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# Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Command

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Preface

ATP 3-37.11 is written for a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) command at the theater level. This ATP provides the foundation for the CBRNE command doctrine and focuses on organization, mission, and command and control (C2). It discusses employment concepts, planning considerations, capabilities, and the support that CBRNE command can provide during a CBRNE response.

The principal audience for ATP 3-37.11 are the commanders, staffs, and leaders of the Army. It is also applicable to the enlisted and civilian leadership of the Active Army, Air Force, Army National Guard, and officials at local, tribal, state, and federal levels.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 3-37.11 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-37.11 is the proponent (the authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-37.11 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-37.11 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent and preparing agency of ATP 3-37.11 is the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID); Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division (CODDD); Doctrine Branch. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-CDC, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 235, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929 or by e-mail to usarmy.leonardwood.msocembx.cfddomdddoc@mail.mil.
Introduction

When the United States (U.S.) military launched an invasion into Iraq in the spring of 2003—initiating Operation Iraqi Freedom—one of the main objectives was to find, exploit, and eliminate the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and capabilities. For decades, U.S. military forces developed specialized forces and trained conventional forces to attack or seize high-value targets, but the U.S. military had never trained, organized, or prepared to seize, exploit, and eliminate another nation’s WMD program.

WMD-elimination continues to be a complex operational demand for U.S. military forces. Operation Iraqi Freedom required the hasty fielding of new and largely untested WMD-elimination capabilities, and in a short period of just a few months, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) organized, trained, and deployed two ad hoc organizations: the 75th Exploitation Task Force and the Iraq Survey Group. When integrated into other military units in support of major headquarters, they provided a rudimentary capability for WMD elimination. Based on this experience, the Department of Defense (DOD) decided to activate a full-time capability for integration into planning for future military operations against global adversaries who may possess WMD.

In a speech given in 2003 by the Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, he implied that in uncertain global environments, the Army must be prepared, trained, equipped, and organized to eliminate the greatest security threat of the decade—WMD.

The first CBRNE command, 20th CBRNE, was activated on 16 October 2004. To meet the requirement for a WMD-elimination program, the Department of the Army (DA) organized the CBRNE command as a deployable, operational-level command to manage existing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response assets. A CBRNE command performs a critical role in countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and WMD-elimination and integrates, coordinates, deploys, and provides trained and ready CBRN/EOD response forces. A CBRNE command may exercise command of CBRN and EOD operations in support of joint and Army force commanders. A CBRNE command provides Army support to the homeland defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). A CBRNE command maintains technical links with appropriate joint, federal, and state CBRN/EOD assets and with research, development, and technical communities to assure Army CBRN/EOD response readiness.

A CBRNE command provides support to Army commanders, joint commanders, and lead federal agencies by utilizing an expeditionary CBRNE capability. Leaders are trained and educated in the Army ethic, culture, and character development. They personally create and sustain a positive command climate in CBRNE units and organizations and meet the highest expectations of the Army profession. A CBRNE command has the capacity to execute simultaneous missions for CBRNE and WMD-elimination missions within and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) across the continuum of conflict.

A CBRNE command is capable of rapidly deploying to serve as a joint task force (JTF) headquarters for WMD elimination and site exploitation missions. With the proper enablers, a CBRNE command is capable of serving as a JTF for other missions, including CBRN response, CWMD, and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations.

Decisive action is the heart of the Army’s operational concept. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0)

This ATP is divided into four chapters:

- **Chapter 1.** Chapter 1 focuses on the construction of a CBRNE command. The organization and its role, core competencies, and functions are critical to understanding what the organization does. (See ADP 1-01 for additional information.)

- **Chapter 2.** Chapter 2 focuses on aspects of mission command as they relate to a CBRNE command. (See ADRP 6-0 for additional information.)
Introduction

- **Chapter 3.** Chapter 3 focuses on the aspects of decisive action that a CBRNE command supports. (See FM 3-0 for additional information.)
- **Chapter 4.** Chapter 4 focuses on sustaining a CBRNE command. (See ADRP 4-0 for additional information.)
- **Appendixes A–G.** The appendixes give an in depth look at the capabilities mentioned throughout the first four chapters of this ATP.

