SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 525–30
Army Strategic and Operational Readiness

This major revision, dated 9 April 2020—

- Changes the name to Army Strategic and Operational Readiness.
- Institutionalizes the fundamentals of Army Strategic Readiness (throughout).
- Contains extensive information regarding the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment and how it is reported, prepared, reviewed, and submitted (throughout).
- Adds “Leading” as a Tenet (3-2g).
History. This publication is a major revision.

Summary. This regulation prescribes the purpose, policies, procedures, and responsibilities for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing Army Strategic and Operational Readiness. It contains descriptions of both existing and maturing concepts, responsibilities, policies, and implementation procedures, and is intended to evolve as Army Strategic and Operational Readiness matures. This regulation establishes the basis for coordinated Army Strategic and Operational Readiness Assessment execution within the Department of the Army to support national objectives.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to Department of the Army Civilian employees.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity’s senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25–30 for specific guidance.

Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions in accordance with AR 11–2 and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix B).

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington DC 20310–0400.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington DC 20310–0400.

Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
This regulation defines Army Strategic and Operational Readiness, outlines assessment processes, and highlights the responsibilities for their execution.

1–2. References
See appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
See glossary.

1–4. Responsibilities
Responsibilities are listed in chapter 2.

1–5. Records management (recordkeeping) requirements
The records management requirement for all record numbers, associated forms, and reports required by this regulation are addressed in the Army Records Retention Schedule-Army (RRS–A). Detailed information for all related record numbers, forms, and reports are located in ARIMS/RRS–A at https://www.arims.army.mil. If any record numbers, forms, and reports are not current, addressed, and/or published correctly in ARIMS/RRS–A, see DA Pam 25–403 for guidance.

1–6. Other authorities
Statutory requirements in this regulation originate from Title 10 and Title 32, United States Code (USC). Title 32 provides the statutory requirements for the National Guard while operating under the command and control of the respective states.
   a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01 establishes the functions of the Department of Defense (DOD) and all of its components.
   b. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1235.12 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for ordering units and members of the Reserve Component (RC) to active duty as an operational force to support the National Defense Strategy (NDS) across the full spectrum of military functions.
   c. Department of the Army General Orders (AGO) No. 2020–01 establishes the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY)’s expectations for the functioning of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and assigns major functions and responsibilities to the Principal Officials of HQDA to assist the SECARMY in the operation and functioning of the Army.

1–7. Background
   a. Army Readiness Structure. Department of the Army senior leaders recognize the need for a comprehensive readiness assessment of the Army at the tactical (unit), operational, and strategic levels (see fig 1–1). At each level, readiness is defined and measured differently against different requirements; however, when combined, these assessments provide a complete understanding of the status of the force and the Army’s institutional abilities to provide the readiness required to accomplish the requirements of the National Military Strategy (NMS) in accordance with 10 USC and 32 USC responsibilities.
   b. Army Tactical (Unit) Readiness. Tactical (Unit) readiness is the capability of a unit to conduct its core or assigned missions. It is measured against the unit’s core designed or assigned mission force structure requirements and features quantitative measures of current resources and training as codified in AR 220–1. Unit commanders report unit readiness monthly in the Commander’s Unit Status Report (USR).
c. Army Operational Readiness. Operational readiness is the Army’s ability to provide and support Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) operational plans (OPLANs) with trained and ready forces in the quantity and with the capabilities required to achieve Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) and other operational requirements for Army forces. It is measured against the Army’s current and projected operational demand requirements in accordance with the Sustainable Readiness Process (SRP) as codified in AR 525–29. Quarterly operational readiness assessments highlight risk in the Army’s ability to generate enough ready units to meet the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) aligned readiness requirements.

d. Army Strategic Readiness. Strategic Readiness is the Army’s ability to provide adequate forces to meet the demands of the NMS. It is measured quarterly through the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment (ASRA) process (see fig 1–2) utilizing one Army and three Joint Staff mandated assessments to obtain an integrated view of current and future strategic readiness. Through Strategic Readiness Tenets (SRTs), the Army assesses leading and lagging measures and indicators to identify trends and risk in strategic and operational readiness across key Army resource areas. The Joint Staff assesses operational demand, Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), and readiness deficiencies to identify and assess risk in the Army’s performance abilities as part of the joint force. ASRAs inform Army senior leaders of critical resource decisions necessary to address and mitigate shortfalls across the near-term (0–2 years), mid-term (2–5 years) and future (>5 years) time horizons.
e. Strategic Levers. To implement decisions based on readiness assessments, Army senior leaders can mitigate or eliminate strategic and operational risk by adjusting strategic levers. Strategic levers include changes in policy, force structure, program funding, training, equipping outputs, or other actions.
Figure 1–2. Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process
f. Army Strategic Readiness Assessment. Existing readiness processes and procedures, outlined in AR 220–1 and AR 525–29, coupled with the Army Strategic Readiness concept (see fig 1–2), form the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment process. Subsequent chapters in the regulation explain these processes in detail.

1–8. Army Strategic Readiness Reviews
Continuous assessments of the current and future strategic readiness environments shape the Army’s ability to execute its mission requirements within the NMS. In general, the Strategic Readiness Update (SRU), Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR), and Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) are outputs informed by the ASRA (see chapter 4). Each output requires and integrates assessments from Army service component commands (ASCCs), Army Commands (ACOMs), Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and the Army Staff (ARSTAF) that feed into the ASRA process. Army senior leaders provide direction, guidance, and prioritization of efforts that ultimately shape desirable outcomes of Army missions in support of the NMS. Applying broad strategic guidance assists in focusing, guiding, and influencing a more definitive end state in the execution of Army objectives.

a. Joint Force Readiness Review. The JFRR, governed under CJCSI 3401.01E, is a quarterly principal assessment to the Chairman’s Readiness System that combines and analyzes unit and Combatant Command (COCOM), Service, and Combat Support Agency readiness assessments. The Army’s input to the JFRR is approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and/or the Chief of Staff prior to submission to the Joint Staff. The Army JFRR process evaluates changes in strategic readiness through the SRT’s leading and lagging measurements (see chapter 5). This process assists Army senior leaders in determining the decisions necessary to revise policy, program resources, or choose an alternate course of action (COA). Continuous parallel planning and coordination with the Joint Staff ensures that Army input to the JFRR clearly articulates applicable readiness concerns across the SRTs.

b. Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. The QRRC, governed by 10 USC 482, is a comprehensive report on the DOD’s ability to fulfill its statutory requirements, and consists of CCDR, Service, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Readiness Assessments. Prepared by the OSD for submission to Congress, the QRRC assessment includes an overall readiness assessment of the DOD’s ability to execute the NMS. Army input to the QRRC includes the following readiness indicators: Personnel Strength; Personnel Turbulence; Other Personnel Matters (accessions and recruiting quality benchmarks); Training (to include Unit Readiness and Proficiency); Logistics (Equipment Fill, Equipment Maintenance, and Supply); and Readiness of National Guard to Perform Civil Support Missions.

1–9. Forums
a. Strategic Readiness Assessment Group. The Strategic Readiness Assessment Group (SRAG) is the Army’s Readiness Reporting governance body. It convenes regularly as an Action Officer (AO)-level working group, but adds Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) sessions as necessary. The SRAG oversees policy, procedures, and system software development/maintenance. It is also a management process forum to coordinate and oversee the production of the ASRA and the SRU. This body also meets in-person as the Army Readiness Council, convening when necessary. SRAG members consist of representatives from ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, USAR, Army Secretariat, and the ARSTAF.

b. Strategic Readiness Update. The SRU is a monthly forum that allows Army senior leaders to provide clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction among SRU participants, consisting of ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, USAR, and the ARSTAF representatives (to include key strategic tenet leads). During SRU meetings, participants provide and discuss focus topics (for example, strategic risk assessment updates and mitigation strategies, operational demand, and OPLAN sourcing concerns, and so forth) to assist senior leaders in making informed decisions. This interaction promotes an early, shared understanding of strategic readiness across the Total Force, resourcing, policy, employment decisions, and other key guidance factors.

