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Security Force Assistance Brigade

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ATP 3-96.1 2 May 2018
Preface

ATP 3-96.1 provides techniques for the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to conduct security force assistance. ATP 3-96.1 provides techniques for leaders who plan, prepare, execute, and assess SFAB operations. The information in this ATP is consistently being reviewed and analyzed against real-world observations of the SFAB. This ATP shall be revised and republished prior to January 2020.

The principal audience for ATP 3-96.1 is the commanders, staffs, officers, and noncommissioned officers of the brigade, battalions, and squadron within the SFAB. The audience includes the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command institutions and components, and the United States Army Special Operations Command, and Joint and Army commands that employ the Security Force Assistance Brigade in conventional operations. The publication serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine, materiel, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures (SOP) for the SFAB.

To understand ATP 3-96.1, the reader must first understand the operational art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP 1, JP 3-0, ADP 3-0, and ADRP 3-0. The reader should understand how the offensive, defensive, and stability tasks described carry over and affect the conduct described by the other (in ADPs 3-07, 3-28, and 3-90 and ADRP 3-07, ADRP 3-90, FM 3-0, FM 3-22, ATP 3-90.1, ATP 3-90.5, and FM 3-96). The reader should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process relates to the Army’s military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures described in ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0. The reader must also understand the concepts associated with mission command as described in ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0. Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding ATP 3-96.1.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (FM 27-10.)

ATP 3-96.1 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-96.1 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for ATP 3-96.1 is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing agency is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms, to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine and Collective Training Division, ATTN: ATZK-TDD, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410; by email to usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Chapter 1
Organization and Capabilities

ATP 3-96.1 provides an overview of security force assistance (SFA), describes the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) organization and the higher headquarters structure in theater. ATP 3-96.1 also discusses the primary mission and roles of the SFAB and describes the structure and duties of the advising team members.

SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-1. Security force assistance has always played a vital role in the U.S. Army’s history. The background nature of SFA operations relegates them to obscurity behind the large conventional military battles throughout history. However, the Army’s history is full of security force assistance ranging from training police in Bosnia to large scale operations in Vietnam and Iraq, all of which provided vital contributions to achieving our nation’s goals.

1-2. The U.S. Army SFAB is the Army’s dedicated conventional organization for conducting SFA around the world. While each SFAB has a regional focus, its unique capabilities enable it to perform wherever it is needed with minimal cultural and regional orientation.

1-3. The SFAB deploys to develop foreign security force capabilities to prevent conflicts, as a deterrent to shape the environment, and when necessary, to bolster foreign security forces (FSF) to a level that it can win and establish a secure environment. The SFAB is designed to be employed as individual teams with the brigade headquarters exercising mission command from home station, with larger echelons deploying and controlling operations in-country, or by deploying the entire brigade into a theater.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND UNIFIED ACTION

1-4. The following paragraphs discuss key terms that facilitate the Soldier’s basic understanding of security force assistance, the role of Special Forces in SFA, and references for additional information. The paragraphs below also discuss the context in which the SFA nests into current joint and Army doctrine.

UNIFIED ACTION

1-5. *Unified action* (DOD) is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). *Unity of effort* (DOD) is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). As military forces synchronize actions, they achieve unity of effort. Unified action includes actions of Army, joint, multinational forces, and the private sector. Through military engagement, military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army’s contribution to unified action is unified land operations. Unlike unilateral U.S. operations, which are solely concerned with the U.S. forces actions, SFA depends upon the U.S. and the partner foreign security forces’ actions. For example, if an SFAB is assigned to advise (a task that resides doctrinally under security cooperation as illustrated by figure 1-1) foreign security force elements that are conducting a defense, and then the foreign security force received a change of mission to participate as part of an offense or a stability action, the SFAB would advise according to the task that the partner foreign security force is conducting. The SFAB is designed to interact with unified action partners aimed at achieving unity of effort in our national interests. (See JP 3-0.) (Figure 1-1, page 1-2.)
Chapter 1

Unified Land Operations (ADRP 3-0)
- Offense
- Defense
- Stability
- Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Stability Tasks (ADRP 3-07)
- Establish civil security
- Establish civil control
- Restore essential services
- Support governance
- Support economic and infrastructure development
- Conduct security cooperation (overarching tasks)

Security Cooperation Activities (FM 3-22)
- Security assistance
- Security force assistance (specified)
- Internal defense and development
- Foreign internal defense
- Security sector reform

Security Force Assistance Tasks (FM 3-22)
OTERA-A
- Organize
- Train
- Equip
- Rebuild and build
- Advise and assist
- Assess

Figure 1-1. Doctrine hierarchy

Unified Land Operations

1-6. *Unified land operations* are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authorities’ tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Unified land operations are the Army’s operational concept and the Army’s contribution to unified action. The goal of unified land operations is to apply land power as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander’s end state. Unified land operations is how the Army applies combat power through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and to consolidate gains. Where possible, military forces working with unified action partners seek to prevent or deter threats. However, if necessary, military forces possess the capability in unified land operations to prevail over aggression. (See ADRP 3-0.)
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-7. Security force assistance is defined as the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). SFA is an activity that is used to improve the capability and capacity of partner nations’ or regional security organizations’ security forces. These forces are referred to as FSF. FSF are forces that provide security for a nation and its relevant population or forces that support a regional security organization’s mission. These forces include military, paramilitary, police, intelligence forces, border police, coast guard, customs officials, prison guards, and correctional personnel.

1-8. SFA occurs within the framework of unified land operations (ADRP 3-0). SFA supports the primary stability tasks of establishing civil security, establishing civil control, and conducting security cooperation. At the operational level, when SFA is the priority, less offense and defense operations are executed relative to stability operations. At the tactical level, however, the frequency of offensive and defense operations adjusts to address the local situation and align with the foreign security forces’ efforts.

1-9. Military forces can conduct SFA across the conflict continuum. SFA activities could focus on improving the security forces of a partner nation that is currently under no immediate threat, on paramilitary forces to counter an insurgency, or on advising the FSF in large scale operations against an external threat.

1-10. SFA can occur across the range of military operations; military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, limited contingency, and crisis response. SFA supports the geographical combatant commander’s theater security cooperation requirements.

1-11. While Army units are vital contributors, SFA is part of a comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach includes close collaboration with military, civilian, joint, and multinational forces. The combatant commander, commander of U.S. forces in the country or region, and the U.S. ambassador are key actors within the comprehensive approach. The SFA must be based on the theater campaign plan, operational campaign plan, and missions and activities directed by the U.S. country team. The SFAB must conduct an objective, continuous assessment that examines the organization, training, equipment, rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved including supporting institutions to accomplish U.S. national objectives within the country or region.

1-12. Law enforcement, military, intelligence, border control forces, and their supporting institutions operate and cooperate within the security sector. U.S. forces must understand how these units are intended to operate in the partner nation scheme, which may be completely different when compared to a U.S. model. U.S. forces should plan to help develop the respective capabilities so that these units can carry out their security functions independently.

1-13. The goal of SFA is to develop and institutionalize the foreign security forces’ ability to successfully plan, prepare, and execute their security missions across the executive, generating, and operating functions (JP 3-20). U.S. forces must be able to advise and integrate SFA into the FSF operations process at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. SFA works seamlessly with the partner nation government at all levels from national to local. (See FM 3-22.)

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE RELATED OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1-14. SFA is one of the five security cooperation activities described in FM 3-22, which includes security assistance, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, and security sector reform. (See JP 3-22, FM 3-07, FM 3-22, and AR 11-31.)

SECURITY COOPERATION

1-15. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U. S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-20). Security
cooperation occurs across the spectrum of conflict and is not exclusively a peacetime activity. Security cooperation includes security assistance programs administered by the Department of Defense as well as activities that enhance interoperability and the collective capability of combined forces (using Title 10 or exercising funding and authority). Security cooperation consists of a bilateral and multilateral defense activities program conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. Various sections of Title 10 and specific public laws addressing Department of Defense interactions with other nations govern security cooperation.

1-16. AR 11-31 establishes the Department of the Army policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the planning, integration, programming, budgeting, and execution of Army security cooperation activities. AR 11-31 is the policy of the U.S. Army to conduct security cooperation activities in compliance with higher-level guidance and in the execution of Army responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 22 which governs the transfer, exchange, conduct, and development of defense articles and services via a variety of U.S. Government programs.

1-17. Commanders distinguish security cooperation from SFA based on using programmatic activities to build relationships and capacities.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

1-18. Security assistance, is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by the Department of Defense. Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20). Security assistance programs typically focus on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, provide training and education to foreign military personnel, and the sale of construction services to support partner nations’ military establishments.

1-19. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) 5105.38M, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), describes the scope of security assistance programs in detail. Security assistance allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments. These transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans. If these transfers are essential to the security and economic well-being of multinational governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the United States. U.S. forces can use security assistance to deliver defense weapon systems to foreign governments; to train international students; to advise other governments on improving internal defense capabilities; and to provide guidance and assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases for regional stability.

1-20. The military component of security assistance, implemented by Department of Defense with policies established by the Department of State, has four principal components: International military education and training, foreign military sales, foreign military financing, and peace operations. Foreign military financing and international military education and training fall inside the military assistance budget process of the Department of State. In addition to funding peace operations, the military components of security assistance are defined below:

- International military education and training contributes to internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian personnel on a grant aid basis (JP 3-22). These programs help to strengthen foreign militaries through training for the proper functioning of a civilian-controlled, apolitical, professional military. International military education and training serves as a foreign policy tool where the United States shapes doctrine; promotes self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating United States-acquired defense equipment; encourages the value of rule of law; and occasionally has a marked effect on the policies of the recipient governments. Foreign students, many of who occupy the middle and upper echelons of their country’s military and political establishments, are taught U.S. doctrine and weapons systems employment resulting in greater cooperation and interoperability.
- Foreign military sales is a nonappropriated program through which foreign governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States (JP 3-22). Eligible nations use this program to help build national security infrastructures.
- Foreign military financing provides funding to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through foreign military sales or commercial channels (JP 3-22). This program can assist nations with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford U.S. assistance. The foreign military financing program can fund foreign military sales.

**STABILITY**

1-21. Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in the law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying, targeting, and mitigating the root causes of instability to set the conditions for long-term development by building the capacity of local institutions.

1-22. Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. A catastrophic event, humanitarian crisis, foreign power-instigated violence, insurgency, domestic rebellion, and civil war may cause instability. Several factors encourage instability. First, instability stems from decreased support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their government. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements. Lastly, instability increases when the normal functions of society are undermined; instead, the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.

**Stability Tasks and the Security Force Assistance Brigade**

1-23. *Stability tasks* are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-07).

1-24. Six primary Army stability tasks correspond to the stability sectors adopted by the U.S. Department of State. Of the six Army stability tasks, generally the SFAB focuses on establishing civil security, establishing civil control, and conducting security cooperation. The subordinate tasks performed by military forces under the primary stability tasks directly support broader efforts within the stability sectors executed as part of unified action. The tasks provide a framework to understand the various lines of effort that other governmental, joint, multinational, and partnered organizations are executing to improve the stability in the area of operations. The six Army stability tasks are:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Conduct security cooperation.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

**Establish Civil Security**

1-25. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the partner nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats; and is essential to providing a safe and secure environment. Without a reasonable level of civil security, other stability tasks are infeasible. Civil security requires five necessary conditions:

- Cessation of large-scale violence.
- Public order.
- Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence.
- Physical protection.
- Territorial security.
Establish Civil Control

1-26. Establishing civil control centers on justice reform and the rule of law, public order, underpinned by efforts to rebuild the partner nation judiciary, police, and corrections systems. It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, including police, prosecutorial arm, public defense, courts, and corrections. Civil control tasks, along with oversight, accountability, and transparency of the justice sector deter corruption that threatens security, justice, and governance institutions. Impartiality of judges in their application of the law to incarcerate convicted individuals is essential to building public trust in due process and a just system. Civil control tasks focus on building temporary or interim capabilities to pave the way for the partner nation or international organizations to implement as permanent capabilities. Civil control includes the following necessary conditions:

- Fair and impartial legal frameworks.
- Public order.
- Accountability to the law.
- Access to justice.
- Culture of lawfulness.

Conduct Security Cooperation

1-27. Establishing or reestablishing competent partner nation security forces is fundamental to providing lasting safety and security of the partner nation and its population. These forces primarily counter external threats. However, they also assist in other key missions including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and some other internal military threats. Developing partner nation security forces is integral to successful operations characterized by stability tasks and includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of partner nation security forces. (See ADRP 3-07.)

Supporting Stability Tasks

1-28. The following stability tasks are generally led by the Department of State or other organizations external to the SFAB. However, these tasks and the organizations that are leading them will influence the SFAB area of operations and must be understood by commanders and staff and considered during the planning process.

Restore Essential Services

1-29. Efforts to restore essential services ultimately contribute to achieving a stable government, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. In failing or failed states, or in the aftermath of armed conflict and major disasters, military forces may support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services; the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. The immediate humanitarian needs and security for local populace are always a foremost priority. Provision of essential services includes the following necessary conditions:

- Access to and delivery of basic needs and services.
- Access to and delivery of education.
- Return and resettlement of dislocated civilians.
- Social reconstruction.

Support to Governance

1-30. Governance is the process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function; effective, legitimate governance ensures that these are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Military efforts to support governance help to build progress toward achieving effective, legitimate governance. Military support to governance focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. The support provided by military forces helps to shape the environment for extended unified action by other partners. Their efforts eventually enable the partner nation to develop an open political
process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks. Good governance includes the following necessary conditions:
- Provision of essential services.
- Stewardship of state resources.
- Political moderation and accountability.
- Civic participation and empowerment.

Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

1-31. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. It focuses on the society’s physical aspects that enable the state’s economic viability. These physical aspects of infrastructure include construction services, engineering, and physical infrastructure in the following sectors:
- Transportation, such as roads, bridges, railways, airports, ports, and waterways.
- Telecommunications.
- Energy (such as natural resources, the electrical power sector, and energy production) and distribution.
- Municipal and other public services.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-32. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

1-33. SFA and the foreign internal defense enable partners to provide for their own security, with a collective goal of contributing to broader regional or global security challenges in support of U.S. policy and interests. However, SFA is not the same as the foreign internal defense, but the actions to organize, train, equip, rebuild, build, and advise, elements of SFA, may take place in conjunction with foreign internal defense activities. At operational and strategic levels, both the foreign internal defense and SFA focus on preparing the FSF to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, and other internal threats to their security; however, SFA also prepares the FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international force.

1-34. SFA activities support efforts by increasing the capacity and capability of partner security forces. Foreign internal defense directly supports activities that involve organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, advising, and assisting the FSF to combat internal threats. The SFA can help set conditions for the conduct of the foreign internal defense when there are external threats that the FSF does not have the capability or capacity to mitigate or overcome. Foreign internal defense includes indirect support, direct support (not involving U.S. combat operations), and combat operations. (See JP 3-22 and ATP 3-05.2.)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-35. Many criteria determine when conventional forces, special operations forces, or a combination are appropriate to conduct SFA. Military force levels, force characteristics, and other factors present planners with optimal, acceptable, and less desirable force package options when resourcing SFA missions. Deployment of a regionally aligned force for an SFA mission depends on the validated requirement of the geographic combatant commander.

1-36. U.S. forces generally involve both conventional and special operations forces when conducting SFA operations. Army doctrine defines mission command and support relationships of both forces operating in the same area. Recent operational experience has shown that, in improving the effectiveness of the FSF, the supported commander conducting SFA may be either a conventional force or special operations forces commander. Subordinate commanders and staffs of both conventional forces and special operations forces may act in the supporting role to the U.S. ambassador. Typically, this is done through the security assistance officer or the defense attaché at the American Embassy.
SECTION II – ORGANIZATION

1-37. While the Army has conducted security force assistance in the past, the SFAB is a unique organization which is built specifically to conduct this task. The organization is designed to operate in and under a wide variety of threat environments, geographic locations, legal agreements, and command structures.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

1-38. The various theater command structures and environments that exist around the world, have significant impacts on the SFAB planning and operations processes. Specifically, the differences between operating within a designated joint operations area (JOA) versus working outside of a JOA are significant.

THEATER COMMAND STRUCTURES

1-39. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the mission command structure in which U.S. forces conduct SFA. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible. All participants must understand missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities. While well-defined in U.S. doctrine, command relationships are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the United States may operate in coalition or partnered operations.

1-40. The SFAB may be a supported command from a U.S. perspective as well as acting as a supporting command for the FSF in the SFAB’s area of operations. For example, an SFAB may support a joint interagency task force conducting international police training. Another example is a joint command supporting an SFAB with joint fires; intelligence, surveillance, civil-military operations, and reconnaissance; or other capabilities while the SFAB supports the FSF in training. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: Lead nation, integrated, or parallel command. Alliance and coalition commands use these structures.

1-41. A lead nation command structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command has a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. The command may have an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the commander to draw upon the expertise of multinational or coalition partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

1-42. Integrated command structures provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. An integrated, combined command has several distinguishing features. Besides a designated single commander, the staff consists of representatives from all member nations. Subordinate commands and staffs are integrated into the lowest echelon necessary.

1-43. A parallel command structure does not designate a single force commander. The coalition leadership develops a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. They can accomplish this by using coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the leadership should avoid the use of a parallel command structure.

Alliance Command Structures

1-44. In combined commands, national political objectives are addressed and usually subsumed within multinational force objectives at the alliance treaty level. Combined command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. In combined operations such as SFA, these structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Combined command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Senior military officers from member nations often lead subordinate commands. Effective operations within an alliance require senior political and military authorities to agree on the type of command relationships that govern the operations of the forces. Potential political sensitivities associated with SFA can impact command relationships and operating procedures.
Coalition Command Structures

1-45. Coalitions often form in response to unforeseen crises that occur outside the area of an established alliance, which is often the case for SFA. Coalition command relationships routinely evolve as the coalition develops. Coalitions often have one of two basic structures: Lead nation or parallel. For SFA, all participating coalition members should augment the partner nation headquarters staff with representatives. These representatives might include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. Such staffing provides the coalition commander with representative leadership and accessible expertise on the capabilities of the coalition members as well as facilitates the planning process. The integration of the multinational command elements into the coalition planning process should occur as early as practical.

COUNTRY TEAM

1-46. The country team plays a vital role with respect to SFA (figure 1-2, page 1-10). The country team is the senior, in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (JP 3-07.4). The chief of mission is the highest U.S. civil authority in a foreign country. As the senior U.S. Government official permanently assigned in the partner nation, the chief of mission is responsible to the President for policy oversight of all U.S. Government programs. The senior defense official is the principal Department of Defense official in a U.S. embassy as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The senior defense official is the command’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited Department of Defense military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all Department of Defense matters involving the embassy or Department of Defense elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The senior defense official is considered the chief of both the security cooperation organization and the defense attaché office in the embassy. The country team develops measures to promote security in conjunction with the partner nation through the development of a yearly theater security cooperation plan. The theater security cooperation plan links the geographic combatant commander’s regional strategy to military operations. The Foreign Service Act assigns the mission chief to a foreign country with responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country except for U.S. Service members and employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander (FM 3-22 and JP 3-07).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-47. There are two main operational environments in which the SFAB units operate: Inside of a geographic combatant command designated joint operations area and outside of a designated JOA. Both scenarios have different legal and operational considerations.

OPERATING INSIDE A DESIGNATED JOINT OPERATIONAL AREA

1-48. When operating inside of an established JOA, the Department of Defense is usually the lead agency with the U.S. Department of State as the supporting agency. In this scenario, SFAB commanders must operate within the Department of Defense nested concept for SFA, especially with their higher military headquarters, along with direct liaison to the embassy country team. The SFAB is assigned to the area military commander, such as the joint force commander or a subordinate commander.

1-49. Operations inside of a geographic combatant commander established JOA gives the joint force commander significant authorities and responsibilities. The joint force commander assigns subordinate organizations to conduct military operations within those areas of operations. The SFAB focuses on SFA tasks at the tactical or operational level. The SFAB can exercise mission command of forces other than SFA elements with augmentation. The SFAB has no organic capability to be assigned an area of operations without augmentation. That augmentation can come in the form of FSF or other military forces. Depending on the size of the assigned area of operations and mission, the SFAB may require augmentation to conduct terrain management, information collection, civil military operations, air and ground movement control, clearance of fires, security, personnel recovery, medical support, and other environment considerations.

1-50. The SFAB, operating inside an established JOA, has an established sustainment network for support. Inside the JOA, the SFAB formation is dependent on the sustainment network of the supporting command for administration control and life support functions (such as field feeding, all classes of resupply, and field and sustainment maintenance of all equipment), as well as religious, legal, force health protection and health service support, finance, postal, personnel, and administrative services.
OPERATING OUTSIDE A DESIGNATED JOINT OPERATIONAL AREA

1-51. When operating outside of a JOA or when a JOA is not established, the SFAB operates at the invitation of the partner nation. The invitation is facilitated through the ambassador (chief of mission) from the geographic combatant commander and under the auspices of security cooperation. The military personnel conducting security cooperation operations are subject to the laws and rules established by the partner nation, the ambassador, and the status-of-forces agreement. Unless otherwise specified, the partner nation is responsible for the security of the personnel assigned to the SFAB formations; however, SFAB personnel always have the right of self-defense.

1-52. The SFAB formation, operating outside an established JOA, may not have a well-established sustainment network. The SFAB formation is dependent on the Army Service component command (ASCC) and the partner nation for many administrative control and life support functions (field feeding, all classes of resupply, and field-level and sustainment-level maintenance of all equipment), as well as some religious, legal, force health protection and health service support, finance, postal, personnel, and administrative services. Depending on formation usage, some forms of sustainment may be coordinated through embassy country team contract support or the Army Contracting Command, Contracting Support Brigade providing contracting support in the particular supporting ASCC’s area of operations. The logistics civil augmentation program has an ASCC aligned task order that can be leveraged to rapidly provide a full range of military sustainment functions both within and outside of the JOA. The logistics civil augmentation program is the strategic (preferred) source for operational contract support. To facilitate mission command, SFAB headquarters elements may be collocated with U.S. embassies, the regional ASCC, a theater special operations command, or the geographic combatant commander based on environmental and mission variables.

ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES AND CAPABILITIES

1-53. The SFAB conducts tactical and operational advising tasks to support theater and strategic objectives. The following list depicts the organizing principles of the SFAB at the tactical and operational levels, and embassy directed missions, while retaining the capability to expand to full combat formations as required. The SFAB—

- Can establish multtier advising teams to support partner nation security sector reform, FSF training, advising, assisting, and providing operational support.
- Can integrate and employ joint fires across multiple domains to support partner nation forces and self-protection requirements.
- Is designed to work seamlessly with joint interagency, and multinational forces to support the theater security cooperation plan and associated shaping activities across the joint phasing construct.
- Can provide economy of force to the supported theater or assigned joint task force and Army forces commander; the mission tailorable nature of SFAB formations allows the distributed partnering of forces to consolidate gains and set conditions for operational transitions.
- Can detach task organized, mission tailored, cross-functional advising teams to support embassy or theater-directed security cooperation activities as required.
- Can share information with other service, joint, interagency, and multinational forces intelligence and collection organizations to facilitate targeting and support situational awareness.
- Can communicate beyond line of sight utilizing both terrestrial and space-based systems.
- Can organize as a brigade combat team (BCT) with augmentation. This capability provides strategic flexibility to the nation in the case of large scale conflicts.

1-54. In addition to the list above, SFABs allow the United States Army to preserve the readiness of its BCTs by conducting SFA missions primarily, which allows the BCTs to focus on large-scale combat operations.
ORGANIZATION DESIGN

1-55. The SFAB retains the standard command group rank structure of existing brigade and battalion headquarters, with the addition of an O-6 deputy commander. The SFAB’s companies contain slightly higher grades than other conventional BCTs. This grading facilitates the ability to conduct SFA with organizations at echelon or up to two levels higher.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

1-56. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have completed professional military education requirements at grade and have completed key and developmental assignments, preferably in a BCT, man the SFAB. Each brigade is assigned a common set of vehicles and equipment. SFAB battalions lack the capability-specific equipment that comes with a BCT (main battle tanks, Infantry fighting vehicles, and the like). The maneuver, engineer, and field artillery battalions do not have their branch-specific vehicular capabilities. The support battalion retains essential capabilities and equipment sets, such as the Forward Repair System Heavy, the Standard Army Tool System, and contact maintenance shop sets required to repair wheeled vehicles and ground support equipment.

ARMORED AND INFANTRY VARIANTS

1-57. Each SFAB, both Armored and Infantry variants, has two maneuver battalions, a Cavalry squadron, a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a military intelligence company, a signal company, a support battalion, and a headquarters and headquarters company. The organizational charts are shown in figure 1-3, page 1-13 and figure 1-4, page 1-13.

1-58. Each maneuver battalion and Cavalry squadron has a headquarters and headquarters company or troop and three maneuver companies or troops. The field artillery battalion has a headquarters and headquarters battery and two cannon batteries. The engineer battalion has one headquarters and headquarters company and two engineer companies. They also have a military intelligence company and a signal company. The support battalion has a headquarters support company, which includes a small distribution, maintenance, field feeding, and medical treatment section.

1-59. The Armor maneuver battalions have two Armor companies and one Infantry company. For the Infantry SFAB, both ground maneuver battalions are light-Infantry based with three light Infantry companies.
Figure 1-3. Infantry security force assistance brigade organization

Figure 1-4. Armored security force assistance brigade organization
SECTION III – MISSION AND ROLES

1-60. Current and future events around the world require the Army to project combat power and influence conditions using innovative means. The SFAB provides a force that’s scalable, flexible, and adaptable; yet at the same time provides a leadership framework for expanding into a full brigade combat team if the need should arise.

MISSION

1-61. The core mission of the SFAB is to assess, train, advise, and assist FSF in coordination with joint, interagency, and multinational forces to improve partner capability and capacity and to facilitate achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. This mission set is developed from the organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess concept (known as OTERA-A) described in FM 3-22. Emphasis is placed on the tasks that are most appropriate for the SFAB to conduct. While the SFAB influences the tasks of organize, equip, rebuild and build, generally, external organizations lead these tasks.

1-62. The SFAB primarily operates forward deployed in theater partnered with equivalent or higher echelon (including ministerial) FSF. Additionally, the SFAB can be directed to conduct distributed, task-organized, cross-functional security cooperation activities to support a combatant commander theater security cooperation plan. Finally, since the leadership structure of the organization is modeled after a BCT, with augmentation (personnel and equipment), the SFAB can organize as a fully functional Infantry brigade combat team or Armored brigade combat team to support large-scale combat operations when necessary. Expansion of an SFAB is a deliberate operation requiring sufficient lead-time to fully man, equip, and train prior to employment.

1-63. The SFAB can detach cross-functional advising teams to increase the area and number of partnered training and operational activities and events. These task-organized formations can support extended duration operations in theater by providing a rotational capability internal to the SFAB.

SUBORDINATE UNIT ROLES

1-64. The most important role of the brigade and battalion headquarters is to provide mission command to their subordinate advising teams in support of their primary mission, which is to develop the FSF.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1-65. The SFAB headquarters and headquarters company supports mission command of subordinate battalions and coordinates with functional companies and attachments. When necessary, the headquarters and headquarters company prepares to assess, train, advise, and assist their counterparts in planning, coordinating, and synchronizing missions. The brigade staff provides the warfighting functional mission command capabilities, to include limited cyberspace electromagnetic activities defensive systems and tools.

MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND CAVALRY SQUADRON

1-66. The SFAB maneuver battalions and the SFAB Cavalry squadron assesses, trains, advises, and assists partnered security forces to control and synchronize maneuver to mass the effects of combat power, both direct and indirect, to gain an advantage on the enemy. The staffs of the maneuver battalions and the Cavalry squadron train, advise, and assist their assigned counterparts in planning, coordinating, and synchronizing combat and other operations. The advising teams of the maneuver battalion and the Cavalry squadron must be prepared to execute tasks with a foreign security force across the range of military operations including military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, limited contingency, and crisis response.
**FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION**

1-67. The SFAB field artillery battalion assesses, trains, advises, and assists partnered security forces to conduct targeting, deliver fires, and integrate fires with other forces in the operational environment. Advising teams advise and train the partner nation security force in the maintenance of its indirect fires systems and must be prepared to support partner nation security forces with indirect fires (through effective use of joint fire assets) to support combat operations if necessary. The SFAB field artillery battalion does not have organic cannon or rocket artillery systems.

**ENGINEER BATTALION**

1-68. The SFAB engineer battalion assesses, trains, advises, and assists the partnered security force to preserve combat power and protect the population through training on emplacing, breaching, reducing obstacles, and route clearance techniques. The engineer battalion also has a small military intelligence company and a signal company that provide limited support to the brigade relative to their counterparts in a conventional BCT. Generally, these companies work with and provide support to the brigade staff. The battalion trains the partnered force on construction tasks and construction equipment operations, as necessary. Though the engineers must be prepared to train the tasks listed above, they require specific equipment (Volcano mine systems, Husky detection systems, road graders, and so forth) to conduct these tasks independently. The engineer battalion has limited capability and capacity to facilitate friendly mobility without augmentation.

**Military Intelligence Company**

1-69. The military intelligence company has limited resources, specifically in personnel and time, to analyze and process single-source intelligence. The organization is designed to work closely with the brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) and provide additional capabilities to include counterintelligence, geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, all-source intelligence, open-source research, and a staff weather office. While not trained as advisors, Soldiers of this company may be used to augment advising teams to provide technical expertise to the advising team or the FSF when necessary.

**Signal Company**

1-70. The signal company is subordinate to the engineer battalion. The signal company provides the SFAB with voice and data retransmission capability for its tactical radio network and worldwide digital voice and data communications using augmented Warfighter Information Network-Tactical assets. The combination of these capabilities allows commanders to conduct mission command throughout the SFAB’s area of responsibility. The signal company is comprised of a retransmission team and a medium network team. Supplementation of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical assets to the SFAB happens by using personnel and equipment from signal platoons assigned from one of the Army’s expeditionary signal companies. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical additionally increases the SFAB’s communications capabilities by allowing the integration of the tactical radio network into the Department of Defense Information Network-Army.

1-71. The retransmission team provides line-of-sight extension of voice and data communications throughout the SFAB’s tactical radio network within a specified area of operation. The retransmission team accomplishes this by using single-channel ground and airborne radio systems, frequency-hopping multiplexers, and omnidirectional antenna systems.

1-72. The medium network team provides beyond line-of-sight voice and data transmission capability throughout the SFAB’s tactical radio network. The Soldier Radio Waveform radios provide this capability using transportable tactical command communications for satellite transmission. The SFAB headquarters and each battalion within the SFAB have Soldier Radio Waveform radios, while the medium network team install and maintain the transportable tactical command communications.

1-73. The signal company and other units throughout the SFAB also have multiband multi-mission radios that allow broadband voice and data transmission up to the top secret level. The radios are compatible with numerous line-of-sight and satellite communications waveforms including very high frequency,
ultrahigh frequency, the single-channel ground and airborne radio system, and the Soldier Radio Waveform.

SUPPORT BATTALION

1-74. The SFAB support battalion provides the following capabilities to support the brigade: Sustainment coordination and synchronization, limited distribution (no supply support activity), limited field maintenance, field feeding, and enhanced role 1 medical. The support battalion maintains a small but mobile distribution, maintenance, and field feeding capability, which can provide limited support to the advising teams in theater and garrison operations. The support battalion coordinates sustainment support between each advising team and the theater support structure. Usually, the brigade support battalion (BSB) headquarters is collocated with the brigade headquarters. The BSB has limited organic structure to physically support the advising teams but has a number of senior sustainment personnel that can coordinate with the theater sustainment structure in a JOA and a non-JOA designated environment. While its priority is supporting the brigade’s advising teams and coordinating external support, BSB personnel can assess, train, advise, and assist partner nation security forces within their capabilities.

ADVISOR ROLE

1-75. The SFAB is designed, manned, equipped, and employed with the mission to advise FSF. Soldiers serving in an SFAB, in any capacity, have an expectation to serve as advisors when necessary. To help understand the advisor role, Soldiers need to understand the broader context of U.S. national foreign policy in which an advisor operates. The advisor mission is critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives and continues to be a primary tool for working with foreign partners to develop their capabilities and capacities to address shared U.S. and partner security interests. (See ATP 3-07.10.)

SECTION IV – ADVISING TEAM ECHELONS

1-76. Advising teams at the various echelons provide the combat power, through their influence with the FSF, of the SFAB. Composed of technically and tactically competent Soldiers, these teams must be creative, flexible, resilient, and prepared to conduct decentralized operations.

TASK ORGANIZATION

1-77. The advising teams are the primary organizations within the SFAB to leverage effects and generally consist of twelve personnel. Advising teams are composed of experienced, motivated, and highly skilled Soldiers, the core of which is designated as primary advisors. Through their enablers, they provide knowledge and experience to the FSF across the warfighting functions. Based on operational and mission variables, all advising teams are designed to operate at echelon or up to two levels higher. At each echelon, the advising teams are divided into an operations and support section to facilitate mission command while executing operations. The advising teams at the various levels are referred to as follows and arrayed across the brigade as depicted in figure 1-5, page 1-18:

- Advising team. Captains lead advising teams, which generally consist of twelve Soldiers per team. The maneuver battalions and the Cavalry squadron do not require augmentation to outfit their advising teams with the full complement of twelve personnel. The field artillery and engineer battalions provide these teams as well; however, they only consist of four Soldiers and generally must be attached to other advising teams or augmented with additional personnel when conducting operations. The support battalion does not have designated advising teams. These teams have the capability to conduct operations at the platoon, company, or battalion level.

- Company advising team. The company advising teams are led by a major and generally consist of twelve Soldiers per team. The maneuver battalions and the Cavalry squadron do not require augmentation to outfit their company advising teams with the full complement of twelve personnel. The field artillery and engineer battalions provide these teams as well; however, they only consist of four Soldiers and generally must be attached to other advising teams or augmented with additional personnel when conducting operations. The support battalion does not have
designated company advising teams. These teams have the capability to conduct operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.

- Battalion and brigade advising teams. There is no designated structure for the battalion or brigade advising teams. The brigade, maneuver battalions, and the Cavalry squadron headquarters have a number of trained advisers that can be cobbled together to form their own twelve-Soldier team. Additional teams can be formed using brigade and battalion advisers augmented with Soldiers from subordinate advising teams. The field artillery, engineer, and support battalions have less advisor trained personnel and generally are unable to field their own twelve-Soldier teams without augmentation. Battalion advising teams are designed to operate at the battalion, brigade, or division level while the brigade advising teams can advise up to the corps level.

1-78. While the capability exists to advise two echelons higher, mission analysis determines whether or not that is appropriate. Generally an experienced, professional, and well-established FSF requires pairing at the advising team’s organic echelon or perhaps one level higher. A less experienced FSF allows for the advising teams to advise one, or even two, echelons higher. During mission analysis, commanders and staffs must weigh the FSF experience level, the effects the SFAB is trying to achieve, resources and time available, and other relevant factors to determine the best distribution of the advising teams. As with all missions, commanders must assess risk, which in this case includes considering whether the teams have the appropriate experience to advise their counterparts versus being able to impact the maximum number of FSF organizations.

1-79. The SFAB is designed to field 36 advising teams at the company echelon and below. The SFAB has the capability to form additional teams, generally at the battalion and higher echelons, by consolidating advisor trained personnel and other enablers in the field artillery, engineer, and support battalions as well as the maneuver battalions, Cavalry squadron, and brigade headquarters. Generally, these additional teams are built to meet specific requirements that are beyond the capabilities of the standard advising teams.
1-80. Before assigning new personnel to an advising team, the SFAB commander and senior enlisted advisor conduct interviews to determine the breadth and quality of their experience. This facilitates each team being well-rounded and flexible. Commanders provide robust mission command cells when operations demand them, particularly for decentralized operations. Commanders task organize advising teams to meet the unique requirements of a mission based on the analysis of operational and mission variables.

1-81. Every theater and operation has unique characteristics that determine the required team capabilities at all echelons. Following is a list of additional team training and capabilities that leaders must consider and assign prior to executing any mission:

- Field ordering officer and pay agent duties. Rank requirements are based on theater policy.
- Electronic warfare team equipment training.
- Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training.
- Foreign weapons and equipment training.

Figure 1-5. Advising teams by echelon
Organization and Capabilities

- Language training and familiarization.
- Cultural awareness and history.
- Foreign disclosure officer training.
- Defense Strategic Debriefing Course.
- Battle staff training.
- Joint fires observer certification.
- Company intelligence support team operations.
- Biometrics training.
- Unmanned aircraft system training.
- Air assault and pathfinder certification.
- Master gunner qualification.

