SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 525–29
Force Generation – Sustainable Readiness

This major revision, dated 1 October 2019—

- Prescribes the Army Force Generation Process and Sustainable Readiness as the Force Readiness method by providing an overview of the major processes and phases of Army Force Generation and the interactions with Sustainable Readiness (chap 1).

- Supersedes Army Directive 2016-05 (Building Training Readiness) in conjunction with AR 350-1 (para 1-1).

- Prescribes responsibilities for headquarters elements within the Army in support of the Sustainable Readiness Process (chap 2).

- Defines Sustainable Readiness as the building and preservation of the highest possible overall unit and strategic readiness posture for the Army over time, given the resources available, so that the Army is ready to meet known and emergent operational demands, while being optimally postured to meet contingency surge demand (chap 3).

- Describes the basis of Sustainable Readiness and articulates how the goal of Sustainable Readiness is to maximize readiness across the Total Army through efficient and effective application of the limited resources through existing Army processes (chap 3).

- Provides an in-depth tutorial of the building blocks of Sustainable Readiness Model and it describes the basis of the Unit Readiness Cycle comprised of quarterly modules all the way through combined Standard Requirement Code projected readiness cycles (chap 4).

- Describes the existing Army processes for force development, equipping, and resourcing which impact and influence the Sustainable Readiness Process (chap 5).

- Describes the operational level process for Sustainable Readiness. It provides an overview on readiness projection development, operational demand analysis, and Readiness Objective development (chap 5).

- Addresses the Sustainable Readiness Process and describes how Sustainable Readiness runs in a given fiscal year (chap 5).

**Army Regulation 525–29**

**Effective 1 November 2019**

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**Military Operations**

**Force Generation – Sustainable Readiness**

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**Applicability.** This regulation applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, the U.S. Army Reserve, and Department of the Army Civilians, unless otherwise stated.

**Proponent and exception authority.** The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and potential risk, and must include formal review by the activity’s senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25–30 for specific guidance.

**Army internal control process.** This regulation contains internal control provisions in accordance with AR 11–2 and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (appendix B).

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Glossary
Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
This regulation describes Army policy for its Force Generation Operations and its processes, and establishes policy for its Sustainable Readiness Process (SRP) to provide ready and responsive forces necessary for the effective prosecution execution of Unified Land Operations.

a. This regulation describes how the Army generates the Total Force as directed by its statutory responsibilities under Title 10, United States Code (10 USC) to organize, man, equip, and train forces in support of national security strategies and guidance. It discusses supporting and parallel processes and models used to plan, program, execute, and assess force readiness to enable the Army to sustainably build and maintain unit (tactical level), force (operational level), and Army (strategic level) readiness across the Force Generation timeframes.

b. Included in this discussion are the Force Generation primary functions and key processes: Direct Army Forces (Define and Prioritize), Develop Army Forces (Manage and Resource), Preserve Army Forces (Balance and Prioritize), and Provide Army Forces (Align and Prepare). Finally, this regulation establishes procedures for the integration and continual refinement of Force Generation decision-making, through a deliberate SRP, in order to provide forces to the Combatant Commander (CCDR) for known, emergent, and contingency requirements.

c. SR encompasses the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of the Army’s Force Generation process. SR informs the Army’s resource decisions in order to maximize both mission and response readiness of the Total Army Force to meet known, emergent, and contingency requirements for Army forces. The execution goal of the SRP is to meet the Readiness Objectives agreed to by the Army’s Senior Leadership. These Readiness Objectives are developed during SR’s planning and preparing phase and are informed by the readiness requirements placed upon the force as well as the resources available. SR must focus on increasing and maintaining our units Personnel, Supply, Readiness, and Training (P, S, R, T) rating, maximizing the use of available resources. SR is a reflection of an Army Mindset change to being ready all the time, thereby achieving readiness consistent with current military strategy, threats to National security, and resourcing levels.

1–2. References and forms
See appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
See glossary.

1–4. Responsibilities
Responsibilities are listed in chapter 2.

1–5. Records management (recordkeeping) requirements
The records management requirement for all record numbers, associated forms, and reports required by this regulation are addressed in the Records Retention Schedule-Army (RRS–A). Detailed information for all related record numbers, forms, and reports are located in Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS)/RRS–A at https://www.arims.army.mil. If any record numbers, forms, and reports are not current, addressed, and/or published correctly in ARIMS/RRS - A, see DA Pam 25–403 for guidance.

1–6. Governing authorities
The Army organizes, mans, trains, and equips the Regular Army and Reserve Components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities. SR prepares forces in the support of National Security Strategy.

a. Statutory authority for this regulation is derived from Title 10, United States Code (10 USC), including 10 USC 162 and 32 USC. This regulation does not supersede or otherwise infringe on the Combatant Command (COCOM) authority vested in Combatant Commanders in 10 USC 162 and 10 USC 164.

b. DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.01, establishes the functions of the Department of the Army in accordance with 10 USC, and contains guidance to the Army on Force Generation. Specifically, DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to “contribute forces through a rotational, cyclical readiness model that provides a predictable and sustainable supply of modular forces to the Combatant Commands, and a surge capacity for unexpected contingencies.”
c. Department of the Army General Order (AGO) 2019–01, prescribes guidance and authorities to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Principal Officials in the context of 10 USC responsibilities.

1–7. Force Generation and Readiness
The Army, as a component of the Military Instrument of National Power, has identified three military force operations central to the generation of Service capabilities: Force Generation, Force Projection, and Force Employment. As a Military Service, the Army is solely responsible for the Force Generation of Army Forces, and therefore must master this operation while ensuring Army Forces successfully enable actions in the other two. Force Generation is the military operation that develops and provides forces for projection and employment to enable military effects across the operating environments (see fig 1–1).

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**INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER**

- Diplomacy
- Information
- Military Force
- Economic

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**GENERATE FORCES**
- Services

**PROJECT FORCES**
- TRANSCOM, DOD, Services

**EMPLOY FORCES**
- Combatant Commands

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**STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS**

- US Army
- US Navy
- US Marines
- US Air Force
- Joint

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*a.* Force employment is the ultimate purpose of a military force and is enabled by both Force Generation and Force Projection. Force Employment is how a military force is used to achieve the desired effects or influence on the Operating Environment. A military force does this by directly or indirectly engaging other actors (enemy, friendly, or neutral) and sustaining the forces being employed. Force Projection is how a military force is moved from where it is generated to where it will be employed. A military force does this by moving its forces from those positions (forward-deployed, staging bases, ports, installations) it has established to project and rapidly employ the forces. Finally, Force Generation is a military force is created from available resources and personnel to be projected and employed. A military force does this by providing the forces it has developed according to the military strategies and operational requirements that describe and direct the desired military effects and influence in the Operating Environment. Force Generation and its Force Readiness policy, SR, will be the focus of what follows.

*b.* In the past, the Army has been directed to achieve its Force Employment objectives of defeating the enemy in declared wars through a Force Generation methodology that required the rapid mobilization of the citizenry into Army forces at the time of incident. More recently, the Army was directed to achieve its Force Employment objectives by deterring the
next war and shaping the operating environment through the readiness of standing Army forces. The establishment in a period of relative peace of a large standing Army as a deterrence dictated the need for readiness as a means to measure how effectively and efficiently the Army was generating forces to meet known, emergent and, most importantly, contingency decisive action (DA) requirements. Force Generation is the Army’s core function and Readiness is its defining metric. Readiness, in the absence of ongoing, large-scale military operations, is how the Army determines the effectiveness and efficiency of its Force Generation operations and processes.

c. How the Army prepares Army forces, measured in terms of readiness, is the defining process within the Force Generation operation. As operational threats, requirements, and resource policies have changed, the process of how the Army readies its forces has changed as well. During the Cold War, the Army used a sustained readiness method with static, tiered resource prioritization tied to war plans to maintain the readiness of the standing Army. At the beginning of the 2000s, with the execution of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army shifted to a predominantly progressive readiness method with dynamic, tiered resource prioritization tied to ongoing operations and other known requirements to maintain the readiness of the Army. This readiness methodology, known as the Army Force Generation method (ARFORGEN), is how the Army successfully executed these operations (comprised of relatively short-term, high-intensity operations and long-term, low-intensity operations). However, the high and enduring operational tempo and limited expansion of the Army resulted in the degradation of the Army’s readiness to rapidly respond to a large-scale wartime contingency with ready and responsive Army forces. ARFORGEN, as a Force Readiness policy, is now replaced by SR which enables the Military Force Operation of Force Generation.

d. As current operations draw-down and change (standard to nonstandard), the Army must again emphasize its ability to respond to a Decisive Action contingency with ready and responsive Army forces, while maintaining, and if necessary expanding, current operations. It will do so through the SR policies and doctrine (see fig 1–2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARFORGEN Readiness</th>
<th>Sustainable Readiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policies and Processes:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policies and Processes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Force Focus: Past &amp; Current Force</td>
<td>• Past, Current, Program &amp; Future Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Requirements Focus: Known and Emergent (rotational) Requirements</td>
<td>• Known, Emergent (all) and Contingency Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Readiness Method(s): Progressive Readiness (only under ARFORGEN)</td>
<td>• Progressive, Sustained, Borrow, Buy and Build Readiness (SR combines all five)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manning: Unit-level by mission</td>
<td>• Individual-level &amp; sustained or Unit-level by mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Models:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Models:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Process: Supported GFM and ASRP (1-3 yrs)</td>
<td>• Supports POM, TAA (4-6 yrs) and is integrated with ASRP and GFM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unit: RESET, Train/Ready, Available Force Pools</td>
<td>• Prepare &amp; Mission Phases with Modules (Readiness, Mission and Availability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mindset:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mindset:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Readiness Priority: Operational LAD with DA when possible or ordered</td>
<td>• Known missions, surge ready and maintain DA readiness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** ASRP - Army Synchronization & Resourcing Process; DA - Decisive Action; GFM - Global Force Management LAD - Latest Arrival Date (in theater); POM - Program Objective Memorandum; SR - Sustainable Readiness; TAA - Total Army Analysis

*Figure 1–2. Readiness Policies and processes, models, and mindsets*
1–8. Sustainable Readiness – Overview
The Army must sustainably generate ready and responsive forces over time to enable their projection and employment as an essential part of Joint and Combined Forces. The Army uses SR to inform, synchronize, and integrate Force Generation tasks and processes at the strategic, operational, and tactical level across the near-term, mid-term, and long-term (see fig 1–3). SR does this by provides the Army a common set of processes, models, and mindset that seek to maximize opportunities to build and maintain Decisive Action Readiness at all times. SR operates on the understanding that a modern military force necessitates the integration of Force Generation Elements and Readiness Attributes across key DOD and Army-wide processes down to the unit level to sustainably build and maintain force readiness. Within the process, Army commands and elements of the Army Staff are integrated to better leverage and inform those existing enterprise level decision-making forums and build force readiness. To achieve this, the SRP projects an accurate operational demand that enables the Army to meet ordered current operations (known requirements) and mitigate the risk to respond to significant emergent or large-scale contingency operations (contingency requirements). SR provides Army senior leaders with the appropriate information to make resource investments needed for appropriate and predictable readiness outcomes, and an analytic framework for balancing near-term readiness requirements with the need to man, equip, and modernize a force for the future.

Figure 1–3. Army Force Generation and Force Readiness (Sustainable Readiness)

Chapter 2
Responsibilities
The following section describes roles and responsibilities for SECARMY directorates, Army Staff elements, Army commands (ACOMs), Army service component commands (ASCCs), and other units involved in Force Generation and SR. Roles and responsibilities will be addressed in greater detail at the tactical (see chap 4), operational (see chap 5), and strategic (see chap 6) levels. Though this list of responsibilities is comprehensive, it is not exhaustive.
2–1. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
The ASA (ALT) will—
   a. Coordinate Force Generation policies and programs within assigned functional area of responsibility or as directed by the SECARMY.
   b. Incorporate Force Generation and SR priorities and decisions into budget and POM estimates for major Army acquisition programs.
   c. In coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G–8, synchronize the procurement of weapon systems and equipment with the SR unit readiness cycles and employment plans.
   d. In coordination with U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and DCS, G–8, synchronize the delivery of weapon systems and equipment with SR unit readiness and employment plans.
   e. In coordination with ACOMs and applicable ASCCs, Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), DCS G–8, AMC, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), synchronize new equipment fielding, displaced equipment fielding, and equipment training with SR unit readiness and employment plans through the Army Synchronization and Resourcing Process (ASRP) in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years. f. In coordination with the DCS, G–4, and AMC develop and initiate program-specific sustainment strategies to support Force Generation training and readiness strategy. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7 and the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command.

2–2. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)
The ASA (CW) will coordinate Force Generation policies and programs within assigned functional area of responsibility or as directed by the SECARMY.

2–3. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
The ASA (FM&C) will—
   b. Validate Army test and evaluation support requirements.

2–4. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Energy, and Environment)
The ASA (IE&E) will coordinate Force Generation policies and programs within assigned functional area of responsibility or as directed by the SECARMY.

2–5. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
The ASA (M&RA) will—
   a. Provide advice to the SECARMY on the budgets for and policies relating to ARNG and USAR, and ensure they are consistent with HQDA Policy and Total Army interests and are appropriately coordinated across HQDA.
   b. Be responsible for setting strategic direction for and ensuring Army policies, plans, and programs for personnel, force structure, manpower management, total force management, total force policy, training military and civilian personnel policies, and reserve affairs are executed consistent with law, regulation, and policy.
   c. Provide strategic guidance and supervision for policies, plans and programs for Army workforce readiness and force management matters the ARSTAF executes involving military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
   d. Provide supervision and direction for Army Total Force manpower, force structure, workforce mix, manpower allocation, and manpower determinations.
   e. Supervise the development and ensure the execution of policies and programs pertaining to Total Army readiness and training.
   f. Supervise policies for and programs related to the accessibility and mobilization of the reserve components, and coordinate and provide assistance and overall guidance.

2–6. Chief Information Officer/G–6
The CIO/G–6 will—
   a. Coordinate Force Generation policies and programs within assigned functional area of responsibility or as directed by the SECARMY. Assess current and emerging information and signal systems throughout all operational and tactical echelons, and examine the associated implications for Force Generation and unit readiness.
   b. Develop, validate, and prioritize information and signal force structure, unit equipping, and signal force employment in accordance with Force Generation policies and processes.
c. In coordination with HQDA, TRADOC, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed training, manning, and equipping priorities for Regular and Reserve Component signal operation units plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.

d. Serve as lead for HQDA level SR interaction with the information and signal tasks and systems as a part of the mission command warfighting function. This includes implementation at the department level of SR related readiness decisions for signal units, assessment of the optimal application of readiness resources (HQDA readiness assessment) to signal units, identification with the Force Provider of signal related readiness risks and proposal of mitigation strategies for synchronization by the SRP, lead organizer of SRP reviews of signal units on a quarterly basis, and HQDA Office of Primary Responsibility for emergent signal SR requirements.

e. Provide guidance, recommendations, and best practices for effective employment of home-station and installation information systems infrastructure and related capabilities.

2–7. Chief, Public Affairs

The CPA will—

a. Coordinate Force Generation policies and programs within assigned functional area of responsibility or as directed by the SECARMY.

b. In coordination with HQDA, TRADOC, FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed training, manning, and equipping priorities for Regular Army and Reserve Component public affairs units plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.

c. Ensure Army Force Generation messaging and products are consistent with other strategic communications programs and initiatives.

2–8. Chief, National Guard Bureau

The CNGB, directly or by delegation to the Director, Army National Guard (DARNG), will —

a. Provide support to SRM synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapters 1 and 5.

c. Ensure ARNG units are prepared to respond to their dual-status mission requirements as directed by their respective Governor or responsible authority.

d. Provide recommendations to revise and adapt mobilization policies and authorities as required to ensure continuous access to appropriate ARNG units.

e. Participate in the development and approval process of the SR informed module charts.

f. In coordination with ACOMs and applicable ASCCs, ARNG, USAR, DCS, G–8, AMC, and TRADOC, synchronize new equipment fielding, displaced equipment fielding, and equipment training with SR unit readiness and employment plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.

g. Review, revise, and adapt equipping policies as required to support Army Force Generation.

h. Integrate SR-informed resourcing decisions within the PPBE Process.

i. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7, DCS G–1, FORSCOM, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed unit manning priorities.

j. Advise the DCS, G–3/5/7 on component-unique force management, force generation and mobilization capabilities to ensure total Army integration of the SR Process into Army defense business systems.

k. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7, the DCS, G–4, FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, and applicable ASCCs develop SRM-informed unit equipping priorities.

l. Review, revise, and adapt personnel policy as required to support Army Force Generation.

2–9. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1

The DCS, G–1 will—

a. Provide support to SR synchronization as described in chapter 3.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.

c. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7, FORSCOM, USASOC, and applicable ASCCs, publish Regular Army Active Component Manning Guidance (ACMG) in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years. ACMG prioritizes how the Army fills its Regular Army units articulated by the DCS, G–3/5/7 Dynamic Army Resource Priority List (DARPL) and in conjunction with the approved end strength published annually in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
d. Review, revise, and adapt personnel policy as required to support Army Force Generation.
e. Ensure U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) is integrated with Force Generation processes and policies.

2–10. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2
The DCS, G–2 will—

a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
b. Provide support to the force generation governance process, as described in chapter 5.
c. Review, revise, and adapt intelligence policy as required to support Army Force Generation.
d. Ensure U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is integrated with Force Generation processes and policies.
e. In coordination with HQDA, TRADOC, FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed training, manning, and equipping priorities for active Regular Army and Reserve Component intelligence units plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.
f. Serve as lead for HQDA level SR interaction with the tasks and systems within the intelligence warfighting function. This includes implementation at the department level of SR related readiness decisions for intelligence units, assessment of the optimal application of readiness resources (HQDA readiness assessment) to intelligence units, identification with the Force Provider of intelligence related readiness risks and proposal of mitigation strategies for synchronization by the SRP, lead organizer of SRP reviews of intelligence units on a quarterly basis, and HQDA Office of Primary Responsibility for emergent intelligence SR requirements.

2–11. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7
The DCS, G–3/5/7 will—

a. Exercise primary responsibility for all aspects of the SRP and will coordinate and develop Force Generation policy, planning and decision-making, and synchronize across the SR Components as described in the regulation.
b. Lead SR synchronization across the SR Components as described in chapter 5.
c. In coordination with the DCS, G–1, FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed unit manning priorities.
d. In coordination with the DCS, G–4, the DCS, G–8, FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed unit equipping priorities.
e. Serve as HQDA Office of Primary Responsibility for the ASRP.
f. Provide support to the ASRC as defined in chapter 5.
g. Task ACOMs, ASCCs, direct reporting units (DRUs), field operating agencies (FOAs), and HQDA agencies for support for SR and Force Generation as required.
h. Serve as the Office of Primary Responsibility for synchronization of aviation unit readiness as part of the ASRP.
i. Publish the HQDA PLANORDs and synchronization orders to synchronize Army-wide strategic planning, resourcing and execution.
j. Provide Total Army Analysis (TAA) outputs and/or SAMAS data to establish supply of forces for SR analysis.
k. Publish Command Plan and Modernization Guidance using SR Operational Demand Guidance (ODG) and Readiness forecasts.
l. Develop the DARPL.
m. Coordinate and supervise all activities related to SR and Force Generation governance and synchronization as described in chapter 5.
n. Integrate the SR and Force Generation governance process with Army force management, joint operations planning, Army Readiness and Global Force Management (GFM) decision-making timelines.
o. Develop, validate, and prioritize, in conjunction with FORSCOM and the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), future year operational demands, both known and contingency, by unit type for the Total Force for use in shaping Army requirements and priorities in the program objective memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimation Submission (BES).
p. Assess operational risk in order to prioritize current and emerging shortfalls and gaps to drive POM development/programmatic decisions.
q. Participate in the development and approval process for the FORSCOM SR informed Readiness and Employment plans.
r. Evaluate in coordination with the Army integrators for manning, equipping, training, stationing, facilities, sustaining, and funding, the affordability, supportability and feasibility of modifications to the Army’s Force Generation in order to improve Army readiness.
s. Establish policy and procedures to synchronize SR through the Army Force Generation Synchronization Toolset (AST), the authoritative system of record to synchronize the Army’s force generation process.

t. Serve as HQDA single entry point for inputs and/or outputs of the operational demand process, SR readiness and employment plans, HQDA forecasted readiness risk assessments, Army Senior Leader Readiness outputs.

u. Monitor, report, and identify issues arising from the Army’s predicted ability to meet readiness requirements in FYs C and D.

v. Exercise process co-champion authorities for the Deploy to Redeploy and Retrograde (D2RR) end to end business process in line with AR 5–1 to ensure force management, force generation and mobilization capabilities are integrated into Army defense business systems to facilitate the SR Process.

2–12. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4
The DCS, G–4 will—

a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 5.

c. Review, revise, and adapt sustainment and logistics management policy as required to support Army Force Generation.

d. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7, FORSCOM, USASOC, ARNG, USARC, and applicable ASCCs, develop SRM-informed unit equipping priorities.

e. In conjunction with DCS, G–3/5/7, FORSCOM and the CAA, the DCS, G–4 will serve as the lead for HQDA level SR interaction with the tasks and systems within the sustainment warfighting function. This includes implementation at the department level of SR related readiness decisions for sustainment units, assessment of the optimal application of readiness resources (HQDA readiness assessment) to sustainment units, identification with the Force Provider of sustainment related readiness risks and proposal of mitigation strategies for synchronization by the SRP, lead organizer of SRP reviews of sustainment units on a quarterly basis, and HQDA Office of Primary Responsibility for emergent sustainment SR requirements.

2–13. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8
The DCS, G–8 will—

a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 3.

c. Support the DCS, G–3/5/7, the DCS, G–4, FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, in developing SRM-informed unit equipping priorities.

d. Review, revise, and adapt equipping policies as required to support Army Force Generation.

e. Integrate SR-informed resourcing decisions within the PPBE Process.

f. In coordination with Army Commands and applicable ASCCs, ARNG, USAR, DCS, G–8, AMC, and TRADOC, synchronize new equipment fielding, displaced equipment fielding, and equipment training with SR unit readiness and employment plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.

g. Continue to provide analytic support to the SRP through the Director, CAA until all functionality is built into the AST.

