

ATP 3-90.40

Combined Arms Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Preface

ATP 3-90.40 provides doctrine on how to conduct the countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) mission as combined arms teams. It is primarily oriented on the brigade combat team (BCT) and below. This manual provides tactical-level commanders, staff, and key agencies with a primary reference for planning, synchronizing, integrating, and executing combined arms CWMD. At a minimum, it—

- Integrates current guidance, lessons learned, and new concepts that have been recently developed and fielded on this subject.
- Introduces the challenges associated with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sites, to include sensitive (weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and select CBRN) and hazardous (toxic industrial material [TIM]) sites.
- Serves as the integrating doctrinal reference for supporting Army publications and their application in support of tactical-level CWMD in operational environments (OEs).
- Acts as a bridge for tactical CWMD operations between joint doctrine (primarily JP 3-40) and tactical doctrine (ADP 3-0, ATP 3-91, FM 3-90-1, and FM 3-96).
- Addresses the unique considerations of tactical CWMD.
- Briefly summarizes existing joint and tactical guidance to assist commanders and staff in applying CWMD fundamentals at the tactical level.

The principal audience for ATP 3-90.40 is Service personnel and civilian agency employees executing or supporting combined arms CWMD. ATP 3-90.40 supports Army operational forces, CBRN personnel, government employees, and civilian agency employees.

Commanders, staff, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 3-90.40 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-90.40 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-90.40 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, their term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-90.40 applies to Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-90.40 is the United States Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School (USACBRNS). The preparing agency is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate; Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division (CODDD); Doctrine Branch, with participation from the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929; by E-mail to usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddcodddcbrndoc@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

ATP 3-90.40 is a product of lessons learned and observations collected from the challenges faced during the execution of WMD elimination. The need for this doctrine was identified under the realization that CWMD is not a CBRN mission enabled by maneuver forces: rather, it is a military operation conducted by combined arms teams and enabled by CBRN, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and other technical elements.

ATP 3-90.40 has 5 chapters and 3 appendixes:

- **Chapter 1.** Provides an introduction to the fundamentals and important terms associated with CWMD executed as combined arms teams.
- **Chapter 2.** Discusses planning considerations for the conduct of CWMD operations.
- **Chapter 3.** Focuses on the control portion of activity 3 of the CWMD construct.
- **Chapter 4.** Focuses on the defeat, disable, and dispose portion of activity 3 of the CWMD construct.
- **Chapter 5.** Discusses the considerations for safeguarding the force and managing consequences, which is activity 4 of the CWMD construct.
- **Appendix A.** Provides systems and reporting techniques for CWMD operations.
- **Appendix B.** Focuses on the disposition of WMD and materials.
- **Appendix C.** Provides recommended contents of a target folder.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Chapter 1

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Fundamentals

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (DODS-CWMD), and the National Military Strategy of the United States identify WMD as one of the key security challenges facing the United States. Countering WMD is an enduring mission of the U.S. Armed forces. Potential adversaries continue to pursue WMD capabilities to enhance their stature and provide leverage against the U.S., its allies, and its interests. Increased access by state and nonstate actors to WMD materials, expertise, and technology heighten these risks, as does the threat of rogue and unstable WMD armed states.

DESCRIBING COMBINED ARMS CWMD, WMD, AND CBRN

1-1. CWMD operations are efforts against actors of concern to curtail the research, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. Combined arms teams provide integral, required capabilities to conduct complex CWMD operations primarily at the tactical level, but these teams also conduct some limited operational-level operations.

1-2. Combined arms CWMD is conducted at the tactical level by an integrated team made up of maneuver forces and enablers. The BCTs can also provide the overall mission command and resources required to prosecute multiple WMD objectives. Deliberate mission analysis results in the establishment of combined arms CWMD task forces (TFs), with maneuver battalions integrating enablers into their formations and conducting tactical and operational level operations with BCTs, divisions, corps, or joint TFs that provide overall mission command.

1-3. To understand the construct for the conduct of combined arms CWMD operations, it is important to understand the associated terms. *WMD* are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon (JP 3-40).

1-4. CBRN can be used as a descriptor for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. This includes traditional WMD materials, agents or devices, dual-use and non-WMD sites, and storage facilities. Dual-use refers to sites that have the capability to produce CBRN materials, such as manufacturing facilities, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and nuclear power plants. CBRN material is required to qualify as WMD. Incidental CBRN hazards (such as TIMs) may fall outside the definition of WMD, but they remain as threats to Army forces.

1-5. CBRN encompasses protective measures and equipment, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), and detection and identification measures and equipment. CBRN is also used to describe the personnel trained in this specialty. The added E for explosives is not needed for general discussions of CBRN. However, the full range of CBRN threats and hazards must acknowledge the explosive hazard that is often present with WMD. This full range of threats and hazards is depicted in the WMD threat and hazard model in figure 1-1, page 1-2.

1-6. The overall CWMD construct entails the execution of tactical and operational tasks and an understanding of the special considerations associated with CBRN environments and WMD-related objectives. Army forces must establish and maintain a base of fundamental individual and collective CBRN defense skills, which enable the ability to function and survive in a CBRN environment. These CBRN defense skills and protection must extend to United States Government (USG) civilians and contractors employed by the U.S. forces in their area of operations (AO).




Figure 1-1. WMD threats and hazards model

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CONSTRUCT

1-7. CWMD is predominately a land-based operation that cuts across all domains and incorporates all warfighting functions. The four activities of the CWMD construct and the tasks that support them are depicted in figure 1-2. The arrows of the graphic indicate how the activities flow into one another. For example, results of initial entry forces characterizing a site lead to a better understanding of the environment for follow-on forces that subsequently exploit the site. See JP 3-40 for further information and guidance on the strategic construct of CWMD.

1-8. There are four activities of the CWMD construct extracted from JP 3-40:

- **Activity 1.** Understand the environment, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- **Activity 2.** Cooperate with and support partners.
- **Activity 3.** Control, defeat, disable and dispose (CD3).
- **Activity 4.** Safeguard the force, and manage consequences.




Figure 1-2. Countering WMD activities and tasks

1-9. Each of the activities of the CWMD construct are further described in the text of this manual. The commander and staff at all echelons should understand that CWMD tasks and activities are neither linear nor are they strictly confined to a single line of effort (LOE), and they may span all operational phases and environments. For example, CD3 tasks might be conducted in a permissive environment during operational phases 0-1. These same tasks occur, in a vastly different manner, in hostile or uncertain environments or during operational phases 2-4. See figure 1-3, page 1-4.




Figure 1-3. CWMD activities across joint planning phases

Note. See JP 3-40 for further information and guidance on the strategic construct to CWMD.

1-10. The Army plans and executes CWMD in a deliberate or opportunistic manner. Deliberate refers to those activities and tasks that are planned for against known objectives and are considered a regular part of the mission set in support of CWMD. When Army forces are in the right place at the right time with applicable capabilities, they take advantage of targets of opportunity. They conduct activities and tasks described in this book with little or no time for planning. The largest difference between deliberate targets and targets of opportunity is time for planning and preparation. An example of conventional Army forces conducting opportunistic tasks is the execution of seize, secure, and assess tasks by a BCT after discovering a WMD site during the conduct of offensive operations.

1-11. The framework of CWMD activities can be utilized to designate tasks or activities for a specific mission based on the military decisionmaking process and identified mission requirements. As CWMD tasks are assigned to forces within the BCT or TF, some tasks overlap into multiple activities and have different meanings to tactical and technical forces. Table 1-1 depicts a crosswalk of those CWMD activities from the joint construct and corresponding typical combined arms tasks and activities for maneuver, technical enablers and follow-on forces. While many of these tasks are CWMD-specific, some of them are planned and executed during decisive action (offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities) tasks. Chapter 2 discusses specific planning considerations for CWMD operations.

Table 1-1. Combined arms CWMD task crosswalk

<i>Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Activities</i>		<i>Tasks of Maneuver Forces</i>	<i>Technical Tasks of Enablers</i>	<i>Tasks of Follow-on Forces</i>
Understand the Environment		IPB ISR Reconnaissance Locate Observe-preserve-report Identify-presumptive	Reconnaissance Assess Characterize Identify-field confirmation CAO	Attribute Predict Identify-definitive
Cooperate and Support Partners		Partner Coordinate Security cooperation Unified action Communications synchronization Civil-military operations	Communications synchronization	Communications synchronization
CD3	Control	Search and attack Cordon and search Security operations Troop movement Relief in place Encirclement Area defense Interdiction	Disable Troop movement Reconnaissance Assess Characterize	SME consultation
	Defeat, Disable, Dispose	Tactical site exploitation Employ fires Block an enemy force Interdict an area or route Employ forensic tools	Identify-field confirmation Translations CAO Packaging of hazardous material Controlled transport of samples Transition	Troop movement Civil-military cooperation Attribute Disable Exploit Degrade Hazardous material disposal Identify-definitive Destruction
Safeguard the Force and Manage Consequences		Risk reduction Force protection CBRN defense Decontamination (immediate/operational) Contamination avoidance Route reconnaissance Sustainment	Mitigate Force health protection Health service support Decontamination (thorough) CBRN response ICBRN-R	Sustain Support ICBRN-R

Note. This figure provides a representative list of potential tasks and is not all inclusive.

Legend:

- CAO civil affairs operations
- CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- CD3 control, defeat, disable, dispose
- ICBRN-R international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-response
- IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
- ISR intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
- SME subject matter expert

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Chapter 2

Mission Planning

Planners at all echelons should consider CWMD operations early in the planning process to facilitate the commander's decision making, execution of orders, and potential task-organizing of capabilities. A BCT may be assigned the CWMD mission and require augmentation with support assets, such as CBRN, EOD, military police, and engineer. The complex nature of CWMD operations and the inclusion of enablers make integrated planning critical. This chapter describes the integration of considerations for planning CWMD missions.

CWMD AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

2-1. CWMD operations require extensive planning, coordination, and execution oversight by commanders and staff and involve collaboration with teams of experts located around the world as part of a multi-Service effort. CWMD planning is not conducted in isolation nor as a separate process. It is the integration of WMD-specific knowledge, experience, and capabilities into planning efforts at all echelons. The associated planning begins at the combatant command level. Centralized planning and decentralized execution of CWMD operations are optimal to ensure that the right assets are provided. Theater assets, including specialized technical experts drawn from the Department of Defense (DOD), are called on during the different phases of a CWMD operation to support commanders and tactical units in the safe, efficient execution of the mission.

Note. Refer to ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-2.70 for more information about CBRN planning considerations and the capabilities and employment of U.S. Army CBRN forces can be found in.

PLANS AND ORDERS

2-2. Plans and orders should provide clear guidance to participating units concerning the capture, seizure, and disposition of equipment, material, personnel, and documents, including automation equipment and personal electronic devices. Operations plans and orders should plan for the intratheater movement of specialized personnel and equipment and coordinate the transportation of suspect or confirmed CBRN-related material for storage, protection, dismantlement, destruction, or disposal. Specific WMD elimination, disposition, monitoring, and redirection activities required at each site and the priority assigned to them are functions of a number of variables. These variables include the—

- WMD facility size and type.
- State of the WMD facility (destroyed, damaged, flawed, perfect condition).
- Nature and scope of exploitation, disposition, and monitoring and redirection requirements.
- Environment or level of uncertainty (hostile, uncertain).
- Time available.
- Technical experts and advisors available.
- Transportation assets available.

2-3. In many cases, the determination of the final disposition for sites cannot be established until after they have been secured by maneuver forces and evaluated by technical experts. Plans and orders may need to describe designated lines of authority for transitioning the site.

RISK MANAGEMENT

2-4. Risk management (RM) is integrated into the entire operations process. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staff use RM to identify and mitigate the risks associated with hazards that have the potential to injure or kill friendly and civilian personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. See ADRP 5-0 for more information on RM. The hazards associated with the CBRN materials and weapons associated with WMD necessitate thorough consideration during planning. An integrated risk assessment prepares the force for the complexities of the mission.

2-5. Before initiating tactical operations against suspected WMD sites, BCTs and technical enablers conduct a risk assessment that considers protection, downwind hazards, and other potential consequences combined with other aspects of the RM process. The analysis includes coordination with higher headquarters to understand the associated risks of the worst-case scenario. Technical analysis and guidance from the CBRN and EOD staff is needed to make risk decisions on protection of maneuver forces and CBRN forces when the potential for encountering a WMD site exists. Examples of risks to be considered during site assessments include the—

- Possibility of encountering agents or concentration levels that exceed the level of protection offered by individual protective equipment (IPE).
- Transfer of contamination outside of the facility.
- Location of the facility or site (underground).
- Effects and use of munitions.

MISSION ANALYSIS

2-6. Tasks associated with planned CWMD operations include site identification, selection, and assessment; the identification of security requirements; and considerations for the preservation and disposition of the site, personnel, materials, and equipment. The planning and coordination of forces and intelligence assets are intended to prevent the destruction, dispersion, transfer, and pilfering of materials, equipment, and personnel when a deliberate tactical CWMD mission is executed. Site identification and selection is a complex process that is better described in targeting, and is covered later in this chapter.

2-7. Deliberate tactical control activities include the following:

- Commanders in an operational area containing sensitive WMD sites organize TFs with the mission of seizing, securing, assessing, and exploiting the sites.
- Commanders ensure that assessments encompass the progress of ongoing operations, the changes in the situation, and the facets of how the operation is shaping the situation for direct or indirect support to a joint TF.
- Commanders balance the requirements of ongoing operations with the requirements to seize and secure sensitive WMD sites. The priorities of the commander are used to dictate the allocation of forces.