Chapter 2
Roles and Responsibilities

2–1. Assistant Secretaries of the Army
ASAs will work with the appropriate Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCSs) to ensure effective coordination within the Department of the Army on strategic readiness policies and programs in their assigned functional areas of responsibility in accordance with AGO 2020–01, and provide independent advice to the SECARMY on Army Strategic Readiness. Each responsible ASA will assign responsibilities for their staff members to assist the DCS, G–3/5/7, in completing the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment and improving Army readiness through the use of strategic readiness data. Each ASA will also coordinate with the appropriate DCS(s) to review the SRU, the JFRR, the QRRC, and other documents relevant to Army
Strategic Readiness to ensure that data is accurate, holistic, and provides the necessary information to the SECARMY and Chief of Staff of the Army.

2–2. **Office of Business Transformation**
The OBT will provide the Corporate Management Assessment for the ASRA.

2–3. **Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G–6**
The CIO/DCS, G–6 will—
   a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (general officer (GO)/senior executive service (SES)) levels.
   b. Support the SRT leads in assessing how the current and anticipated state of Army information technology capabilities and capacity will affect readiness in their domains.
   c. Provide an overall analysis of the measures and indicators in support of information technology and the Army’s network to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   d. Provide the Net-Centric portion of the ASRA narrative to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   e. Serve as Army Staff proponent for CIO/DCS, G–6 sponsored measures under the Capacity and Capability Tenet / Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) Readiness indicator.
   f. In coordination with U. S. Army Cyber Command (USARCYBER) and DAMO–CY, support DODIN–A Readiness indicator assessment process.

2–4. **Chief, National Guard Bureau**
The CNGB, directly or by delegation to the Director, Army National Guard (DARNG), will—
   a. Provide the information necessary to measure the Army as a Total Force to each SRT proponent.
   b. Assign ARNG members (quarterly) as members of the SRAG to assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 in properly assessing the overall strategic readiness of the Total Force.
   c. Support the SRT leads by providing information and assessments relevant to the ARNG in their domains.
   d. Provide data input for the Leading SRT indicators and measures to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   e. As a Land Holding Command (LHC), provide installation status reports (ISRs) on the condition of infrastructure (ISR–I), services (ISR–S), mission capacity (ISR–MC), and readiness with commander’s comments on Installation Readiness shortfalls to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

2–5. **Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1**
The DCS, G–1 will—
   a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/SES) levels.
   b. Lead the Manning SRT assessment and provide the Tenet narrative for the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   c. Lead the analysis and provide the assessment of Human Capital Management for the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   d. Provide data input for the Leading SRT indicators and measures to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   e. Ensure U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) provides data input, including military cohort Branch and Functional Area Proponent data, for the Leading SRT indicators and measures to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
   f. Provide summary for the QRRC to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

2–6. **Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2**
The DCS, G–2 will—
   a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/SES) levels.
   b. Support the Manning, Training, and Equipping Tenet leads in assessing how current and programmed intelligence manpower, training, and materiel capabilities affect readiness within their domains.
   c. Provide the Battlespace Awareness section of the JCA assessment to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

2–7. **Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7**
The DCS, G–3/5/7 will—
   a. (DAMO–ODR) Lead the assessment of Army Strategic Readiness.
   b. (DAMO–ODR) Plan, develop, and manage the SRAG.
   c. (DAMO–ODR) Collect, analyze, and synthesize strategic readiness assessment information and data in a usable format. Upon request, disseminate information and data to appropriate Department of the Army agencies, commands, Joint Staff, and government agencies.
d. (DAMO–ODR) Develop and issue guidance for the use of strategic readiness information.

e. (DAMO–ODR) Task ARSTAF agencies and the responsible ACOM, ASCC, DRU, and/or the CNGB, when applicable, to provide supplemental information and data for analyzing strategic readiness, analysis of strategic readiness status information and data, and recommendations for improving the Army’s overall Strategic Readiness.

f. (DAMO–ODR) Collect, compile, and coordinate the SRU, JFRR, QRRC, and any other readiness assessment relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.

g. (DAMO–ODR) Provide information in support of the JFRR, QRRC, SRU, and any other readiness assessment relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.

h. (DAMO–ODR) Lead the Capacity and Capability SRT to assess the sufficiency of the Army’s inventory of forces, resources, and infrastructure to execute the requirements of the NMS based on measures and indicators from all Army organizations.

i. (DAMO–ODR) Compose the Capacities and Capabilities SRT narrative for the ASRA.

j. (DAMO–ODR) Compose the Force Support, Force Application, and Command and Control assessments for the ASRA.

k. (G–38) Provide the Protection assessment for the ASRA to DAMO–ODR.

l. (DAMO–SS) Provide the Global Force Management and Building Partnerships assessments to DAMO–ODR.

m. (DAMO–TR) Lead the assessment of Army Operational Readiness and provide the Operational Demand narrative as part of the Capacity and Capability tenet to DAMO–ODR.

n. (DAMO–TR) Lead the Training SRT to assess the Army’s ability to develop, coordinate, and resource policies, strategies, and initiatives to achieve directed levels of individual, leader, and unit training readiness needed to support the NMS.

o. (DAMO–TR) Provide the Training Tenet narrative for the ASRA to DAMO–ODR.

p. (DAMO–TR) Lead the Leading SRT to assess the Army’s ability to prepare leaders to operate globally, across the range of military operations, and within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment.

q. (DAMO–TR) Provide the Leading Tenet narrative for the ASRA to DAMO–ODR.

r. (DAMO–TR) Provide the Force Preparation (JCA) assessment for the ASRA to DAMO–ODR.

s. (DAMO–TR) Provide a summary for the QRRC to DAMO–ODR.

t. (DAMO–ODR) Ensure the policies and procedures established in this regulation undergo review and revision at least every 5 years.

u. (DAMO–CY) Serve as the primary HQDA Army Staff proponent for the DODIN–A Readiness Indicator under the Capacity and Capability Tenet.

v. (DAMO–CY) Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/ SES levels).

w. (DAMO–CY) Lead DODIN–A Readiness assessments.

x. (DAMO–CY) In coordination with USARCYBER, provide readiness assessments of the DODIN–A Readiness to DAMO–ODR.

y. (DAMO–ODP) Provide the Protection portion of the ASRA narrative to DAMO–ODR.

2–8. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4

The DCS, G–4, in partnership with the ASA (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), will—

a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/ SES) levels.

b. Lead the Sustaining SRT to assess the Army’s ability to provide logistics, construction, personnel, and medical services necessary to project forces and sustain operations until successful mission completion.

c. Provide the Sustaining Tenet narrative for the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

d. Coordinate with the DCS, G–9 and provide the Mission and Tactical Logistics Assessment for Logistics Readiness Centers in the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

e. Ensure impacts to logistics and sustainment are coordinated across all programmatic decisions events and milestones with projected readiness impacts across the program objective memorandum (POM). Work in concert with relevant HQDA officials to ensure impacts are calculated and senior officials are informed of impacts and include those assessments in POM development.

f. Provide Total Force logistics assessment of units and sustainment capabilities with consideration of readiness risk to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

g. Provide summary for QRRC to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

h. In coordination with DCS, G–3, and DCS, G–8, establish strategic and operational logistics and sustainment risk reporting requirements to enable strategic risk assessments.
2–9. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8
The DCS, G–8 will—

a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/SES) levels.
b. Lead the Equipping SRT to assess the Army’s ability to provide equipment to organizations to meet the current and projected documented requirements and surge demands in support of the NMS.
c. Provide the Equipping Tenet narrative for the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
d. Provide summary for the QRRC to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
e. Coordinate programmatic decisions with projected readiness impacts across the POM. Work in concert with relevant HQDA agencies to ensure impacts are calculated and senior officials are informed of impacts, and include those assessments in POM development. Update decision briefings to Army senior leaders as part of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.
f. Provide future programmatic force readiness assessments to Army senior leaders as part of both the Army SRU process and the PPBE process, including as a special topic in the annual POM executive summary.