ADVISING TEAM

1-82. Advising teams are the base element in the SFAB and are unique among conventional Army formations. The general functions of the various team members are described in the paragraphs that follow. While team leaders and commanders may change the advising team based on operational and mission variables, generally, the advising team consists of twelve personnel and is arrayed as depicted in figure 1-6, page 1-20. Senior advisors lead the operations section and the support section. Both of the Infantry or Armor battalions, as well as the Cavalry squadron, can field nine of these teams, which are assigned the warfighting function enablers. The field artillery and engineer battalions can each provide four advising teams of four personnel each, which generally require additional enabler and other augmentation to conduct operations with the FSF. Refer to figure 1-5, page 1-18, for additional clarification.

COMPANY ADVISING TEAM

1-83. Each maneuver company and Cavalry squadron troop, with the exception of the headquarters and headquarters company or troop, can field one company advising team. With augmentation, both the field artillery and engineer battalions can field two company level advising teams each. The personnel assigned to the company advising team have two sets of responsibilities, both external to the FSF and internally to the organization. The external function of each member of the advising team is tailored to support the assigned organization based on the unit assessment of the FSF and within the scope of the given mission and resources. The internal functions of the team members are listed in FM 3-21.10. When the company advising team is advising the FSF, detailed mission command planning must take place according to organizational reporting structures described in chapter three. Without augmentation, the company does not have the personnel to advise an FSF and exercise mission command of subordinate units at the same time.

1-84. While commanders may change the structure of the organizations based on environmental and mission variables, normally, the company advising team is arrayed as depicted in figure 1-6, page 1-20. Generally, since the company advising team is aligned with the same duty positions as the subordinate advising teams, their external functions are similar and should be used as a reference. However, company advising teams must be versed in staff operations and can assume that most of their advising is done in this environment. Since the majority of the team consists of staff sergeants, likely many without significant staff experience, additional staff training and preparation should be conducted prior to executing a deployment.
1-85. Advising team functions are divided into two areas, internal and external, as described below:

- Internal functions directly support the advising team. These functions include pay, evaluations, and promotions as well as maintenance and supply.
- External functions pertain to the advising team’s mission as it relates to the FSF. Individuals or units build the FSF capability and capacity through performing these functions. These functions may be narrow in scope or apply across warfighting areas. External functions illustrate a method of dividing responsibilities within an advising team, but are not all inclusive or appropriate for all situations.

**Team Leader**

1-86. The team leader is a commissioned officer. The team leader is directly involved with advising the FSF commander and senior staff. The team leader is responsible for leading the team through the execution of battle drills. The team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Leads all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Conducts assessments of the foreign security forces’ capabilities.
- Approves all outgoing reports.
- Provides input for, and submits, the FSF training and readiness reports.
- Ensures the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Ensures operations are conducted in a safe manner and ensures the integration of risk management (ATP 5-19).
- Accounts for team equipment.
- Educates self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the operational environment.

1-87. The team leader performs the following external functions:

- Advises the FSF commander.
- Liaises with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducts cross-cultural negotiations with the FSF.
- Supports the FSF with capabilities.

**Assistant Team Leader**

1-88. The assistant team leader is the senior noncommissioned officer on the advising team. The assistant team leader is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advising team. They are the primary advisor to the team leader and fill the team leader role in their absence. The assistant team leader performs the following internal functions:

- Leads the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Plans training to ensure the team’s combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.
● Reviews the team’s operations and training calendars.
● Coordinates staff actions before they reach the team leader.
● Directs the team’s budget.
● Manages and directs interpreters.
● Writes outgoing reports and messages.

1-89. The assistant team leader performs the following external functions:
● Represents the team in the absence of the team leader.
● Advises the foreign security forces’ leadership.
● Assists the FSF senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) with enforcing the commander’s intent, maintaining discipline, and conducting precombat checks.
● Provides input for the FSF training and readiness assessments.
● Reviews programs of instruction prior to execution.
● Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

SENIOR ADVISOR, OPERATIONS

1-90. The operations senior advisor is an NCO within an advising team and is an officer within the company advising team. They are responsible for advising the operational functions with the FSF to include intelligence, maneuver, fires, and explosive hazard operations. Since the assistant operations advisor reports to the operations senior advisor, they have the responsibility to monitor the human resource functions of the FSF. When conducting battle drills, the operations senior advisor serves as the team leader for the operations section. The operations senior advisor performs the following internal functions:
● Assists with mission command and leads the operations team.
● Leads team members in the daily routine to ensure all mission requirements take place.
● Assists the team leader with developing an operations schedule for the team including a synchronization matrix. Maintains the team operations calendar.
● Assists the assistant team leader with writing and reviewing required reports.
● Ensures team equipment is serviceable.
● Ensures uniform standards are met.

1-91. The operations senior advisor performs the following external functions:
● Advises the FSF operations to include current and future operations planning, battle tracking, and reporting.
● Advises the FSF operations staff in base defense, traffic control points, detainee operations, and other relevant operations.
● Promotes the importance of the NCO corps within the FSF through counseling and development.
● Advises the FSF on the basic tenets of troop welfare.
● Provides input on the FSF readiness.
● Adheres to the principles of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
● Supports the FSF with capabilities.

ASSISTANT OPERATIONS ADVISOR

1-92. An NCO, generally with Infantry or Armor experience, fills the assistant operations advisor position. They are responsible for assisting the team leadership with mission command and managing administrative functions. The assistant operations advisor serves as an operations team member, also, and reports to the operations senior advisor. The assistant operations advisor performs the following internal functions:
● Provides input for training assessments.
● Establishes and maintains the team’s operations center.
In most cases, serves as the advising team pay agent according to combatant command guidance and procedures.

Ensures team members are administratively ready to deploy (wills, powers of attorney, insurance, record of emergency data, emergency notifications, and so forth).

Prepares personnel accountability and morning reports.

Maintains a team administrative records book.

Manages promotions, reenlistments, pay issues, mail, and awards.

Monitors family readiness and maintains team social roster.

1-93. The assistant operations advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advises the FSF on human resource operations including military pay and personnel accountability.
- Assists the FSF with processing personnel to support operations which includes casualty tracking.
- Trains the FSF administrative personnel.
- Assesses the FSF personnel systems and operations.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARD ADVISOR

1-94. The explosive hazard advisor is an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team leader certified NCO who is responsible for providing explosive hazard technical and tactical advice to the team leader. They provide the same advice to the FSF, which includes training the FSF explosive hazard personnel when appropriate. They serve as an operations team member and report to the operations senior advisor. The explosive hazard advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Provides input for training assessments.
- Provides explosive hazard technical and tactical advice.
- Provides EOD response capability for limited scope and limited duration missions in direct support of the advising team’s mission.
- Prepares and submits EOD specific reporting requirements via the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Information Management System.
- Assists the team leader when coordinating for external EOD assets.

1-95. The explosive hazard advisor performs the following external functions:

- Provides explosive hazard technical and tactical advice to the FSF.
- Consolidates FSF external EOD support requests.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR

1-96. The intelligence advisor is an NCO who is responsible for preparing team intelligence reports, conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), assisting the team leader in building an information collection plan, and requesting external resources. The intelligence advisor assists the foreign security force with the same functions. They also serve as an operations team member and report to the operations senior advisor. The intelligence advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Advises the team leader on intelligence.
- Monitors routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, and recent activities).
- Provides reach back capability to leverage multidiscipline, multiechelon intelligence enablers in support of advising team operations.
- Maintains the cultural calendar and advises the team of key dates and significant activities.
- Trains and advises the team in the use of biometric and forensic equipment used in tactical site exploitation.
- Advises on the intelligence preparation of the operational environment to support operations.
Organization and Capabilities

- Advises on the preparation of the information collection plan.
- Assists the team with collecting information for required reports during missions.
- Coordinates through higher headquarters for counterintelligence support for insider threat, antiterrorism, and force protection assessments.
- Provides input for training assessments.
- Assists with monitoring the accountability for, and welfare of, interpreters.

1-97. The intelligence advisor performs the following external functions:
- Advises the FSF intelligence section.
- Advises the FSF on using intelligence assets.
- Advises the FSF on processing tactical information into predictive analysis.
- Supports intelligence for the FSF combat operations.
- Supports intelligence briefings to the FSF commander.
- Integrates intelligence reporting with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners’ intelligence enterprises, where allowed.
- Shares intelligence and information with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners according to foreign disclosure officer approval when allowed.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

FIRES ADVISOR

1-98. The fires advisor is an NCO who is responsible for developing a team fires plan, requesting external fires and assets, and assists the team leader with the clearance of fires. The fires advisor assists the FSF with many of the same functions. They serve as an operations team member and report to the operations senior advisor. The fires advisor performs the following internal functions:
- Assists the team leader with fires planning and coordinates with higher headquarters to verify and request the availability of fire support assets.
- Requests fire support assets to support the team.
- Provides team training on fire support procedures, assets, and capabilities.
- Assists the team leader with tracking all partnered force elements in the area of operation.
- Provides input for training assessments.

1-99. The fires advisor performs the following external functions:
- Assists with the planning, coordination, and employment of fire support for the partnered force.
- Trains and assists the FSF with improving their fire support processes.
- Supports the FSF with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
- Ensures the employment of U.S. or joint fires are properly cleared prior to execution.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

SENIOR ADVISOR, SUPPORT

1-100. The support senior advisor is an NCO who is responsible for advising the foreign security force on the support functions which include medical, maintenance, logistics, and communications. The support senior advisor serves as the team leader for the support section while executing battle drills. The support senior advisor performs the following internal functions:
- Assists with mission command and leads the support team.
- Assists the team leader with developing a training and support plan for the team including a training schedule. Consolidates information into the team synchronization matrix.
- Maintains a weekly training calendar.
- Assists the assistant team leader with writing and reviewing required reports.
- Ensures all team members can train and advise the FSF.
• Manages team drivers’ training program.
• Coordinates for team religious support.
• Ensures team equipment is serviceable.
• Ensures uniform standards are met.

1-101. The support senior advisor performs the following external functions:
• Advises and supports the foreign security forces’ support plans.
• Advises the FSF on roles and responsibilities of enlisted personnel.
• Promotes the importance of the NCO corps within the FSF through counseling and development.
• Advises the FSF on the basic tenets of troop welfare.
• Consolidates and coordinates the FSF external religious support requests.
• Provides input on the FSF training.
• Adheres to the principles of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the FSF with capabilities.

LOGISTICS ADVISOR

1-102. The logistics advisor is an NCO who is responsible for managing the team’s logistics and advising the FSF on issues which include property accountability, managing funds, and processing external support requests. They serve as a support team member and report to the support senior advisor. The logistics advisor performs the following internal functions:
• Advises the team leaders on logistics.
• Collects, processes, and coordinates for team logistics support through the next higher headquarters.
• Maintains equipment accountability and conducts periodic inventories of team equipment.
• Assists the assistant team leader with managing the team funds.
• Assists with tracking and monitoring contracts and deliverables.
• Coordinates with the logistics civil augmentation program forward elements and expeditionary contract administration on service delivery.
• Serves as the team armorer.
• Provides input for assessments.

1-103. The logistics advisor performs the following external functions:
• Advises the FSF on logistics, specifically supply and transportation.
• Assists the FSF with establishing and maintaining a system to track their deceased Soldiers.
• Advises the FSF on tracking and monitoring contract deliveries.
• Adheres to the principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

MEDICAL ADVISOR

1-104. The medical advisor is an NCO who is responsible for providing medical support to the advising team and advising the FSF on triage procedures, first responder medical training, and managing medical supplies. They serve as a support team member and report to the support senior advisor. The medical advisor performs the following internal functions:
• Provides input for assessments.
• Maintains principal responsibility to instruct point of injury care, self-aid, buddy-aid, combat lifesaver, and tactical combat casualty care principles and fundamentals.
• Trains medical evacuation concepts from point of injury through continuum of care.
• Assesses, conceives, and implements mass casualty concept.
• Gathers and disseminates information on known health threats with the area of operations.
Organization and Capabilities

- Advises on medical capabilities of nearby assets.
- Stabilizes patients and prepares them for medical evacuation.
- Trains and assists the team in managing field sanitation.
- Maintains class VIII (medical) supply.
- Verifies faults, requests class VIII parts, and maintains maintenance records of team medical equipment.

1-105. The medical advisor performs the following external functions:
- Trains the FSF on rapid trauma assessment and trauma medicine, point of injury care, medical evacuation, mass casualty operations, and concepts of far forward medical care.
- Stabilizes patients and prepares them for medical evacuation.
- Advises the FSF on maintaining class VIII supplies and equipment.
- Trains and assists the FSF on field sanitation, field hygiene, preventive medicine, and food preparation.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

COMMUNICATIONS ADVISOR

1-106. The communications advisor is an NCO who is responsible for establishing and maintaining communication networks for the team while advising the FSF on building a communications network, developing communication contingency plans, and conducting communications maintenance. They serve as a support team member and report to the support senior advisor. The communications advisor performs the following internal functions:
- Provides input for assessments.
- Advises on radios and communications capabilities.
- Provides communications maintenance support for the advising team’s vehicles and communications equipment.
- Verifies faults, requests class IX parts, and maintains maintenance records of communications equipment.
- Manages communications security.

1-107. The communications advisor performs the following external functions:
- Advises the FSF on communications planning, training, management, and communications security.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

MAINTENANCE ADVISOR

1-108. The maintenance advisor is an NCO who is responsible for verifying faults, ordering parts, and conducting repairs on the team’s vehicles. They assist the FSF with developing a maintenance standard operating procedure (SOP), establishing service schedules, ordering parts, and training their maintenance personnel. They serve as a support team member and report to the support senior advisor. The maintenance advisor performs the following internal functions:
- Provides input for assessments.
- Provides limited field-level maintenance support and services for the advising team vehicles and equipment, other than medical and communications equipment.
- Verifies faults, requests class IX (repair) parts, and maintains maintenance records other than medical and communications equipment.
- Collects, processes, and coordinates for team maintenance requests through next higher headquarters.

1-109. A sergeant has the responsibilities of the maintenance advisor. The maintenance advisor performs the following external functions:
- Assists partnered force with developing a maintenance program to include routine maintenance and service schedules, mechanic training, troubleshooting, and ordering parts.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the FSF with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

BATTALION AND BRIGADE ADVISING TEAMS

1-110. Battalion and brigade advising teams do not have a designated structure. Generally, these higher echelon teams are purpose built after assessing the FSF, prioritizing FSF capability gaps, and assigning advisor-trained personnel from the battalion or brigade staffs to directly address shortfalls within the limitations of the partner-nation agreements. The personnel assigned to the battalion and brigade advising teams have two sets of responsibilities, both externally to the FSF and internally to the organization. The external function of each member of the advising team is tailored to support the assigned organization based on the unit assessment of the FSF and within the scope of the given mission and resources. The general internal functions of the battalion and brigade advising team members are listed in ATP 3-21.20 and FM 3-96 respectively. While a higher echelon advising team may expect to operate in a secure environment, operating in a small team has inherent risks and there are critical training tasks that should not be overlooked. For example, a battalion advising team leader may be coming from a battalion command position or a brigade staff position; they may be familiar with battle drills for convoy operations but not for other small-unit tactics. For each mission and operation, every member of the advising team must be trained to proficiency in their basic warrior tasks and battle drills appropriate for the operating environment. Additionally, planning must take place to account for key battalion or brigade leadership being located away from the battalion’s main command post while advising the FSF.

1-111. The SFAB provides the capability to influence conditions through increasing the capability and capacity of FSF anywhere in the world. Faced with an uncertain future, history shows us that the ability to shape a security environment through the population provides the United States Government with a powerful tool to advance national goals.
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Chapter 2
Mission Command

SFAB commanders and staffs apply the principles of mission command to effectively lead their organization to complete their assigned mission. They build partnerships to develop their understanding, visualization, and description of the operational environment, local populations, key actors, and the enemy. Simultaneously, commanders use the information gained from advising teams to modify existing plans, reallocate assets, and refine the SFA operation.

SECTION I – ART OF COMMAND

2-1. *Mission command* is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). The six principles listed below guide commanders when exercising mission command:

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
- Create shared understanding.
- Provide a clear commander’s intent.
- Exercise disciplined initiative.
- Use mission orders.
- Accept risk.

Mutual trust, shared understanding, clear intent, mission orders, and disciplined initiative foster agile and adaptive forces. Commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue within their organizations and with unified action partners to facilitate unity of effort. Commanders provide clear intent and use mission orders to identify information gaps, describe their guidance, assign tasks, and allocate resources.

BUILD COHESIVE TEAMS THROUGH MUTUAL TRUST

2-3. Advising teams rely on teambuilding to accomplish the SFA mission. The SFAB expands on this principle and integrates partnered forces, supporting elements, and other groups of interests. Commanders must foster trust among all echelons of the command and the partnered force. SFAB personnel interactions with FSF partners, determines the level of trust among organizations. These interactions develop consistent gains by serving as building blocks towards a shared end state. Additionally, SFAB commanders generally operate in dispersed locations, and therefore, must develop trust in their subordinates. Their mutual trust allows them to issue broad, and sometimes vague, guidance and be confident that their subordinates can execute using disciplined initiative. Teambuilding requires developing mutual trust through shared experience and is sustained through repetition. So the SFAB can capitalize on this principal, these groups must—

- Share a common vision and end state among all the partners.
- Implement repetition in systems, both internal to the SFAB and external to the FSF and other partners and supporting elements. Ensure the processes are flexible enough to work with a variety of organizations and environments but consistent enough to build the required trust between the various organizations.
- Demonstrate commitment to the FSF, other partners, and supporting agencies.
CREATE SHARED UNDERSTANDING

2-4. In an SFAB, developing a shared understanding is absolutely vital to mission success and more complicated than in a typical maneuver unit. SFAB commanders must communicate this shared understanding among their own personnel, the FSF, other partners, and supporting agencies. Complicating this process are differences in language, culture, and organizational constructs. Each of these differences contribute to filters that the information must flow through while still maintaining the original intent. Shared understanding is the foundation under which all tasks are planned or conducted to support the SFA mission.

2-5. Collaborative mission analysis and problem solving develops shared understanding. The SFAB and their partners must identify a problem statement and reach an agreed upon solution. Commanders must consider perspective and cultural awareness to fully understand issues and motivations that the FSF and partnered forces may raise. Collaboration is a requirement throughout the duration of the SFA mission to ensure solutions remain effective as conditions change or evolve.

PROVIDE A CLEAR COMMANDER’S INTENT

2-6. Commanders must provide a clear intent, which includes an end state for the SFA mission. The commander’s intent must be disseminated and understood at all levels, yet simple enough to allow subordinates to execute confidently when faced with complex decisions which may be complicated by language and cultural barriers. The commander’s intent should include an expanded purpose and list key tasks which provide subordinates with enough guidance to achieve the desired end state. The end state should address desired capabilities of the partnered force and effects on the operational environment (expressed through the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time known as PMESII-PT), while addressing success for elements of the SFAB.

EXERCISE DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE

2-7. SFAB leaders and subordinates execute disciplined initiative to seize the tactical advantage in the absence of orders and under changing conditions. Commanders provide their intent, purpose, key task, and desired end state, and then trust their subordinates to quickly take the actions to achieve that intent. Communication between adjacent units, higher headquarters, and subordinate units is key to successfully executing disciplined initiative.

USE MISSION ORDERS

2-8. Mission orders describe how the commander sees the operation unfolding with sufficient detail, context, and clarity. Mission orders describe when, where, and how the commander intends to employ forces to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders’ maximum latitude to develop flexible and effective options in parallel, simultaneous, and complementary efforts.

ACCEPT RISK

2-9. SFAB advising teams can operate in decentralized, austere environments with limited lines of communication. They rely on their training, partnerships, and coordination with unified action partners for protection. Commanders and staffs must define the acceptable level of risk after all hazards have been identified and reasonably mitigated. Not all risk can be completely mitigated; the commander at the appropriate echelon makes the decision to accept, or not accept, associated risks.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

2-10. Advising teams can parallel plan with the next higher echelon formation. The advising teams have a member representing each warfighting function who can conduct analysis and provide information assessments. Advising teams use the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures, independent of their assigned unit, partnered with the FSF, or in collaboration as part of a coalition, to develop a plan. The next higher commander’s intent should guide plans developed with the partnered elements.
2-11. The SFAB follows the principles of the operations process. The operations process, while simple in concept (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), is dynamic in execution. Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate and execute numerous tasks throughout the headquarters and with subordinate units. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following principles to effectively use the operations process:

- Drive the operations process.
- Build and maintain situational understanding.
- Apply critical and creative thinking.
- Encourage collaboration and dialogue.

**COMMANDERS DRIVE THE OPERATIONS PROCESS**

2-12. The commander is the central figure in the operations process. Commanders within the SFAB can hold several roles with disparate responsibilities while deployed. The commander commands the unit to which they are assigned, but can serve as a leader of an advising team, also. Commanders either provide guidance to their organizations, or recommend guidance when advising a commander who is conducting the operations process. When applicable, nesting of guidance is critical because it has to be understood and valid to the SFAB units, the advising teams, and the partnered force. Simplicity of the message is essential due to limited personnel, communication, language constraints, and distance between units.

**Understand**

2-13. Identifying common ground and mutual interests among various organizations quickly establishes a shared understanding. Once built, a shared understanding provides the foundation for the relationships between organizations. Confirmation and backbriefs are used to verify the shared understanding across organizations. Time must deliberately be resourced and planned to develop a shared understanding. A shared understanding allows agreements and SOPs to build, and refine through repetition, among the various organizations.

**Visualize**

2-14. As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the problem, they start to visualize potential solutions to solve that problem and their desired end state. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach through which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 5-0).

2-15. Commanders must visualize their operational environment including their command, area of operation (including terrain and civilian population), the enemy, and the partnered force. They must view all these factors holistically and identify the impacts these factors have upon one another. Visualization must include commanders seeing themselves and their impact on the operational environment. When operating with an FSF, commanders must include partnered commanders and forces in this process as well.

2-16. Visualization includes determining an end state. A useful technique for an SFAB commander may be first to determine the end state as desired or defined by FSF military and political leadership. Similar to solving a printed maze by starting at the finish and working backwards, a commander can visualize what success looks like for the unit. Commanders then work backwards to develop intermediate goals, objectives, key tasks, and purpose for the organization, subordinate units, and the partnered force. As always, commanders ensure that their intent nests with the higher headquarters.

2-17. When developing and describing goals and objectives for the SFAB and partnered forces, commanders identify potential problems or friction points. Many of these friction points involve language and cultural differences which may result in motivational differences among the various groups. Some examples include conscripted Soldiers versus volunteers, FSF pay in relation to the host-nation economy, and levels of training.
Describe

2-18. Commanders should avoid vague or nondescriptive terms. Phrases such as, “I want this to be the best rotation ever,” provide little in the way of vision or guidance to subordinates. Commanders must have a clear vision of an end state to describe it to their subordinates.

2-19. When describing a shared vision with a partnered force, the commander must consider the language and cultural differences that could impact the mutual perception. Short, simple, specific, and culturally appropriate language should be chosen to communicate the vision at all levels within the unit, within the FSF, and with other supporting organizations.

Planning Guidance

2-20. After visualizing and describing the desired end state, commanders determine an operational approach and provide planning guidance to allow staffs to begin developing a plan. Goals, objectives, key tasks, and additional guidance, as necessary, help staffs develop creative and flexible plans with the greatest latitude for initiative by subordinate leaders. Commanders consider the various conditions that subordinate advising teams operate in when providing planning guidance. Due to the large number of variables, generally planning guidance is broad in scope to allow subordinate organizations and advising teams the flexibility to develop their plans.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

2-21. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. When building plans, the SFAB staffs and commanders identify operational decision points that have a significant impact on the success of the mission. Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) are aligned to the operational decision points which are then tracked in a decision support matrix. The staff recommends CCIRs, which the commander approves, to facilitate rapid and informed decision making. Commanders and staffs monitor and update the CCIRs as the operation progresses. Unit SOPs are developed and refined to make CCIR development as efficient as possible.

2-22. Criteria for CCIRs are:

- Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
- Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
- Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
- Time sensitive.

2-23. CCIRs change over time and require periodic update and refinement. Additionally, CCIRs should be limited in number to ensure effectiveness in recognition and management. They must be understood and reported on at every relevant echelon. (See ADRP 5-0.)

2-24. Once approved, a CCIR falls into one of two categories: Priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements.

2-25. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01). Priority intelligence requirements identify information about the enemy and operational environment that commanders and staffs use to execute predetermined operational decisions. For the SFAB, civilian considerations may be as critical to the commander as intelligence regarding the enemy. Additionally information on the FSF relations with SFAB teams may also be critical to commanders. Generally, information collection assets are aligned to priority intelligence requirement.

2-26. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements identify the information about the mission, troops, support, and time available for friendly forces that the commanders and staffs require to execute operational decisions as identified in the decision support matrix.
**Essential Elements of Friendly Information**

2-27. Commanders describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore, should be protected from enemy detection. Although essential elements of friendly information are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. Essential elements of friendly information establish elements of information to protect rather than ones to collect.

2-28. Essential elements of friendly information may be critical to the success of the SFAB and their mission. Commanders must balance developing trust and understanding with the FSF against sharing too much information that could potentially benefit the enemy. Identifying essential elements of friendly information is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information. Operational security must be practiced by all members of the advising teams, and must be trained and monitored with the FSF partners.

**Direct**

2-29. Commanders direct operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

- Preparing and approving plans and orders.
- Establishing command and support relationships.
- Assigning and adjusting tasks.
- Building effective teams and brokering partnerships.
- Positioning liaisons to maximize cooperation and the exchange of information.
- Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure effective mission command.
- Allocating resources to exploit developing opportunities and counter emerging threats.

2-30. Commanders must ensure their staffs are flexible and agile when developing solutions to complex problems. They must develop techniques that allow their staffs to perform identified tasks with battle drill efficiency. Accountability, safety, and protection are areas the staff must ensure are routinely and regularly planned, rehearsed, and performed. Continuous mission analysis enables commanders to focus their limited assets at the correct time and place.

2-31. During mission analysis, staffs use creative approaches to both wargaming and course of action development. SFAB units may not align with the task organization of their counterpart FSF. Perhaps the FSF partners do not have an engineer battalion or field artillery battalion. These battalions and their advising teams can be task organized and used to address other areas of concern. For example, if a partner force has no engineer capability, the brigade’s engineer battalion could focus on advising battalion staff, which frees another battalion to focus exclusively on the company level and below. Additionally, if one region or sector is friendly and the FSF partner is highly competent, the commander may decide to task organize a smaller advisor force for this area while creating a more robust capability in another sector. Commanders ensure their intent is understood, establish clear tasks for subordinate leaders and staff, and trust their staffs and subordinate leaders to develop solutions. Regardless of how an SFAB commander directs the organization, working in conjunction with the assigned FSF organization is critical to mission success.

**Lead**

2-32. SFAB commanders provide leadership to their elements. They demonstrate what a leader is as an advisor to the partnered force. They do not lead their partnered force, they merely guide or influence the partnered leadership through their advising role and by setting an example when working with their subordinates. SFAB commanders have to know when to lead their own advising teams, when to provide private support and counsel to their partner, and when to provide public guidance to build credit for both the advisor teams and the partnered force leadership.
Assess

2-33. Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and to determine how the operation is progressing. The SFAB conducts an assessment process to determine the baseline conditions of their environment, the relationship and status of the partnered force, and the requirements of the mission. As part of continuously assessing the situation, the SFAB refers to their assessment for metrics to analyze MOPs and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) (chapter 4).

BUILD AND MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

2-34. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision making (ADP 5-0). Building and maintaining situational understanding is essential to establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality decisions throughout the operations process.

Share Situational Understanding

2-35. Successful operations demand timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, the commanders and staffs seek to share situational understanding throughout the operations process.

2-36. Commanders and staffs at all levels share understanding, which is essential to establishing the situation’s context, synchronizing effective efforts, assessing operations, and making decisions that are aligned with the higher commander’s intent in collaboration with the FSF. SFAB commanders continually strive to share their situational understanding and work through periods of limited communication and guidance as the situation evolves and moves towards achieving an outcome-based metric.

2-37. Figure 2-1 describes an example of an SFAB network activity model. Figure 2-1 describes a sequence of actions to develop a partnered relationship. In the figure, the commander and staff conduct network engagement activities to develop and map a friendly network. The network assists identifying information requirements, unity of effort, capabilities, limitations, constraints, vulnerabilities, and assets. (See ATP 5-0.6.)
Figure 2-1. Notional security force assistance brigade friendly network model

2-38. The components of the friendly network activity model include—

- International support. A group of nations that provides support to the international coalition and the U.S. Government.
- U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Embassy country team leads the efforts to develop and coordinate the international coalition’s actions that provide assistance to the host nation.
- International Coalition. In collaboration with the U.S. Department of State and Defense, the international coalition provides military support to the host nation to achieve stability in the region.
- Geographic combatant commander. The commander provides strategic guidance and control of all U.S. military action.
- United States Agency for International Development. Under the guidance of the U.S. State Department, and in coordination with the host nation and international support, identifies and assists with civil projects that can promote stability in the area of operations.
SFAB. At the tactical level, the SFAB provides mission command of all actions occurring within their area of operations, and conducts SFA tasks to develop capacity and capability for the FSF.

- Host-nation infantry battalion and members of the international coalition. The FSF battalion from the host nation conducts area security operations with advisement and assistance from the SFAB.
- The U.S. Agency for International Development, civil-military operation center, and SFAB work together to develop, execute, and oversee civil projects designed to increase stability in the area of operations.

2-39. Forces acting in concert conduct tasks that create action or conditions, which create a synergistic effect. Tasks for the SFA, FSF, and unified action partners include:

- Modernize sewage system. A civil project that aids the quality of life and health of the local population.
- Conduct area security operations. The FSF, supported by their SFA counterparts, conducts area security operations to provide freedom of maneuver, isolate the threat from their sources of strength, provide security, and promote stability to the area of operations.

2-40. The tasks may lead to conditions or actions within the operational environment, such as—

- Local employment. The employment of people from the local population to modernize and maintain their sewage system leads to stability in the host-nation region.
- Regional stability. The actions of the friendly network can achieve regional stability and unity of effort to promote the host nation and aid the host-nation population (neutral network).

2-41. Finally, the conditions or actions discussed above can be synergistically enhanced by utilizing military information support operations and public affairs, among other capabilities synchronized by information operations to promote host-nation legitimacy and mitigate the threat network’s efforts.

### Operational and Mission Variables

2-42. SFAB commanders and staff must consider their FSF partners into the mission variables. Commanders and staffs describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. They use mission variables; mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations to describe characteristics. When assigned a mission, commanders and staffs filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations.

### Cultural Understanding

2-43. Commanders consider how culture (both their own and partner nations within an operational area) affects operations as part of building their situational understanding. Cultural understanding is paramount to the success of the SFAB. Culture is the shared beliefs, values, norms, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. The SFAB and subordinate units must consider how culture influences not only their actions, but also the actions of their FSF partners. Making decisions through a strictly Army centric viewpoint may impair mission success. Additionally, understanding the culture of participating unified action partners is crucial to building mutual trust and shared understanding.

### Apply Critical and Creative Thinking

2-44. Commanders and staffs apply critical and creative thinking throughout the operations process to assist them with understanding situations, making decisions, and directing action. Critical and creative thinking is indispensable to the operations process. SFAB commanders and staffs, by necessity, require critical and creative thinking as a matter of course. Adapting to new and unfamiliar problems creates constant friction within the SFAB and battalion staffs. Commanders and staffs at all echelons must devise new and creative solutions to problems that they or the Army may not have experienced. Often, solutions to these problems can come from outside sources, such as the partnered force, if able to share the information.
Encourage Collaboration and Dialogue

2-45. Throughout the operations process, commanders demand continuous collaboration and dialogue among the staff and between the FSF and other unified action partners. Specifically, in the SFAB, commanders must encourage a free flow sharing of ideas based on experience, insight, and an understanding of the situation.

2-46. Throughout the planning process, commanders, advising teams, staffs, the FSF, and unified action partners actively collaborate to understand situations and make decisions. They conduct collaborative planning participation during course of action development and decision making and resolve conflicts before the order is issued. By including collaborative participation, they improve situational understanding, and develop common ground and objectives upon which to build efforts and mutual trust.

SECTION II – INTEGRATING PROCESSES AND CONTINUING ACTIVITIES

2-47. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions to synchronize the force according to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commanders and staffs use several integrating processes and continuing activities to do this.

INTEGRATING PROCESS

2-48. In addition to the major activities of the operations process, commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process. The integrating processes are—

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Targeting.
- Risk management.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

2-49. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and other aspects of an operational environment within a specific geographic area. Led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff participates in IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces.

2-50. IPB consists of four steps. Each step is performed or assessed and refined to ensure that IPB products remain complete and relevant. The four IPB steps are to—

- Define the operational environment.
- Describe environmental effects on operations.
- Evaluate the threat.
- Determine threat courses of action.

2-51. IPB supports all activities of the operations process. IPB identifies gaps in current intelligence. SFAB intelligence sections may have difficulty processing information into intelligence and may require reach back capabilities. (See chapter 8.) IPB products help commanders, subordinate commanders, and staffs understand the threat, physical environment, and civil considerations throughout the operations process.

2-52. SFAB elements conduct IPB. The specific inputs and outputs associated with the IPB may be altered due to information sharing constraints with their partner FSF. All efforts should be made to bring the FSF into the IPB process to provide training to their commanders and staffs. A clear understanding of the classification of the material handled by members of the SFAB must be strictly adhered to.

TARGETING

2-53. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The purpose of targeting is to integrate
and synchronize fires into operations. Targeting begins in planning, and it is an iterative process that continues through preparation and execution. The steps of the Army’s targeting process are—

- Decide.
- Detect.
- Deliver.
- Assess.

2-54. The SFAB does not have organic fires capability and must coordinate with higher headquarters for support. Brigade and battalion fires cells may require augmentation (see chapter 8 for more information). Advising teams must be prepared to assist the FSF, de-conflict, or employ artillery and other fires. An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. Commanders then establish the control measures necessary to minimize the chance of these events. The measures (fire support coordination measures, no-strike list, airspace coordinating measures, and others) are included in the operation order. SFAB commanders and personnel must always account for the FSF fratricides as well. Control measures must be coordinated through the FSF and understood thoroughly at all levels to prevent fratricide and collateral damage.

2-55. The brigade and battalion S-2s coordinate with the United States Air Force staff weather office in the military intelligence company, or their closest in-theater counterpart, for weather assessment information and capabilities. The brigade and battalion S-2s should integrate the weather effects information into IPB, MDMP, fires, targeting, building the common operating picture, and information collection activities to enhance the commander’s ability to achieve the desired effects. Coordination with the United States Air Force may not always be available.

RISK MANAGEMENT

2-56. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Identifying and accepting risk is a principle of mission command. (See chapter 9.)

CONTINUING ACTIVITIES

2-57. While units execute numerous tasks throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs always plan for and coordinate the following continuing activities:

- Liaison.
- Information collection.
- Security operations.
- Protection.
- Terrain management.
- Airspace control.

LIAISON

2-58. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. When advising teams are working with FSF and there is a U.S. unit in the same area of operations or adjacent areas, the advising team has a responsibility to liaise and coordinate informally with the U.S. unit. Formal liaison and coordination should occur between the FSF and the U.S. unit with the advising team fulfilling its role with the FSF. This is true regardless of the context. For example the U.S. unit and FSF may be part of a multinational force answering to the same commander or the U.S. unit may have a unilateral mission with a completely separate chain of command. In either of these examples, the FSF and the U.S. unit may have exchanged liaison officers at their echelon or at a higher echelon. None of these situations remove the responsibility for the advising team to conduct liaison and coordination. From a U.S. unit perspective, the advising team has expert knowledge on the FSF that they do not have. This can be critical to avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions. Through liaisons, advising teams conduct, coordinate, and share information gained from assessments, information analyses, and refined commander’s guidance. (See FM 6-0.)
INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-59. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Information collection integrates the functions of the intelligence and operations staffs focused on answering the commander's critical information requirements.

2-60. The SFAB conducts information collection activities to determine the enemy situation and may rely on partnered forces to assist in the collection of this information. SFAB personnel must also maintain an awareness of partner FSF operational norms in order to identify environmental changes that may have an impact on the advising teams. The intelligence officer develops indicators to monitor, which assist teams in identifying and reporting FSF atmospherics. (See FM 3-55.)

SECURITY OPERATIONS

2-61. Commanders and staffs continuously plan for and coordinate security operations throughout the conduct of operations. The five forms of security operations are screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. SFAB units primarily conduct partnered area security and local security. (See FM 3-90-1.)

PROTECTION

2-62. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). (See chapter 9.)

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

2-63. Terrain management is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other (ADRP 5-0). SFAB personnel must become proficient at training the FSF in terrain management. In most circumstances, the SFAB is not assigned an area of operations. SFAB units must also consider unified action partners located in their partner’s area of operations and ensure coordination occurs with them for the use of terrain.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

2-64. Airspace control is capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace (JP 3-52). Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs must integrate and synchronize forces and warfighting functions within an area of operations (ground and air). Through airspace control, commanders and staffs establish both positive and procedural controls to maximize the use of airspace to facilitate air-ground operations.

