population.
- There can be a lack of privacy and increased protection risks.

A-26. Where possible, such accommodation in public buildings should be a temporary solution. The supporting infrastructure of the building (water, electricity, sanitation) will deteriorate quickly from concentrated use, to the extent that living conditions can become dangerously unhealthy. The buildings decay rapidly primarily because they are unsuited to such large numbers and lack the necessary infrastructure and utilities. In addition, the very low sense of responsibility by its inhabitants contributes to
the deterioration. Furthermore, since the normal use of the building has to be suspended with various social and economic consequences, both local and national governments are reluctant to transform public buildings into DC facilities. If such use is permitted, the need for quick evacuation of the building should be borne in mind as this may be requested by the government.

**Hurricane Katrina**

The Superdome presented what many perhaps assumed was a suitable existing facility; however, the expected population quickly grew and exceeded initial estimates. The Superdome was understaffed, undersupplied, and lacked accessibility due to high floodwaters which made resupply, evacuations, and other operations difficult. The facility lost power and the existing back-up power provided only dim lighting. Conditions at the stadium worsened due to the increasing size of the population and a lack of air conditioning, running water, and proper waste management. Eventually, the Superdome became declared *uninhabitable* and was ordered to be evacuated as soon as possible; however, state and local officials lacked the necessary transportation assets to do so without additional support.

**Tentage**

A-27. The primary advantage of using tents is that it provides a quick means for establishing a basic level of capabilities. However, the impacts of long-term use of tents must be considered. The life-span of an erected canvas tent depends on the manufacturing, the length of storage before deployment, the climate, and the care given by its occupants. Where tents are used for long durations, provisions for repair materials should be considered. The longer tentage is used and exposed to the elements, the less likely it is to be easily repacked, stored, and reused. Tentage used outside of the United States is typically not retrograded back to the United States unless it can meet the rigorous cleanliness requirements mandated by Executive Order 13122. Additionally, the cost of tentage, when combined with shipping costs into remote areas, may be more expensive than using local materials and labor to construct base camp facilities. Other disadvantages for tents are that they are susceptible to damage from high winds and are highly flammable unless made from fire retardant material. Additionally, they may not provide necessary protection from extreme weather conditions.

A-28. Figure A-1 is an example of a DC camp that was focused on the use of tentage. Hundreds of tents stretched out on the plains near Fier, Albania, as the United States built a tent city called Camp Hope on May 23, 1999, as part of Operation Sustain Hope. Sustain Hope was the United States effort to bring in food, water, medicine, and relief supplies, and to establish camps for the refugees fleeing from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. This camp was planned to support up to 20,000 refugees.
Prefabricated or Manufactured Buildings

A-29. Prefabricated or manufactured buildings are types of structures that consist of several factory-built components that are assembled on-site to complete the unit. The primary advantage with prefabrication is that it saves time on the construction site; this may be a factor when construction time is limited based on tactical or weather conditions. Potential disadvantages to consider include requirements for careful handling of prefabricated components, such as concrete panels, and the tendency for leaks where prefabricated components are joined.

Traditional Construction

A-30. Traditional construction using wood, steel, or concrete masonry units offers flexibility in designs, including the incorporation of necessary protection measures and the ability to perfectly adapt to existing site conditions. Disadvantages include the time and efforts needed for designing and constructing individual facilities, especially on a large scale. The environmental impact of procuring or using local construction material, such as the harvesting of timber, soil degradation, and so forth, must also be considered.

BASIC DESIGN

A-31. The overall physical layout of the camp should reflect a decentralized community-based approach, focusing on family, community, or other social groups. The camp should be subdivided into sections for ease of administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. Major sections normally include a camp headquarters, a clinic, a dining facility, personal hygiene facilities, sleeping areas, and animal compounds. Sleeping areas are further subdivided into separate areas for families, unaccompanied children, unattached females, and unattached males. Cultural and religious practices should also be considered, and efforts should be made to keep families together whenever possible.

A-32. Site planning should use a bottom-up approach by starting with the characteristics and needs of individual families, and reflect the wishes of the community as much as possible. Each community should
be planned to include its own immediate services, such as latrines, showers, water points, waste collection, and clothes washing facilities. This promotes ownership which will lead to better care of facilities by communities.