The United States Army uses the term mission command versus C2; however, C2 is still a valid joint term. (See ADP 1-02 for additional information.)

Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which ATP 3-37.11 is the proponent have been added for purposes of this publication. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. See introductory table-1 for specific term changes.

**Introductory table-1. Modify Arms terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives</td>
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Chapter 1  
CBRNE Command

The risk of employment of complex CBRNE hazards against U.S. interests and allies, and the associated costs of insufficient preparation against those hazards, is substantial. The global landscape is complicated by potential adversaries that have the technology or desire to employ a broad range of CBRNE hazards—from traditional chemical and biological warfare agents and nuclear weapons to nontraditional and asymmetric threats, such as radiological dispersal devices, toxic industrial chemicals, biotoxins, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The risk of WMD; the continued threat and expanded use of IEDs; and the acquisition, proliferation, use, and prevalence of asymmetrical CBRNE threats have intensified across the globe. The CBRNE command is the DOD specialized CBRNE capabilities and expertise used to respond to counter the full range of CBRNE threats.

ROLE

1-1. A CBRNE command is the DA CBRNE formation focused on countering the full range of CBRNE hazards at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. The command integrates, coordinates, deploys, and provides trained and ready forces.

1-2. The role of a CBRNE command is to operate at the joint/theater level of military planning and operations for global response missions in support of the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) objectives. The CBRNE command is tailorable and assists combatant commands (command authority) (COCOMs) with tailoring force packages for deployments based on mission requirements during times of increased tensions in a region.

1-3. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives are components that are threats or potential hazards with adverse effects in the operational environment. The explosive component incorporates the full range of explosive ordnance hazards (including IED and WMD threats).

1-4. Army commanders exercise C2 when serving as JTF commanders. They exercise mission command over Army forces.

SECTION I—CORE COMPETENCIES OF THE CBRNE COMMAND

1-5. A CBRNE command is dedicated to countering CBRN and explosive ordnance hazards and threats. A CBRNE command is designed, staffed, and trained to identify, target, assess, exploit, and remediate WMD threats through mission command of its assigned forces. By design, the command tracks, manages, and executes the response and provides mission command for the Army and C2 of joint specialized forces. It executes CWMD missions and provides technical capabilities and CBRNE subject matter expertise to joint and Army commanders. The command is designed to deploy an operational command post that establishes the core of a JTF or Army headquarters in support of CWMD or other CBRNE missions. The three core competencies of a CBRNE command are described in the following paragraphs.

EXERCISE COMMAND OVER ASSIGNED FORCES

1-6. A CBRNE command is comprised primarily of CBRN and EOD brigades and groups; WMD coordination teams (see appendix E); nuclear disablement teams (NDTs) (see appendix F); a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives analytical and remediation activity (CARA)
(see appendix D); and an area medical laboratory (AML) (see appendix G). The CBRNE command provides unity of command and effort for these highly technical organizations to support the WMD common operational picture (COP) and the supported headquarters mission requirements. Additionally, the CBRNE command receives operational control (OPCON) of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) consequence management unit to provide CBRN subject matter expertise upon mobilization. A CBRNE command focuses on WMD elimination, CWMD, and countering and defeating CBRN and explosive ordnance threats and hazards. Forces can be tailored for any CBRN and explosive ordnance response for seamless integration with military and civilian partners.

**Provide Forces to Unified Action Partners**

1-7. A CBRNE command is assigned training and readiness authority of its assigned CBRN and EOD units to support Army and joint requirements and CCDR requests for forces. These forces may be provided at their full authorized strength, or they may be tailored and reorganized to support specific force employment. The CBRNE command headquarters and its subordinate forces can support integration with a JTF headquarters or receipt of joint enablers to act as joint C2 elements or fully functional JTFs.