2-65. The SFAB does not have the organic airspace control capability to employ fires via the airspace management procedures as a typical conventional BCT. When the SFAB employs fires, they rely on supporting organizations to provide the airspace control functions.

BATTLE RHYTHM

2-66. Commanders and staffs must integrate and synchronize numerous activities, meetings, and reports within their headquarters, with their higher headquarters, and with subordinate units as part of the ongoing operations. Advising teams integrate and synchronize their activities with the FSF. They do this by first understanding the foreign security force battle rhythm and then building the SFAB and advising team battle rhythms to be compatible and complimentary to the FSF schedule. Battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations (FM 6-0).

2-67. The SFAB battle rhythm sequences the actions and events within a headquarters that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information that supports decision making. With a decidedly smaller footprint than other brigades and battalions, the SFAB must carefully plan their battle rhythm to prevent being overcome by information and events. An effective battle rhythm—
Establishes a routine for staff interaction and coordination.

- Facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, subordinate units, and the foreign security force.
- Facilitates planning by the staff and decision making by the commander.

2-68. The SFAB’s battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities synchronized by time and purpose. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly depending on the planning horizon. A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events (ADRP 5-0). The planning horizons are short, mid, and long and correspond to the integrating cells within a headquarters, which are: Current operations cell, future operations cell, and plans cell. The planning horizon of the SFAB must be tied to the commander’s goals and objectives and are viewed similar to decision points. Due to the nature of SFAB operations, the planning horizon may extend over a number of years.

2-69. The SFAB must plan reporting requirements to account for their reduced personnel involved with receiving and processing reports and to account for the unpredictable nature inherent in working with the FSF. Historically, staffs have faced challenges in anticipating and reacting to changing conditions during peacetime training. Training challenges such as scheduling conflicts, personnel availability, and changes to firing range procedures or usage are exacerbated even further by language difficulties, protection requirements, and host-nation capabilities. Something as simple as a lack of transportation to a range could delay training without adequate reporting procedures.

2-70. In the SFAB, commanders and staff must plan proactively and develop tracking and reporting tools to anticipate and monitor changes in the environment. Small changes in political or military variables of a host nation could have significant impacts on the effectiveness and protection requirements of the SFAB and have an impact on the SFAB’s effectiveness with the FSF. The SFAB should develop immediate reporting procedures, for instance, on accountability, implementation of protection measures, and partnered FSF reactions. SFAB staffs must plan proactively to anticipate the occurrence of these type of events and should plan and execute mitigating strategies should they occur.

2-71. Commanders and staff need to determine what information they require and prioritize information reporting accordingly. Required reports such as accountability, maintenance status, and the FSF unit training status need to be routine and simplified. Commanders and staff should develop reporting criteria that quickly highlights deficiencies. Important information needs to be apparent, easily identified, and capable of transmitting through multiple mediums at low cost and stress on the communication system.

2-72. Redundancy needs to be inherent in to all reporting throughout the SFAB. Network, personnel, connectivity, and even electrical power availability limitations may preclude collecting required reports from a single network or system.

2-73. Commanders adjust the unit’s battle rhythm as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a daily plans update briefing. As the situation changes, the commander may require a plans update briefing only weekly. Some factors that help determine a unit’s battle rhythm include the staff’s proficiency, higher headquarters’ battle rhythm, and current mission. In developing the unit’s battle rhythm, commanders and the chief of staff or executive officer consider the following:

- Higher headquarters’ battle rhythm and report requirements.
- Duration and intensity of the operation.
- Planning requirements of the integrating cells (current operations, future operations, and plans).

2-74. Meetings (including working groups and boards) consume a large amount of a unit’s battle rhythm. Meetings are gatherings to present and exchange information, solve problems, coordinate action, and make decisions. SFAB meetings must be planned out well in advance and personnel must stay focused on the meeting task and purpose. Dispersed locations connectivity and language barriers preclude long, detailed, and complicated meetings, especially those involving the FSF partners. Meetings with the FSF should be rehearsed to anticipate problems, cultural objections, and new terms needing translation. (See FM 6-0.)
RUNNING ESTIMATES

2-75. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on accurate and current running estimates. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0).

2-76. Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execution. SFAB staffs must remain extremely disciplined to maintain running estimates. (See FM 6-0.) In their running estimates, the commander and each staff section continuously consider the effect of new information and update the following:

- Facts.
- Assumptions.
- Friendly force status (to include the partner FSF).
- Enemy activities and capabilities.
- Civil considerations.
- Conclusions and recommendations.

SECTION III – PARALLEL PLANNING WITH FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

2-77. The character of SFAB-FSF partner parallel planning differs by what mission the SFAB is undertaking. In its primary mission to assess, train, advise, and assist, the SFAB commander and staff will assist the FSF partner commander and staff to conduct foreign partner mission planning. In this situation the SFAB parallel plans by supporting what is a partner nation led effort ensuring that mutual U.S. partner nation objectives are addressed and combined operation mission requirements are coordinated. If the SFAB were expanded into a fully functional Infantry brigade combat team or Armored brigade combat team to support large scale combat operations, SFAB commanders and staffs conduct parallel planning with subordinate staffs by including foreign partner commanders and staffs in U.S. led efforts. They must develop their own plans while simultaneously guiding their partner forces on staff processes. The SFAB, when deployed, performs the same staff functions as a BCT. Executive officers, in conjunction with the operations staff officers (S-3s), lead their staffs in the MDMP. They attempt to take the commander’s vision, goals, and objectives and define them in the operational approach.

2-78. Additionally, the FSF commander’s vision must be included and unified goals and objectives are defined. The resulting (consolidated) objectives are analyzed for decision points that effect the operation. The S-3 and S-2 propose CCIR, and refine and validate the measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and indicators from the assessment process used to build the common operating picture. Additionally, the S-2 develops priority intelligence requirement to assist in developing situational understanding of the operational environment. The partnership itself should be examined and measured for its effectiveness by both U.S. and FSF partners.

2-79. All staff conduct continuous mission analysis for effectiveness. They analyze the mission for task organization, limitations, and projected problems. Staff can use warfighting functions as a guide to analyze effectiveness. Staffs may determine they cannot accomplish the mission through cross-leveling resources or task organization and require augmentation. The command submits a request for forces to their higher headquarters outlining resources required. (See chapter 8.)

2-80. The primary difference between SFA activities and other operations or tasks depends on the prescribed task and configuration of the SFAB. When the SFAB’s primary mission configuration is to advise, the FSF does its own mission planning in part or in full depending on its capabilities. When the SFAB is configured as a fully functional Infantry brigade combat team or Armored brigade combat team to support large scale operations, the FSF partner unit command and staff is integrated into U.S. led BCT planning to the extent necessary to meet mutual objectives. Brigade and battalion staffs should always conduct an abbreviated mission analysis prior to mission planning with the FSF. A mission analysis brief by the SFAB organization—

- Gives the SFAB time to do prior coordination to avoid any potential issues between the SFF and other forces.
- Provides the advising team with a base of knowledge of information required to advise counterparts.
• Allows the advising team time to develop effective teaching and mentoring tools to foster FSF understanding of the operation.
• Allows advisors to stay with their counterpart throughout troop leading procedures. This requires preplanning and coordination with the rest of the advising team and the partner unit.

2-81. Often times, the FSF plans are produced directing different priorities than their SFAB counterparts. Operational plans must be responsive to established priorities, and must be coordinated with plans of other units and agencies. SFAB advisors coach counterparts to take into account the contributions and priorities of its partnered forces. Some aspects of planning include:

• Selective application of combat power to minimize population casualties.
• Coordinating of regional and provisional plans and dissemination of information to subordinate units. Time must be provided to process plans at all levels.
• Detailed estimates of the situation.
• Consideration of the role and capabilities of the FSF. Planning at all levels should incorporate the employment of the FSF. Advisors to tactical units must coordinate this planning with sector and subsector advisors.
• The outcome of planning is a plan or an order that—
  ▪ Fosters mission command by clearly conveying the commander’s intent.
  ▪ Assigns tasks and purposes to subordinates.
  ▪ Contains the minimum coordinating measures necessary to synchronize the operation.
  ▪ Allocates or reallocates resources.
  ▪ Directs preparation activities and establishes times or conditions for execution.

ORGANIZING FOR OPERATIONS

2-82. Advising teams maintain continuity with their counterparts during planning and mission preparation. As elements of the FSF become more capable, this allows the advisor to shift from direct advising to supervision and mentorship to boost the FSF confidence and legitimacy in operations. The advisor may coordinate additional resources and assets, as well as oversee some processes such as close air support, joint fires, medical evacuation, EOD, employment of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and engagements with unified action partners. These assets may provide capabilities not present in the partnered force. The use of these assets can provide combat multipliers and credibility to the FSF efforts.

COMMAND ADVISORS

2-83. The command advising team must stay slightly ahead of the FSF and communicate their guidance to their subordinate units ahead of the FSF communicating their guidance to their subordinate units. By accompanying the FSF unit commander during the receipt of mission from higher headquarters, the lead advisor can provide guidance needed to plan or prepare for assigned missions. The lead advisor, advises and assists the FSF commander on planning guidance for the mission. The advisor monitors how the FSF comprehends the commander’s intent and all specified or implied tasks. Constant comparison between what the advising team receives through their chain of command is reviewed with what the FSF receives through their chains of command. Constant comparison ensures that all elements have a shared vision.

STAFF ADVISORS

2-84. The staff advising team assists the FSF with developing operational plans and managing current operations. Staff advisors are organized across warfighting functions, and augmented with specialty advisors as necessary, based on FSF assessments to meet the partnered force’s mission requirements.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER ADVISOR

2-85. The executive officer advisor observes and provides advice to the executive officer to perform the organizational analysis of the unit’s coordinating staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process according to initial planning guidance. With the FSF counterpart, the advisor assists foreign staff
sections as they develop estimates and plans. In addition, the executive officer advisor monitors the liaison and coordination with FSF higher headquarters, recommending changes to improve efficiency.

**ADJUTANT ADVISOR**

2-86. The adjutant advisor provides advice, assistance, and makes recommendations to the FSF counterpart for all efforts related to human resources. The adjutant advisor monitors the maintenance of the FSF unit strength, accountability of personnel, disposition of casualties, unit morale, and possibly postal activities. The adjutant advisor may manage matters concerning the FSF pay system, leave procedures, and casualty pay procedures.

**INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ADVISOR**

2-87. The intelligence officer advisor advises and assists the monitoring of the FSF operations security to protect classified and sensitive material and operations and recommends improvements. The advisor helps their counterpart update the situation map to keep the map current. The advisor assists the FSF intelligence officer and recommends improvements to the standard operating procedures of command post communications architecture to ensure that the intelligence section receives situation reports. The intelligence officer helps the counterpart monitor the collection, and evaluate, interpret, and disseminate information. The advisor assists with examining captured documents and material. The officer helps gather and disseminate intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets. The advisor helps the counterpart to brief and debrief patrols executing reconnaissance and security activities. Finally, they assist, with the operations officer advisor, the development of information collection plans.

**OPERATIONS OFFICER ADVISOR**

2-88. The operations officer advisor helps the foreign counterpart to prepare tactical plans using estimates, predictions, and information. The officer monitors command and communications nets, assists with preparing all orders and plans, and helps to supervise the training and preparation for operations. Finally, the operations officer advisor monitors the planning process and makes recommendations for consistency with MOPs and MOEs.

**LOGISTICS OFFICER ADVISOR**

2-89. The logistics officer advises and assists the foreign counterpart in logistics and maintenance. The officer monitors the support provided to the foreign unit, its subunits, and attachments. The logistics officer advisor identifies shortfalls affecting capability and performance of the FSF. The officer describes to the advising team leader which capabilities are needed to address the shortfalls.

**SIGNAL OFFICER ADVISOR**

2-90. The signal officer advisor advises and assists the FSF in the planning, design, and maintenance of communication networks. The signal advisor also advises and assists the foreign counterpart in digital network defense planning and coordinates for external assets and resources as necessary. Provides technical and tactical information to the FSF to support their operations.

**MEDICAL ADVISOR**

2-91. The medical advisor advises and assists the foreign counterpart in health service support and force health protection activities including deployment of medical assets, establishment of tactical and operational level medical treatment assets, development of patient evacuation routes, procurement and distribution of medical supplies, and implementation of force health protection measures to reduce disease and non-battle injury. The medical advisor works with the FSF and the civil military advisor to train the FSF on use of medicine as an engagement tool to gain access and information.
**CIVIL MILITARY ADVISOR**

2-92. Civil-military teams advise the commander and staff on civil-military considerations and coordinate efforts of any agency conducting civil operations in the area. The civil-military team mentors the counterpart team on the supported foreign element staff on civil-military operations, the legal and moral obligations of military commanders to civilian populations under their control, and the importance of respecting human rights. The civil-military team may introduce the counterpart to relevant nongovernmental organizations, United States Agency for International Development project officers, and provincial reconstruction team staff.

**RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS ADVISOR**

2-93. Unit ministry teams advise the commander and staff on issues related to ethics, morality, and religion as it impacts the team, operations, and the local population. Understanding the impact of religion upon the operations, partnered security forces, and the local population is pivotal to the success of the SFA objectives. The unit ministry team is trained on the conduct of Soldier leader engagements with key religious leaders as well as foreign partner military counterparts. Additionally, the unit ministry team provides advisement on religious affairs both directly and via reach-back capability through supervisory channels as well as networked relationships with the geographic combatant commander and the ASCC chaplain offices.

**COMPANY ADVISORS**

2-94. Advisors sent to elements below battalion level help the FSF counterparts analyze the mission and commander’s intent from higher headquarters. They assist the FSF in the performance of troop leading procedures. In addition, the teams assist their FSF counterparts to analyze the mission variables. From these variables, advisors help their foreign counterparts to develop a course of action that meets the higher headquarters concept of operations and commander’s intent. The teams report to their higher SFAB partnered element their observation of the FSF process. They communicate any discrepancies between the lower and higher plan and develop a plan to engage the FSF leadership. Finally, the teams advise and assist with the conduct of operations and augment communication capability between the FSF commanders.

**AFTER ACTION REVIEW**

2-95. 2-95 The after action review (AAR) is an essential element of building the FSF capabilities. The FSF unit commander, with assistance from their advisors, should conduct the AAR so the FSF can sustain and improve their capacity. The AAR begins with a review of the training goals with the FSF unit commander. Advisor personnel ask leading questions, surface important tactical lessons, explore alternative course of actions, keep to the teaching points, and make the AAR positive. All key personnel should be present (both FSF and the advising team). The FSF unit commander should review the training event with their entire unit as applicable. At this review, the FSF commander should stress how they intend to strengthen their chain of command and place focus on themselves as the primary trainer of the unit. The FSF unit commander discusses not only what happened but why it happened. The FSF commander must discuss the important tactical lessons learned, alternate courses of action the unit could have taken, and important teaching points. Some AAR points are best kept among the commanders to maintain a productive working relationship and unit cohesion.

2-96. The FSF commander discusses in detail activities and salient points (sustain and improve) for each phase of the operation including information operations, battle drills and contingencies, and all implied and specified tasks. Conclude with a plan to follow-up and make improvements as necessary.

2-97. The FSF commander discusses general positive points with the groups. The purpose of the group AAR is not to single out a leader, staff member, Soldier, or unit to criticize in front of others. The U.S. military culture of group AARs to discuss all mistakes is a technique the U.S. military finds valuable because our culture accepts the technique as important for improvement. Many cultures do not accept pointing out areas needing improvement (criticisms) of one person or group to another person or group. The advisor should discuss the issue with that member or unit outside of the AAR. The advisor should produce a productive environment for the member or unit to discuss improvements. The point of AARs is to improve. When an
issue is unit wide or recurring, the advisor discusses the issue with the FSF leadership to find a solution. The leader announces the issue and solution.

2-98. An advisor should never take credit for an idea; instead they should empower their counterpart. They discuss the issue and come to a solution together, even if the advisor has the answer. The advisor must remember they are mentoring the FSF counterpart to think of solutions on their own. Also, by empowering the FSF counterpart, the FSF counterpart builds confidence within their organization, and the advisor builds trust with their counterpart. As a result, the FSF counterpart will likely seek the advisor’s viewpoint, and accept their view more readily in the future to build upon demonstrated success.

2-99. Advisors conduct an internal AAR, focusing on what the team must sustain and improve, to advise the FSF. Internal AAR (advisors only) topics include:
   - Conduct of advisors.
   - Conduct of the FSF (done in preparation for the FSF AAR).
   - Review rules of engagement and escalation of force for effectiveness and compliance and training level.
   - Review advisor’s parallel planning for accuracy and effectiveness.
   - Did advisor develop, sustain, and improve topic areas for the FSF?
   - Were advisors with the FSF throughout the operation?
   - Were advisors prepared for the operation (such as equipment, knowledge of mission, planning with host-nation forces)?

2-100. The advising team creates a report detailing the outcome of the AAR and compares it to the assessment and development plan for the FSF. They make annotations of what the intended outcomes were before the event to compare them to data points collected from the AAR. Finally, the advising team delivers the report to their higher headquarters along with their analysis of the outcomes of the events in comparison to the assessment and development plan for the FSF.

2-101. Mission command enables commanders, in conjunction with their foreign security force partner, to provide broad guidance to their subordinate elements thus facilitating the exercise of disciplined initiative. Building an environment of trust, communication, and initiative among subordinate commanders, staffs, and advising teams will facilitate mission command and lead to successful deployment operations, as discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Deploy

The SFAB begins planning for operations immediately upon receiving a directed mission from its higher headquarters. Key information such as location, required capability, FSF requirements, and duration are included in this initial warning order. Chapter 3 discusses considerations for an SFA mission from receipt of mission to post deployment activities.

SECTION I – RECEIPT OF MISSION

3-1. Planning for deployment is one of the most crucial phases of an operation. Personnel shortages, time and equipment limitations, language and cultural differences, dispersed operating locations, and fragile lines of communication challenge units as they begin preparations to deploy. Planning must be a multi-echelon, collaborative effort among staffs and leaders at various echelons within the SFAB.

3-2. The geographic combatant commander issues terms of reference and guidance to the ASCC, the numbered theater army, which submits a request for forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Staff through Department of the Army channels issues the deployment order to Forces Command and ultimately to the designated SFAB. The order includes the plan for the SFAB’s reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; base support; communications integration; and sustainment. The SFAB conducts predeployment site surveys and subsequent coordination for clearance to the theater to facilitate mission planning and sustainment for the duration of the mission.

3-3. SFAB subordinate organizations and elements begin detailed preparations immediately upon receiving their mission. The unit begins predeployment training immediately with known requirements. The unit tailors the training to mission specifics from predeployment site surveys. The unit obtains supplies, equipment, and training materials to conduct individual, leader, and collective training to prepare for deployment. Units may request or be granted direct liaison authorized with unified action partners as required.

INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PREPARATION

3-4. SFAB leaders and staffs conduct mission analysis to determine if the unit is sufficiently organized and equipped to meet the mission parameters stated in the order. SFAB staffs refer to the order for the information necessary to begin coordination for entering the country at the location needed with required equipment. Leaders or staff generates information requests for needed information not contained in the order.

MULTI-ECHELON PLANNING

3-5. To inform mission planning, the deploying SFAB element identifies the commander’s purpose, intent, and mission statement; constraints, rules of engagement, and implied tasks. The SFAB identifies the command and support relationships for its deploying element to determine their operational, tactical, and administrative control; security; and sustainment while in transit and in-country. The deploying element develops its task organization and by-name deployment roster to commence critical administrative requirements. The geographic combatant commander provides the ASCC with exercise, training terms, and funding lines available for the deployment and the conduct of the mission. The information provides operational requirements, funding, and authorities linked to the assigned exercise or training missions.

3-6. The SFAB reviews the theater security cooperation plan and the relevant regional or country plans to conduct detailed planning. In reviewing the existing plans, the SFAB defines success by focusing on long term goals rather than a set of lesser tactical, short-term wins. When reviewing the deployment schedule,
planners take the operational variables; political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (seasons, harvests, elections, or referendums); into account when developing the tempo of the mission and the deployment schedule of headquarters and subordinate elements. With long-term goals in mind, the SFAB develops measures of performance and effectiveness for each potential course of action. This is part of the integrating process of operational assessment mentioned in chapter 2. The aforementioned theater and country plans may contain MOPs and MOEs, but the SFAB must do more than merely refine the higher headquarters’ plans. The SFAB must conduct their own analysis and nest their plan with higher guidance ensuring both are conducive to lower level execution.

**FUNDING AUTHORITIES**

3-7. The information in the paragraph below is for the education of leaders and personnel involved with the deployment of an SFAB. The SFAB is not responsible for the funding for deployment and missions. The higher headquarters organizations plan for funding for deployment and missions.

3-8. The geographic combatant command identifies Title 22 funding authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act (if appropriate) and coordinates with the U.S. Embassy and Department of State to transfer funds through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to the ASCC. Service component commands execute a military interdepartmental purchase request to obtain funding. The Department of Defense determines if SFA is done under Title 10 or Title 22 authority. If under Title 10 authority, Army Service component commands (or a designated joint task force) are funded through the established base budget, overseas contingency operations funding, or funds otherwise appropriated by Congress. If required, the geographic combatant command, in conjunction with the country team, negotiates an acquisition and cross-support agreement with the host nation to ensure the host nation receives payment for logistical support services. Additionally, other bilateral agreements may exist that ensure the availability of appropriated host-nation resources. These agreements may include payment to the United States through foreign military sales.

**ANALYZE CURRENT PLANS**

3-9. In preparation for deployment, the SFAB identifies and reviews existing campaign plans and country plans from the geographic combatant command, the ASCC, and the chief of mission as well as other documents critical to U.S. interests and strategic goals in the region. The SFAB cross references and compares these plans to operational and environmental assessments to determine the capabilities needing development to prepare the FSF for successful mission achievement.

**AREA FAMILIARIZATION**

3-10. Staffs develop and distribute study materials and briefings on the operational area to leaders and Soldiers. These products emphasize host-nation culture and language and provide cultural tips for developing a good rapport with foreign personnel.

**INITIATE COUNTRY ENTRY REQUIREMENTS**

3-11. The SFAB can expect delays during the visa application process due to political considerations and potential inefficiencies at host-nation embassies and consulates. Some countries may require a letter of introduction through the supported embassy security cooperation organization. An approved visa is often required for country clearance and can delay the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System approval process. The SFAB personnel officer (S-1) is usually the individual and office that is responsible for planning and monitoring the visa process. The U.S. Passports and International Travel, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs website provides additional information and specific requirements for each country.

3-12. The SFAB submits proposed predeployment site survey dates to the ASCC or country team. The proposed dates include time spent going to and from the geographic combatant command headquarters for briefings and guidance, as well as travel to the host nation. Staff planners must consider encountering delays when transiting through foreign countries. Planners must anticipate passport and visa requirements in those countries as well. Lastly, planners must consider using commercial aircraft or U.S. military aircraft.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY

3-13. The predeployment site survey aims to present information accurately based on the existing FSF mission variables, which are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. The predeployment site survey also provides detailed information on in-country mission command, support, protection, and sustainment relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission execution. The site survey coordinates the in-country reception of the SFA forces. The coordination requires all units, outgoing and incoming, to apply a comprehensive approach at all levels of command.

3-14. The SFAB conducts a predeployment site survey 180-270 days prior to deployment. Doing so gives the unit adequate time to plan, conduct, or alter their existing training plan to accommodate the country and theater specific requirements of their mission. An example of this is the intelligence advisor conducting initial threat vulnerability assessments on proposed SFAB facilities. Security force assistance missions are generally tailored to the needs of the partnered force or host nation. The predeployment site survey provides an opportunity to gain the information required to address planning requirements and confirms the partner FSF expectations.

3-15. The following paragraphs describe SFAB specific information requirements that should be determined by the unit to ensure it can properly prepare and train upon return.

THEATER MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS

3-16. The SFAB mission may require Soldiers to operate outside the capability of conventional force medical support. Key medical considerations for SFAB planners include: Individual and collective force health protection measures including immunizations and chemoprophylaxis; suitability, capacity, and capability of local medical facilities and assets; time and distance factors associated with patient evacuation; availability and suitability of civil and military (known as CASEVAC and MEDEVAC) ground and air assets (include airframe use authorization); and suitability of Class VIII supplies and blood products. These and other medical considerations as well as precoordination with supporting host nation and FSF medical assets should be answered during the predeployment site survey.

ECHELON OF ADVISING

3-17. The host nation’s description of their FSF may not align with the SFAB’s organizational assessment during the predeployment site survey. The SFAB updates their assessments during the predeployment site survey and makes any recommendations for changes to the chain of command. Advising at higher echelons requires a focus on staff processes and a knowledge of the host nation and the FSF systems and processes. The SFAB aligns its personnel to appropriate rank structures with the FSF. For example, a U.S. major to advise a foreign lieutenant colonel. The SFAB identifies any cultural risks associated with the possibility of giving offense or injuring the partnership based on advisor pairings (considers rank, gender, age, cultural background, religion, race, and ethnicity).

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

3-18. An institutional assessment on the needs of the FSF is required to determine the capacity to complete their training and mission preparations. The level of proficiency, equipment, and resources may vary widely from mission to mission or even unit to unit within the same host nation. The FSF needs shape the development as well as advising team augmentation needs. Units must prepare for the need to develop plans to support a wide range of missions including force generation, institutional instruction, or operational assistance. Examples include the development of national level schools or academies for initial entry Soldiers, professional military education for staff officers, or field expedient tactical training for squads mid mission. While operational organization and institutional assessment helps the unit to shape their preparations, the environmental assessment identifies needs to change in the environment that force the SFAB to adjust the focus of the effort with the FSF. (See chapter 4.)
Chapter 3

EXPECTED DEGREE OF UNIT SEPARATION

3-19. The need for a unit to disperse once in-country significantly impacts how they conduct their mission across all war fighting functions. Units may consolidate at a single location from which advising teams depart and return daily or spread out across an entire area of responsibility with advising teams separated from the nearest U.S. forces by a significant distance. The degree to which forces are expected to separate affects the risk associated with all actions during the mission and is considered when determining augmentation and resourcing requirements.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

3-20. During the site survey, the designated SFAB personnel recovery officer coordinates with the personnel recovery coordination section at the next higher headquarters or the regional security officer of the U.S. Embassy to assess, coordinate, and develop the brigade’s personnel recovery plans and procedures.

SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT

3-21. The SFAB can deploy with an advance party, main body, and trail party. When deployed, they maintain a rear detachment to provide continuity for the unit and to maintain a base of operations for mission command. For each deploying element, the SFAB must provide a mission command element to oversee the movement of forces and make coordination with higher echelons and reception organization. Mission variables determine the size and composition of the mission command and include personnel actions, accountability equipment, and possibly logisticians.

ADVANCE PARTY

3-22. An advance party deploys to the host nation or partner organization area of operations after the unit completes its mission planning and the commander determines the unit has met all predeployment training requirements. The advance party conducts predeployment activities and coordinates necessary travel documentation and country clearances. The advance party reviews the rules of engagement and any status-of-forces agreements before deploying. If applicable, the proper staff provides an updated threat briefing to the unit. If necessary, the unit places all supplies and materials on pallets beforehand and prepares the load manifest.

3-23. Upon arrival, the advance party processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters and embassy, if required, of its arrival and status. Often the higher headquarters or embassy provides point of contacts to the advance party. These contacts help the advance party obtain the proper identification, documentation, and weapons permits.

3-24. The advance party establishes contact with all U.S. and FSF tactical unit commanders and conducts final premission planning activities. The advance party procures secure working, storage, and living areas for the unit and reconnoiters and prepares the training sites. The advance party coordinates for special support equipment to unload heavy supplies and transport the supplies and personnel to the training site.

MAIN BODY

3-25. The main body of the SFAB element deploys after completing its planning and the commander determines the main body has met all predeployment training requirements. The unit processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters of its arrival and status. The unit obtains the proper identification, documentation, and weapons permits as required. Members of the advance party meet the main body on its arrival and brief the main body on any required changes to the operation order.

3-26. The unit off-loads equipment and personnel onto vehicles for movement to the training site, or it stores the equipment in a secure area until the processing is complete. The commander or team leader is ultimately accountable for the advisor team’s physical and personal security. The commander or team leader ensures personnel stay with the equipment to guard it. Depending on the threat situation, the commander ensures protective measures are in place to safeguard personnel and equipment.
SECTION III – IN-THEATER PREPARATIONS

3-27. The SFAB uses in-theater preparations to finalize requirements critical for mission success. From confirming support relationships to establishing personal relationships with the supported higher headquarters, this preparation time is critical for the SFAB and can set the conditions throughout the deployment. Local conditions may require the unit to confirm or establish its in-country and external mission command, support, and sustainment relationships from outside its area of operations upon arrival. The SFAB establishes clear lines of communication with its higher headquarters to—

- Determine the limits of the available support and expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.
- Confirm or establish communications procedures between the supporting element and the unit including alternative and emergency procedures for mission command, available support, medical evacuation, and available medical assets by capability.

3-28. Upon arrival in the theater of operations, the SFAB may be received by a host-nation greeting party. The greeting party may come from a higher military command, embassy or country team representative, members of the FSF, or the local leadership. In most cases, the advance party has established protocol procedures. If greeted by a host-nation greeting party, the SFAB prepares to receive the party and acts in accordance with cultural norms and customs. This could involve ceremonies, exchange of gifts, meals, and commemorations.

3-29. Following the greeting, the unit immediately establishes operations security procedures to support its mission execution and establishes the SFAB defense plan. Once protection procedures are in place, the SFAB main body proceeds to confirm and reconfirm relationships and mission requirements, adapting the plan as required. SFAB advising teams, which are working with the FSF, can then begin movement to respective locations of the partnered forces.

3-30. The unit establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronization. In support of this effort the unit—

- Identifies the location of the concerned host nation, United States Government activities, partners, NGOs, or other agencies.
- Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.
- Coordinates for interpreter support and link-up.
- Exchanges information or intelligence.
- Confirms or establishes other coordination protocols as necessary.
- Incorporates the newly established or changed procedures into the plans for mission execution.

3-31. After receiving a detailed briefing and further guidance from the advance party, unit personnel continue to develop effective rapport with the FSF commander and counterparts. They also assess their working, storage, and living areas for security and verify the location of the training site, communications center, dispensary area, and the FSF troop area. With the FSF commander, the team leader—

- Make requests for a counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the FSF commander and the unit commander.
- Establishes rapport.
- Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner.
- Briefs the unit’s mission, its capabilities, restrictions, and limitations.
- Begins the assessment process.
- Reviews all unit plans, ensuring that those which are tentative identify the assistance needed to finalize them.
- Recommends the most desirable courses of action while emphasizing how they satisfy present conditions, achieve the desired training, and meet advisory assistance goals.
- Informs the higher in-country U.S. commander of any significant changes in the unit’s plan to assist the FSF.
3-32. The advising team leader or designated individual—

- Supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within the unit and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent units or agencies.
- Monitors the implementation of information collection plans including updating the commander’s priority intelligence requirements, conducting area assessment, and coordinating for additional intelligence support.
- Establishes liaison with the FSF intelligence and security agencies as required (within the guidelines provided by applicable higher authority).
- Assesses the intelligence threat and resulting security requirements including coordination with higher headquarters on specific security and operations security measures.
- Analyzes the foreign unit’s status to finalize unit plans for advisory assistance. The plans can include task organization of a unit with counterparts, staff functions for planning the SFA, and advisory assistance for executing the SFA.
- Explains analysis to counterparts and encourages them to participate in analyzing, preparing, and briefing the analysis, if required.
- Prepares and briefs the plans for training and advisory assistance.
- Helps the foreign unit inspect the available facilities to identify deficiencies. If the unit finds deficiencies, prepares estimates of courses of action for the FSF commander to correct them.
- Supervises the preparation of the facilities with their counterparts and informs unit and FSF commanders on the status of the facilities.

3-33. The unit establishes security based on present or anticipated threats. Some things that the unit considers are: improving defensive positions, establishing an internal guard system, redundancy of communications, and dissemination of defensive plans. The unit coordinates defensive measures with the FSF to develop a mutual defensive plan.

3-34. If the partnership is developed enough, the SFAB element can discuss viable security measures with foreign counterparts. Following an analysis of the foreign security forces’ security posture and facilities, the unit encourages the FSF (through counterparts) to adopt additional security measures as needed. The unit coaches the FSF to conduct full rehearsals of defensive plans; if unable to conduct a full rehearsal, the unit conducts internal rehearsals of the plans.

SECTION IV – EMPLOYMENT

3-35. Employment typically refers to the execution of SFA tasks by the SFAB. Employment tasks are discussed in later chapters. Section IV describes employment considerations that are separate from the SFA tasks that the SFAB conducts. Section IV includes operating considerations related to positioning SFAB forces, frequency of contact, rules of engagement, and conflict intensity.

DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS

3-36. The SFAB and its advising teams can expect missions that require the entire SFAB deploying to a single country to multiple teams and elements positioned across multiple continents and countries. This is determined by mission requirements of the requesting nation. Established communication networks and coordination procedures listed in SOPs assist in mitigating the communication challenges associated with decentralized operations. Additional control measures need to be planned for the sustainment of these dispersed forces. Forces that are decentralized require additional sustainment support. Normally, SFAB advising teams collocate at the company level to provide enough mutual supporting Soldiers to run a command post, provide local security, and conduct advising operations.

PROXIMITY AND FREQUENCY

3-37. The operational assessment process determines the state of the FSF. MOPs and MOEs, combined with a training plan, determine how the SFAB advising teams achieve success. The proximity of the advising team to the FSF is an important planning factor because it correlates to the rapport developed between the two
forces. While conducting the operational assessment, the SFAB determines how close and how often the SFAB element needs to interact with the FSF. The relationship can span from living and eating with the partnered force, to traveling around a country periodically making visits for specific training events over an expressed time period.

CONFLICT INTENSITY

3-38. Conflict intensity plays an important role in determining the type of assistance that the SFAB provides to the FSF. In more permissive and less dangerous environments, the SFAB generally is able to disperse advising teams across a larger geographic area, maintain a closer relationship with the local population, and spend more time advising tasks less related to combat. For example, in a permissive environment, the SFAB may focus more time with the local police forces than the military. In a less permissive environment with a greater enemy threat, generally, the SFAB spends more time with the FSF working on combat-related tasks and less time working on other projects. The rules of engagement and the status of forces agreement with the host-nation guides SFAB operations under various conflict intensities, which are further refined by higher headquarters.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

3-39. The rules of engagement applying to the SFAB will be developed and disseminated from higher echelons and will vary from the standing rules of engagement depending on the mission and operational environment. SFAB leaders must ensure understanding among the advising team members of how the rules of engagement effect the type of support advisors can provide the FSF. Further, SFAB members must communicate with the FSF the limitations of the type of support in order to manage expectations and maintain credibility. SFAB members must also understand the application of self-defense and collective self-defense as it applies to the FSF. Finally, the SFAB members must understand the variations and caveats to the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement that the FSF operate under. FSF rules of engagement will be developed at higher echelons of the FSF command. SFAB members are expected to train and advise FSF to follow the basic tenants of the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement. Violations of either should be reported through the designated SFAB reporting structure.

ORGANIZATIONAL REPORTING STRUCTURE

3-40. The SFAB can be employed in a variety of configurations based on assigned tasks and operational and mission variables. Each of the following configurations results in unique reporting structures that provide their own challenges. The three organizational reporting structures listed below are how the organizations within the SFAB generally communicate:

- Horizontal.
- Vertical.
- Mixed.

HORIZONTAL

3-41. The horizontal reporting structure is the most challenging arrangement for an organization to exercise mission command. The reporting structure is used when the SFAB is employing a maximum number of advising teams. Under this structure, company, battalion, and brigade leadership are dispersed throughout the area of operations and conduct advising duties. This leaves limited personnel at the command post to receive and disseminate reports, manage current operations, plan for future plans, and to battle track the on-going operations of the SFAB.

3-42. When using the horizontal reporting structure, subordinate elements report directly to their battalion main command post. The main command posts serve as the first echelon to receive reports directly from advising teams. As an example, if a single maneuver battalion has 13 advising teams dispersed across an area of operations, the battalion main command post becomes the mission command node where all advising teams send their reports, both operational and sustaintment.
3-43. The horizontal reporting structure allows the SFAB to apply maximum influence through their approximately 40 advising teams within an area of operations. However, since many of the advising teams consist of key SFAB leaders, the command post takes on a greater responsibility for receiving reports than the other reporting structures. Additionally, the command post must remain capable of conducting planning for current and future operations, controlling information collection activities, and assisting with emergencies as required.