2–10. Chief, U.S. Army Reserve
The CAR will—

a. Support the SRT leads by providing information and assessments relevant to the USAR in their domains.
b. Assign USAR members, on a quarterly basis, as members of the SRAG to assist in properly assessing the overall strategic readiness of the Total Force.
c. Provide data input for the Leading SRT indicators and measures to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
d. Provide identification, data input, analysis, and recommendation of logistics / sustainment readiness tenet to the DCS, G–4.
e. As an LHC, provide ISR–I, ISR–SISR–MC, and Readiness with commander’s comments on Installation Readiness shortfalls.

2–11. Chief of Engineers
The COE will—

a. Provide operational engineering analysis for the ASRA to the DCS, G–4, and DCS, G–9.
b. Provide Logistics input to the DCS, G–4.

2–12. The Surgeon General
TSG will—

a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/SES) levels.
b. Provide an AO as a participating member in the Manning SRT to assist DCS, G–1.
c. Provide the Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG) narrative to the Manning Tenet to the DCS, G–1.
d. Provide OTSG’s assessment for Human Capital Management to the DCS, G–1.
e. Provide the Health assessment for the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
f. Provide input to the Sustaining Tenet including operational demand shortfalls for medical forces and capabilities to the DCS, G–4.
g. Provide operational medical analysis for the JFRR to the DCS, G–4.
h. Provide Logistics input to the DCS, G–4.

2–13. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–9
The DCS, G–9 will—

a. Participate in the SRAG at the AO, colonel (O6/GS15), and flag officer (GO/SES) levels.
b. Assess the Army’s ability to provide sustainable and secure installation infrastructure, services, and resources to enable mission, Soldier, and family readiness at enduring Army locations to meet the needs of the Army and CCDRs in support of the NMS.
c. Provide the Installation Tenet narrative for the ASRA to the DCS, G–3/5/7.
d. Provide mission/tactical Logistics input to the DCS, G–4.
e. Identify projected installation readiness impacts during the development of the POM, and coordinate programmatic decisions with HQDA officials to ensure senior officials are informed of the associated risks.
f. Provide decision briefings to Army senior leaders as part of the PPBE process.
g. Develop programmatic force readiness assessments to Army senior leaders as part of both the Army SRU process and the PPBE process for the Installation Program Evaluation Group (II PEG).
h. Provide installation analysis support for the ASRA to the DCS, G–4.
i. Provide installation analysis support for the ASRA to DAMO–TR.
j. Serve as the Program Manager for the ISR.

2–14. **Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command**
The CG, USASOC will provide support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the analysis of strategic readiness for Army Special Operations, across all of the SRTs on matters concerning Special Operations Forces.

2–15. **Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command**
The CG, FORSCOM will—
a. Provide support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the analysis of the Capacities and Capabilities, Training, and Leading SRTs, and across all of the SRTs on matters concerning FORSCOM.
b. Provide risk assessment to sustainment forces and logistics readiness analysis to DCS, G–4.

2–16. **Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command**
The CG, TRADOC will—
a. Provide support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 in the analysis of strategic readiness, concerning the Training, Leading, and Capacities and Capabilities SRTs and across all of the SRT on matters concerning TRADOC.
b. Provide sustainment forces risk assessment in accordance with applicable force structure and Defense Planning Guidance.

2–17. **Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command**
The CG, AMC will—
a. Provide support to the DCS, G–4; DCS, G–8; and DCS, G–9 in the analysis of the Equipping, Installations, and Sustaining SRTs.
b. Synchronize the distribution and redistribution of materiel to achieve the highest level of readiness for equipping for the near-term (0–2 years). This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 10–87 and AR 525–29.
c. Provide depot maintenance analysis and fleet readiness analysis for the QRRC to DCS, G–4.
d. Provide depot maintenance, Army rail, Army Prepositioned Stock (APS), supply readiness driver, and ground and aviation fleet analysis for the Sustaining Tenet in accordance with DA PAM 525–30 to DCS, G–4. As an LHC, provide ISR–I, ISR–S, ISR–MC and Readiness with commander’s comments on Installation Readiness shortfalls.

c. Provide an assessment on infrastructure required to support deployment operations to DCS, G–4 As an LHC, provide ISR–I, ISR–S, ISR–MC and Readiness with commander’s comments on Installation Readiness shortfalls.

2–18. **Commanding General, U.S. Army Installation Management Command**
The CG, IMCOM will—
a. Provide support to the DCS, G–4; DCS, G–8; and DCS, G–9 in the analysis of the installation infrastructure, facilities and services, and development and assessment of the Installation SRT.
b. Synchronize the distribution and redistribution of funding to achieve the highest level of readiness for Installation facilities and services for the near-term (0–2 years).
c. Provide Installation analysis for the QRRC and the PPBE to DCS, G–9.
d. As an LHC, provide ISR–I, ISR–S, ISR–MC, and Readiness with commander’s comments on Installation Readiness shortfalls.
e. Provide an assessment on infrastructure required to support deployment operations to DCS, G–4 As an LHC, provide ISR–I, ISR–S, ISR–MC and Readiness with commander’s comments on Installation Readiness shortfalls.

2–19. **Commanding General, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command**
The CG, SDDC will—
a. Provide an assessment of strategic Aerial Ports of Embarkation / Debarkation and Seaports of Embarkation / Debarkation as per the DPG to HQDA.
b. Provide an assessment of Defense Freight Rail Interchange Fleet to AMC, enabling AMC to report on Army Rail Enterprise to HQDA.

2–20. **Commanding General, US Army Cyber Command**
The CG, USARCYBER will—
a. Report DODIN–A Readiness assessments on a monthly basis and provide analytic support to the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–CY).
b. Serve as operational proponent to DAMO–CY for all issues and reporting related to DODIN–A Readiness.
c. Provide subject matter expertise on DODIN–A readiness support to DAMO–CY.

Chapter 3
Concepts

3–1. General
The ASRA is a process that assesses the ability of the Total Force ARNG, USAR, as well as the Regular Army (RA) operating and generating forces -to execute its role to meet the demands of the NMS.

a. The ASRA is a continuous process with a quarterly report to Army senior leaders. Through objective and subjective measures of different elements of the Army’s readiness, this process is used to determine the degree to which the Army can provide and sustain forces to meet the demands of the NMS over different time horizons.

b. The ASRA provides a comprehensive assessment that includes efforts to mitigate potential problems in Army readiness. The ASRA informs Senior Leader decisions, actions, and other requirements and informs Congress, OSD, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) of future Army readiness projections.

c. Sustainable Readiness is the Army's force generation process (see AR 525–29). The Army uses it to generate trained and ready units for known operational requirements, while simultaneously creating the adequate depth necessary to remain optimally postured to deploy rapidly for unforeseen contingencies. A main goal of Sustainable Readiness is to inform the Army’s resource decisions to maximize readiness of the force to meet known and contingency demands. For the first Fiscal Year of the Army’s next POM, Sustainable Readiness sets Army requirements for unit readiness (that is, readiness objectives for types of forces) and for operational readiness (that is, force readiness objectives) that optimize the Army’s ability to meet the timelines for readiness units in CCDR OPLANs as required by Defense Planning Guidance.