**Operate as a Joint Task Force for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and CBRNE**

1-8. A CBRNE command is capable of operating as a JTF headquarters in support of Army and joint force commander’s (JFC’s) requirements to conduct CWMD, CBRNE, or DSCA tasks (see appendix A). This command can operate as a JTF in numerous ways, ranging from a robust staff augmentation cell OPCON to the theater Army or joint force land component commander, or to a more traditional JTF role with CBRNE and other enablers supporting or enabling maneuver units within the area of responsibility (AOR) to conduct exploitation actions at WMD or CBRNE sensitive sites. As a JTF, the CBRNE command has the ability to maintain the integrated CWMD and CBRNE COP to ensure a shared understanding of the current state of the CBRNE force in relation to CBRNE hazards and the relevant aspects of the operational environment (OE). During steady-state, a CBRNE command maintains the COP of assigned forces who are deployed to conduct operations or training around the globe. When deployed as a JTF CWMD headquarters, a CBRNE command maintains the COP for current, future, and planned elimination operations. A CBRNE command sets CWMD priorities, including individual sites or types of sites that are prioritized by security, consolidation, and transfer. This includes WMD sites that have not yet been secured by coalition forces, sites that are occupied by theater maneuver units, and sites that have been turned over for consolidation.

**SECTION II—CORE FUNCTIONS**

**Exercise Command**

1-9. A CBRNE command provides mission command of assigned forces and assists the supported commander in force tailoring to fulfill theater requirements and fill information gaps within a campaign. The CBRNE command ensures unity of command and unity of effort for these assigned forces to manage the inherent complexity of CWMD operations and operations in CBRNE environments.

**Command and Control a Joint Task Force Headquarters**

1-10. A CBRNE command is a JTF-capable headquarters capable of deployment in support of a wide range of CWMD and CBRNE activities. It can provide WMD coordination teams to supported and supporting headquarters at the division level and above to allow liaison and advice across the spectrum of CBRNE threats. It also maintains a Joint Technical Analysis and Integration Cell (JTAIC) that provides intelligence analysis and decision products, fusing analysis from the intelligence community with the technical intelligence produced by subordinate CBRNE technical forces.
1-11. As a JTF, the headquarters tracks, manages, and provides C2 of Army and other service CBRN and EOD units and specialized organic headquarters elements; plans and directs the execution of WMD-elimination missions; and provides technical capabilities and CBRNE subject matter expertise to Army and JFCs in support of WMD elimination, CWMD, C-IED, and other CBRN and EOD mission sets.

**Provide CBRNE Planning Support and Staff Augmentation**

1-12. CBRNE command supports planning that is conducted through operational headquarters, such as Army divisions, corps, theater Army and theater special operations commands (TSOCs), JTFs, and other elements requiring additional technical expertise. When the CBRNE command operational command post is deployed, it is capable of integrating with the supported command headquarters staff or of operating as a separate element to conduct CBRN, EOD, and CWMD planning. It can also provide support through specialized teams.

1-13. The CBRNE command is also supported by the USAR consequence management unit, which provides CBRN technical analysis and advice on sensitive-site assessment and exploitation, CBRN response, incident management, mass casualty decontamination, and medical management operations.

- **Technical intelligence.** Technical intelligence enables the development of targeting packages and prosecution support packages in support of offensive operations. The exploitation of material leads to an increased understanding of enemy networks.

- **Hazard modeling.** Hazard modeling includes teams of Soldiers and civilians who have specialized CBRNE training and experience to provide technical expertise.

- **Reachback.** Reachback is the process of obtaining products, services, applications, forces, equipment, or materials from organizations that are not forward-deployed. This process requires advanced coordination and planning.

1-14. A CBRNE command maintains WMD coordination teams (see appendix E) that provide specialized CBRNE staff augmentation and technical subject matter expertise to support planning and coordination for countering CBRNE and WMD threats in support of operational and theater requirements. These teams are composed of deployable CBRN, EOD, and nuclear experts who have organic intelligence and communications assets and can advise supported divisions, corps, Army Service component commands (ASCCs), or other organizations on CBRNE planning and operations.