A-33. The basic design for a DC camp centers on an administrative area and up to eight 1,000-person enclosures. The facility is designed to be expandable in capacity increments of 1,000. The initial facility is constructed with the administrative area and one 1,000-person enclosure and then expanded, as needed, by adding additional 1,000-person enclosures until the maximum 8,000 capacity is reached. The target upper number of civilians in a camp is approximately 8,000. This number helps enforce control measures and allows for the efficient administration of the camp and its population. Figure A-2 depicts a DC facility with eight 1,000-person enclosures, each of which are divided into two 500-person compounds. The compounds are further divided into two 250-person subcompounds. Each 1,000-person enclosure must be self-contained with electric and water capabilities and must be able to be occupied immediately upon completion. Flexibility of this design facilities various separations within the same larger camp (single men, single women, families, and other potential requirements for separation).

A-34. The Army Facilities Components System (AFCS) is the primary tool that planners use for both site design and facilities and infrastructure design. The AFCS designs aid in solving contingency construction that is constrained by resources and time. Facilities in the AFCS can be rapidly constructed with locally available materials. This allows for the use of preexisting supplies and indigenous craftsmen, both of which dramatically reduce costs and save time. The facilities and components in the AFCS satisfy many of the DC camp construction requirements identified during planning. The AFCS can provide the specifications and material requirements for a variety of facilities when dimensions or population input is supplied. These plans are easily modified for temperate, frigid, tropic, and desert climates. The AFCS facilitates DC camp design within units at the lower tactical levels that typically lack the necessary design skills and capabilities.
OPERATIONS

A-35. The skills needed for operating a DC camp do not reside in any single branch or functional area. A base operations center is used to group the necessary capabilities to produce synergic effects. The size, composition, and configuration of the base operations center needed for a DC camp may vary based on the population of the camp, the complexity of facility and infrastructure operations and maintenance requirements, and the characteristics of the DC population. For smaller DC camps with simpler and less extensive facilities and infrastructure, the base operations center may be subsumed within the owning unit’s command post, or it may be a stand-alone operations center. The organizational structure of base operations centers and the tasks they perform are detailed in ATP 3-37.10. Some of the key tasks or areas of emphasis that may be unique to operating DC camps include—

- Camp control.
- Information dissemination.
CAMP CONTROL
A-36. Control of the camp population is key to successful camp operations. DC camp commanders must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline within the camp. They must publish and enforce rules of conduct for the camp as necessary. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

A-37. Because of the large number of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, the use of HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become as involved in the administration of the camp as is viable.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
A-38. Dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. CA public information teams and area military information support units may be able to assist.

LIAISON
A-39. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. U.S. Government and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and charitable organizations may help in relief and assistance operations.

INITIAL PROCESSING
A-40. The initial processing begins with the transport of civilians to the DC camp. The HN (in coordination with NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and other international organizations) normally assists in arranging transportation for DCs, but military assets may be required to move DCs from the initial point of contact to established collection points and camps. Processing is done in a positive manner because these civilians may be fearful and in a state of shock. Civilians should understand why they are being processed and know what to expect at each station. This is accomplished by the facility commander ensuring that all DCs, HN representatives, or other officials receive an entrance briefing upon their arrival. The briefing is provided in the native language of the DCs. If there is more than one language represented, the briefing is provided in multiple languages to meet all language requirements. The facility commander may minimize difficulties through careful administration and by implementing the following measures:

- Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate facilities or sections of a facility.
- Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (according to the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).
- Furnishing necessary information regarding the status and future of DCs.
- Making it possible for DCs to speak freely to camp officials.
- Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.

A-41. Military personnel provide training and support, while NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, international organizations, or other U.S. agencies typically conduct the processing of DCs at designated DC camps. In the absence of these organizations and agencies, military personnel may perform the functions found in table A-1. The number and type of processing stations vary from operation to operation. Table A-1 also shows stations that are typically required during DC operations.
Table A-1. Actions during in-processing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Responsible Individuals*</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Search and screen</td>
<td>Military police staff, MI personnel, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and international organizations</td>
<td>Conduct a pat-down search to ensure that weapons are not brought into the facility and that the facility is not infiltrated by insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Military police staff</td>
<td>Prepare forms and records to maintain accountability of DCs. Use forms and records provided by the HN or CA personnel or forms and records used for detainee operations that may apply to DCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Identification card or band</td>
<td>Military police staff</td>
<td>Issue an identification card or band to each DC, if required, to ease facility administration and control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Medical evaluation</td>
<td>Medical personnel</td>
<td>Evaluate DCs for signs of illness or injury, and treat them as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Assignment</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Assign a sleeping area to each DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Personal items</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Issue personal comfort items and clothing if available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number of people performing these tasks depends on the number of DCs and the time available. When possible, allow HN authorities to conduct most of the processing.