2–14. Chief, Army Reserve
The CAR will—

a. Provide support to SRM synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

c. Provide recommendations to revise and adapt mobilization policies and authorities as required to ensure continuous access to cohesive USAR units.

d. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7, the DCS, G–4, FORSCOM, USASOC, ARNG and applicable ASCCs, develop SRM-informed unit equipping priorities.

e. Review, revise, and adapt equipping policies as required to support Army Force Generation.

f. Integrate SR-informed resourcing decisions within the PPBE process.
g. In coordination with ACOMs and applicable ASCCs, ARNG, USAR, DCS, G–8, AMC, and TRADOC, synchronize new equipment fielding, displaced equipment fielding, and equipment training with SR unit readiness and employment plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.

h. Review, revise, and adapt personnel policy as required to support Army Force Generation.

i. Ensure USAR manning priorities are integrated with Force Generation processes and policies.

j. Advise the DCS, G–3/5/7 on component-unique force management, force generation and mobilization capabilities to ensure total Army integration of the SRP into Army defense business systems.

2–15. The Chief of Engineers
The COE will—
  a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
  b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
  c. In coordination with HQDA, TRADOC, FORSCOM, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed training, manning, and equipping priorities for assigned Regular Army and Reserve Component engineer units.
  d. Serve as lead for HQDA level SR interaction with the engineer tasks and systems as a part of the protection warfare function. This includes implementation at the department level of SR related readiness decisions for engineer units, assessment of the optimal application of readiness resources (HQDA readiness assessment) to engineer units, identification with the Force Provider of engineer related readiness risks and proposal of mitigation strategies for synchronization by the SRP, lead organizer of SRP reviews of engineer units on a quarterly basis, and HQDA Office of Primary Responsibility for emergent engineer SR requirements.

2–16. The Surgeon General
TSG will—
  a. Coordinate Force Generation policies and programs within assigned functional area of responsibility or as directed by the SECARMY or Chief of Staff, Army (CSA).
  b. In coordination with HQDA, U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), FORSCOM, USASOC, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, plan, develop, and coordinate training, manning, and equipping priorities for Regular Army and Reserve Component medical units in support of Force Generation.
  c. Provide SRM-informed medical policy and guidance for institutional training and leader development.
  d. Serve as lead for HQDA level SR interaction with the medical tasks and systems as a part of the sustainment warfare function. This includes implementation at the department level of SR-related readiness decisions for medical units, assessment of the optimal application of readiness resources (HQDA readiness assessment) to medical units, identification with the Force Provider of medical related readiness risks and proposal of mitigation strategies for synchronization by the SRP, lead organizer of SRP reviews of medical units on a quarterly basis, and HQDA Office of Primary Responsibility for emergent medical SR requirements.

2–17. Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
The ACSIM will—
  a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
  b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapters 1 and 5.
  c. Review, revise, and adapt installation management policy, to include individual training, unit training, mobilization, demobilization, deployment, and redeployment as required to support Army Force Generation.
  d. Provide SR-related readiness projections for future years during the planning process of the SRP.
  e. Integrate SR-informed resourcing decisions within the Installation Status Report Program.
  f. Ensure ARNG manning priorities are integrated with Force Generation processes and policies.

2–18. Director, Office of Business Transformation
The Director, OBT will—
  a. Exercise process co-champion authorities for the D2RR end to end business process in line with AR 5–1 to ensure force management, force generation and mobilization capabilities are integrated into Army defense business systems to facilitate the SRP.
b. Support the integration of force management, force generation and mobilization capabilities and data exchanges with Enterprise Resource Planning systems and enduring Defense Business Systems to support efficient and effective automation of the SRP.

2–19. Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command
The CG, FORSCOM will—
   a. Execute SR by directing and monitoring all SR activities of assigned forces (see AR 10–87).
   b. Form and chair forums to synchronize the implementation of Readiness Projections and assess them against Readiness Achieved and Readiness Objectives. Form and chair forums to facilitate execution of the planning and synchronizing of SR within prescribed authorities.
   c. In conjunction with DCS, G–3/5/7 and CAA, develop, validate, and prioritize program and future years operational demands (projected known and contingency) by unit type for the Total Force for use in shaping Army readiness requirements and resource priorities in the POM and BES.
   d. Execute the DCS, G–3/5/7 policies and priorities for manning, training and training support, equipping, supplying, maintaining, and other SR-applicable matters.
   e. Support senior commanders in their role as the primary integrators and executors of SR at the installation level.
   f. Oversee assessment and reporting of forecasted unit readiness of applicable Army forces in SR, through AST, the authoritative system of record to synchronize the Army's Force Generation Process.
   g. Serve as manager of the AST, the authoritative system of record to synchronize the Army's Force Generation Process.
   h. Provide support to the execution of the development of readiness requirements and objectives, as detailed in chapter 5 and appendix F.
   i. Exercise training and readiness oversight (TRO) for all CONUS based RC conventional Army forces not otherwise assigned to a CCMD, and combatant command assigned forces, as delegated by the SECARMY.
   j. Execute unit mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, reconstitution planning, and execution within policy and guidance established by HQDA.
   k. Coordinate with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) regarding sourcing assigned Army forces in accordance with the GFM process.
   l. Exercise process co-champion authorities for the D2RR end to end business process in line with AR 5–1 to ensure force management, force generation and mobilization capabilities are integrated into Army defense business systems to facilitate the SRP.

The CG, TRADOC will—
   a. Provide support to SRM synchronization as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapters 1 and 3.
   c. Participate in the development and approval process of the SR informed module charts.
   d. Produce unit Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATSs) synchronized with the SR informed module charts and make available through the Army Training Management System (ATMS) to support SR-based unit training.
   e. Review, revise, and adapt training policies, to include individual, unit, and institutional training as required to support Army Force Generation.
   f. Conduct institutional training and leader development in support of Army Force Generation.
   g. In coordination with DCS, G–1, identify Professional Military Education (PME) training requirements and dates to ensure alignment with SRM unit readiness and employment planning.
   h. Provide support to SRM with date-compliant operational environments in accordance with AR 350–1.

2–21. Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command
The CG, AMC will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapters 1 and 3.
   c. In coordination with ASA (ALT), ACOMs, and ASCCs, execute the fielding of new equipment to support SR unit readiness and employment plans.
   d. In coordination with ASA (ALT), the DCS, G–8, ACOMs, and ASCCs, synchronize the distribution and redistribution of Army materiel in accordance with Army directives and priorities.
   e. In coordination with ASA (ALT), the DCS, G–8, ACOMs, and ASCCs, synchronize and prioritize the divestment of excess and obsolete equipment.
f. Oversee the synchronization and prioritization of Life Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs) capabilities and resources in support of SR.

g. Leverage automatic identification technologies and systems to manage Army Force Generation asset and materiel visibility, control retrograde of Class VII to maintenance activities, control cost, and provide management and leadership a view of the Total Force resource posture, condition, and location.

2–22. Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The CG, USACE will—

a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapters 1 and 3.

c. In coordination with HQDA, TRADOC, FORSCOM, USAR, ARNG, and applicable ASCCs, develop SR-informed training, manning, and equipping priorities for assigned Regular Army and Reserve Component engineer units.


The CGs will —

a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.

b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

c. Serve as Title 10 (10 USC) TRO authority responsible for all Reserve Component (RC) (USAR and ARNG) conventional Army forces assigned.

d. Coordinate with respective supporting Combatant Command (USCENTCOM) regarding sourcing Army forces in accordance with the GFM process.

2–24. Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

The CG, USASOC will—

a. Assess and report Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) unit readiness to Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and HQDA, as applicable.

b. Serve as the lead integrator for ARSOF, in accordance with Army and USSOCOM Force Generation requirements, to source geographic combatant commander (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) known, emerging, and contingency requirements.

c. Organize, man, train, equip, sustain, mobilize, deploy, redeploy, demobilize, and reconstitute planning and execution within policy and guidance established by Commander, USSOCOM and HQDA.

d. Serve as 10 USC, TRO authority responsible for all Reserve Component ARSOF assigned to USASOC.

e. Support SR synchronization plans through the ASRP, as required for PTDO Service Provided Capabilities (SPCs).

f. Function as a supported command for ARSOF participation in SR (see AR 10–87). As the ASCC to USSOCOM, USASOC is the Army force provider for ARSOF and provides ready and responsive ARSOF to CCDRs. In its capacity, USASOC exercises administrative command authority and responsibility, on behalf of SECARMY, and exercises OPCON over Army forces, as delegated by the Commander, USSOCOM.

g. USASOC commands, controls, trains, sustains, deploys, transforms, and reconstitutes assigned forces to support CCDR’s known, emerging, and contingency requirements.

h. USASOC supports, as directed by the COMUSSOCOM, all Joint, multinational, and interagency elements.

i. USASOC participates in Joint training, integration, concept development, war-games, experimentation, and transformation planning with other USSOCOM organizations.

j. USASOC coordinates with applicable ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, other agencies, and USSOCOM to source validated force requirements for operational plans (OPLANS), contingency plans, and contingency operations.

k. USASOC plans, develops, coordinates, and validates GFMAP sourcing requirements thru USSOCOM Global Synchronization of Special Operations (GSOS) Process.

l. Integrate SR informed resourcing decisions within USASOC processes and the PPBE Process.

m. Execute the DCS, G–3/5/7 policies and priorities for manning, training and training support, equipping, supplying, maintaining, and other ARSOF SR-applicable matters.
2–25. Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command
The CG, USASMDC/ARSTRAT will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
   c. Coordinate with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) regarding sourcing Army forces in accordance with the GFM process.
   d. Assess and report Army space and missile defense (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) unit readiness as applicable. Serve as 10 USC 10 TRO authority responsible for all Reserve Component (USAR and ARNG) Army space and missile defense (GMD) forces assigned to USSTRATCOM.
   e. Responsible for Army space unit mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution planning and execution within policy and guidance established by HQDA.
   f. Proponent for the GMD SRP and participate in the SR, ASRP, and associated forums to synchronize SR processes and systems within USASMD/ARSTRAT.
   g. Execute the DCS, G–3/5/7 policies and priorities for manning, training and training support, equipping, supplying, maintaining, and other GMD SR-applicable matters.
   h. Provide guidance, recommendations, and best practices to HQDA and to the force providers for effective use of space and satellite support in training events under the SRP. Subject to the overall DOD-level priorities for satellite support, give consideration to major training events under the SRP in the allocation of satellite resources.

The CG, ATEC will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

The CG, MDW will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

2–28. Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy
The Superintendent, USMA will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

The CG, IMCOM will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
   c. Support the planning preparation, training and execution of mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution.

2–30. Director, U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center
The Director, USAASC will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

2–31. Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
The Commanding General, INSCOM will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the force generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
2–32. Commanding General, U.S. Army Medical Command
The CG, MEDCOM will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
   c. Review, revise, and adapt medical training policy, to include individual and institutional training to support Army Force Generation, and in coordination with USASOC as a force generator and institutional medical trainer.
   d. Conduct institutional training and leader development in support of Army Force Generation.
   e. Participate in the development and approval process of the FORSCOM and USASOC readiness and employment plans.
   f. Develop and publish policy to optimize individual Soldier readiness to support the SRP.

2–33. Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
The CG, USACIDC will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.

2–34. Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command
The CG, USARC will—
   a. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   b. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
   c. Participate in the development and approval process of the SR informed module charts.
   d. In coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7, the DCS, G–4, FORSCOM, ASA (ALT), USASOC, ARNG and applicable ASCCs, develop SRM-informed unit equipping priorities.
   e. Review, revise, and adapt equipping policies as required to support Army Force Generation.
   f. In coordination with ACOMs and applicable ASCCs, ARNG, OCAR, DCS, G–8, AMC, and TRADOC, synchronize new equipment fielding, displaced equipment fielding, and equipment training with SR unit readiness and employment plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years.
   g. Review, revise, and adapt Army Reserve training policies and guidance, to include individual, unit, and institutional training as required to support Army Reserve Force Generation.
   h. Conduct institutional training and leader development in support of Army Reserve Force Generation.

2–35. Commanding General, U.S. Army Cyber Command
The CG, ARCYBER will—
   a. Serve as 10 USC TRO authority responsible for all Army RC (USAR and ARNG) Cyberspace Operations (CO), Information Operations (IO) and Electronic Warfare (EW) forces assigned to USSTRATCOM.
   b. Coordinate with USSTRATCOM and U.S CYBER COMMAND (USCYBERCOM) with regards to sourcing Army CO, IO and EW forces in accordance with the GFM process.
   c. Execute the DCS, G–3/5/7 policies and priorities for manning, training and training support, equipping, supplying, maintaining, and other CO, IO, and EW SR-applicable matters
   d. As an ASCC to USSTRATCOM, ARCYBER provides ready and responsive Army CO, IO and EW forces to CDRs. In its capacity, ARCYBER exercises administrative control authority and responsibility, on behalf of SECARMY, and exercises OPCON over Army forces, as delegated by the Commander, USSTRATCOM.
   e. Provide support to SR synchronization plans through the ASRP in Years A and B and through the SRP in all other years as described in chapter 5.
   f. Provide support to the Force Generation governance process, as described in chapter 1 and appendix C.
   g. Manage the TSS Enterprise at the installation level.

2–36. Senior commanders
In line with AR 600–20, SR recognizes the significant role of the SC in the “synchronization and integration of Army priorities and initiatives at the installation” level. Within the context of SR, senior commanders will—
   a. Oversee operational readiness inspections of units slated in Ready or Mission modules to validate readiness.
b. Conduct appropriate ammunition management and allocation commensurate with the training priorities associated with SR and Employment Plans.

c. Oversee training area and range apportionment to maximize the readiness of the units on their installation. Ensure installation support and/or coordination meets the requirements of the post as laid out in SRP priority documents.

d. Prepare, resource, and facilitate the loadout and deployment support for deploying units.

e. Consistent with the priorities of approved SR readiness and employment plans, provide the necessary resources to train, including time, and protect subordinate units from unprogrammed taskings or other training distractions. Publish training guidance (that includes a calendar) to give subordinate commanders adequate time to properly plan and resource training.

f. Exercise tasking authorities in line with AR 600–20 to facilitate ready units at their assigned location.

g. Conduct, resource, and facilitate external evaluations, as necessary, in support of the SRP.

h. Synchronize New Equipment Training/New Equipment Fielding (NET/NEF) milestones with commanders to maximize ready units.

i. Apply strength management processes, within their span of authorities, to maximize readiness in line with SRP priorities.

Chapter 3
History and Context of Army Force Generation and Sustainable Readiness

3–1. Force Generation and Sustainable Readiness
The Army has successfully generated forces for its country since 1775, and developed and evolved both how it generates forces and prepares (readies) them for military operations. Both the Army’s Force Generation and Force Readiness processes evolved in response to the changing demands of the operating environment based on the National Military Strategy (NMS). Army Force Generation and Readiness requirements are defined by those commanders who employ Army forces and framed by national level strategic documents. SR, the Army’s new readiness doctrine, operates within and across the existing Force Generation phases and influences decisions and resourcing at all levels, from strategic down to the tactical-level, through key inputs and forums at each level.

3–2. Evolution of Army Force Generation and the Preeminence of Readiness
To generate forces (Force Generation), the Army employs either a reactive (generate as needed or deterrence-in-process) or proactive (standing forces, deterrence-in-being) method. The Force Readiness methods used to prepare for war or deterrence of war vary and are heavily influenced by which generation method is used. For the reactive method, the Army has used the borrow (Joint, Coalition, or non-standard), buy (contracted) or, most often the case, build (mobilize the citizenry) Force Readiness methods to prepare the forces and resulting effects. For the proactive method, the Army has either used the sustained or progressive Force Readiness method. The Army can also combine these Force Readiness methods to tailor the Total Force as threats change, as is the case with SR (see app C).

a. From the inception of the Army through World War II, the primary method of Force Generation was reactive, borrowing, buying and building Army forces through sister services, allies, contractors and massive mobilization at the time of war. The Army maintained a small standing force, but relied on the industrial might and patriotic sense of the people to build the necessary forces capable of combat. With the beginning of the Cold War, the Nation changed its Force Generation to a proactive process. This necessitated the maintenance of readiness versus the traditional building of the necessary forces and Force Readiness at the time of incident based on a small standing Army.

b. Within the last fifty years, the Army has cycled through multiple Force Readiness methods. In the latter half of the 20th Century, the Army followed a sustained readiness with static, tiered resourcing priorities based on the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO). The Army was focused almost exclusively on OPLANS to fight the Soviet Union and North Korea. The static, sustained readiness method was prioritized by the time when a unit was needed within the OPLAN to fight a near-peer state actor (response readiness), which then set the day-to-day resource priorities and training opportunities for individual units. Units were placed along a readiness and priority spectrum and sourced to high, medium, or low levels to meet readiness requirements. Units expected to respond early were highly resourced while other units were resourced much lower (see fig 3–1).
c. With the attacks of September 11th, the Nation, and the Army, shifted from deterring a perceived threat to defeating a confirmed enemy in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In response to this shift, the Army’s Force Readiness method changed to meet significant numbers of specific known operational demands in two theaters. These demands were generally enduring and predictable based on DOD employment and mobilization policies (for example, BOG-Dwell). This predictability is best represented by the forecasted latest arrival dates (LADs) and the ability for the Army to optimize its readiness and resource priorities based on them. The ARFORGEN readiness model maximized unit readiness for the Current Force to meet these LAD prioritized requirements by surging personnel, equipment, and training to support units deploying into a theater. In order to meet the significant number of operational requirements, the Army chose to accept risk in its ability to respond effectively to contingency requirements or execute War Plans against near-peer adversaries by reducing the number of ready units available for those contingencies. The near cyclic nature of sourcing requirements with units progressing through the ARFORGEN’s progressive readiness method enabled the Army to synchronize the Army Readiness Enterprises to deliver ready and responsive units to the respective theaters. As the GWOT drew down, the Army transitioned to a Force Readiness policy and doctrine that meets current demands and prepares the Army for contingencies in the future—SR.

d. SR enables the Army to effectively prioritize force management and readiness resource decisions, allowing it to manage risk and prepare the Total Army Force to be ready and responsive over time. This, in turn, enables the Army to sustainably generate and provide Army forces that as a part of the Joint Force will win in a complex world both now and into the future. It is underpinned by a process which maximizes opportunities to build and maintain decisive action readiness consistent with current resourcing levels. SR is built on the understanding that the requirements on the Army for a modern force necessitate building and maintaining readiness for both future known and contingency demands. SR provides the context and method to prepare Army forces to meet known and contingency Joint Requirements, while fulfilling the statutory requirement to train, equip, and man units for future conflicts.

3–3. Army Force Generation—Leveraging the Past to Meet Current and Future Requirements
The Army recognized it needed to continue to refine and codify its Force Generation readiness process in order to maintain its ability to provide ready and responsive forces in the near- to long-term despite strategic uncertainty, expected resource
Force Generation elements. Therefore it is the Army’s core process, enabling it to effectively and efficiently generate forces for employment in support of national military objectives, Army Service Requirements (ASRs) and U.S., State and territorial requirements. Therefore it is the Army’s core process, enabling it to effectively and efficiently generate Army Forces over time to successfully project to and be employed by the Joint Commander as a fully integrated part of Unified Land Forces capable of achieving the NMS. The Army accomplishes its Force Generation responsibilities through four key Force Generation functions, following a four-phase model designed to effectively assess and manage the seven Force Generation elements.

3–4. Force Generation Context

Force Generation is one of the three military force operations—Force Generation, Force Projection, and Force Employment (see app C). Force Generation is how the Army directs the development, preservation, and provision of ready and responsive forces for employment in support of national military objectives, Army Service Requirements (ASRs) and U.S., State and territorial requirements. Therefore it is the Army’s core process, enabling it to effectively and efficiently generate Army Forces over time to successfully project to and be employed by the Joint Commander as a fully integrated part of Unified Land Forces capable of achieving the NMS. The Army accomplishes its Force Generation responsibilities through four key Force Generation functions, following a four-phase model designed to effectively assess and manage the seven Force Generation elements.

a. Force generation elements (see fig 3 – 2 and app C). The Army uses the Force Generation Elements to help build its situational understanding of the Force Generation process and support the decision making of Army leaders at all levels. It filters information categorized by strategic guidance into relevant information with respect to the desired Total Force. The Army uses these elements, in combination with the strategic guidance, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct Force Generation. They are comprised of three foundational elements (force, requirements, and resources), two analytical elements (demand and readiness), one comparative (Risk) and one contextual (Time). These elements are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of Force Generation and Force Readiness.

(1) Forces. Describes and defines the authorized force structure and expected doctrinal military effects. Forces are the foundational element that defines and delineates all others. They are characterized by size (number) and shape (functions and component) as reflected by the authorized organization, manning, equipping, and the supporting facilities necessary for the resulting forces, if fully resourced, to achieve their wartime mission (military effects).

(2) Requirements. Describes the desired military effect or influence in the appropriate operating environment expected by a military force employer (Joint–CCMD, Service, or Governor). They are a result of analysis by a force employer that is validated and given to a force provider to fulfill. Requirements are the foundational justification for the size of the force and the timely allocation of resources to achieve the necessary readiness. Requirements are managed in four categories: 1) Doctrinal – those requirements the Army does based on unique Army capabilities, Joint or Army policy, preparation for contingency or known requirements, and historical precedence; 2) Contingency – requirements in support of OPLANs and approved by the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense; 3) Known – requirements validated and ordered by an authorized force employer that commits Army forces to execute a known mission, requiring the prioritization of resources based on the priority of the mission; and 4) Emergent – requirements that expand Known requirements or for operations that do not warrant the execution of an approved CONPLAN or WARPLAN.

(3) Resources. Describes those things that when applied to Forces over time enable them to achieve their wartime missions. Resources are the foundational element that frames the potential size, shape, and readiness of the forces based on their availability. Resources are derived from the funds provided to the Army to pay for personnel and to purchase and maintain equipment, parts, supplies, facilities, and services needed to generate Forces and Readiness, deploy and redeploy, and execute and sustain military operations.

(4) Demand. Describes the requirements in terms of force structure, mission readiness, and response readiness. It is a result of analysis by a force provider of a Requirement that is quantified by Forces (Task Force, Unit, Capability, Personnel, or Equipment) based on the Resources available over time. This demand signal is the force provider’s means of translating Requirements into a metric based on the applicable Forces and Resources that can be compared directly to Force Readiness.

(5) Readiness. Describes how the Army measures success in force generation in the absence of deploying and conducting military operations. The success is defined and defended through this force readiness assessment process and determines the efficacy and efficiency of a service’s force generation processes to generate and maintain force readiness as compared to the defined requirement (threat). Readiness is considered in two categories: mission and response readiness. Mission Readiness is the readiness level units have attained according to specified measured areas of resources and training necessary for units to perform wartime missions based on a unit’s organizational design and core functional capabilities (as measured by the Unit Status Report) or specific operational missions as requested by a CCMD (as measured by it’s a-rating). Response Readiness is the calculation of time and resources required for units to attain mission readiness and conduct Army Force Projection tasks to position and move to the theater of operations to perform their ordered wartime or specific mission.
(6) **Risk.** Risk describes the standard metrics that decision makers use to prioritize readiness and mission decisions, especially with regards to prioritization. Risk is viewed through two lenses; risk to mission, and risk to force. Risk to mission is when a force, unit or capability cannot meet the required mission readiness level in accordance with the requirement timeline (response readiness). Risk to force is when a unit is deemed available but below the required mission readiness level at the time of employment.