2-8. CWMD operations require a unique blend of capabilities within the force that is tailored to the specific target. Some of the considerations for properly tailoring a TF or team to conduct CWMD operations are—

- Mission command.
- CBRN detection, identification, and sampling.
- Decontamination.
- Security.
- EOD.
- Forcible entry.
- Interpreters.
- Biometrics.
- Forensics.
- Earthmoving and removal.
- Heavy lift capability.

- Sustainment.
- Information operations (IO).
- Transportation.
- Life support.
- Enhanced communications that enable reachback to technical experts.
- Special lighting.
- Power.

2-9. The vignette below depicts the actions taken by a BCT from receipt of the mission through the transfer of responsibility to another force or organization. The vignette is broken into parts to illustrate the pertinent information needed or produced by a BCT conducting CWMD operations.

CWMD Vignette

U.S. forces are participating in a United Nations campaign in response to clear and present danger of an aggressive and autocratic regime that has been developing nuclear and chemical WMD capabilities. A U.S. division has been tasked to prepare to conduct CWMD operations in support of the campaign.

The division assigns a combined arms brigade combat team (BCT) the mission to assess an identified WMD site located in the AOs to set conditions for advanced technical exploitation and elimination activities by follow-on forces. Division headquarters provides a target folder for the objective, which incorporates intelligence information from national-level sources and technical analysis from the division chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) cell. The folder is analyzed to determine the initial risk analysis and appropriate task organization for the battalion-level task force that will seize the objective.

The enemy force consists of remnant platoon-size elements located in the area of defense, with local security forces expected to defend the WMD site.

TASK ORGANIZATION

2-10. In a deliberate CWMD operation, the existence of the site and its general nature, extent, and purpose are known. Operations to control, defeat, disable, and/or dispose of suspected WMD objectives are deliberately planned by using forces that are task-organized for the mission. When requisite expertise in the planned mission does not exist in the organization, commanders submit a request for additional forces to their higher headquarters. Through task organization, commanders establish command or support relationships and allocate resources to weigh the decisive operation or main effort. Command and support relationships provide the basis for the unity of command and unity of effort in operations.

2-11. TF commanders should consider augmenting their staff with CWMD expertise. The TF may require the following cross-functional staff organizations to manage CWMD processes and tasks:

- **CWMD cell.** A CWMD cell can be formed to manage CWMD processes, capabilities, and tasks. This integration occurs more informally at the brigade level and below. The CWMD cell provides the commander with specialized, technical subject matter expertise to support CWMD operations. The CWMD cell collaborates with other staffs, warfighting function areas, enablers, and multinational partners as required to develop CWMD situational awareness and risk management and to support the planning, coordination, and synchronization of operations.
- **CWMD working group.** A CWMD working group is an enduring or ad hoc group focused on CWMD activities to provide analysis to the commander. The working group consists of a core functional group, such as CWMD or protection cell members, and other staff and component representatives as required. Through execution matrixes and running estimates, the working group maintains an assessment of the progress of the operation.

2-12. Unity of command and the collaboration of maneuver and technical staff efforts promote effective planning and the mission execution. When CBRN, EOD, and other exploitation enablers are available, they should be integrated into the operations process to advise the commander. A combined staff (with technical enablers incorporated into the intelligence, planning, and logistical efforts of the BCT staff) is an observed best practice in establishing rapid coordination and communication between all elements.

2-13. CWMD is not conducted solely by maneuver forces nor solely by CBRN forces. Enabling forces across the warfighting functions contribute to the success of the overall mission. Examples of the different enablers that contribute to CWMD include but are not limited to—

- CBRN forces.
- EOD personnel.
- Engineers.
- Military police.
- Logistics personnel.
- Health services support.
- Legal personnel.
- Civil affairs personnel.
- Multifunction teams (military intelligence [MI] exploitation specialists).
- Information-related capabilities (for example, combat camera and Public Affairs).

2-14. A CWMD TF may include joint and interagency elements assigned from theater resources. Additional support units provide the TF commander with advanced capabilities to deal with a wide variety of medium and large sites. Special operations forces (SOF), government agencies (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy), or external experts may be called on to assist the TF at sensitive WMD sites. A sample CWMD TF organized for the planned exploitation of a large WMD site is depicted in figure 2-1. The TF is built around an infantry battalion and includes sufficient combat assets to seize and secure a defended site. Specialized enablers are kept in reserve until needed.

CWMD Vignette (continued)

The BCT publishes a warning order to allow battalions to begin their planning process. One maneuver battalion is designated as a CWMD TF and is provided appropriate enablers. TF reconnaissance forces are given information collection priorities and begin reconnaissance activities. The BCT requests a hazardous response platoon to assist in an assessment of the objective site. An EOD element is assigned to provide support for expected explosive hazards. Identified enabler elements are requested to join the CWMD TF as soon as possible to allow them to participate in the military decisionmaking and rehearsal process. The warning order designates expected enabler elements as tactical control (TACON) to the CWMD TF. TACON is selected because the site is not expected to require prolonged activities.




Figure 2-1. Example task force organized for deliberate CWMD operations

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

2-15. The size, scope, and preplanned integration of CWMD operations determine the requirements for specific CWMD mission command functions. Small-scale or less complex CWMD operations may not require the formation of a separate mission command structure. Assigned CBRN assets should be prepared to conduct an initial assessment of emerging or unplanned WMD targets. For a large-scale or more complex effort, CWMD operations may require the formation of a TF.

2-16. Commanders must clearly define command and support relationships for enablers. This is especially important in TF operations that have attached enablers from different commands. Many enablers require specialized resources, supplies, and maintenance that must be planned for as the TF is assembled. The enablers do not come with basic, organic logistics support and depend on the supported command.

2-17. During the planning process, it is important to discuss the authority to act on the WMD site. Commanders may give senior enablers who are on site the authority to direct actions that ensure the safety of operations, regardless of their actual position. For example, the officer or noncommissioned officer in charge of the technical enablers may not be in command of the operation, but they may be given the authority to make decisions that affect the safety of the mission and personnel involved.

2-18. Clear articulation of relationships and responsibilities encourage common understanding and communication. Traditional command and support relationships (operational control, TACON, general support) are described in table 2-1, page 2-6.

2-19. Enabling forces and units support land-based CWMD operations with integrated staff, platoon- to brigade-level organizations, and specialized detachments. Staff, elements, and support personnel typically exist at all levels of command to advise the commander on the integration and synchronization of forces required for CWMD operations.

Table 2-1. Command and support relationships for enablers

If the command relationship is—	Then inherent responsibilities:							
	Have command relationship with—	May be task-organized by—	Unless modified, ADCON responsibility goes through—	Are assigned position or AO by—	Provide liaison to—	Establish/maintain communications with—	Have priorities established by—	Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship of—
OPCON	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
TACON	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	TACON;GS GSR; R; DS
If the support relationship is—	Then inherent responsibilities:							
	Have command relationship with—	May be task-organized by—	Receives sustainment from—	Are assigned position or an AO by—	Provide liaison to—	Establish/maintain communications with—	Have priorities established by—	Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship by—
Direct support	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Supported unit	Parent unit; supported unit	Supported unit	See note
General support	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not applicable
Note. Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.								
Legend:								
ADCON	administrative control			HQ	headquarters			
AO	area of operations			OPCON	operational control			
DS	direct support			R	reinforcing			
GS	general support			TACON	tactical control			
GSR	general support-reinforcing							

Note. More information about command and support relationships can be found in ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0.

2-20. In the case of a domestic WMD incident, the DOD should determine which specialized local, state, or national assets can respond to the incident. Additionally, the DOD and Department of State (DOS) reach out to international partners for specialized assistance, as needed. Units that are assigned missions in domestic CBRN response efforts under defense support to civil authorities must understand their roles and relationships in that support. Commanders must distinguish between military and civilian operational authorities. Commanders of those units that are assigned missions in response efforts follow their military chain of command, but they understand that the mission is controlled by civil authorities. See ADRP 3-28 for more information on defense support of civil authorities.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

2-21. The staff collectively determines how, where, and to what extent the OE (with a focus on threats and the terrain and weather) affects friendly mobility. CWMD planning must assess enemy WMD capabilities. These capabilities are based on threat patterns; threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); time; and available resources (manpower, equipment, and materials). Additionally, the effects of terrain, weather and

equipment performance must be considered. Intelligence, MP, CBRN, health service support, and civil affairs staff elements provide assessments of the possible effects of WMD on the population. This assessment allows for greater understanding of the environment. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) facilitates protection and information collection planning, which allows the staff to refine vulnerability assessments of friendly and threat capabilities. TF CBRN personnel can assist maneuver and intelligence personnel with the analysis of information pertaining to WMD.

2-22. During the IPB process, the staff assesses facilities that are capable of dual use to produce CBRN materials that could be employed as WMD or to create intentional or accidental hazard areas. Commercial chemical manufacturing facilities, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, and nuclear power plants are potential nontraditional sources for CBRN hazards.

2-23. Planning considerations for intelligence must include assessing the need for all-source intelligence and collection management capabilities. The all-source intelligence capability is required to manage technical intelligence and information requirements; fuse information from intelligence agencies, escort teams, and EOD; and synchronize efforts from the all-source intelligence community supporting CWMD. The collection management section requests resources and integrates intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in support of the CWMD mission.

2-24. Additional considerations include information on geography, supplies, services, and transportation. When coupled with input from CBRN and EOD enablers, this analysis adds a CBRN threat and hazard supplement to the IPB assessment. When combined with the common map background within mission command/mission command systems, the resulting information forms the CWMD portion of the common operational picture.

2-25. An accurate CWMD picture facilitates decision making. CBRN staff and enablers continuously update the CWMD portion of the real-time modified combined obstacle overlay based on changes in the situation (mission variables). Additionally, new information resulting from information collection (such as WMD network, site, threat, and hazard information), requests for information, geospatial engineering (geospatial information and data generation), and staff analysis refines the modified combined obstacle overlay. The obstacle framework serves as an aid in considering possible impediments to successful CWMD operations and in organizing the results of this analysis within running estimates and staff updates or presentations.

2-26. CWMD operations typically occur in full view of a global audience. Thus, the IPB must account for and analyze the informational environment in terms of its impact on CWMD and the effect that CWMD has on the information environment. To be effective, CWMD requires support from a range of actors. Understanding these audiences and the ways in which they can be influenced to support desired outcomes is an essential component of this analysis. The information systems management officer (BCT and above) or designated representative leads this effort.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-27. BCTs conduct information collection through reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, and security tasks focused on information requirements to bridge information gaps. Gaps identified during IPB are developed into information requirements and mitigated through continuous reconnaissance. Actionable information supports planning for deliberate (planned) and hasty (targets of opportunity) operations against WMD sites.

2-28. During the planning and execution of information collection, the TF may have access to collection assets and information at a variety of levels. The following paragraphs discuss some of these assets and available information.

2-29. National- and theater-level collection assets provide updates to tactical forces before and during deployment. Theater-level shaping operations require actionable information, including adversary centers of gravity and decision points and the prediction of adversary antiaccess measures. Space-based resources are important to support situational awareness during deployment and entry phases to—

- Monitor protection indicators.
- Provide warning of ballistic missile launches threatening aerial and seaports of debarkation and other threats to arriving forces.

- Provide the communications links to forces en route.
- Provide meteorological information that could affect operations.

2-30. Operational-level intelligence assets operate from a regional focus center. This regional focus center (located in the crisis area) provides primary analytical overwatch for alerted tactical maneuver elements. The theater Army MI brigade provides overwatch and functions as a command post and a research node. The MI brigade intelligence staff must completely understand the deploying tactical force commander's intent. The MI brigade must understand the deploying forces situation and the status of the current mission. In addition, the MI brigade requires access to relevant data and knowledge regarding the planning at higher headquarters and national levels.

2-31. CWMD is integrated into information collection planning and running estimates. During IPB, the staff collectively identifies information gaps, to include gaps addressing CWMD. These gaps are developed into information requirements. The senior CBRN staff officer is responsible for integrating those requirements within the information collection plan. This includes ensuring that the battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2)/assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) and battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3)/assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) are provided with the necessary information on CBRN, engineer, military police, and other available specialized reconnaissance capabilities for consideration on how best to employ them. Because they are often in close contact with the local population, military police, civil affairs, and other applicable elements are incorporated into the information collection plan enabling the obtainment of civil information. This information can apprise commanders on the effects of the conduct of CWMD operations in respect to the population.

2-32. Site assessment feeds information collection and, in turn, may create the demand for more information requirements. CBRN reconnaissance assets have increased capabilities to meet the information requirement demands. Sensible use and integration with available resources maximizes information collection abilities. CBRN reconnaissance teams task-organized with the BCT can be used to provide initial assessments to determine a need for further exploitation or make to immediate mission recommendations. See FM 3-55 for more information on information collection.

EXPLOITATION AND FORENSICS

2-33. *Site exploitation* is the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law (ATP 3-90.15). Forces attempt to identify WMD nodes or actors through actions undertaken in site exploitation. Site exploitation takes advantage of forensic standards when detecting, collecting, processing, and analyzing material. There is an increase in the time and resources required going from site assessment to site characterization to site exploitation. Each of these tasks is explained below and their relationship shown in figure 2-2. Understanding the following tasks helps define the responsibilities of enablers during CWMD operations:

- **Site assessment.** A site assessment detects WMDs and related materials, delivery systems, and technologies. A site assessment requires less time and resources.
- **Site characterization.** Site characterization is a complete description and inventory of personnel, equipment, material, and information discovered during exploitation. It is an in-depth process of the site and requires more time.
- **Site exploitation.** Site exploitation is a time-, resource-, and capability-intensive task. It is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or material found while conducting of operations. It requires additional enablers that are not organic to the unit to exploit data, information, and materials obtained during the operation.