VERTICAL

3-44. Vertical reporting structures provide the most traditional flow of information and reporting. When using this structure, command posts are used in every company and higher organization across the SFAB. The structure is used when the SFAB is less concerned with employing the maximum number of advising teams and is more concerned with maintaining mission command.

3-45. When using this reporting structure, no more than one brigade or battalion level advising team is away from the command post at any given time. This allows senior leadership to be present for issuing guidance for current or future operations as required. At the company level, the advising team cannot conduct advising operations using their full team without additional augmentation to maintain enough staff to maintain a command post. However, some members of a company advising team could be used to augment subordinate teams as necessary. When this reporting structure is used throughout the brigade, the SFAB can employ approximately 27-30 of their roughly 40 potential advising teams.

MIXED

3-46. The mixed structure is a combination of both the vertical and horizontal structures and is used within the same organization, either battalion or brigade level. For example, one maneuver battalion could establish a horizontal structure with all 13 of their advising teams reporting to the battalion command post. Another battalion could establish a vertical reporting structure, and not using their company advising teams, which limits the number of advising teams to approximately 10 (to include the battalion advising team) within their area of operations.

3-47. In that scenario, the battalion designates 1 of their 13 potential advising teams as a company command post. A maneuver battalion may have 8 advising teams reporting directly to the battalion command post while the remaining 3 report through their company command posts to battalion. There are situations that may result in advising teams, within subordinate battalions, reporting directly to the brigade command post due to location, priority of effort, available resources and assets, and other considerations. These situations fall under the mixed reporting structure.

SECTION V – REDEPLOYMENT

3-48. Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to home station or mobilization site. Before redeployment, units inventory all supplies and equipment to be passed on to a relieving unit or to ship back to home station when the mission is complete. These actions ensure all items are accounted for and the chain of custody for property and equipment is uninterrupted. Unit commanders and staff—

- Prepare a final evaluation report showing their estimate of the foreign unit’s capabilities, which provides an assessment of employment capability that the relieving U.S. unit or FSF leadership may use.
- Discuss the foreign unit’s performance with its commander. The SFAB may submit a copy of the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the next higher partner-nation military commander.
- Pass custody of training schedules, lesson plans, foreign operational records, and the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the foreign unit and, if required, the relieving U.S. unit.
- Present debriefings, AARs, and foreign unit final evaluations to the higher in-country U.S. commander and country team as required.

3-49. The unit foreign disclosure officer ensures that the requirements of the commander and staff to disclose military information and technology are understood by country, category, and classification level and that the authorities and procedures are in place to affect these disclosures.
3-50. The outgoing unit commander supervises the redeployment. The commander reviews and provides guidance for the preparation of unit redeployment plans and approves prepared plans. As operations progress, the commander and operations officer assess and select alternatives or changes to the redeployment plan based on the intelligence officer’s intelligence estimate. They develop and disseminate a fragmentary order for selected alternatives or changes.

3-51. Unit personnel prepare all accompanying supplies and equipment for shipment. They brief ground support personnel on equipment handling procedures, routes, convoy procedures, and actions to take if a terrorist or insurgent incident occurs. They load personnel and equipment for movement to the departure airfield or airport following the load plan in the unit’s operation order. They maintain accountability for all personnel, supplies, and equipment.

MISSION TERMINATION

3-52. A relief in place is an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The authority for determining the mission handoff lies with the incoming commander since they assume responsibility for the mission. SFAB units may conduct relief in place with other SFABs, other U.S. military forces, joint military forces, or may not be relieved at all.

3-53. Commanders of SFAB units may elect to replace teams, elements, detachments, or units for a variety of reasons to provide continuous Army support to security cooperation. Changes in the host-nation operational variables may require reshaping force packages as situations or operations plans change. SFA missions often transcend all joint phases of the operation: Shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units. For example, new equipment may be fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of the reason, mission handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

3-54. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: Sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered, which are described below:

- A sequential relief occurs when each element within the relieved unit is relieved in succession, from right to left or left to right, depending on how it is deployed. Sequential or staggered reliefs can take place over a significant amount of time.
- A simultaneous relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to execute, but is more easily detected by the enemy.
- A staggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each element in a sequence determined by the tactical situation, not its geographical orientation.

3-55. A relief in place may affect the conditions under which the mission continues. In SFA, this may not entail an in-country relief or transition of authority. While executing the SFA mission, advising teams are encouraged to record all relevant information and share with incoming units. This historical record can serve as an in-briefing for incoming units. Information for this brief can be gathered from SFA activities, virtual meetings, video teleconferences, or preferably from face-to-face commander and staff meetings between transitioning teams or units assisting with achieving continuity of operations. Ideally, these procedures are executed unit-to-unit in the host nation. When it is not possible to do a direct transition to a relieving unit, lessons learned and post mission debriefings provide a historical record that assists in bridging the gap between activities or operations. Post mission debriefings are typically reviewed prior to a unit conducting their predeployment site survey. Whenever possible, conduct the relief at night or under other limited visibility conditions.

3-56. The relieved unit takes the following actions when planning for a relief in place:
- Issue an order immediately.
- Maximize operations security to prevent the enemy from detecting the relief operation.
- Plan for systematic relief of subordinate units to prevent gaps in capability.
- Plan for transfer of excess ammunition, wire, petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and other material of tactical value to the incoming unit.
- Provide training on specialized equipment or techniques applicable to the operational environment.
Control movement by reconnoitering, designating, and marking routes, and providing guides to the relieving unit.

3-57. The incoming and outgoing commanders meet to exchange information regarding the following:

- Current assessment documents of the outgoing unit.
- Enemy situation.
- Outgoing unit’s tactical plan including graphics, fires plans, air space control, and inter and intratheater medical evacuation procedures.
- Fire support coordination, including indirect fire plans and the time of relief for supporting artillery and mortar units.
- Number and types of partnerships with the FSF.
- FSF capabilities and limitations brief by unit and advising team.
- Time, sequence, and method of relief.
- Location and disposition of obstacles, and the time when the commanders transfer responsibility.
- Supplies and equipment to be transferred.
- Movement control, route priority, and placement of guides.
- Command and signal information.

Note: Units conduct relief on the radio nets of the outgoing unit.

- Maintenance and logistical support for disabled vehicles.
- Identified capability gaps and recommendations to fill gaps when conducting relief with a conventional or special operations force.

3-58. The considerations list, training plan, briefings, and surveys serve to assist an incoming unit with a handoff of the SFA activities. These documents are even more important when conducting an indirect handoff as the unit uses them to provide a historical perspective of actions that have occurred prior to relief.

3-59. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander, directly or through a liaison, of the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission. When issues arise during a relief in place, and they cannot be resolved between incoming and outgoing commanders, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

3-60. If the incoming unit or the FSF is unavailable during the handoff, the advising team or unit immediately notifies the higher headquarters ordering the exchange. If the incoming unit commander has not assumed responsibility, their unit immediately comes under operational control of the outgoing unit and is absorbed into that unit position. Possible exceptions include a rapidly evolving noncombatant evacuation operation or the underlying crisis that triggers it. The outgoing unit commander and their host-nation counterpart control the operation. If the outgoing unit commander has passed responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the operational control of the incoming unit, and the host-nation unit coordinates its movements with the new unit. When both outgoing and incoming SFA commanders are available, both officers together should make physical contact and introductions with the advised SF leadership. Army units conducting SFA tasks that involve direct support, including combat operations, may need to follow these same procedures.

TRANSFER OF ACTIVITIES

3-61. The transition of all activities to the host nation occurs incrementally at multiple echelons over time, but success is defined by fulfillment of the mutually agreed upon objectives of the U.S. and partner nation. In cases where SFAB activities represent contributions to building a sovereign partner nation’s existing capacity, transition may be the completion of a specified, relatively short program of instruction by the SFAB to the FSF. In cases where entire societies must be stabilized or rebuilt post-conflict, SFAB transition may be only one small part of a lengthy, large scale overall stability campaign transition plan involving establishment of acceptable host-nation sovereignty to include self-sufficient defense and security. The intention of direct and indirect approaches to security cooperation is to change the security environment by enabling the host nation to provide its own internal defense and development. This leads to strengthening
regional security through mutual defense goals in synchronization with U.S. priorities established in the mission performance plan.

CUSTOMARY FAREWELLS

3-62. Upon departure, the host-nation representatives may bid farewell to the SFAB. Representatives may come from a higher military command, the embassy or country team, members of the FSF, and local leadership. The SFAB prepares to receive the party and acts in accordance with cultural norms and customs. This could involve ceremonies, exchange of gifts, meals, and commemorations.

SECTION VI – POST DEPLOYMENT

3-63. The unit commander conducts post deployment debriefs to provide an overview of the mission with analysis of actions and outcomes. Topics of the brief must be communicated at the appropriate levels of clearance with respect to the audience. The brief includes an overview of operational and mission variables, MOPs and MOEs, and the outcome of the assessment task the SFAB performed.

POST MISSION DEBRIEFING

3-64. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. The unit undergoes an extensive debriefing. The debriefing may occur prior to redeployment or once back at home station. The S-2 typically coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to conduct the returning unit’s debriefing. All deployed personnel, to include attachments, must be available for the debriefing.

POST MISSION DOCUMENTATION

3-65. After the debriefing, SFAB commanders and staff prepare three documents: An AAR, a report of lessons learned, and an assessment. The SFAB commander must document partnered forces tasks, missions, operations, and capabilities at brigade level and below to assist in developing and recording levels of proficiency specific to partner nation standards. Different materiel standards may apply in the partner nation, resulting in equipment standards that are different from U.S. forces. Cultural conditions could involve adaptive standards for organization and leadership.

3-66. Post-mission documentation ensures consistency during intermittent operations. The documentation should include recommended measures of performance for advisors to develop training and evaluation criteria for individual and collective tasks. Advisors use recommended measures of performance as a starting point to develop standards of performance for the foreign security force.

AFTER ACTION REVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNED

3-67. Lessons learned validate knowledge and experience derived from observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations. Lessons learned, when further validated, eventually lead to a change in behavior at the tactical level (such as tactics, techniques, and procedures), the operational level, or the strategic level, or in one or more of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy domains (DOTMLPF-P). Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the unit submits a report of lessons learned. The report documents the commander and staff’s reflection of the operation and recommendations for the future. Units often prepare the lessons according to the elements of combat power: Mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, leadership, and information. The method addresses what worked and did not work during the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing tactics, techniques, and procedures in the unit.

3-68. As security cooperation programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the program to fit special circumstances and environments. Lessons learned provide valuable data that informs the assessment of not only the SFAB conducting the mission, but also of partner security forces.
3-69. AR 11-33 states commanding generals of all Army commands, Army Service component commands, and other direct reporting commands require subordinate units, brigade size or larger (except in the case of specialty units, which operate or deploy separately at the detachment, company, or battalion levels), to submit unit-level AARs and other lessons learned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned for review, analysis, dissemination, and archiving according to the following guidelines. The unit will submit AARs to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (Combined Arms Center) no later than 90 days after returning to home station after participating in a major Army, joint, or joint combined (multinational) exercise training or security cooperation mission. Units completing combat training center rotations may submit a copy of the relevant portions of their take-home package.

3-70. As a minimum, the lessons learned report is forwarded to the appropriate theater army, and the Service and joint lessons learned agencies to allow integration into subsequent unit training and leader education. Units submit comprehensive AARs focusing on the specifics of security cooperation activities such as joint exercises to gather lessons learned information as soon as possible after mission execution. They submit reports to the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Center for Army Lessons Learned website allows users to either access a database of lessons learned or submit a request for information. The Center for Army Lessons Learned website also maintains links to other lessons learned databases and centers including the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, which is accessible to all Services.

ASSESSMENT

3-71. The SFAB conducts a comprehensive assessment using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance (determined by the theater army) of all SFA activities conducted with the FSF. Upon completion of the mission, the SFAB submits assessments to the theater army being supported. The assessments are also submitted to the office of the TRADOC Capabilities Manager for Security Force Assistance Brigade. These assessments are critical to helping the combatant command and theater army assess those activities conducted to determine progress towards achieving theater campaign plan objectives. The assessments are shared with U.S. forces transitioning into theater to assume responsibility.

3-72. In all operations, units assess the short-term, midterm, and long-term success of the FSF. SFAB success criteria will differ depending on the specific partner nation’s status, envisioned end state in the original U.S. order and the higher commander’s intent. For example, short term SFAB success may be the extent to which the SFAB achieved its mission to train the FSF partner forces on specific programs of instruction over a specified timeframe. Midterm SFAB success might be how the results of SFAB short-term success contribute to future FSF development and establishes the foundation for continued SFAB-FSF partner unit engagement leading to improved capacity. Long-term success criteria is likely to be based on how SFAB tactical and operational success with their FSF partner unit contributes to, or falls short of, the strategic and policy goals stated in the higher commanders’ orders and fulfillment of Theater Security Cooperation Plan objectives. Chapter 4 covers these assessments in more detail.
Chapter 4
Assess

Theater Army planners conduct assessments to determine the capabilities and capacity of the foreign defense establishment to achieve the objectives and end states defined in the theater campaign plan and country plan before conducting SFA activities with a foreign nation. These assessments continue through the duration of the SFA mission.

SECTION I – INITIAL ASSESSMENT

4-1. The SFAB continues the assessment of the theater planners by elaborating on the initial findings and continuing the work of a previous partnered force. The assessments are a part of a continuous process that incorporates input from the higher command, previous partnered forces, subordinate component commands, appropriate country teams, agencies outside the Department of Defense, and post-mission reports from previous U.S. military operations and training missions. (See FM 3-22.)

4-2. Assessments require a command-wide effort, with the commander’s support and leadership being critical for success. Advisors must be the subject matter experts or have input from the appropriate subject matter experts from across the entire staff. For SFA missions, assessments may require close collaboration with members from various U.S. country teams within embassies, other U.S. stakeholders at the geographic combatant commands and other Army commands, and possibly the partner nation government and other multinational partners.

4-3. Assessments must be integrated into the planning and execution phases of SFA. While planning is top-down, assessments are conducted bottom-up (figure 4-1, page 4-2). SFAB staff planners and the advising teams conducting the SFA mission must work together to ensure that they task and properly develop appropriate MOE, MOP, and indicators. The execution of these tasks creates effects that achieve objectives to attain end states. Without the proper MOEs, MOPs, and indicators, commanders have difficulty determining if the tasks accomplished their intended purpose.

4-4. SFAB commanders, staffs, and elements need to ensure assessments have both quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (narrative) metrics. Conducting assessments, particularly at the strategic and operational levels, is both an art and science. Assessors must examine the operational environment through multiple perspectives and solicit quantitative and qualitative input from a wide assortment of information and people.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE

4-5. Brigade and battalion staffs work with advising teams to develop evaluation criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs. A MOE addresses whether the staffs and teams are performing the right activities and attaining the desired end state, objective, or effect. MOPs help determine if an activity or task is achieving its intended results and if it is completed properly. Both a MOE and a MOP require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation (table 4-1).

MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

4-6. MOE are criteria staffs use to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOE help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?” MOE measure changes (positive or negative) in a quantifiable indicator associated with the target audience of an SFA mission. In SFA operations, the MOE is challenging because it is difficult to discern causal effects of SFA activities; and, if there are causal effects, they are generally long-term. Shortsighted MOE can hamper SFA operations. SFAB staff and commanders make an effort to ensure that the MOE can reasonably exclude other causal explanations so that they provide a legitimate MOE of the SFA efforts. The SFAB staff provides guidance to their teams to prevent any tunnel vision when reporting to ensure teams report objectively and accurately. Continuous assessment provides measurable feedback of MOE and MOP of the developmental progress for a specific force and collectively across the FSF. When assessing tasks, the staff identifies what the FSF must do, how well they must be able to do it, and what factors are impeding the FSF from accomplishing their objectives. The assessment measures how well FSF are performing individual and collective training tasks.
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

4-7. The MOPs are the metrics used to measure the level of performance of a given FSF task. Examples are duration, frequency, intensity, accuracy, and throughput. The MOP may include the number of patrols the FSF conduct (or number of critical meetings and engagements); the amount of time an advisor spends with their counterpart; the number of units trained; the amount of equipment issued; and the number of facilities built or rebuilt. The MOP give leaders an understanding of where they need to improve their performance as it relates to their effectiveness. SFAB teams need to maintain neutrality in reporting accuracy. SFAB teams naturally hope their partner force does well overall, however, inaccurate reporting does not benefit the partner FSF team or the FSF as a whole. Simply looking at the higher level MOP without considering the MOEs and MOPs associated with the foreign security force, can result in misplaced effort.

4-8. The MOP assesses friendly actions and is tied to measuring task accomplishment. The MOP help to answer the question, “Are we doing things right?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. In general, evaluating task accomplishment using MOP is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer.

INDICATORS

4-9. Indicators are items of information that provide insight into an MOE or MOP. Reports, surveys and polls, and information requirements are indicators. Indicators help to answer the question, “What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform multiple MOP and MOE. The company advisor team working in conjunction with the battalion staff is the best element to develop indicators.

Table 4-1. Assessment measures and indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)</th>
<th>Measures of Performance (MOPs)</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Answers the question:</td>
<td>Answers the question:</td>
<td>Answers the question: What is the status of this MOE or MOP?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are we doing the right things?</td>
<td>Are we doing things right?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures purpose accomplishment.</td>
<td>Measures task completion.</td>
<td>Measures raw data inputs to inform the MOE and MOP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No hierarchical relationship to MOPs.</td>
<td>No hierarchical relationship to MOEs.</td>
<td>Subordinate to the MOE and MOP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging to correctly choose.</td>
<td>Simple to correctly choose.</td>
<td>Challenging to correctly choose.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PLANNING FOR ASSESSMENT

4-10. An assessment is the determination of progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessments evaluate and measure the progress of SFA tasks toward a strategic end state. Assessments inform and assist commanders to make appropriate decisions pertaining to plans, resources, and execution. More specifically assessments—

- Allow commanders to gain situational understanding of the operational environment.
- Outline how conditions have changed over a defined period of time.
- Are used by commanders and staffs to determine objectives and requirements for mitigating and managing risk.
- Assist commanders in determining progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.

4-11. Assessments consist of—

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.
4-12. Some general assessment considerations that can be applied in all operational environments are—

- Determining what is the appropriate balance of qualitative and quantitative assessments within the campaign plans and country plans. At the strategic and operational levels, assessments typically become more qualitative, and availability of hard data may drive the balance of quantitative assessments.
- Understanding how the specific SFA assessment nests with the theater campaign or country plan assessments leverage and integrate government assessment efforts and help to drive the demand for additional missions to support those plans.
- Understanding the balance between the assessments of task achievements (inputs), progress toward intermediate military objectives (outputs), and progress toward theater strategic end states (outcomes).
- Determining the best way to leverage or shape subordinate elements and external stakeholders to inform a holistic assessment. Some methods of achieving this are:
  - Involving commanders in the assessment process to include assessment requirements in plans and orders.
  - Explaining the importance of assessments.
  - Involving everyone in the assessment process and findings.

4-13. In addition to the considerations listed above, staff must remember that assessments serve the commander. Commanders must ultimately provide guidance and provide buy-in to the methodology. Proper assessment training across all staff elements, extensive time and effort, and rigorous investment in assessment resources is crucial to ensure success.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

4-14. The assessment process must start with an understanding of the operational environment and support strategy development. The process must encourage unity of effort, focus resources, and anticipate partner needs. The desired end states account for U.S. strategic goals, priorities of the FSF or the partner nation government, and regional factors and concerns. (See ATP 3-07.10.) The assessment process includes the steps below.

STEP 1: ASSESS OBJECTIVES AND END STATES

4-15. Assessment begins once the SFAB receives the mission. Specifically, it is necessary to assess objectives, end states, and the need for the effort. The SFAB advising teams must remain engaged with the SFAB battalion staffs who interact with brigade planners to ensure that objectives, effects, and activities are measurable as a means of evaluating initial resource allocation. Once the SFAB establishes measurable objectives and associated effects, the MOE and MOP development begins.

STEP 2: IDENTIFY VARIABLES OF INTEREST

4-16. The next step in this objective-led process is to identify variables of interest, which in the case of the SFA operational environment are usually political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure-based metrics. Simply put, this step entails a characterization of the operational environment by teams of planners, operations research analysts, intelligence analysts, and various experts. Resources available (or to be sought out), to accomplish this understanding may include academia, media, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, SMEs, social-network sites, and other publicly available information. Step 2 creates the foundation for the baseline assessment. The assessment team identifies relevant assessment products (classified or open-source) that civilian and military organizations produce. With the desired condition established, the assessment teams can generate which metrics to measure to indicate progress towards the planned end state.

STEP 3: DATA COLLECTION AND EXAMINATION

4-17. After the assessment team identifies the variables of interest for either the MOP or the MOE, the next step is collection and examination of the data. The assessment team generates a baseline and hypotheses related to the operational environment through careful examination of data. Each variable requires information to populate the data. The team incorporates data collection plans into the operations planning
process. This way, data requirements are known prior to the commencement of activity. The plan includes the timing and frequency of data collection, organizations, or personnel responsible for collection, and required special tools, reporting formats, hardware, and software.

**STEP 4: DEVELOP A Baseline, Hypothesis, and Test**

4-18. Step 4 is an assessment of the environmental design and a proposal theory of effort to test that design. The team develops hypotheses and hypothesis tests to create a baseline model of the operational environment. The baseline is a reference point for future comparisons. Activities are assessed against desired effects and progress towards objectives by comparing to this baseline. A baseline assessment includes ensuring that stated objectives are clear, understandable, and measurable. A baseline assessment enables the team to assess progression from the baseline to the end state using the stated objectives. A baseline assessment is an opportunity for assessors to apply design theory to the plan by stressing the need for a forward thinking approach to the objectives. Step 4 includes mapping out the design theory (to the best of the assessors’ current abilities) to drive MOP measurement and develop hypotheses as to which MOE these activities influence. Mapping the nonlinear design of the environment and potential effects of activities allows for anticipation of the possibility of the team performing activities well, but not having the desired outcome.

**STEP 5: Analysis and Assessment**

4-19. The analysis and assessment step emphasizes the all-important evaluation of the MOE and MOP relationship analysis. Armed with sufficient data, observations, and hypotheses, assessment teams can begin analysis. The team identifies and highlights gaps in the assessment plan to identify and assign actions needed to adjust collection and analysis plans to improve the assessment process. Understanding current and desired conditions requires acknowledging the underlying assumptions. During the analysis step of the assessment process, staffs continually challenge assumptions they identify during planning. If they subsequently disprove assumptions, then reframing the problem may be appropriate. Since this step of the process enters a cycle that includes the aforementioned step of examining data, developing hypotheses, and hypothesis testing, this step requires tactical patience for effects to take place. If the success threshold for the MOE criteria is not met, yet the corresponding (theorized) MOP criteria were met, the assumption as to the impact of those efforts may be false.

**STEP 6: Rolling Up**

4-20. Rolling up accounts for the fact that the MOP at each assessment level may vary. As lessons emerge from effects-based analysis, the analysis of those MOE must be rolled-up into higher-level assessment processes (if applicable). Mission-level assessment metrics are likely to be different than strategic-level assessment metrics. However, the effects of various missions feed into a singular strategy level assessment that must account for all operations within the strategic plan.

**STEP 7: Report and Recommend**

4-21. Finally, following after action reviews, the team develops an after action report of feedback for future operations, recommendations to the commander, and factors which require further analysis. Reports are periodic (as appropriate) and include all key players. Strategic communications play a large part in who receives what information. When applicable, personnel conducting the assessment consult with all staff members to validate recommendations prior to reporting to the commander. Table 4-2, page 4-6, lists example considerations the team uses when developing the MOE for an organizational assessment of the FSF.
### Table 4-2. Recommended questions when developing measures of effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Attendance record.</td>
<td>-Soldiers are satisfied with their welfare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Vetting of personnel exists.</td>
<td>-State of morale.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Procedures for salary and allowances.</td>
<td>-Security of families.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Salaries are paid on time.</td>
<td>-Presence of family in the area of operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Soldiers are satisfied with their welfare.</td>
<td>-Fairness (merit based assessment).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Command</td>
<td>-Number of independent operations planned and executed.</td>
<td>-A standardized command philosophy is taught and used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Headquarters staffed to full establishment.</td>
<td>-Planning is conducted according to a process, not ad hoc.</td>
<td>-Application of the intelligence process to planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Degree of span of command.</td>
<td>-Recognition of the need to apply policy and doctrine.</td>
<td>-Ability to conduct combined arms operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Recognition of the need to apply policy and doctrine.</td>
<td>-Ability to integrate nonmilitary assets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>-Absence and sickness rates.</td>
<td>-Level of trust in the chain of command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Retention.</td>
<td>-Motivated.</td>
<td>-Shows initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Recruitment.</td>
<td>-Organized.</td>
<td>-Interacts with nonmilitary organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Requisite positions filled.</td>
<td>-Interacts with nonmilitary organizations.</td>
<td>-Can communicate effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Literacy.</td>
<td>-Interacts with nonmilitary organizations.</td>
<td>-Self develops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Requisite education standard.</td>
<td>-Interacts with nonmilitary organizations.</td>
<td>-Trains and empowers subordinates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Military academy graduation rates.</td>
<td>-Can communicate effectively.</td>
<td>-Willingness to adopt change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Staff college admissions.</td>
<td>-Self develops.</td>
<td>-Meets the requirements of the force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-International engagements.</td>
<td>-Trains and empowers subordinates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Selection is merit based vs. position and influence.</td>
<td>-Willingness to adopt change.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>-Relevant to mission-essential task list.</td>
<td>-Recognition of the importance of training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Mission-essential task list and training objectives are achieved.</td>
<td>-Integrated system exists that includes a curriculum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Validation is conducted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Lessons are learned.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Delivered on time.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Resourced.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>Basis of provisioning achieved in weapons, vehicles, and communications.</td>
<td>-Is there confidence in the equipment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Ability to problem solve issues arising from equipment failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Able to supply the requisite level of supplies.</td>
<td>-Control measures exist to account for the material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Support mechanisms exist to care for and maintain material.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION II – TYPES OF ASSESSMENT

4-22. The SFAB performs four types of assessments: Operational, organizational, environmental, and institutional (figure 4-2). Assessments occur at all levels of the FSF and U.S. functionality and are continuous, collaborative, and simultaneous in nature. As explained in the following paragraphs, the four types of
Assessments seem separate and distinct but may occur simultaneously while a unit is assessing the FSF progress and its mission daily.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Assessment</th>
<th>Institutional Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization Structure</td>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed Missions</td>
<td>- Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Materiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Leadership &amp; Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-2. Foreign security forces assessments**

**ORGANIZATIONAL**

4-23. The organizational assessment compares the current organizational structure and operational state of the FSF to the designed or intended capabilities and capacity to execute directed missions. To determine what the organization is designed to do, the organizational assessment answers these questions: What are the foreign security forces’ roles? What is the FSF mission (FSF mission analysis)? What are the foreign security forces’ developmental goals and objectives? The following paragraphs hold considerations for finding answers to these questions.

4-24. The SFAB starts the organizational assessment during the predeployment phase. Commanders and staff must focus on objectives and end states of the FSF higher governing body first rather than the organization. Starting with the organization first is often a planning pitfall. Commanders often make the mistake of organizing their forces with the FSF based on similarities of size and capabilities. This is common when the FSF is conducting operations other than military such as policing or humanitarian aid for example.

4-25. As the SFAB conducts the military decision-making process and continues its organizational assessment, task organization becomes clearer to the commander. The commander advised by staff can determine who is best able to gather the data and complete the remaining steps of the assessment process and advising mission. A MOP is to track each echelon’s mission orders and compare it to their defined mission-essential task list or listed role to determine if they are operating accordingly.

**OPERATIONAL**

4-26. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the foreign security forces’ ability to perform their missions, roles, or functions. It shows how well the FSF can conduct their missions. A clear
understanding of the FSF operational or institutional mission serves as the starting point to base the operational assessment.

4-27. The SFAB evaluates success of the SFA mission by assessing performance, capabilities, and training of the FSF. When the FSF reaches their desired end state, they—

- Provide a reasonable level of security in the area of operations without infringing on the population’s civil liberties or posing a coup threat to the government.
- Operate within the rule of law.
- Sustain their operations after U.S. or multinational forces depart.
- Have the full faith and support of the local population and central government.

4-28. Effective FSF displays the following characteristics and capabilities:

- Flexible. A force that can accomplish the broad missions that the nation requires, not just to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command and organizational structure that is feasible for the partner nation.
- Proficient FSF that—
  - Can work with adjacent organizations to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
  - Is tactically and technically proficient, can execute their national security mission, and integrate with allies.
  - Is competent in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.
  - Is thoroughly trained with a modern police ethos to include security procedures, investigation basics, evidence collection, and court and legal procedures.
- Self-sustained. Forces that can manage their own equipment throughout its lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conduct administrative support.
- Well led. Leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values and are selected for promotion based on competence and merit.
- Professionalism as follows:
  - FSF that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
  - FSF that are loyal to the central government and serve national interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.
- Integrated into society. A force that is representative of the nation’s major ethnic groups and is not seen as the instrument of just one faction. Cultural sensitivities toward the incorporation of all groups must be observed.

4-29. The capabilities support the overall campaign design. The evaluations of the FSF capabilities reflect the foreign security forces’ ability to influence the operational environment to reinforce the overall design. Ultimately, the success or failure of an FSF unit may rest more on its ability to affect the operational environment in general than on its ability to execute specific tasks.

4-30. While a campaign design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living process, the same holds true for an advisor’s evaluation of the FSF success. Metrics for evaluating success changes as the conditions in the area of operations shift. An advisor’s ability to implement and maintain the “learn and adapt” imperative leads to more accurate assessments of the FSF.

4-31. The two questions below provide a great starting point for evaluating the FSF:

- Base the evaluations on the goals of the campaign design and ask, “To what extent can the FSF achieve those goals?”
- Keep in mind the maxim: “First, do no harm,” and “no better friend—no worse enemy.” To what extent does the FSF reflect these maxims?
ENVIRONMENTAL

4-32. The environmental assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on a specific FSF organization (ATP 3-07.10). The environmental assessment validates the suitability of an FSF organization’s directed missions. This also may reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the FSF beyond those normally associated with a similar type of security force. The environmental assessment answers the following questions: What are the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time impacts on FSF capability development? What are the threats? Are there any geographical considerations?

4-33. The majority of the information contained within the environmental assessment is gathered during the IPB process. SFAB staffs and advising teams constantly update this information and exchange information with the FSF to the extent possible without violating security procedures.

INSTITUTIONAL

4-34. The institutional assessment evaluates the FSF capabilities by examining doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy, or a similar construct, to close existing capability gaps. The institutional assessment answers the following questions: Why does the organization have capability gaps and why does the organization have capacity gaps? The best framework to assess FSF institutions is the DOTMLPF-P framework.

4-35. The information below is outlined in the DOTMLPF-P framework and can assist advisors in preparing assessments. The questions posed below provide a frame of reference to help evaluate the employment of advisors and the value of rendered assistance to the FSF. These questions combine objective and subjective analysis, but to employ them effectively requires the advisor’s interpretation and sound judgment. These questions are not all-inclusive and are presented as examples only. While focusing mainly on institutional assessment, there are other factors as they relate to capability and capacity gaps or other impediments to development. The questions are as follows:

- **Doctrine:**
  - Does the advising team operate according to which way is the best approach or does it seek to promote and integrate the FSF doctrine among the force with which it works?
  - Are doctrine and unit structures standard (and understood) across the FSF?
  - Does doctrine provide clear, complete methods to instill and execute discipline, acquisitions, and support activities?
  - Do advising team leaders and the FSF counterparts understand the doctrine and have it available?
  - Is doctrine written at a level that the FSF commanders can understand?

- **Organization:**
  - Do advisors focus on developing competent cadres to conduct training?
  - Do FSF personnel conduct the majority of training?

- **Training:**
  - Do all foreign forces receive a basic education and job training while they are serving?
  - Are advisors familiar with the FSF organizations, equipment, and weapons?
  - Do they have some familiarity with local languages?
  - Are advisors effective in using interpreters?
  - Can advisors distinguish between cultural practices and excuses?
  - Did advisors use AARs to assist the FSF learning?
  - Does initial training of the FSF focus on basic skills such as first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline?
  - Are leaders trained on tactics such as patrolling and urban operations?
  - Are FSF units trained to a standard on the following skills?
  - Does the advising team provide effective personnel management?
- Does the advising team conduct all phases of logistical operations?
- Does the advising team coordinate indirect fires?
- Does the advising team provide for effective medical support?
- Are the FSF leaders competent in the following skills: Information collection, day and night patrolling, point security, cordon and search operations, operations with police, treatment of detainees, psychological operations, and civic action?

**Materiel:**
- Did follow-on assessments start by reviewing resources, determining where to commit or redirect resources, and deciding whether to request additional resources?
- Are FSF better equipped than the enemy and insurgents they may face?

**Leadership and education:**
- Are leaders promoted based on demonstrated competence and performance?
- Are leaders promoted based on family ties, party membership, or tribal ties?
- Do leaders seek to develop subordinates?
- Do leaders care and seek to maintain the welfare of their subordinates?
- Does the unit act corruptly or abuse its power against the public?
- Does the force treat all members of the public equally regardless of party or tribe?
- Does the FSF abuse civilians?
- Are training systems in place to teach the FSF personnel rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict?
- Do units reflect ethnic, tribal, and religious diversity of the partner nation?
- Does desertion or any other negative trend particularly affect one group?
- Do advising leaders understand the FSF commander’s accountability system and are they capable of tracking it for signs of corruption or widespread disaffection?
- In addition to assessing soldier skills, are advisors assessing subjective measures such as loyalty to the government and the acceptance of values such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption?

**Personnel:**
- Are there clear mental, physical, and moral standards for recruits?
- Are recruiting areas secured?
- Have recruits been vetted against known insurgent lists?
- Officer vetting. Are all officers vetted to ensure they do not have ties to radical or insurgent organizations?
- Are NCOs selected from the best enlisted personnel?
- Are there large pockets of former members of a single illegal unit, tribal faction, or other illegal militant faction within a single unit?
- Are pay scales widely available and understood?
- Does taxing of subordinates or other corrupt practices occur?
- Is a death notification and benefit structure in place for foreign forces killed or who otherwise die in service?
- Are corrupt individuals dismissed when they engage in corruption?
- Are personnel accountability systems in place, understood, and enforced?
- Do the FSF commanders understand the importance of personnel accountability?

**Facilities:**
- Do garrisons provide housing and basic healthcare for commissioned officers, NCOs, Soldiers, and families?


- **Policy:**
  - Are individuals promoted based on a combination of competence, professionalism, and social status?
  - Does the promotion system result in the selection of competent leaders who are culturally accepted?
  - Have commanders completed plans for demobilization and transition to civilian life for Soldiers, NCOs, and officers who are considered a hindrance to the force?
  - Are transition systems in place for foreign forces returning to civilian life after completing their enlistments?
  - Do advisors live, sleep, and eat with the FSF units?
  - Is segregation kept at an absolute minimum?
  - Do higher level commanders understand the roles and limitations of advisors, do they treat them as advisors or do they treat them as liaisons?
  - Do police and military liaison officers exist and coordinate military and police actions with their counterparts?
  - Is appropriate coordination conducted between the police and military?

**CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT**

4-36. Assessments are a continuous process of examining inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and the impact on objectives. As the assessments are being done, planners and assessors ask the following questions:

- Has the objective been achieved?
- If the objective has not been achieved, are we measuring the objective correctly?
- If the objective has been achieved, what are the impediments to achieving the objective?

4-37. It is important to delineate assessment responsibilities across several stakeholders to account for differing levels of organizational authority and expertise and to maximize the level of objectivity into the assessment process. It is possible for an individual and staff section to have several different assessment roles and responsibilities. Some of the roles and associated responsibilities are listed below:

- Data collectors attend the SFA events and collect relevant information.
- Advisors perform formal assessments of programs and activities.
- Designated personnel review the assessments and certify those assessments as legitimate.
- Staff and advising team members aggregate assessments to determine what is being collectively observed.
- Advising teams develop recommendations to the commander and staff, based on the assessment findings of the SFA plans and missions for possible solutions or capability requirements using DOTMLPF-P format.

4-38. The SFAB conducts assessments to support each SFA task. SFA tasks should not begin, progress, change, or cease without conducting assessments. The SFAB and its subordinate elements, in partnership with the FSF, should spend considerable time updating assessments to shape the operation, consolidate gains, and prevent wasted time and resources on activities that are not reaching the security cooperation objectives.
Chapter 5

Train

The SFAB assists other nations by developing training programs and institutions to facilitate an improved, sustainable capability and capacity of select FSF. Train refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate the FSF training, leader development, and education at the individual, collective, and staff levels. Activities may include the development and execution of program of instruction training events and leader development activities. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of their security environment. The SFAB task of training may be the priority task performed by the brigade as a whole, or it may be a task performed by subordinate elements while the SFAB is conducting another task.