1-15. The CBRNE command is also supported by two deployable field laboratory elements—the AML and the CARA mobile expeditionary laboratories. (See appendix D for more information on CARA, and see appendix G for more information on AML.)

**Support Emergency and Disaster Response, Law Enforcement Activities, Special Events, and Other Domestic Activities**

1-16. A CBRNE command maintains mission command of assigned Army EOD forces. EOD forces provide EOD emergency response on garrison and off post in support of civil authorities per DODD 3025.18. Additionally, a CBRNE command can be a force provider for EOD forces in support of joint EOD very important person protection support activity (VIPPSA).

1-17. A CBRNE command provides CBRN and EOD personnel as a surge capability for the United Nations General Assembly, Papal visits, and natural disaster relief efforts. A CBRNE command’s CARA unit responds to and neutralizes hazards resulting from chemical-biological accidents or incident situations in the continental United States (CONUS) and to emergency responses worldwide at the request of a national command authority.

1-18. A CBRNE command may be called upon short or no notice to provide assets to contribute to DSCA. Missions can include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Providing a technical reachback capability in support of civil authorities.
- Collaborating and sustaining relationships with joint and interagency intelligence organizations to support domestic CBRNE operations.
Chapter 1

- Providing laboratory, WMD coordination team, and NDT CBRNE operations in support of civil authorities.
- Coordinating for CONUS aviation support to chemical surety transportation missions.
- Deploying selected elements in support of specified Joint Chiefs of Staff contingency plans.
- Remaining capable of serving as a JTF headquarters in support of homeland defense missions in a surge capacity.
- Deploying elements in support of the CBRNE response enterprise. The command provides CBRN forces and a WMD coordination team in support of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for the defense CBRN response force mission.

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1-19. The primary responsibility of the CBRNE command is to conduct CWMD operations to support nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts by the U.S. government by providing support to the specialized activities and tasks:

- Understand the environment, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- Cooperate with and support partners.
- Control, defeat, disable, and dispose of WMD threats.
- Safeguard the force, and manage consequences.

1-20. CBRNE command personnel are specially trained and capable of advising supported commanders or agencies in the optimal employment of CBRNE assets to accomplish missions. CWMD efforts also curtail actors of concern in the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD and in the related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.

1-21. A CBRNE command maintains rapidly deployable teams that have specialized CBRNE training and experience to provide technical expertise, planning support, and hazard modeling or prediction to support CWMD missions. These teams have the ability to—

- Assess and characterize. These teams are trained and equipped with military and commercial analytical instruments to perform low-level chemical, biological, and radiation detection and chemical and biological agent and radiological isotope identification, and they can conduct operations in contaminated environments.
- Exploit and eliminate. These teams support counterproliferation and elimination objectives by providing CBRNE technical intelligence analysis, conducting operational risk assessments, and recommending disposal procedures for CBRNE materials.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS

1-22. A CBRNE command provides mission command, training, and readiness authority for Regular Army CONUS-based EOD forces. As a force provider, a CBRNE command provides EOD forces to support decisive action by conducting detection, identification, on-site evaluation, render safe, exploitation, and final disposition of all explosive ordnance, including IEDs and WMDs. Additionally, EOD forces provide capability through four functional areas: render safe, technical intelligence, protection, and disposal. EOD forces are essential to the homeland response mission and provide routine support to civil authorities by providing on- and off-installation EOD response to federal, state, tribal, and local public safety officials to render safe explosive ordnance/IEDs/WMDs and to support to the United States Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service (Department of State) for the protection of very important persons.