Figure 2-2. Relationship of tasks to time and resource requirements

2-34. Forensic science covers a broad range of disciplines that have their own unique practices. Many of these disciplines are laboratory-based and depend on the skills and analytical expertise of scientists and engineers. Others are more subjective and rely on expert interpretation of observations. The objective of the exploitation of strategic targets is to ultimately assign attribution.

2-35. The chemical attribution signature is a unique signature of specific chemicals that can be produced by analytical instruments, such as spectrometers. Taggants are nonreactive substances added to an explosive that may be traced back to the manufacturer and may assist in attribution. Currently, there is an increased use of improvised explosives using energetic material not produced commercially. This has resulted in a clear need for chemical attribution signatures to aid in the attribution of new and ever-changing improvised explosives. Identifying chemical attribution signature compounds is imperative in associating with the threat agent.

2-36. Units involved in CWMD operations plan how to seize and dispose of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, and other items collected during the mission. Site assessment and exploitation teams require detailed instructions for handling dangerous items or materials.

Note. More information about site exploitation and forensics can be found in ATP 3-90.15.

TARGETING

2-37. *Targeting* is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The targeting process is used to identify, target, and exploit sensitive sites. It is analogous to, and can be embedded in, the process used by a fires cell in planning, preparing, and executing other time-sensitive or high-payoff targets.

DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, AND ASSESS

2-38. Decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting methodology facilitates the attack of the correct target at the correct time with the most appropriate asset. D3A consists of four functions:

- **Decide which targets to engage.** This step provides the overall focus and sets priorities and criteria for intelligence collection and engagement planning.
- **Detect the targets.** The operations officer at all levels is responsible for directing the effort to detect high-payoff targets identified in the decide function.
- **Deliver the appropriate effects (conduct the operation).** The deliver function of the targeting process executes the target engagement guidance and supports the commander's battle plan once the high-payoff target has been located and identified.
- **Assess the effects of the engagement(s).** Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progress of operations and compare them to the initial vision and intent.

2-39. Commanders and their staff must carefully weigh the desired effects to be achieved by employing organic or supporting fires during WMD operations. The creation of secondary hazards or collateral damage through offensive or defensive fires could limit future courses of action, and require staff to generate detailed branches or sequels. When feasible, emphasis should be placed on the use of nondestructive means for planned targets and targets of opportunity.

PREPLANNED TARGETS

2-40. The comprehensive intelligence and analysis of potential WMD sites should be collaboratively developed across the command and disseminated as part of the IPB. Units require listings of known and suspected WMD sites in their operational area to incorporate into their IPB. Information on suspected WMD sites should be requested and developed well in advance of anticipated operations. Extensive coordination may be necessary to obtain the information. The location and nature of sensitive sites inform the commander of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

2-41. Planning should provide a target or site list prioritization method for determining which WMD sites on the master list should be exploited. This planning should be part of the normal targeting process to ensure that staff members are aware of the plan and to use resources from the other elements of the targeting process.

2-42. When planning targets for CWMD operations—

- Targets must be prioritized based on predetermined factors; however, the prioritization must remain flexible to allow for ad hoc site exploitation.
- Targets must be injected into the unit targeting process early. This allows members of the effects coordination cell to allocate resources and allows subordinate units ample time to plan.
- Written orders must be specific about sensitive site assessment and sensitive site exploitation task accomplishment and unit requirements for supporting the effort.
- Priority intelligence requirements must be defined for each sensitive site.
- IPB must continue on the target as the date of execution nears. Detailed target folders must be delivered to the team well in advance of conducting the exploitation.
- Detailed coordination must be complete before executing the exploitation.
- Detailed feedback about the exploitation must be briefed after its completion. This determines if the target must be exploited further or if the mission is complete.

2-43. Units conduct planned target assessments as part of the IPB, and they prepare target folders for each site assessed. A target folder is a hard copy or electronic folder that contains target intelligence-related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. Target folders are used to war-game and determine how a unit would respond if a WMD-related incident occurred, and prepare tentative WMD vulnerability reduction measures and response plans.

2-44. The initial target folder development for WMD sites often takes place at the operational level, and planners should ensure dissemination to units that are preparing for WMD site seizure and secure missions. The target folder includes identified or potential collateral damage concerns or collateral effects associated with the target. Staff should continually update target folders as data is collected to reflect the most recent information regarding target status. An example of target folder contents can be found in appendix C.

TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

2-45. Units should have contingency plans or standing operating procedures in place to provide subordinate elements with guidance if a WMD site is discovered. A thorough review of suspected sites in a units area of responsibility and the identification of sites within the current scheme of maneuver for an operation prepare commanders and units for possible CWMD operations.

2-46. When WMD sites are discovered, commanders must ensure that friendly forces and noncombatants are protected and simultaneously plan for isolation. Concurrently, commanders conduct IO to inform and influence relevant audiences to maximize protection, ensure essential collaboration and support, or deter unwanted behaviors. The discovery of a WMD site is of immediate interest to the chain of command. The discovering unit should secure the site as soon as it is tactically feasible and provide an immediate report with as much detail as possible.

2-47. The commander and staff begin preparations in anticipation of orders to isolate and/or seize the site in question. The discovering commander or unit leader balances the need for detail and speed against the risk involved in obtaining detailed site information. The following actions should be taken:

- Immediately report the discovery of potential sensitive sites.
- Isolate and secure sensitive sites as soon as tactically feasible and control them until relieved of the responsibility by higher headquarters.
- Balance mission accomplishment with personnel protection.

2-48. Concurrently, units that discover the site conduct careful mission analysis to assist the commander in assessing the risk to the unit, mission, and noncombatants. Increased risk occurs when the site is secure and not exploited. In addition to the threats posed by site contents, the site may be highly contaminated, booby-trapped, mined, severely damaged, or protected by explosive devices. The site may also contain unexploded ordnance or improvised explosive devices. The enemy might try to destroy the site to prevent its capture.

2-49. Commanders must—

- Establish tight access controls at sensitive sites.
- Coordinate with enablers to establish the correct sequence of actions for site exploitation.
- Mitigate risks to the force after the site is secure.
- Take every necessary precaution.
- Use trained and equipped experts for site exploitation.
- Provide feasible support to the sensitive site exploitation team.
- Secure and safeguard captured personnel, material, documents, and electronic data for exploitation.
- Maintain control of the site until the mission is complete.
- Implement IOs and Public Affairs contingency plans.

2-50. Based on reports from an opportunity site, planners begin to develop targeting information and plan the necessary coordination to transfer responsibility for the target. Planners consider the tactical situation and ensure that adequate security elements are available. The vignette on page 2-12 explains actions on a target of opportunity.

Target of Opportunity Vignette

The Cavalry Squadron conducts zone reconnaissance from Phase Line Zebra to Phase Line Tiger in the BCT AO to identify enemy forces and defensive positions. The squadron maneuvers all three troops abreast with squadron controlling the crossing of phase lines. A CBRN R&S platoon (heavy) with nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicles (NBCRVs) is attached to the cavalry squadron to provide CBRN reconnaissance during the movement. In addition, the squadron elements are utilizing their assigned CBRN detection equipment during their movement.

On crossing PL Yak, Bravo Troop identifies an abandoned factory. Bravo Troop sends a size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report to the squadron tactical command post and receives orders to establish an outer cordon to isolate the factory. The CBRN R&S platoon detects a chemical signature consistent with a nerve agent emanating from one of the factory warehouses. No personnel are in sight.

The squadron headquarters sends their CBRN 4 report from the CBRN R&S platoon to the BCT. The BCT orders the squadron to establish a perimeter and continue observation while the BCT's CBRN R&S platoon (light) is moved forward to assist in assessing this emerging WMD objective. Squadron personnel brief the CBRN R&S platoon on their observation from the factory. The squadron headquarters orders Alpha Troop to clear and seize the factory. Alpha Troop dons protective gear and thoroughly clears the factory to ensure that there is no enemy present. Forward security elements report seeing a suspected cache of 122-mm rockets in the suspect warehouse.

Alpha Troop marks the area, completes clearing the site, and withdraws to positions that allow it to secure the area in question while the R&S platoon conducts an assessment. Alpha Troop conducts a handover with the R&S platoon leader to share information specific to the site (sketch, pictures, and hazards).

The CBRN R&S platoon is tasked with locating and confirming or denying the presence of hazardous materials at the site. They confirm a cache of 122-mm rockets and note that some of them are leaking a suspicious liquid. Field confirmatory results indicate that the liquid is Sarin. An assessment report is sent to higher headquarters. The BCT continues to provide security while technical support is requested to further exploit the site.

2-51. A particularly dangerous period of time occurs when the enemy abandons a sensitive site and friendly forces are not in the position to secure it. Noncombatants may enter the site for various reasons. In doing so, they may expose themselves to great risk, endangering the population and friendly forces near the site. (For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, local civilians looted barrels of radioactive material from the Iraqi Tuwaitha nuclear processing facility.) Commanders must also understand that the site assessed may be tied to a larger network.

Note. More information about targeting can be found in ATP 3-60.

ATTACKING THE NETWORK

2-52. When engaging human networks, staff must be able to utilize deliberate and dynamic targeting to meet the conditions of the OE. Attack the network (AtN) activities enhance the targeting process by providing options to analyze the available information and provide the commander with greater situational and target awareness for making decisions on who and how to target a node or network.

2-53. The AtN framework consists of activities that employ lethal and nonlethal means to support friendly networks, influence neutral networks, and neutralize threat networks. AtN is conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) throughout unified action partner organizations. The operational approach for AtN includes three LOEs:

- Support friendly networks as the priority effort.
- Influence neutral networks as a supporting effort.
- Neutralize threat networks as a supporting effort.

2-54. These LOEs are mutually supporting and work concurrently. No single LOE can effectively develop efficiently functioning friendly networks without the support of the local population and the neutralization of threat networks.

2-55. Interacting with and engaging networks requires the use of lethal and nonlethal means to support, influence, or neutralize network members, cells, or an entire network. As part of this effort, commanders select, prioritize, and match effective means of interacting with friendly networks, influencing the neutral network, and neutralizing threat networks. Commanders and staff utilize the targeting process to identify targets, determine the desired effects on those targets, predict secondary and tertiary effects, and plan lethal and nonlethal effects. This process enables the prosecution of targets to capitalize on and exploit targets of opportunity.

2-56. The staff uses IPB products to determine friendly, neutral, and threat actors and supporting networks present in the OE. The resulting intelligence products are used throughout targeting. The staff also determines those actors and network activities outside of the AO that may have important links to the networks within the OE. During the military decisionmaking process, commanders and staff integrate the information from IPB and other methods to comprehensively understand the OE to determine the best approach for supporting, influencing, and neutralizing networks within the OE.

2-57. Understanding the common nodes existing in a WMD network aids the D3A targeting methodology. Components of a conceptual WMD network are depicted in figure 2-3, page 2-14. The following nodes are typical of those found in a WMD network:

- **Mission command.** These functions or activities provide motivation and the means to control activities of the WMD program. This includes actions to provide strategic direction, coordinate the activities of other networks, facilitate the flow of information and resources throughout the networks, and provide the motivation to acquire WMD. This function may be state-directed or may reflect ideological, financial, business, or other concerns, which can motivate WMD proliferation or the acquisition of a WMD capability.
- **Finance.** Finance activities secure and transfer the funding for all aspects of a WMD program. These activities may include brokers, intermediaries, financial institutions, banking systems, and charities.
- **Scientific and technical expertise.** These functions or activities provide the knowledge and expertise necessary to produce WMD and related infrastructure (for example, designing, producing, machining, testing, and storing). This function harnesses information and expertise from scientists, researchers, engineers, and technicians to support capability development.
- **Logistics.** These functions or activities acquire, produce, and transport the raw material, people, production material, and finished products. This function acquires missing components or technology; trains and recruits needed expertise, as required; and may support the theft of WMD technology, components, or functional weapons. This facet includes a significant portion of the network, including shipping companies, producers, and import/export companies.
- **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** These activities acquire detailed target data and determine potential sources of WMD components, technology, and expertise to protect the program.
- **Weapon delivery.** These activities deliver the WMD to the target and initiate its firing. These activities can be conventional weapons systems or unconventional delivery methods, such as a backpack sprayers or crop dusters.




Figure 2-3. Conceptual WMD network

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TASKINGS IN SUPPORT OF CWMD

2-58. A major factor in the success of CWMD operations in hostile and uncertain environments lies in the ability of a maneuver unit to first form the nucleus of a CWMD TF and then plan and execute the seizure and security of a designated WMD site. Maneuver forces may encounter complex, sensitive sites where it is tactically imprudent to secure and clear an area without expert assistance.

2-59. The BCT provides the overall mission command and resources required to prosecute multiple WMD objectives in hostile and uncertain environments. If the sensitive site contains WMD, the role of tactical-level units in exploitation often centers on seizing, securing, and preserving the integrity of the site pending the arrival of a subject matter expert (SME) who is trained and equipped to technically exploit it.