3–2. Key terminology and lexicon
The terminology and lexicon used in this policy will help facilitate clear, effective, and consistent internal and external communications regarding the Army’s strategic readiness assessment process and procedures. (Note: Some terms do not translate universally across the DOD or the Joint Staff; some terms are expressly used by the Army and for the purposes of this publication).

a. Army Strategic Readiness. Army Strategic Readiness is the Army’s ability to provide adequate forces to meet the demands of the NMS. The NMS describes the ways and means by which our military supports enduring national interests as articulated in the National Security Strategy and accomplishes the defense objectives in the NDS.

b. Total Force. The Total Force refers to the service in its entirety, encompassing all activities, organizations (AC, ARNG, and USAR), personnel (military and Army Civilians), contractors and contract services, installations, and so on, which support and carry out the Army’s 10 USC functions.

c. Operating forces. Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof (see AR 220–1).

d. Generating force. The generating force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by Joint force commanders (see AR 220–1).

e. Future readiness. Future readiness is an assessment of the Army’s operational and strategic readiness levels in the mid-term (2–5 years). This projection is based primarily on assumptions made about future requirements, funding, and resourcing; and incorporates Army strategic planning guidance for possible emergent events that could adversely affect the expected or desired readiness status of the Army (Capacities and Capabilities).

f. Strategic levers. These are measures the Army can take, upon direction, to mitigate possible readiness shortfalls. Strategic levers are further described in chapter 5. Such actions include, but are not limited to, changes to policy, resourcing, and funding.

g. Strategic Readiness Tenets. The Army SRTs are: Manning; Equipping; Sustaining; Training; Leading; Installations; and Capacities and Capabilities. Each readiness tenet contains measureable objectives and qualitative indicators which provide leading indicators of future changes in readiness. Some indicators have relationships with others, either within the tenet or across two or more tenets. These relationships are based on the use of the strategic levers.

(1) Manning. The Army’s ability to man the Total Force (Regular Army, Reserve Component, and Civilians) with qualified personnel in the right grade and skill set in support of the NMS. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) Personnel Structure. Documented Personnel requirements and authorizations. The Personnel Management Authorizations Document and/or Updated Authorizations Document are the G-1’s authoritative sources of authorizations to match personnel to documented requirements for Military personnel. Comparing authorizations to the Force Structure Allowance (FSA) provides a metric of how well authorizations align with end strength. The FSA is the congressionally-mandated or
programmed end strength minus an assumed quantity of Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (typically 13% of end strength) and represents the maximum authorization level compatible with the end strength. The Army Civilian Personnel System, approved Tables of Distribution and Analysis (TDA's), and the current fiscal year President’s Budget are used to match onboard personnel to approved requirements and authorizations for civilian personnel.

(b) Acquire. Ensure the Army is manned with the proper number of military and civilian personnel in the requisite grade and skill set, within the manpower budget and Federal law. Acquire has three important interrelated dimensions.

1. Manpower Management. The first dimension of acquire develops forecasts and establishes manpower targets for accession, attrition management, retention, and promotion.

2. Accession, Attrition, and Retention Management. The second dimension converts the accession and retention targets to missions and ensures that they are effectively executed by the responsible agency.

3. Training Integration. The third dimension establishes training programs and ensures an efficient flow of trainees and students.

(c) Employ. The function of assigning personnel to organizations based on Army requirements and priorities. This includes the Army’s ability to man units with deployable, ready personnel. While this is a dynamic indicator, some of the sub-measures may include adherence to AC Manning Guidance, individual deployability measures, unit readiness measures, personal readiness and resiliency, and fill of mission critical civilian occupations.

(d) Retain. Similar and interrelated to Acquire, this function ensures that the Army is staffed with quality military and civilian personnel in the right grades and skills and within the manpower budget to meet the Army’s requirements.

(2) Equipping. The Army’s ability to provide equipment to organizations to meet the current and projected documented requirements, and to meet surge demands in support of the NMS. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) Equipment On Hand overall. Equipment On Hand (EOH) is the percentage of fill for equipment available that enables the unit to conduct its doctrinal mission as published in appropriate authorization documents.

(b) Pacing Item Equipment on Hand. Pacing Item Equipment on Hand (PI–EOH) is a subset of EOH that focuses on the fill percentage for available equipment identified as Equipment Readiness Code-P (ERC–P) that is critical for the unit to accomplish its doctrinal mission.

(c) Equipment Readiness Code-P Equipment Modernization. The status of the Army to assess the level and percentage of ERC–P equipment fielding that addresses:

1. The ERC–P equipment that has exceeded its economic useful life.
2. The ERC–P equipment that is not being procured and fielded due to fiscal realities and adjustments in priorities.
3. The velocity of fielding new ERC–P equipment to units ensuring overmatch capabilities.

(3) Sustaining. The Army’s ability to provide logistics, engineering capabilities, personnel, and medical services necessary to maintain operations until mission completion. This is accomplished through the integration of national and global resources and ensures Army forces are physically available and properly equipped, at the right place and time, capable of interoperability in a Joint Interagency Multinational environment in support of the NMS. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) Maintain Army Readiness. The sufficiency of logistics provided to maintain the Army’s capability to conduct the full range of military operations in support of the NMS. Generating logistics capabilities includes analysis of all actions taken to preserve materiel (aviation, combat, and support systems) in a serviceable condition or restore it to serviceability, through both field and sustainment maintenance; ammunition materiel required to accomplish the mission; and logistics information systems. The resulting analysis provides an indicator of the logistics enterprise’s ability to provide a continuous flow of resources from the strategic base to the maneuver forces maintaining combat readiness, strength, and endurance.

(b) Project the Force. The Army’s ability to project national power from the continental United States or outside the continental United States in response to requirements in support of military operations. This includes analysis of available data and readiness information measuring the ability of Army forces to move to and from ports, port management, and mobilization processes. This indicator measures the ability of the Generating Force to rapidly respond to the CCDR’s requirements, position contingency forces in theater to meet a range of crisis situations, and set conditions for mission success.

(c) Set Theater Sustainment. The ability to conduct expeditionary logistics required to support initial and austere operations. This includes measuring the logistics enterprise’s ability to conduct Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration and establish the Distribution Network supporting needed to execute the depth and duration of Army operations, through war reserves and strategic surge. It includes assessments of key logistics enabler forces; the integration of commercial and contractor support; and materiel, force structure, and programs to provide for essential sustainment services.

(d) Sustain Unified Land Operations. The logistics enterprise’s resiliency to exploit, maintain, and retain a logistical and resourcing advantage in support of extended land operations. It includes assessments of the long-term sustainment,
forces, and the impacts of interoperability among other Military Services and Multi-national partners.

(4) Training. The Army’s ability to develop, coordinate, and resource the policies and strategies needed to achieve directed levels of individual, leader, unit, and force training readiness. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) Collective Training. Extent to which training resources enable operating forces to satisfy requirements of the NMS with acceptable levels of risk.

(b) Institutional Training. The ability to achieve fill rates in Initial Entry Training/Military Occupational Specialty/functional, professional military education, and civilian education within the institutional training base and personnel readiness required to meet Army readiness requirements.

(c) Training Support. The ability to provide sufficient live, virtual/gaming, and constructive training enablers through the Army’s Training Support System products, services, and facilities to create training conditions that realistically portray the operational environment and enable mission essential task list (METL) based operational training strategies.

(5) Leading. The Army’s ability to provide leadership as the multiplying and unifying element of combat power in executing the requirements of the NMS. The preparation of Army leaders to operate globally, across the range of military operations, and within the JIIM environment is achieved through training, education, and experience. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) Qualification. The ability of the Army to support/enable the development of specific skills and knowledge required of a modified table of organization and equipment or TDA position through initial military training, functional training, and specialized education.

(b) Education. The ability of the Army to provide and support formal instruction in civilian and military institutions to impart knowledge and facilitate intellectual development. The purpose of education is to enhance an individual’s ability to understand challenging and uncertain situations.

(c) Experience. The ability of the Army to provide assignments and utilization to develop competence through repeated exposure and requirement to operate in simulated and real-world situations. Expertise develops in subject matter areas as depth of experience increases in that specific area. Experience enhances an individual’s ability to perform in challenging and uncertain situations.

(6) Installations. The ability to provide sustainable and secure installation infrastructure, services, and resources to enable Mission Readiness, Soldier and Family Readiness, and Installation Capacity at Army locations world-wide to meet the needs of the Army and the CCDRs in support of the NMS. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) Mission Readiness. The ability to provide installation infrastructure and services to support the missions of assigned and mobilized units (quality, quantity, functionality).

(b) Soldier and Family Readiness. The ability to provide infrastructure and services that allow Soldiers to focus on the mission.