- **Render safe.** EOD procedures involve the application of special EOD procedures, methods, and tools to provide the interruption of functions or the separation of essential components of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (including IEDs) to prevent an unacceptable detonation.
- **Technical intelligence.** Technical intelligence includes the collection, processing, exploitation, and analysis of enemy improvised and conventional weapons and components to provide near-real-time technical intelligence (see appendix B) to tactical commanders and EOD forces.
Protection. EOD eliminates or reduces the effects of explosive hazards to protect combat power and the freedom of action. Explosive ordnance hazards are ever-present dangers in most areas of operation. They limit mobility, deny the use of critical assets, and potentially injure or kill Soldiers and civilians. EOD forces have the capability to render safe, destroy, and/or mitigate the effects of explosive ordnance, to include IEDs and CBRN munitions, across the range of military operations. EOD forces assist commanders with render safe, the disposal of explosive ordnance and hazards, and the implementation of protective works and consequence management. EOD forces also provide technical advice and assistance to combat engineers during route, area, and minefield clearance operations; provide support responses to nuclear and chemical accidents and incidents, including technical advice and procedures to mitigate hazards associated with such items; and provide EOD support to humanitarian assistance efforts that involve explosive ordnance hazards.

Final disposal. The final disposal of explosive ordnance may include demolition or burning in place, removal to a disposal area, or other appropriate means. These actions are assessed throughout and conclude when all explosive ordnance has been rendered safe and destroyed.

SUPPORT TO COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

1-23. EOD forces assigned to a CBRNE command can form the basis of C-IED JTF. Designing a successful C-IED operation is a complex task that involves all echelons of the joint force. It is based on a framework designed to ensure the freedom of movement of friendly forces. It also enables commanders and staffs to plan and take proactive measures to identify and defeat IED events before they are successfully employed. There are key IED activities within each level of war that influence operational planning. These activities must be viewed individually and in relation to the other activities that enable a C-IED effort.

1-24. C-IED operations must take a holistic approach that incorporates intelligence, information, training, operations, materiel, technology, policy, and resourcing solutions. This approach is designed to address all of the fundamentals of assured mobility, to include prediction, detection, prevention, neutralization, and mitigation. This approach should be considered in terms of joint interdiction, which encompasses assured mobility and many other factors of warfare.

1-25. C-IED operations are conducted across the phases of a military operation (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority) and should be executed within multiple lines of operation. The operations should commence conditionally and then continue in parallel throughout a campaign. The C-IED commander may change the lines of operation based on the OE. The three baseline C-IED lines of effort are as follows:

- Attack the network. Joint force attack the network actions prevent the emplacement of the IED by attacking adversary vulnerabilities at multiple points. Key vulnerabilities within the adversary IED employment system include the ability to influence the support of the local populace; the employment of IED tactics, techniques, and procedures; the ability to maintain an IED component supply and distribution chain; and the ability to establish and modify the IED build emplacement process.

- Defeat the device. When defeating an IED, the goal is to prevent or mitigate its physical effects while marginalizing or preventing the adversary from exploiting its psychological effects through information activities, such as propaganda and disinformation. C-IED defeat actions begin once the device has been emplaced to detect, safely disarm, and record the technical categorization and tactical characterization required to achieve thorough technical and forensic exploitation and analysis.

- Adapt the force. Commanders must ensure that the force is adequately trained before deployment. Areas of special interest include the development of relevant and current IED-related tactics, techniques, and procedures; drills; and standard operating procedures. Training should be designed to enhance individual and unit protection and the unit ability to effectively operate in a high-threat IED environment. Training should also include those activities that facilitate the establishment and growth of multinational and partner nation IED defeat capabilities, including the transfer of C-IED technology and U.S. force tactics, techniques, and procedures. (See ATP 3-90.37 for additional information.)
SUPPORT TO VERY IMPORTANT PERSON PROTECTION SUPPORT ACTIVITY

1-26. EOD forces assigned to a CBRNE command provide very important person protection support to the United States Secret Service and the Department of State for the protection of the President and Vice-President of the United States and for the protection of the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, as requested through USNORTHCOM VIPPSA, per DODD 3025.13.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

1-27. A CBRNE command is a force provider of CBRN forces that conduct the full spectrum of CBRN tactical tasks as described in current doctrine. These units conduct CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, contamination control, and DSCA by supporting the defense CBRN response force.