2-60. BCT and battalion CBRN staff officers advise maneuver commanders on CWMD operations. The CBRN staff officers provide information on tactical capabilities, limitations, and the proper employment of CBRN enablers. They also provide expertise on CBRN threats and hazards during the RM process, consider how CWMD affects relevant audiences, and advise the commander on ways to influence behaviors in the AO to align with the commander's intent. CBRN staff officers can reach out to the division CBRN cell for advanced analysis and additional capabilities when needed.

2-61. Enablers are integrated into maneuver BCTs at echelon to form CWMD TFs tailored to specific mission requirements. The task organization for each CWMD TF is determined by the commander and based on mission analysis and enabler availability. Some low-density enabler elements may be kept in reserve until the maneuver commander determines the technical requirements needed for further action.

2-62. A tactical unit may be tasked to assess and exploit a sensitive site with inherent capabilities in a preplanned or targets-of-opportunity scenario. Assigned CBRN reconnaissance personnel are trained and equipped to analyze and mitigate incidents involving highly toxic materials. CBRN staff officers can assist with mission command of hazardous incidents.

2-63. The TF (maneuver) commander oversees the initial assessment of the site and provides mission command, security, communications, and logistical support for exploitation and other elimination activities. The TF commander is responsible for mission execution and success until relieved by a follow-on force.

2-64. BCTs can conduct CWMD operations during and through any of the tasks of decisive action and throughout the range of military operations. Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support CWMD operations. Some specific tasks or missions that the BCT may conduct are explained in the following sections.

RECONNAISSANCE

2-65. *Reconnaissance* is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Maneuver forces use various forms of reconnaissance during CWMD operations:

- **Zone reconnaissance.** Zone reconnaissance allows intelligence development on threat, terrain, infrastructure, and society within specified zones of operation.
- **Area reconnaissance.** Area reconnaissance focuses reconnaissance efforts within a smaller geographic area than zone reconnaissance but requires collecting the same information as zone reconnaissance.
- **Route reconnaissance.** Route reconnaissance is a directed operation to obtain detailed information of a specific route and of influencing terrain along the route.
- **Special reconnaissance.** Special reconnaissance is an operation conducted by SOF in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance and employ capabilities and assets not normally available to conventional forces.

2-66. These forms of reconnaissance contribute to CWMD operations when finding a WMD site during normal reconnaissance tasks and lead to detailed reconnaissance to learn more about an identified site. The data gained from this reconnaissance, combined with other potential intelligence feeds, contribute to the ongoing assessment of the site.

2-67. Reconnaissance elements must be cautious and look for external indicators that a site may contain WMD. The introduction of kinetics increases the risk for the release of chemicals present for potential explosions.

AREA SECURITY

2-68. *Area security* is a security task conducted to protect friendly forces, installation routes, and actions within a specified area (ADRP 3-90). Area security degrades the ability of the enemy to affect friendly actions in a specific area by denying the enemy the opportunity to use an area for its own purposes. BCTs conduct area security to establish security around base camps, critical infrastructure, airfields, facilities, main supply routes, lines of communication, terrain features, towns, equipment, and high-value assets. In the case of CWMD operations, area security is conducted to secure the WMD site, prevent unauthorized access, and protect personnel on site. Offense, defense, and stability tasks support area security. See FM 3-98 for more information on area security.

CORDON AND SEARCH

2-69. *Cordon and search* is a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a target area and searching suspected locations within a target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband (FM 3-90-1). It is frequently applied during stability tasks for a variety of reasons, to include capturing personnel, locating weapon caches, gathering combat information and intelligence, and securing key facilities and terrain. Most cordon and search missions are executed at battalion level and below. Refer to ATP 3-06.20/MCRP 3-30.5[MCRP 3-31.4B]/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP 3-2.62 for more information. The cordon and search task may be applied to CWMD operations that are either planned or targets of opportunity. For planned targets, the cordon and search force is augmented with appropriate enablers. For targets of opportunity, a maneuver unit comes upon a WMD site and must secure it while awaiting specialized forces.

2-70. Unique characteristics of WMD sites require specific preparation for the maneuver forces that seize and secure them. Because of potential hazard release, minimizing kinetic activity while enabling force protection and threat elimination is an important consideration. A tactical call-out should be the first option planned in an attempt to get to personnel on the objective to cooperate. Soldiers must be prepared to observe and report initial observations from the objective to enable rapid decision making for further actions and resource allocation. There should be detailed planning and rehearsals for the integration of enablers who conduct specialized assessment and exploitation tasks.

TROOP MOVEMENT

2-71. Battlefield agility depends on the capability to rapidly move troops to concentrate combat power at decisive points. During CWMD operations, troop movement may be impeded by contamination on the battlefield. Some examples of additional planning considerations for troop movements during CWMD operations include—

- Alternate routes.
- CBRN reconnaissance assets.
- Unit detection equipment.
- CBRN IPE.
- Logistics movement.

PASSAGE OF LINES

2-72. Depending on the scale and scope of the CWMD campaign, CWMD TF elements may move through U.S., host-nation, or allied battle space to conduct CWMD operations. A primary combatant force may have established a perimeter or occupied the objective. In such cases, coordination is essential for movement to the objective, battle handover, and passage of lines to set conditions for the CWMD TF to seize and secure the objective. In the case of multinational operations, liaison considerations are critical to overcome potential language, standard operating procedure, and communication challenges.

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT, THREATS, AND VULNERABILITIES

2-73. Understanding the environment, threats, and vulnerabilities is the first activity of the CWMD construct. The BCT commander and staff must develop an understanding through the analysis of the operational and information environments, including operational and mission variables within a particular region. This understanding is developed and maintained through a continuous process of describing and evaluating the actors, audiences, threats, and materials that can affect the AO. To accomplish this, maneuver forces and their staff conduct IPB, information collection, targeting, and threat assessments, as shown in the vignette below.

Vignette

The brigade staff works continuously to refine the information requirements against the information collected by the reconnaissance force. Fires planning includes the designation of indirect and direct fire control measures to provide forward elements with the means to engage enemy forces while minimizing the chance for kinetic effects on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities. The task force reconnaissance forces are focused on identified WMD objectives to determine the levels of activity, personnel, and movement patterns. The reconnaissance forces report real time information to the CWMD task force. The reconnaissance force reports observing a large industrial facility with individuals wearing protective garments coming and going.

LOCATE AND IDENTIFY

2-74. Actionable information supports the commander, TF, and staff in planning missions and in response to targets of opportunity. During planning, collection resources are identified and tasked to meet CCIRs in support of the operation. Gaining knowledge of the threat capabilities and intentions may significantly alter operational plans.

2-75. The joint force commander (JFC) uses SOF and intelligence collection assets to locate WMD-associated system nodes and program elements, to include production facilities, storage/stockpile sites, and key program personnel. Developing robust, information-sharing relationships with unified action partners, particularly related to identity data, is an essential component to this activity.

2-76. At the tactical level, BCTs conduct continuous reconnaissance and security tasks within their AO. Commanders conduct reconnaissance and security tasks to protect the force and to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The commander sets reconnaissance priorities early because reconnaissance tasks precede the main body movement, minimizing the time available for troop-leading procedures for the reconnaissance force (including planning and rehearsal times, pre-combat checks, inspections, and maintenance). The commander sets priorities in the warning order, establishing the focus, tempo, engagement/disengagement criteria, and displacement criteria as shown in the vignette on page 2-16. Missions without focus degrade the collection capabilities of the reconnaissance force. The improper utilization of assets can leave an enemy vulnerability or a catastrophic threat undiscovered.

2-77. Once a WMD-related element or capability is located, the intelligence staff coordinates with interorganizational experts to scope, categorize, and prioritize the posed threat. Confirmation of a threat leads to increased communication between the brigade and higher headquarters. An enhanced spectrum of resources are available to the brigade for further analysis to characterize and then assess specific elements of the program more effectively. During conflict, the initial identification of CBRN materials is likely performed by conventional forces. Prior to execution, conventional forces should be made aware of the types of facilities, material, and munitions they may encounter so that personnel protective equipment, security, and reporting are properly addressed.

2-78. Tactical-level organizations must ensure that adequate training is received on the identification of WMD materials before beginning reconnaissance and security tasks. Personnel should have a basic understanding of indicators that show when WMD may be present, the identification of WMD facilities, and WMD equipment and materials. One method of training is to develop flash cards similar to those used for identifying aircraft or vehicles. Knowing what to look for increases the probability of discovering and identifying suspected materials. Soldiers need to understand their role as primary sensors during the securing of an objective. Conscious observations and reporting facilitates rapid assessment and command decision making.

2-79. On seizure of the objective, the commander coordinates the initial assessment, which is based on technical and nontechnical inputs. These can include Soldier observations, tactical questioning of personnel located on or near the objective, CBRN and high-yield explosive technical observations, sampling, and tactical site exploitation. This information should be gathered for initial analysis and prioritized for reporting or evacuation for further analysis. Enablers support this initial analysis.

URBAN OPERATIONS

2-80. Operations in urban environments provide unique challenges for any mission, including CWMD. The density of man-made structures makes predictions of hazard areas difficult, and the density of people can create chaos in a mass casualty situation or when a CBRN incident or accident occurs. Several of the fundamentals of urban operations applicable to CWMD that commanders and their staff must understand include—

- Minimizing collateral damage.
- Preserving critical infrastructure.
- Controlling transition.
- Restoring essential services.

2-81. Urban environments pose unique challenges due to the subterranean conditions that exist (sewers, tunnels, subways). EOD and CBRN enablers have the capability to test air quality and detect CBRN hazards in any environment, to include subterranean and oxygen-deficient environments.

COOPERATE WITH AND SUPPORT PARTNERS

2-82. Cooperation with and support of domestic and foreign security partners enhances collective, regional, and national capabilities to receive timely indicators and warnings, track material of concern, secure WMD materials and stockpiles, respond to and defeat WMD threats, and manage the consequences of attack. These efforts and capabilities promote common threat awareness, countering WMD self-sufficiency, military interoperability, military and civilian preparedness, and WMD risk reduction. Commanders must maintain and improve existing relationships with partners and seek out new partnerships. Commanders and staff may also be required to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations, which can provide enhanced capabilities and capacities. Military activities must be closely integrated with supporting interagency efforts.

2-83. Maneuver commanders provide support to the geographic combatant commander cooperation and partner activities to pursue CWMD objectives. The cooperation and partner activities mission is a collection of interrelated day-to-day activities that deny, dissuade, and prevent potential adversaries from obtaining or proliferating WMD.

2-84. The following are examples of typical operations in support of CWMD activity (cooperate with and support partners):

- **Security cooperation.** Security cooperation programs and initiatives are intended to improve defense relationships and increase regional capabilities for collective WMD defense. This includes efforts to cooperate and partner with actors that have mutual interests to support international norms related to WMD possession, proliferation, or use. Maneuver force participation in combined exercises and training and nation assistance efforts (to include security assistance and foreign internal defense) improve partnering and cooperation on treaty monitoring, collective enforcement of sanctions, enforcement of arms control, and disarmament activities.
- **Unified action.** The presence of international members increases the legitimacy of countering WMD efforts and fosters greater cooperation in areas such as site and team security, site assessment, detection, decontamination, transportation, medical care, laboratory support, language support, and intelligence.
- **Civil-military operations.** The maneuver commander should cooperate with the local population. The local populace can assist in determining the location and function of WMD facilities, identification and location of key personnel employed at WMD or dual-use sites, identification of local environmental hazards, and identification and location of individuals who are not part of the populace. They can also assist in identifying potential WMD sites.
- **Communications synchronization.** Establishing productive relationships with partners, the local populace, and media organizations is an inherent element of the commander's efforts to inform and influence personnel inside and outside of their organization. Advised by Public Affairs and IO officers, commanders should cooperate with relevant counterparts to align, synchronize, and communicate themes, messages, images, and actions. Commanders use their staff to work with partners to quickly and effectively communicate risk and response information to the public to create a favorable OE and avoid confusion and hysteria.

Chapter 3

Control Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

This chapter expounds on the first aspect (control) of activity 3 of the CWMD construct. Special care must be taken during planning and execution because many tactical tasks familiar to maneuver commanders are used with a different technique when conducting CWMD planning. This especially applies when integrating CBRN enabler forces. *Control* is a tactical mission task which requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations (FM 3-90-1). Planning for CWMD operations may require synchronization with select CBRN-trained personnel and supporting elements to meet the mission to divert, intercept, seize, delay, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy an adverse WMD program. Listed below are the control tasks that tactical forces can be expected to execute.

ISOLATE

3-1. *Isolate* is a tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces (FM 3-90-1). This task includes conducting analyses of critical factors of WMD programs to identify capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. Isolating and denying access to critical WMD program components prevent actors of concern from furthering WMD acquisition, development, proliferation, or utilization. Isolation tasks may require the coordination of conventional forces and interagency and international partners, to include law enforcement and specialized technical capabilities.

3-2. At the tactical level, isolation activities are actions designed to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, equipment, munitions, or personnel from a particular site, often in advance of seize and secure activities. When preventing proliferation is the key task, the achievement of site isolation may be the decisive point. Isolation of WMD critical components may be necessary for follow-on CWMD activities and tasks.

DIVERT

3-3. A *diversion* is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). For the purpose of the CWMD construct, this task involves efforts and resources to change the intended course or destination of shipments of WMD-related technologies, materials, expertise, and/or means of delivery willingly or by force. The JFC may use a combination of operations to accomplish this task. In some cases, this may not require direct action, but rather a show of force, the demonstration of a U.S. presence, or a formal communication from the U.S. Government to render the desired effect. For example, diversion may result from strategic activities such as a focused cyberspace attack, maritime interception operations (visit, board, search, and seizure), or formal diplomatic actions (demarche).