(c) Installation Capacity. The ability to provide assured access to energy, water, land, and air in the quantity and quality required to support current and future missions.

(7) Capacity and Capability. The Capacity and Capability assessment is the centerpiece of the Army’s strategic readiness assessment process. No other tenet evaluates the Army’s ability to generate the requisite forces in both sufficiency and quality to meet CCDR requirements. As such, this assessment may incorporate data points from other tenets. In broad terms, Capacity is a measurement of the Army’s inventory of available forces to execute the requirements of the NDS, NMS, and DPG. This is influenced by the dispersion of forces across the categories of assigned, allocated, and Service retained; and balanced across the four components (RA, ARNG, USAR, and APS). The Capacity assessment is not intended to replicate holistic Total Army Assessments or other evaluations; rather it is intended to measure the availability of the current and POM force to achieve current, planned, and contingency missions. The Capability portion of the assessment complements the sufficiency evaluation by providing a qualitative assessment that incorporates the current and programmed readiness of the available forces. While the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process and Capacity assessments may indicate a sufficient force, the Capability assessment is an evaluation of the current readiness and other factors that evaluate the quality of the Force that is available for employment. Assessed by the following indicators:

(a) War Time Readiness. The Army’s ability to provide capabilities to the Joint Force in support of SecDef approved OPLANS by generating sufficient forces to conduct conclusive land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment. This indicator evaluates the totality of the capabilities provided by the Army across multiple domains, components, and warfighting functions. This indicator is measured primarily through the Operational Demand Model (ODM)
and other outputs from the Sustainable Readiness process. An example of a potential sub-measure would be the ability of the Army to meet the readiness objectives found in the ODM.

(b) Force Generation The Army’s capability in bringing the Total Force to a state of readiness for war, contingency, or national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the RC, assembling, organizing, and training personnel and units, and energizing the industrial infrastructure to provide required supplies and materiel in support of ongoing or anticipated operations. Here again, a potential example would be the sufficiency of the Army’s mobilization capacity to fulfill the demands of not just annual GFMAP missions, but also surge requirements for major war plans.

(c) Department of Defense Information Network-A Readiness. The ability of the DODIN–A to enable mission command and those actions taken to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain DOD communications systems and networks in a way that creates and preserves data availability, integrity, confidentiality, as well as user/entity authentication and non-repudiation.

h. Strategic Readiness Tenet proponents. These are the key participating staff sections in the SRAG. SRT proponents are assigned specific roles and responsibilities (see chap 2). The proponents are the subject matter experts in their respective tenet areas as depicted in table 4–1.

3–3. Process
Using the SRTs as a starting point, the SRT proponents will work with the ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, ARNG, and the USAR (see fig 3–1) to identify key measures and indicators that influence the overall readiness of the Army. The organizations then provide their findings for each measure and indicator to the HQDA proponent for the relevant SRT (see para 5–4). The Army Strategic Readiness process is not exclusive to those ARSTAF sections that are proponents of a particular SRT. In order to obtain an accurate measure of the Army, at the strategic level, all primary ARSTAF must participate in the SRAG at all levels: AO, colonel, and GO/SES. Other agencies outside of the primary staff may participate in the SRAG, as deemed necessary by the DCS, G–3/5/7.

a. Tenet Leads. HQDA proponents are then responsible for aggregating the results of each of the measures and indicators, determining the effects on the overall readiness of the Army, and developing a risk assessment of those impacts from the perspective of their tenet. Each SRT proponent will then provide their analysis to the SRAG.

(1) Upon receiving each HQDA proponent’s input, the SRAG provides an overall assessment of Army strategic readiness while considering each of the seven SRTs together, any other data, trends, or indicators from other ARSTAF sections, and any other source needed to render an overall strategic assessment of the Army. From this analysis, combined with military judgment, the SRAG develops an overall ASRA.

(2) The ASRA provides Army senior leaders a holistic view of readiness across the Army. This allows Army senior leaders to address readiness concerns by employing appropriate strategic levers to influence changes in policy and budgeting in order to address problems in Army Strategic Readiness.
b. Indicators and measures.

(1) Indicators  Trends or objective measures that indicate the state or level of organizational readiness. Organizations in the ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, ARNG, and USAR must identify their respective key indicators of readiness that depict a positive or negative trend for use as a tool to determine future readiness. The key indicators provided must remain consistent over time in order to develop trends that facilitate the analysis.

(2) Measures  Highly objective status assessments calculated from authoritative data. ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, ARNG, and USAR have established measures within their organizations that provide a status for each indicator.

c. Strategic Readiness Assessment Group.

(1) The SRAG is led by the Operations Directorate, DCS, G–3/5/7.
Chapter 4
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process

4–1. Introduction
The ASRA process is a HQDA process that relies on inputs from the Total Force to assess and produce a strategic assessment of the Army’s Total Force readiness (see fig 4–1). Vetted through the SRAG, it produces a collaborative and comprehensive strategic assessment of current and future readiness. The assessment is accomplished by analyzing and assessing key strategic level measures and indicators. Army organizations, utilizing existing respective systems and processes, identify macro level measures and indicators that influence current and future readiness, and submit these measures and indicators to the proponents of the SRTs for further analysis. Upon completion of their analysis, the SRT proponents convene the SRAG, led by the DCS, G–3/5/7, Army Readiness Division (DAMO–ODR), as depicted in figure 4–1.

4–2. Organization input
Through existing systems and processes, organizations across the Total Force are responsible for determining their respective readiness by assessing their SRT driven key measures and indicators. The measures and indicators must reflect impacts by any of the seven strategic readiness tenets on the current and future readiness of the organization. Reporting organizations submit their strategic level input to the respective readiness tenet proponent on the ARSTAF (see table 4–1 and fig 4–1).
4–3. Measures and indicators
Measures and indicators can reflect any of the following characteristics: objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective. The measures and indicators must reflect impacts on readiness at a strategic level, and must closely relate to the seven SRTs. Submissions from organizations may relate to one or many SRTs. Organizations will submit information for consideration that may not fit perfectly within the tenets, but is of key strategic concern to the respective organization. SRT proponents and the SRAG will collaborate with the submitting organizations to ensure clarity of information in order to complete the analysis. The SRT proponents and SRAG, over time, will refine and standardize the measures and indicators for all ACOMs and agencies.

4–4. Primary and supporting strategic readiness tenet proponents
The primary SRT proponents are representatives from the ARSTAF as depicted in table 4–1. The ARSTAF proponents are responsible for collecting, reviewing, processing, and adjudicating the submitted strategic measures and indicators. The proponents will conduct their respective analysis and prepare a preliminary assessment for review and discussion at the AO-level SRAG. Supporting SRT proponents, in the development of the ASRA, are organizations external to the ARSTAF that are tasked to support the ARSTAF in matters pertaining to strategic readiness. Table 4–1 reflects the alignment of these supporting agencies with the ARSTAF proponents and the associated tenet. The efforts and collaboration between the primary and supporting SRT proponents will enhance the overall development of the ASRA.

| Table 4–1 | Army Strategic Readiness tenet proponents and/or supporting proponents |
| Readiness Tenets | ARSTAF Proponent | Supporting Proponent |
| Manning | DCS, G–1 | DCS G–2, USAR, ARNG, OTSG, HRC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and USASOC |
| Equipping | DCS, G–8 | DCS, G–2; AMC, USAR, ARNG, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and USASOC |
| Sustaining | DCS, G–4 | AMC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, USAR, ARNG, OTSG, USASOC, DCS, G–9, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and SDDC |
| Training | DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR) | DCS, G–2; TRADOC, ARNG, USAR, FORSCOM, USASOC, and DCS, G–9 |
| Leading | DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR) | DCS, G–1; ARNG; USAR; FORSCOM, TRADOC, USASOC, and HRC |
| Installations | DCS, G–9 | U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USAR, ARNG, FORSCOM, TRADOC, USASOC, AMC, DCS, ASCCs, DRUs, and ARSTAF |

4–5. Proponent analysis
The proponent analysis conducted at the strategic level informs the determination of current and future impacts on readiness. The preliminary assessment will include: a problem statement, impacts on readiness (current and future), COAs, COA analyses, conclusions, recommendations, and way ahead.