(7) **Time.** Time describes aspects of Force Generation and enhances or limits its effectiveness. It can be addressed in two distinct areas. Time to Generate addresses when a unit-type will exist in the Army Structure (ARSTRUC) Memorandum-Current, Program or Future timeframe. Time to Prepare addresses the time it takes to man, equip, and train a unit-type to effectively perform its wartime mission based on the unit’s organizational design to provide core functional capabilities in support of the CCDR’s requirements. Time to Prepare also considers when a unit-type is needed to execute the assigned or doctrinal mission and is influenced by Joint Requirement timelines, Latest Arrival Date (LAD) times, and training to produce the appropriate mission readiness.

**FRRDRR-T**

Figure 3–2. Force Generation Elements

b. **Force Generation Phases** *(see fig 3–3 and app C)*. These phases, or Force Generation process, encompass the SR phases, which operates predominately within Force Generation Phase II (Program to Budget the Program Force Readiness). The Force Generation phases are described sequentially from the Future Force (Phase I) working through the Program Force (Phase II) and the Current Force (Phase III) to the Past Force (Phase IV).
Figure 3 – 3. Force Generation Phases

(1) **Force Generation Phase I – Develop to Program the Future Force Readiness.** In Phase I, the Army develops new concepts to provide the necessary data to develop program lines. This phase focuses on the Future Force through concept development of future capabilities and units to both define the desired military effect, the required force structure and equipment and to capture these in the budgetary and programmatic processes. At its conclusion, Phase I produces a defined and programmable concept of a ready and responsive capability (the Future Force). Future Army forces are units, infrastructure, and capabilities the Army is envisioning and developing for preparation and employment in FY F and beyond. These forces will exist in the long-term and are the focus of the Army strategic, long-term processes to ensure the Army continues to provide ready and responsive forces for future operational requirements. This generally applies to forces executing missions late in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP – FY C–G) timeframe and beyond.

(2) **Force Generation Phase II – Program to Budget the Program Force Readiness.** In Phase II, the Army prioritizes program lines across the FYDP (FY C–G) to submit a Budget to the Department of Defense, President and Congress. This phase focuses on the Program Force (Execution year plus 2 – 7 years or FY C to G) by informing funding and resource allocation decisions within the budget build system. At its conclusion, Phase II enables the Army to submit a budget that sustainably provides ready and responsive forces. Army units, infrastructure, or capabilities capable of executing validated Known and Emergent missions and responding to contingencies in the mid-term (FY C–E) and supports budget planning, POM programming and modernization. SR, both the process and the supporting models, is focused on enabling the execution of Force Generation Phase II through its support to both the POM and TAA processes and setting the conditions in Phase III to sustainably provide ready and responsive Army Total Force.

(3) **Force Generation Phase III – Prepare and Execute the Current Force Readiness.** In Phase III, the Army executes the appropriation and prepares units in accordance with known requirements to provide ready and responsive forces, making it the main effort of Force Generation. This phase focuses on the Current Force by influencing and informing resourcing prioritization and synchronization in the near term. At its conclusion, Phase III produces ready and responsive forces provided in a sustainable manner through its linkages to the other phases through the SRP. Current Army Forces are Army units, infrastructure, or capabilities that are currently executing or preparing to execute a validated mission in the execution years (FY A and B) or will enter their Mission Phase without a Joint mission in FY A or B. The ASRP and Global Force Management (GFM) sourcing process are focused on enabling the execution of Force Generation Phase III.
(4) **Force Generation Phase IV–Assess and Reconcile the Past Force Readiness.** In Phase IV the Army evaluates the results of readiness decisions and reconciles readiness resource expenditures in order to meet statutory budgetary requirements and provide updated planning factors for Phases I–III. This phase focuses on the Army’s Past Force by analyzing and assessing lagging indicators for readiness to validate resource allocation and funding level and the ability to build readiness and successfully execute ordered missions. At its conclusion, Phase IV produces updated planning factors for readiness decisions based on assessment of Past Force Readiness and an assessment of the Current Force Readiness for employment (Army forces, units, and capabilities that have fulfilled requirements that can be retrospectively assessed to validate current and future Readiness Objectives). The budgetary execution process, Unit Status Report (USR), Army Strategic Readiness Assessment (ASRA), and other after action review processes for both Readiness Achieved and missions executed support Force Generation Phase IV and provide the basis to reconcile expenditures to purchase readiness and military effects (operations) and assess the outcomes of the Army’s readiness planning and resource decision making.

3–5. **Force Generation in the National Strategic Context**

Force Generation enables the Army to fulfill its statutory responsibility to develop and provide land forces to the CCDR for employment in support of national military objectives. Understanding the application of Force Generation begins by placing it in the context of support to national strategy and describing the way in which strategy drives operational demands, both known demand as derived from the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) and contingency demand as derived from OPLAN (operational plans) that are then translated into ready and responsive forces employed in a theater of operations. In the national strategic context, the Army, through Force Generation, provides CCDRs with ready and responsive forces and capabilities necessary to execute the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the other elements of national strategic guidance.

3–6. **Army Force Generation and Readiness – Shaped and Determined by the Force Structure, Requirements and Resources**

Readiness is how the Army validates Force Generation when units and capabilities are not being employed in military operations. The success is defined and defended through this force readiness assessment process and determines the validity and effectiveness of the Army’s Force Generation process to generate and maintain force readiness as compared to the defined requirement or threat. The requirement is the driving element to develop readiness, however when a validated requirement does not exist, the Army retains the capability to build readiness based on doctrinal, historical, or standardized missions from across the range of military operations. In the end, Army readiness is shaped by requirements and resources, either those validated for CCDR missions or those requirements based in doctrine and readiness guidance for deterring or shaping both the operational and strategic environment (see fig 3–4).

a. **Support to Total Army Analysis–Force.** Developing and defining the Future Force structure and equipment requirements provides the basis of establishing Force Readiness Standards and Strategies for the Program and Current Force. TAA is an annual comprehensive process used by the Army to determine what types and quantities of units’ best support the strategy. TAA shapes the Army, sizes the force between components and capabilities within authorized end strength, builds new capabilities, reduces least needed capabilities, refines existing capabilities and balances those within the end-strength of each component. TAA culminates in the annual publication of the Army Structure document (ARSTRUC), a directive document used to inform the Army of approved force structure changes over the course of the FYDP and is the key point of reference for the development of the Army’s program objective memorandum (POM). The TAA structure and manpower allocation system (SAMAS) force file is the “supply” used to meet “demand” in the Operational Demand Guidance (ODG). SR relies on TAA’s ARSTRUC as the basis for development of FY C–E Readiness Objectives. Conversely, SR analysis informs TAA through the Emerging Growth Forum.

b. **Operational Demand Model–Requirements.** The ODM is the articulation of the forecasted demands on the Army during the FYDP. The ODM derives the Joint requirements from a combination of Joint Staff Requirements laid out in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) with contingency demands articulated in the National Military Strategy (NMS), Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) with acknowledgement of the Army Service Requirements. The ODM also examines other dimensions of demand that are required to execute Joint requirements and codifies these requirements to ensure the full Force Requirement is recognized and resourced properly. This combination and analysis provides a clear picture of the requirements across the force. This process derives from these documents from the Joint known and contingency requirements, Joint and Army doctrine, and operational practices to establish the operational demand for the SR process.

c. **Known Demand Readiness Objectives Development–Readiness.** Army Force Providers develop the readiness levels for the Program Force through the Known Demand Readiness Objectives (KDRO) process. These KDROs are based on Standard Requirement Codes (SRCs) or unit types. Each KDRO is initiated in Phase 1 of the SRP and show Unit Readiness Cycles (URCs) from FY B through FY F. Known forecasted demands are placed over these readiness cycles to provide a
clearer picture of units throughout the SR spectrum. Once combined, Readiness Objectives can be built to meet demand requirements. In the future, the Army will expand this capability to also develop Readiness Objectives for those capabilities in the Generating and Institutional Forces that are not captured by SRC to better balance readiness resourcing across the Total Army.

d. **Operational Demand Risk Assessment–Risk.** Operational Demand Risk Assessment (ODRA) is the combination of projected readiness levels, derived from the KDRO and projected against specific Operational Plan (OPLAN) requirements which are aligned with the DPG. The difference between the projected readiness and the requirements is articulated as risk to the Operational Force and operational depth as well as strategic depth. The ODRA provides further clarity to the requirements by breaking Operational Plan (OPLAN) requirements by the force flow in which units are required to be in the theater. The results of the ODRA and the Readiness Objectives are the key support documents to the POM process, the main effort of SR Phase 2.

e. **Support to Program Objective Memorandum Process–Resources.** The POM process is an annual, Joint process by which the Army establishes its budget request and program through the FYDP. SR directly supports and is influenced by the allocation and prioritization of resources in the POM process. Through the POM, SR provides a framework for budget decisions and development by establishing operational demand informed Readiness Objectives and mitigation measures to reduce the risk for all forces across time and function, and between each component.

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**Sustainable Readiness**

**Demand Based Context**

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**Achieve highest possible unit and service readiness with a clear understanding of the risk**

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**Figure 3–4. Overview of Sustainable Readiness**
3–7. Sustainable Readiness–Process, Model, and Mindset

As identified earlier, SR provides the Army a common set of processes, models, and mindsets that seek to maximize opportunities to build and maintain decisive action readiness in a sustainable manner based on resources available and known requirements at the time. This is accomplished through the SRP, executes over a 4-year timeframe and assess, synchronizes and integrates on a quarterly basis. The Army is doing this through the maturation of its Force Readiness policies, processes, models, and mindsets developed under ARFORGEN to those of SR (see fig 3–5). SR, through the existing forums such as the Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference (ASRC), other appropriate Boards, Commissions, and Committees such as General Officer Steering Committees (GOSCs), and Senior Leader Readiness Forum (SLRF) (processes), enables Commander dialogue to set the conditions through policy adjustments for staffs at every level to expand current planning horizons and improve planning (mindset) for budgeting, modernization, Manning, equipping, and training in anticipation of known and unknown requirements. All of this is grounded in the different SR models (SRM), which are found at operational-level (SR four-phase process model) and at the unit and module level (models).

3–8. Sustainable Readiness Phases

The SRP operates predominantly in Force Generation Phase II (the Program Force) and supports both Force Generation Phase I and III. The phases of SR are introduced below and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

a. Sustainable Readiness Phase 1 Plan and Prepare Readiness Objectives. In Phase I the Army develops the picture for requirements levied on the force as well as the readiness projections by unit type. These requirements and projections are compared with risk identified which produces readiness objectives for Phase 2. At its conclusion, Phase I has develops initial draft Readiness Objectives (RO–I).

b. Sustainable Readiness Phase 2 Establish Readiness Objectives. In Phase II the Army further analyzes the Readiness Objective to inform the POM along with elements that manage forces. At its conclusion, Phase 2 publishes the final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) through a HQDA Execution Order (EXORD).

c. Sustainable Readiness Phase 3 Assess Projected Readiness. In Phase 3 the Army executes the appropriation and prepares units in accordance with Readiness Objectives and known requirements to provide ready and responsive forces. Commanders (Army Force Providers, installation, unit and organizational) prepare Readiness Projections, based on Readiness Objectives, the appropriated budget, and the missions their units have been aligned to base on the GFM and Army processes. The assessment of Readiness Projections to Readiness Objectives enables the Army and Army Force Providers to systematically consider potential shortfalls and gaps in the desired readiness 12–24 months out. This assessment enables the reallocation of resources early enough to minimize overall disruption to readiness. It also enables the Army to refine its planning factors for the SR, POM, and TAA process, while more effectively assess the risks to readiness caused by unforeseen changes to missions or operational conditions. At its conclusion, Phase 3 produces ready and responsive forces provided in a sustainable manner.

d. Sustainable Readiness Phase 4 Assess Achieved Readiness. In Phase 4, the Army evaluates the results of readiness decisions and reconciles readiness resource expenditures in order to provide updated planning factors for Phases 1–3. Commanders (Army Force Providers, installation, unit and organizational) support the assessment of Readiness Achieved to Readiness Objectives through the submission of USR and providing feedback to the causes of deviations from the Readiness Objectives. This enables the Army and Army Force Providers to systematically consider adjustments to Readiness Objectives and Readiness Projections, as well as refining the planning factors and overall readiness standards and strategies that established them. This assessment enables improved decision-making for the initial allocation and in stride reallocation of resources and alignment of missions that could potential disrupt readiness. It also enables the Army to refine its planning factors for the SR, POM, and TAA process, while more effectively assess the risks to readiness caused by unforeseen changes to missions or operational conditions. At its conclusion, Phase 4 produces updated planning factors for readiness and force generation decisions based on assessment of the past force readiness and an assessment of the current force readiness for employment and mission execution.
**Phase 1**

**Plan & Prepare Readiness Objectives**

- **Requirements** - Determine Contingency Demand (ODM)
- **Forces** - Set Forecasted Units and Organizations (TAA)
- **Readiness** - Determine initial Readiness Strategy by compo based on Contingency Demand
- **Requirements** - Determine Forecasted Known Demand (ODM) = Readiness Requirements
- **Risk** - Assess Risk between Readiness Requirements (ODM) and Force Readiness based on Readiness Strategy
- **Mitigate Risk** - Set initial Readiness Objectives (KDRO)

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**Phase 2**

**Established Readiness Objectives**

- **Requirements** - Determine Contingency Demand (ODM)
- **Forces** - Set Forecasted Units and Organizations (TAA)
- **Readiness** - Determine initial Readiness Strategy by compo based on Contingency Demand
- **Requirements** - Determine Forecasted Known Demand (ODM) = Readiness Requirements

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**Notes:** ASRC/P-Army Synchronization & Resourcing Conference / Process; Cdrs- commanders; CSA- Chief of Staff of the Army; FY- fiscal year; Leader Readiness Forum; SR- Sustainable Readiness; TAA- Total Army Analysis; USR- Unit Status Report; Figure 3–5. Sustainable Readiness Process
3–9. **Fundamentals of Sustainable Readiness – Modules, Cycles, and Objectives**

a. The strategic and operational level processes and decisions are built on and facilitated by the tactical-level and, in order to be successful, the tactical level process must be predictable and repeatable. Units, from team up to corps, are the medium through which the Army conducts operations. SR depicts forecasted levels of unit readiness as measured against
assessing the feasibility of resources to stated goals is an important element of the SRP, as discussed below.

The process of allotting resources to modules and then a goal for planners and staffs to meet. Setting this goal enables staff sections with extended planning horizons to project reported readiness of the unit. Whereas, outside of the month of execution, C-level ratings tied to module definitions reflect different readiness dependent upon the time of application. In the month of execution, C-level ratings reflect the unit’s ability based on organizational design to provide core functional capabilities to perform its wartime mission(s) in support of Unified Land Operations (ULO). When applied to the SRM, C-level ratings tied to module definitions will indicate different readiness dependent upon the time of application. In the month of execution, C-level ratings reflect the reported readiness of the unit. Whereas, outside of the month of execution, C-level ratings tied to module definitions reflect a goal for planners and staffs to meet. Setting this goal enables staff sections with extended planning horizons to project resources forward and assess capability to resource to the goal. This synchronization and prioritization is built upon unit level reporting through Defense Readiness Reporting System–Army (DRRS–A) and Net-centric Unit Status Reporting (NetUSR) and projections of readiness aligned against known mission requirements. In order to execute the process effectively and iteratively, SR applies a framework to universally convey a single or group of units’ status. These are the basis of the SRP, SR Phases 1–4 or Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) and are directly influenced by unit level reporting.

4–1. Purpose

SR hinges on the mindset change that shifts to building and maintaining predictable levels of readiness to meet both known, emergent, and contingency requirements in a sustainable manner. SR is key in the function of providing Army Forces – it enables the programming and prioritization of readiness resources to prepare Army Forces to meet CCMD ordered (known or emergent) and approved requirements (contingency). This synchronization and prioritization is built upon unit level reporting and supports the imperative that Mission Essential Task List (METL)-based, decisive action training to common, objective, and measurable standards best prepares and postures Army forces to meet operational demands, whether known, emergent, or contingency. Army forces report decisive action readiness using overall readiness ratings, which are assessed and reported through the Commander’s Unit Status Report (CUSR). These readiness standards are reflected in SRM planning and execution through their incorporation in the unit module definitions.

(1) C-level ratings, which are an overall measure of a unit’s training, personnel, and equipment assessments, reflect a unit’s ability based on organizational design to provide core functional capabilities to perform its wartime mission(s) in support of Unified Land Operations (ULO). When applied to the SRM, C-level ratings tied to module definitions will indicate different readiness dependent upon the time of application. In the month of execution, C-level ratings reflect the reported readiness of the unit. Whereas, outside of the month of execution, C-level ratings tied to module definitions reflect a goal for planners and staffs to meet. Setting this goal enables staff sections with extended planning horizons to project resources forward and assess capability to resource to the goal. The process of allotting resources to modules and then assessing the feasibility of resources to stated goals is an important element of the SRP, as discussed below.

(2) For those units in receipt of an assigned mission, the Army reports projected unit ability to accomplish its mission using an A-level (assigned mission) rating in accordance with AR 220–1. A-level ratings assess three of the four measured areas (Assigned Mission Manning (AMM), Assigned Mission Equipping (AME), Assigned Mission Training (AMT)), where four measured areas are assessed for C-levels (Personnel (P), Equipment and Supplies (S), On-hand/available Equipment Readiness/Serviceability (R), and Unit Training Proficiency (T)). For A-level, commanders evaluate training, personnel, and equipment availability carefully tailored to reflect the unique requirements of the assigned mission.

4–2. The Sustainable Readiness Model

a. The SRM depicts forecasted levels of unit readiness through the first three years of each FYDP and beyond. It accomplishes this through the production of quarterly module presentations of every SRC in the Army from the current year through at least year three of the FYDP. These quarterly modules are depicted, one after another, to graphically display an individual unit’s projected readiness and employment over a specified period of time. This grouping of SR modules for a single unit is the unit readiness cycle (URC). In the SRM, a grouping of Unit Readiness Cycles (URCs) for all units associated with a particular SRC or capability with the associated forecasted known requirements is called a known Demand Readiness Objectives (KDRO). SR modules and URCs are applied across the Army and are typically depicted at the parent unit (AA level) UIC reporting level when utilized by HQDA, though it is expected that different echelons and/or staffs will manipulate URCs to suit their particular requirements.

b. The SRM supports the imperative that Mission Essential Task List (METL)-based, decisive action training to common, objective, and measurable standards best prepares and postures Army forces to meet operational demands, whether known, emergent, or contingency. Army forces report decisive action readiness using overall readiness ratings, which are assessed and reported through the Commander’s Unit Status Report (CUSR). These readiness standards are reflected in SRM planning and execution through their incorporation in the unit module definitions.

The SRM supports the imperative that Mission Essential Task List (METL)-based, decisive action training to common, objective, and measurable standards best prepares and postures Army forces to meet operational demands, whether known, emergent, or contingency. Army forces report decisive action readiness using overall readiness ratings, which are assessed and reported through the Commander’s Unit Status Report (CUSR). These readiness standards are reflected in SRM planning and execution through their incorporation in the unit module definitions.

(1) C-level ratings, which are an overall measure of a unit’s training, personnel, and equipment assessments, reflect a unit’s ability based on organizational design to provide core functional capabilities to perform its wartime mission(s) in support of Unified Land Operations (ULO). When applied to the SRM, C-level ratings tied to module definitions will indicate different readiness dependent upon the time of application. In the month of execution, C-level ratings reflect the reported readiness of the unit. Whereas, outside of the month of execution, C-level ratings tied to module definitions reflect a goal for planners and staffs to meet. Setting this goal enables staff sections with extended planning horizons to project resources forward and assess capability to resource to the goal. The process of allotting resources to modules and then assessing the feasibility of resources to stated goals is an important element of the SRP, as discussed below.

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4–3. Sustainable Readiness Model modules

The SRM uses modules to organize and graphically depict unit readiness information and to signal resourcing requirements. The modules vary in length (from 3 months to several years for the RC) but are depicted and managed in a quarterly
framework. This is to support the operational-level resourcing and training planning process, while staying integrated with the tactical-level execution of readiness preparation and execution. Each module represents a given unit’s activity during the four quarters of a designated fiscal year of the 6-year time horizon for planning. The SR modules provide a clear representation of a unit’s preparedness for decisive action in support of ULO. There are three basic modules: Prepare, Ready, and Mission, with additional descriptive categories in the Prepare and Mission modules which assist planners and unit Commanders in synchronizing resource decisions and unit activities. Each module is color-coded for graphic representation in SRM planning. See appendix E, Aspects of Unit Readiness, for in-depth detail on tactical level SR. The SRP relies primarily on the Readiness and Mission modules, and uses the Availability Modules when assessing a unit’s readiness against a specific requirement (Known, Emergent or Contingency). The two availability modules are Non-Available and Committed:

a. The three basic SRMs are outlined in figure 4–1:

(1) **Yellow.** Prepare (with Red Letters for C4 transition or building readiness; with Black Letters is building readiness at C3; with Dark Green Letters is Maintaining readiness at C3 – primarily for the RC).

(2) **Green.** Ready (Dark Green for C1 level readiness/Light Green for C2 level readiness).

(3) **Purple.** Mission (Dark purple for C1/C2 missions that require decisive action readiness, Light purple for missions not requiring C1/C2 decisive action readiness).

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**Modules:** Three descriptive modules to categorize readiness by quarters

Aligns force generation with quarterly training and readiness processes

- Provides common standards across the Total Army
- Clear representation of a unit’s preparedness for decisive action
- Synchronizes resource decisions and unit activities

- **Prepare Module** – service retained or assigned units recovering, transitioning or preparing for a mission at either a C4 or C3 level.

- **Ready Module** – service retained or assigned units ready and available for immediate deployment by attaining or maintaining a C2 or C1 level of decisive action readiness.

- **Mission Module** – allocated or assigned units executing a joint ordered mission. Modules differentiate whether or not the mission requires <C2 or C1 / C2 decisive action readiness.