INTERCEPT

3-4. Conventional forces and SOF capabilities may be necessary to stop the movement of CBRN materials, WMD components and means of delivery, WMD-related personnel, or functional weapons into or out of specified areas or nations. Such actions may require boarding vessels and using search and detection capabilities to secure and seize shipments. Intercept actions involve interagency or multinational partners. A

tactical example might include a BCT setting up checkpoints to limit the movement of personnel and materials outside of a designated area.

SEIZE

3-5. *Seize* is a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force (FM 3-90-1). This task involves taking possession of WMD capabilities (such as a designated areas, buildings, transports, materials, or personnel) to deny an actor of concern access to WMD capabilities.

3-6. Seizing WMD sites often entails cordon and search operations. Important tactical considerations for seizing known WMD sites include—

- Collateral damage estimates.
- Fire control measures.
- A potential accidental hazard release.
- A scaled use of force.

3-7. Tactical callout should be used first to attempt to co-opt personnel in and around the site. Ongoing messaging to the populace in the vicinity of the site should continue to ensure that there is no interference from them. Planning seizure activities can minimize possible populace exposure to contaminants and to friendly forces in the area.

3-8. A protective mindset is essential for tactical formations operating in an environment where CBRN threats and hazards may be present. Hazard awareness and understanding are CBRN passive defense measures that enable forces to comprehend the character, nature, and subtleties of CBRN hazards and their impact on the operating environment, the mission, and forces. Soldiers conducting CWMD operations must be trained to recognize the indicators and evidence of CBRN hazards.

3-9. Soldiers need to understand their role as primary sensors when securing the objective and the importance of preserving the site. Timely and accurate observation and reporting facilitates rapid assessment and command decision making.

3-10. Seizing differs from securing because it requires offensive action to obtain control of the designated area or objective. Once a force seizes a WMD-related objective, it secures the objective and prepares it for potential follow-on actions, such as exploitation and destruction.

SECURE

3-11. *Secure* is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action (FM 3-90-1). Preventing unauthorized access to sites or the removal of WMD-related technologies, materials, or personnel may be necessary to prevent the use, proliferation, looting, or compromised integrity of physical evidence. A component of the secure task is conducting the assessment and characterization of maneuver and CBRN elements. Reporting to higher headquarters to support decision making for actions and forces is required to conduct exploitation and other advanced technical activities.

3-12. The requirement to secure sites is a crucial mission analysis consideration because of the potentially large force requirements and the balance of competing JFC priorities. WMD master site lists prioritize WMD-related sites that must be deconflicted and integrated with other objectives. Planning considerations include—

- Forces capable of securing the suspected WMD site, including security, within zoned areas of operations.
- Forces capable of the assessment, characterization, and handling of personnel on site based on the mission analysis.
- Barriers, such as concertina wire, for blocking roads and filling gaps in site security that are not covered.
- Control of the local population (who may be loyal to workers or rogue groups operating on site).

- The prevention of looting or the destruction of WMD materials and computers by site occupants.
- Contingency plans for targets of opportunity.
- Resources that must be left at risk (equipment, personnel).
- Reports and other critical information needed by enablers.
- The impact and mitigation of exclusion zones.
- Unique challenges of an underground WMD site (communications, force requirements, unknown size and scope, kinetic activity).

Vignette

The CWMD TF orders Alpha and Bravo companies to establish an outer cordon to prevent personnel and equipment from entering or leaving the target area. Charlie Company is ordered to clear the objective area of hostile forces. On the area being cleared, Charlie Company establishes an inner cordon to prevent interference from outside elements and to protect forces involved in conducting the site assessment.

To conserve time, the commander decides to order the CBRN reconnaissance platoon to follow Charlie Company elements as they deliberately clear the objective. This allows Charlie Company to focus on security tasks while the CBRN reconnaissance platoon provides immediate verification of CBRN hazards. Charlie Company observes and reports immediate findings, which appear to confirm that the site is a chemical-production and munitions-filling facility. Soldiers conducting the clearing are aware of the requirement to preserve the site to the greatest extent possible and to not disturb papers, lab equipment, or other materials present.

While Charlie Company establishes an inner cordon, the CBRN reconnaissance platoon conducts a site assessment to confirm or deny the presence of WMD or the precursors for a WMD. The CBRN platoon conducts a thorough initial site assessment by swabbing surfaces, taking sensor readings, taking pictures, and producing sketches of the inside areas of the facility and confirms the presence of chemical warfare agents. Reports and photos are sent through the CWMD TF to the BCT for analysis, and all forces assume a defensive posture while awaiting further instructions.

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Chapter 4

Defeat, Disable, and Dispose of WMD Threats

This chapter continues the discussion of activity 3 of the CWMD construct. The tasks within the defeat, disable, and dispose part of activity 3 require the expertise of enablers with technical skill sets. Transitions represent a critical set of actions that the commander must consider to avoid the potential proliferation of WMD material or accidental release or creation of CBRN hazards.

DEFEAT

4-1. *Defeat* is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force's commander is unwilling or unable to pursue that individual's adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander's will and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use (FM 3-90-1). Pathway and WMD defeat activities cover the spectrum of offensive activity, including conventional, cyberspace, and special operations, that address the development and use of WMD. Pathway defeat activities focus on actions to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate the conceptualization, development, possession, and proliferation of WMD.

4-2. After an actor of concern has obtained WMD critical requirements (expertise, technology, components, materials, delivery systems, facilities), WMD defeat efforts target critical vulnerabilities (such as the ability to assemble, stockpile, deliver, transfer, or employ WMD) and seek to neutralize or destroy them. This involves employing tailored lethal and nonlethal capabilities to neutralize or destroy weapons and agents; delivery systems; and materials, facilities, and processes, including the functional or structural defeat of hardened targets. At the tactical level, the BCT conducts tasks to defeat a threat at a particular site and to set the conditions that allow technical forces to defeat a WMD network.

DELAY

4-3. A *delay* is to slow the time of arrival of enemy forces or capabilities or alter the ability of the enemy or adversary to project forces or capabilities (FM 3-09). Efforts to hinder the development, acquisition, proliferation, or use of WMD include lethal and nonlethal capabilities employed directly by or in support of another lead agency. This can include direct action against specific nodes in a WMD network or program, such as production storage and transportation facilities. Actions above the BCT may include strategic efforts to delay key actors, including financial sanctions, legal actions, or travel restrictions (such as, the national watch list).

DISRUPT

4-4. *Disrupt* is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt the enemy's timetable, or cause enemy forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90-1). The BCT may be given a mission to disrupt the development, acquisition, or proliferation of WMD. This may include direct actions to intercept material en route. Disruption is particularly well suited to targeting key nodes, such as transportation, leadership, logistics, or financial nodes.

DESTROY

4-5. *Destroy* is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any

function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1) Planning for destruction activities involves additional specialized assets and logistics, such as secure routes from the sensitive site to an alternate location for the transport of WMD devices, materials, and personnel. Disposition authority may lie with the combatant commander (CCDR) or another government agency, such as the DOS. Destruction planning activities should address the:

- Use of EOD, technical escort, and contractor support.
- Civilian expertise for dismantling, destroying, and disposing of WMD devices and materials.
- Additional security for the removal and transport of WMD devices and materials.
- Requirements for marking and monitoring (air, surface water, groundwater).
- Contingency plans and risk mitigation measures for CBRN hazards.
- Allocation, transportation, and storage of large quantities of Class V supplies needed for chemical or biological destruction and disposal.

NEUTRALIZE

4-6. For the purposes of this manual, two of the definitions for neutralize from JP 3-0 apply. *Neutralize* 3) to render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps; 4) to make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent (JP 3-0). Neutralization includes efforts to render WMD capabilities ineffective or unusable. Examples include making CBRN agents and materials harmless or rendering delivery systems unusable. The BCT sets the conditions for the neutralization of the WMD capability. Enablers may be required to neutralize WMD material.

DISABLE

4-7. Disablement includes efforts to exploit, degrade, or destroy critical and at-risk components of a WMD program. Critical components are those components that pose a threat to friendly forces, while at-risk components are those components of a WMD program that are at risk of loss or proliferation. Disable tasks seek to ensure that these items are not used, lost, or proliferated. They also seek to reduce the risk of the capabilities being proliferated, lost, or stolen. If follow-on activities to complete WMD program dismantlement are required, WMD disablement may transition to another department or agency for final disposition. Before conducting WMD disablement tasks, the BCT isolates, seizes, and secures the specified WMD objective. Site disablement operations support follow-on destruction operations. This task includes providing means and procedures to report CBRN and conventional ordnance incidents and to ensure that the collateral is forwarded to intelligence agencies. Based on mission requirements, friendly forces may disable the device or neutralize the hazard.

Note. EOD should have the capabilities to counter explosive hazards associated with WMD. EOD skills may be required if the site has residual explosive components from a WMD device or if the site is known or suspected of harboring unexploded ordnance.

EXPLOIT

4-8. Exploitation involves taking full advantage of information regarding tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. Site assessments feed exploitation by providing insights used by the commander and staff to decide which further actions and resources are needed to exploit the site. WMD exploitation tasks seek to maximize the value of intelligence gained from personnel, data, information, and materials obtained during CWMD operations.

4-9. Forces conduct site exploitation during CWMD operations because of strategic implications of WMD. Tactical exploitation begins on site by maneuver and enabler Soldiers using methodical actions to answer information requirements and to facilitate future operations. Technical exploitation takes place in a laboratory environment or by technical enablers conducting scientific analysis on-site, if available.

Note. Specific information about tactical and technical site exploitation can be found in ATP 3-90.15.

4-10. Forces process and exploit information, personnel, and/or material found during the conduct of CWMD operations in conjunction with interagency and international partners as required to produce timely, actionable information. Planning considerations for exploitation operations must include capabilities for the initial characterization of site WMD materials, weapons, equipment, personnel, data, and infrastructure. Forces may require technical reachback capabilities for WMD targets of opportunity. Exploitation planning activities should address the—

- Impact and mitigation of exclusion zones.
- Level of expertise required to conduct exploitation operations (interrogators, specialized technicians, certified confined-space operators).
- Trained personnel available to collect and preserve evidence.
- Additional security requirements.
- Time committed to exploitation operations.
- Personal protective equipment (self-contained breathing apparatus or CBRN IPE).
- Stay-behind forces.
- Reports and other critical information required to transition to follow on forces.

Note. For further guidance on processing and exploitation, refer to ATP 3-90.15, JP 2-0, and JP 2-01.

DEGRADE

4-11. The destruction and disposal of an actor's WMD capability are typically preferred to degradation, but factors such as time, resources, access, and security may necessitate that only the most critical at-risk elements be degraded and/or destroyed. Whatever the reason, degradation should ensure that the capability to threaten friendly forces is not possible for a period of time.

DISPOSE

4-12. Disposal efforts target WMD remnants (program elements, facilities, personnel, surplus materials, dual-use capacity, confiscated/seized cargo, equipment, and delivery systems). This may include deliberate technical processes to reduce or dismantle production methods, materials, stockpiles, and technical infrastructure; the redirection of WMD, related technologies, materials, or an actor's efforts and expertise toward peaceful productive activities; and monitoring to ensure that expertise or program elements are not reconstituted or reused in an illicit capacity. The JFC typically sets the conditions for the disposition of an actor of concerns WMD program. The final disposition may require a larger USG or international effort.

REDUCE

4-13. *Reduce* is a tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an encircled or bypassed enemy force (FM 3-90-1). This disposal task seeks to diminish a potential threat, improve the security of the remnants, reduce costs of sustaining program elements, and eliminate an excess capacity or capability. Reduction programs and operations, such as the demilitarization of stockpiles, may be led by another USG department or agency or by an international partner or organization. Geographic combatant commanders should coordinate activities to ensure that they are mutually supporting and do not conflict.

REDIRECT

4-14. Redirection involves repurposing facilities, expertise, and materials associated with WMD program elements. This is especially important when program elements have a dual-use nature. The redirection of expertise includes retaining personnel with WMD expertise (for example, scientists and engineers) for new, legitimate employment. Depending on the environment, the lead for this task may transition to another organization or partner nation.

DISMANTLE

4-15. Dismantling a WMD facility, stockpile, or program is the process by which forces systematically reduce the program to a level that it can no longer operate for its intended purpose. Depending on the environment, the lead for this task may transition to another organization or partner nation.

MONITOR

4-16. *Monitoring* is the continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation (ADRP 5-0). Monitoring is the disposal task action taken to continually review and inspect programs, personnel, and facilities to ensure that they are not producing WMD and that remnants are not being reconstituted or reused in an illicit capacity. Monitoring and redirection tasks are normally conducted in a secure tactical environment, operating with the DOS, host-nation, and other agencies. Monitoring and redirection planning activities should address the—

- Sustainment of specialist and expert personnel.
- Increased or continued security of perimeters and barriers.
- Involvement of agencies and organizations in the threat reduction cooperation process.
- Continued security, including the potential transfer of authority for the security mission.
- Logistic support for the new operation.
- Host-nation requirements in support of the unexploded ordnance mission.