Legend:
- CA civil affairs
- DC dislocated civilian
- HN host nation
- MI military intelligence
- NGO nongovernmental organization

A-42. The DC camp commander determines the accountability procedures and requirements necessary for DC operations within the camp. Translators are present throughout processing. A senior member of the camp staff greets new arrivals and makes them feel welcome. DCs are briefed on facility policies and procedures and screened to identify security and medical concerns. They are offered the use of personal hygiene facilities. Family integrity is always maintained if possible.

A-43. Searches are conducted of arriving DCs to take control of any items that may cause harm to camp personnel and residents. Searchers confiscate and tag all confiscated items that noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy. Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, or hand it over to other agencies (such as local law enforcement). The owner should be given an official receipt (such as a DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-in) and an explanation of the owner’s rights and procedures for getting it returned. Camp commanders must ensure accountability of all confiscated property.

A-44. Same-gender searches are conducted whenever possible, and strip searches are never conducted without special authority and only in unique situations. Speed and security considerations may require mixed-gender searches. If so, perform them in a respectful manner, using all possible measures to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. The on-site supervisor carefully controls Soldiers doing mixed-gender searches to prevent allegations of sexual misconduct. Using HN, NGOs, or international humanitarian organization personnel to conduct searches may prevent negative situations from developing.

A-45. Military police may be responsible for classifying DCs during processing. They coordinate with CA personnel, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and international organizations to determine proper classifications. Military police personnel can expect a continuing need for reclassification and reassignment of DCs. Statements made by DCs and the information on their identification papers determine
Appendix A

their initial classifications. Agitators, enemy plants, and individuals who may be classified as DCs are identified by their activities. DCs may be reclassified according to their proper identity and/or ideology through a civilian internee review tribunal. DCs reclassified as detainees will be transferred to a theater internment facility or a strategic internment facility.

A-46. The National Detainee Reporting Center has the ability to assist commanders in establishing an automated detainee reporting system to process DCs. This portable detainee reporting system (jump kits) will assist in processing identification cards, interment serial numbers, and demographic information. An identification card is used to facilitate identification of a DC. It contains the DC’s name, photograph, and control number. The control number may be an interment serial number or a sequenced control number specific to the DC. Identification cards or bands permit identification by categories listed above. An identification band permits rapid, reliable identification of an individual and may also be used in resettlement operations. While DCs cannot be prevented from removing or destroying identification bands, most will accept their use for identification purposes. When identification bands or cards deteriorate, replace them immediately.

ADDRESSING MISTREATMENT OR ABUSE

A-47. All DOD personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) must correct, report, and document any incident or situation that might constitute mistreatment or abuse of DCs. Acts and omissions that constitute inhumane treatment may be violations of U.S. laws, U.S. policy, and the law of war. These violations require immediate action to correct. Simply reporting violations is insufficient. If a violation is ongoing, Soldiers have an obligation to take action to stop the violation and report it to their chain of command.

A-48. All personnel who observe or have knowledge of possible abuse or mistreatment will immediately report the incident through their chain of command or supervision. Reports may also be submitted to the military police, a judge advocate, a chaplain, or an inspector general who will then forward the report through the recipient's chain of command or supervision. Reports made to other officials will be accepted and immediately forwarded through the recipient's chain of command or supervision, with an information copy to the appropriate CCDR.

A-49. Any commander or supervisor who obtains credible information about actual or possible abuse or mistreatment will immediately report the incident through command or supervisory channels to the responsible CCDR or to another appropriate authority (such as the USACIDC or the inspector general) for allegations involving personnel who are not assigned to a CCDR. In the latter instance, an information report is sent to the CCDR with responsibility for the geographic area where the alleged incident occurred.

BASIC CONDUCT REMINDERS

A-50. The following basic conduct reminders apply from initial contact with DCs, through in-processing, and throughout the duration of DC activities. All DC camp personnel will—

- Observe rigorous self-discipline.
- Maintain a professional but impartial attitude.
- Follow the guidelines established in the rules of interaction and the ROE.
- Cope calmly with hostile or unruly behavior or incidents.
- Take fair yet immediate, decisive action.