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b. The Availability Modules are only used when analyzing unit readiness against a specific known, emergent or contingency mission. Based on force alignment guidance, these modules identify those units that are not available due to Force Employment or Force Projection missions or tasks (Committed) or Force Generation (Non-Available). Determining if a unit is in a particular Availability Module depends on the requirement being analyzed. A Contingency Requirement necessitates a Decisive Action level of readiness and therefore would result in more units being considered Non-Available, whereas an Emergent Requirement for Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) often has a lower level of required readiness and therefore would result in less units being assessed as Non-Available.

   (1) **Orange = Committed.** This represents an availability assessment based on Force Employment or Force Projection considerations (on-going missions – known requirements). A unit assessed as Committed is not readily available due to its physical location (deployed in another CCMD AOR), it being deployed to or from an on-going Joint requirement, or not available due to SECDEF guidance concerning the priority of missions (emergent requirement that is not as high a priority
as the Global Response Force requirement). There are a very few unique Force Generation tasks that can make a unit
Committed, like support to software development and munitions maintenance as with some air defense systems and the
Army maintaining contingency ready forces without a Joint PTDO order.

(2) Red = Non-Available. This represents an availability assessment based on Force Generation considerations. A unit
assessed as Non-Available is not readily available either a low mission or response readiness assessment or a failure to
meet SECDEF’s deployment policy. The low readiness is due to such Force Generation issues as modernization, conver-
sion, activation or inactivation. These conditions make it difficult for the unit to rapidly gain the readiness necessary (re-
sponse readiness) to meet the specified requirement. The failure to meet the SECDEF’s deployment policy is due to a unit
not having sufficient dwell time as compared to its last deployment (AC) or mobilization duration (RC).

c. General. These modules are managed and organized in two distinct phases – Prepare Phase and Mission Phase. A
unit that uses a Sustained Method will always be in a Mission Phase and will either have the same Ready Module or
Mission Module based on whether it is sustaining a service mission (Generating Force) or a Joint mission (forward de-
ployed units in South Korea or theater assets, like the Theater Intel Brigade). A unit that uses a Progressive Method will
have both a Prepare Phase and a Mission Phase.

d. Decisions. Outside of graphically depicting unit readiness information, modules can assist commanders and staffs
in synchronizing resource decisions and activities required to produce the objective or projected unit readiness, and provide
a clear representation of unit mission readiness for decisive action in support of ULO. These decision points, which are
generally tied to module transition periods, are critical at the operational level of force readiness by enabling Force Gen-
eration organizations and communities to plan, prepare, and execute the allocation and prioritization of readiness resources.
The module transition periods are also critical to senior commanders (SCs), DRUs, other unit providers, and tactical level
unit commanders as they facilitate timeline based analysis to establish Readiness Projections to plan and prepare and assess
whether units will be able to achieve Readiness Objectives at a point in time the resources can be re-allocated if necessary. See figure 4–3 for depiction of unit cycles and module transition points.

4–4. Sustainable Readiness Unit Models – Unit Readiness and Deployment Cycles

a. The SRM builds upon Unit Models, which are comprised of a series of modules grouped along a timeline based on the
Force Readiness Strategy for that Standard Requirement Code (SRC, or unit type) or unit, and how the unit is currently
being employed (current and forecasted known requirements). The primary two Unit Models are the Unit Readiness Cycle
(URC) and Unit Deployment Cycle (UDC). A unit has a UDC only if the unit is deployed according to SECDEF deploy-
ment policy-Deployment-to-Dwell (D2D) for AC or Mobilization-to-Dwell (M2D) for RC units. The Force Readiness
Strategy provides planning guidance for the establishment of the initial URC within a particular unit type or SRC. This is
the cycle that a unit follows to achieve and maintain a prescribed readiness level (see sec 4–2).

(1) Force Readiness Strategy. The Force Readiness Strategy articulates the requirements and methods by which the
URCs will be manipulated to achieve the desired readiness mixture.

(2) Unit Readiness Cycle characteristics. The model or cycle a unit follows to build and maintain or just maintain its
Readiness Level. A URC has four key characteristics that determine how a unit is resourced and expected to build and
maintain readiness.

(a) Unit Readiness Method. The method used to build and maintain readiness for existing forces are Sustained or Pro-
grressive. The Sustained method means a unit is resourced and expected to maintain the same Readiness Level (or better)
at all times (for example, units forward deployed in South Korea, theater assets or the Generating Force). This results in
the unit always being in the Mission Phase. The Progressive method means the unit builds to a level of readiness during
its Prepare Phase and then maintains its Readiness Level during its Mission Phase (see app E for additional Readiness
Methods).

(b) Unit Readiness duration. The length of a URC, normally expressed in terms of years, in which a unit is resourced
and expected to build and maintain the desired readiness level.

(c) Unit Readiness level. The level of readiness expressed in C-levels that a unit is resourced and expected to build and
maintain (Progressive) or maintain (Sustained) during the URC.

(d) Unit Readiness objective. The point in time, usually a specific quarter, that a unit is projected to achieve the required
level of readiness. The URO also prescribes in quarters the duration the level of readiness is required to be maintained (see
app E for details).

(3) Unit Deployment Cycle. The model or cycle a unit follows to achieve a deployed status; a unit can have multiple
URCs inside a single UDC. The main components of a UDC are the Deployment or Mobilization phase and the Dwell
Phase.

(a) Deployment Phase. Formerly known as “Boots-on-the-Ground,” this is the portion of an AC unit’s UDC when the
unit is deployed to a location or operation recognized by the SECDEF as an operational deployment.
(b) **Mobilization Phase.** This is the portion of a RC unit’s UDC when the unit has been mobilized for a SECDEF recognized operational deployment. Unlike the AC, an RC unit counts the mobilized time prior to and after the deployed period.

(c) **Dwell Phase.** The time for either an AC or RC unit from the end of its last deployment until the start of its next deployment.

b. The URC establishes the Readiness Objectives for a unit. In the SR process, these start as a doctrinal template and are then modified based on the projected known requirements. Requirements can take the form of deployments, Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO), and home station employment among others. Force Requirements drive URCs by establishing readiness requirements with known timelines. The types of Force Requirements levied on Army units are described in paragraph 4–5.

c. Once the Readiness Objectives are certified by Army senior leaders and resourced by the supporting budget, the unit commanders and force providers establish Readiness Projections, through the ASRP, to ensure the Readiness Objectives are met. If conditions (budgetary constraints) or requirements (emerging missions or threats) cause the readiness requirements to adjust, commanders do this through the Readiness Projections and then account for the deviations from the Readiness Objectives based on the change in conditions or threats.
Figure 4–2. Sustainable Readiness Models – Unit Readiness and Deployment Cycles
4–5. Demands at the Unit Level
At the unit level, requirements (known, emergent, and contingency) managed through GFM and CCMD plans must be aligned with identified ready and responsive Army forces to meet them. Units throughout their readiness cycles are expected to fill requirements based on their current or projected level of readiness. These demands will ultimately impact and drive unit readiness cycles and the overall unit readiness model. Force requirements and their corresponding demands for forces are managed as follows:

a. **Known requirements.** These requirements are those that have been either validated or ordered by an authorized employer of Army Forces. For Joint known requirements, the SECDEF, through the Joint Staff, orders Army units to support on-going operations and Joint Exercises to support CCDRs. An example of a Joint known demand would be a unit deployed against a rotational requirement to Korea, Europe, or Operation Spartan Shield.

b. **Emergent requirements.** The requirements are those that either expand, increase or modify current known requirements in support of on-going operations or those that support new operations that are not already approved in OPLANs, CONPLANs, or War Plans. Examples of emergent requirements are the Army’s commitment of a unit to support the expansion or modification of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan or operations to counter Zika or Ebola outbreaks.

c. **Contingency requirements.** Contingency requirements are those that support SECDEF approved OPLANs, CONPLANs or War Plans. Examples of Contingency Requirements include ABCTs and Sustainment Brigades to conduct an OPLAN in the EUCOM AOR.

4–6. **Known Demand Readiness Objectives**
KDROs consolidate a set of individual URCs (unit readiness cycles) by capability (for example, all Sustainment Brigade HQs) or collection of capabilities based on how the units are employed for known or contingency requirements (Brigade Combat Teams) or based on changes in capabilities over time (for example, conversion of Combat Support Hospitals to Field Hospitals). These depictions facilitate the planning and synchronization of resources and Force Generation activities across the force, while enabling leaders at all levels to visualize the Army’s readiness capacity, actual or objective, at any given point in time on the six year time horizon for planning. When compiled in its entirety, the KDRO is a classified document. The KDRO is the basis of analysis for SR at the operational level (see fig 4–3).
Figure 4 - 3. Sustainable Readiness KDRO with Sustainable Phases

Legend:
- Initial KDRO presented to CSA
- Final KDRO approved at SLRF
- Prepare Transition - redeploy, modernize
- Prepare Build at C3
- Maintain / Readiness at C2
- Maintain / Readiness at C3 (primarily for RC units)
- Deliberate Modernization
- MTOE - E-date
- Collective training - CTC external eval
- Change of Command

SR Phases
- Phase 1: Plan and Prepare Readiness Objectives
- Phase 2: Establish Readiness Objectives
- Phase 3: Assess Readiness Projections
- Phase 4: Assess Readiness Achieved

FY D KDRO Timeframe
- Objective Year
- Obj Yr +1 (2nd Look)
- Obj Yr +2 (1st Look)

Figure 4 - 3. Sustainable Readiness KDRO with Sustainable Phases
### Figure 4-3: Sustainable Readiness KDRO with Sustainable Phases---Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Plan and Prepare Readiness Objectives</td>
<td>Establish Readiness Objectives</td>
<td>Assess Readiness Projections</td>
<td>Assess Readiness Achieved</td>
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<tr>
<th>SR Phases</th>
<th>FY D KDRO Timeframe</th>
<th>Objective Year</th>
<th>Obj Yr +1 (2nd Look)</th>
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<tr>
<td>RC5</td>
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Legend:
- **Star**: Initial KDRO presented to CSA
- **P4**: Prepare Transition - redeploy, modernize
- **P3**: Prepare Build at C3
- **R2**: Maintain / Readiness at C2
- **R1**: Maintain / Readiness at C1
- **M**: Deliberate Modernization
- **E**: MTOE - E-date
- **C**: Collective training - CTC external eval
- **Green Arrow**: Change of Command
4–7. Sustainable Readiness at the Tactical Level
At the tactical level, SR is realized through the knowledge of a unit’s readiness and deployment cycles and the resulting Readiness Objective to be achieved two years in the future (Current Force timeframe or Force Generation Phase III). These Readiness Objectives form the planning basis for the Readiness Projections that commanders develop based on ordered Joint and service missions and the budget approved by Congress. In accordance with the strategic readiness tenets listed in AR 525–30 - Manning; Equipping; Sustaining; Leading; Installations; and Capacities and Capabilities, the SRP and that unit’s readiness cycle will influence each of these tenets. From a tactical perspective, the unit must be aware of their readiness and deployment cycles and plan and prepare Readiness Projections based on what the unit should receive or not receive, or expect to give up in the coming 12–24 months. Additionally, at the tactical level, the unit must be prepared to report readiness accurately and be able to anticipate readiness challenges and risk to achieving the objective.

Chapter 5
The Sustainable Readiness Process (Operational)
SRP focuses on the prepare (Phase II) and execution (Phase III) phases of the Army’s Force Generation process while it informs, synchronizes, and integrates all four phases. SR is tied closely to complementary Joint and Army processes including, but not limited to, the PPBE process, the Defense Acquisition System, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), Business Capability Acquisition Cycle, the GFM process, the Army Command Plan Development process, Army Strategic Readiness process, the SRP, and ASRP. In execution, the SRP’s purpose is to build and maintain ready and responsive forces that can meet the current planned requirements (GFMAP) of the CCDRs, while maintaining the ability to meet contingency requirements. To accomplish this purpose, SR develops Readiness Objectives based on forecasted readiness requirements, initial readiness strategy, and assessment of the Current Force Projected and Achieved Readiness. It informs the prioritization and allocation of readiness resources across all Army Forces to achieve the Army’s desired readiness end state for the Program Force. For the Current Force (current Fiscal Year + 1 year), HQDA prioritizes resources, makes policy adjustments, and other efforts to enable the Army Force Providers FORSCOM, USASOC, ARNG, USAR), ASCCs, and DRUs). These actions include, but are not limited to, re-distribution of resources in the execution year through such forums as the Budget Requirements and Program Process (BRP), the Army Equipping Conference (AEC), (formally known as the Army Equipping Reuse Working Group (AERWG)), the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment (ASRA) process, and the mid-year Review. Many of the Army’s logistic, medical, civil affairs and military information support operations enablers do not reside in the Regular Army (RA) or are of limited quantity. Thus, the Army is dependent on reserve formations for meeting contingency demands supporting early entry and theater shaping requirements. SR uses a model for generating required RA and RC capabilities necessary to respond to contingencies at an appropriate level of risk. The model is not directive to a specific component or generation cycle, but necessary to inform resourcing and risk mitigation decisions at the Army level at the SRC level of coordination. Components maintain UIC specific and SRC management flexibility to meet HQDA directed Readiness Objectives for component specific requirements to build and maintain readiness for low density capabilities, RC unique or high demand early entry capabilities such as Theater Signal Commands, Seaport Operating Companies or Field Hospitals, respectively.

5–1. Sustainable Readiness Planning and Execution
The SRP consists of the following key components: governance mechanisms, organization, authorities and battle rhythm necessary to manage Readiness Objectives and provide ready and responsive Army forces. The process is executed across four phases: Phase 1-Plan and Prepare Readiness Objectives; 2-Establish Readiness Objectives; 3-Assess Readiness Projections; and 4-Assess Readiness Achieved. It both leverages and integrates with existing Joint and Army processes (such as the ASRP, the PPBE, Force Management Processes) to provide the oversight and division of labor needed to support senior leader decision-making up to and including Department of the Army levels. During the planning element of the SRP, readiness and resourcing decisions inform the development of the Army’s POM, the Army’s Command Plan, the ASRA, the ASRP, the development of DCS, G–3/5/7 resource prioritization (Army Priority List (ARPL), Integrated Requirements Priority List (IRPL), and DARPL) documents, among others. The execution element of SRP includes the following forums: selected General Officer Steering Committees (GOSC), the Strategic Readiness Update (SRU), and the ASRC among others.

5–2. Sustainable Readiness Phases
The SRP operates predominately in Force Generation Phase II (Program to Budget), and focuses on the Program Force, but has significant linkages to Phases I (Develop to Program), and the Future Force, and Phase III (Prepare and Execute), and the Current Force. See figure 5–1, the SRP for a graphical depiction of the SR Phases.
a. **Sustainable Readiness Phase 1 Plan and Prepare Readiness Objectives.** In Phase 1 the Army develops the Operational Demand Guidance, which articulates the requirements levied on Army forces. Additionally, Phase 1 analyzes the Known Demand Readiness Objectives and the projections of readiness through FY F. The ODG and KDROs are compared during Phase 1 to identify readiness shortfalls and assess risk at the SRC level as compared to the DPG. Additionally, SR analysis develops draft or initial Readiness Objectives (RO–I) for each unit type. This phase focuses on the Program Force (Execution year plus 2–6 years or FY C to G) through budgetary and programmatic processes. At its conclusion, Phase 1 produces the Initial Readiness Objectives (RO–I), which represent a programmable concept of ready and responsive capabilities (the Program Force) in support of the POM process.

b. **Sustainable Readiness Phase 2 Establish Readiness Objectives.** In Phase 2 the Army prioritizes program lines across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to submit a Budget to the Department of Defense, President and Congress. Initial Readiness Objectives are refined through the POM process, resulting in the Final Readiness Objectives (RO–F). Additionally, the objectives approved at the Senior Leader level and are tasked to the appropriate commands through a HQDA EXORD. The phase focuses on the Program Force (Execution year plus 2–7 years or FY C to G) by informing funding and resource allocation decisions within the budget build system. At its conclusion, Phase 2 produces the Final Readiness Objectives based on the submitted budget, which will enable the Army to sustainably provide ready and responsive forces.

c. **Sustainable Readiness Phase 3 Assess Readiness Projections.** In Phase 3 the Army executes the appropriation and prepares units in accordance with final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) and known requirements to provide ready and responsive forces. This phase focuses on the Current Force (Execution year to Execution year plus 1 year, or FY A to B) by influencing and informing resourcing prioritization and synchronization in the near term, through the Readiness Objectives and the feedback from the assessment of the Readiness Projections to the objectives. This enables the Army and the Army Force Providers to more effectively and consistently set the conditions to balance between mission execution and readiness preparation across the Force Generation and SR Phases. At its conclusion, Phase 3 produces ready and responsive forces provided in a sustainable manner and an assessment of how close the force is to achieving its objectives and projections to inform Force Generation and Force Readiness Processes.

d. **Sustainable Readiness Phase 4 Assess Readiness Achieved.** In Phase 4 the Army evaluates the results of readiness decisions and reconciles readiness resource expenditures in order to provide updated planning factors for Phases 1–3. This phase focuses on the Army’s Past Force (Execution year minus 1–4 years, or FY A–1 to FY A–4) by utilizing existing assessment forums, such as the SRU to analyze and assess indicators of achieved readiness to validate resource allocation and funding level and the ability to build readiness. At its conclusion, Phase 4 produces updated planning factors for readiness decisions based on assessment of the Past Force Readiness and an assessment of the Current Force readiness for employment.

5–3. **Organization and Responsibilities at Echelon**

The SRP is organized and led by DCS, G–3/5/7, and supported by the Army Secretariat, HQDA staff, ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, and other organizations, at all echelons, with 10 USC responsibilities for building or sustaining unit readiness and Force Generation. See chapter 2 for a comprehensive list of responsibilities by organization.

a. As previously mentioned, responsibility for the SRP is conceptually organized around “top-down” policy and resourcing guidance established by the Army Secretariat and HQDA staff, which influences the “bottom-up” refinement of resourcing and readiness planning through the Phase 3 and 4 assessments at the ACOM, ASCC, and/or DRU level and the accurate reporting readiness of the units below.

b. The SRP does not change existing organizational responsibilities under the PPBE, ASRP or GFM processes, but supports them by informing, synchronizing and integrating them through a consistent Force Readiness policy and doctrine.

5–4. **Focus and timeframes**

The SRP focuses far enough into the FYDP process to sufficiently inform the TAA process and support the Army’s program and budget development, provide lead planning times for the Army’s manning community, and to influence any other resource synchronization efforts. To that end, the SRP uses a six-year horizon for planning, coinciding with the fiscal year (FY) construct used in the POM. This construct assigns a letter to each future FY under consideration, with the execution year (that is, current year plus one) designated FY A, followed by the budget year, FY B, and the program years, FY C and D.
5–5. Phases of Sustainable Readiness Process

The SRP occurs in phases that are sequential for a particular FY’s Readiness Objectives and simultaneously executed each year for four separate FYs – FY A (Phase 1), FY B (Phase 2), FY C (Phase 3), and FY D (Phase 4)–Objective Year. SR can be viewed in four phases (Phase 1: Plan & Prepare Readiness Objectives, Phase 2: Establish Readiness Objectives, Phase 3: Assess Readiness Achieved, and Phase 4: Assess Readiness Achieved). SR, and the SRP, seeks to inform and synchronize the PPBE phases through deliberate and efficient use of available Army forums and resources. SR will also inform the two assessment phases, as the SRP is a constant cycle of observation, analysis, decisions, and assessment. The SRP utilizes the Force Generation Elements to organize its Governance and Processes to enable the Army to effectively Generate Forces and Provide them as a ready and responsive Total Force in an adaptable, flexible, agile and sustainable over time manner.

a. At the beginning of Phase 1, the DA staff engages the Army Senior Leadership to get the initial Force Readiness Strategy for the components and functional forces, along with the preliminary force structure. This establishes the baseline framework for Force Readiness and Force inventory that will be shaped into a set of Readiness Objectives.

(1) The next critical process in Phase 1 is the Operational Demand Model. The SR workgroup (WG) conducts a series of sessions to evaluate current Joint and Army planning guidance to determine what Known and Contingency requirements, both documented and undocumented, will form the basis of the Operational Demand to compare to the Objective Year Readiness Objectives. This process includes analysis into other dimensions of demand based on input from the DA staff, Army Force Providers and the analysis of previous years. The results of this analysis are presented to the Army Senior Leadership in the Operational Demand Validation Board, and the Operational Demand guidance is set for the FY.
enables organizations like the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) and FORSCOM to evaluate Contingency Requirements or Known Requirements and effectively translate them into Readiness Demands to compare to the initial Readiness Objectives.

(2) After the Operational Demand guidance is set, and the Global Force Management force alignment process for the fiscal year prior to the Objective year is initiated, the SR WG and FORSCOM are able to establish the KDROs with the forecasted Known Requirements. This produces the draft KDROs that enable the risk analysis coming next. At the same time that FORSCOM and the other Army Force Providers (ARNG, OCAR, and the ASCC) are building and verifying the draft KDRO, the CAA is updating the Contingency Requirements based on the guidance provided by the ODVB. With the completion of these two critical processes, the SR COI/WG (community of interest / workgroup) are able to conduct the Operational Demand Risk Assessment (ODRA) that looks at how much risk exists when the initial Readiness Objectives are compared at the unit capability (or SRC) level to the Operational Demand (Known and Contingency). This analysis forms the basis for prioritizing the effort of the SR COI/WG and Army staff in preparing to present the draft Readiness Objectives to the CSA.

(3) Once the draft Readiness Objectives are presented to the CSA, and he approves them for planning, and issues his SR guidance for the POM off-site, the DCS, G–3/5/7 publishes the Initial Readiness Objectives (RO–I) to support the POM process during Phase 2 of the SRP.

b. Phase 2 is primarily focused on adjusting the Readiness Objectives based on resourcing and modernization input from the DA staff and Army ACOMs and Force Providers as they develop their portions of the POM. As the process approaches the POM submission and the Senior Leaders Readiness Forum (SLRF) in the 3rd quarter, the focus shifts to finalizing and getting command approval of the Readiness Objectives. A draft of the RO–I will be provided to the Army Force Providers in AST to facilitate the development of the initial Commander’s Readiness Projections for the September ASRC (Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference). Once the commanders have approved their RO–I, key objectives are presented at the SLRF for final approval by the Army’s Senior Leaders. Once approved, DAG3 publishes the final Readiness Objectives (RO–F), which locks them as a readiness baseline for future assessments and planning. Generally, readiness objectives, once final, are only adjusted if the inventory is changed (add, subtract, or modified) inside of Phase 3 or 4.

b. Phase 3 and 4 are focused on gathering assessments on how close the Army is coming to achieving its Readiness Objectives and whether any differences are caused by inaccurate planning factors (for example, C1 is not achievable at that level of OPTEMPO funding), or due to significant changes in mission (for example, addition of Emergent requirements or cancelling of significant numbers of Known Requirements). In both cases, comparing the Readiness Objectives to the Projections in Phase 3 or to Readiness Achieved in Phase 4, the intent is to examine the data at the aggregate level first. This analysis helps the Army determine if its processes are sufficient in resources and the application of those resources to sustainable plan, prepare and execute readiness and achieve these objectives. This is less about an individual unit achieving its objectives and more about how well the SRC, capability, or Force Provider did at achieving the objectives. In the ASRC, the comparison of Objectives to Readiness Projections enables the Army leadership to hone in on those capabilities that either are struggling for resources, being over tasked, or a combination of the two. This assessment and follow-up analysis is shared through the SR COI/WG and Force Generation community to help improve planning and inform pending budget or POM prioritizations.