TRANSITION

4-17. A unit that has secured a WMD objective transitions on orders from higher headquarters. Transitions can occur when the commander has satisfied mission requirements, the unit has been relieved, or the continued presence in the area presents unacceptable risk to forces or the populace. This change in the mission may be a result of the interrelationship of the other instruments of national power, such as a transfer to host-nation military forces. The battle handover process with host-nation forces can be a complicated and time-consuming process. Language barriers and a lack of tactical communications interoperability can be mitigated with prior planning. Examples of scenarios for transition during tactical operations involving a sensitive site include the following:

- The site is assessed or exploited, and no evidence of WMD is found to warrant further investigation or evidence collection is complete and the commander receives a change in mission from a higher commander.
- The unit is relieved in place by another unit, or site security can be transferred to another element, such as host-nation military.
- The unit transitions to close an incident site. CBRN response operations conducted on an incident site may be transitioned to a partner nation or USG personnel to close. Otherwise, efforts are made to mark the area to reduce residual threats to personnel or civilians in the area.

4-18. Measures to facilitate a transition between responsible units should have a detailed information exchange plan, including the—

- Location and disposition of forces on site (the orientation of units/weapons, routes, control measures, support areas).
- Site description (terrain and structure characteristics).
- Identification of key buildings and facilities and signs of site functionality, such as running power or machinery.
- Threat, enemy disposition, and hazards on site.
- Civilian presence on site and identification of key individuals, such as workers, technical specialists, or security forces.
- Signs or indicators of CBRN contamination (sick or dead personnel or animals or symptoms among security forces).
- Development of plans for passage lanes onto the site, decontamination lanes, and medical sites.
- Coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff (JS) to plan for transition or the transfer of responsibility of DOD-led CBRN response with other multinational forces or nation-states.

4-19. Planning should include the transfer of responsibility (as soon as possible) to a designated agency or organization that is responsible for conducting advanced technical and monitoring and redirection activities. A rapid battle handover (transfer of authority) of the destruction mission is essential to releasing the limited assets for other missions. Transition forces must be capable of providing ongoing security mission command and sustainment to forces conducting these advanced tasks for the duration of the mission.

4-20. Designated agencies (DOS, International Atomic Energy Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency) may assume the lead for monitoring and redirection activities. The capability to monitor and redirect requires planning and technical expertise to help commanders and unit leaders with the long-term elimination of WMD production sites and related activities.

4-21. The speed of advancement in offensive operations might lead to bypassing WMD sites to maximize movement. WMD sites left unsecured are a serious risk consideration. Bypassed sites become a target for the theft or loss of hazardous materials that could fall into a threat actors hands.

4-22. Unified action with the leading maneuver efforts of a partner nation requires clear guidelines to delineate criteria and objectives for transitions of responsibility at WMD sites. Battle handover decisions made at the operational level are done with coordination between the ground CCDR and higher headquarters.

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Chapter 5

Safeguarding the Force and Managing Consequences

Traditional Army CBRN defense tactics have centered on the detection and avoidance of CBRN threats and hazards. CWMD operations increase the likelihood of forces entering and remaining in contaminated environments, highlighting the need for protection and mitigation techniques. CWMD operations require Soldiers to systematically locate the products and production of WMD and then to seize, secure, and preserve the site so that exploitation and destruction activities can be conducted and proliferation from the site can be prevented. CWMD operations may require forces to remain on site for an unknown period of time (days to months) until relieved. These requirements mean that Soldiers should expect to encounter WMD materials, equipment, and munitions while conducting CWMD operations, and they may have to conduct sustained operations in a contaminated environment. Safeguarding the force and managing consequences require layered and integrated defensive measures to reduce the effectiveness of CBRN threats and hazards, allowing the BCT to protect its forces and the surrounding population, respond to CBRN incidents, sustain operations in CBRN environments, and mitigate the effects if a release occurs.

PREPARING FOR COUNTERING WMD

5-1. The possibility of operations in contaminated environments emphasizes the importance of competence and confidence in the individual and collective CBRN defense skills of Soldiers conducting CWMD operations. Success depends on the effective use of unit and personal protective equipment, CBRN defense training, and proven TTP. Preparing for CWMD operations consists of activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to sustain operations in a CBRN environment and to execute mission tasks. Preparation creates conditions that improve opportunities for success and readiness to execute CWMD operations.

5-2. Rehearsals, integrations of task-organized units, preoperation checks, and inspections are some examples of preparation activities. The training of warrior tasks and battle drills under the conditions of CBRN environments strengthens preparations for CWMD operations. The following are some of the individual and collective tasks that should be trained:

- Warrior tasks and battle drills under CBRN conditions.
- Individual and equipment decontamination.
- Collective protection (COLPRO) shelter operations.
- CBRN IPE employment.
- CBRN detection equipment employment.
- First aid in CBRN environments.

MITIGATE

5-3. Mitigation is the ability to plan, prepare, respond to, and recover from CBRN incidents. This task focuses on maintaining the joint force ability to continue military operations in a CBRN contaminated environment and on minimizing or negating the vulnerability to, and the effects of, CBRN attacks. This task may support civil authorities and foreign governments.

5-4. Commanders make every reasonable attempt to limit or reduce exposure to CBRN threats or hazards. Exposure to chemical or biological hazards can have immediate or prolonged health effects, and exposure to

radiological hazards are cumulative. Commanders must be able to assess the risks to plan for operations in CBRN environments, to include R&S of WMD sites. Commanders have the authority to adjust protection or mitigation measures. The following provides a brief description to guide commanders to help them to understand the hazards and take steps to mitigate the hazards when hazards cannot be avoided:

- **Chemical.** Besides the standard protection measures (IPE, avoidance, and detection), exposure guidelines also include safe levels of exposure to chemical agents. Exposure guidelines for chemical agents are chemical-specific. Understanding these levels is an important consideration when making decisions for unmasking. These guidelines are set with the understanding that exposure above certain levels can impact health effects (immediate and long-term) and mission success.
- **Biological.** The brigade surgeon can assist with quarantine, restriction of movement, and medical management guidelines.
- **Radiological/nuclear.** Exposure to radiation has a cumulative effect on personnel. Commanders use operational exposure guidance (OEG) to set the maximum amount of external ionizing radiation a unit may receive while performing a particular mission. The radiation exposure status provides a means for tracking the unit dose and can be used to estimate operational impacts and select the appropriate unit for a mission while mitigating further exposure.

Note. More information about military exposure guidelines, medical management guidelines, and operational guidelines can be found in ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37 and ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3.

CBRN ACTIVE DEFENSE

5-5. Layered and integrated CBRN defense necessitates active and passive measures. Active defense measures defeat a WMD attack by destroying their delivery systems. Maneuver forces take measures to defend against conventionally- and asymmetrically-delivered WMD threats and CBRN hazards by employing actions to divert, neutralize, or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while en route to their target. These defensive measures include, but are not limited to,—

- Air and missile defense.
- Special operations.
- Security operations.
- Counter-battery fire.

CBRN PASSIVE DEFENSE

5-6. Passive defense are the measures taken to prevent, minimize or negate the vulnerability to, and the effects of, CBRN threats and hazards. Examples include CBRN IPE; health protection; R&S to support avoidance measures; and the decontamination of areas, people, and objects. The principles of passive defense are CBRN protection and contamination mitigation. These defensive measures include, but are not limited to,—

- Conducting CBRN hazard predictions.
- Detecting CBRN agents with assigned equipment.
- Marking CBRN hazards.
- Conducting warning and reporting.

5-7. The ability of the force to survive and continue operations in a CBRN environment hinges on its ability to effectively employ CBRN protection measures. Protection measures are integrated into every aspect of the operation. Protection measures are taken to keep CBRN threats and hazards from having an adverse effect on military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, and facilities. CBRN threats and hazards can occur from the enemy employment of WMD, discovery of make-shift labs, or accidents involving spills of TIMs. All of these can potentially cause mass casualties and large-scale destruction. The protection working group within the BCT command post establishes prioritization lists that consider vulnerabilities, criticality, and threats.

Individual Protection

5-8. The success of individual protection lies in CBRN training readiness into individual tasks. Basic skill sets include recognizing and reacting to hazards, employing IPE, and executing tasks such as communicating on a radio or firing a weapon while in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP).

Collective Protection

5-9. COLPRO seals out potentially contaminated air and creates an overpressure with filtered air. COLPRO allows a group of individuals to obtain relief from IPE while in a CBRN contaminated environment. COLPRO is not a replacement for MOPP gear, but it provides the commander flexibility when operating for extended periods in a contaminated environment. Fixed-site, transportable shelters and mobile COLPRO allow options to meet the needs of the situation.

Note. More information on individual protection and COLPRO can be found in ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37. Basic standards of proficiency for individuals include survival standards and operating standards. Standards of proficiency for individuals, CBRN defense specialists, medical personnel and commanders can be found in ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3 and FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42.

5-10. CBRN staff elements at the battalion level inform the command of the organizational readiness for operations in CBRN environments. When designated, company-level CBRN specialists serve as the commander's advisor on CBRN readiness and on the integration of defense tasks into individual and collective training.

Note. More information on capabilities and the employment of CBRN forces can be found in ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-2.70.

AVOIDANCE

5-11. Commanders should take reasonable measures to avoid CBRN contamination. During CWMD operations, forces may be required to function in contaminated environments. Bypass criteria are established by higher headquarters to assist commanders in contamination avoidance.

5-12. When CBRN hazards exist in the OE, a commander may decide to bypass the contamination to continue the mission to protect the maneuver force. Some considerations for the bypass of a contaminated area include the following:

- The contaminated area is marked with alternate available routes.
- The unit cannot cross the area without exceeding the OEG.
- A risk assessment determines that casualties and a loss of combat power are likely to occur.

Note. Refer to ATP 3-11.37/MCWP 3-37.4/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP 3-2.44 for more information about marking CBRN hazard bypass routes.

DECONTAMINATION

5-13. If avoidance fails, forces must be prepared to conduct decontamination. The commander's risk assessment should address the four decontamination principles listed below and be considered during planning and execution:

- **Speed.** Personnel should conduct decontamination operations as soon as possible.
- **Need.** Decontaminate only what is necessary.
- **Priority.** Decontaminate the most essential items first.
- **Limited area.** Decontaminate as far forward as possible to limit spread to clean areas.

Note. Detailed information about the planning, preparation, and execution of decontamination can be found in ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37.

5-14. There are four basic levels of decontamination: immediate, operational, thorough, and clearance. The levels may be differentiated by the increasing time and resources that are needed at successive levels. The increasing levels also correspond with a reduction of the risk of exposure to Soldiers as the levels increase. The first two levels of decontamination are conducted and supported at the unit level. This emphasizes the need for unit-level training of the following tasks:

- **Immediate.** Immediate decontamination is a lifesaving measure that should be conducted as soon as possible by the individual, buddy, or crew. It includes skin decontamination, personal wipe down, operator wipe down, and spot decontamination. Immediate decontamination should be trained as a battle drill following a CBRN attack and is conducted at the point of contamination.
- **Operational.** Operational decontamination limits the spread of contamination, allows the force to continue operations within the contaminated area, and enables the freedom of maneuver. The tasks include MOPP gear exchange and vehicle wash down. On a WMD site, the operational decontamination is conducted in a clean area, close to the objective. It is conducted with organic capabilities and the unit trained team.

5-15. The second two levels require the technical support of CBRN forces:

- **Thorough.** Thorough decontamination provides a reduction of risk that allows long-term MOPP reduction. The tasks include detailed equipment decontamination and detailed troop decontamination. Outside support from the CBRN unit is required, and augmentation is provided to support. Thorough decontamination is resource- and time-intensive, and it is recommended to take place after a unit has completed operations on site.
- **Clearance.** Clearance decontamination allows unrestricted transportation, maintenance, and the employment or disposal of equipment.

5-16. Commanders must take precautions to mitigate the spread of contamination to the environment. Reducing contamination and limiting the spread of cross-contamination during operations protect the local civilian community and supports host-nation, global community, U.S., and ally interests. The following activities are examples of protecting the environment and the personnel operating in it from contamination:

- Diverting forces and civilians around or away from areas of possible contamination.
- Prohibiting the local civilian population from entering or exiting areas that are deemed contaminated.
- Assessing the risk of cross-contamination internal to the site against time, security, and decontamination resources.
- Decontaminating contaminated personnel and equipment as near as possible to the contaminated site before they move.
- Decontaminating contaminated personnel and equipment before movement to a new location.
- Using engineer assets to prepare the site for destruction activities to mitigate and limit the spread of contamination.
- Conducting risk assessments on the environmental impacts of destroying, removing, transferring, and disposing of WMD and TIMs located on or off site.

CBRN RESPONSE

5-17. CBRN response measures are taken to minimize the effects of CBRN hazards if the assigned forces are responding to an intentional or accidental CBRN incident, domestically in support of civil authorities, or for overseas operations. Domestically, forces may be assigned a mission to conduct CBRN response to assist local, state, and federal agencies. These assigned forces are called the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise (CRE). The CRE conducts CBRN response in support of local authorities or the lead federal agency by providing capabilities to conduct patient/mass casualty decontamination (MCD) and additional capabilities of emergency medical services and casualty search and extraction. Additional forces may be called on to provide immediate assistance because of their

proximity to a CBRN incident or they may be used to supplement the follow-on forces. In an international framework, forces may be called on by the DOS to provide assistance to a CBRN incident.

5-18. Commanders use response frameworks to conduct planning for CBRN incidents and to assist with response by maintaining planning and coordination activities, reviewing and understanding policies and procedures, conducting training, and upgrading and maintaining the equipment necessary to respond. The BCT commander may integrate available CBRN expertise into his RM procedures to provide response to CBRN incidents at home or overseas. A CBRN response must be rapid to save lives and minimize the overall impact of the incident.