A-51. The DC camp commander takes positive action to establish those daily or periodic routines and responses that are conducive to good discipline and control. DC camp personnel—

- Enforce policies and procedures that provide control of camp residents.
- Give reasonable, decisive orders to civilians in a language they understand.
- Post camp rules, regulations, instructions, notices, orders, and announcements that residents are expected to obey in an easily accessible area. This information is printed in a language understood by the DCs. Those individuals who do not have access to the posted copies will be given a copy.
- Ensure that the DCs obey orders, rules, and directives.
- Report DCs who refuse or fail to obey an order or regulation.
- Enforce nonfraternization with DCs.
- Refuse to accept gifts or engage in any commercial activity with DCs.
This page intentionally left blank.
# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. The proponent publication for a term is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>area damage control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army doctrine reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCS</td>
<td>Army Facilities Components System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFPD</td>
<td>Air Force policy directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>antiterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCARS</td>
<td>Airborne Target Coordination and Attack Radar Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attn</td>
<td>attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTP</td>
<td>Army tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDID</td>
<td>Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>criminal investigation division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODDD</td>
<td>Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>explosive hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordinance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>engineering pamphlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPW</td>
<td>Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTA</td>
<td>graphic training aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWS</td>
<td>Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>high-risk personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFOB</td>
<td>joint forward operating base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGMARS</td>
<td>logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGSEC</td>
<td>logistics security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>listening post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>maneuver enhancement brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCoE</td>
<td>Maneuver Support Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>main supply route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWD</td>
<td>military working dog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>observation post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>provost marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>port of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>quick response force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>rules for the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-9</td>
<td>battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>training circular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>tactical combat force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>traffic control post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACIDC</td>
<td>United States Army Criminal Investigation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION II - TERMS**

None.
This page intentionally left blank.
References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

AIR FORCE PUBLICATIONS
Most Air Force publications are available online: www.e-publishing.af.mil.
AFPD 31-1. Integrated Defense. 28 October 2011.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ATP 3-34.80. Geospatial Engineering. 23 June 2014.
ATP 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 3 June 2014.
ATP 3-37.34. Survivability Operations. 28 June 2013.
ATP 3-55.6. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airborne Target Coordination and
ATP 3-57.10. Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control. 6 August 2013.
ATP 3-57.20. Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
15 February 2013.
ATP 3-57.60. Civil Affairs Planning. 27 April 2014.
ATP 3-57.70. Civil-Military Operations Center. 5 May 2014.
References

ATP 4-13. Army Expeditionary Intermodal Operations. 16 April 2014.
ATP 4-14. Expeditionary Railway Center Operations. 29 May 2014.
ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 5 April 2013.
ATTP 3-34.23. Engineer Operations—Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team. 8 July 2010.
ATTP 3-37.31. Civilian Casualty Migration. 18 July 2012.
ATTP 3-90.4. Combined Arms Mobility Operations. 10 August 2011.
FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.
FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 28 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.
References


JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 4-01.5. Joint Terminal Operations. 6 April 2012.

Other Publications


Web Sites


Prescribed Forms

None.

Referenced Forms


DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
RECOMMENDED READINGS


Index

A
ADC. See area damage control (ADC)
aerial ports and terminals, 3-18
security, 3-19
airbase, 1-20
defense, 3-14
security, 3-15
antiterrorism (AT), 1-1, 3-23
area damage control (ADC), 3-2, 3-13
area reconnaissance, 1-20
area security, 3-1, 3-2, 3-14, 3-17, 3-21, 3-22
assured mobility, 1-1, 1-16, 2-1, 2-7
astray cargo, 5-5
AT. See antiterrorism (AT)

B
base camp, 3-2
security and defense, 3-3, 3-14, 3-15
threat levels, 3-16
base cluster, 3-13, 3-17
threat levels, 3-16
base defense, 3-13
plan, 3-15
base defense force, 3-16
base defense operations center, 3-17
border
operations, 5-3
security, 5-1
breaching
support to, 2-4
breaching operations, 2-2
combined arms, 1-8, 2-2
covert, 2-3
deliberate, 2-2
hasty, 2-2