5–6. Sustainable Readiness Process Governance

Readiness Objective oversight and management resides in the DCS, G–3/5/7. Readiness Objectives are essentially ‘contracts’ of readiness between the Secretary and Chief of Staff, Army and the Army’s Force Providers based upon the submitted budget and the correlated resources to readiness levels. As SR doctrine and policy and the SRP matures, the intent is to apply this process to the Total Army (that is, TDA structure, institutional forces, and generating forces). Compliance with Readiness Objectives will be monitored by the DCS, G–3/5/7 through the SRU, as well as in coordination with FORSCOM through the ASRC. Inability to meet and provide units in line with the agreed upon Readiness Objectives will affect the Army’s ability to accomplish its intended objectives for the year in question. If a shortfall exists, it must be worked continuously at echelon and finally, if mitigation proves impossible, revised Readiness Objectives must be taken to the Army’s senior leaders for risk mitigation or risk acceptance. See appendix F for in-depth detail on SR oversight and process governance.

Chapter 6
	Relationship to Joint and Army Strategic and Operational Processes

The SRP is intertwined with existing Department of Defense, OSD, Joint Staff, and HQDA processes. Additionally, this connection affects Army enterprise wide systems and requires constant input and feedback. The Army Commands (such
as FORSCOM), ASCCs (such as, USAREUR), the USAR, the Army National Guard, and Department of the Army directorates and agencies all contribute along with the CCMD, USASOC, Joint Staff and OSD. SR informs, synchronizes, and integrates existing Army and departmental processes through effective governance to achieve maximum readiness and, in the near future, becomes Global Force Information Management (GFIM) compliant through using the Army Force Generation Synchronization Toolset (AST).

6–1. Joint Strategic Planning System
The JSPS is the primary system by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CCDRs, conduct deliberate planning and provides military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. JSPS products, such as the NMS and the JSCP, provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces, and resource requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the NSS and other Presidential directives. These products also provide a means to evaluate extant US military capabilities, to assess the adequacy and risk associated with current programs and budgets, and to propose changes for consideration by the President, SECDEF, and Congress. Other elements of JSPS, such as the CJCS Risk Assessment, the Joint Strategy Review, and the Comprehensive Joint Assessment, inform decision making and identify new contingencies that may warrant deliberate planning and the commitment of resources. The JSPS is described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01C.

a. National Security Strategy. The NSS is published by the executive branch of the United States government and provides a vision and strategy for advancing the nation’s interests. The strategy sets out the principles, priorities, and actions that describe how America will deter aggression and implement the NSS. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 (amending 50 USC, Chapter 15, Section 404a) requires the President to submit a report on the NSS to Congress each year.

b. National Defense Strategy. The NDS serves as the DOD’s capstone document and flows from the National Security Strategy (NSS) and informs the National Military Strategy (NMS). It provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance, specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. It addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces will fight and win America’s wars and how we seek to work with and through partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert conflict. The NDS describes our overarching goals and strategy. It outlines how DOD will support the objectives outlined in the NSS, including the need to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against us, our allies, and our friends; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); work with others to defuse regional conflicts, including conflict intervention; and transform national security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. The NDS acts on these objectives, evaluates the strategic environment, challenges, and risks we must consider in achieving them, and maps the way forward.

c. National Military Strategy. The NMS, derived from the NSS and National Defense Strategy (NDS), prioritizes and focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States while conveying the CJCS’s advice with regard to the security environment and the necessary military actions to protect vital US interests. The NMS defines the national military objectives (that is, ends), how to accomplish these objectives (that is, ways), and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy (that is, means). The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and CCDRs identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk. Subordinate to the NMS are branch national military strategies.

d. Defense Planning Guidance. The DPG is issued by the Secretary of Defense and provides guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums of the Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM (see CJCSI 8501.01B). Use of the DPG allows SR to recommend appropriate OPLANS that align to the defense planning scenarios to establish readiness requirements. The decision on which plans to use is made in the Operational Demand Validation Board (ODVB) GOSC.

e. Guidance for the Employment of the Force. The GEF provides 2-year direction to CCMDs for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. The GEF is the method through which OSD translates strategic priorities set in the NSS, and NDS into implementable direction for operational activities. It consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching guidance document. The GEF is an essential document for CCMD planners as it provides the strategic end states for the deliberate planning of campaign plans and contingency plans. It also directs the level of planning detail, as well as assumptions, which must be considered during the development of plans (see CJCSM 3130.01A).

f. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. The GFMIG is a critical source document for force planning and execution. The GFMIG integrates complementary assignment, apportionment, and allocation information into a single GFM document. GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS, joint force availability requirements, and Joint force assessments. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability.
of US military resources and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces assignment, apportionment, and allocation. It is updated every two years and approved by SECDEF. The GFMIG provides planners essential information for aligning resources to the military actions. It contains direction on assignment of forces to CCDRs, specifies the force allocation process that provides access to all available forces (including military, DOD, and other federal departments and agency resources), and includes apportionment tables used by CCDRs for sourcing plans requiring designation of forces.

g. **Global Force Management Allocation Plan.** The GFMAP is the SECDEF’s Deployment Order (DEPORD) for forces. A primary goal of the allocation process is to help CCDRs achieve campaign plans and operations while balancing operational and force provider risks to potential future operations. The GFMAP, compiled by Fiscal Year, directs the apportionment of forces via GFM allocation from force providers to supported CCDRs.

h. **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The JSCP is a joint planning document that provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s formal planning guidance to the CCMDs and Chiefs of Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities. It is the cornerstone document, which officially starts deliberate planning along with assigning specific planning tasks and identification of roles and responsibilities to support planning integration across CCMD (see CJCSM 3130.01A).

i. **Relationship to Sustainable Readiness.** The GEF contains the Readiness and Availability Prioritization (RAP) model, as a construct for assessing the sufficiency of Force Generation. The GFM process articulates known demand and provides guidance on force availability for planning purposes. CCDR’s contingency plans, and associated Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TFPDDs), represent CCDR-validated demand signals for contingency requirements. Use of the DPG defense planning scenarios guides SR in the selection of OPLANs to articulate contingency requirements for Homeland Defense (HLD) and overseas demands. Service readiness informs the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, Joint Force Readiness Review, and Joint combat capability assessments. GFM and the SRP are mutually supporting. The GFMAP provides the known demand for a given fiscal year, upon which the SRP can build known readiness requirements. The SRP supports force apportionment by projecting the Army’s investments in unit readiness, which translate into the apportionment tables as force availability.

### 6–2. Army Service Requirements

a. Additional requirements levied on Army forces exist outside of the GFM system. Army organizations require and request conventional operating and/or generating forces to fulfill Service specific requirements. These service requirements, while not accounted for under GFM, must be accounted for within the Army and ODG to minimize negative impacts on building and maintaining readiness or fulfilling Joint Requirements.

b. Army Service Requirements (ASR) can consist of exercises, tests and/or evaluations (T&E), war games, experiments, simulations, studies, taskers, and any other activity not covered by the GFM process where HQDA or an ASCC, ACOM, or DRU is requesting an operating or generating force capability (unit), regardless of size, from HQDA, another ACOM, DRU, or ASCC.

### 6–3. Translating Strategic Guidance into Operational Demand

Informed by national strategic end-states, the SECDEF and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) give guidance to further define the ends, ways, and means necessary to accomplish national strategy. This guidance reaches CCDRs principally via the JSCP and GEF. Combatant Commander’s apply this guidance through their Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) and OPLANs. The DPG is published to enable CCDRs and the Services to analyze their programs against a common baseline of scenarios for contingency requirements at home and abroad. Taken together, this and other portions of the GFM process assist in refining and specifying the demand for actual or potential employment of Army forces. Depending on the source, these demands can be categorized as known, emergent, or contingency demands. See figure 6–1 for an overview of requirements.

a. **Known demands.** As stated in chapter 4, known demands are SECDEF-directed or CCDR-directed requirements for Army forces to perform known, forecasted, and in many cases rotational missions in support of national end states. The GFM process guides SECDEF decisions for the assignment and allocation of forces to the CCDRs against known demands, provided through the GFMIG and the GFMAP. An example of a known demand would be a unit deployed against an enduring requirement to Korea, Europe, or rotational requirement in support of Operation Spartan Shield.

b. **Emergent demands.** When a crisis or other event emerges that necessitates the employment of Army forces not otherwise accounted for under the GFMAP or an existing contingency plan, the GFM process translates approved crisis action planning into allocated emergent Army force requirements through a deployment order (DEPORD). Since these demands are unforeseen, they are considered an emergent operational demand that must then be considered for validation within the known demand assumptions for the purposes of SR. An example of an emergent demand would be the US Army
response to the Ebola epidemic in 2014 and the committal of the 101st Division Headquarters along with select smaller units.

c. **Contingency demands.** With guidance from the SECDEF and CJCS, the deliberate operational plans (with TPFDDs) developed by CCDRs contain requirements for Army forces should the President order the execution of a given plan. The Army identifies and prepares forces prior to crisis to meet contingency requirements for plans that are likely to execute or are otherwise of high priority to the Nation. Contingency demand includes requirements for units that must deploy early in crisis and those that constitute follow-on forces for exploitation or stability operations. For the purposes of SR, the ODVB recommends the family of OPLANs, that is, contingency demand, which the Army will use to plan future readiness requirements. The CSA is the approval authority for the Army’s contingency demand requirements. An example of a contingency demand would be a numbered OPLAN associated to a geographic combatant command.

![Diagram of Army Force Generation in the National Strategic Context](image_url)

**Figure 6–1.** Army Force Generation in the National Strategic Context

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6–4. **Connecting operational demands to Unit Readiness**

Taken together, the known and emergent demands managed through GFM and the contingency demands found in high priority CCMD plans must be aligned with identified Army forces that will deploy to meet them. The Army prepares these forces prior to providing them to the CCDR by improving or sustaining readiness in units to accomplish their assigned missions. For this reason, successful force generation requires a significant investment in readiness.

a. The Army provides the CCDR units from the Operating Force (Specifically, the ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, and Reserve Component (RC) headquarters with 10 USC responsibilities) with qualified personnel, suitable equipment, competent leaders and adequate funding.

b. The Army resources unit and strategic readiness through force management, training, and budget processes. Unit Commanders can then plan and execute tough, realistic training to sufficiently prepare for their designed or directed mission.
6–5. Connecting Sustainable Readiness to the JSPS and Force Generation
As explained in chapter 5, the SRP predominately operates within Force Generation Phase II (Program Force) and is executed at the operational level. This positioning affords SR the ability to influence vertically the strategic and tactical levels as well as horizontally through time to the Future and Current forces. At the strategic level, SR builds the connective tissue with both the resourcing and requirements aspects of force generation while simultaneously influencing readiness at the tactical level.

a. Within the POM and Budget process, SR establishes and justifies defendable requirements and objectives that are used to allocate and prioritize resources to appropriate areas of concern or interest. This strategic process in turn directly impacts the tactical level through the proper allocation of resourcing to the appropriate unit types enabling units through URCs and unit employment plans to build and maintain readiness to meet requirements.

b. Force Structure (another strategic level resource component) provides the basis of analysis for SR at the operational level. Through the operational level analysis, SR can identify areas of concern for force structure and input those observations into the TAA process which in turn can affect the pool of available forces years in the future through the adjustment of Army Force Structure. On a broader level, the process of analysis and influencing is repeated across all other existing Army processes, such as the DARPL, IRPL, Command Plan, ACMG, which in turn continue to affect force readiness in the future years.

c. Outside of the resourcing processes, at the strategic level, SR has direct linkages to assessing Army forces through the SRU. These Army Senior Leader assessment forums assess fight tonight capabilities, or current readiness at the tactical level, against SR developed operational demand, to provide Senior Leaders a comprehensive picture of the status of the Army at the strategic level and influence decisions on prioritization that affect readiness across all levels.

d. All of the influences, linkages and ties described above impact and enable the Army’s ties to the JSPS. This ability to meet and fulfill JSPS requirements is executed through FORSCOM and the development of the Mission Alignment Order (MAO), which aligns ready and responsive forces to approved requirements. SR provides the understanding of requirements and facilitates the prioritization of resources through the ASRC to ready Army forces to meet these Joint requirements.

6–6. Sustainable Readiness and Army Existing Processes
SR informs existing Army processes and programs, such as the DARPL, the Army Command Plan (CPLAN), the Army’s ACMG and provides input for potential emerging growth demand in TAA. SR provides the analytical ability to project ready and responsive forces to meet requirements 4 years into the future in order to allow the Army’s leadership to synchronize resource decisions with the development of the POM.

6–7. The Programming Process
The main objectives of the annual Army PPBE process are to establish, justify, and acquire resources needed to carry out and execute the Army’s assigned missions and to provide the CCDRs the best mix of Army forces, equipment, and manpower. SR, through the ODVB process and Readiness Objectives analysis, provides the Army with anticipated institutional and operational commitments and the associated readiness requirements to appropriately inform PPB analysis and resourcing decision. This creates an opportunity for various program evaluation groups (PEGs) and force providers to assess currently programmed resources and evaluate the sufficiency of dollars to attain the Readiness Objectives.

a. Specifically, unit Readiness Objectives and the associated analysis, provides a detailed demand signal to PEGs and facilitates determining whether resource allocation strategies meet, exceed, or fall short of Army goals. The SRP outputs, such as Readiness Objectives, provides critical inputs into strategic guidance, like The Army Plan (TAP) which includes the Army Vision (AV), Army Strategic Plan, Army Planning Guidance (APG), Army Programming Guidance Memorandum (APGM) and Army Campaign Plan (ACP). SR will also influence the POM build.

b. The APGM relates operational tasks to resource tasks and programming, thereby helping link operational tasks and their associated resources to Army 10 USC functions. The APGM provides direction to PEGs by conveying Army senior leader intent, as well as broad, general guidance concerning acceptable levels of risk for the initial POM or Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) build. SR influences and informs the application of readiness and warfighting requirements derived from strategic and operational capabilities to program development.

6–8. Army Force Development
Force development is the process that defines military capabilities, designs force structures to provide these capabilities, and produces plans and programs that, when executed through force integration and preparation activities, translate organizational concepts into a ready and responsive Army (based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources). The proponent for these processes is the DCS, G–3/5/7.
a. Total Army Analysis, Force Structure and Force Design Updates. TAA shapes Army force structure and determines the best mix of organizations that are required and resourced as a balanced and affordable force and examines the projected Army force through both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Army force structure decisions are analyzed, staffed, and approved via TAA. Force Generation is a component of the modeling supporting TAA. Implementation of TAA’s force structure changes via Force Design Updates should be synchronized for minimal impact to mission ready forces. TAA builds the force that is the “supply” which is used to meet the “demand” of the operational demand model. Insufficient capacity identified through operational demand analysis and Readiness Objectives development in support of the SRP, is captured and introduced through the force provider as emerging growth and submitted to compete in the next TAA cycle in accordance with procedures outlined in AR 71–32.

b. Prioritization, Equipment Modernization, and Documentation. SR informs Army prioritization and modernization efforts.

1. No later than the first half of the first quarter of FY A, the FY C - FY E initial Readiness Objectives (RO – I) for Army units are approved by the CSA (end of SR Phase 1) in preparation for the POM offsite at the end of the quarter (beginning SR Phase 2). From this decision, HQDA will issue guidance in the first quarter of FY A to the materiel community to enable modernization planning and programming.

2. The modernization community will take the guidance and approved FY C - FY E initial Readiness Objectives (RO – I) and identify the best units in the Prepare Phase in FY C (part of the FY D Mission Force) to propose for modernization during FY C.

3. This evaluation will identify which systems or equipment require a deliberate modernization versus an in-stride modernization. Those units requiring a deliberate modernization will necessitate a modification to those Readiness Objectives (adding Prepare Modules). This modification will be briefed down the chain of command for clarity, concurrence and synchronization.

4. Fielding of equipment will be scheduled to minimize impact to the unit and build readiness leading up to the MTOE effective date (Edate).

5. Deliberate modernization requiring additional Prepare modules or affecting unit Readiness Objectives will be presented as decision points in subsequent FY A ASRP forums. The Army will strive to have most units S1, but potentially not all at the same modernization level. The Army will attempt to limit large redistributions of equipment between units.

6. All recommended changes to the Readiness Objectives must be coordinated with the appropriate Force Provider to ensure they are captured in the RO – I and updated prior to the submission of the supporting POM and presentation of the RO – I at the SLRF in the 3rd Quarter of FY A. Once the RO – I is approved by the CSA and Army Senior Leaders at the SLRF, HQDA will publish the final Readiness Objectives (RO – F) in the 4th Quarter of FY A (end of SR Phase 2). Only the Readiness Objectives for FY C will be final. Fiscal Year D and E will be revised in upcoming SR processes.

c. Dynamic Army Resource Prioritization List. Developed by DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–FM), the DARPL serves as the established precedence that guides the distribution of resources, funding, and equipment, against established sourcing solutions. The DARPL covers the Total Army. SR forecasts unit’s priority based on forecasted demand which assists in the development of distribution priorities. Forecasted URCs along with Readiness Objectives inform the DARPL.

d. Command Plan. The Command Plan is an annual force management process that accounts for and documents force structure decision at the unit identification code (UIC) level of detail and enables Army Staff, resource providers, Army Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to adjust current and programmed force base on the ARSTRUC. It provides manpower, personnel, and equipment requirements and authorizations at military occupational specialty (MOS) and/or grade and line item number (LIN) level of detail.
Appendix A

References

Section I

Required Publications

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) website https://armypubs.army.mil.

AR 10–87
Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units (Cited in para 2–19a.)

AR 71–32
Force Development and Documentation (Cited in para 6–8a.)

AR 220–1
Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies (Cited in para 4–2b(2).)

AR 525–30
Army Strategic Readiness (Cited in para 4–7.)

AR 600–20
Army Command Policy (Cited in para 2–41.)

(Cited in para 6–1d.) (Available at http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/defense-planning-guidance-dpg.)


Section II

Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication.

AD 2012–08
Army Total Force Policy

AD 2016–05
Building Training Readiness

ADP 1
The Army

ADP 3–0
Operations

AR 700–142
Type Classification, Materiel Release, Fielding and Transfer

CJCSI 3100.01D
Joint Strategic Planning System (Available at https://www.jcs.mil/library/cjcs-instructions/)

CJCSI 8501.01C
Management of Modeling and Simulation (Available at https://www.jcs.mil/library/cjcs-instructions/)

DODI 8260.03

JP 1–0
Joint Personnel Support

JP 1–02
Section III
Prescribed Forms
This section contains no entries.

Section IV
Referenced Forms
Unless otherwise indicated, DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) website https://armypubs.army.mil.

DA Form 11–2
Internal Control Evaluation Certification

DA Form 2028
Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
Appendix B

Force Generation Elements

B–1. General
Army Force Generation is the function of the Army, as a service, to create and provide Army forces for projection and employment to enable military effects and influence across multiple operating environments. It is the primary responsibility of the Army to manage, develop, preserve and provide ready and responsive forces to support National Military Strategy by enabling the CCDRs to execute their missions across time.

A military force exists and operates based on three fundamental and interrelated operations. These operations explain how a nation generates, projects and employs military forces to achieve national objectives. These operations cover creating and preparing a force capable of executing joint requirements; the positioning and moving of ready units to Combatant Commander Area of Operations; and sustainment and engaging these units in military operations. From the Military Force Operations, the Army derives Army Force Generation. See figure 1–1 for military force as an instrument of national power.

a. Force employment. Force Employment is the primary purpose of a military force. It is the operation that enables it to sustain and conduct military missions across the different operating environments. Military missions are primarily focused on engaging the enemy, but also includes engaging with allies, neutral parties, and directly supporting its citizens. This enables the military force to create the desired effects and influences across multiple operating environments and achieve the National Military Objectives. The employment of U.S. federal military forces is the sole responsibility of CCDRs as codified by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The employment of National Guard forces (in 32 USC status) is the sole responsibility of the executive of that particular state or territory.

b. Force projection. Force Projection is the secondary purpose of a military force. It is the operation that enables it to position and move forces from where they are generated to where they are to be employed. This is a shared responsibility of the services (deployment facilities and unit capabilities), CCMDs (TRANSCOM for strategic lift and GCCs for RSOI), and the Government (enact agreements to transit nations and forward station forces).

c. Force Generation. Force Generation is the foundational purpose of a military force. It is the operation that enables it to develop and provide forces for projection and employment that create military effects and influence across multiple operating environments. It is the primary responsibility of the services to direct, develop, provide and preserve service forces to support the NMS by enabling the CCDRs to execute their missions. The DOD, through the Joint Staff, is responsible for ensuring the generation of Joint Forces from the service forces. It is the lead for the Government when generating coalition forces through treaty, agreements, or other political arrangement to conduct coalition warfare or military operations (see fig 1–1).