PROVIDE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

1-28. Under a variety of conditions and locations, CBRN forces utilize current technology to detect chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals and materials, biological agents, radiological agents, nuclear materials, and explosive hazards from weapons and devices in any environment. CBRN Soldiers and civilians can detect specific agents at levels far below those deemed harmful by the Surgeon General in near-real-time. In the Active Component, these forces reside in CBRN companies (hazard response and technical escort) and brigade combat team CBRN reconnaissance platoons. The Reserve Component maintains CBRN companies (biological surveillance) that can conduct fixed-site surveillance for biological threats.

SUPPORT CONTAMINATION CONTROL

1-29. CBRN forces can decontaminate assigned personnel, chemical-biological equipment, and critical equipment and supplies and can assist in mitigating initial hazards. In the Active Component, these forces reside in CBRN companies (area support), while the Reserve Component maintains CBRN companies (area support), which contain a greater capacity for decontamination.

1-30. Technical CBRN units, such as hazard assessment platoons assessment squads; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives response teams (CRTs); and NDTs, conduct limited technical decontamination of assigned personnel and advise supported commanders on actions to avoid contamination by maneuver forces.

1-31. General purpose CBRN units, such as hazard assessment platoon and area support CBRN companies, support the thorough decontamination of Army forces to reconstitute combat power and allow the supported unit to operate without protective equipment. Thorough decontamination is a logistically complex operation requiring personnel support from the supported unit to fully man the equipment and troop decontamination stations. (See ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.37 for additional information.)

SUPPORT THE DEFENSE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE FORCE

1-32. The defense CBRN response force is a joint military organization that responds to large CBRN incidents to save lives and minimize human suffering. It is prepared to deploy within 24–48 hours of notification. It provides mission command; security; logistics; transportation; engineering; air/ground evacuations; and Role 2 and 3 medical, search and extraction, decontamination, detection, and identification services.

1-33. A CBRNE command provides a subordinate C2 headquarters and multiple CBRN companies (hazard response) for the defense CBRN response force mission in support of USNORTHCOM. The CBRN command is tailored to respond to and mitigate the effects of CBRNE attacks on the homeland.
CONDUCT TECHNICAL ESCORT OF CBRNE MATERIAL

1-34. CBRN Soldiers and civilians are highly trained and equipped to accompany designated material that requires a high degree of safety or security during shipment. The CBRN technical escort capability provides regional response to the homeland and CCDDRs. The three areas of focus for technical escort units are—

- **Sampling.** Sampling personnel use the best available techniques and equipment to extract CBRN or environmental samples from munitions, devices, materials, and the environment. They also maintain the required chain of custody of the samples, meeting U.S. law enforcement standards.
- **Packaging.** Personnel within the command can secure hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and safely package it for escort and/or storage in approved containers in a safe and expedient manner that meets federal and military transport requirements.
- **Transport.** Transport CBRN command personnel are the only authorized personnel who are trained, qualified, and authorized to transport chemical surety material within the United States.
- **Identification.** CRTs are capable of conducting a field confirmatory analysis of chemical and radiological materials, respectively. A field confirmatory analysis supports tactical decision making for material movement and consolidation and for the further exploitation of a specific site.

1-35. CRTs provide OCONUS technical escorts of CBRNE material. CARA conducts the movement of chemical surety material within the United States and can provide limited support for OCONUS operations. CARA technicians are the only civilians authorized to escort chemical surety material within the DOD.

NUCLEAR FACILITY CHARACTERIZATION, DISABLEMENT, AND TECHNICAL FORENSICS

1-36. A CBRNE command has highly trained teams that have the ability to disable nuclear WMD infrastructure; package, transport, and safeguard nuclear and/or radiological materials that pose a threat to friendly forces; collect and transport samples of radiological material or nuclear WMD intelligence for forensic analysis; and conduct sensitive-site exploitation operations on nuclear sites. These teams also support other federal agencies to provide technical nuclear forensic analysis after the detonation of a nuclear device.