SECTION I – PLAN

5-1. The training task is one of the most important organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess concept (commonly referred to as OTERA-A) tasks that the SFAB executes. Training is critical to the success of the U.S. mission when working with FSF. Training has application within most missions that the SFAB conducts.

5-2. The complexity of the SFAB planning for training is similar to the planning conducted by the combat training centers or training support brigades. The FSF and SFAB commander’s visualizations and end states are refined into goals and objectives by commanders, staffs, and their FSF counterparts. These goals and objectives are then translated into training objectives. SFAB commanders, staffs, and leaders use many of the training principles in ADP 7-0, ADRP 7-0, and organization and echelon-specific combined arms training strategies to plan training and then adapt it to the partner FSF.

5-3. Using the MDMP, brigade and battalion, staffs develop long-range training goals based on the FSF mission-essential task list. It is unlikely that the FSF has an actual mission-essential task list since the list is a U.S. Army construct; however, they likely have a list of priorities or a similar construct to facilitate planning. The SFAB advisors then coach or lead their FSF staff counterparts through the process of unit training development. (See ADRP 7-0.)

5-4. Following the development of long-range training plans by the SFAB and the FSF, commanders, staffs, and advising teams develop and execute subordinate training plans. Additionally, in their roles as advisors, staffs and advising teams train their counterparts on planning training and meeting training goals.

5-5. The SFAB modifies delivery of training based on the foreign security forces’ capacity and capability. The largest variables that affect training are differences in language and culture. The SFAB can mitigate these variables prior to deployment through study, and during the deployment by developing a good rapport with their counterparts.

TRAINING METHODS

5-6. The U.S. forces use an effective method of training known as the crawl-walk-run method to teach individual tasks, battle drills, collective tasks, and field exercises. (See ADP 7-0.) Forces use the method to develop well-trained leaders and units. Training must take into consideration the unit’s mission and the higher unit’s mission to ensure a practical training plan. Identifying the higher commander’s mission and intent, as well as the tasks and purposes of other units in the area, which the FSF may have to support,
would add context to the training. The crawl-walk-run method can be expanded to include training with other organizations.

5-7. At a minimum, units continue individual training to improve and sustain individual task proficiency while training on collective tasks. Collective training requires interaction among individuals or organizations to perform tasks, actions, and activities that contribute to achieving mission-essential task proficiency. Collective training includes performing collective, individual, and leader tasks associated with each training objective, action, or activity.

**INDIVIDUAL TRAINING**

5-8. Training of individual foreign security force members emphasizes the mission requirement. Trainers must consider physical and mental conditioning, tactical training, basic rifle marksmanship, first aid, combatives, and the operational environment when planning their mission. Individual training includes general tactics and techniques of security operations and the motivation, operations, and objectives of internal and external threats. Tough and realistic training conditions troops to mentally and physically withstand the strain of continuous operations. Trainers must consider cross-training on all types of weapons, communications and other equipment, and skills particular to their unit. Personnel losses must never cause weapons, communications equipment, or essential skills to be lost due to a lack of fully-trained replacement personnel.

**SMALL UNIT LEADER TRAINING**

5-9. In most military operations, FSF small-unit leaders must adjust plans and execute operations with little additional guidance to be successful. Therefore, advisors stress small-unit leadership training which can occur concurrently with individual training. Tools to train leaders are manuals, previously established training, and tactical exercises without troops, battle simulations, and unit missions. The training develops aggressiveness, tactical proficiency, and initiative. Depending on the mission, small-unit leader training includes combined arms technical training such as procedures for forward observer and close air support. Leadership training must include land navigation in difficult terrain and under conditions of limited visibility. Mission readiness, logistical operations, and the health and welfare of subordinates are continuous parts of training, also.

**COLLECTIVE TRAINING**

5-10. Collective training starts at the squad level. Squad battle drills provide key building blocks that support operations. Trainers can link battle drills and collective tasks through a logical, tactical scenario in a situational training exercise. Although this exercise is mission-oriented, it results in more than mission proficiency. Battle drills and collective tasks support situational training exercises, while these exercises support operations. Advisors must understand the operational environment when training the FSF; training incorporates how internal and external threats and civilians affect the environment. Flexibility in using U.S. doctrine and understanding host-nation doctrine in training enhances efforts to make training realistic. Trainers modify U.S. doctrine to fit the FSF level of expertise, their mission command, the tactical situation, and the sustainment base. Often the structure and capabilities of the FSF differ from that required by U.S. doctrine.

**TRAINING LEADERS**

5-11. The effectiveness of the FSF directly relates to the quality of their leadership. Building effective leaders requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, and specialized training. The ultimate success of any SFA effort depends on creating viable FSF leaders able to carry on the fight at all levels and build their nation on their own.

5-12. The standards of leader training reinforce different levels of authority within the foreign security force. Clearly established responsibilities for commissioned and noncommissioned officers specify what is expected of recruits and leaders. Reinforced subordinate relationships to civilian authorities ensure civilian control. In addition, training establishes team dynamics. In some cultures, security forces may need training
to understand the vital role of members not in primary leadership positions. For example, noncommissioned officers may be a new or different concept for some the FSF.

5-13. Much of what counterparts learn about leadership is through observing the SFAB advising teams that provide the training. Trainers model leadership through example. The advisor’s job is to reinforce desired values in the counterpart’s attitude. The effect of this mindset is the creation of a learning organization with professional leaders who are competent and confident. How advisors train them on these basic values and effects is the art of advising. Part of that art relies on the advisor and advisor team demonstrating these values and effects through their actions.

SECTION II – PREPARE

5-14. Establishing realistic goals for the FSF and following through on training plans consumes time. There will be intense pressure to find training shortcuts, employ quick fixes, or train personnel on the job. Trainers must resist such approaches. Such approaches often create more problems than they solve. However, trainers must avoid the temptation to create long, complex training programs based on unrealistic standards. Effective programs account for the partner-nation’s culture, resources, and short-term security needs. No firm rules exist on the duration of particular training programs. Trainers can use existing and historical training programs to determine the duration of training. To a certain extent, the enemy threat dictates the length of training. As security improves, training programs can expand to facilitate achievement of the long-term end state.

5-15. The training that the SFAB performs with the FSF involves many of the individual and collective skills common to conventional military operations. All parties should clearly understand the agreed upon tasks, conditions, and standards which are to be measured. Metrics for evaluating a unit’s performance can be quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative evaluation methods or measurements evaluate the foreign security forces’ performance using predetermined metrics or percentages. Qualitative evaluation methods or measurements measure the foreign security forces’ performance using observations without specific metrics or statistics to quantify the data. In all cases, the advising team should use methodologies that the FSF leadership has agreed to. Measuring loyalty to the host-nation government is an example of something that can be measured with quantitative and qualitative methods. A quantitative method would first ascertain a baseline for metrics such as the number of conscripted Soldiers that reenlist and the percentage of volunteer Soldiers that do the same. Next, goals are set for improvement and these numbers are measured over time to determine whether they increase, decrease, or remain the same. A qualitative method would rely solely on observation and the criteria for observation may or may not be consistent among different observers. An example is an advisor noticing that one platoon does not complain about the government while another platoon seems to frequently make complaints about the government. This observation may or may not be shared by other advisors looking at the same platoons. During the preparation phase, the advising team develops evaluation sheets for each task or standard to be evaluated based upon the methodology being used. Examples include observational data collection sheets to assist in their observation of training and training evaluation outlines.

5-16. Training evaluation standards are predetermined and mutually agreed upon metrics for evaluation of tasks during preparation for training. Trainers clearly and succinctly state the task conditions and standards. A training and evaluation outline is a summary document that provides information on collective training objectives, related individual training objectives, resource requirements, and applicable evaluation procedures for a type of organization. Trainers develop task condition and standards to be suitable for the FSF with appropriate performance measures described with GO/NO GO criteria for each step. Early on, do not expect the FSF to perform to established U.S. evaluation standards. The training and evaluation outline provides the means to help leaders evaluate task execution and subjectively assess the unit’s ability to perform the task.

5-17. Effective training programs require clear, detailed individual, leader, and unit performance standards. These standards consider cultural factors that directly affect the ability of the individual or unit to operate. For example, training a staff or unit to conduct effective operations requires more time in countries where the average soldier is illiterate. Building a security force from the ground up takes far more time than creating one around a trained cadre. Thus, using existing military personnel to form units and cadres for units often proves to be more effective than creating novice security forces.
5-18. Often, poorly trained leaders and units commit more human rights violations than well-trained, well-led units. Leaders and units unprepared for the pressure of active operations tend to use indiscriminate force, target civilians, and abuse detainees. Leaders account for unit inexperience when planning and while leading operations. These actions can threaten the popular support and government legitimacy essential for success. Badly disciplined and poorly led FSF can facilitate insurgent recruiting and propaganda efforts.

SECTION III – EXECUTE

5-19. During the execute phase, the SFAB advising teams begin training the FSF based on the agreed upon mission-essential task list and individual and collective training standards. The SFAB and battalion headquarters’ primarily conduct current operations to facilitate the tasks the subordinate elements conduct.

5-20. Trainers plan and structure the training plan in such a manner as to address the deficiencies identified in the initial training assessment. The training plan identifies partner-nation members that can assist with training the FSF, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the process. Finally, the training plan considers the unit’s eventual self-sustainment. As the FSF gains sufficient capacity and necessary capabilities to perform independently, advisors transition from a leading role to a supporting role. The plan for training the FSF uses a comprehensive approach, supports the SFA strategy, and consists of varied echelons. Trainers working with other echelons and actors within the area of operations can provide support and expertise that enhance the training and operations process as well as limit redundancy.

5-21. As part of the training plan, the advising team leader needs to ensure the security of the training sites. On the day of training, the advising team receives a situation and threat update from higher and applies their own knowledge, understanding, and situational awareness to—

- Analyze the threat to determine any capabilities to attack or collect intelligence on the FSF training at each site.
- Prepare estimates of course of actions that would deny the training sites to any attack.
- Present the unit commander with a risk assessment identifying security concerns with mitigation solutions.
- Before each training session ensure that all personnel, both the United States and the FSF, understand the defensive actions to take and operations security measures to execute in the event of an attack. At a minimum, a brief back rehearsal is required.

5-22. To present the training material properly, trainers (both the FSF and the SFAB), follow the lesson outlines approved in the program of instruction. All training clearly states the mutually agreed upon tasks, conditions, and standards desired in a manner that assures they are understood by the FSF trainees. Trainers state all warning and safety instructions in both the partner-nation language (through interpreters) and English. The training includes demonstrations of each task, stressing the step-by-step process. Trainers monitor students’ progress during instruction and practical exercises, correcting their mistakes immediately or noting the mistakes and correcting them at the appropriate time.

5-23. The FSF to be trained range from a trained, professional FSF to an untrained, poorly disciplined unit. Below are some tips for advisors when conducting training:

- Rehearse all classes with counterparts and, as necessary, with interpreters.
- Execute the prescribed program of instruction making adjustments as necessary.
- Adhere to the training schedule consistent with cooperation from the FSF and changes in mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
- Ensure all training objectives satisfy actual training needs identified during the analysis of the operational environment and campaign plan.
- Encourage the FSF commanders to ensure all their personnel receive training as scheduled.
- Ensure all training objectives are structured according to applicable partner-nation doctrine or U.S. military doctrine when specific modifications to doctrine are made to meet an identified in-country need.
- Implement multiechelon training by teaching individual, crew, leader, and collective skills concurrently.
- Adhere to the lesson outlines consistent with the cooperation from the partner-nation forces and changes in the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
- Demonstrate the execution of, or show the desired end result, to clearly illustrate the task.
- Stress the execution of the task as a step-by-step process, when possible.
- Monitor the foreign security forces’ progress during practice and ensure mistakes are corrected as they are observed. Be consistent with the training and with the other instructors. If the instructor is the at fault party, engage the instructor in a culturally appropriate manner to address the deficiency.
- Periodically, use a second or third interpreter to monitor instruction given by interpreters to validate translations.

SECTION IV – ASSESS

5-24. The SFAB advising teams update their operational and institutional assessment at the conclusion of each phase or training event. The assessment is a collaborative event with the FSF partners, however, initially SFAB personnel may conduct an internal assessment as a component for a larger partner assessment.

ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5-25. When assessing training, commanders and leaders consider—
- Their own observations and those of subordinate leaders and other individuals.
- Feedback from after action reviews.
- Results of unit evaluations.

5-26. Leaders must be sure to incorporate the foreign security forces’ observations into their assessment. The foreign security forces’ observations based on their cultural perspective may be more relevant and applicable than that of U.S. forces.

5-27. One method to capture observations, insights, and lessons learned from the FSF is to conduct an AAR. There are several techniques or variations on how this can be accomplished. In each case, the advising team emphasizes to the FSF leadership the importance of participation by all members of the FSF that were involved in the event being reviewed. Cultural sensitivities may be a factor in consolidated AARs, which may lead to echeloned AARs. For example, holding an AAR for the officers, a separate AAR with the noncommissioned officers, and another with the enlisted personnel. The AAR technique varies based on the event and the developmental stage the FSF is in. The advising team may lead the AAR. In these cases, the advising team may wish to go over the high points of the AAR process with key FSF leaders so they are not caught unprepared in front of their subordinates. Advisors never want to be the cause for their counterparts being embarrassed. A second technique is to have the FSF leadership run the AAR. This may require a walk through or rehearsal with the advising team coaching the leadership prior to conducting the AAR. As the FSF matures, the advising team may shift from one technique to another with the final result being the FSF conducting their own AARs to feed their own assessments. Chapter 2 discusses AARs in more detail.

ADVISING TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES

5-28. Advising teams ensure participation and understanding by all participants at AAR functions, while reinforcing the FSF to be diligent with security concerns at all training events.

5-29. During the end of a training assessment or at the conclusion of each phase of training, reports of corruption, gross inefficiency, personal who hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or sympathy (proven or suspected) for the threat are compiled and reported to the next-higher U.S. commander through the operations channel. At the end of the training assessment or at the conclusion of each phase advisors—
- Participate in the FSF unit debriefing describing the changes in capacity and capability to improve future performance.
- Conduct a unilateral debriefing to identify recurring or significant problems.
- Modify the unit's planned SFA mission to correct identified problems.
- Make recommendations for awards for both units' personnel, as applicable.
5-30. Advising teams report updated assessments to the next higher element through the operations channel. The report contains a quantifiable metric to describe the current operational state of counterparts. The higher SFAB echelon analyzes this data to formulate the overall unit status of the partnered FSF. The SFAB commanders adjust plans through the issuance of revised guidance following analysis and significant changes in capacity and capability of the FSF.

5-31. Training FSF is inherently more difficult than training a conventional U.S. Army unit. The foreign security force typically does not have the same foundation in training as do U.S. forces. Through advising and assisting, discussed in the following chapter, the SFAB can greatly improve the effectiveness of the FSF training programs.
Chapter 6
Advise and Assist

Advise and assist are often paired together due to their close relationship. Each is a separate task, but is so closely paired with one another within the SFA construct that they are often executed simultaneously.

Advise refers to all activities that provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, guidance, advice, and counsel to the FSF while they conduct the mission assigned to the individual, unit, or organization. Advising occurs under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and to support individuals or groups. (See FM 3-22.)

Assist provides supporting or sustaining capabilities that allow another force to meet objectives and their desired end state. Operational variables determine the level of advice and the amount of assistance. Foreign security force assistance can be conducted through augmentation of their forces and may not include an advising component. When advising is required, the SFAB advising teams normally advise and assist concurrently. The assistance continues until the FSF establishes systems or maintains an environment that no longer requires assistance.

SECTION I – ADVISE

6-1. When conducting the advise task, U.S. forces interact with the FSF and other defense organizations in an effort to increase the foreign security forces’ capability that meets U.S. strategic goals. U.S. forces advising the FSF must coordinate their efforts with the geographic combatant command and country team to ensure that the United States presents clear and consistent themes and messages to the FSF (FM 3-22). At the tactical level, U.S. advisors provide sound tactical advice on the conduct of individual and collective tasks and operations that the FSF conducts.

6-2. The U. S. Army may provide advisors for tactical, institutional, and governmental-level positions. The tactical level refers to military units. The institutional level refers to service level interactions with a foreign security organization (such as an army, border patrol, defense department headquarters, or academic institution). The governmental level refers to government departments or ministries not responsible for security. (See FM 3-22.)

6-3. The SFAB advisors rely on their experience, judgment, and knowledge of joint and Army doctrine and training principles to coach, train, and mentor their FSF partners. They provide guidance and counsel while developing those same foundational traits in their counterparts.

6-4. The ways by which SFAB forces conduct advising duties varies in conduct and positioning. Often, the terms advising and training are used to refer to the same task. However, while there is a relationship between the two terms, they are separate tasks. Advisors provide advice and coaching through training development and execution; however, training is only one piece of the greater advising task. The advising task includes other aspects as well, such as coaching, serving as a liaison, and providing general counsel to FSF personnel. When possible, advising teams should live with the FSF they are advising. Whether living near the FSF or not, advising teams must make a deliberate effort to establish an effective communication system between the advising teams and their counterparts to ensure the appropriate communication channels are available when required. Close integration of the advising teams and the FSF enhances the trust and confidence between the forces and builds legitimacy for the U.S. forces with the local population.
6-5. Generally, there are three levels of advising that teams operate under as defined below:

- Level One Advising. Advising teams advise their counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either an embedded footprint or in close proximity.
- Level Two Advising. Advising teams advise their counterparts on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and capability of, the designated counterpart, threat level to advisors, and resources available.
- Level Three Advising. Teams provide advice from a centralized location (such as at a regional training center or school) or during a battle field circulation or staff assistance visit. Level three advising is not limited to the advising teams. For example, staff personnel with a particular expertise that are not normally part of an advising team may be used to conduct level three advising for a specific capability.

PLAN

6-6. The SFAB provides advising teams capable of advising two echelons higher than their organic organization. For example, an SFAB company commander can advise an FSF brigade commander, a brigade staff could advise an FSF corps staff, and so on. This capability drives the increased rank and experience requirements for serving in the SFAB. While the capability exists to advise two levels higher, the mission analysis determines whether or not that would be appropriate. Generally an experienced, professional, and well-established FSF requires pairing at the advising team’s organic level or perhaps one level higher. A less experienced FSF allows for the advising teams to advise one, or even two, echelons higher. During mission analysis, commanders and staffs must weigh the FSF experience level, the effects the SFAB is trying to achieve, resources and time available, and other relevant factors to determine the best lay down for the advising teams. As with all missions, commanders must assess risk, which in this case includes considering whether the teams have the appropriate experience to advise their counterparts versus being able to impact the maximum number of FSF organizations.

6-7. All planned operations should be coordinated with the FSF. One indication of an effective advising effort is the amount of personal involvement the FSF takes in their own operations. The civilian population should see that they are secured by their own security forces. This promotes the legitimacy of the host-nation government and builds trust and confidence in the security forces.

6-8. SFAB advising teams teach, coach, and advise in a cycle. As the FSF become proficient in a skill, the advisor can move on to other skills and tasks. If the FSF requires retraining on a specific task or has quickly learned a new task ahead of schedule, the advisor can adjust the training plan in conjunction with the FSF personnel. As the proficiency of the FSF increases, less of the advising team’s time is spent conducting training and more is spent coaching, advising, and monitoring the FSF training.

6-9. Advisors should understand the organization of the local government and how their activities impact the operational variables in the area. Usually a set of agreements exist between various local agencies, security forces, and the national government (usually through some sort of inter-ministerial council). These agreements provide a coordinated effort in servicing the various needs of civilian population. If necessary, the advisor may work with other agencies to assist in getting such agreements made. The brigade civil affairs staff officer can assist with these matters. If such agreements already exist and they’re conducive to the mission, advisors should recognize and strengthen them.

6-10. The SFAB elements commonly operate in complex environments via interdependent operations. Interdependent operations require near-seamless integration of agencies representing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The advisors increase their negotiation and cross-cultural skills as they work with these various agencies.

6-11. When the SFAB is prioritizing the quality of the advising mission over the number of FSF organizations impacted, advising teams generally pair with a single FSF. However, this may not always be the case due to mission and operational variables which may require advising teams to work with a greater number of organizations.
PREPARE

6-12. Often advisors find defining success in an SFA environment difficult. Progress cannot be easily tracked or measured by the MOEs or indicators on a day-to-day basis. Achieving a tactical objective does not in and of itself equate to mission success. Success is achieved by the FSF achieving the goals and objectives as described in their commander’s vision. Ultimately, the FSF should plan and execute their own training and operations with an advisor providing advice, coaching, and oversight. To ensure that a plan is fully accepted, the FSF must develop training and operations as their plan.

6-13. Advisors prepare for operations by reviewing internal and FSF SOPs. They also study U.S. and FSF doctrine and collective tasks pertinent to the task being trained. The SFAB teams must be subject matter experts on a variety of subjects.

6-14. The SFAB advisors should obtain knowledge about their counterparts, to include cultural norms, history of the region and people, and other relevant information that allows them to quickly establish rapport. This includes an understanding of leadership processes, human nature tendencies, and motivations. Information may take the form of books, staff rides, videos, reports, discussions, previous operational reports, professional speakers, and other research materials. Rapport is measured through the advisor’s ability to motivate their counterpart to take a desired action.

EXECUTE

6-15. First and foremost, advisors must know the doctrine, rules, and regulations that regulate their actions while working with the FSF. The U.S. advisor is a master of U.S. Army doctrine while understanding the doctrine, rules, and regulations that guide the FSF. Done well, the advisor can readily detect departures from both and make required adjustments.

6-16. It is important to remember that advising teams do not command FSF personnel or units. Advisors provide advice, training, and when required, access to coalition resources via the assisting task discussed below. They are not intended to lead FSF in combat. Advising teams are responsible for mission command within their own team. Although they are not the commanders, they should be prepared to coach the commander of the foreign unit, which could include working side-by-side during an enemy engagement.

6-17. Advisors have no command influence over the FSF and must depend on influence and relationships to positively affect FSF efforts through teaching, coaching, and advising. Advisors often work with counterparts of higher rank than themselves. Advisors should consider the foreign unit’s experience and capabilities and carefully choose opportunities to inject or impart knowledge. The advising teams must be confident in the information that they present; trust and rapport is quickly lost if the advisors provide incorrect information. Generally, foreign units value advisors who are subtle in their teaching, coaching, and advising. Advisors who create a climate in which FSF personnel feel they are teaching themselves often prove the most effective.

6-18. To be successful, advising teams must accomplish their mission through their counterparts without exercising any command influence over them. Therefore, they must establish rapport, trust, and relationships with their foreign counterparts to build potential influence and be successful. This requires advisors to focus on the Army doctrinal attribute of “intellect,” which includes an emphasis on mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise. Successful advisors have a genuine interest in other people, they smile, adhere to cultural norms, use proper names and titles, actively listen, discuss their interests, and make the other person feel important.

6-19. Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action is effective only if the counterpart trusts the advisors professional competency. The counterpart questions the advisor’s competence when they do not perceive the proposed solution as realistic. Therefore when laying out courses of action or recommendations, the advisor takes time to explain why the COAs are executable and effective.

6-20. As the FSF begins to see successes from their joint efforts and proficiency increases, they naturally want a larger hand in their own matters. The advisor may sometimes feel they want to assume more responsibility than they can effectively manage. Advisors ought to appreciate these evidences of growing pains, for they are a necessary part of becoming able to assume responsibility. The advisor needs to adjust to the growing desires of the people to help themselves and plan future encounters accordingly.
6-21. Trust is a fundamental building block of human relationships and at the very core of leadership. Followers must trust their leaders. This is especially true in combat, when orders must be followed immediately to succeed on the battlefield. However, trust cannot be mandated, it must be earned. Advisors must earn the trust of their counterpart and trust them in return. In any culture, this trust is built over time through consistent, principle-centered behavior and actions that demonstrate honesty, integrity, trust, dignity, and respect for all people.

6-22. The SFAB advising teams must build the morale and confidence of the FSF. Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results in high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While defeat in a small operation may have little strategic consequence in a conventional war, often a small tactical defeat of the FSF has serious strategic consequences. If the FSF fails, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the host-nation government’s ability to protect them. As much as possible, the FSF begins with simpler missions. As their confidence and competence grows, these forces can assume more complex assignments. Collaborating with joint or multinational units can help new forces build confidence in adjusting to combat stress.

6-23. Trainers carefully monitor and evaluate the operational performance of an inexperienced organization to correct weaknesses quickly. The employment plan for the FSF allows enough time for additional training after each operation. Gradually introducing units into combat allows the advising teams and the FSF leadership to identify poor leaders, conduct retraining, or take other actions. Trainers identify competent leaders to give them greater authority and responsibility.

ASSESS

6-24. Advising teams conduct an assessment at the conclusion of each task. Leaders do the following:
- Participate in the FSF after action review, encouraging the FSF commander and key subordinates to honestly appraise the organization and to implement changes to improve future performance.
- Recommend solutions to correct identified problems.
- All previous reports of corruption, gross inefficiency, personnel who hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or sympathy (proven or suspected) for the threat are compiled and reported to the next-higher U.S. commander through the operations channel.
- The advising teams complete AARs and submit them to their higher headquarters. SFAB leaders review AARs and submit them according to the reporting instructions provided in the operations order.

SECTION II – ASSIST

6-25. Assisting is the task of providing support and capabilities to the FSF so they can achieve objectives and reach the desired end state. The level of assistance is based on conditions, resources, and time available and should continue until the FSF can establish the required systems or until conditions no longer require it. SFAB elements conducting the assisting task generally execute the advising task concurrently. The assist task can also be accomplished through partnering with or augmenting the foreign security force.

PARTNERING

6-26. Partnering is essentially a relationship between peers. For example, two battalions are serving as each other’s partner unit. Each unit maintains their own command structure, staff, and training cycle. However, the units generally plan operations together. This may involve two separate planning efforts with each unit planning to conduct their missions within their area of operations based on an agreed upon timeline or it could involve establishing a joint planning cell to build a more closely linked operational plan. Understanding the counterpart’s doctrine is critical to a partnered mission’s success. Units from different nations may perceive common military terms differently; therefore, it’s vital to discuss mission intent and coordination measures in detail. Generally, liaisons are swapped between the two units to assist with better communication.

6-27. Due to the nature of their operations, the SFAB is unlikely to partner with another unit. However, it is quite likely that their FSF counterparts may partner with another unit. For example, an SFAB maneuver
battalion could be advising an FSF brigade in Eastern Europe. That same FSF brigade could be partnered with a U.S. brigade combat team in their area of operations.

6-28. Unit partnerships do not replace advisor roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship amongst FSF, advisors, and the partner units. Partner units should look to the advisor to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering opportunities and training events. Advising teams support U.S., coalition, and partner unit objectives through their interaction with the FSF. Conventional units partnering with a foreign security force should incorporate some level of advisor skills training in their unit training program, especially if those units are conducting SFA activities.

AUGMENTING

6-29. Augmenting is an arrangement where the FSF provides individuals or organizations to serve with U.S. units, or U.S. individuals or organizations serve with the FSF. Augmentation improves the interoperability of the U.S. and the FSF. Augmentation can occur at many levels and in many different forms. One great example of this is the use of Republic of Korea Soldiers within the U.S. formations in South Korea. Other examples include a U.S. Infantry company working for a Polish battalion or that Polish battalion serving under a U.S. brigade to accomplish a specific mission. As these examples show, augmentation can be of short duration for a specific operation or of a longer duration for an enduring mission. Augmentation quickly immerses Soldiers in the language and culture of another nation and can be used to quickly build trust and confidence among various organizations.

PLAN

6-30. The SFAB aims to assist security forces in reinforcing the legitimacy of their government and building confidence in the local population. To provide support and capabilities to the FSF, the SFAB must first identify all of the resources, systems, institutions, and capabilities that are available to the FSF and themselves in the designated theater. Additionally, the SFAB should understand the mission and operational variables that may impact their operations and ability to provide support. Understanding these factors allows the SFAB to plan for the likely support requirements that the FSF may ask them to provide. Conditions of the operational environment can rapidly change; and therefore, the SFAB should anticipate potential changes to support requests as the operation persists.

6-31. Providing assistance to SFA operations often includes many actors, making unity of effort essential for success. The security force assistance includes U.S. (conventional and special operations forces), FSF, nongovernmental organizations, and other civilian and military joint and multinational military organizations that are often involved in SFA. When conducting MDMP, staffs pay particular attention to coordinating the various capabilities. This includes U.S. government and military assets, the FSF capabilities, other partner nation’s assets, and nongovernmental organization capabilities to integrate all of them into one cohesive effort. Network engagement tasks can assist commanders and staff with integrating all the various entities found within the operational environment into the MDMP.

6-32. Legitimacy is a concept that goes beyond a strict legal definition; it includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government, group, or organization. A government’s legitimacy is built upon the local and international community perceptions, which is critical in developing and maintaining local and international support. The United States may not be able to sustain a long-term relationship with a nation if it lacks a legitimate government.

6-33. The ultimate goal of the SFAB is to create security forces and supporting institutions that are competent, capable, committed, confident, and have the required capacity to be successful. The advising teams work to build the following attributes within the FSF:

- Competency—
  - Individually and collectively across all echelons.
  - Across all war fighting functions and systems.
- Capability and capacity—
  - Trained to accomplish missions.
  - Forces are rightsized to sustain operations.
- Resourced in accordance with validated requirements.
- Sustainment organizations can keep the force in the fight at its projected peak.

- **Commitment**—
  - To security of all the people and survival of the state.
  - To preservation of the liberties and human rights of all citizens.

- **Confidence**—
  - In themselves to fulfill their mission.
  - That their professionalism will instill trust in the citizens.
  - That their professionalism and trust in the government will be returned by the government.

### PREPARE

6-34. The SFAB advising teams should receive training on the legal, technical, and tactical considerations for providing capabilities to the FSF. In addition to the training discussed under the advising task, additional training should include information about the FSF capabilities, theater sustainment and support assets available, rules of engagement for employing fires and attack aircraft, rules or legal guidance for providing supplies, food, medical support, and so forth. The SFAB advising teams and staff must become familiar with the FSF organization and equipment, particularly the weapons and equipment not in the U.S. inventory. In addition to the SFAB training considerations in the previous chapters, SFAB commanders and staffs should consider incorporating the following assistance-related topics into their training plans:

- Legal responsibilities and procedures when providing medical care to the FSF, local civilians, and other personnel.
- Financial obligations and limitations when providing logistic and contracting support.
- Regulations and procedures regarding the employment of joint fires to support the FSF.
- Understanding legal reporting requirements; specifically regarding human rights violations, corruption, and other activities that may be detrimental to mission success or violate U.S. and international laws.
- Understanding FSF weapon system capabilities and limitations to provide appropriate implementation guidance to the foreign security force while conducting operations.

### EXECUTE

6-35. Providing assistance to an FSF requires significant legal and administrative actions to ensure the resources provided are done so in a legal and ethical manner. It is important that the SFAB establishes clear SOPs and guidance to the advising teams, staffs, and commanders to clarify request requirements, reduce potential confusion, and expedite the support which is often critical to the success of a particular operation.

6-36. The amount of assistance provided to the FSF should decrease as their capabilities increase. While success on the battlefield is absolutely critical, especially for the Soldiers conducting the fight, SFAB commanders and team leaders must continuously assess the tactical need of the asset for the current fight versus the long term operational and strategic development of the capability within the FSF. If the automatic response is to provide the requested capability, the FSF is less likely to develop their own capability.

6-37. Security force assistance is a developmental effort over time. Success is measured by the increase in the foreign security forces’ capability, capacity, competency, commitment, and confidence in areas in which U.S. forces are assisting them. The SFA activities include plan, resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain. The foreign security forces’ capability and capacity to execute these activities should improve over time with the SFAB’s assistance.

### ASSESS

6-38. Advising teams conduct assessments after providing support to the FSF. When conducting reviews, consider the following information or items of concern (this list is not all inclusive):
Advise and Assist

- Was the support or capability provided available through the FSF organizations? If so, why was it not used? If not, is the capability being developed?
- How many times was similar support requested by the FSF within the past 30 days? How many times was the support provided?
- How significant was the support on the battlefield? What were the effects? Could those effects have been created with another asset or capability? Does the FSF have access to support that provides similar effects?
- Document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions that hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

6-39. The advising teams complete AARs and submit them to their higher headquarters. SFAB leaders review AARs and submit them to the country team to assist with the continued development of the FSF capabilities.

6-40. The advise and assist tasks serve as the foundation of the SFABs work with the FSF. Though the two tasks are distinct, they are often conducted simultaneously and nested with each other. For the FSF to fully meet security cooperation objectives, the FSF must also be organized, equipped, and acquire facilities.
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The SFAB is typically not heavily involved in the organize, equip, rebuild, and build SFA tasks. However, the SFAB does have an interest in the expansion of FSF capability and capacity; therefore, advising teams can find themselves conducting actions that directly support FSF goals within the organize, equip, rebuild, and build framework. In this capacity, they observe, advise, and assist the FSF in a defined and limited role.

**SECTION I – ORGANIZE**

7-1. Organize is an SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist the FSF in developing their organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. U.S. forces must understand the existing security structure of the FSF, and what their end state looks like, to better assist them. SFAB personnel may provide advice and guidance to their counterparts to help them through the process. For instance, if the foreign security forces’ mission is recruiting, advising teams advise and assist the FSF as it sets missions, determines incentives, and develops recruiting material. SFAB elements should pay particular attention to the unique cultural factors and sensitivities of the region while assisting with this task.

**PLAN**

7-2. The partner nation’s social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats have significant implications for the organizing effort. SFA missions are tailored to the overall security cooperation goals between the U.S. and the partner nation. In some cases, this is relatively limited, short duration training and assistance to competent and well-established partners. In other cases, it entails long-term, comprehensive joint and interagency efforts to rebuild fractured societies, which aim to support the creation of an efficient organization with appropriate staff structure and supporting institutions. In addition to developing a standard unit structure across the FSF, the doctrine, policies, systems, and SOPs should be uniform among the FSF units. As the foreign security force matures, U.S. leaders and trainers should expect more independent organizational decisions. The partner nation determines the structure of its security forces including approving all organizational designs. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, equipment, and internal organizational designs.

7-3. Supporting infrastructure that provides the organizing and generating requirements of the FSF are key factors in the long-term success of the FSF. SFAB commanders and advising team leaders work with various ministries and organizations that are responsible for the national security of the partner nation. The supported nation may have a variety of representatives participate in organizational planning, including representatives from the ministry of defense, finance, interior, justice, public works, transportation, culture, economic development, and international relations and cooperation just to name a few. SFAB commanders may request augmentation from ministerial advisory teams to assess strengths, weaknesses, and joint requirements of the ministerial-level organizations. When gaps are identified, the joint and multinational ministry teams assist the partner nation in developing the appropriate systems and capabilities. These efforts could include collaboration with other joint and multinational advisor teams and may include a number of topic areas, including procurement, personnel, intelligence, finance, legal, and other national-level management systems.

**PREPARE**

7-4. Organizing FSF generally involves assessing and developing the areas listed below. The list below is not all inclusive:

- Recruiting and hiring.
- Promotion screening and selection.
- Pay and benefits.
- Leader recruiting and selection.
- Personnel accountability.
- Demobilization of security force personnel.

**RECRUITING**

7-5. Recruiting is the most basic, yet most important, task when establishing FSF. The recruiting program should assimilate local ethic, family, and cultural themes that are appropriate for the environment and achieving the end state. Ultimately, a successful recruiting program should bring a composition of people into the security forces that reflect the demographic and ethnic groups of the region. The SFAB command and advising teams, along with other joint and multinational partners, should encourage and support efforts to recruit from minority populations. Mobile recruiting can be used to target specific areas, ethnic groups, or tribes. Recruiting efforts should encourage moderate groups and factions within hostile or potentially hostile ethnic groups to join FSF. Often partner-nation governments resist recruiting disaffected ethnic groups. However, even moderate success in recruiting from these groups can provide an enormous payoff. These successes build the security forces’ legitimacy and often quiets legitimate fears of such groups regarding their relationship with the partner-nation government. Effectively disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former enemies or other armed groups should be part of the overall plan as well.

7-6. A proper recruiting program identifies behavioral, physical, and moral standards for the recruits. Ideally, recruits are centrally screened and inducted. Recruiting centers should reside in safe and secure areas since they are often a target of insurgent attacks in uncertain areas. All recruits should undergo a basic security check and be vetted against lists of suspected enemies. Foreign agencies and personnel perform this screening, ideally with oversight or monitoring by outside organizations. Membership in illegal organizations or extremist groups needs to be carefully monitored. Past membership need not necessarily preclude a person from joining the foreign security force; however, any ongoing relationship with an illegal organization requires close monitoring and is generally a discriminator for recruitment. FSF personnel should be advised to establish limits on the number of recruits that once belonged to an illegal unit, tribal militia, or other militant factions, that are sent to a single military or police unit.