B–3. Force Generation Phases
Force Generation is the military force operation that develops and provides military forces for force projection and employment to enable military effects and influence across multiple operating environments. It is the primary responsibility of the Army to direct, develop, provide and preserve the Total Army Force to support National Military Strategy by enabling the CCDRs to execute their missions and Army Service Requirements (ASR).

a. General. Force Generation includes Institutional, Generating and Operating Forces across all components (that is, the Total Army) and enables integrated readiness resource priorities at the: unit and installation level (tactical); Army Force Provider and Army Command level (operational); and at the Army and DOD level (strategic).

b. Phases. Force Generation directs the Total Force across time through its four phases: Phase I – Develop to Program Future Force Readiness; Phase II – Program to Budget Program Force Readiness; Phase III – Prepare and Execute Current Force Readiness; and Phase IV – Assess and Reconcile Past Force Readiness.

c. Future Army Force. The Future Force are those units, infrastructure, and capabilities and their corresponding readiness the Army envisions and develops for preparation and employment in FY F and beyond (or current year plus five and beyond). These forces will exist in the near to far future and are the focus of the Army strategic processes that ensure the Army continues to provide ready and responsive forces for future requirements. These forces are described through readiness standards and strategies applied to the inventory authorizations and end strength to synchronize and integrate subsequent force generation phases.

d. Program Army Force. The Program Force are those units, infrastructure, and capabilities and their corresponding readiness determined by a submitted POM for preparation and employment in FY C to G (or current year plus two to seven). These forces will exist in the near future and are the focus of Army operational processes that ensure the Army will provide ready and responsive forces for Emerging and forecasted Known and Contingency Requirements. These
forces are described through Readiness Objectives applied to the inventory authorizations and end strength to synchronize and integrate Army readiness decisions and processes that systematically prepare and execute force readiness and operational requirements.

e. **Current Army Force.** The Current Force is the main effort of force generation. It is comprised of units, infrastructure, and capabilities and their corresponding readiness based on the approved resources, Known requirements (Joint, Service, and State), and the near-term operational environment in FY A and B. These forces exist now and are the focus of Army tactical readiness processes that prepare and provide ready and responsive forces. It enables the prioritization and balancing of resources to execute known requirements and maximize readiness (mission and response) for Emerging and Contingency Requirements. These forces are described through Readiness Projections provided by their commanders and the force alignments provided by the Army Force Providers that enable the Army to selectively adjust priorities and set the readiness and mission tempo for the Total Army. Once readiness is executed, the Current Force transitions to the Past Force and enables the Army to systematically assess its readiness decisions, priorities, and processes for future decisions.

f. **Past Army Force.** The Past Force is comprised of the units, infrastructure, and capabilities and their corresponding readiness based on the decisions and processes used to achieve this readiness. These forces exist in the past and are the focus of Army readiness assessments in FY A that consider decisions and resource expenditures as far back as FY A–4. The assessment of the Past Force, from the tactical (USR) to the strategic (ASRA), are described by Readiness Achieved and provide crucial information to improve and refine planning factors in the Army’s Force Readiness and Force Generation processes. It enables the systematic prioritization and balancing of resources to plan, prepare, and establish new readiness standards and strategies, improved Readiness Objectives, and enhance commander’s Readiness Projections. The Past Force assessment also improves how the Army aligns its forces to meet known requirements while remaining ready and responsive to meet Emerging and Contingency Requirements within approved and expected resource constraints in a dynamically changing operating environment (see fig B–2).

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**Notes:** ASRA - Army Strat Readiness Assessment; ASRC - Army Synchrn & Resourcing Conf; ASRP - Army Synchrn & Resourcing Process; POM - Program Objective Memorandum; PBES - Planning, Programming, Budgeting, & Execution System; SRP - Sustainable Readiness Process; SRU - Strat Readiness Update; TAA - Total Army Analysis; USR - Unit Status Report

**Figure B–1. Force Generation Phases**

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**B–4. Army Force Generation Elements**

When the Army considers any force generation task or process, it organizes its effort around seven elements – forces, requirements, resources, demand, readiness, risk, and time (FRRDRRT) (see fig B–2) – similar to how a Soldier analyzes
a tactical map using the mnemonic OAKOC (Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues of Approach, Key Terrain, Obstacles, Cover and Concealment) or a tactical operation using METT–TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops Available, Time, Civilian Considerations).

a. Forces. Describes and defines the authorized force structure and expected doctrinal military effects. Forces are the foundational element that defines and delineates all others. They are characterized by size (number) and shape (functions and component) as reflected by the authorized organization, manning, equipping, and the supporting facilities necessary for the resulting forces, if fully resourced, to achieve their wartime mission (military effects).

b. Requirements. Describes the desired military effect or influence in the appropriate operating environment expected by a military force employer (Joint – CCMD, Service, or Governor). They are a result of analysis by a force employer that is validated and given to a force provider to fulfill. Requirements are the foundational justification for the size of the force and the timely allocation of resources to achieve the necessary readiness. Requirements are managed in four categories: 1) Doctrinal – those requirements the Army does based on unique Army capabilities, Joint or Army policy, preparation for Contingency or Known requirements, and historical precedence; 2) Contingency – requirements in support of OPLANs and approved by the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense; 3) Known – requirements validated and ordered by an authorized force employer that commits Army forces to execute a known mission, requiring the prioritization of resources based on the priority of the mission; and 4) Emergent – requirements that expand Known requirements or for operations that do not warrant the execution of an approved CONPLAN or WARPLAN.

c. Resources. Describes those things that when applied to forces over time enable them to achieve their force requirements. Resources are a foundational element that frames the potential size, shape, and readiness of the forces based on their availability and quantity. Resources are derived from the authorities and funds provided to the Army to recruit and pay for personnel and to purchase and maintain equipment, parts, supplies, facilities, and services needed to generate forces and readiness, deploy and redeploy, and execute and sustain military operations.

d. Demand. Describes a force provider assessment of the requirement in terms of applicable capability, corresponding Army readiness level and the types of available forces. This assessment is based on the following: 1) the appropriate force for the mission (size and capability); 2) the required readiness level (C1 for contingency, <C2 for some DSCA); and 3) how authorities, funding and response timeline determine what forces are available – component based on authorities, resources and time to prepare, and deployment restrictions based on Army and Joint D2D and M2D policy. This analysis provides a demand signal that can be directly compared to available force readiness according to the applicable authorities and resources to determine risk.

e. Readiness. Describes how the Army measures success in force generation (by law) in the absence of deploying and conducting military operations. The success is defined and defended through this force readiness assessment process and determines the efficacy and efficiency of a service’s force generation processes to generate and maintain force readiness as compared to the defined requirement (threat). Readiness is considered in two categories; mission and response readiness. Mission readiness is an assessment of the potential ability of a unit (capability or task force) to sustain Joint Forces or engage a threat in a theater of operation. This assessment reflects the level a unit has attained according to specified measured areas of resources and training necessary for it to perform wartime or specified missions based on a unit’s organizational design and core functional capabilities (as measured by the USR) or specific operational missions as requested by a CCMD (as measured by its A-rating). Response readiness is an assessment of the potential ability of a unit (capability or task force) to position and move from where it is generated to a theater of operation (Force Employment). This assessment reflects the calculation of time and resources required for the unit to attain mission readiness and conduct Army Force Projection tasks to position and move to the theater of operations to perform its ordered wartime or specified mission.

f. Risk. Describes how the Army assesses the acceptability of the comparison of force readiness to force demand. It is viewed through two lenses: risk to mission and risk to force. Risk to mission is an assessment of potential mission failure when a force, unit or capability cannot meet the required mission readiness level at the time of employment or is not available to deploy. Risk to force is an assessment of the potential risk of degradation or destruction of a unit employed prior to achieving the required readiness for the mission.

g. Time. Describes how time defines aspects of force generation and enhances or limits its effectiveness. It can be addressed in two distinct areas. Time to generate addresses when a unit-type will exist in the Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC) – Current, Program or Future timeframe. Time to prepare addresses the time it takes to man, equip, and train a unit-type to effectively perform its wartime or specified mission based on the unit’s organizational design to provide core functional capabilities in support of the CCDR’s requirements. Time to prepare considers when a unit-type is needed to execute the assigned or doctrinal mission and is influenced by Joint Requirement timelines, LAD times, and training to produce the appropriate mission readiness.
The Army is authorized and required by law to organize, man, train, and equip the AC and RCs with the end state of fielding integrated operational forces to provide predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities. To meet this end state, the Army executes force generation through four key functions consisting of: Direct Army Forces, Develop Army Forces, Preserve Army Forces, and Provide Army Forces.

**a. Direct Army Forces.** The force generation function that enables the Army to define its forces and prioritize the resources needed to provide those forces to the Joint Commander. The Army defines its forces (roles, responsibilities and functions); the readiness standards those forces must achieve; the criteria by which it assesses the risk to mission and those forces when employed (mission completion); and the requisite resources to mitigate that risk and ensure mission success while preserving the Army. It directs the priorities for the application of its appropriated resources to its authorized forces to ensure readiness standards are met and missions are successfully executed. The Secretary of the Army, through the Chief of Staff and Army Secretariat, is responsible for directing Army forces and shares key aspects of this responsibility with the commanders of the ACOMs. HQDA directs, manages, and assesses these standards with policies, strategies, guidance and orders and executes them through the other three key functions. This ensures the Army meets its legal and moral responsibilities to the nation to provide a ready and responsive Total Force in a sustainable manner.
b. **Develop Army Forces.** The force generation function that enables the Army to manage its force structure and resource them to enable the Army Force Providers to prepare and provide them to the Joint Commander. The Army manages its force structure through the TAA process to inform and maximize the authorized size (end strength) by shaping and balancing between the different functions (Operating, Generating, and Institutional Forces) and components (Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve). It prioritizes resource allocations between the Current, Program and Future Force to ensure SR across time. HQDA is responsible for developing and resourcing Army forces and coordinates this process with the commanders of the ACOMs and Army Force Providers. This ensures the Total Army is the right Army, at the right readiness, at the right time to provide ready and responsive forces to the Joint Commander in a sustainable manner.

c. **Preserve Army Forces.** The force generation function that enables the Army to assess itself to balance its readiness and resources to effectively maintain the health and readiness of the Total Force. The Army assess the force generation elements (force, requirements, resources, demand, readiness and risk) across time to balance their priorities to ensure the Army can meet both the current and future requirements of force employers in a sustainable manner. HQDA directs this function, but it is the responsibility of all commanders from ACOM to company-level to preserve Army forces. The Army, through its commanders and leaders in the force generation processes, balances the risks between competing requirements through the proper prioritization of resources and demand fulfillment. This ensures the Army provides forces for its current requirements (Joint, State and Service) and is postured for Emerging and Contingency requirements without unduly jeopardizing force readiness in the future.

d. **Provide Army Forces.** The decisive force generation function (main effort) – it is the culmination of the other three functions. It enables the Army to align its forces to prepare them to execute all requirements (Joint, State, and Service). The Army, through its Army Force Providers (FORSCOM, USASOC, ARNG, USARC, ASCCs, and DRUs), assess the requirements (Joint and Army) to align the right forces for Known, Emergent, and Contingency Requirements. The Force Providers prepare these forces to execute these missions (mission readiness) in the time allotted (response readiness) to enable them to be pre-positioned or deployed to and be successfully employed by the Joint Commander. It also ensures that Army Forces, as a part of the Joint Forces, are properly sustained and effectively redeployed and readied for future requirements in a sustainable manner. This ensures the Army executes its current Known Requirements (Joint, State and Service) and is postured for Contingency Requirements without unduly jeopardizing force readiness in the future.
Appendix C

Resource Principles and Concepts

C–1. Core elements of Unit Level Readiness
C-level ratings, which are essential to SR as a measure of a unit’s readiness, are training, personnel, and equipment assessments, and reflect a unit’s ability to accomplish its core functions and provide its as-designed doctrinal capabilities in support of ULO.

C–2. Training the Army
The SRM is constructed using the imperative that METL-based, decisive action training to common, objective, and measurable standards best prepares and postures Total Army forces to meet operational demands, whether known, emergent, or contingency. Across the Total Force, the Army employs different training strategies and templates to determine the necessary training requirements to attain appropriate T-levels. These training templates are even more diversified when pertaining to the Reserve Component, where both progressive (4-year and 5-year models) and enduring training models (Sustained Readiness) are used to achieve required readiness.

a. A unit’s training plan is essential to building readiness. For the RA, the intent is to minimize the time in the prepare module and always rapidly build readiness to enter the “Ready” module with decisive action proficiency ready for immediate deployment. Reserve component units preparing to be part of the early deployment force progressively build readiness over multi-year periods. The goal is for Reserve Component units to enter the “Ready” module, achieving C2 readiness, while the remainder of the force stays in the prepare module, cycling between C3 and C4 readiness levels over multiple years.

b. In the Prepare module, Commanders train their units to proficiency in the unit’s core capabilities. Using an objective baseline standard for assessing collective training readiness, all Army units will undergo external evaluations directed by Commanders two levels up prior to reporting a trained (T-) proficiency level.

c. As each Commander develops their unit training plan, they focus on the individual and collective tasks required to accomplish their overarching mission essential task. This training includes the integrated training environment with live, virtual and constructive environments that should consist of live fire, mission command, and maneuver scenarios conducted in Decisive Action Training Environments against a hybrid threat.

d. Units in the “Ready” module maintain decisive action levels of readiness and are at the highest readiness levels. The Ready module includes those Reserve Component units receiving additional training days and other resources to achieve decisive action readiness. The Army goal for both service retained and assigned units in this module is to build and maintain the highest levels of decisive action readiness, thus keeping units in the band of excellence by effectively managing resources and activities.

e. With the standards prescribed under Objective-T, and increased reliance on third party external evaluations, Unit Commanders will now have the resources to train and maintain proficiency on their Mission Essential Tasks and report the readiness achieved to common, easily quantified and measurable standards.

C–3. Manning the Army
Manning the Army involves Army Structure processes and prioritization of Army units to ensure personnel fill levels are in line with end strength. The proponent for these processes is the DCS, G–1.

a. The Manning Process. At the completion of the TAA process, the Army issues an ARSTRUC, which determines the size of the force necessary to support the NMS. The DCS, G–3/5/7 utilizes the Force Management System (FMS) and the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) processes to define requirements for personnel and equipment. Based on Army end strength the DCS, G–1 develops the Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD) to determine the personnel distribution plan, by skill and grade, to the UIC level.

b. Manning Prioritization. When operational requirements and personnel authorizations exceed the distributable inventory, a prioritized fill of units is required in order to maintain unit readiness at appropriate levels across the Army. This prioritized manning distribution is aligned with Army priorities, adheres to Department of Defense Instruction and Department of Army Time-On-Station policy, and is codified in the Active Component Manning Guidance (ACMG). The ACMG supports Force Generation through a consistent flow of personnel in support of designated unit manning levels. Units can expect natural attrition and personnel turnover regardless of their readiness module.

C–4. Equipping the Army

a. Equipping the Army is a broad and encompassing process that includes identifying equipment capability shortfalls, developing equipment solutions, prioritizing, fielding, repairing/recapitalizing and finally obsolescing equipment. Training
and Doctrine Command is responsible for identifying capability gaps and, when appropriate, proposing materiel solutions. ASA (ALT), in conjunction with AMC, develops and sustains equipment capabilities for materiel fielding, transfer, and displacement via the product program manager (PM) (see AR 700–142). This process includes development and testing of the Sustainment Key Performance Parameter (KPP) and Key Systems Attributes (KSA), and synchronizes new equipment fielding, replacement equipment fielding, and equipment training. DCS, G–8 determines equipment resourcing. DCS, G–3/5/7 determines priority for units to receive equipment along with identifying equipment obsolescence. The Army Materiel Command (AMC), is the Army’s lead Materiel Integrator (LMI) who executes the DCS, G–3/5/7’s prioritizations based on DCS, G-8’s allocation of equipment.

b. As the equipment is resourced and procured for each budget year, AMC/ASC with ASA(ALT), DCS, G–8 staff synchronization officers (SSOs), and ARNG and USAR systems integrators (SIs) develop and vet proposed sourcing decisions (PSDs) to field equipment to prioritized units. ASA (ALT) conducts NET/NEF for units receiving new or modernized equipment. Fieldings requiring NET/NEF should be scheduled as early as possible in a Prepare phase to avoid major collective training periods in the SRM. AMC, in coordination with ASA (ALT) and/or program office, ensures equipment is maintained and sustained over its life cycle before removal from the inventory when assessed as obsolete. Synchronization and de-confliction occurs in the ASRP through the SR battle rhythm to include the semi-annual ASRP Phase II Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference (ASRC), held once in the spring and fall each year.

C–5. Equipping principles and concepts

a. As an overarching principle, the Army’s intent is to modernize and field equipment to units within their Prepare phase(s) of the SRM. HQDA and ACOM planning will identify equipment and/or systems, which due to their complexity or significant strain to a unit’s resources, require deliberate fielding in Prepare modules only. Similarly, equipment identified as best suited for in-stride fieldings will be delivered during Prepare modules whenever possible. However, due to other mission requirements or multiple required fieldings, in-stride fieldings may occur in Ready or Mission modules (see fig 3–2).

b. Annually, units receive updated MTOEs that are modernized given distributable quantities of equipment derived from DCS, G–8. The Army will improve equipment readiness by delivery or transfer of equipment to the correct location in order to minimize and mitigate long-term equipment on hand (EOH) shortfalls. Under SR, MTOE E-Dates will vary throughout the fiscal year and will be synchronized with unit Prepare modules.

c. The Army optimizes unit readiness by aligning modernization with unit’s established manning and training strategies. This process uses the Army’s equipment modernization strategy’s anticipated output and delivery to units, based on the DARPL and synchronized within the appropriate SRM modules.

d. The Army will strive to ensure most units are S1, but potentially not all like units will be at the same modernization level. The Army will attempt to limit large redistributions of equipment between units (see fig C–1).

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**Figure C–1. Fielding equipment within sustainable readiness**

- **Prepare** modules are preferred for all equipment fielding and required for deliberate fieldings which require significant materiel integration, extensive New Equipment Training or New Equipment Fielding (NET/NEF), or cause significant impacts to unit training.

- **Ready** modules are best for less-disruptive in-stride fieldings due to the intensive focus on decisive action training and achieving and maintaining deployment Readiness.

- **Mission** modules generally accept only the least-disruptive in-stride fieldings that do not interfere with the current mission or involve equipping required due to a validated Operational Needs Statement (ONS) or Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON).
Appendix D

Aspects of Unit Readiness

D– 1. Sustainable Readiness Model modules
The SRM uses modules to organize and graphically depict unit readiness information and to signal resourcing requirements; each module represents a given unit’s activity over the three months of a designated fiscal year quarter on the 5-year time horizon for planning. The SR modules provide a clear representation of a unit’s preparedness for decisive action in support of ULO. There are three modules: Prepare, Ready, and Mission. There are additional descriptive categories for all three module types which assist planners and unit commanders in synchronizing resource decisions and unit activities. Each module is color-coded for graphic representation in SR planning.

D– 2. Prepare Modules (Yellow with Black or Red Lettering)
Service retained and assigned units in prepare modules are not available for decisive action without significant risk to mission. The Army’s goal for units in this module is to adequately resource (man, equip, and fund) them to build decisive action readiness by executing an approved training plan. Units remain in this module until they are projected to achieve a C2 level of readiness. The time a unit remains in a Prepare module may exceed the template time depending on the complexity or time required for training or fielding new equipment. Force providers may source units in prepare modules for other missions, and may source subordinate elements, individuals, or equipment for requirements (including decisive action) subject to confirmation or validation of readiness as appropriate. As indicated below, units in this module are further categorized in one of four ways, based on expected resourcing level. Prepare modules are color-coded yellow with black lettering when the unit projects C3 level of readiness; yellow with red lettering when the unit projects C4. Each of the categories below has a two-letter labels for ease of reference.

a. Ready (C3) (Label: R3). Applied to units that projected to have the manning, equipment, and other resources in place to maintain readiness, through an approved unit training plan, at the C3 level. Units in a R3 module are ready for C3 level missions or would require additional resources to attain a C2 level of readiness if required.

b. Building Readiness (Label: P3). Applied to units projected to have the manning, equipment, and other resources in place to build C3 in order to build to C1 or C2 readiness or maintain R3 readiness in the Mission phase. The Army resourcing goal for this module is minimum personnel and equipment supply ratings as laid out in ACMG, Modernization Guidance and Command Plan documentation with broad goals of P2 and S2, respectively, with the ability for commanders to deliver at least 80 percent of authorized unit strength to the training environment. Most Reserve Component units will fall in this category by design. P3 modules are further labeled with the unit’s anticipated C-level rating (C3 or C4) to provide visibility for planning and risk mitigation when aligning units to operational demands/readiness requirements.

c. Building Readiness (Label: P4). Applied to units projected to have the manning, equipment, and other resources in place to maintain C4 in order to build to C1 or C2 readiness or maintain R3 readiness in the Mission phase. The Army resourcing goal for this module is minimum personnel and equipment ratings as laid out in the ACMG, Modernization Guidance and Command Plan documentation with broad goals of P2 and S2, respectively. This module (most often used by the RC in Prepare Years 1–3) allows commanders and planners to accept some risk with these units in order to support the readiness of other units without unduly risking the unit’s ability to attain its Readiness Objectives and Projections in the Mission phase.

d. Transitory (Label: PT). Applied to units that are unable to build readiness due to an Army-directed activity (for example, a force structure change, inactivation, or the fielding of major weapon systems), as well as unit redeploying from an expeditionary deployment to account for the time its equipment is redeploying and conducting any required reset activities. Units in the transitory category are unable to build (and are likely losing) readiness, and will therefore typically achieve an overall readiness rating no higher than C4 and sometimes C5 with activation, inactivation, and deliberate modernization activities. Personnel and equipment supply ratings may vary based on unit circumstances. Examples will include redeploying units, units converting from an ABCT to an SBCT, or units fielding new equipment that will take longer than one Prepare module (deliberate modernization versus in-stride modernization). The Army resourcing goal for this module category is to rapidly align resources and activities to move the unit into a building readiness (PB) prepare module.

e. Limited Resources (Label: PL). Applied to units that are deliberately resourced at HQDA, or other command direction, to maintain a lower overall level of readiness (either C3 or C4) due to Army-wide resource constraints. Personnel and equipment supply ratings may vary based on unit circumstances. Units in the limited resources category are unable to build overall readiness to C2. Examples will include resource weighting under sequestration.
D–3. Equipping the Army

a. Equipping the Army is a broad and encompassing process that includes identifying equipment capability shortfalls, developing equipment solutions, prioritizing, fielding, repairing/recapitalizing and finally obsoleting equipment. Training and Doctrine Command is responsible for identifying capability gaps and, when appropriate, proposing materiel solutions. ASA (ALT), in conjunction with AMC, develops and sustains equipment capabilities for materiel fielding, transfer, and displacement via the product Program Manager (PM) (see AR 700–142). This process includes development and testing of the Sustainment Key Performance Parameter (KPP) and Key Systems Attributes (KSA), and synchronizes new equipment fielding, replacement equipment fielding, and equipment training. DCS, G–8 determines equipment resourcing. DCS, G–3/5/7 determines priority for units to receive equipment along with identifying equipment obsolescence. The Army Materiel Command (AMC), is the Army’s lead Materiel Integrator (LMI) who executes the DCS, G–3/5/7’s prioritizations based on DCS, G-8’s allocation of equipment.

b. As the equipment is resourced and procured for each budget year, AMC/ASC with ASA (ALT), DCS, G–8 Staff Synchronization Officers (SSOs), and ARNG and USAR Systems Integrators (SIs) develop and vet proposed sourcing decisions (PSDs) to field equipment to prioritized units. ASA (ALT) conducts NET/NEF for units receiving new or modernized equipment. Fieldings requiring NET/NEF should be scheduled as early as possible in a Prepare phase to avoid major collective training periods in the SRM. Army Materiel Command, in coordination with ASA (ALT)/Program Office ensures equipment is maintained and sustained over its life cycle before removal from the inventory when assessed as obsolete. Synchronization and de-confliction occurs in the ASRP through the SR battle rhythm to include the semi-annual ASRP Phase II Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference (ASRC), held once in the spring and fall each year.

d. As an overarching principle, the Army’s intent is to modernize and field equipment to units within their Prepare phase(s) of the SRM. HQDA and ACOM planning will identify equipment and/or systems, which due to their complexity or significant strain to a unit’s resources, require deliberate fielding in Prepare modules only. Similarly, equipment identified as best suited for in-stride fieldings will be delivered during Prepare modules whenever possible. However, due to other mission requirements or multiple required fieldings, in-stride fieldings may occur in Ready or Mission modules (see fig 3–2).

b. Annually, units receive updated MTOE’s that are modernized given distributable quantities of equipment derived from DCS, G–8. The Army will improve equipment readiness by delivery or transfer of equipment to the correct location in order to minimize and mitigate long-term equipment on hand (EOH) shortfalls. Under SR, MTOE E-Dates will vary throughout the fiscal year and will be synchronized with unit Prepare modules.

c. The Army optimizes unit readiness by aligning modernization with unit’s established manning and training strategies. This process uses the Army’s equipment modernization strategy’s anticipated output and delivery to units, based on the DARPL and synchronized within the appropriate SRM modules.

d. The Army will strive to ensure most units are S1, but potentially not all like units will be at the same modernization level. The Army will attempt to limit large redistributions of equipment between units.