C
checkpoints, 3-4, 3-8
deliberate, 3-8, 3-9
hasty, 3-9, 3-10
organization, 3-10, 3-11
civil security, 1-11, 3-2, 5-3
civil-military operations (CMO), 4-3
clearing operations, 1-22, 2-4,
See also route clearance support to, 2-5
CMO. See civil-military operations (CMO)
collection point, 2-6
activities, 2-12
dislocated civilians, 2-10
straggler control, 2-12
combat
outposts, 3-8, 3-11
power, 1-4
security, 3-4
combined arms, A-1
conflict continuum, 1-3
controlling movement, 4-5
convoy security, 3-2, 3-5, 3-7
cordon security, 3-4
counterreconnaissance, 3-1
counterterrorism, 3-23
criminal activity threat assessment, 5-8
criminal intelligence, 5-7

D
DC. See dislocated civilian (DC)
deadly force, 1-3, 1-10
defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), 1-14
military police capabilities, 1-15
defensive tasks, 1-8
detention operations, 1-1, 1-7
dislocated civilian (DC) assistance to, 1-13
control, 2-10, 3-12
operations support, 4-5
dislocated civilian (DC) camps
design considerations, A-4
operations, A-9
planning, A-1
security, A-4
standards, A-3
displaced person, 4-1
DSCA. See defense support of
civil authorities

E
enablers, 1-16
evacuation planning, 4-8
evacuee, 4-2

G
gap-crossing operations, 2-5
support to, 2-7

H
hasty breaching, 2-2
high-risk personnel, 3-17

I
information collection, 3-1
inner security area, 3-14
internally displaced person, 4-2
law of war, 3-15
local security, 3-22
logistics pipeline, 5-5
logistics security (LOGSEC), 5-4
threat assessment, 5-6, 5-8
LOGSEC. See logistics security (LOGSEC)

M
main and alternate supply route
regulation and enforcement, 2-8
maneuver, 2-1
migrant, 4-2
military police disciplines, 3-18, 4-2, A-1
military police operations, 1-2, 1-15
military working dogs (MWDs), 1-22
mobility, 2-1
mobility considerations, 3-3
mobility operations, 2-2
movement and maneuver, 2-1
movement and maneuver warfighting function, 2-1
movement control, 3-3, 4-6
clearing, 4-6
collecting, 4-7
roadblocks, 4-6
movement corridor, 1-23
MWD. See military working dogs (MWDs)

30 October 2014
ATP 3-39.30
Index-1
Index

N
NEO. See noncombat evacuation operations (NEO)
nested cargo, 5-5
node protection, 3-17
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), 4-2
support, 4-8

O
offensive tasks, 1-6
outer security area, 3-13

P
passage of lines, 2-7
perimeter zone, 3-13
physical security, 3-23
populace control, 4-1
responsibilities, 4-3
port vulnerability assessment, 5-8
Posse Comitatus Act, 1-15, 4-2,
5-3
protective services, 3-17, 3-18

Q
QRF. See quick response force (QRF)
quick response force (QRF), 3-4,
3-20

R
railheads and terminals, 3-18
security, 3-19
reconnaissance. See also route
reconnaissance, See also area
reconnaissance capabilities, 1-18
civil, 1-20
patrols, 1-21
presence patrols, 1-21
zone, 1-20
reconnaissance and surveillance, 1-17
refugee, 4-1
resettled person, 4-2
resources control, 5-1
public and private property, 5-2
response force, 3-20
operations, 3-20
returnee, 4-2
route
clearance, 2-5
planning, 4-5
reconnaissance, 1-19, 2-9
security, 3-3, 3-4
RUF. See rules for the use of
force (RUF)
rule of law, 4-9
rules for the use of force (RUF), 4-9
rules of interaction, 4-8

S
seaports and terminals, 3-18
security, 3-19
security and mobility support, 1-1,
1-5, 1-11

security and mobility support
discipline, 1-1, 1-5
security operations, 3-1, See also
route security, See also civil
security
stability mechanism, 1-9
stability tasks, 1-9
stateless person, 4-2
straggler, 2-11
straggler control, 2-11
surveillance, 1-22

tactical combat force, 3-20
technical capabilities, 1-2
threat assessment process, 5-6
threat levels. See base camp
threat levels
traffic control plan, 2-9
traffic control post, 2-8
traffic regulation, 2-8
traffic regulation plan, 2-8

U
UAS. See unmanned aircraft
system (UAS)
unmanned aircraft system (UAS), 1-22

W
war victims, 4-2
By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1429403

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).