Note. See ADRP 3-28 for more information on defense support to civil authorities.

CONTAMINATED CASUALTY CARE

5-19. Planning for contaminated casualty care, transportation, and logistics must occur before the threat of contamination occurs. Because of the time, resources, and stresses involved in the care of contaminated casualties, advanced planning is required.

5-20. Casualties are decontaminated as far forward as possible on an already established thorough decontamination or MCD site as the situation permits. Contaminated casualties that need medical treatment must be decontaminated at a patient decontamination site before they are admitted into a medical treatment facility. The admission of one contaminated casualty into a medical treatment facility could contaminate medical staff, equipment, and the facility, reducing treatment capabilities in the facility. For more information regarding a patient decontamination site, refer to ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3.

Note. Removing the outer clothing of patients with radiological contamination reduces 90 percent of external contamination. Do not let radiological contamination interfere with immediate lifesaving treatment.

CONTAMINATED REMAINS

5-21. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the initial search recovery, tentative identification, and evacuation of deceased unit personnel within their AO. Mortuary affairs personnel are responsible for coordinating the disposition of contaminated human remains. This includes the decontamination of remains when required. For more information on mortuary affairs/fatality management operations, refer to ATP 4-46 and JP 4-06.

MASS CASUALTY DECONTAMINATION

5-22. Given the urbanization of the world today, future military operations can be expected to occur in densely populated urban areas overseas or in the homeland. Because of the population density, a CBRN incident is magnified incrementally in terms of casualties needing assistance. The number of casualties from an incident may overwhelm the capacity of national or organizational resources. During the conduct of MCD, commanders and leaders may serve in supporting roles to other organizations working toward a common objective. MCD operations may require security forces to secure the MCD area and restrict access to protect and segregate contaminated personnel from uncontaminated personnel. Contingency planning for situations involving mass casualties should begin on receipt of the mission.

Note. More information about MCD can be found in ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37.

SUSTAIN

5-23. Sustain is the ability to maintain response and recover operations from CBRN incidents. In reference to the joint force, sustainment is the ability to support operations in a CBRN environment and to conduct

recover/reconstitution operations to regenerate unit combat readiness. This task may support civil authorities and foreign governments.

5-24. The sustainment warfighting function consists of three elements (logistics, personnel services, and health service support) that are critical components to success in CWMD operations. The Army's ability to provide these three elements in a CBRN environment is necessary for maintaining CWMD operations until successful mission completion.

5-25. Sustainment planning must be nested within the operations plan and should include the entire array of sustainment functions. The following are some examples of considerations for sustainment during CWMD operations:

- Plans should include the impacts that CWMD may have on EOD, maintenance, transportation, distribution, and field services operations.
- Potential hazards that CWMD present on human resources and financial management operations.
- Impacts that CWMD activities may have on casualty care, casualty evacuation, and medical logistics.
- Sustainment of CBRN defense skills creates its own sustainment challenges because of required training sets of equipment.
- ROE for management of civilians during an international CBRN response.

5-26. CBRN response and mitigation operations are resource-intensive. They require manpower, supplies, water, medical supplies, decontamination, facilities, and special waste handling. Sustainment plans must include considerations for the specific resources required for decontamination operations. Site exploitation may take a considerable amount of time; therefore sustainment for extended operations must be planned.

Note. For more information on planning for sustainment support to CWMD, see ADRP 3-28, ADRP 4-0, ATP 4-02.3, and FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42.

SUPPORT

5-27. Maneuver forces may be directed to support another USG department or agency if a CBRN incident occurs and host-nation support for the local population is insufficient to save lives and maintain essential government services. This support may be rendered domestically through the defense support to civil authorities or internationally through International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear-Response (ICBRN-R). See JP 3-41 for more information on ICBRN-R.

Appendix A

Information Management

The ultimate goal of the commander's information requirements and collection results is to provide output that relays actionable information and raises situational awareness. Information management concerns the complete cycle of information flow from identifying the need, collection, distribution to those who need it, and ultimately its disposition. The staff manages this constant cycle of exchange. Information management is a key aspect of activity 1 of the CWMD construct (understanding the environment, threat, and vulnerabilities).

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

A-1. A number of information management systems with core capabilities for integrated early warning, modeling, simulation, battlefield management, and medical surveillance are currently under development or have been fielded.

- **CBRN-specific systems.** The Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) provides an integrated early warning capability to provide time-sensitive CBRN defense information throughout the OE to enhance overall force protection. The Joint Effects Model (JEM) provides predictive modeling of CBRN hazard areas and effects resulting from CBRN weapons and TIM.

Note. More information about CBRN specific systems information management systems (such as JWARN and JEM) is available in ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 3-37B/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-2.70.

- **Mission command systems.** A mission command system is the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, facilities, and equipment that supports the philosophy of mission command and the command and control warfighting function.

Note. More information about mission command systems can be found in ADRP 6-0.

COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

A-2. CWMD involves a complex set of missions that cannot be executed effectively without integrating information and expertise across a wide scope of specialties. From IPB to site exploitation, coordination and the integration of necessary information, systems, and personnel allow increased understanding, better communication, and more effective decision making. The successful execution of CWMD activities is contingent on effective information collection, analysis, and the sharing of hazards encountered throughout the OE. Accurate and rapid reporting enables commanders at all echelons to make timely decisions for the allocation of low-density enablers required to conduct exploitation and other activities.

A-3. The initial information collection is often performed by Soldiers on the ground serving as primary sensors during the securing of the objective. The ground force commander's initial assessment of an objective is based on inputs from Soldier observations, tactical questioning of personnel located on or near the objective, and technical observations from enablers. Reports that are used to communicate the CBRN materials, equipment, munitions, threats, and hazards are contained in tactical and technical reports. Units operating in and around areas exposed to CBRN threats or hazards need information to warn downwind troops, implement protection measures, or avoid the hazard area. A checklist like the example in table A-1, page A-2, captures items coordinated during CWMD operations.

Table A-1. Example coordination checklist

<i>Coordination Items</i>	<i>Completed</i>
Intelligence exchange	✓
Communication information	
Frequencies	
Priorities of work	
Linkup time and place	
Logistic support requirements	
Command relationships	
Checkpoints and release points	
Bypass criteria	
Medical support	
Decontamination support	
Specialized teams (explosive ordnance disposal, criminal investigation division, nuclear disablement teams, other three letter or government agencies)	
Translators	

REACHBACK SUPPORT

A-4. Technical reachback is the ability to contact a technical SME when an issue exceeds the on scene capabilities. Reachback capabilities provide units in the field connectivity to SMEs at headquarters, national level laboratories, industrial entities, academia, or other state/federal resources. Reachback may include the identification of nonstandard CBRN warfare agents, modeling and hazard prediction, and sample evacuation and identification. Some examples of organizations that provide reachback capabilities are the—

- Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
- 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Command.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
- National Response Center.

A-5. Communications capabilities may be required to provide links to SMEs. For example, a secure video link may be required to connect unit teams on site with SMEs located elsewhere in the AO.

A-6. Planning for CWMD operations also includes synchronizing multi-Service intelligence capabilities that focus on potential adversary WMD proliferation capabilities, immediate intentions, and the environment. It is oriented more toward combat than long-range planning. Tactical intelligence support is critical to CWMD planning activities.

TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL REPORTS

A-7. The commander's initial assessment is based on technical and tactical inputs. The tactical inputs can include Soldier observations, tactical questioning of personnel located on or near the objective, CBRN technical observations and sampling, and site assessments. This information should be gathered for initial analysis and prioritized for reporting or evacuation for further analysis. The personnel to conduct this initial analysis should come from the maneuver and supporting enabler staff. The reports required for a CWMD operation are similar to those required for any other military operation; however, specific reports required for prioritizing and monitoring the developing situation are prepared as directed by the commander.

A-8. It is critical that technical and tactical reports are processed through the TF communication structure. This also pertains to requests for technical information from higher level agencies or units. Technical reports include site assessments; reports prepared for specialized reconnaissance or forensics teams; weather reports; health exposure reports; and detailed hazard predictions from the chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear warning and reporting system (CBRNWRS). The commander’s staff assists in processing and recording data collected from technical reports.

A-9. The technical challenges of information exchange exist on the battlefield. Prior planning and SOPs must address the prioritization of what information is exchanged. Figure A-1 depicts some of the reporting and information exchanges that occur during a CWMD operation. The exchange of information flows vertically up through command channels, down to subordinate units, and laterally between units in the AO.




Figure A-1. Information flow

SIZE, ACTIVITY, LOCATION, UNIT, TIME, AND EQUIPMENT REPORT

A-10. The SALUTE report is an oral or written report that is prepared by the tactical element acquiring the information or by intermediate command echelons. It is used to rapidly report (by electrical or other means) information that could lead to further reconnaissance or the capture of foreign material. Conscious observation and reporting facilitates rapid assessment and command decision making. Activities such as the movement of bulk chemicals or unusual activities at dual-use facilities observed by tactical patrols can enhance a greater picture of occurring events and drive further surveillance or changes to information requirements.

A-11. SALUTE reports that indicate potential WMD activities are forwarded to the technical intelligence liaisons or directly to the captured material exploitation center. Because of this information, a technical intelligence team could be dispatched or the captured enemy material could be moved to the captured material exploitation center or the theater captured material exploitation center. SALUTE reports and unit situation reports (SITREP) continuously feed the intelligence process and gain a better understanding of threat capabilities and activities. A sample SALUTE report reporting the discovery of a CBRN facility is shown in table A-2.

Table A-2. Example SALUTE report

SALUTE REPORT	
TO: G-2, V Corps DTG: 230900Z AUG 09	
FROM: G-2, 2nd Cavalry Report No.: 07-0623	
1. SIZE: Delivery was escorted by four vehicles and eight guards.	
2. ACTIVITY: Manufacturing facility observed receiving 20 barrels marked with chemical hazard labels. Barrels were delivered under armed escort at 0200 and immediately placed inside holding area. Aboveground facility indicates it is a type of chemical production facility.	
3. LOCATION: Town of Al-Dahran (UTM EH55619372). The facility has four large stacks and two small stacks about 30 meters off the ground. (Provide the grid coordinates, as a minimum.)	
4. UNIT/UNIFORM: Unit unknown, military style uniform, individuals handling the barrels wore masks. (Include the enemy forces on target, if known or friendly unit calling up report.)	
5. TIME: 230200Z AUG 09. (Always use Zulu time.)	
6. EQUIPMENT: Masks, small arms weapons, two trucks, two cargo trucks.	
Legend:	
AUG	August
DTG	date-time group
G-2	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
No.	number
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
UTM	universal transverse mercator

Note. See ATP 3-21.8 and FM 6-99 for more information on SALUTE and SITREPs.

SITE REPORTS

A-12. Units can develop tactical reports to provide information from deliberate or opportunity targets to the commander. Initial assessment reports can be used to submit critical information to the commander for continued analysis. The initial forces on site submit complete reports as the mission dictates. Examples of information sent in an initial assessment report include the—

- Reporting unit.
- Mission designator.
- Site name and location (grid or latitude/longitude).
- Date-time group of the mission, and time on target.
- Site or facility description and assessment.
- Indicators observed at the site.
- Recommendation for further exploitation.

A-13. Timely and accurate reporting from seized sites is critical. The initial assessment should rapidly confirm or deny that the site is a legitimate WMD site. Once a site is identified for its potential to contain sensitive information, the sharing of information facilitates immediate commander decisions for resource allocation and follow-on actions.

A-14. Accurate and timely reporting is more important than specific formats. A command-established report format for site assessment can also be determined. Additional information added from the initial assessment includes the hazard location, contamination type, and presumptive identification.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR SITE SURVEY REPORT

A-15. The site survey initial assessment report conducted by the CBRN element is used to submit critical information to higher headquarters for continued analysis. The maneuver force is responsible for reporting initial findings from the objective. The initial team on site prepares and submits a completed report as the mission dictates as soon as possible. The maneuver staff submits a report containing the information from the initial CBRN reconnaissance forces and other assigned enablers, if available. More information about these reports can be found in ATP 3-11.23/MCWP 3-37.7/NTTP 3-11.35/AFTTP 3-2.71.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR REPORTS

A-16. CBRN staff use or create the information in CBRN and weather reports, but information contained within those reports must be shared on a large scale to aid tactical planning and execution. The CBRNWRS provides data and information to support situational awareness and mission planning. These reports are scaled in terms of information and time. A CBRN 1 report is an initial observers report. A CBRN 4 report is a monitoring and survey report. A CBRN 6 report is used to provide detailed information on CBRN events.

A-17. Deployed maneuver forces that are responding to targets of opportunity or conducting planned CWMD operations should report findings by using the standard series of warning and reporting messages associated with the CBRNWRS. CBRN warning and reporting is an information management function that entails collecting and analyzing data from assessments to support WMD elimination operations based on plans, the commander's intent, the operational context, and the situation.

Note. More detailed information on CBRN warning and hazard prediction can be found in GTA 03-06-008 and TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83.

A-18. Mechanisms may be established by the CBRN staff of the division or corps to ensure that the current command warning and reporting system is linked or is interoperable with medical and DOD occupational and environmental health surveillance reporting channels. This allows personnel to enter CBRN incident sampling data into the Defense Occupational and Environmental Health Readiness System, complete rosters of individuals at incident or exposure sites, and submit reports and other information to the [United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine Deployment Occupational and Environmental Health Surveillance data portal](#).