**PROMOTION SCREENING AND SELECTION**

7-7. There are a number of considerations when developing a promotion system. Ideally, selection for promotion should stem from proven performance and potential for increased responsibility. Objective evaluations are a means to ensure promotions are made by merit and not through influence or family ties. While merit based systems are preferred, some cultures or regions value the social status of a person’s family or ethnicity more than others. Therefore, a merit based system that works well in one country or region may not work well in another.

7-8. There are two basic promotion systems to be considered. The first method of selection identifies the most competent performers, trains them, and recommends them for promotion. The second method identifies those with social or professional status within the training group, then trains and recommends them for promotion. The first method may lead to more competent leaders but could be resisted for cultural reasons. The second method ensures the new leader is accepted culturally but may sacrifice competence. Generally, the most effective solution comes from combining the two methods.

**PAY AND BENEFITS**

7-9. Adequate compensation minimizes a culture of corruption in FSF. Spending the money needed for competitive wages and producing quality security forces is less costly than dealing with the impacts of a corrupt and abusive force that alienates the population and reduces confidence in the government. Paying the police adequately is especially important. Their duties and frequent contact with civilians often expose them to opportunities for corruption.

7-10. Payroll procedures and systems are vitally important, also. They must be transparent and accountable, which results in the security force members receiving their full pay and entitlements while providing the government with a means to manage and allocate the funds. Centralized administration of compensation
through secure and automated systems minimizes the risk for corruption and manipulation; however, the supporting infrastructure may not be in place. If that is the case, it is built and implemented over time.

7-11. Effective FSF can help improve partner-nation social and economic development through the benefits each member receives. Ideally, every recruit should receive a basic education, job training, and morals and values indoctrination, which impacts the larger society as the trained security forces interact with the local population and move into other careers after their service.

LEADER RECRUITING AND SELECTION

7-12. Due to the influence they could wield, officer candidate standards should be high. Candidates should be in good physical and mental health and be able to pass an academic test with higher standards than the test for enlisted recruits. Recruiters carefully vet officer candidates to ensure that they do not have any current or previous ties to radical or enemy organization.

7-13. Noncommissioned officers should be selected from the best enlisted FSF members. Objective standards, including proficiency tests, should be established and enforced to ensure that promotion to their ranks come through merit, ideally. Many armies lack a professional noncommissioned officer corps; establishing one for a foreign security force may prove difficult and take an extended period of time. In the meantime, more responsibility may be placed on the commissioned officers.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

7-14. Partner-nation leaders carefully track and account for FSF. Proper personnel accountability reduces corruption, efficiently uses resources, and ultimately maintains combat power. In countries with manual banking systems and where soldiers are paid in cash, additional tracking mechanisms should be established to minimize corruption and properly allocate the limited resources. In addition to efficiently managing resources, there is intelligence to gain through a properly managed personnel accountability system. For example, if a large number of security personnel fail to report for duty, this can indicate a possible planned enemy attack. Additionally, low unit morale, enemy and militia influences, and other information may be discerned from well-maintained accountability data.

DEMOBILIZATION OF FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL

7-15. Partner nations should develop and implement programs to keep a class of impoverished and disgruntled former officers and soldiers from forming. As the FSF mature, officers who perform poorly or fail to meet the standards need to be removed. Providing some form of government provided education, grants, or low interest business loans facilitates discharged personnel to earn a living outside the military. Soldiers who serve for several years should be considered for a lump-sum payment or pension to ease their transition to civilian life. While the FSF government establishes the details of these programs, generally they should not apply to those found guilty of major human rights abuses or corruption. Transition or demobilization planning should start as soon as commanders anticipate the need, which may not be required in all cases. Similar programs may be required when demobilizing nongovernment militias.

EXECUTE

7-16. During the execution and monitoring of the organize task, SFAB elements have to exercise patience as this can be an enduring task and may take many years to reach the desired end state. Intermediate goals should be established to track the effectiveness of the organizing plans. SFAB elements should accumulate data pertinent to the task and measure that information through appropriate MOPs and MOEs that have been established in the initial planning cycle and further refined as time goes on. As the advising teams monitor the security force actions while executing this task, they may have to adjust their advice to the FSF as they work towards their stated goals and end state.

ASSESS

7-17. SFAB advising teams conduct end-of-mission assessments at the conclusion of key organizing tasks and phases. Due to the long-term nature of this process, it may be appropriate to establish reoccurring
quarterly reviews to properly assess progress. Some considerations for conducting an assessment of the 
organizing tasks are as follows:

- Identify the FSF organizing end state and ensure that the SFAB personnel and the foreign security 
  personnel share the same vision.
- Along with the FSF, establish a battle rhythm for reviewing the organizing tasks. This may include 
  routine assessments along with others conducted at the completion of key events.
- Advising teams document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, 
  gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions of FSF or government officials who 
  habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the 
  enemy or adversary groups.

7-18. The advising team completes an AAR and submits it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB reviews and 
submits it to the country team and higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of FSF capabilities.

SECTION II - EQUIP

7-19. In accordance with authority provided by Congress, the equip task is conducted using formal contracts 
or agreements between the U.S. government and an authorized foreign purchaser (FM 3-22). Security 
assistance is the primary means to enable the equip task and authorizes the United States to build the capacity 
and capability and improve the interoperability of a partner nation. As with the organize task, SFAB elements 
have a limited role in the equip task. Generally, this includes ensuring FSF receive the equipment or services 
agreed upon in the security assistance contract and that all terms of the contract are completed to satisfaction. 
This may involve conducting, also, or coordinating for new equipment training for the FSF. Reporting 
requirements for the advising teams is likely.

PLAN

7-20. The equipping task is accomplished through several mechanisms. Equip refers to all activities to create, 
 improve, and integrate material and equipment procurement. The equipping task includes accountability of 
equipment through the fielding process and maintenance through life cycle management. New equipment 
training and the recapitalization of the old equipment may be included. All equipment should fit the nature 
of the operational environment.

7-21. The SFAB’s responsibility is to identify shortfalls in the FSF capability, communicate those shortfalls, 
assist the FSF in requesting the appropriate equipment to correct those shortfalls, and ensure the proper 
equipment and training is received by the end user. The strategic plan for security force development should 
outline equipment requirements. Appropriate equipment is affordable and suitable for the threat. Forces must 
be able to train on the equipment. Interoperability may be desired in some cases. A central consideration 
includes the partner nation’s long-term ability to support and maintain the equipment. The strategic plan for 
equipping FSF should consider the following:

- Appropriate equipment is affordable and suitable against the threat.
- Forces must be able to train on the equipment.
- Interoperability among the various FSF organizations with external organizations in some 
  cases.
- Long-term ability to support and maintain the equipment.

PREPARE

7-22. The requirements under the equipping task may be as simple as assisting with maintenance of existing 
weapons or as extensive as providing everything from a Soldier’s individual military gear to an entire combat 
vehicle fleet. The FSF should be supplied with equipment that is comparable, or preferably better than, the 
enemy’s equipment. This may be challenging for police forces in uncertain environments, who are often 
lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed enemies.

7-23. Primary considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment 
costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex or expensive equipment. In most operations,
having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly capable armored vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance. Effective maintenance systems for FSF often begin with major maintenance performed by contractors. The FSF sustainment and maintenance programs develop over time through training, guidance, and supervision. (See FM 3-22 for more information.)

EXECUTE

7-24. Material and equipment sources include U.S. foreign military sales, multinational or third-nation resale of property, contracts with internal suppliers, or purchases on the international market. The organizations responsible for equipping the foreign security force should obtain equipment that meets their needs for quality, timeliness, and cost. As part of their training, the FSF should be taught property accountability procedures to reduce corruption and to safeguard resources. The FSF should provide their equipment the same level of control and protection, according to their laws and regulations, which U.S. forces provide for similar equipment. (See AR 12-1 and DSCA 5105.38M.)

7-25. The SFAB should prepare to monitor and assist the FSF with new equipment training. This may include providing trainers from the SFAB, assisting the FSF in establishing the appropriate contracts with external organizations, and monitoring the foreign security force’s internal new equipment training program.

ASSESS

7-26. SFAB advising teams conduct end-of-mission assessments at the conclusion of key equipping tasks and phases. Some considerations for conducting an equipping task assessment are as follows:

- Identify the FSF equipping end state and ensure that the SFAB personnel and the foreign security personnel share the same vision. This should include a comparison of the FSF and enemy equipment capability, prioritizing capability gaps, and presenting possible solutions to both the FSF and SFAB higher headquarters.
- Along with the FSF, establish a schedule for reviewing the equipping tasks. This is generally conducted at the completion of key equipping events.
- Assesses the gathered information and make adjustments to the equipping plan in conjunction with the FSF.
- Advising teams document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions of the FSF or government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

7-27. The advising teams complete an AAR and submit it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB reviews and submits it to the country team or higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of FSF capabilities.

SECTION III – REBUILD AND BUILD

7-28. The vision for the SFAB is that they have a limited role in the tasks of rebuild and build. These tasks are largely planned, executed, and resourced at the strategic and ministerial levels.

PLAN

7-29. Building multinational and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations helps the combatant commander shape the security environment. The Army’s primary contribution to building partner military capacity is to lead efforts to collaborate with foreign partners in building security capacity. The Army integrates the capabilities of the conventional, generating, and special operations forces to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts on three levels: Tactical, institutional, and ministerial. The Army’s contribution—

- Builds institutional capacity in the partner nation, which is fundamental to success in such operations.
- Develops the ability of partners to defend against internal and external threats.
Improves interoperability allowing partners to contribute to multinational operations.

Assists other countries to provide for their own security.

7-30. The rebuild and build task refers to all activities related to restoring and developing FSF capability, capacity, and supporting infrastructure (FM 3-22). This task requires an in-depth analysis of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the desired end state and operational environment. The specific tasks vary according to the mission’s goals and objectives in addition to the partner-nation’s priorities, resources, and their ability to maintain the infrastructure. This task often involves construction of facilities, transportation networks, communication systems, utilities, and a wide variety of other infrastructure projects that support the nation. Success largely depends on long-range planning, prioritizing projects, and allocation of sufficient resources through the partner nation or international political process. While every situation is unique, the SFAB could find itself involved to some degree in on-going building and rebuilding tasks.

PREPARE

7-31. The FSF needs facilities for storage, maintenance, training, and shelter. Some of which should be secure facilities that allow for classified information storage, planning, and communications. These facilities that concern the SFAB operations include barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military facilities. Building training centers and unit garrisons requires a long-term security force basing plan. If possible, garrisons should include housing for the partner-nation soldiers and their families. This may also include government provided healthcare for the families and other benefits. These decisions are largely made at the ministerial and strategic levels of the partner-nation government.

EXECUTE

7-32. Construction takes significant time; therefore, it is ideal if the partner nation invests early in building or rebuilding key facilities. SFAB advising teams assist the FSF with developing plans to protect and maintain infrastructure. Facilities should be prioritized for protection and the resources to protect that infrastructure should be allocated accordingly. Some key facilities include headquarters buildings, major sustainment facilities, barracks, political institutions, major utilities, police stations, and culturally significant landmarks that, if destroyed, could potentially incite significant violence. The partner nation may need to make large investments in time and resources to restore, create, and maintain the local and nationwide infrastructure necessary to effectively command, control, and maintain their security forces.

ASSESS

7-33. SFAB advising teams should provide assessments on the relevant infrastructure in their counterpart’s area of operations. Generally after the initial assessment, monitoring the building and rebuilding tasks consists of sending occasional progress reports higher. The advising teams should consider the following list of considerations when assessing these two tasks:

- As part of the initial assessment, FSF infrastructure capabilities and capacities should have been identified.
- Using the partner nation and U.S. government vision as a guide, the SFAB personnel and their FSF counterparts, discuss and prioritize infrastructure capability gaps in the area of operations. These priorities should be submitted through the appropriate channels, resources requested, and monitored for progress. Generally, these progress reports are submitted as key phases of a project are completed.
- Advising teams document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions of the FSF or government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

7-34. The advising teams complete an AAR and submit it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB reviews and submits the AAR to the country team or higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of FSF capabilities.
7-35. Commanders of SFABs may receive a mission to conduct the organize, equip, rebuild, and build tasks. They provide advice while developing foreign security force counterparts on programs such as recruiting, new equipment issue, and command supply discipline based largely on their knowledge and experience with U.S. Army policies and institutions. Commanders and staffs continuously evaluate the capabilities of their partner FSF to execute any of the tasks listed in the previous chapters. When commanders cannot satisfactorily complete their mission, they request augmentation of forces, equipment, or facilities.
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Chapter 8

Augmentation

Commanders assess requirements based on operational and mission variables, and coordinate for necessary forces, which include joint, component, or civilian agencies and contractor support. Commanders and staffs evaluate criteria and requirements due to changing conditions involving the civilian population, enemy forces, and infrastructure. When the assigned force structure is insufficient to accomplish the mission or task, commanders submit a request for forces to the next higher headquarters. When requesting augmentation, commanders and staffs plan for integration and synchronization of augmented personnel and equipment. This chapter describes some of the considerations for augmented personnel, equipment assigned to support an SFAB, and analysis considerations for determining augmentation requirements.

SECTION I – AUGMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

8-1. SFAB commanders and staff augment their forces when higher headquarters directs them to do so or when mission requirements change. Commanders identify initial mission requirements during predeployment training and conduct an initial analysis using the initial mission assessment as a guide. Commanders and staffs assess the SFAB for the acceptable level of manning or equipment for all operations. Changes in missions, tasks, or conditions can initiate a requirement for additional capabilities. Commanders and staffs are responsible for identifying requirements not organic to the formation. Generally, these include unique sustainment requirements for maintenance, recovery, or ammunition. They may also include additional protection or other considerations.

COORDINATION

8-2. Augmentation coordination involves higher headquarters, contributing organization staffs, SFAB staff, subordinate units, and unified action partners. Coordination needs to be as thorough and detailed as possible. All parties must understand the concept of the operation, including detailed coordination instructions. If necessary, coordination includes an interpreter to facilitate explanation and understanding.

8-3. Coordination with higher headquarters involves requests for forces, identifying contributing organizations, providing liaisons with identified organizations, and notification upon arrival. Coordination with subordinate units involves determining how the augmented support is task organized within subordinate units and clearly stating the intent and objectives for the augmentee.

8-4. Units determine force requirements when requesting augmentation from unified action partners. Units conduct an analysis to determine additional requirements for working with American forces. The requirements can include the following:

- Personnel considerations including personnel status; health records; accountably rosters; battle roster numbers; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training requirements; threat briefings; and interpreter support.
- Medical requirements including immunizations, medical records, and specific, theater medical training and health requirements.
- Training requirements including technical certifications, weapon qualifications, vehicle training, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) requirements.
Logistics considerations including transportation, fuel, ammunition, recovery, and sustenance. Additionally, any unique requirements including the means to recover, fuel, arm, and repair vehicles and equipment that is not organic to the requesting unit.

MULTINATIONAL AND FOREIGN SECURITY AUGMENTATION

8-5. Each multinational military or foreign force has unique capabilities, methods, and force structure. Conducting allied, foreign, and U.S. forces comprehensive capabilities briefs aids in understanding these variables across the organizations. Previous experience working with one nation does not translate to working with another.

8-6. Detailed communications are key when planning reconnaissance and security operations with a multinational or foreign military partner and begin immediately upon receipt of the mission. Confirmation briefs during planning aid in reducing language, cultural, and military capability barriers. Exchange of liaison personnel, with interpreters as necessary, occurs as early as possible in the planning process. The list below is not exhaustive; however, SFAB units and staffs can use this list of considerations to begin planning for operations with a multinational or foreign security force:

- **Mission command**
  - Compatibility of radios and digital systems.
  - Multinational radios encryption capable.
  - Communications security requirements (North Atlantic Treaty Organization key).
  - Multinational radio capabilities and limitations affecting U.S. ability to conduct retransmission.
  - Multinational forces’ retransmission capabilities.
  - Digital versus analog. Effective communications planning.
  - Digital collaboration capabilities.
  - Secret Internet Protocol Router Network capabilities.
  - Placement and use of liaison officers and planners.
  - Type and frequency of rehearsals.
  - Rules of engagement. National caveats that may restrict the force.
  - Task organization. Command relationship authorization.

- **Maneuver**
  - Exchange of tactics, doctrine, and SOPs.
  - Maneuver assets, capabilities, and limitations.
  - Explain terminology and jargon (and rank structure as applicable).
  - Work to reduce the language barrier to the greatest extent possible.
  - Task organize changes and impacts of command relationships (if authorized).
  - Incorporate route clearance, mobility, and countermobility.

- **Intelligence**
  - Classification and authority to release information.
  - Intelligence sharing in both directions.
  - Understand United States and multinational information collection capabilities.
  - Interrogation procedures and restrictions, which vary widely from nation to nation.

- **Fires**
  - Assets, capabilities, and limitations.
  - Cross boundary fires (approval authority).
  - Call for fire and counterbattery procedures and authorities.
  - Use of precision guided munitions.
  - Clear understanding of fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures.
  - Established fires and quick fire radio frequencies.
Augmentation

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Include in rehearsals.

Protection—
- Multinational CBRN endurance and detection capabilities.
- Multinational explosive ordnance disposal and survivability capabilities.
- Detainee operations and procedures.
- Key assets that require engineer support to increase survivability such as command posts and communications platforms.

Sustainment—
- Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, which determine national financial obligations.
- Types of command support relationships and nesting with acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.
- Resupply of nationally distinct items (specifically classes III, V, IX, and CBRN).
- Transportation and distribution capabilities or requirements.
- Medical capabilities.
- Fuel requirements and compatibility for foreign equipment.
- Power generation requirements (220/110 volt).

SECTION II – AUGMENTATION ANALYSIS

8-7. SFAB commanders and staffs use the six warfighting functions of mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection as a framework for conducting analysis and determining what additional augmentation may be required. The staffs in the SFAB may use the warfighting functions to identify requirements and gaps. The augmentation examples provided below are not all-inclusive. The examples initiate thought and discussion, which facilitate planning. Warfighting functions are a framework to assist the unit with determining augmentation requirements. Staffs can use any framework with which they are comfortable and proficient to determine requirements.

MISSION COMMAND

8-8. The SFAB has a mission command structure that integrates warfighting functions into its organization. The mission command structure does this through direct integration (placing team members directly with their counterparts) or decentralized methods (placing various team members throughout the FSF formation at key locations). Direct integration is most useful when the intensity of conflict is high and information requirements drive quick reactions such as counterfire missions. Decentralized methods are best used when the SFAB is in regional support or as part of a coalition supporting various nonintegrated forces. Successful mission accomplishment in decentralized methods of augmentation relies on task execution at lower echelons and emphasizes leader initiative and involvement.

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

8-9. The SFAB commander requests additional civil military operation capabilities to engage the civil component of the operational environment. Due to the SFAB’s mission of working through the FSF or partnered nation, the ability to interact with the civilian populace is a key component of success. Support of the civilian populace is imperative to the legitimization of the FSF. The civil component of the SFA requires additional specialized expertise in training and developing the FSF. Commanders use civil military operations to enhance the relationship among military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present.

8-10. Civil affairs augmentation provides the SFAB with specialty skills to enhance the conduct of civil military operations. (See FM 3-57.) The five civil affairs core tasks are:
- Populace and resources control.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Civil information management.
- Nation assistance.
• Support to civil administration.

INFORMATION

8-11. No matter the type of FSF, information plays a significant role in the execution of its mission. From information management to activities in cyberspace, in public diplomacy, and international messaging, how the FSF views and employs information likely permeates everything they do. Therefore, the SFAB must prepare to support the foreign security forces’ information functions.

8-12. The SFAB has a sparse information capability that does not include specialists outside of communications technicians. During mission analysis, when the SFAB determines its own capability gaps and requests external support, they request appropriate personnel or units. These may include cyberspace, public affairs, functional area 30 personnel, and psychological operations or other units and capabilities. The desired capability and capacity of the FSF and the analysis of the SFAB’s organic capabilities drives the need for external capabilities.

NETWORK AND COMMUNICATIONS

8-13. Signal operations support the SFAB by providing communications and the digital network to enable mission command. Three network operations tasks of enterprise management, network assurance, and content management, which provide the SFAB with the ability to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain operations, support the SFAB. These capabilities provide the SFAB with access to cyberspace, higher and lower organizations, the Department of Defense information network, and the FSF and unified action partners as necessary. Since the SFAB often operates in austere environments, augmentation is required to ensure reliable communications.

8-14. Network and communication augmentation support is scalable and flexible. The SFAB signal officer anticipates, plans, and coordinates for additional signal capabilities as necessary. (See FM 6-02.) The signal core competencies include—

• Network operations.
• Network transport and information services.
• Spectrum management operations.
• Visual information and combat camera.
• Communications security.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

8-15. The SFAB may require additional maneuver forces to enhance the organization’s physical security or to assist in missions the FSF executes. In an established JOA, the SFAB requests additional maneuver support through the higher headquarters. In some cases, their higher headquarters may direct the SFAB to coordinate directly with unified action partners or the FSF for additional maneuver forces. When deployed to a theater that does not have an established JOA, the SFAB coordinates with the host-nation FSF, or government via the embassy country team for additional security forces.

AVIATION

8-16. Army Aviation conducts air-ground operations as the aerial maneuver force of the combined arms team, or as an independent maneuver force to support ground forces conducting decisive action tasks. Army Aviation executes their seven core competencies through the following tactical, enabling, and sustaining tasks. (See FM 3-04.)

• Provide accurate and timely information.
• Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
• Destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces.
• Air assault ground maneuver forces.
• Air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
• Evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel.
• Enable mission command over extended ranges and complex terrain.

8-17. When supporting the SFAB mission, attack, lift, and unmanned aircraft system capabilities are the most probable aviation augmentation requirements. When available, Army aviation augmentation provides the SFAB with the ability to conduct air movement of personnel, leaders, critical supplies, equipment, and systems as well as attack aviation support to combat operations. Due to the flexible nature of aircraft, short duration, and short notice augmentation can be requested through supporting aviation units. For example, an unmanned aircraft system may be able to provide observation on a suspected enemy indirect fire site while flying back from another mission.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

8-18. The SFAB may request special operations force’s support for a wide variety of operations or tasks. Special operations forces conduct a wide variety of missions and activities including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, preparation of the environment, military information support operations, civil affairs operations, counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. (See FM 3-05.)

8-19. Many of the Army special operations force missions and activities are conducted with and through indigenous, foreign, irregular, and regular partners. Army special operations forces are specifically assessed, trained, and equipped to engage with many of the same partners and populations SFAB Soldiers encounter. Army special operations forces often conduct similar activities to those of the SFAB but with different partners, at a different scale of operations, and for specific, specially defined purposes. Army special operations forces frequently have preestablished relationships and influence in foreign partner nations. Army special operations forces and the SFAB should be natural and complementary partners.

8-20. Oftentimes, special operations forces are already conducting missions in areas where a nation is requesting SFA. In many cases, the host nation may be expanding the parameters of their SFA request and the SFAB may find itself relieving special operations forces of its mission to allow special operations forces to transition to other tasks. The SFAB and the special operations forces conduct operations independently but collaborate and coordinate when it is determined they have shared interests.

INTELLIGENCE

8-21. The SFAB commander may require additional intelligence capabilities to support the mission. The SFAB intelligence officer has limited resources, specifically in personnel and time, to analyze and process intelligence. During mission analysis, the SFAB staffs analyze organic intelligence capabilities, restrictions of intelligence activities within the area of operations, available augmentation capabilities, and sustainment requirements of additional intelligence resources. The seven intelligence disciplines are: human intelligence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, geospatial intelligence, and technical intelligence.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

8-22. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-0).

8-23. While the SFAB does not have a full team, it does have a human intelligence technician and collector sergeant assigned to the military intelligence company that may perform limited human intelligence functions. If required, the SFAB commanders may request human intelligence collection teams to support and assist with SFA. However, prior to requesting or employing human intelligence collection teams, staffs must examine status of forces agreements, rules of engagement, and political conditions that may restrict the employment of human intelligence collection teams and human intelligence operations to support foreign forces or environments. Human intelligence tasks include the following:
• Conducting source operations.
• Debriefing U.S. and allied forces and civilian personnel including dislocated civilians, third-country nationals, and local inhabitants.
• Interrogating detainees.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

8-24. The SFAB is assigned counterintelligence personnel within the military intelligence company that may perform counterintelligence functions, and if needed, may be augmented with external capabilities. Counterintelligence operations counter or neutralize adversary intelligence collection efforts through information collection, counterintelligence investigations, operations, analysis, production, and technical services and support. Counterintelligence augmentation can assist the SFAB with conducting counterintelligence investigations and with conducting antiterrorism and force protection assessments. Counterintelligence support is available in a JOA but may require additional coordination in a non-JOA environment. Legal restrictions may prohibit certain counterintelligence activities within the area of operations. The four tasks of counterintelligence include—

• Counterespionage.
• Support to protection.
• Support to research and technology protection.
• Cyber counterintelligence.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

8-25. Signals intelligence is intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0). Signals intelligence provides technical intelligence information, complements intelligence derived from other sources, and is often used for cueing other sensors to potential targets of interest. For example, signals intelligence augmentation could identify activities of interest through their systems which may then be used to cue the SFAB or the FSF elements to confirm potential enemy activity. The discipline is subdivided into three subcategories: Communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. (See ADRP 2-0.)

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE

8-26. Measurement and signature intelligence is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0).

8-27. Depending on the operational environment assessment, the SFAB commander and staff may consider measurement and signature intelligence information to support the SFAB and FSF missions. Measurement and signature intelligence information and capabilities are available through the theater or regional intelligence channels by requesting the required information.

OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

8-28. Open-source intelligence is relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements. Also called OSINT (JP 2-0).

8-29. The SFAB commander and staff may assign the additional duty of open-source intelligence specialist to intelligence personnel to support the mission. An analyst with the additional duty may enhance and expedite the analysis of local information.
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE

8-30. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-03).

8-31. The SFAB could require geospatial intelligence capabilities to support assigned missions. An example of using geospatial intelligence personnel to support the FSF may be providing them with detailed graphics to conduct operations. As with measurement and signature intelligence and the other more technical capabilities, the information these assets provide is generally available for request through theater or regional intelligence channels.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

8-32. Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages (JP 2-0). The role of technical intelligence is to ensure Soldiers understand the threat’s full technological capabilities. With this understanding, U.S. forces and the FSF can implement appropriate countermeasures, operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

8-33. The SFAB commander considers augmenting technical intelligence capabilities based on the operational environment and the mission. For example, the area of operations may have the presence of near peer hostile states conducting concurrent operations. Augmentation of technical intelligence capabilities include personnel and equipment with the ability to monitor threat capabilities, provide technical guidance to commanders, and provide reach back capabilities to other systems and resources. (See ADRP 2-0.)

COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

8-34. Complementary intelligence capabilities contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence to facilitate the conduct of operations. The complementary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances at each echelon and can vary across the intelligence enterprise. The SFAB and the FSF may require these additional capabilities. If so, the request will generally be routed through the higher headquarters or country team. These capabilities include, but are not limited, to the following:

- Biometrics-enabled intelligence.
- Cyber-enabled intelligence.
- Document and media exploitation.
- Forensic-enabled intelligence.

FIRES

8-35. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process (ADRP 3-0). Generally, the SFAB relies on nonorganic fires capabilities. When operating in a JOA, the SFAB may request Army fires systems to support offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Deliver fires.
- Integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires.
- Conduct targeting.

8-36. Due to the organization of the SFAB and the absence of organic indirect fires systems, it is critical to establish the fires support communication channels with supporting theater elements to ensure that fire support is available when necessary. Additionally, due to the nature of their mission working with an FSF, the clearance of fires, rules of engagement, fire support coordination measures, and airspace coordination measures must be well-defined and communicated between all the organizations involved in the operations. (See JP 3-09, FM 3-09, FM 3-96, and ATP 3-09.42.)
JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL FIRES

8-37. Joint or multinational fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components or nations in a coordinated action to produce the desired effects to support a common objective. Developing policy, guidance, and plans to employ operational and strategic fires are primarily joint activities. Joint fires include surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires.

8-38. When integrating joint and multinational fires, coordination and synchronization responsibilities are heightened and requests for indirect fire support are elevated to a higher headquarters element. It may be necessary to establish a liaison with the supporting unit, especially with multinational units.

8-39. Fire support coordination in multinational operations requires special arrangements with multinational forces and local authorities. Special arrangements include implementation of communications and language standards, exchange of liaison personnel, and adoption of interoperability procedures.

FIELD ARTILLERY

8-40. Field artillery is the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers (JP 3-09). Field artillery contributes to operations by massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets with precision, near-precision, and area fire capabilities. Field artillery can rapidly shift fires throughout the area of operations to support the scheme of maneuver and to counter unforeseen enemy reaction to achieve the maneuver commander’s desired effects.

8-41. The SFAB has a field artillery battalion that is not equipped with cannon or rocket batteries. In a JOA, SFAB fires personnel must coordinate with a component field artillery headquarters (field artillery brigade and division artillery) or a field artillery unit that has been assigned a support relationship with the SFAB. Field artillery is the maneuver commander’s principal means for providing continuous and responsive indirect fires to support operations. Field artillery provides continuously available fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. Field artillery can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace.

CLEARANCE OF FIRE PROCEDURES

8-42. The timeliness of fires clearance is greatly enhanced through the development and execution of established battle drills. The battle drills should be disseminated to all responsible parties and rehearsed regularly. Through timely mission reporting, the FSF and SFAB elements can maintain situational awareness to clear their area of operations. The SFAB uses their command systems to relay that information to coalition forces to coordinate, and clear the fires.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

8-43. The SFAB has no organic or assigned air defense personnel or equipment. Air defense artillery is a term unique to the Army for its dedicated air and missile defense capabilities and forces. Air and missile defense is direct (active and passive) defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01). Commanders assess enemy air threats then air defense artillery forces are organized and assigned based on mission and operational variables. In a JOA environment, the SFAB falls under an area air defense plan. When air defense artillery personnel are assigned or attached to the SFAB as augmentation, air defense artillery commanders and staffs brief the supported commander and staff on the capabilities and limitations that the air defense artillery personnel and equipment can provide.

8-44. When necessary, based on the enemy threat assessment, the SFAB considers integrating air defense artillery throughout all phases of major operations. The air defense artillery performs the following essential tasks:

- Integrate air defense artillery assets according to the area air defense plan.
- Allocate available assets throughout the operational area.
- Deploy early warning systems.
- Coordinate airspace control activities with theater, corps, and subordinate air defense artillery cells.
- Recommend air defense artillery tactics and techniques to best counter air and missile threats.
TARGETING

8-45. Targeting is a critical component of the fires warfighting function. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The SFAB staff structure has limited targeting personnel within their staffs, much of this capability resides on the advising teams. The SFAB staffs rely heavily on subordinate advising teams to provide targeting information and recommendations to the staff. Higher headquarters can request additional support as necessary. (See JP 3-60 and ATP 3-60.)

PROTECTION

8-46. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatant) and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners, including partner nations. Protection is a critical consideration for the SFAB given its potential employment in areas where established protection infrastructure may be limited. The SFAB may receive greater support from theater protection assets within a JOA. Outside of established JOAs, comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring protection planning and coordination is required to ensure sufficient protection. Every operational environment has unique protection planning considerations.

8-47. Protection is an essential consideration for SFAB commanders and staffs and often requires significant augmentation based on assessed threats and mission requirements. In permissive environments, the SFAB relies on protection capabilities and security provided by the FSF. In semi-permissive or hostile environments, the SFAB may require augmentation with complementary protection capabilities. Listed below are key protection augmentation elements that may be available to SFABs.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

8-48. CBRN provides critical protection capabilities to achieve hazard awareness and understanding, CBRN protection, and contamination mitigation. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction signifies a growing threat across the world and the SFAB must prepare to operate in this environment. Having no organic CBRN units or equipment to assist with CBRN prevention and response, the SFAB must carefully consider the threat environment and request CBRN augmentation when a significant CBRN threat exists.

8-49. CBRN capabilities can support the SFAB with performing offensive and defensive operations in CBRN environments.

ENGINEERS

8-50. Engineers provide technical expertise across their disciplines of combat, general, and geospatial engineering. The SFAB contains an engineer battalion, however, those engineer capabilities focus on providing engineer advisory and assistance expertise. Engineer battalion individual members have technical expertise in reducing explosive hazards (conventional and improvised), which may hinder SFAB mobility. As the situation dictates, especially when the SFAB encounters significant construction requirements, commanders and staffs must consider augmentation of the SFAB with additional engineer capabilities or contracted construction support. The engineer battalion commander and staff provide the SFAB with the experience necessary to provide recommendations on engineer support required.

8-51. When available, various types of engineer organizations can provide the following capabilities:

- General engineering (restore damaged areas, construct and maintain line of communications, establish base camps, repair or restore infrastructure, provide engineering assessments, provide master planning for facility and design support, develop and maintain facilities, provide power generation and distribution, and contracted construction oversight).
- Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).
- Geospatial engineering (terrain analysis, terrain visualization, tailored map products, geospatial foundation data, theater geospatial data).
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

8-52. EOD augmentation provides the SFAB with capabilities to render safe and dispose of explosive ordnance hazards including unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and homemade explosives. While the explosive hazard advisor on most advising teams provides EOD response for limited scope and limited duration missions in direct support of the advising team, they do not provide near the capability and capacity of a fully equipped and manned EOD team. Therefore, EOD augmentation is required to clear large scale and complex explosive ordnance hazards for the SFAB advising teams per the rules of allocations pertaining to EOD support.

8-53. EOD augmentation could provide the following capabilities:

- Disposal support.
- Development of an EOD disposal support plan.
- Coordination for EOD disposal support.
- Supervision of EOD operations.

MILITARY POLICE

8-54. Military police provide police, detention, security, and mobility support capabilities that may augment SFAB protection capabilities to enhance security and preserve combat power. Given the core competencies of policing, investigations, and corrections military police may also be requested to augment the SFAB with police advisors when requirements exist to advise and assist partner nation police or corrections organizations. In recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, military police provided scalable and flexible police development training teams critical to accomplishing police advise and assist missions. (See FM 3-39, FM 3-63, and ATP 3-39.10.)

8-55. Military police provide a unique mixture of capabilities across the military police disciplines that may augment SFAB protection or advisor capabilities including—

- Police operations (law enforcement, forensics and biometrics support, criminal investigations, civil disturbance control, evidence response teams, host-nation police training support, customs support, and support to border control and boundary security).
- Detention operations (confinement of U.S. military prisoners, detainee operations, and host-nation corrections training and support).
- Security and mobility support (area security, base and base camp defense, response force operations, critical asset security, high-risk personnel security, route and convoy security, antiterrorism and physical security support, and military working dogs).

SUSTAINMENT

8-56. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0). Sustainment considerations for the SFAB are similar to protection in that SFABs have access to established theater infrastructure in established JOAs, but require significant augmentation when employed outside of a JOA. (See chapter 10.)

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

8-57. The SFAB may require augmentation that doesn’t necessarily align with the warfighting functions. Higher headquarters may direct augmentation or it could take the form of unified action partners or ministry liaison teams.

UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

8-58. Augmentation from unified action partners depends on the specific requirements of the SFAB’s mission and the participation of other nation’s forces. In uncertain environments, the presence of non-military
unified action partners may be limited. Many civilian, law enforcement, and other agencies require a permissive or semi-permissive environment before agreeing to participate in on-location SFA operations.

8-59. Potential unified action partner augmentation may include:

- Joint and multinational military partners.
- U.S. federal agencies like the Department of State, Department of Justice, and United States Agency for International Development.
- International governmental organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

LANGUAGE SUPPORT

8-60. SFAB operations are highly dependent on foreign language support. Exploiting the enemy forces and communicating with the FSF, host-nation organizations, and local populations necessitates using interpreters and linguists. Proper management of this critical asset is important to operations and must be closely monitored.

8-61. SFAB staff must analyze linguist needs to determine the minimum level of foreign language proficiency needed including additional requirements for security clearances, specific ethnicities, genders, or other considerations. While the interpretation of peace negotiation requires outstanding linguistic capability and a cultural acumen, the translation of routine documents (with the aid of a dictionary) requires a much different skill set and should be considered when assessing requirements.

MINISTRY LIAISON TEAMS

8-62. The ministerial liaison team serves as a single unit collocated with the host-nation ministry of defense, interior, or other institutions to provide continuous advisory support to host-nation personnel and leaders. The SFAB augmentation of the ministerial liaison team is determined by higher headquarters.

8-63. The ministerial liaison team may include subject matter experts on contingency contracting (51C), budgeting (36A), strategic plans and policy (FA59), foreign area officer (FA48X), provost marshal (31A), strategic intelligence (34A), logistics (90A), force modernization and design, human resources, medical, and legal advisors.

ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION

8-64. Commanders require augmentation when they determine they can no longer accomplish the mission with assigned force structure or equipment. Augmentation allows commanders to accomplish tasks and enables success. In addition to premission planning, commanders must constantly assess operations to determine what augmentation capabilities are required and integrate those forces into their operations as seamlessly as possible. As with any SFAB function, augmentation requires careful consideration with FSF partners. One area requiring continuous augmentation analysis is protection, which is discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 9
Protection

The commander must understand the threat environment in the operational area. Commanders can accurately assess threats and employ measures to safeguard SFAB personnel and facilities when they have access to intelligence from local, regional, and national resources. Protection planning address requirements for quick reaction forces, emergency or contingency operations, personnel recovery, and the integration of the SFAB personnel into the FSF protection plan.

SECTION I – PROTECTION

9-1. Protection focuses on preserving combat power. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize protection capabilities and resources throughout the operations process in order to protect the force, enable freedom of action, and identify and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States, allies, and partners. The SFAB must consider all aspects of protection to include internal, external, and foreign security force enhancements. (See ADRP 3-37.) The three categories of force protection measures relevant to the SFAB are—

- Friendly force protection measures.
- FSF protection measures.
- Leveraging FSF to enhance protection.

FRIENDLY FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES

9-2. The friendly force protects themselves through their own actions. Friendly force protection includes measures or tasks executed by the SFAB to preserve combat power. These tasks include establishing internal security measures, implementing a field sanitation program, establishing internal SOPs for conducting operations with the FSF, executing preventative medicine checks and inspections, conducting risk assessments prior to operations or training events, and ensuring all personnel are aware of the identified risks.

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES

9-3. The FSF develops the ability to protect themselves through their actions. These include those activities that develop and improve the ability of the FSF to preserve combat power. These tasks are similar to the tasks listed above including helping the FSF establish a field sanitation program, teaching them the importance of preventive medicine checks and inspections, assisting them in developing SOPs for safe vehicle and weapon operations, and training the risk management process.

LEVERAGING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES TO ENHANCE PROTECTION

9-4. The SFAB uses the FSF actions to enhance their protection. These activities are apart from and enhance the SFAB’s organic protection capabilities. The SFAB leverages the FSF personnel and resources to apply more combat power against the SFA tasks and requirements.
REINFORCING PROTECTION CAPABILITIES

9-5. The list below describes the primary protection tasks for the SFAB in a context of tasks internal to the SFAB. External training to the foreign security force allows the SFAB to leverage the FSF protection capabilities to provide additional force protection. Due to the SFAB structure, size, and mission, the primary protection tasks listed below receive additional attention during the planning process to reduce risk and mitigate identified vulnerabilities. The tasks that the SFAB is particularly concerned with are—

- Survivability operations.
- Force health protection.
- EOD.
- Personnel recovery.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.
- Risk management.
- Antiterrorism.
- Physical security.

SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS

9-6. Survivability consists of two aspects—avoiding and withstanding. Avoiding seeks to prevent an enemy attack, surveillance, or accurate targeting. Withstanding is minimizing or preventing, degradation after having been attacked. Survivability operations conducted by the SFAB seek to avoid and withstand threats and hazards from enemy forces and insider threats. (See ATP 3-37.34.) Friendly survivability operations include constructing fighting positions, hardening facilities, and employing camouflage and concealment.

9-7. FSF survivability tasks allow the supported force to avoid or withstand threats and hazards. Survivability operations for the supported force will vary due to their organic equipment, time, and resources available. The SFAB personnel should discuss the importance of improving survivability with the FSF and assist them in conducting assessments, developing improvement plans, and prioritizing resources and projects. When appropriate, the SFAB can provide and coordinate additional United States Government or other agency resources to the FSF.

9-8. Without augmentation, the SFAB is resource constrained and doesn’t have the organic structure to create more than rudimentary protective works for themselves. Therefore, additional resources provided by the FSF are essential to the survivability of the SFAB. These operations are typically resource intensive and require heavy equipment and significant manpower. Leveraging FSF resources for SFAB survivability directly correlates to the threat level as determined in the unit threat assessment.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

9-9. Force health protection encompasses the measures to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of Soldiers. Force health protection measures create a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Force health protection encompasses the preventative measures, which include preventive medicine, veterinary services, combat and operational stress control, dental services, and laboratory services.

9-10. Preventing friendly health issues preserves the effectiveness of the SFAB by keeping its members available. Methods to prevent disease begin with personal hygiene, food and water sanitation, waste management, and pest control. Every region has unique health hazards that must be analyzed by the SFAB medical personnel to identify which, if any, vaccines are required prior to deployment. The SFAB medical officers and Soldiers must be aware of seemingly innocuous diseases that friendly forces bring with them to an area of operations, which they may transmit to the local population or the FSF. The key to preventive and protective care is information, which provides the SFAB with the capability to assess the current health environment and properly deliver information to the affected human population. Derived from robust health surveillance and medical intelligence, the information addresses occupational, local environmental, and health threats from industrial hazards, air and water pollution, endemic or epidemic disease, CBRN, and directed-energy device weapons (high-powered microwaves, particle beams, lasers). Health service support
9-11. Foreign security force health protection supports improving the overall health and well-being of the FSF by adopting best practices and standards that may not have been previously practiced. In some instances, these practices mirror those of the SFAB. In other instances, these practices may be nation specific for the operational environment. Often, the FSF adapts to their local environment and becomes resistant to diseases prevalent there while the SFAB personnel may require inoculation against those same diseases. The reverse is also true. SFAB personnel may have a resistance to diseases that the FSF personnel have not encountered. The SFAB accounts for all of these considerations during the planning process.

9-12. Regardless of conditions, the SFAB attempts to maintain their internal standards of health protection according to the Army and U. S. Government policy. While modern technology may provide significant defense against disease and hazards, the inability to access technology solutions may require SFAB personnel to adopt rudimentary practices developed by local inhabitants to combat health hazards. In these cases, the SFAB medical personnel identify and adopt these local practices to share among the Soldiers of the unit.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

9-13. Explosive ordnance hazards are ever-present dangers in most areas of operation. These explosive ordnance hazards include munitions and explosives such as unexploded ordnance including, but not limited to bombs, artillery projectiles, rockets, guided missiles, land mines, chemical munitions, booby-traps, and IEDs. These hazards limit mobility, deny the use of critical assets, and have the potential to injure or kill Soldiers and civilians. The threat of explosive ordnance hazards range from minor mobility and protection risks to severe mobility limitations, catastrophic equipment destruction, and the loss of lives. An open area, with very little enemy presence or past combat engagements, is unlikely to contain explosive ordnance hazards. Locations dominated by restrictive mobility corridors, past enemy activity, military live fire training locations, ammunition storage points, or previous maneuver engagement areas have a higher likelihood of explosive ordnance hazards.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

9-14. Army personnel recovery is the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). Army forces work together with the Department of Defense and other unified action partners to recover individuals and groups who become isolated. Isolation refers to persons separated from their unit or in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. In addition, Army forces support the recovery of other persons designated by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The personnel recovery mission includes preparing Soldiers, other Service members, Army civilians, and contractors in danger of isolation while participating in any activity or mission sponsored by the United States. The personnel recovery task is particularly important to the SFAB as additional maneuver forces may or may not be present in the operational area where the SFAB is located (within or outside of a designated JOA).

9-15. The SFAB commander assesses the operational variables and typically considers personnel recovery from three perspectives: U.S. and SF together in tactical isolation, FSF or host nation led recovery of U.S. and a FSF combined element, or U.S. led recovery of U.S. only forces (FSF is incapable or untrustworthy). The SFAB commander provides personnel recovery planning guidance and isolated Soldier guidance prior to the execution of all missions. The commander considers four general approaches (sometimes referred to as methods) to conduct personnel recovery: Unassisted, immediate, deliberate, or external support. Effective guidance addresses the challenges of isolation within a unit’s area of operations. Effective guidance is concrete enough for Soldiers to implement. Isolated Soldier guidance applies to the entire command since the uncertainty and complexity of military operations expose everyone to risk of isolation, regardless of rank. Isolated Soldier guidance must include the set of circumstances (isolation criteria) under which the Soldier or small element executes their isolated Soldier guidance and their mission changes from their primary mission to one of evasion (See FM 3-50 for more information).

9-16. The FSF or host nation may also employ national police in response to personnel recovery requirements. When FSF or host-nation forces are in the lead, personnel recovery assistance provided by the
FSF to the SFAB facilitates rapid initiation of personnel recovery. The mission is incredibly time sensitive and high priority. As part of their training to the FSF, SFAB commanders, staffs, and advising team leaders should incorporate these types of operations into the training plan. Generally, the FSF is more familiar with the operational environment and population; therefore, a well-trained FSF has a higher chance to successfully recover the missing personnel in a timely fashion.

**CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR**

9-17. The CBRN protection measures are taken to keep CBRN threats and hazards from having an adverse effect on military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, and facilities. CBRN threats and hazards include weapons of mass destruction, CBRN-enhanced improvised weapons and devices, and toxic industrial material. All of these can cause potential mass casualties and large scale destruction. Many state and nonstate actors (including terrorists and criminals) possess or are seeking to possess, develop, and proliferate weapons of mass destruction.

9-18. The CBRN protection capacity is limited to individual soldier equipment and hardening of facilities to mitigate the effects of CBRN threats and hazards. In addition to mitigating the effects of CBRN threats and hazards, the SFAB ensures it identifies and avoids areas where CBRN is known to have been previously employed as the effects may linger.

9-19. The FSF CBRN protection capability and capacity development enables the FSF to preserve their force in similar fashion to U.S. forces. The FSF can provide early warning and information, which assists in reducing the effects of CBRN threats and hazards on SFAB members. The FSF also support the SFAB by preventing acquisition, containing and reducing threats, and by responding to crises.

**RISK MANAGEMENT**

9-20. Commanders and advising team leaders must manage risk in every operation. Due to the nature of SFAB operations, the unit generally operates under an increased level of operational risk relative to other conventional force units. Leaders must identify potential risks, prioritizing those risks, and then implement mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood and danger of those risks. Commanders, staffs, and team leaders must accept some level of risk in their operations. If properly managed, accepting a higher level of risk may lead to tactical opportunities. Commanders use risk management to identify and mitigate risk. They can reduce the risk through careful planning and foresight. Risk is a function of the probability of an event occurring and the severity of the event expressed in terms of the degree to which the incident impacts combat power or mission capability.

9-21. The FSF should train in the risk management process to enhance their ability to reduce potential incidents that adversely affect their readiness to execute missions. The FSF can provide capability and capacity, which is not organic, to mitigate the SFAB residual risk. For example, using FSF heavy equipment to construct protective works. The SFAB preserves combat power and reduces the support requests from other organizations by reducing the residual risk through FSF assets.

**ANTITERRORISM**

9-22. Antiterrorism is related to physical security and comprises proactive defensive measures used to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defend individuals and property against terrorist acts. These measures include limited response and containment by security forces.

9-23. The SFAB antiterrorism tasks include several supporting and information programs, such as military occupational specialty functionally trained personnel. The SFAB antiterrorism resources include risk management, antiterrorism planning, awareness training, command information programs, validation of defensive plans (counterintelligence), security considerations, and other resources.

9-24. SFAB units work with the FSF by training, monitoring, and assessing antiterrorism measures. Eliminating or minimizing the insider threat is critical to mission success due to the amount of damage a successful attack can cause between the SFAB and FSF personnel and relationships. The SFAB advising teams help to establish a foreign security force antiterrorism program, monitor the plan, and coordinate for additional resources.
9-25. The FSF support to the SFAB includes target selection for monitoring, intelligence gathering and surveillance, facility security, and attack response including securing a location to prevent an enemy from escaping. After an attack, the FSF secures the location and the SFAB personnel conduct the post-attack exploitation.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

9-26. Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). The Army employs physical security measures in-depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. This approach is based upon continuing evaluation and employment of protective measures including physical barriers, cleared zones, lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (See ATP 3-39.32.)

9-27. SFAB commanders, staffs, and team leaders consider physical security throughout the planning and operations cycle to ensure that critical areas are secured against likely threats. Within the SFAB, the provost marshal may provide critical expertise to develop physical security plans, direct physical security measure implementation, and to coordinate for assets to facilitate physical security. The ability to perform physical security inspections and assessments is greatly enhanced by military police training at the United States Army Military Police School’s Physical Security Course and identify with the physical security inspector additional skill identifier. Critical areas the SFAB may consider for extensive physical security measures include—

- Bases or base camps.
- Access or entry control points.
- Key command posts, communication nodes, or sustainment facilities.
- Weapons, arms, ammunition, and explosive storage areas.
- Troop housing areas or other high concentration areas such as dining facilities.

9-28. Physical security considerations for the SFAB extend to the advice, assistance, and training the SFAB provides the FSF to improve their physical security. The SFAB can impact the foreign security forces’ ability to secure its critical assets against unauthorized access, damage, or criminal activity by supporting the FSF with physical security inspections and assessments, and providing support to implement physical security measures. Foreign security forces that can protect their critical assets can apply greater combat power to the mission. For instance, poor physical security of the FSF bases, weapons, command nodes, and housing areas can severely compromise the SFAB’s mission success by threatening the foreign security forces’ readiness through enemy attrition of personnel, morale, and equipment.

9-29. Physical security measures implemented by the SFAB and FSF complement each other and produce a combined security posture that enhances the protection of both. Due to the highly interactive basis of the relationship, the security of one force is directly related to the security of the other. When SFAB personnel collocate within the FSF bases, operate from FSF facilities, or depend on FSF infrastructure, they rely significantly on FSF physical security measures to enhance their own protection.

SECTION II – ADDITIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

9-30. While protection provides an overall approach to preserving combat power, there are additional protection considerations that the SFAB must address to achieve comprehensive and layered protection. The integration and synchronization of operations security, local security, and area security with the protection tasks enable commanders to protect forces, critical assets, and information. These security considerations include—

- Operations security.
- Local security.
- Area security.
OPERATIONS SECURITY

9-31. Operations security is a significant challenge during SFA activities. The need to protect critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities from hostile elements facilitates the overall security of the SFAB. The nature of the SFA implies that many host-nation officials and the population have information regarding some U.S. activities before they occur, which increases operational risk. However, critical information and key activities can be protected by identifying the operational risk associated with certain types of information, designating the appropriate people with which information can be shared, monitoring the success of the operations security program, and implementing changes as necessary. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or sympathizers within the FSF acting as informants. The SFA must consider the possibility of informants within the FSF when designing the operations security program.

9-32. The unit should provide extensive operations security to U.S. and FSF personnel involved in SFA activities and programs to ensure effectiveness of their operations. Communications security is an implied subcomponent of operations security. Communications security is essential throughout the planning and execution of SFA activities. SFAB personnel should be trained in the protection of sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials. Communications security between the SFAB and the FSF can be challenging as the FSF may not have compatible systems, or may not have any communication security capability. In cases where the FSF has no capability, the SFAB establishes alternative communications methods, which protect sensitive information from being released, which can have unintentional consequences or be used by the enemy.

LOCAL SECURITY

9-33. Local security is a security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADRP 3-90). Local security is an inherent responsibility of every individual, organization, and commander. Local security involves efforts taken to defeat local threats to provide immediate protection to the friendly force. The SFAB contains local security capabilities to retain the ability to defend itself no matter what the operational environment. Generally, security tasks beyond local security are beyond the organic capability of the SFAB and must either be performed by an augmentation security force or by the FSF.

9-34. Local security includes observation posts, local security patrols, perimeter security, overwatch positions, and other measures to provide close-in security for a force. The SFAB must always place local security in the forefront of its considerations, as the ability to continuously secure itself is critical to its ability to perform its assigned tasks and fulfill its mission. The SFAB routinely works with the FSF in small teams and minimal additional security personnel. In most cases, the small team employs one of its members to provide overwatch of its members during FSF engagements. The designated member is disengaged from the meeting or training, focusing on the environment and participants. The overwatch personnel must remain vigilant to the behavior and actions of everyone present. The designated member must also be cognizant of customs and courtesies of the FSF members so as not to mistake normal behavior and action with aggressive action or conversation tone.

9-35. On those occasions when SFA operations are politically sensitive, successful insider attacks may have a greater strategic effect than a conventional force-on-force attack. Therefore, these attacks are a goal of many enemy organizations and must be considered while planning and conducting SFAB operations. In such cases of increased risk of attack, security measures must be modified accordingly. All members of the SFAB have a responsibility to contribute to local security. Unless augmented with a dedicated security force, the SFAB team members collectively share the responsibility to contribute to continuous local security through constant observation, awareness, and rotational security duties, as necessary.

9-36. As the SFAB trains the FSF, a foundational principle for the FSF is the ability to secure themselves and provide for their own local security. As in all security operations, the SFAB must teach the FSF to implement the five fundamentals of security: Provide early and accurate warning, provide reaction time and maneuver space, orient on the force or facility to be secured, perform continuous reconnaissance, and maintain enemy contact. Foreign security forces operating consistent with the fundamentals of security detailed in FM 3-98, develop basic local security competencies. Once proficient at these fundamentals, they
begin to perform additional forms of security operations, which allow them to prevent surprise and preserve reaction time for decision-making and maneuver.

9-37. The FSF contributes to the SFAB local security through personnel, equipment, and facilities it may provide to the SFAB, as well as through partnered area security efforts. This extends the reach of the SFAB to influence threats beyond the reach of its own local security.

**AREA SECURITY**

9-38. The SFAB has limited capabilities to perform area security. The success of SFAB area security operations are largely influenced by the capability and capacity of the partner FSF. *Area security* is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90). Inside a JOA, area security is usually the responsibility of the commander assigned an area of operations. The SFAB relies on mutual support from U.S. and foreign maneuver forces for their protection. Outside a JOA, the SFAB's protection beyond its own inherent local security capabilities relies heavily on the success of partnered area security. Area security often focuses on the following activities:

- Base or basecamp defense.
- Critical asset security.
- Node protection.
- High risk personnel security.
- Response force operations.
- Lines of communication security.
- Checkpoints and combat out posts.
- Convoy security.
- Port area and pier security.
- Area damage control.

9-39. Partnered area security is complementary to local security and extends the reach of the SFAB to protect itself beyond the extent of its local security. As the SFAB often operates in austere environments, SFAB protection often relies on their ability to defeat local threats. The SFAB also defeats threats in the surrounding areas before potential threats can generate combat power and present a threat to the SFAB beyond its ability to defeat the threat with local security alone. However, the SFAB is significantly limited (as well as constrained in non-JOA environments) in its ability to perform area security beyond the extent of its local security. As such, the SFAB achieves protection by partnering with the FSF to perform partnered area security. Partnered area security leverages the strengths of each force (SFAB and FSF) to complement the weaknesses of the other and thereby achieve synergy to defeat threats in the area beyond the reach of the SFAB capabilities or authorities.

9-40. As part of partnered area security, the SFAB provides the FSF with key strengths within its approved role and authorities to allow the FSF to perform area security more effectively. For instance, while the FSF may provide the bulk of combat power with ground maneuver forces and enablers, the SFAB may provide linkage to U.S. joint or multinational enterprises (such as joint fires, intelligence, or logistics). The ability of the SFAB to coordinate support (for example, aviation, EOD, special operations forces) to the FSF enhances the foreign security forces' ability to accomplish security in areas and populations, while SFABs remain in an advise and assist role. In some cases, when the FSF capabilities are insufficient to defeat a significant threat, the SFAB may augment with additional combat power to directly engage enemy forces through offensive operations. The objective of direct U.S. military operations is to protect partner nation political, economic, and social institutions against immediate threats, and to stabilize the operational environment so FSF can resume control for area security.

9-41. As the SFAB provides key support and assistance to the FSF, the FSF provides the primary maneuver forces to accomplish partnered area security. Due to this combined effort, the SFAB's protection is enhanced beyond the reach of its inherent local security measures through the contributions and effects that the FSF provides within its territory and among its population. This complimentary approach also supports the SFABs ability to prevent, deter, or defeat threats beyond the capacity of its local security. Preserving the legitimacy
of the partner nation by developing the effectiveness of the FSF to solve their own internal security problems is of strategic importance and essential to attain long-term security outcomes.

**High Risk Personnel Security**

9-42. Personnel are categorized as being high risk based upon their chances of being targeted by threat elements due to their grade, assignment, symbolic value, vulnerability, or specific threats. Given the SFAB’s mission, there could be circumstances in which high-risk personnel require considerable security planning and potential protective services support. When necessary, the commander and staff plan for appropriate protective services. The protective services support may augment the SFAB for attached high-risk personnel, or more commonly coordinate through the ASCC or geographic combatant commander for a temporary protective services detail to accompany the high-risk personnel for the duration of the mission. Specially trained United States Criminal Investigations Command special agents and military police with the protective services additional skill identifier provide continuous executive-level protective services to designated high-risk personnel. (See FM 3-39.)

9-43. The FSF often requires the ability to secure their own high-risk personnel. While the SFAB may provide limited training in this capacity, training in advanced U.S. protective services techniques is typically limited by the sensitive nature of the techniques and the outside the scope of the SFAB’s mission.

**Counter-improvised Explosive Device**

9-44. IEDs can provide the enemy with a tactical advantage in ways that other weapons do not. Tactically, IEDs compensate for a lack of heavy weapons by providing greater lethality, standoff, and survivability than small arms. IEDs provide a countermobility capability against mounted and dismounted units and a means to attack hardened targets such as armored vehicles and fortifications. Like landmines, IEDs alter the terrain to channelize movement into prepared ambushes. IEDs provide standoff that reduces the bomber’s vulnerability by keeping them out of the range of U.S. weapons and sensors. The IED’s indiscriminate nature and anonymity make it a fearsome psychological weapon, heightening the combat stress of friendly forces.

9-45. SFAB commanders and staffs will include counter-IED into their planning and training processes at home station, take proactive measures to identify and target the IED networks, and reduce the employment of IEDs by increasing the cost to the enemy through attrition. The SFAB must view these activities individually and in conjunction with the other counter-IED efforts.

9-46. At a minimum, counter-IED activities should include the three lines of efforts of the counter-IED framework; network engagement, train the force, and defeat the device. The level of effort varies throughout the course of the operation by phase. The SFAB should develop and execute appropriate counter-IED plans to ensure comprehensive support to an operation throughout the execution. (See ATP 3-90.37.)

**CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS**

9-47. Several of the primary protection tasks focus on the commander’s ability to establish civil control, maintain civil order, and influence and control populations to prevent disruption to military operations. These protection tasks include police operations, detention operations, and populace and resource control.

**Police Operations**

9-48. Police operations involve the application of control measures and enforcement mechanisms within an area of operations to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the population. The Army conducts police operations to maintain order within its communities and formations, and when directed, to apply policing activities to civilian populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent. Police operations include law enforcement, forensic analysis and biometric support, criminal investigations, customs support, support to civil security and civil control (includes host-nation police training and support), police engagement, civil disturbance control, traffic management and enforcement, and evidence response team support. (See ATP 3-39.10.)

9-49. Protection of the SFAB includes not only protection against external threats, but also protection against criminal threats in the operational environment, criminals infiltrating FSF, or crimes occurring within the
SFAB. When the SFAB faces significant crime problems or criminal threats, the commander and staff should coordinate through the provost marshal for necessary military police support to prevent, deter, and investigate criminal activity inside and outside the SFAB formation.

9-50. Police operations may be necessary when the SFAB’s mission includes increasing the capability and capacity of foreign law enforcement organizations. While other unified action partners (that is the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) are often responsible for assisting foreign law enforcement organizations, the Department of Defense may be required to lead the effort in uncertain environments when civilian agencies and personnel are unable to perform these missions based on the security environment. Given the technical skills required in training police organizations (escalation of force, evidence collection, preservation and storage, forensic analysis, and criminal investigations), if the SFAB’s mission includes training FSF police organizations, the commander and staff should augment the SFAB with military police support.

9-51. A partner nation’s ability to maintain civil order and police its population according to the rule of law is critical to SFAB protection. When partner nation police organizations fail to achieve order, enforce laws, and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the stability and legitimacy of a partner nation is significantly undermined. Failure to achieve public security can significantly degrade the SFAB’s protection and threaten its ability to focus on its primary mission. When this is the case, assessment may require a focus on training the FSF police organizations to improve partner nation police capabilities to prevent, investigate, and disrupt organized criminal activities that threaten order and stability in the partner nation or geographic region.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

9-52. Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military operations. Detention operations by U.S. military police includes the confinement of U.S. military prisoners, detainee operations, and host-nation corrections training and support. While partner nations may use different naming conventions to refer to their detention functions, the common feature of detention relates to FSF tasked to detain, intern, confine, or otherwise exert control over a detained or incarcerated population (See FM 3-63.)

9-53. While the SFAB has limited involvement or requirements to perform detention operations themselves, it is imperative that partner nation FSF (military and police) perform their detention operations according to the rule of law, while abiding by international laws, norms, and standards. While the SFAB focuses on building partner nation FSF military capability and capacity, if that capability is employed in violation of international laws and norms, the strategic impact threatens to undermine U.S. national objectives. When the SFAB faces a mission in which the FSF is performing detention operations, the commander and staff coordinate through the provost marshal to ensure technical oversight is provided to prevent violations of human rights, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Geneva Conventions by the partner nation FSF.

9-54. When FSF perform detention operations, the SFAB may be required to advise or assist them to ensure proper techniques and methods are employed to prevent abuse or human rights violations. The primary advisor to oversee detention operations is the provost marshal; however, the technical details and procedures required to perform detention operations to standard may require coordination to receive augmentation by military police correction and detention specialists. Potential issues the SFAB should maintain are oversight and awareness of relating to partner nation detention operations include:

- Ensuring humane treatment of detainees.
- Monitoring and enforcing pretrial correction standards consistent with the rule of law.
- Improving and maintaining health, hygiene, and appropriate social services.
- Establishing and maintaining the appropriate oversight of the corrections system.
- Promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of detainees back into the population.

9-55. The FSF detention operations contribute to the SFAB protection by removing potential threat populations (insurgent or criminal) from the operational area. The ability of partner nations to implement their own effective criminal justice systems (police, corrections, and judicial) to adjudicate civil disputes, prosecute violations of criminal laws, and incarcerate convicted criminal offenders is critical to the overall stability and order of the nation and region. In places where legitimate criminal justice systems exist, the
SFAB benefits from the protection provided by maintaining stable social and political conditions. In places where the criminal justice system is undermined by rampant insurgent or criminal activity, corruption of government personnel and institutions, or the presence of competing governance structure (criminal, terrorist, or insurgent), the SFAB’s protection is significantly threatened by the surrounding instability, disorder, or criminalized power structures. The ability of the partner nation FSF to achieve a legitimate civil order is essential to preventing conflict and consolidating gains to achieve long-term U.S. strategic objectives.

**Populace and Resource Control**

9-56. Populace and resources control consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: Populace control and resources control. Both components are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce populace and resources control measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ populace and resources control measures of some type and to varying degrees across the range of military operations. Populace and resources control operations are executed with, and as an integral part of, military operations.

9-57. Populace control measures are a key element in the execution of primary stability tasks in the areas of civil security and civil control. Populace control involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe and secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. Control measures require a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the operational environment that support stability through unit of effort.

9-58. In every operational environment, the movement, activities, and actions of populations can disrupt military operations. Deliberate populace and resource control is normally conducted during a civil or military crisis or emergency, especially when more restrictive measures are used. Ideally, the host nation conducts populace and resource control, regardless of the mission, while U.S. military forces may provide support. This is the case for the SFAB’s advise and assist missions. The SFAB’s role in populace and resource control most often comes in the form of its advisory capacity, which likely requires augmentation with civil affairs staffs or units to provide dedicated advisors to oversee populace and resource control operations. (See FM 3-57.)

9-59. A partner nation’s ability to uphold governance and protect its population depends on its ability to control its own populations and resources, while abiding by international laws and norms. A government’s inability to control its population and resources undermines its ability to govern. For FSF, the SFAB can provide the advice, expertise, and supervision necessary to implement effective populace and resource control without violating laws and norms. This balance is often difficult to achieve, even more so in the environment the SFAB operates, where internal and external threats are pervasive. Finding the right balance between the legitimate use of force to uphold governance authority and protect the population versus the abusive use of force that ignites public grievance and resistance is a delicate balance and often a central challenge in achieving U.S. strategic ends through effective and legitimate means.

9-60. The ability of the FSF to successfully perform populace and resource control contributes to SFAB protection by reducing the disorder in the operational environment and mitigating the disruptive impact a population may have on the FSF and SFAB operations. As with area security, only when the FSF are capable, willing, and legitimate in exerting control over their populations and resources can the SFAB expect to derive the protection necessary to operate in austere and potentially hostile environments to fulfill its mission.
Chapter 10

Sustainment

The BSB is designed to provide limited logistics and Army Health System (AHS) support to an SFAB and its battalion. In addition to conducting their SFAB mission, the BSB must also train, advise, and assist FSF on the development of sustainment operations. Chapter 10 provides an overview of the BSB’s role and describes how the BSB conducts operations as part of the SFAB and supports the brigade’s battalions.

SECTION I ─ BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION ROLE AND ORGANIZATION

10-1. The SFAB BSB provides mission command of the support battalion’s headquarters support company and the internal support sections. The BSB advises and assists FSF on logistics and health service support. The BSB design contains minimal organic ability for internal sustainment. The SFAB is dependent upon host nation, operational contract support, the ASCC, Embassy Country Team, and area support from a contracting support brigade and BSB or combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB) for its sustainment support.

10-2. When an SFAB operates inside a geographic combatant commander’s designated JOA, the brigade nests with established sustainment structures. Typically, inside a JOA, the expeditionary sustainment command conducts and oversees the distribution management, transportation operations, material management, personnel services, and operational contract support. The BSB can coordinate sustainment support needed through an expeditionary sustainment command and typically receives sustainment support from a BCT’s BSB or CSSB in the JOA through their area support mission and responsibilities. Operating inside a JOA allows the BSB to utilize preestablished traditional Army sustainment systems and distribution networks.

10-3. When an SFAB operates outside a geographic combatant commander’s designated JOA or when there is no JOA established, the brigade may not have traditional Army sustainment systems and distribution networks to rely on for resupply, distribution, maintenance, transportation, and AHS support operations. With no other conventional forces in the JOA, the BSB must coordinate sustainment support through the contracting support brigade contracting support, host-nation support, directly with the Defense Logistics Agency, Embassy, or the ASCC for their location. These entities support administrative, sustainment, and life support functions. The BSB must coordinate with one of these entities for the resupply of all classes of supply, medical evacuation, maintenance support, field feeding, finance, postal, and any other type of support needed. (See chapter 1.)

10-4. The role of a BSB is to provide limited logistics and AHS support to an SFAB depending on theater assets available. The BSB may advise, assist, and accompany the FSF in sustainment operations. The core competencies of the SFAB BSB are to provide sustainment planning, synchronization, and execution of logistics and AHS support for the brigade and provide sustainment advice and assistance to the FSF.

10-5. The BSB performs the following functions: Distribution operations, field-level maintenance, and enhanced role 1 medical care for the SFAB. The BSB is an expeditionary, multifunctional logistics battalion with integrated AHS support that can operate at the tactical level in a potentially dispersed area of operations to support a brigade advising and assisting FSF. The BSB and its organic units may be tasked to operate in limited capabilities in smaller sections, decentralized, and under the operational control of other government entities such as the embassy chief of mission or the ASCC.
BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION ORGANIZATION

10-6. A headquarters support company, along with the subordinate sections, comprises the BSB. The headquarters support company includes a distribution section, maintenance section, field feeding section, and a medical treatment section. Figure 10-1 depicts a BSB’s task organization to support the brigade.

![Figure 10-1. Support battalion task organization](Image)

Legend: SFA – security force assistance; SPT – support

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMPANY

10-7. The headquarters support company’s primary mission is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics and health service support for the SFAB. The headquarters support company has a secondary mission to advise and assist the FSF in sustainment operations as necessary. The headquarters support company consists of the command group, S-1, the BSB logistics staff officer (S-4), the BSB signal staff officer (S-6), and the support operations section. The headquarters support company has a small maintenance section, distribution section, field feeding section, and a medical treatment section. The BSB’s headquarters support company provides mission command, administrative, and logistics support for all organic units to the BSB. The BSB staff (S-1, S-4, and S-6) is responsible primarily for the internal administrative operations of the BSB. Members of the support operations section may be required to advise and assist the FSF in sustainment operations as well as its primary role of coordinating external sustainment operations for the brigade.
Battalion Commander

10-8. The BSB commander is the brigade’s senior logistician and the senior logistics advisor to the FSF. BSB commanders are the primary advisors to the brigade commander on the sustainment of all brigade operations. They provide guidance to the BSB staff, the S-4, brigade executive officer, and the S-3 to effectively achieve the brigade commander’s intent. BSB commanders are responsible for logistics synchronization and execution.

Command Sergeant Major

10-9. The BSB command sergeant major is the senior enlisted member of the BSB and provides mature knowledge, experience, and judgement. The command sergeant major communicates with the SFAB units’ sergeants major to verify the quality of support and to resolve issues for BSB Soldiers supporting other battalions in the SFAB. The command sergeant major provides technical and tactical advice to the commander and staff on the planning, training, preparation, and execution of all BSB missions. The command sergeant major’s duties and responsibilities vary according to the commander’s specific desires or needs.

S-1

10-10. The battalion S-1 serves as the BSB principal staff officer for human resources support and other issues impacting the health, morale, and welfare of BSB Soldiers. The S-1 coordinates medical, religious, postal, and legal support. Human resource support in the BSB includes personnel accountability, strength reporting, casualty operations, personnel information management, personnel readiness, essential personnel services, postal operations, and command interest programs. (See ATP 1-0.1.)

S-4

10-11. The BSB S-4 serves as the battalion logistics staff officer. The S-4 coordinates for internal battalion supply functions, determines supply requirements (except medical), determines supply priorities, and coordinates the requisition, acquisition, and storage of supplies and equipment. The S-4 coordinates the strategic and operational deployment of the BSB. The S-4 also requests for any movement through controlled routes. Additionally, the S-4 maintains unit equipment lists and assists in developing unit movement plans for the BSB.

10-12. Internally, the S-4 monitors the field feeding, property book activities, internal maintenance operations, unit basic loads, equipment operational status, and the status of requisitions for equipment and supplies for the BSB. The BSB S-4 manages the battalion’s budget, to include the funding approval portion of execution management under Global Combat Support System-Army. Lastly, the BSB S-4 acquires and assigns facilities and develops the internal battalion logistics status report.

S-6

10-13. The S-6 is the principal staff officer responsible for communications, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and networks within the BSB. The S-6 advises the commander, staff, and subordinate units on communications and establishing automation systems administration procedures for all information systems. The battalion signal staff officer’s primary function is to ensure the integrity of the voice and digital communications network.

Support Operations

10-14. Support operations is the staff function of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment in support of units conducting decisive action in an area of operations (ATP 4-93). The support operations section provides centralized and integrated planning for all support operations within the brigade. Support operations functions generally include transportation, maintenance, ammunition (ATP 4-35.1), AHS support, supply and field services, and distribution operations.

10-15. The support operations section coordinates the brigade’s logistics and provides the technical supervision for the logistics mission of the BSB. The BSB support operations section is the principal staff section responsible for synchronizing BSB distribution, transportation, replenishment, and maintenance.
operations for all units assigned or attached to the SFAB. The BSB support operations section is responsible for applying the BSB’s capabilities against the brigade’s requirements; then coordinate for external support to mitigate shortfalls. The brigade S-4 identifies requirements through daily logistic status reports, running estimates, and mission analysis.

10-16. The brigade S-4 is the logistics planner for the brigade, focusing on midrange to long-range planning. Support operations straddle midrange (future operations) to short-range planning and focus on coordinating the execution of the sustainment plan. The support operations section also develops the concept of support (in coordination with the brigade S-4) and the distribution plan, which includes logistics package operations.

10-17. The BSB support operations is the key interface between the brigade and any supporting sustainment unit and agencies such as the expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, Defense Logistics Agency, CSSB, or BSB from a BCT. The support operations section is responsible for coordinating external SFAB support requirements with an expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, CSSB, or BSB support operations.

Distribution Section

10-18. The BSB distribution section’s role in the headquarters support company is to provide limited execution and oversight of supply distribution to support the brigade. Additionally, the distribution section’s secondary mission is to advise and assist the FSF in distribution and supply support operations. The squad manages the distribution of supplies to the brigade and provides limited distribution capability for class I, II, III, IV, V, and IX. The BSB distribution section can also execute daily receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply through a small supply support activity.

Maintenance Section

10-19. The role of the BSB maintenance section in the headquarters support company is to perform limited field-level maintenance on or near the unserviceable pieces of equipment or weapon systems of the SFAB. Generally, this includes limited field-level maintenance support to the brigade headquarters company and the support, field artillery, and engineer battalion headquarters companies. The maintenance team’s secondary mission is to advise and assist the FSF in field-level maintenance operations and potentially sustainment-level maintenance operations depending on the needs of the FSF.