4–6. Strategic Readiness Assessment Group
a. The SRAG is the forum for the formal analysis, review, development, and presentation of the approved ASRA. As previously stated, the SRAG convenes at three levels: AO, CoC, and GOSC. Representatives at the AO level develop the formal assessment for presentation to the CoC for additional guidance, input, and approval consensus. After approval by the CoC, the staff prepares the formal assessment for presentation to the GOSC.
b. The DCS, G–3/5/7, (DAMO–OD) is the proponent for the SRAG forums. The Army Readiness Division is responsible for the coordination, facilitation, and presentation for all levels of the SRAG. The Director of DAMO–OD serves as the host for the SRAG GOSC. The permanent members of the SRAG will consist of two representatives (primary and alternate) of the SRT proponents and other invited stakeholders from the ARSTAF, identified by the SRAG, on a case by case basis.

4–7. The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment
a. The ASRA is a quarterly comprehensive analysis of the strategic readiness levels across the Total Force. This assessment combines the strategic measures and indicator assessments from the SRTs and any other strategic information. The intent of this assessment is to portray a holistic view of current, future, and projected readiness, expressed in the near-term, mid-term, and far-term future.

b. The ASRA is narrative in format and submitted with supporting data. It extends the current view with a future and projected outlook. The ASRA combines objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective data and information.

c. The utility of the ASRA is broader in scope than any current process. Not only does it provide the strategic readiness view of the Total Force for Army senior leaders, but it also informs external audiences and specific statutory requirements.

Chapter 5
Resourcing and Strategic Levers

5–1. General
The Army can mitigate strategic readiness shortfalls through various policy or strategy adjustments across the SRTs identified in chapter 4, as well as by other executable decisions implemented by Army senior leaders. Following an assessment by the Army SRAG, Army senior leaders may re-prioritize or re-program resources to mitigate readiness shortfalls. Additional strategic levers, from changes in force structure and program funding to adjustments in training and equipping outputs beyond the unit level, are potential mitigation actions available for use to improve the Army’s readiness in key areas.

5–2. Resourcing
a. At the strategic level, the Army often addresses or rectifies readiness deficiencies through: the Army Strategic Plan, Army Planning Guidance, the Army Campaign Plan, and the Army Campaign Support Plan (ACSP). These are the most notable examples through which the Army can effect readiness over the near and mid-term future. The ACSP addresses the shaping of the future Army and addresses concerns from across all seven SRTs for near-term, mid-term, and long-term planning.

b. The ASRA also provides analyses of projected readiness trends informed by concurrent leading indicators across the SRTs. Each readiness tenet contains measurable objective and qualitative indicators which forecast change in readiness. For each of these measures, there are actions the Army can take to adjust and mitigate potential readiness shortfalls (see Table 5–1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 5–1 Leading indicators and strategic levers</th>
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<td>Readiness Tenets</td>
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| | | Changes to Army organization structure and loca-
| Sustaining | Maintain Army Readiness | Adjustments to policy and legislative requirement |
| | Project the Force | |
Table 5–1
Leading indicators and strategic levers—Continued

| Set Theater Sustainment  | Budgets or funding levels informed through the POM/SPAR process  |
| Sustain Unified Land Operations  | Force structure adjustments through the TAA process and adjustments to AC/RC units  |

| Training  | Collective training  |
| Institutional training  | Adjustments to operational tempo (OPTEMPO) funding  |
| Training support  | Adjustments to training strategies/training support system  |
|  | Adjustments to policy and doctrine  |
|  | Adjustments to priorities and requirements  |

| Leading  | Qualification  |
| Education  | Adjustments to force structure, training, education, personnel, and assignment policies  |
| Experience  | Adjustments to resourcing, priorities, and requirements  |
|  | Adjustments to individual and collective training opportunities, education opportunities, and implementation or modifications of leadership or leader development programs and initiatives  |

| Installations  | Mission readiness  |
| Soldier and Family Readiness  | Adjustments to installation policies, regulations, and doctrine  |
| Installation Capacity  | Adjustments to Army facility or service standards (quantity, quality, or eligibility parameters)  |
|  | Adjustments to Facility Investment Strategy (FIS) and annual Facility Investment Guidance (FIG) Project prioritization  |
|  | PPBE Funding Allocations and Reallocations at Mid-Year and End of Year (Reviews)  |

| Capacity and Capability  | War Time Readiness  |
| Force Generation  | Adjustments to policy and doctrine  |
| DODIN–A Readiness  | Adjustments to force structure  |
|  | Adjustments to resourcing, priorities, and requirements  |
|  | Adjustments to future modernization, and science and technology investments  |

5–3. Strategic levers

Strategic levers serve to influence or mitigate risks posed by readiness deficiencies at the strategic level. While financial resources represent one type of strategic response, Army senior leaders and other decision-making authorities possess a range of other mechanisms to effect readiness. The foregoing actions are the primary tools available to the SRAG and are commensurate with the seven SRTs discussed in chapter 4. While budgetary and programming activities are not one of the seven SRTs, the impact of its reach warrants inclusion as a strategic response.

a. Manning

(1) Manning levers include a wide range of personnel policy (Accessions, Retention, Recruitment), RA/RC Manning Guidance, force structure changes, and the implementation or cancellation/delay/reduction of boards (promotion selectivity, officer separation, qualitative service program) for all Military personnel. Manning levers for civilians are greatly influenced by strategic levers outside the Manning tenet (for example, Code of Federal Regulations Title V, TAA, PPBE). Many of these levers are reviewed on a recurring basis by G–1 subject matter experts who provide recommendations to the DCS, G–1 for implementation guidance.

(2) Senior Army leader input to the Total Force analysis process, the programming and budgeting process, and resulting adjustments to force structure are reflected in the Army structure and force design updates.

(3) Changes and adjustments to the Army’s future structure effect readiness across manning, training, and equipping functional areas at various “aim points” along the sustainable readiness process that produces trained and ready Army units to meet COCOM operational requirements.
b. Equipping
(1) SPAR and POM process to prioritize limited funding.
(2) Relative priority of units as found in the IRPL.
(3) Changes to Army organization structure and locations.
c. Sustaining
(1) Adjustments to policy and legislative requirements.
(2) Budgets or funding levels informed through the POM/SPAR process.
(3) Force structure adjustments through the TAA process and adjustments to AC/RC units.
d. Training
Army training proficiency level requirements are identified through the operational demand validation board to meet future Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) requirements of the CDRs. The ability of units to meet their TPFDD requirements is significantly impacted by their funded levels. Impacts to training readiness are effected through:
(1) Adjustments to OPTEMPO funding.
(2) Adjustments to training strategies and associated training support system.
(3) Adjustments to policy and doctrine.
(4) Adjustments to priorities and requirements.
e. Leading
The preparation of Army leaders is effected through:
(1) Adjustments to force structure, training, education, and personnel and assignment policies.
(2) Adjustments to resourcing, priorities, and requirements.
(3) Adjustments to individual and collective training opportunities, education opportunities, and implementing or modifications to leadership or leader development programs and initiatives.
f. Installations
(1) Installation policies, regulations, and doctrine.
(2) Army facility or service standards (quantity, quality, or eligibility parameters).
(3) FIS and FIG.
(4) Project Prioritization.
(5) PPBE.
(6) Army Programmed Funding, Funding Allocations and Reallocations during year of execution.
g. Capacities and Capabilities
(1) Adjustments to policy and doctrine.
(2) Adjustments to force structure.
(3) Adjustments to resourcing, priorities, and requirements.
(4) Adjustments to future modernization, and science and technology investments.
h. Budgetary and/or programming
Army’s PPBE process provides many opportunities to adjust resourcing to impact future Army readiness. Budget execution decisions, programmatic guidance, and funding adjustments reflected in the Army POM effect readiness across the Army’s 10 USC functions within the program evaluation groups over the future-years defense program and PPBE cycle.