D–4. Equipping principles and concepts

a. As an overarching principle, the Army’s intent is to modernize and field equipment to units within their Prepare phase(s) of the SRM. HQDA and ACOM planning will identify equipment and/or systems, which due to their complexity or significant strain to a unit’s resources, require deliberate fielding in Prepare modules only. Similarly, equipment identified as best suited for in-stride fieldings will be delivered during Prepare modules whenever possible. However, due to other mission requirements or multiple required fieldings, in-stride fieldings may occur in Ready or Mission modules (see fig 3–2).

b. Annually, units receive updated MTOE’s that are modernized given distributable quantities of equipment derived from DCS, G–8. The Army will improve equipment readiness by delivery or transfer of equipment to the correct location in order to minimize and mitigate long-term equipment on hand (EOH) shortfalls. Under SR, MTOE E-Dates will vary throughout the fiscal year and will be synchronized with unit Prepare modules.

c. The Army optimizes unit readiness by aligning modernization with unit’s established manning and training strategies. This process uses the Army’s equipment modernization strategy’s anticipated output and delivery to units, based on the DARPL and synchronized within the appropriate SRM modules.

d. The Army will strive to ensure most units are S1, but potentially not all like units will be at the same modernization level. The Army will attempt to limit large redistributions of equipment between units.

D–5. Ready Modules. (Dark and Light Green and Yellow with Green Lettering)

Service retained and assigned units in ready modules are available to plan for decisive action. The Army’s goal for units in this module is to maintain C1 (objective) or C2 (threshold) levels of readiness, managing resources and activities to maintain unit readiness for deployment. Units in ready modules must be ready to deploy or mobilize immediately. Force providers may source units in ready modules for contingency requirements subject to confirmation or validation of readiness as appropriate. The ready module includes those reserve component units receiving additional training days and other resources to achieve a minimum a C2 level of decisive action readiness. Ready modules are color-coded dark green when the unit projects C1 level of readiness; light green when the unit projects C2. In addition to the green modules is the Ready (C3) (Label: R3, Yellow with Dark Green lettering) is applied to units that are expected and resourced to build to and maintain, through an approved unit training plan, at the C3 level. Units in a R3 module are ready for C3 level missions or would require additional resources to attain a C2 level of readiness if required. This module primarily supports the RCT C3 training strategy.

D–6. Mission Module (Dark and Light Purple)

Service retained and assigned units in mission modules are projected to be in receipt of mission orders, based on known demands either approved by the SECDEF through the GFM allocation process, or by a CCDR as an Assigned Force Demand (AFD). Expected decisive action readiness levels are dependent on mission requirements. Mission modules include units at to C2 levels required for decisive action, as well as mission-specific A-level requirements. Units in a mission module are only available to meet unknown or contingency demands as determined by the SECDEF, and as such are
generally not available to force providers for sourcing other requirements. Mission modules are color-coded based on projected readiness level; dark purple for missions requiring C1 to C2 decisive action readiness, and light purple for A-level assigned mission readiness. In the latter category, units with A-level mission requirements at less than C2 readiness are expected to transition to extended prepare module periods upon mission completion, in order to rebuild lost decisive action capability. As below, units in this module are further categorized in one of three ways, based on mission source and utilization.

a. Prepare to Deploy (Label: P1 or P<2). Applied to a unit projected to be allocated, assigned, or Service retained in receipt of a SECDEF approved Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO). Units in the “prepare to deploy” category must meet the requirements of the PTDO mission, and are normally resourced and trained to maintain C1 (Objective) or C2 levels of decisive action readiness. Examples include Global Response Force (GRF), Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Response Force (DCRF), and Command and Control Chemical, Radiological, Biological, Nuclear Response Element – A/B (C2CRE A/B) ; and Campaign Plan for Global SOF Operations.

b. Mission Allocated (Label: A1 or A<2). Applied to Assigned or Service retained units conducting allocated missions under SECDEF approved orders. Units in an allocated mission module are normally resourced and trained to C1 (Objective) or C2 (Threshold) levels required for decisive action, transitioning to A1 level readiness specific to their mission if necessary. Examples of A1 include NATO Response Force (NRF), Korea Rotation BCT and Operation Spartan Shield (OSS). Examples of A<2 include Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS).

c. Assigned Forces Demand (Label: D1 or D<2). Applied to units projected to be assigned to a CCMD conducting a specified mission, ordered by the CCDR, usually in support of shaping (Phase 0) or deterrence (Phase 1) operations. Units in an assigned forces demand mission module are normally resourced and trained to C1 (Objective) or C2 (Threshold) levels required for decisive action, prior to transitioning to A1 level readiness specific to their mission. Examples of units include Pacific Pathways, Atlantic Resolve, and EUCOM and PACOM Theater Committed Forces (see fig D–1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Modules</th>
<th>Modules Labels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>(Required C-Level: &lt; C2 = A1)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>D1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Readiness C-Level: C2)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>R1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Maintain C1 Readiness</td>
</tr>
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<td>(Readiness C-Level: C4)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Build C3 Readiness</td>
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<td>PL</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Limited Resources</td>
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</table>

**Figure D–1. Sustainable Readiness Module Labels**

**D–7. Depicting Module Transitions**

*Note* that in most cases the projected transition between modules will not occur precisely at the beginning of a given fiscal quarter. In such cases, URCs reflect the module in longest use for that quarter. For example, if an assigned unit is projected to redeploy from a CCDR-ordered A-level mission requirement in the second month of the quarter, the entire quarter would be categorized as an allocated mission module (light purple) on the unit’s readiness plan. URC and Readiness Objectives
observed below the DA level will show transitions at the month point based on the readiness module on the 15th of that month (1–15 goes to the beginning, 16 an above goes to the next month).

**D–8. Unit Readiness Cycle**

SRM Model modules are used in the development of URCs. Assigning a module type to a unit for a given quarter quickly conveys information on planned or executed unit activity for that time period. By definition, each module is associated with a projected level of decisive action and/or assigned mission readiness; each depicts a unit’s Readiness Objective, Projection or Achieved to respond to demand; each conveys a general picture of the resources a unit is expected to be allocated prior to and retain during that period.

a. When placed on the 6-year SRP planning horizon, the combined modules form the unit’s long-term readiness plan in a KDRO, illustrating its projected ability to build and maintain readiness. On this common framework, a unit’s anticipated Readiness and Mission modules and corresponding Prepare and Mission phases are synchronized in time with the resources and other Force Generation activities required to transition between unit activities. As stated earlier, the SRM assigns a letter to each FY to provide a doctrinal frame of reference to each FY as the process manages and integrates the planning, budgeting, preparing, and executing Army force and unit readiness. Fiscal Year A is always the current year, with current +1 being FY B, then FY C and so on. For clarity, when discussing execution of SR, fiscal years will be used. When planning or discussing planning events, FY A–F will be used.

b. Unit readiness cycles differ depending on POM fiscal year in terms of detail, use, and authority. Additionally, unit readiness planning is progressive (for example, the FY D plan one year becomes the FY C plan the following year when discussing planning actions; when discussing execution of SR planned events, organizations will utilize fiscal years).

c. There will be significant overlap in the planning and execution of the SRP; all stakeholders will have roles and responsibilities in both the planning and execution portions of SRP (for detailed information on SRP, see Chapter 5 of this document). As a general rule, the Army’s Force Providers (FORSCOM) ASCCs (USAREUR, USARPAC, USARCENT, USARNORTH, USAR SOUTH, USASOC, USASMDC/ARSTRAT), ARNG, USAR, and the ASRP will focus the bulk of their efforts and the execution of their authorities in Years A and B, while HQDA and the SRP will focus its efforts and authorities in Years C through F (see fig D–2.)
(1) **FY A (Current Year: Planned Execution).** The URC for FY A is ready to be executed, but has not yet begun execution. As such, it is the Readiness Projection with the greatest level of detail. It captures operational deployments, major collective training events, the distribution of expected resources, and other unit activities. Commanders and staffs are responsible for ensuring that FY A projection reflect accurate readiness and availability information.

(2) **FY B (Synchronization). (FY A Plus One).** The URC for FY B synchronizes actual force development requisitions (personnel and materiel) and training resources with the objective readiness levels planned and approved in previous years.

(3) **FY C (Planning). (FY A Plus Two).** FY C is the first year of the Program and is the current year plus two. It is a crucial year for SR as decisions made as a result of the SRP inform resourcing priorities of the Army. The URC for FY C reflects continued development from the rough level of detail in the FY D plan to the level required for initial resource and readiness planning and synchronization. URCs for FY C depict planned HQDA and force provider forecasted decisions about mission alignment, resourcing, and risk, and include Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations, changes of command, major equipment modernizations, MTOE updates, and unit reorganization.

(4) **FY D (Planning). (FY A Plus Three).** FY D is the second year of the Program and is current year plus 3. The URC for FY D is a forecast based on programmed force structure, anticipated transformation, reorganization, and capability fielding, and enduring force requirements. FY D URCs are used by HQDA and resourcing organizations to support shaping and supporting the future force.
Appendix E
Sustainable Readiness Process (Operational)

E–1. Sustainable Readiness Phase 1 – Plan and Prepare Readiness Objectives (3–7 Years Out)
The SR Plan and Prepare phase consists of receiving the output of TAA, consisting of the ARSTRUC, and the execution of the first three steps of the SRP (Step 1-Develop Readiness Requirements; 2-Project available readiness; 3-Capture Risk). The output of this phase will be resource informed initial Readiness Objectives (RO–I), risk to readiness requirements, and decision points (DPs) regarding resource prioritization to inform and influence budget input (see fig E–1).
Sustainable Readiness Process
(Sustainable Readiness Process Model – Army-level)

**Phase 1** Year 1
Plan & Prepare Readiness Objectives

1. Requirements for Planning
   - Contingency
   - Known

2. Readiness Strategy
   - Forces (TAA)
   - Force Provider Assessment

3. Readiness Requirements
   - Risk (ODRA)

4. Mitigate Risk / Manage Readiness
   (Synchronization and Resource Planning)
   - Manning
   - Training
   - Leading
   - Equipping
   - Sustaining
   - Installations

Initial Readiness Objectives

**Phase 2** Year 2
Execute Readiness Objectives

5. Finalize Readiness Objectives

Final Readiness Objectives

**Notes:**
ASRA: Army Strategic Readiness Assessment;
ASRP: Army Synchronization & Resourcing Process;
JCCCA: Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment;
MRM: Material Readiness Management;
MTB: Mission Training Brief;
SRU: Strategic Readiness Update;
ODRA: Operational Demand Risk Assessment;
POM: Program Objective Memorandum;
TAA: Total Army Analysis

Figure E–1. Sustainable Readiness Process
Figure E–1. Sustainable Readiness Process---Continued

a. The TAA ARSTRUC establishes the supply of forces for SR analysis. Step 1 in the SRP is the development of readiness requirements. Readiness requirements originate from the known demands of the approved GFMAP and the contingency demands of DPG aligned TPFDDs. Identifying and combining the known and contingency demands captures the Army’s future readiness requirements and are denoted operational demand. Once developed, a general officer steering
committee, known as the ODVB, assesses and recommends approval of the readiness requirements for the year under development.

1. **Step 1: Develop Readiness Requirements.** SRP development of readiness requirements is coordinated by the DCS, G–3/5/7 with crucial input from FORSCOM, and various ASCCs. The SRP receives readiness demand signals from the Joint Staff through the GFM process. The SRP utilizes these joint requirements to produce an operational demand model, the primary Army document that articulates readiness requirements to the force.

   (a) **The Operational Demand Validation Process.** The ODVP, which is coordinated by the DCS, G–3/5/7 with input from FORSCOM, plays an important role in the larger SRP. The ODVP clearly articulates requirements and gains Army stakeholder recommendations and ultimately gains Army Senior Leader approval of the Army demand requirements in a given planning year through the development and codification of the ODG. The process requires assumptions by planners which must be explicitly approved by Army senior leaders. It is heavily influenced by the GEF, which is aligned with the DPG. The ODVP connects Force Generation and the SRP to national strategy by developing unit readiness requirements based on CCMD demand for ready units. It has four subordinate steps:
   
   1. Determination of known requirements.
   2. Determination of contingency requirements.
   3. Translation of requirements into SR Operational Demand.
   4. Codification of the ODG through approval by Army Senior Leadership.

   (b) The ODVP approves the forecasted requirements on the Army in future years through the first three years of the Fiscal Year Defense Plan. The ODVP considers two of the three types of requirements:

   1. Known requirements (forecasted) for forces to conduct SECDEF-approved operations in a CCMD’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).
   2. Contingency requirements for forces planned to execute SECDEF-directed, high-priority CCMD contingency plans.
   3. These two types of requirements are combined into a single list of operational demands representing the total demand for ready and responsive Army forces in a given fiscal year. Operational demand forms the basis for the Army’s readiness requirements (or demand signal) when matched to the appropriate SRM modules and is calculated for the same three-year time horizon for planning that guides the rest of the SRP. The four steps are discussed in greater detail below.

   (c) **Determination of Known Requirements.** Near-term (FY A) known requirements are approved and ordered annually through the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) process and published in the GFMAP, or, for CCMD assigned forces demands, through the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM). To project a planning factor for known requirements for the remainder of the SRP time horizon, planners initially use this list of approved FY A requirements as the forecasted known requirements for FYs D–F. The SRP planning community then adjusts the list of forecasted known requirements for these years based on anticipated changes to the operational environment, force structure, joint sourcing decisions, and other developments that may alter the need for Army forces in future years. Sourcing of emergent requirements will be conducted through the ASRP, adjudicated through the semi-annual ASRC, with the Army’s Force Providers informing the SR participants of sourcing decisions made in Years A and B, particularly highlighting those decisions that impact Years C and D. Consideration will be given whether emergent requirements sourcing in Years A and B would necessitate a change made in the Operational Demand process.

   (d) **Determination of Contingency Demand.** Planners use the TPFDD found in CCMD contingency plans to determine the Army force requirements that form the contingency demand. Force requirements from several DPG aligned priority plans may be selected in order to best represent national level strategic requirements for the Army (that is, those plans that represent a comprehensive requirement for multiple theaters). The consolidated contingency demand list is used for each year (FY A–D) of the SRP time horizon for planning, updated as the CCMD updates and publishes changes to the plan/TPFDD.

   (e) **Standard unit types.** The unit and capability requirements that comprise known and contingency demands are drawn from a variety of different formats (that is, the GFMAP, JCRM, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) databases), each with its own rules for recording requests for Army forces. Latent changes to force structure and requests for subordinate, task organized, or non-standard elements further add to the diffusion of unit requirements.

   (f) For some requirements, in order to standardize the operational demand list, planners must match force requirements to a consolidated unit type on a (shorter) standardized list. For example, the ODVP might consolidate four contingency plan company level requirements into a single battalion (under contingency demand); in a similar manner, it may translate a GFMAP requirement for a 1000-person security forces element into a single battalion (under known demand).

2. **Step 2: Projection of Available Readiness.** Step 2, projecting available readiness, occurs as the Army’s force providers (that is, FORSCOM, ASCCs, DRUs, USAR, and ARNG) develop, assess, and approve forecasted readiness projections for the year under development (FY C). These forecasted readiness projections are laid out on modular charts that visually depict what the force provider assesses it is capable of providing in terms of readiness for that year.
(1) Development of Readiness Objectives. The development of Readiness Objectives generally runs immediately after approval of the readiness requirements and includes:

(a) Development and validation of the Year C URCs for every SRC in the Army by the Army’s Force Providers.

(b) An Army Staff (ARSTAF) review of the feasibility of resourcing those URCs for the entire force. Through SR there is a vetting process for which units will be used to perform the tasks needed at a certain FY. Part of the process take in effect the amount of the costs of particular units against POM requirements or actual year budget. In order to ascertain whether the Army can afford units to perform tasks the cost to operate the individual units must be compare to the POM or the budget given.

(c) An iterative process with HQDA, other resourcing agencies and the Army’s Force Providers to adjust projected resource allocation to maximize readiness to meet the FY C readiness requirements.

(d) The SR community continues through its other dimensions of demand step to refine and codify the methods to identify requirements and comparable readiness standards for the TDA (table of distributions and allowances) organizations of the Generating Force and Institutional Force. This enables the Army to fully identify the demand against the Total Army and ensure it balances its resources and has the necessary structure and readiness to respond rapidly to a contingency event across all three Military Force Operations – Generation, Projection and Employment.
c. **Step 3: Identification of Risk.** Step 3, identifying risk, is the difference between operational demand (Step 1) and the Projected Readiness (Step 2) (see fig E-2). This difference is expressed in terms of risk associated with SRCs incapable of meeting the readiness requirements.

(1) Categories of risks within SR:

(a) **Operational Readiness Risk.** Risk in fielding ready units in the first 90 days of a contingency. Operational Risk looks at the day at which an unready unit would be sent forward to fulfill a requirement as well as the percentage of the requirement that has been met with a ready unit. Assessment of operational risk prompts Army Senior Leaders to make decisions about sending the unready unit or accelerating a unit’s readiness cycle to meet requirements.

(b) **Operational Depth Risk.** Operational Depth Risk is the assessment of a unit’s capability of fulfilling requirements through the duration of the contingency (outside of the 90 day window). Risk to operational depth can be expressed in the terms of Readiness Shortfalls or Inventory Gaps. Readiness shortfalls exist when a unit’s readiness cycle is not optimized, while an inventory gap is when the total inventory does not meet the total requirement.
E–2. Sustainable Readiness Phase 2 – Execute Readiness Objectives (2–3 Years Out)

The SR Execute Readiness Objectives Phase, which includes the SRP Steps 4, and 5, mitigates risk to mission identified in Phase 1 then disseminates and institutionalizes the CSA-approved final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) in all Army future year resource planning systems (see fig E–1).

a. Risk Mitigation. Step 4. Risk Mitigation, is the development of mitigation strategies for the risks identified in Step 3. Options to mitigate risk may include increasing Reserve Component readiness, adjusting Reserve Component Force Generation cycles, adjusting sourcing options, increasing or decreasing unit inventory and adjusting manning or equipping guidance. While not all inclusive, these are a number of identified mitigation strategies for the risk identified in Step 3 of SRP.

b. To date, these mitigation strategies are developed in group sessions composed of subject matter experts from appropriate stakeholders across the Army Enterprise. At conclusion, when all risk mitigation strategies are employed, the SR community has developed resource informed Readiness Objectives. These resource informed Readiness Objectives are then taken through a series of GOSCs and finally to the Army Chief of Staff for approval.

c. Following dissemination, the Readiness Objectives, ODG, and readiness projections influence the prioritization processes which include: the DARPL, the ACMG, modernization guidance, CPLAN, Army Training Strategy, Technical Guidance Memorandums, among others. As resources are allocated against approved Readiness Objectives, this effort apportions equitable resources, synchronizes priorities, and enables the Army to build and maintain the most optimally ready and responsive force to meet CCDR’s contingencies. It is important to note that the SRP does not subsume any of the systems or documents listed here. Instead, SRP informs and influences these systems through resourcing decisions made by the Army’s Senior Leadership as they are put into the Army’s systems of record listed above.

E–3. Sustainable Readiness Phase 3 – Assess Projected Readiness (1–2 Years Out)

The SR Assess Projected Readiness Phase is the implementation of the final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) by the Army’s force providers (Step 6). During this phase, the Army’s Force Providers source, train, modernize, equip, man, and fund the readiness build of the Total Force (see fig E–1).

a. Informed by ASRA assessments of previous years SR Phase 4 (Assessed Achieved Readiness), the ASRC, which is co-chaired by HQDA and FORSCOM, is the primary forum for enforcing adherence to Readiness Objectives and synchronizing the allocation of resources or staffing actions to ensure that CSA approved readiness are accomplished. Outputs from the processes include, but are not limited to: army strategic resourcing tenet assessments and subsequent adjustments in the current FY to current FY plus 2 years, prioritized resources within the Mission Alignment Order timeline, Army training laydown, CTC calendar and execution order, among others.

(1) The ASRC is part of the ASRP which is the bi-annual process facilitated by FORSCOM and with oversight by DCS, G–3/5/7. The process is broken into two phases: Phase 1 which deals with friction in resourcing, and Phase 2: the ASRC. Phase 1 includes: weekly mobility readiness movements (MRM) (SVTC) for the purpose of eliminating friction points for units within 180 days of deployment; monthly ASRP SVTC that includes representatives from FORSCOM (G–3/5/7 Plans, Training, Force Integration, Program Office, DCS, G–1, DCS, G–4, DCS, G–8), TRADOC (MCTP, NSC, CALL), AMC, IMCOM, IHC, ARSTAFF, ASA (ALT), U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), ASCCs, USARC, ARNG, 32d AAMDC, 20th CBRNE, corps, and divisions for the purpose of action officer level friction point synchronization and elimination across Army readiness equities.