10-20. Field-level maintenance is not limited to the removal and replacement of components but also allows for the repair of components or end items on or near the system. Field-level maintenance also includes adjustment, alignment, services, applying approved field-level modification work orders as directed, fault and failure diagnoses, battle damage assessment, repair, and recovery. The maintenance team always repairs and returns items to the user. If the item cannot be repaired, a replacement is ordered. Operators perform field-level maintenance actions.

10-21. Sustainment-level maintenance is off-system component repair or end item repair, which returns the equipment back to the national supply system. National-level maintenance providers perform sustainment-level maintenance.

Field Feeding Section

10-22. The field feeding section is designed to coordinate class I support for the advising teams. The section ensures that SFAB Soldiers have access to food and water that is properly prepared and stored at the various locations. They conduct inspections, monitor supplies, and coordinate with the support operations section. While not trained advisors, the field feeding section Soldiers may augment advising teams to provide technical support to the FSF as necessary.

Medical Treatment Section

10-23. The SFAB possess reduced organic AHS assets that provide enhanced role 1 medical care. Therefore, the brigade may require AHS support on an area basis for role 2 and higher medical care. The brigade may deploy as separate and small units in disparate locations. Consequently, it is not possible to assign AHS support dedicated assets to every SFAB element.
10-24. The brigade employs in operations that require officers and NCOs to have a thorough knowledge of other Services and multinational forces’ AHS capabilities, limitations, organizations, and procedures. Security force assistance missions are inherently joint, combined, interagency, and multinational in nature.

**BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT STAFF**

10-25. The sustainment staff of the SFAB plans, directs, controls, and coordinates sustainment with unrelenting endurance in support of operations. Key members of the SFAB’s sustainment staff includes the S-1, S-4, property book officer, brigade surgeon, financial management staff officer, and the unit ministry team. These staff sections perform common staff responsibilities that are briefly described below. The staff develops internal brigade policies and plans in their respective technical areas and provides guidance, priorities, and allocations to subordinate commands.

**Brigade S-1**

10-26. The S-1 is the principle staff advisor to the brigade commander for all matters concerning human resources support. The S-1 section plans, provides, and coordinates human resources support, services, or information to all assigned and attached personnel within the SFAB and subordinate units. The S-1’s primary duties and responsibilities include the following:

- Maintaining unit strength and personnel accountability statuses.
- Preparing personnel estimates and annexes.
- Planning casualty replacement operations.
- Assisting the support operations officer plan detainee operations and dislocated civilian movement.
- Planning the BCT postal operation plan.
- Conducting essential personnel services for the brigade.

**Brigade S-4**

10-27. The S-4 is the coordinating staff officer for logistical operations and plans. The S-4 provides staff oversight to the SFAB in the areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, and field services. The S-4 is the brigade staff integrator between the brigade commander and the BSB commander who executes sustainment operations for the BCT. The S-4’s primary duties and responsibilities include the following:

- Conduct sustainment preparation of the operational environment.
- Develop the concept of logistics support for SFAB operations in coordination with the BSB.
- Manage the logistics status report.
- Manage combat readiness common operational picture.
- Monitors and analyzes equipment readiness status of all brigade units.
- Recommends sustainment priorities and controlled supply rates to the commander.
- Manages the property book for the SFAB and theater provided equipment assigned to the brigade.
- Develops acquisition ready statements of work for operational contract support requirements.
- Plans for intratheater movement and the deployment of personnel and equipment.
- Manages brigade contract support integration.

**Property Book Officer**

10-28. The property book officer is the primary advisor to the command and supported units on all property accountability and organizational-level supply matters. Typically, all property, except real property, requires continuous detail accounting from the time of acquisition throughout an item’s life cycle until the property is disposed of or consumed. Property book officers develop, execute, monitor, and provide input to the budget. They coordinate funds availability and oversee the small purchase program for standard and nonstandard equipment. They manage materiel through record adjustments, issues, turn-ins, property losses, and status reports. The property book officer applies for, coordinates, and manages the unit Department of Defense Activity Address Codes.
10-29. The mission of the property book officer is to ensure all authorized equipment is on-hand or on requisition for all units to accomplish their mission. The property book officer maintains the property records for all accountable assets issued to supported units. The officer controls all input to and output from the automated processes supporting the property book system. The property book officer processes documents, such as financial liability investigations, adjustment reports, statement of charges, cash collection vouchers, and managerial reports the command requires.

Brigade Surgeon

10-30. The brigade surgeon is responsible for the AHS support for the SFAB. The surgeon is a brigade-level special staff officer that coordinates AHS support activities with the brigade S-1 and other headquarters elements that affect the AHS support in the brigade and where applicable, the FSF. The brigade surgeon is responsible for the technical supervision of all medical activities in the command. The brigade surgeon is part of the brigade commander’s special staff, and as such, provides advice to the brigade commander on all medical or medically related issues. The brigade surgeon keeps the brigade commander informed on the status of AHS support for the brigade, the health of the command including the FSF, a plan for appropriate medical training for the FSF, and an assessment of the medical training status.

10-31. The brigade surgeon plans and coordinates (internally and externally) for the following AHS operations:

- Medical intelligence requirements.
- Local population assessment.
- Assessment and requirements for the medical advise and assist missions of the SFAB.
- Planning and coordinating (both internally and externally) for the following Army Health Service operations:
  - Medical evacuation by organic assets, area support medical evacuation provided by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, or U.S. Navy resources or resources from the civilian community (contract), host nation, and multinational resources.
  - Medical treatment including hospitalization in role 3 medical treatment facilities the Services, multinational forces, or host nation establishes. This includes medical treatment facilities afloat.
  - Dental services.
  - Veterinary food safety and security inspection, animal care, veterinary preventive medicine activities of the command, and civic assistance programs within the local community.
  - Medical advise and assist missions.
  - Preventive medicine services.
  - Medical laboratory services.
  - Foreign humanitarian assistance programs.
  - Behavioral health and combat and operational stress control programs.
  - AHS assessments, estimates, and plans.

10-32. The brigade surgeon’s staff has a medical operations officer, an environmental science engineering officer, and a health care NCO. The medical operations officer and the environmental science engineering officers are both assigned to the medical section of the BSB and provide support to the brigade surgeon in addition to their primary responsibilities. The brigade surgeon’s staff is responsible for assisting the brigade surgeon with planning, coordinating, advising, and synchronizing AHS support operations and requirements. In addition, the section is responsible for the foreign security forces’ medical requirements including medical training and support in the brigade’s area of operations. For augmentation of AHS assets, the brigade surgeon’s section coordinates through the higher echelon headquarters with the medical force provider in the area of operations.

Financial Management Staff Officer

10-33. The financial management staff officer (S-8) is the principal financial management advisor to the SFAB commander. The financial management officer directs, prioritizes, and supervises the operations and functions of resource management and finance operations for the brigade. The S-8 establishes and implements command finance operations policy. The S-8 asks the legal representatives for advice regarding laws and financial management regulations governing obligations, expenditures, and limitations on the use...
of public funds. The S-8 coordinates financial management policies and practices with the contracting command. The S-8’s primary duties and responsibilities include the following:

- Identifying, certifying, and managing funds available for immediate expenses.
- Integrating all financial management requirements into operational planning.
- Utilizing staff, commanders, training calendar, fiscal triad, and analysis of total cost to develop funding requirements and submit requirements to higher headquarters.
- Monitoring and reporting status of funding.
- Submitting and monitoring the status of requirements packets and spending plans to the appropriate boards, bureaus, cells, and working groups.
- Coordinating contracting and financial management disbursing support for field ordering officers and pay agents.
- Monitoring execution of the SFAB’s contract expenditures.

**Brigade Legal Team**

10-34. The brigade legal team consists of one judge advocate and one paralegal NCO. The brigade legal team provides legal support to SFAB operations and advises the commanders and staff on all aspects of criminal, administrative, operational, international, and fiscal law. The brigade judge advocate is the primary legal advisor to the SFAB commander. The brigade legal team can perform advisory tasks for FSF legal personnel at the direction of the SFAB commander. The brigade legal team is not a source of official legal advice to any foreign commanders or personnel.

**Brigade Unit Ministry Team**

10-35. The unit ministry team consists of a chaplain and religious affairs specialist. The primary role of the unit ministry team is to provide religious support and advise the command on moral, ethical, and religious issues that may impact operations.

10-36. As a member of the brigade commander’s personal staff, the chaplain and religious affairs specialist have direct access to the commander and other leaders throughout the brigade’s area of operations. The unit ministry team is part of the operations process and serve as subject matter experts on religious affairs. They are trained on the conduct of Soldier leader engagements, which can facilitate command directed engagements that are synchronized with the SFAB’s objectives. The unit ministry team must maintain support channels with the ASCC or geographic combatant commander chaplain offices to facilitate reach back capability with trained world religions chaplains.

10-37. The SFAB unit ministry team provides religious support to Soldiers throughout the brigade area. Developing a coverage plan is the responsibility of the brigade chaplain. This coverage plan may include multinational chaplaincy support to provide adequate free exercise of religion. (See JP 1-05, JP 3-08, and FM 1-05.)

10-38. Due to the potential advising role of the unit ministry team, mission specific training requirements must be coordinated with the brigade S-3 and external subject matter experts to ensure that the team is prepared to provide advising support to the FSF as necessary. The brigade unit ministry team develops a unit ministry team training plan to ensure they are adequately trained to support the SFAB mission.

**LOGISTIC OPERATIONS**

10-39. The BSB has limited capacity to provide logistics support to the brigade. The BSB is dependent upon echelons above brigade sustainment forces or contract logistics support to meet the required capacity to support the brigade. While operating in an established JOA with a logistics force structure, the BSB must understand support relationships. The BSB must often utilize other logistics units that are tasked with area support responsibility for units in their geographic location or that are traversing their area of operation. Additionally, the BSB must understand methods to procure supplies and execute sustainment functions outside of the traditional military systems such as contracting or host-nation support when they are not located in a designated JOA.
**SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

10-40. Command and support relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities between higher headquarters, subordinate, supported, and supporting units. Clearly defined support relationships are critical for the successful employment of the SFAB, which has no organic higher sustainment unit dedicated to logistics support. The SFAB, when it is not in a designated JOA, must rely on support relationships with adjacent conventional units or other entities such as host nation support, Defense Logistics Agency, contracting support brigade, or the chief of mission through an embassy for support.

10-41. Support relationships define the desired purpose, scope, and effect when one capability supports another. There are four support relationships in Army doctrine: Direct support, reinforcing, general support, and general support reinforcing. The BSB is organic to its SFAB, and therefore; no command relationship is necessary between the two units. The brigade typically has a general support relationship with conventional Army sustainment forces. Examples of conventional sustainment forces are a BCT’s BSB or a sustainment brigade’s CSSB. General support is the support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). Each support relationship directed in unit orders reinforces the commander’s priority of support. Higher headquarters designates the support relationships through appropriate orders to specify the details of the support relationship.

**AREA SUPPORT**

10-42. Area support is a task assigned to a sustainment unit directing it to support units within or passing through a specified location. Sustainment units, such as a BSB from a BCT or CSSB from a sustainment brigade, can provide area support to the brigade and its BSB located in or passing through their assigned areas of operation. A sustainment unit tasked to provide area support supports all units within a set geographic boundary. The geographic boundary may cross multiple battalion or other unit boundaries.

10-43. An SFAB and its BSB do not have organic or dedicated higher support organizations. The brigade has no other means of support other than host-nation support, CSB reach back, embassy, ASCC, or other means when outside of a JOA. The SFAB usually receives area support from a CSB and a BCT’s BSB or a CSSB when establishing a JOA. While a BSB or CSSB are organic to other headquarters, these sustainment units also have an additional area support mission.

10-44. A BCT’s BSB and a sustainment brigade’s CSSB may find themselves providing area support for small, unique units such as an advising team or a Special Forces operational detachment alpha. Area support may be habitual or conducted on a limited basis depending on mission variables and orders. Ideally, SFAB and other units project support requirements so that the BSB or CSSB have the support the unit requires, but often the required support is based on opportunity. BCT BSBs and CSSBs from a sustainment brigade, plan to support SFABs and their organic units with all classes of supply as required.

10-45. When an SFAB requires resupply through area support from a BSB or a CSSB, support operations coordinates with the supporting unit’s support operations, S-4, or other sustainment planner to integrate their requirements into the concept of support and to synchronize support operations. (See ATP 4-90.)

**DISTRIBUTION, REPLENISHMENT, AND RESUPPLY OPERATIONS**

10-46. The distribution section of the BSB has the primary mission to manage and assist with distributing class I, II, III, IV, V, and IX of supply for the brigade. The distribution section has limited personnel and supply transportation capability to support the SFAB. When appropriate, the BSB distribution section may assist in receiving, storing, and issuing all classes of supply through a small supply support activity to resupply the brigade on a limited basis.

10-47. The battalion S-4 gathers logistics requests that the advising teams generate (which are outside of the unit’s organic capacity) and relays the requests to the brigade S-4 and support operations section. The support operations officer plans cell coordinates and synchronizes distribution operations to meet the support requirements using internal BSB assets or external assets provided by a CSSB, sustainment brigade, expeditionary sustainment command, or contract logistics support as dictated by the theater sustainment structure.
10-48. Resupply operations require continuous and close coordination between the brigade and the supporting units when operating in a JOA. The SFAB may establish accounts and relationships with additional sustainment units in the JOA such as an expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, or a CSSB to receive additional transportation, ammunition resupply, supply and field services, and a distribution support.

10-49. In an area where a JOA and traditional military echelons of support have not been established, the brigade may need to contract for transportation, ammunition, supply and field services, and distribution operations. Additional means of resupply to the brigade might include aerial delivery, support delivered directly from the Defense Logistics Agency, coordination for support through the ASCC or embassy, or other nontraditional military resupply means. These techniques may not be applicable to all situations when operating outside of a JOA.

**LOGISTICS PACKAGE OPERATIONS**

10-50. A logistics package is the grouping of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander (FM 3-90-1). The logistics package technique is a simple and efficient way to accomplish routine, planned resupply between units. Before a logistics package, the support operations section coordinates to configure loads for resupply to battalions in the brigade. The distribution section from the BSB can conduct limited logistics package operations generally involving special or emergency resupply. Scheduled logistics packages usually contain a standardized allocation of supplies based on the concept of support, synchronization matrix, and the supported force’s consumption rates. The logistics package operations are usually coordinated by the support operations section through an external supporting organization.

**MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS**

10-51. The primary purpose of maintenance is to ensure equipment readiness and to generate combat power by repairing damaged equipment as quickly and as close to the point of failure as possible. SFABs have a very limited capability to repair their brigade systems with the maintenance assets organic to the BSB’s maintenance section. SFABs need to evacuate their equipment that requires field-level maintenance to another organization or echelon of support, such as a support maintenance company of a CSSB or BSB field maintenance company.

10-52. The maintenance advisors located in the advising teams make every attempt to repair nonmission capable equipment if possible. The battalion S-4 can establish a maintenance collection point in their battalion area of operation to provide a consolidation point for damaged equipment, hasty repairs, or to perform battle damage assessment and repair. The battalion S-4 must coordinate with the support operations section to evacuate most nonmission capable equipment to the maintenance section or to an external organization such as a BSB field maintenance company.

10-53. The maintenance advisor in the advising team initially requests class IX repair parts and maintenance support through their next higher headquarters maintenance personnel for any nonmission capable equipment. If the maintenance advisor cannot fix the piece of equipment or does not have the repair parts, time required, or tools required, they can request additional support through their higher headquarters to the BSB’s support operations section. The BSB support operations section then coordinates additional maintenance support if needed through their maintenance section or an external organization, such as a supporting BCT’s field maintenance company.

10-54. In an area where a JOA and traditional military echelons of support have not been established, the SFAB may need to contract additional maintenance personnel, local purchase class IX repair parts, or request replacement equipment, end items, and repair parts through the ASCC to the CSB or other Army contracting organization. These techniques may not be applicable to all situations when operating outside of a JOA.

**RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

10-55. Recovery is the process of repairing, retrieving, and freeing immobile, inoperative materiel from the point where it was disabled or abandoned. Commanders in the SFAB must emphasize the use of self and like
vehicle recovery methods to the greatest extent possible. These practices minimize the use of the BSB’s limited recovery assets for routine recovery missions. The maintenance advisors, maintenance warrant officer in the support operations section, and supported battalion S-4 balance the overall repair effort, available resources, and the tactical situation to coordinate recovery operations that support the commander’s priorities.

10-56. The BSB has limited recovery assets located in the maintenance section. These are the only recovery assets in the brigade. When possible, the BSB maintenance section recovers the brigade’s organic equipment. Generally, recovery operations are coordinated by the support operation section with external organizations. Maintenance planners must establish recovery priorities when recovery assets are limited. The battalion S-4, the support operations maintenance warrant officer, and the maintenance advisors are responsible for developing the repair and recovery plans. The maintenance plan includes battle damage assessment, priority for support, tactical situation, forecasted workload, and availability of maintenance and recovery personnel.

**Operational Contract Support**

10-57. Operational contract support is the integration of commercial sector support into military operations. The austere nature of the SFAB creates a tremendous need for this capability. The three types of contracted support available to support SFAB operations are listed below:

- Theater support contracts are contracts awarded by contingency contracting officers deployed to the operational area. Theater support contracts provide the ability to rapidly contract for logistics support within a theater of operations.
- Systems support contracts are prearranged contracts awarded and funded by acquisition program executive officers and project and product management officers. These contracts provide technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, class IX support for a variety of nontype classified and selected other Army weapon and support systems.
- External support contracts are contracts awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting head of contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. The largest and most commonly known external support contract is the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.

10-58. Part of planning an SFAB’s mission, when host nation, embassy, or adjacent unit general support is unavailable, is to determine which type of contracted support best meets the sustainment needs of the brigade. In any contracting support option, the SFAB is required to provide contracting officers’ representatives and receiving officials for contracted logistic services and commodities.

**Contracting Officer Representative, Field Ordering Officer, and Pay Agent**

10-59. The role of the field ordering officer is to procure authorized, urgently needed supplies and services from local sources during operations because normal supply channels are either not available or cannot provide them in a timely manner. Field ordering officers derive their purchasing authority from a warranted contracting officer. Field ordering officers have authorization to purchase supplies or nonpersonal services immediately available up to the established micro-purchase threshold.

10-60. A pay agent is an extension of the finance office’s disbursing officer at the unit level. The deputy disbursing officer or disbursing agent trains the pay agent to account for government funds and make payments in relatively small amounts to local vendors. The pay agent is paired with a field ordering officer and cannot be appointed as a field ordering officer, certifying officer, order or request goods or services (such as contract for), or hold other accountable positions such as a property book officer. (See ATP 1-06.1.)

10-61. The contracting officer representative is an employee, military or civilian of the U.S. Government, a foreign government, or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization and coalition partner appointed in writing by a warranted contracting officer and serving in the position as an extra duty. Contracting officer representative responsibilities include monitoring contract performance and performing other duties specified in their appointment letter. (See ATP 4-92.)
SECTION II – ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT

10-62. The AHS provides health care to U.S. Soldiers across the entire range of military operations from austere environments to well-staffed and well-equipped medical treatment facilities. The AHS is responsible for the operational management of the health service support and force health protection missions for training, predeployment, deployment, postdeployment, and where applicable, advising and training the FSF and partner nation elements.

10-63. Although many features of the SFAB are common to maneuver BCTs, some unique differences in the table of organization and equipment and associated missions-tactical employment are necessary for the SFAB. The differences arise primarily in the medical assets available, the operational, tactical, and SFA mission of the brigade in an established JOA, or in circumstances where a JOA is not available. Medical planners should review lessons learned from prior SFA missions and the associated elements to ensure successful AHS support for the brigade and its mission. (See FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2.)

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

10-64. Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Army. Additionally, as directed, the Army Medical Department provides support to other Services, agencies, FSF, and authorized organizations and includes casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics. Casualty care encompasses a number of Army Medical Department functions, such as organic and area medical support, hospitalization, the treatment aspects of dental care, behavioral and neuropsychiatric treatment, clinical laboratory services, and treatment of CBRN patients. (See FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2.)

10-65. The amount of sustainment support network available internally (within the JOA by augmentation) is dependent on the area of operations and operational environment of the SFAB and whether the brigade is operating within a designated JOA or outside a designated JOA. Operations outside a designated JOA may not have a well-established sustainment network and depend on the ASCC and the host nation for life support functions, force health protection, air medical evacuation, and other health service support requirements.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

10-66. Force health protection encompasses measures to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. These measures also include the prevention aspects of a number of Army Medical Department functions such as health promotion including the performance triad (sleep, activity, and nutrition) and tobacco cessation; preventive medicine including medical surveillance and occupational and environmental health surveillance; veterinary services including food inspection and animal care missions, and the prevention of zoonotic diseases transmissible to man; combat and operational stress control; dental services (preventive dentistry); and laboratory services (area medical laboratory support). (See chapter 9, FM 4-02, and ATP 4-02.2.)

MEDICAL TREATMENT SECTION, BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

10-67. The support battalion’s medical treatment section provides enhanced role 1 AHS support to the SFAB and the FSF if authorized. Authorization for AHS support to FSF is coordinated, approved, and promulgated with and by appropriate United States and host-nation authorities.

10-68. The medical section leader performs additional duties as the brigade medical operations officer. The section leader is responsible for operational and clinical activities the section conducts. When working with the FSF, the section leader is the core of the advise and assist role of the BSB medical section. The field surgeon provides medical advice and direction for the medical element and accompanies the medical section. The section leader provides assessments of the medical support and training requirements of the FSF to higher and directs or conducts the same with medical section assets. The section leader requests appropriate materiel
and personnel support from higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements to support the FSF mission. The medical section leader assists the subordinate maneuver battalion and Cavalry squadron medical sections in planning, coordinating, and monitoring AHS support operations.

10-69. The medical section sergeant is a staff sergeant (MOS 68W30). The medical section sergeant assists the section leader and medical operations officer and supervises the operations of the section. The section sergeant advises and assists their FSF counterpart if one is assigned. The medical section sergeant is vital to effective supervision of the medical section activities including maintenance of section equipment, requests for general categories of supplies, and class VIII supplies. The medical section sergeant prepares reports of medical section activities and functions with the section leader. (See ATP 4-02.3.)

**MEDICAL TREATMENT SECTION CAPABILITIES**

10-70. The medical treatment section provides routine medical care and advanced trauma management for Soldiers of the brigade and when authorized, the FSF. The medical treatment section provides limited laboratory services and blood support. The section supports brigade elements without organic medical support.

10-71. The medical treatment section leader determines the general set-up and security of the medical treatment section’s area of operations in consultation with the BSB commander and appropriate medical leadership. The medical treatment section leader directs, coordinates, and supervises team operations based on the brigades AHS support plan. Medical team leadership, in consultation with the brigade surgeon’s section, determines medical requirements, directs the medical activities of the brigade’s enhanced role 1 medical treatment facility, and monitors class VIII and blood requirements.

10-72. The medical laboratory personnel perform clinical laboratory and blood banking to aid physicians and physician assistants in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of diseases. Laboratory functions include performing laboratory procedures consistent with role 2 treatment capabilities. Medical personnel perform blood banking procedures according to TM 8-227-11/NAVMED P-5123/AFI 44-118. The element is responsible for storing and issuing blood and blood products and is capable and trained in the principles and fundamentals of fresh whole blood and the walking blood bank.

**PREVENTIVE MEDICINE CAPABILITIES**

10-73. The environmental science engineering officer provides preventive medicine, advice, and consultation in the health threat assessment area, force health protection, environmental sanitation, epidemiology, sanitary engineering, and pest management. Through routine surveillance, inspection of potable water supplies, inspection of field feeding facilities, and the application of pest management practices they identify actual and potential health hazards, recommend corrective measures, and assist in training brigade Soldiers and the FSF in disease and nonbattle injury prevention programs. The preventive medicine personnel provide unit field sanitation team training for both the SFAB and the FSF personnel and is a valuable resource for the promotion of health in the unit and affected host-nation entities. In an advising capacity, the environmental science and engineering officer provides medical intelligence related not only to threat estimates but also to combating the potential exploitation of partner-nation medical resources by negative influencers.

**BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CAPABILITIES**

10-74. The SFAB has no organic behavioral health capability and must request support from supporting AHS assets. When available, the behavioral health officer supports commanders in the prevention of combat and operational stress reaction through the SFAB’s behavioral health activities. The behavioral health officer delivers advice and assistance in the areas of behavioral health and combat and operational stress control. The behavioral health officer collects and records social and psychological data and counsels personnel with personal, behavioral, or psychological problems. The concept of behavioral health support is to provide care at the Soldier’s location to the greatest extent possible as this expedites treatment and minimizes both lost time and evacuation of Soldiers out of the brigade area of operations. General duties include assisting in a wide variety of psychological and social services such as providing classes in stress control, compiling caseload data, and providing counseling to Soldiers experiencing emotional or social problems. In addition,
the behavioral science officer refers Soldiers to higher roles of care, when indicated, and provides individual case consultation to commanders, NCOs, chaplains, surgeons, and physician assistants within the supported area of operations. The behavioral science officer may consult with the commander concerning individual and group dynamics within the area of operations. (See ATP 4-02.5.)

**BRIGADE MEDICAL SUPPLY CAPABILITIES**

10-75. The brigade medical logistics noncommissioned officer provides the brigade with class VIII coordination, synchronization, and execution of medical logistics support for the medical team and the supported brigade.

10-76. Operational class VIII organizational assets in the brigade are fixed and deploy with assigned AHS support units. Operational medical logistics support relies on the application of the class VIII supply chain that is agile, responsive, and swift. The supply chain possesses situational understanding of the supported organizations, the operational environment, mission, and the area of operation. During the initial deployment phase, the medical treatment section receives medical resupply mainly through preconfigured push packages, medical resupply sets from the supporting medical logistics company, a higher logistics support activity.

10-77. Due in part to long supply lines, limited storage, and the limited transportation assets available medical logistics planning is critical to the SFAB’s success. Potential support to local nationals, the FSF, and friendly armed forces are additional challenges that must also be considered.

**MEDICAL EVACUATION TEAM**

10-78. The SFAB has limited organic medical evacuation resources and is dependent upon the JOA medical units for augmentation of their AHS support. When deployed outside a JOA, coordination with the appropriate nodes, United States, host nation, and other capability providers is critical prior to and during deployment. To ensure that the brigade and the associated FSF receive comprehensive and timely AHS support for evacuation of casualties and patients within and out of the area of operations, a rolling assessment of available capabilities and phases of SFAB operations determines what support is required through organic evacuation assets and what support the JOA evacuation assets can provide. Area evacuation assets are preplanned, coordinated, and synchronized outside of a JOA, such as through various U.S. entities, host-nation assets, multinational, or contract evacuation assets. Early coordination and communication is vital to the success of AHS evacuation support to SFAB operations.

**MANEUVER BATTALION AND CAVALRY SQUADRON MEDICAL TREATMENT TEAMS**

10-79. A medical treatment team is organic to the maneuver battalions and the Cavalry squadron. The mission of these medical treatment teams is to provide role 1 AHS support to the maneuver element. The medical treatment teams have similar configurations for the maneuver battalions and Cavalry squadrons. The field artillery and engineer battalions have no organic medical treatment teams. The medical treatment teams may perform the additional mission of providing one medical evacuation team for the maneuver elements, though this action detracts from doctrinal medical treatment team capabilities. The medical treatment team is dependent upon the maneuver elements to which it is assigned for all logistic support (with the exception of class VIII supplies), such as communication; administrative; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; and life support such as food and water.

10-80. The medical treatment team forms the battalion or squadron aid station and provides role 1 unit medical support including sick call, tactical combat casualty care, and advanced trauma management. The medical treatment team has access to the battalion communications network. Through the network, the medical treatment team has access to all major elements of the battalion and with other supporting and supported units. The medical treatment team personnel include the physician assistant, the senior medic, and an emergency care NCO. The treatment team trains to provide tactical combat casualty care and to assist with advanced trauma management procedures commensurate with their training.

10-81. The physician assistant is the clinical professional and medical officer in charge of the maneuver battalion and Cavalry squadron medical sections. As the physician within the battalion or squadron, they provide medical advice and direction for the medical element and accompany the medical treatment team.
The physician assistant is advanced trauma management qualified and works under the professional supervision of the brigade field surgeon. The physician assistant—

- Provides medical treatment for sick and injured patients within their scope of practice and abilities, referring those patients requiring treatment beyond the physician assistant’s capability to the supervising physician or to a higher role of care.
- Provides advanced trauma management for wounded patients.
- Provides clinical and medical advice and assistance to their FSF medical counterparts.
- Establishes advise and assistance requirements for medical NCO’s training in self-aid, buddy aid, and other medical techniques and procedures to both the United States and the FSF.
- Recommends specific medical training for the FSF personnel to the command.

10-82. The medical treatment team NCO in charge is a sergeant first class (MOS 68W40). The medical NCO in charge assists the physician assistant and supervises the operations of the medical treatment team. The NCO in charge advises and assists their FSF counterpart if one is assigned. The NCO in charge is vital to effective supervision of the medical treatment team activities including maintenance of team equipment, requests for general categories of supplies, and class VIII supplies. The NCO in charge prepares reports of team activities and functions for the physician assistant.

**COMBAT MEDIC TEAM**

10-83. Every maneuver company and Cavalry troop, aside from the headquarters company or troop, is assigned an organic combat medic team. The combat medic team consists of one emergency care sergeant (68W30) and three emergency care sergeants (68W20). Additionally, the field artillery and engineer companies, aside from the headquarters company, are assigned an emergency care sergeant (68W30). These combat medics provide tactical combat casualty care and role 1 medical support to the elements to which they are assigned. The combat medics also advise and assist their FSF counterparts if one is assigned. Technical supervision of the combat medics is provided within the headquarters company or by the brigade field surgeon. The combat medics perform the following medical functions:

- Triage and tactical combat casualty care for the sick and wounded.
- Arrange medical evacuation for litter patients and direct ambulatory patients to the casualty collection point or to the battalion aid station.
- Initiates a DD Form 1380, *Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Card*, for the sick and wounded. As time permits, prepares a DD Form 1380 on deceased personnel.
- Screen, evaluate, and treat, within capabilities, those patients suffering from minor illnesses or injuries.
- Keep the company commander and the battalion or squadron physician assistant informed on matters pertaining to the health and welfare of the Soldiers.
- Manage class VIII resupply for the unit’s combat lifesavers, vehicle first aid kits, and warrior aid and litter kits.
- Maintain sufficient quantities of medical supplies to support the tactical situation.
- Serve as a member of the unit field sanitation team. In this capacity, advise the commander of the advising team leader and supervise unit personnel on matters of personal hygiene and field sanitation.
- Develop and maintain Soldier and combat medic skills in the context of the tactical and operating environment.
- Maintain tactical combat casualty care skills for a broad range of emergencies.

**MEDICAL EVACUATION**

10-84. *Medical evacuation* is the process of moving any person who is wounded injured, or ill to and between medical treatment facilities while providing en route medical care (FM 4-02). Medical evacuation consists of collecting, sorting, transporting, and providing en route medical care. Patients are evacuated from the lower role of care to the higher role of care. Due to the brigade’s limited assets and area of operations
where the SFAB may operate, the use of dedicated medical evacuation assets may not always be possible. The SFAB planner must integrate the use of disparate (contract, multinational, other Service) evacuation assets into the medical evacuation plan.

10-85. An efficient and effective medical evacuation system for the brigade rapidly and efficiently moves the sick, injured, and wounded to a medical treatment facility to minimize mortality. A medical evacuation system also serves as a force multiplier as it clears the operational area (battlefield) enabling the commander to continue their mission with all available assets. A properly executed medical evacuation system improves Soldier morale by demonstrating that care is quickly available if they are wounded. An efficient medical evacuation system also——

- Builds rapport with the FSF by coordinating or providing rapid medical evacuation of the FSF when wounded, injured, or ill.
- Provides en route medical care that is essential in improving the prognosis and reducing the disability of the wounded, injured, or ill Soldiers.
- Provides medical economy of force.
- Provides connectivity of the AHS to the military health system.

10-86. The evacuation team provides ground medical evacuation of patients from supported units to the medical treatment section. The evacuation team, evacuation sergeant, and ambulance aide or driver provides tactical combat casualty care, prepares patients for medical evacuation, and provides en route care for patients. The evacuation team operates and maintains assigned ambulances, communications equipment, and medical equipment sets.

10-87. The medical evacuation team performs route reconnaissance (by map, aerial reconnaissance, coordination with the S-2 and S-3, and vehicular route reconnaissance), develops, and issues all necessary route and navigational information. The evacuation team maintains situational understanding and uses all available navigational tools to ensure quick and secure evacuation of patients.

10-88. According to mission requirements, the brigade commander in conjunction with the brigade surgeon’s cell can weigh the main effort with the medical evacuation team.

**CASUALTY EVACUATION**

10-89. Nonmedical units use the term casualty evacuation when referring to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical platforms without en route medical care.

**WARNING**

Casualties transported in this manner may not receive proper en route medical care or be transported to the appropriate medical treatment facility to address the patient’s medical condition. If the casualty’s medical condition deteriorates during transport, or the casualty is not transported to the appropriate medical treatment facility, an adverse impact on their prognosis and long-term disability or death may result.

10-90. Since casualty evacuation operations can reduce combat power and degrade the efficiency of the AHS, units should use casualty evacuation to move Soldiers with less severe injuries when medical evacuation assets are overwhelmed. Medical planners ensure the operation plan and the operation order address casualty evacuation operations as a separate operation as these operations require preplanning, coordination, synchronization, and rehearsals. The casualty evacuation plan ensures casualties with severe or life-threatening injuries are prioritized for evacuation and are evacuated on dedicated medical evacuation platforms.
10-91. When possible, augment nonmedical vehicles and aircraft transporting casualties with a combat medic or combat lifesaver. The following factors limit the type of en route monitoring, medical care, and first aid provided:

- Skill level of the individual providing care. The emergency care sergeant and health care NCO can provide emergency medical intervention; whereas, the combat lifesaver can only monitor the casualty and ensure the basic lifesaving first aid tasks are accomplished.
- Medical equipment available.
- Number of casualties transported.
- Accessibility of casualties. If a nonstandard evacuation platform is loaded with the maximum number of casualties, medical personnel or combat lifesavers may be unable to attend to the casualties while the platform is moving. If the condition of the casualty deteriorates and emergency measures are required, the platform must stop to permit care to be given.

10-92. Casualty evacuation and medical evacuation are complimentary capabilities that reduce Soldier mortality. Casualty evacuation platforms do not negate the need for planning for and using organic medical evacuation assets. When outside a JOA, casualty evacuation does not negate the need for planning and coordinating for area support medical evacuation assets (air medical evacuation). As complimentary capabilities, casualty evacuations enhance the SFAB commander’s options and ability to clear their wounded from the engagement area, allowing the more severely wounded and injured access to the increased lifesaving capabilities of the medical evacuation platform.
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms and acronyms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<td>Army Health System</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<td>Army Service component command</td>
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<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<td>BSB</td>
<td>brigade support battalion</td>
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<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSB</td>
<td>combat sustainment support battalion</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Department of Defense form</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>FSF</td>
<td>foreign security forces</td>
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<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decisionmaking process</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>battalion or brigade personnel staff officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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SECTION II – TERMS

airspace control
Capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace (JP 3-52).

area security
A security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADRP 3-90).

Army personnel recovery
The military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50).

assessment
The determination of progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0).

battle rhythm
A deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations (FM 6-0).

commander’s critical information requirement
An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0).

commander’s visualization
The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach through which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 5-0).

country team
The senior, in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (JP 3-07.4).

field artillery
Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers (JP 3-09).

fires warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process (ADRP 3-0).
friendly force information requirement
Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0).

general support
The support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3).

geospatial intelligence
The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-03).

human intelligence
The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-0).

information collection
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55).

local security
A security task that includes low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADRP 3-90).

logistics package
The grouping of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander (FM 3-90-1).

measurement and signature intelligence
Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0).

medical evacuation
The process of moving any person who is wounded injured, or ill to and between medical treatment facilities while providing en route medical care (FM 4-02).

mission command
The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0).

open-source intelligence
Relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements. Also called OSINT (JP 2-0).

planning horizon
A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events (ADRP 5-0).

physical security
That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0).
priority intelligence requirement
An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01).

protection
The preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0).

protection warfighting function
Related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 3-0).

risk management
The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0).

running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0).

security assistance
A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by the Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20).

security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific U. S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20).

security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20).

signals intelligence
Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0).

stability tasks
Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-07).

support operations
The staff function of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment in support of units conducting decisive action in an area of operations (ATP 4-93).

sustainment warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADRP 3-0).

targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0).
technical intelligence
Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages (JP 2-0).

terrain management
The process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other (ADRP 5-0).

unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP-1).

unity of effort
The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1).

unified land operations
Simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or defense support of civil authorities’ tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADP 3-0).
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