5–4. Conclusion
Prescriptive approaches to readiness deficiencies are often cross-cutting and interdependent, requiring approval authority beyond the unit, proponent, or organizational levels. Impacts to one SRT often affect another, in which case, the ARSTAF at DCS, G–3/5/7 serves as proponent for strategic level implementation. Risk mitigation strategies and resourcing actions must also conform to statutory and regulatory provisions. While the Army is afforded the flexibility to implement various risk reduction measures or commit/reduce resources across the SRTs, policy changes at the strategic level will require Army Secretariat and/or Congressional action.
Appendix A

References

Section I
Required Publications

AR 220–1
Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies (Cited in para 1–7b.)

10 USC
Armed Forces (Cited in para 1–6.)

32 USC
National Guard (Cited in para 1–6.)

Section II
Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication. DOD publications are available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/. USCs are available at http://uscode.house.gov/.

AGO 2020–01
Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army

AR 10–87
Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units

AR 11–2
Managers’ Internal Control Program

AR 25–30
Army Publishing Program

AR 71–32
Force Development and Documentation Consolidated Policies

AR 500–5
Army Mobilization

AR 525–29
Army Force Generation

AR 525–93
Army Deployment and Redeployment

CJCSI 3401.01E
Joint Combat Capability Assessment (Available at https://www.jcs.mil/.)

DA Pam 25–403
Guide to Recordkeeping in the Army

DA Pam 525–30
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Procedures

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Available at https://www.jcs.mil/.)

DODD 5100.01
Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

DODD 7730.65
Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)

DODI 1235.12
Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)
JP 1
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 3–28
Defense Support of Civil Authorities

National Defense Authorization Act (current fiscal year)
(Available at http://www.gpo.gov/)

10 USC 221
Future-years defense program: submission to Congress; consistency in budgeting

10 USC 482
Quarterly reports: personnel and unit readiness

Section III
Prescribed Forms
This section contains no entries.

Section IV
Referenced Forms
Unless otherwise indicated, DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website (https://armypubs.army.mil).

DA Form 11–2
Internal Control Evaluation Certification

DA Form 2028
Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
Appendix B

Internal Control Evaluation

B-1. Function
The function covered by this evaluation is Army Strategic and Operational Readiness.

B-2. Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation is to assist the DCS, G–3/5/7 in evaluating the key internal controls listed below. It is intended as a guide and does not cover all controls.

B-3. Instructions
Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation, or other). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action identified in supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 11–2 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).

B-4. Test questions
   a. Is this regulation reviewed at least once every 5 years and updated as necessary?
   b. Are the officials responsible for Army Strategic and Operational Readiness oversight knowledgeable regarding the provisions of this regulation and is this regulation and other required references available and in use?
   c. If applicable, were any published instructions that supplement the provisions of this regulation coordinated with and/or approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) in accordance with this regulation?
   d. Do the processes developed to produce the ASRA adequately provide the framework for SRT proponents to strategically measure their respective tenet(s)?

B-5. Supersession
This checklist replaces the evaluation checklist for Army Strategic and Operational Readiness published in AR 525–30, dated 3 June 2014.

B-6. Comments
Help make this a better tool for evaluation of internal controls. Submit comments to the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.
Glossary

Section I

Abbreviations

ACOM
Army command

ACSP
Army Campaign Support Plan

AGO
Army General Orders

AMC
U.S. Army Materiel Command

AO
action officer

APS
Army Prepositioned Stock

AR
Army regulation

ARNG
Army National Guard

ARSTAF
Army Staff

ASA
Assistant Secretary of the Army

ASCC
Army service component commands

ASRA
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment

CAR
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve

CCDR
Combatant Commander

CG
commanding general

CIO
Chief Information Officer

CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs instruction

CNGB
Chief, National Guard Bureau

COA
course of action

CoC
Council of Colonels
**COCOM**  
Combatant Command

**COE**  
Chief of Engineers

**COMPO**  
Component

**DA Form**  
Department of the Army form

**DCS**  
Deputy Chief of Staff

**DCS, G–1**  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1

**DCS, G–2**  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2

**DCS, G–3/5/7**  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7

**DCS, G–4**  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4

**DCS, G–8**  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8

**DCS, G–9**  
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–9

**DOD**  
Department of Defense

**DODD**  
Department of Defense Directive

**DODIN**  
Department of Defense Information Network

**DPG**  
Defense Planning Guidance

**DRU**  
Direct Reporting Unit

**EOH**  
Equipment on Hand

**ERC–P**  
Equipment Readiness Code-P

**FIG**  
Facility Investment Guidance

**FIS**  
Facility Investment Strategy

**FORSCOM**  
U.S. Army Forces Command

**FSA**  
Force Structure Allowance

**GFMAP**  
Global Force Management Allocation Plan
GO
General Officer

GOSC
General Officer Steering Committee

HQDA
Headquarters, Department of the Army

HRC
Human Resources Command

IMCOM
Installation Management Command

IRPL
Integrated Requirements Prioritization List

ISR
installation status report

ISR–I
installation status report–infrastructure

ISR–MC
installation status report–mission capacity

ISR–S
installation status report–services

JCA
Joint Capability Area

JFRR
Joint Force Readiness Review

JIIM
Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational

JP
Joint publication

LHC
Land Holding Command

METL
mission essential task list

NDS
National Defense Strategy

NMS
National Military Strategy

OBT
Office of Business Transformation

ODM
Operational Demand Model

OPLAN
operational plan

OPTEMPO
operational tempo

OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTSG
Office of The Surgeon General

POM
Program Objective Memorandum

PPBE
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

QRRC
Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

RA
Regular Army

RC
Reserve Component

SDDC
[Military] Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

SECARMY
Secretary of the Army

SES
Senior Executive Service

SPAR
Strategic Portfolio Assessment and Review

SRAG
Strategic Readiness Assessment Group

SRP
Sustainable Readiness Process

SRT
Strategic Readiness Tenet

SRU
Strategic Readiness Update

TAA
Total Army Analysis

TDA
Tables of Distribution and Analysis

TPFDD
Time Phased Force Deployment Data

TRADOC
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSG
The Surgeon General

USAR
U.S. Army Reserve

USARCYBER
U.S. Army Cyber Command

USASOC
U.S. Army Special Operations Command

USC
United States Code
USR
Unit Status Report

Section II

Terms

Army Command
An Army force designated by the SECARMY, performing multiple Army 10 USC functions across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control.

Army force generation
A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional CCDR requirements (see AR 525–29).

Army National Guard
As used in this regulation, ARNG describes Army units under the control of the individual States and Territories that become a component of the Army when in the service of the United States. Also, those Army organizations designated as force structure COMPO 2.

Army National Guard of the United States
As used in this regulation, the Army National Guard of the United States describes federally recognized Army units consisting of members of the ARNG who have been mobilized and come under the control of Federal authorities.

Army Service Component Command
An Army force designated by the SECARMY, composed primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component for a CCDR. If designated by the CCDR, it serves as a Joint Force Land Component Command or Joint task force. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with operational control and administrative control (see AR 10–87).

Army Service Component Headquarters
An Army headquarters designated by the SECARMY to support sub-unified commands (see AR 10–87).

Assigned mission
An operational requirement that a unit is formally assigned to a plan for, prepare for, or to execute.

Assigned mission level
The assigned mission level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish its primary assigned mission. The assigned mission levels are further explained in AR 220–1.

Capability
The Army’s ability to achieve desired effects with ready units, organizations, and systems to meet the requirements of the NMS.

Capacity
Sufficient inventory of Army forces to execute the requirements of the NMS.

Category level
The category level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit’s ability to accomplish/provide core functions/designed capabilities and to execute decisive action as represented in its METL. This overall assessment is derived by considering the current status of four measured areas-personnel, equipment-on hand, equipment readiness/serviceability and training-that indicate the availability status of resources (personnel and equipment) and unit training proficiency measured against the requirements and capabilities established by the unit’s modification table of organization and equipment.