MEDICAL REPORTING

A-19. The supported CCDR provides guidance and support to component commands to ensure that DOD health surveillance requirements are met for reporting and archiving health surveillance data and reports (disease, nonbattle injury, reportable medical, and occupational and environmental health [OEH] surveillance). Ensure documentation in individual medical records of individual health treatment provided at all roles of care is complete. Document periodic occupational and environmental monitoring summaries for each permanent or semipermanent basing location, and update it annually.

A-20. The occupational and environmental monitoring summaries are filed in the medical records of each individual, or to which the exposure applies, or to archive the summaries so they are readily available electronically to health care providers and redeployed personnel. This link is established by documenting the individual exposures in the Defense Occupational and Environmental Health Readiness System. Copies of the report should be submitted to the [Military Exposure Surveillance Library](#) for archiving. Refer to DODI 6055.01, DODI 6055.05, DODI 6490.03, and TG 230 for more information.

Note. SF 600, *Chronological Record of Medical Care*, can be used to document an individual's health status before and after a mission. See AR 40-66 for more information on completing SF 600.

SITE EXPLOITATION REPORT

A-21. One of the most important information aspects of CWMD operations is postmission reporting. It occurs when a participating element provides collected information and gives an assessment of future actions that should be undertaken regarding the target. It is important to accurately report what was observed regarding the target. The site exploitation report does not need to be a detailed accounting of the mission; but, it should discuss who, what, where, and when and the result of the mission. The report should supplement information already submitted by the team, including the—

- Executive summary.
- Site or facility assessment.
- Characteristics of the target and surrounding area.
- Indicators observed at the site or facility.
- Location of hazards and type of contamination.
- Identification of hazards and confidence level of identifications.
- Type and location of samples taken.
- Actions taken on the target to destroy or deny CBRN materials or production equipment.
- Site layout (description, diagrams, photographs, site sketch).
- Interviewed personnel.
- Enemy contact.
- Noncombatants encountered.
- Recommendation for further exploitation and remediation.
- Priority information requirements and CCIRs.

Appendix B

Weapons of Mass Destruction Disposition

Disposition at the tactical level is to destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer, or otherwise verifiably dispose of adversary WMD weapons, materials, equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. WMD disposition tasks are usually conducted by specialized forces. Conventional forces may support disposition tasks in conjunction with their responsibilities to continue to secure a WMD site or in support of follow-on activities. This appendix outlines some of the tasks used to frame the conduct of disposition activities.

DESTROYING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NETWORKS

B-1. The objective of a destroy mission is to damage a WMD network system or system component so that it cannot perform functions or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. When destroying a WMD site, commanders and unit leaders should consider the following:

- Higher headquarters directives.
- The minimum safe distance for demolition or destruction and the element being destroyed. For example, when destroying munitions that contain chemical agents, consider the effects of the demolition activity and the chemical agent itself.
- The successful demolition of munitions and agents to ensure that the site or material cannot be reused.
- The use of EOD to conduct the demolition or disposal of munitions and agents.
- The use of engineers to ensure that the site cannot be reused.
- The possible requirement for significant logistic support to destroy bunkers and tunnel or cave complexes because of the complexity of charges needed.
- The use of fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft targeting sensor and armament capabilities for precision destruction.
- The use of projected munitions.
- Security and defense requirements against adversaries who may attempt to prevent the US, its allies, and other civilian agencies from destroying the WMD site.
- A safety assessment of site-marking requirements, wastes, and by-products that remain on site, including the potential for ground and surface water contamination.
- The ability to assess the site or munitions to confirm the successful destruction or mitigation of contaminants outside the destruction zone.

B-2. The desired destruction end state entails—

- Safely destroying or disposing of WMD agents, devices, materials, and stockpiles.
- Dismantling the entire WMD supporting infrastructure (eliminating facilities or rendering them unusable, removing key personnel from association with the WMD site).
- Rendering the industrial base incapable of supporting WMD development and production.
- Preparing for long-term monitoring and inspection program requirements.
- Marking residual hazards and establishing necessary air, surface, water, and ground monitoring requirements.

DISMANTLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NETWORKS

B-3. The objective of a dismantle mission is to take apart a WMD network system or system component so that it is impossible or economically infeasible to rapidly restore it to an operational state. Dismantling may be accomplished by destruction, removal, or transfer. Specialized military augmentation and/or a combination of civilian assets conduct dismantling operations. When dismantling a WMD site, commanders and unit leaders should consider the following:

- Higher headquarters directives.
- The use of specialized assets to safely dismantle CBRN production, research, and development facilities.
- The security and defense of complex bunkers and tunnels or cave entry and exit points.
- Security and defense requirements against adversaries who may attempt to prevent the US, its allies, and other civilian agencies from dismantling the WMD site.

MOVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NETWORKS

B-4. The objective of a removal mission is to move a WMD network system or system component to another location to preserve forensic evidence or conduct further intelligence exploitation. Removal operations are used to separate a key component of a WMD network from the network, hindering the reestablishment of a site. Specially trained units and aviation and transportation assets support commanders in removing WMD, CBRN materials, TIM, and associated equipment.

B-5. Materials taken from the site should be tagged with information listing where they are found, the circumstances in which they are found, and the individual(s) handling them. Removed TIMs should also be tagged with the name, quantity, concentration, and amount if known. Combat camera teams or other designated military personnel should document the scene with photographs and video. Digital or conventional photographs are acceptable; however, digital photographs have the advantage of rapid transmission to higher headquarters, other SME teams, and continental U.S.-based experts.

TRANSFERRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION NETWORKS

B-6. The objective of a transfer mission is to use a WMD network system or system component for a peaceful purpose. Transfer is likely to occur when dealing with dual-use components of a WMD network. The WMD network includes materials, equipment, facilities, and personnel as part of the unexploded ordnance mission area. Long-term security may be required until responsibility can be properly transferred.

B-7. When transferring a WMD site, commanders should consider the following:

- Higher headquarters guidance.
- The type of environment (hostile or uncertain).
- Additional assets required while conducting other operations.
- The transfer of responsibility to another lead agency.
- The conduct of decontamination operations.
- The reconstitution of forces.

B-8. Transfer must be conducted in compliance with related treaties. Commanders and unit leaders should consider the following:

- Prohibitions or special procedures for handling secured WMD, associated components, and support equipment.
- Reporting, declaration, and notification requirements for U.S. military activities.
- Constraints and restraints on U.S. military actions, such as WMD elimination operations, military activities in direct support of WMD elimination, and military activities that may indirectly contribute to the accomplishment of the WMD elimination mission.

DISPOSING OF WMD NETWORK COMPONENTS

B-9. The objective of a disposal mission is to move or assign WMD network components to the next phase of the elimination process, ensuring the inability to reconstitute the WMD network. It includes verifying the disposal of adversary WMD agents, weapons, materials, equipment, personnel, and infrastructure (such as dual-use assets and capabilities). Disposal activities include—

- Moving detainees to a designated controlled area.
- Removing WMD agents, devices, materials, systems, and equipment to a controlled area.
- Marking residual hazards and establishing necessary air, surface, water, and ground monitoring requirements.
- Controlling dual-use facilities and equipment for later conversion to nonmilitary purposes.

CONSOLIDATING WMD MATERIALS

B-10. Destruction often involves the consolidation of WMD materials in specified locations where demilitarization operations take place. These actions can occur during the removal, transfer, and disposal phases of destruction activities. WMD material is removed to preserve evidence for further exploitation, and military responsibility could end here because of the transfer of authority to nonmilitary control. However, the consolidation task could continue if military forces remain responsible for the disposal task. Consolidation is always coordinated and authorized at the appropriate level according to approved supplemental WMD elimination specific rules of engagement or rules for the use of force.

B-11. A primary consideration during consolidation and reorganization is to increase security around the sensitive site, particularly in urban areas. Curious visitors and noncombatants who remain in their homes during fighting may attempt to loot the site.

B-12. Demilitarization operations may be subject to monitoring according to existing international treaties and agreements. Specific guidance from the national level is provided. The guidance is executed by the combatant command according to approved plans and policies.

B-13. Preparing WMD material for final disposition requires the use of protective packaging for safe containment and transportation. Commanders should use accessible storage facilities to safely store materials that are awaiting final disposition. Arrangements and agreements must be made for transporting and maintaining control of WMD material across various regions. Interagency, contractor, and foreign nation approvals and technical advice and skills should be provided to commanders.

B-14. Neutralizing WMD agents, devices, materials, precursors, and residual products requires prior identification and characterization of WMD sites. The neutralization process minimizes the release of CBRN-related hazards into the environment and reduces the amount of exposure to personnel, particularly of exposure to a release that can cause casualties or fatalities. Adequate time must be provided for safe neutralization.

B-15. Consolidated WMD material is transported to a central destruction facility, where a monitoring and redirection officer assumes responsibility. If WMD material remains under DOD control, destruction is coordinated with EOD assets. Consideration must be given to the number, size, and type of material to be destroyed; exposure criteria; available assets; and control of the environment in which the destruction mission is accomplished. These factors may lead to material being consolidated at one or more sites within the host nation for more efficient destruction operations or to the material being shipped out of the country for destruction. Coordination with EOD assets determines where and how disposal occurs.

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Appendix C

Recommended Target Folder Contents

A target folder is a hard copy or electronic folder that contains target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. This appendix provides an example of information that may be contained in a target folder for sensitive sites.

TARGET FOLDER CONTENTS

C-1. Initial target folder development often takes place at the theater level. Tactical planners develop target folders for each known site in their AO. Target folders are disseminated to units preparing site assessment. Target folders should contain the following information:

- Current imagery of the site.
- Current and historical intelligence of the site and its surrounding and supporting facilities or areas.
- Intelligence from other site assessments that relate to the current site, including general information that helps focus the unit efforts at the planned site or influences TTP for conducting site assessment. This is part of a critical intelligence feedback loop.
- A diagram of the site that shows physical barriers and obstacles and an assessment of possible enemy improvised explosive devices or booby traps.
- Entrances and exits to and from the site.
- The number, types, and functions of buildings on site. When available, include blueprints or plans of buildings and underground utilities. Details on these structures may be available from local government offices.
- The suspected type of site (CBRN research, production, or storage; command and control; headquarters; intelligence collection; signal).
- Items at the site that may require seizure, such as documents or electronic media. Describe these items in terms that are easily understood by small-unit leaders. Photographs of similar items may also be useful.
- The presence and description of on-site personnel:
 - What military unit or civilian agency controls the site?
 - Who are the occupants of the site?
 - Are there key personnel who may be encountered at the site?
 - If the site is abandoned, are displaced personnel or looters likely to be present?
 - What are the demographics of the local population?
- Logistic support to the site, which is critical if the mission includes preventing the interdiction of utilities and supplies after the site has been secured:
 - What supplies and utilities are provided at the site?
 - Where do supplies and utilities originate?
 - Where are the best locations and means of interdicting logistics to the site?
- Known or suspected downwind hazard areas, contaminated areas, training areas, test areas, and ranges near the site and an assessment of battle damage.
- Historical data from previous multinational inspections of the operational area or site.
- Agent data, suspected type, and amount of CBRN hazards.
- The target designator.
- Weather information.

- At least six elements of target identification:
 - A basic encyclopedia number or unit identification.
 - A functional classification code or suffix.
 - A name.
 - A country code.
 - Coordinates with reference datum.
 - A significance statement.
- Amplifying text (all sources, including pertinent measurement and signature intelligence information).
- Geospatial information and service-related data.
- A simulation analysis.
- Graphics:
 - Drawings.
 - Maps.
 - Gridded reference graphics.
 - Photographs.
 - Building plans.
- Site significance.
- Collection strategies.
- Command guidance:
 - Contamination avoidance and a desired end state.
 - Communications and technical reachback procedures.
 - Special sample collection, storage, and management procedures.
 - An operational exposure guide and turn-back dose rate.
- Transportation details.
- Road information.
- Analyst comments.

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 3-90.40 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army doctrine publication
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
AtN	attack the network
ATP	Army techniques publication
attn	attention
BCT	brigade combat team
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNWRS	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warning and reporting system
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CD3	control, defeat, disable and dispose
COLPRO	collective protection
CODDD	Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division
CRE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
D3A	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DA	Department of the Army
DC	District of Columbia
DOD	Department of Defense
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODS-CWMD	Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
DOS	Department of State
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
FM	field manual
G-2	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
G-3	Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations
GTA	graphic training aid
IO	information operations
ICBRN-R	international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-response

IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPE	individual protective equipment
JEM	Joint Effects Model
JFC	joint force commander
JP	joint publication
JS	Joint Staff
JWARN	Joint Warning and Reporting Network
LOE	line of effort
MCD	mass casualty decontamination
MCoE	Maneuver Center of Excellence
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP	Marine Corps working publication
MI	military intelligence
MO	Missouri
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
MSCoE	Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NBCRV	nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicle
NSS	National Security Strategy
No.	number
OE	operational environment
OEG	operational exposure guidance
OEH	occupational and environmental health
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
RM	risk management
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SF	standard form
SITREP	situation report
SME	subject matter expert
SOF	special operations forces
SOH	safety and occupational health
TACON	tactical control
TF	task force
TG	technical guide
TIM	toxic industrial material
TM	technical manual
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures
U.S.	United States

USACBRNS	United States Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School
USG	United States Government
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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ATP 3-90.40
29 June 2017

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gerald B. O'Keefe". The signature is written in a cursive style with some stylized flourishes.

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