(2) The ASRP Phase 2 is the Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference is co-chaired by DAMO–TR Director and FORSCOM G–3/5/7, and conducts the final cycle synchronization and elimination of friction points. This is accomplished through two GOSC SVTCs co-chaired by DAMO–TR Director and FORSCOM G–3/5/7 for the purpose of validating all remaining Phase 1 friction points prior to the Phase 2 ASRC and then validating those remaining friction points for the ASRP Phase 3, Presentation to the FORSCOM CG and DCS, G–3/5/7.

b. Sustainable Readiness Process Projected Readiness Reporting. ACOMs are responsible for the execution of approved final Readiness Objectives (RO–F). Implementation of approved final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) occurs at echelon and throughout four different time horizons (FY A–FY D). As such, while this component is led by FORSCOM and ASCCs, successful implementation requires the concerted efforts of staff and commanders at echelons to ensure that the Army’s approved Readiness Objectives are met.

c. Readiness reporting. Situational awareness of the Army’s ability to achieve the necessary measured readiness level (C-level) requires consistent readiness level updates regarding the forces in the SR model and a modules corresponding C-level that units must maintain or achieve to process through the various SR modules (see AR 220–1).

(1) FORSCOM and USASOC monitor the status of units, analyze strategic and operational risks, and provide periodic status reports of the force to DCS, G–3/5/7.

(2) FORSCOM and USASOC provide planning estimates of unit’s capability to meet its Readiness Objectives over time to DCS, G–3/5/7.
(3) FORSCOM and USASOC provide force status briefings and HQDA unit strategic updates to readiness reporting requirements, as required.

**E-4. Sustainable Readiness Phase 4 – Assess Achieved Readiness (Ongoing)**

During the SR Assess Achieved Readiness phase, the Army enterprise evaluates the readiness actually achieved in order to update and refine Force Generation planning factors and assumptions for the other three phases (Step 6 and 7). The assessments and outcomes of the readiness build cycle are continually incorporated back into the SRP (see fig E–1).

a. Similar to the establish phase, the assessment phase is primarily conducted through the ASRA and the ASRP. Readiness actually achieved as measured by USR, is compared to Readiness Objective and Readiness Projections shortfalls and excesses are discussed to more fully inform the Army’s Force Generation planning, preparing, and execution phases.

b. Oversight of SR Phase 4 (Assess Achieved Readiness) and the impacts of earlier ASRC resourcing decisions resides with the DCS, G–3/5/7. This oversight is provided through the ASRA (see AR 525–30), which is the primary execution feedback forum for the SRP. The SRP, through the ODG, provides the ASRA with the total requirements for the Army in a given fiscal year. These requirements facilitate ASRA’s process of comparing current unit readiness against a validated set of requirements to articulate the Army’s overall level of risk. The ASRA, through the current readiness reporting, is then capable of identifying and projecting issues or shortfalls based off the leading and lagging indicators that are presented monthly to the CSA or VCSA. This assessment which helps indicate shortfalls in the projected accomplishment of approved Readiness Objectives helps inform actions in other oversight and synchronization forums.

c. It is important to note that the decisions made regarding programming for Years C and D significantly affect the execution of Years B and A. As a result, there is a direct link between the programmatic decisions made in Years C and D as those years roll forward and become Years A and B, the years of execution. HQDA departmental assessment of readiness in Years A and B falls to DCS, G–3/5/7 through the ASRA. The bulk of the execution efforts and resource synchronization for the Army are determined as part of the ASRP managed by FORSCOM. The execution effort of SR is the iterative work required to compare the actual application of resources as compared against Readiness Objectives. Step by step, the process will occur as follows:

1. Commanders and staffs will continuously monitor unit ability to accomplish approved Readiness Objectives.
2. Anticipated shortfalls will be worked at echelon and through existing Army processes; objectives which require additional synchronization will be brought to the SR Forum and ultimately to an appropriate GOSC for coordination and discussion for identification of suitable courses of action.
3. Unresolved Readiness Objectives will be taken to the Army’s senior leaders through existing processes for additional risk mitigation or proposed course of action approval.
Appendix F

Internal Control Evaluation

F–1. Function
The function covered by this evaluation is SR.

F–2. Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation is to assist DCS, G–3/5/7 in evaluating the key internal controls listed. It is not intended to cover all controls.

F–3. Instructions
Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, and simulation). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action identified in supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that this evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 11–2 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).

F–4. Test questions
a. Is the ARPL updated at least every 2 years?
b. Is the Integrated requirement priority list updated at least every FY or when necessary?
c. Is the DARPL updated either twice each year or when necessary?
d. Are the initial Readiness Objectives (RO–I) presented to and approved by the CSA in the 1Q of the FY in support of preparation for the POM off site in December?
e. Are the final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) presented to and approved by the Army senior leaders not later than the 3Q of the FY in support of the 4Q ASRC?
f. Are the Readiness Objectives assessed against the Readiness Projections semi-annually following the ASRC?
g. Are the Readiness Projections assessed against the Readiness Achieved semi-annually during each ASRC?
h. Are the Readiness Objectives assessed against the Readiness Achieved on a quarterly basis?
i. Is this regulation reviewed at least once every 3 years and updated as necessary?

F–5. Supersession
This evaluation replaces the evaluation for ARFORGEN previously published in AR 525–29, dated 14 March 2011.

F–6. Comments
Help make this a better tool for evaluating internal controls. Submit comments to the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.
Glossary

Section I

Abbreviations

ACOM
Army command

ACP
Army Campaign Plan

AERWG
Army Equipping Reuse Working Group

AFG
Army Force Generation

APGM
Army Program Guidance Memorandum

ARNG
Army National Guard

ARSOF
Army Special Operations Forces

ARSTAF
Army Staff

ARSTRUC
Army Structure Memorandum

ASCC
Army service component command

ASRA
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment

ASRC
Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference

ASRP
Army Synchronization and Resourcing Process

BES
Budget Estimate Submission

BOIP
Basis of Issue Plan

BRP
Budget Requirements and Program Process

CAA
Center for Army Analysis

CCDR
combatant commander

CCMD
combatant command

CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CSA
Chief of Staff, Army
CTC
Combat Training Center

DARPL
Dynamic Army Resource Prioritization List

DRRS – A
Defense Readiness Reporting System – Army

DRU
direct reporting unit

EOH
equipment on hand

FMS
Force Management System

FOC
fully operationally capable

FYDP
Future Years Defense Program

GCC
geographic combatant commander

GEF
Guidance for Employment of the Force

GFM
Global Force Management

GFMAP
Global Force Management Allocation Plan

GFMB
Global Force Management Board

GFMIG
Global Force Management Implementation Guidance

GOSC
General Officer Steering Committee

JCCA
Joint Combat Capability Assessments

JCRM
Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager

JFFR
Joint Force Readiness Review

JOPES
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JSCP
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSPS
Joint Strategic Planning System

KDRO
known demand readiness objectives

LAD
latest arrival date
METL  
mission essential task list

METT–TC  
Mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time, and civilian considerations

NDS  
National Defense Strategy

NEF  
New Equipment Fielding

NET  
New Equipment Training

NMS  
National Military Strategy

NSS  
National Security Strategy

OAKOC  
Observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment

ODG  
operational demand

ODRA  
Operational Demand Risk Assessment

ODVB  
Operational Demand Validation Board

ODWS  
Operational Demand Work Sheet

OPLAN  
Operational Plan

PEG  
program evaluation group

PMAD  
Personnel Management Authorization Document

POM  
program objective memorandum

PPBE  
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

QDR  
Quadrennial Defense Review

QRRC  
Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

RAMG  
Regular Army Active Component Manning Guidance

RAP  
Readiness and Availability Prioritization

RC  
Reserve Component

ROD  
Readiness Objectives Development
**RO–F**
Final Readiness Objective

**RO–I**
Initial Readiness Objective

**RSOI**
Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement & Integration

**SAMAS**
Structure Manpower Allocation System

**SECDEF**
Secretary of Defense

**SLRF**
Senior Leader Readiness Forum

**SR**
Sustainable Readiness

**SRC**
Standard Requirement Code

**SRM**
Sustainable Readiness Model

**SRP**
Sustainable Readiness Process

**SRU**
Strategic Readiness Update

**TAA**
Total Army Analysis

**TCP**
Theater campaign plan

**TGOSC**
Training General Officer Steering Committee

**TO&E**
table of equipment and personnel

**TPFDD**
Time Phased Force Deployment Data

**TRO**
Training and Readiness Oversight

**UIC**
unit identification code

**ULO**
Unified Land Operations

**USAR**
U.S. Army Reserve

**USR**
Unit Status Report
Section II
Terms

Allocated forces
Those forces, individuals, and resources provided by the President or Secretary of Defense to a Combatant Commander, not already assigned to that CCDC.

Apportioned forces
Those forces and resources assumed to be available for deliberate planning as averaged over the fiscal year. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed.

Army command
An Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army, performing multiple Army Service 10 USC functions across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control (ADCON).

Army service component command
An Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army, comprised primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component of a combatant command or sub-unified command. If directed by the CCMD, serves as the JFLCC or JTF. Command responsibilities are those assigned to the CCMD and delegated to the ASCC and those established by the Secretary of the Army.

Assigned forces
Those units, equipment, and resources which have been placed under the COCOM (command authority) of a unified commander by the direction of the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces for Unified Commands” Memorandum in accordance with 10 USC, Section 162.

Basis of Issue Plan
The document that establishes the distribution of new equipment and associated support items of equipment and personnel, as well as the reciprocal displacement of equipment and personnel. (Army) Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms. BOIP quantity/disposition is identified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) document and is normally proponent determined and coordinated with the ACOMs for fielding priority. Note: BOIP refers to materiel solutions and is not applicable to all enablers such as training land.

Decisive action
The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support to civil authorities tasks (see ADRP 3–0).

Deliberate (major) modernization
A complex process with generally a long fielding duration, significant impacts on TTPs, and significant materiel integration dependencies. A Deliberate Modernization is the fielding, introduction, or replacement of a major system or piece of equipment (tank, patriot, and combat systems) requiring a new equipment training (NET) period that exceeds the desired set of Prepare Modules (one to two) and is done during Prepare Modules only. A unit conducting a Deliberate Modernization will have a URC with at least 3 and possibly 4 Prepare Modules in some extreme cases (that is, THAAD), and the NET cannot be integrated into a unit's core METL training template.

Deliberate fielding
A complex process involving fielding or replacement of a major system or piece of equipment (tank, capability set, and combat systems), requiring significant materiel integration, extensive New Equipment Training or New Equipment Fielding (NET/NEF), or causing significant impacts to unit training. Deliberate fielding is accomplished during Prepare modules and may require one or more prepare modules to complete.

Direct reporting unit
An Army organization comprised of one or more units with institutional or operational support functions, designated by the Secretary of the Army, normally to provide broad general support to the Army in a single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. DRU’s report directly to a HQDA principal and/or ACOM and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army.
Dynamic Army Resource Priority List
The DARPL is a document generated by the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–FMD) and provides detailed prioritization of specific units over time. Programmers primarily use the unclassified version, which removes the qualitative data for use in resourcing applications. The DARPL is generally updated twice each FY at the beginning and midpoint of the resourcing process, but may be updated, as required.

Generating Force
The Generating Force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and maintain the operating forces of the Army (see ADP 1).

Global Force Management
The DOD Process to align assignment, allocation, and apportionment of forces to CCDRs, in support of the national defense strategy and joint force availability requirements (see DODI 8260.03).

Global Force Management Allocation Plan
CJCS document approved by the SECDEF that authorizes force allocations and deployment of forces in support of Combatant Commander force and Joint Inter Agency requirements. Provides details on the type of force or capability allocated and number of units, passengers, or overall area of responsibility presence for each CCOM.

Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
The GFMIG is a critical source document for force planning and execution. The GFMIG integrates complementary assignment, apportionment, and allocation information into a single GFM document. GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments.

Guidance for Employment of the Force
The GEF provides two-year direction to CCMDs for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. The GEF is the method through which OSD translates strategic priorities set in the NSS, NDS, and QDR into implementable direction for operational activities. The GEF provides the written policy guidance and priorities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and COCOMs for reviewing and preparing campaign and contingency plans.

Institutional Army
Those organizations and activities that generate and maintain available ready and responsive forces to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy and support CCMD in the performance of the full spectrum of military operations. Administer executive responsibilities in accordance with public law.

In–stride (minor) modernization
A simple process with generally a short fielding duration, few impacts on TTPs, and few materiel integration dependencies. An In-Stride Modernization is the fielding, introduction, or replacement of a minor system or piece of equipment that the NET can be easily integrated with a unit's core METL training template. The NET can be completed during any module (Prepare, Ready or Mission and Committed in some cases) with the preference being a Prepare Module.

In–stride fielding
A less-complex process compared to deliberate fielding characterized by a short fielding duration, less significant impacts on training, and few materiel integration dependencies. The NET/NEF can generally be completed during any module (Prepare, Ready, or Mission in some cases), though with all fieldings, the preference being within a Prepare module.

Joint Planning and Execution Community
Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, mobilization, deployment, employment, support, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces assigned or committed to a joint operation (see JP 1–02).

Latest arrival date
A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by the supported CCDR as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations (see JP 1–02).

Operating Forces
Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. Operating forces consist of units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight (see ADP 1).

Reset
A set of actions to restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with a unit’s future mission (see JP 1–02).
State Adjutants General
The adjutant general is the individual in charge of the federally recognized National Guard and any other organizations or components of the organized militia as may be created by the governor pursuant to federal or state law in each state.

Unified Land Operations
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (see ADP 3–0).

Section III
Special Abbreviations and Terms

A–Level
The A-level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish the assigned mission and those tasks on its METL that are specifically associated with the assigned mission (see AR 220–1).

Army Service Requirements
Additional requirements levied on Army forces exist outside of the GFM system. Army organizations require and request conventional operating and/or generating forces to fulfill Service specific requirements. Army Service Requirements (ASR) can consist of exercises, T&E, war games, experiments, simulations, studies, taskers, and any other activity not covered by the GFM Process where HQDA or an ASCC, ACOM, or DRU is requesting operating or generating force capability (unit), regardless of size, from HQDA, another ACOM, DRU, or ASCC.

ASRC
The Army Synchronization and Resourcing Conference (ASRC), co–chaired by DAMO−TR Director and FORSCOM G−3/5/7, conducts the final cycle synchronization and elimination of friction points. The semi–annual ASRC includes an Army information briefing SVTC before the conference and 2–Star GOSC (SVTC) co–chaired by DAMO−TR Director and FORSCOM G−3/5/7 at the end of the conference.

ASRP
The Army Synchronization and Resourcing Process is the Army’s operational process for planning, synchronizing, governing, and executing SR across the Total Force. The ASRP synchronizes the equity demand signals of sourcing, training, modernizing, equipping, manning, and funding for the readiness build of RA and RC forces with emphasis on progressive friction point adjudication throughout a three phase process of each bi–annual ASRP cycle.

Assigned Force Demand
Within the GFM allocation process, the means for tracking and CCDR use of forces assigned under the “Forces For” Memorandum to conduct operational missions within the CCMD AOR.

C–Level
The C-level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish the core mission(s) for which the unit is designed.

Contingency Force Requirements
The deliberate contingency plans developed by CCDRs contain requirements for Army forces should the President order the execution of a given plan. The Army identifies and prepares forces prior to crisis to meet contingency requirements for plans that are likely to execute or are otherwise of high priority to the Nation. Contingency demand includes requirements for units that must deploy early in crisis and those that constitute follow-on forces for exploitation or stability operations.

Early deployers
Those units and capabilities with a ready to load time of 60 days or fewer days for emergent or contingency requirements.

Emergent Force Requirements
When a crisis or other event emerges that necessitates the employment of Army forces not otherwise accounted for under the GFMAP or an existing contingency plan, the GFM process translates approved crisis action planning into allocated emergent Army force requirements.

Force Employment
Force Employment is an element of Military Force. It is the operation whereby the military creates effects across the different operating environments. The employment of military forces is the sole responsibility of CCDRs as codified by the Goldwater–Nichols Act. (See Military Force Operations for other elements).
Force Generation
Force Generation is an element of Military Force. It is the operation that creates and provides units for projection and employment to enable military effects and influence across multiple operating environments. It is the primary responsibility of the services to develop, provide and preserve forces in support of the NMS to enable the CCDRs to execute their missions. (See Military Force Function for other elements)

Force Projection
Force Projection is an element of Military Force. It is the operation that enables military forces to move from where they are generated to where they are to be employed. This is a shared responsibility of the Services (power projection platform and deployment skills and knowledge), CCMDs (TRANSCOM for strategic lift, GCC for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)), and the US Government to enable treaty agreements that allow forces to be forward deployed. (See Military Force Function for other elements)

Governance
As it pertains to the SR, governance is the establishment of policies, processes, and decision-making forums, and their continuous monitoring, to organize and order future year readiness forecasting decisions pursuant to the generation of ready and responsive Army forces.

Known Demand Readiness Objectives
Army Force Providers project readiness levels for all unit types through the module based SR model in the Known Demand Readiness Objectives. These KDROs are Standard Requirement Code (SRC) based, in which like type units are grouped to show URCs from FY A through FY E. Known demands are placed over these readiness cycles to provide a clearer picture of units throughout the SR spectrum, which range from units in a prepare module through a ready module, which includes those units currently assigned a mission.

Military Force Operations
Military Force Functions consists of three separate but interrelated elements; Force Generation, Force Projection, and Force Employment. These elements cover the creation and preparation of a force capable of executing joint requirements, the positioning and movement of ready units to CCDR Area of Operations, through the employment and redeployment of those ready units. From the Military Force Operations, the Army derives Force Generation.

Operational capability
The means by which types of Army units, organizations, and systems to support the Army’s ability to achieve desired effects and capacity to meet National Military objectives (see HQDA EXORD 194–16).

Operational Capacity
Ability to provide capabilities in the scale, timeliness, and with the endurance needed to meet operational demand for a specified time in support of National Military objectives (see HQDA EXORD 194–16).

Operational Demand
The assessment of actual and projected demand for ready and responsive Army operating forces, based on requirements in the GFMAP and combatant command campaign and contingency plans. Operational demand is represented in the Operational Demand Guidance (ODG) and guides the development of unit and Army readiness requirements managed through the SRM.

Operational Demand Work Sheet
Operational Demand Work Sheet combination of projected readiness levels, derived from the Known Demand Readiness Objectives (KDRO) and projected against specific Operational Plan requirements. The difference between the projected readiness and the requirements is articulated as risk to the Operational Force and operational depth as well as strategic depth. The Operational Demand Risk Assessment provides further clarity to the requirements by breaking Operational Plan requirements by the time period in which unit times are required to be in the theater.

Operational depth
Those units and capabilities above the current operational forces required to fulfill an emergent or contingency requirement.

Operational Force
Those units and capabilities at any given time being employed against known requirements.

Operational Readiness
The capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system, or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed (see JP 1–0).
Operational Reserve
An Operational Reserve provides ready capabilities and capacity that are accessible, routinely utilized, and fully integrated for military missions that are planned, programmed, and budgeted in coordination with the RA.

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
The PPBE Process is how the DOD allocates resources. The PPBE Process is how the DOD manages to stay within their fiscal budget while they follow the Secretary of Defense’s policy, strategy, and goals.

Prepare-to-deploy order
An order issued by a competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement.

Readiness Employment Plan (Capability)
Readiness and employment plans organized by capability collate individual readiness plans for all units associated with an Army capability (for example, shaping operations, set the theater, and combined arms maneuver). By this definition, depictions of capabilities are most likely subjective combinations of multiple unit type plans.

Readiness Employment Plan (Tailored)
Senior commanders and staff at all levels can also tailor readiness and employment plans to fit a specific requirement (for example, a depiction of readiness for all subordinate elements of a task-organized division or corps). For example, a Corps or Division Commander, in his role of SC, could group all readiness and employment plans for the units in his organization and ensure that his staff resources those units to meet the resource levels associated with the modules as indicated above.

Readiness Employment Plan (Unit Type)
Readiness and employment plans organized by type depict individual readiness plans for all units organized under a standard unit type. Unit type depictions are useful in gauging readiness and availability for specified forces or force requirements.

Readiness objectives
The feasible overall unit readiness (by unit type or capability and capacity) the Army plans to build to minimize the risk to meeting operational demands (known and contingency). Initial Readiness Objectives are produced during SR Phase 1 and are used to initial inform the CSA and aid in the development of POM guidance prior to senior commander (SC) and Force Provider staffing and input. The final Readiness Objectives (RO–F) are produced in Phase 2, the SR Execute Phase. At this point, the Readiness Objectives are approved by the CSA through EXORD publication, briefed during the Senior Leader Resourcing Forum (SLRF), and used in all Army future year resource planning systems.

Service Retained Forces
Regular Army and Reserve Component operating forces under ADCON to the SECARMY and not assigned to a COCOM. These forces are commanded by a service-designated commander responsible to the Army unless allocated to a COCOM for the execution of operational missions.

Standard Requirement Code
A twelve-position alphanumeric code that identifies the SRC, type organization, edition, and variation for all types of units in the Army inventory.

Strategic depth
The units and capabilities above the operational forces that are available and capable to replace or rotate with units or expand the operational force.

Strategic Readiness
The ability of the Army to provide the capability and capacity to meet the requirements of the NMS (see AR 525–30).

Sustainable Readiness
The building and preservation of the highest possible overall unit and strategic readiness posture for the Army over time, given the resources available, so that the Army is ready to meet known and emergent operational demands, while being optimally postured to meet contingency surge demand. Planning for anticipated employment and the timely synchronization of resources enables SR and prevents unnecessary drops in readiness levels, preserving readiness already built.

Sustainable Readiness Model
The framework used by the Army to forecast Readiness Objectives and mission risk for units and Army capabilities over time. The SRM produces a representation of Current and Planned Force unit Readiness Objectives; it enables resource synchronization (to include the balancing of readiness investments across the Total Force) while assisting senior leader visualization of risks to mission resulting from projected unmet operational demand requirements.
**Sustainable Readiness Process**
The Army’s strategic process for planning, synchronizing, governing, and executing SR across the Total Force. The SRP enables informed senior leader readiness decision-making, shaping the annual planning, programming, and budgeting process to maximize readiness and generate forces in support of GFM. SRP replaces the Army’s progressive readiness process known as ARFORGEN.

**Unit Readiness**
The ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels: unit readiness and Joint readiness. Unit readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the CCDRs to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Army units measure and report overall unit readiness through a combined assessment of the current status of unit personnel, equipment, and training. (see AR 220–1).