Civil support
DOD support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities (DODD 3025.18 and JP 3–28).

Combatant command
A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments. The organization is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Also called unified COCOM (see JP 1).
Command authority
The authority over a subordinate unit/element that enables the higher unit to task organize and direct that subordinate unit/element for operations in accordance with the Army command relationships defined in Army doctrine (that is, organic, attached, and operational control).

Critical dual use equipment items
Critical dual use equipment items are those equipment items that support both the operational requirements of Army units (COMPO 1, COMPO 2, and COMPO 3) and that are necessary to enable Army units (COMPO 1, COMPO 2, and COMPO 3) and personnel to assist civil authorities in responses to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters as identified in national planning scenarios (that is, facilitate defense support to civilian authorities).

Decisive action
The Army’s ability to provide capabilities to the Joint force to conduct conclusive land operations through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations (or defense support of civil authorities) appropriate to the mission and environment.

Direct reporting unit
An Army organization composed of one or more units with institutional or operational functions; designated by the SECARMY; providing broad general support to the Army in a normally single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. Direct reporting units report directly to a HQDA principal and/or ACOM and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army (see AR 10–87).

Equipment readiness and/or serviceability
A logistic indicator that portrays the combined impact of equipment shortages and maintenance shortfalls in a unit’s ability to meet wartime requirements. (Note: the term “equipment serviceability” is used at the Joint level).

Expeditionary
The Army (with support from Joint Force) provides capabilities to deploy combined arms forces in austere locations capable of conducting operations immediately upon arrival.

Future–Years Defense Program
A requirement under 10 USC 221 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress each year, at or about the time that the President’s budget is submitted to Congress, a future-years defense program (including associated annexes) reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary to support the programs, projects, and activities of the DOD included in that budget. Any such future-years defense program will cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is submitted and at least the four succeeding fiscal years (for a total of 5 years).

Generating force
The generating force mans, trains, equips, deploys, and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. The generating force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operating forces of the Army. The generating force is also the Army’s principal interface with the commercial sector. Our Nation’s industrial base provides equipment and sustainment for the Army, which is managed by the various headquarters of the generating force.

Indicator
A measure or combination of measures which articulate a trend on the current or projected state of an organization’s readiness. A leading indicator is typically “input” oriented, hard to measure, but inherently forward looking in nature, providing the information necessary to influence the future state. A lagging indicator is typically “output” oriented, easy to measure, essential for charting progress, but of limited value with respect to predicting the influencing the future state.

Land Holding Commands
Commands with Real Property accountability and Real Property Maintenance responsibilities. The Army’s four major LHCs that receive OSD-modeled Real Property Sustainment funds based on the Real Property Inventory are: Installation Management Command, US Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Army Materiel Command (Depots and Ammunition Plants). LHCs are responsible to provide garrison staffs and garrison commanders (or similar accountable positions) responsible for ISR and USR reporting. This includes reporting assessment of ability to accomplish Mission Essential Tasks and to report any readiness issues.

Lever
An option available to Senior Leaders to mitigate an identified strategic readiness shortfall.

Major headquarters
An Army headquarters higher than battalion level.
Major unit
An Army unit larger than battalion size.

Measurement
A status assessment that is objective because it is calculated from authoritative data.

Metric
A quantitative, objective, or empirical data point that supports a standard of measurement.

Military risk
Military risk is composed of the risk to mission assessed by the CCMD, risk to the force assessed by the Services, and risk to potential future operations.

Mission
The task together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military organizations, a duty assigned to an individual or organization; a task (see DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Mission essential task list
A compilation of collective mission essential tasks, which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission. Also see standardized METL.

Mobilization
Army capabilities for bringing the Total Force to a state of readiness for war, contingency, or national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the RC, assembling, organizing, and training personnel and units, and energizing the industrial infrastructure to provide required supplies and materiel in support of ongoing or anticipated operations.

Modification table of organization and equipment
An authorized document that prescribes the modification of a basic table of organization and equipment necessary to adapt it to the needs of the specific unit or type of unit (see AR 71–32).

Operating forces
Operating forces consist of units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight. They include about two-thirds of the Regular Army, and three-fourths of the Army’s Total Force.

Operational Demand Assessment
The Army’s ability to deliver ready forces on the scale, timeliness, and for specified duration to meet the COCOM operational requirements aligned with the DPG.

Operational Readiness
The Army’s ability to provide and support CCDRs with trained and ready forces in the quantity and with the capabilities required within needed timelines to meet operational plan requirements of the Defense Planning Guidance.

Readiness
The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels: unit readiness and Joint readiness. Unit readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the CCDRs to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Joint readiness is the CCGR’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute their assigned missions (see AR 220–1).

Readiness Assessment
A mission-focused, capabilities-based, common framework that provides the CCGRs, military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other key DOD users an assessment of the ability of an organization to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS, as directed in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, aligned with the DPG, GFMAP, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The assessment is informed by observed performance, resource availability, and military experience/judgment. Reference: CJCSI 3401.01E

Regeneration
Strategic, institutional, and national capability to expand Total Force capacity. Strategic and operational ability to reconstitute and reestablish personnel, equipment, and command and control to sustain the land force for combat effectiveness in the theater of war.
Reporting unit
AC and RC units and key installations (includes both operating forces and generating force) that are registered in the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army database and that are required to submit a USR in accordance with the provisions of AR 220–1 to meet either internal or externally-directed requirements.

Set the Theater
The Army provides capabilities to establish and maintain the conditions necessary to retain joint force freedom of action. The Army combines forward deployed forces and rotational forces to develop, maintain, and operate the theater structure. Joint forces depend on the Army to provide essential capabilities including [theater level] logistics, communications, intelligence, long-range fires, and air and missile defense.

Special Operations Forces Groups, Regiments, and Commands
Regular Army and reserve Special Forces groups, psychological operations groups, special operations aviation regiments, ranger regiments, and civil affairs commands.

Standardized mission essential task list
A set of essential standardized tasks for like units that reflect their designed capabilities. The standardized METL will be developed or prescribed in accordance with Army doctrine established by TRADOC and will be approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7.

State adjutant general
An individual appointed by the governor of a State to administer the military affairs of the State. A State adjutant general may be federally recognized as a general officer of the line provided he or she meets the prescribed requirements and qualifications. However, they may be federally recognized as a GO, Adjutant General Corps, for tenure of office.

Sustainable Readiness
The building and preservation of the highest possible overall unit and strategic readiness posture for the Army over time, given the resources available, so that the Army is ready to meet known and emergent operational demands, while being optimally postured to meet contingency surge demand. Sustainable Readiness appropriately balances readiness across the Total Force, also balancing risk to the Army’s ability to meet both known and contingency demands. Planning for anticipated employment and the timely synchronization of resources enables Sustainable Readiness and prevents unnecessary drops in readiness levels, preserving readiness already built.

Sustainable Readiness Process
The Army’s strategic process for planning, synchronizing, governing, and executing Sustainable Readiness across the Total Force. The SRP enables informed senior leader readiness decision-making, shaping the annual planning, programming, and budgeting process to maximize readiness and generate forces in support of Global Force Management. SRP replaces the Army’s progressive readiness process known as Army Force Generation.

Task
A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations.

Training level
The overall unit training level indicating the degree of unit training proficiency in the wartime tasks for which the unit was organized and designed. The T-level is measured against the unit’s all-inclusive training requirements to achieve or sustain full METL proficiency. It incorporates the unit’s pre-mobilization training requirements and nuclear, biological, chemical training requirements, if applicable.

Unified command
A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander, composed of significant assigned components or two or more Military Departments, and established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Unit
Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organization and equipment; specifically, part of an organization. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued, or used. In this meaning, also called unit of issue. Headquarters and support functions without wartime missions are not considered units (see DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Unit readiness
The ability of a unit to perform as designed.
Unit status
The measured resource and/or status levels in a unit at a specific point in time.