1-37. NDTs are the only DOD organization capable of assessing, exploiting, characterizing, and disabling facilities associated with the nuclear fuel cycle in semipermissive or permissive environments. They advise commanders on the risks associated with these facilities, provide detailed information related to potential material proliferation, and assist the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide detailed technical intelligence and safe long-term disablement of nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

1-38. Technical nuclear forensics is usually conducted in the homeland in conjunction with the employment of the defense CBRN response force, but it is specifically focused on collective material debris from a nuclear blast for analysis and attribution by the U.S. government. These operations are conducted through the joint interagency task force, including Air Force, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOE personnel and CBRNE command forces.

RECOVERED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIAL

1-39. The CARA maintains four remediation response teams (RRTs) to conduct the assessment and remediation of recovered chemical warfare material (RCWM) in the CONUS and OCONUS. These are predominantly performed in support of cleanup operations at formerly used defense sites.

1-40. The Mobile Munitions Assessment System, an analytical platform for the nonintrusive analysis of RCWM, is deployed for emergency response operations.
LABORATORY OPERATIONS

1-41. A CBRNE command has laboratory capability within the CARA and AML. Both mobile expeditionary laboratories provide advanced technologies for theater validation identification.

- **Mobile laboratory operations.** The CARA provides advanced technologies for the theater validation identification of CBRNE agents and explosive materials, supporting intelligence gathering to provide timely and actionable support to forces responding to CBRNE incidents. The AML is an expeditionary laboratory consisting of three modular teams to provide CBRN threat assessment, theater validation identification, and health hazard consult.

- **Force health protection.** The AML maintains Level IV preventive medicine staff support for force health protection units, such as preventive medicine and veterinary teams.

COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS

1-42. A CBRNE command is a highly technical, special-purpose, expeditionary formation across multiple installations. A CBRNE command is composed of Active Component CBRN and EOD forces and is organized to consolidate mission command of these special-purpose assets under an operational headquarters within the United States Army Forces Command.

1-43. A CBRNE command is composed of a general staff, separate standard requirement codes organic to the headquarters, and subordinate units. A CBRNE command has a deployable headquarters, EOD groups, a CBRN brigade, the CARA, the AML, a consequence management unit, NDTs, and WMD coordination teams. These subordinate commands support the COCOMs in operations and contingencies throughout the world.

1-44. A CBRNE command is a multicomponent headquarters containing USAR Soldiers in the headquarters staff and in the WMD coordination teams. It is also supported by the USAR consequence management unit under mission command of the 76th Operational Response Command.

COMMANDER AND STAFF

1-45. A CBRNE command is a division level command commanded by a brigadier general due to the complex mission of the command; the synchronization of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities; and the strategic OE in which a CBRNE command operates. The commander is supported by a general staff (see figure 1-1). This staff can be organized into two separate command posts—the operational command post and the main command post—during a deployment of the CBRNE command. The command group consists of the commander, the command sergeant major, one deputy commander, one chief of staff, and one senior civilian advisor. The purpose of the command group is to allow the commander to exercise personal leadership for any number or combination of missions.

COMMAND POSTS

1-46. A CBRNE command operates two separate types of command posts—the operational command post and the main command post—to perform its three competencies (providing a mission command of forces, providing forces to Army and joint commands, and acting as a JTF headquarters). When required, a CBRNE command can also establish a tactical command post to provide an early entry or forward mission command and a planning element to a supported Army or joint headquarters.

1-47. The operational command post is a deployable 120-person command post that forms the core of the JTF headquarters. It is responsible for providing C2 for joint service forces during CWMD and CBRNE operations. The primary role of the operational command post is to coordinate CBRNE and CWMD efforts in support of the theater Army, joint force land component command (JFLCC), or supported JTF by providing specialized mission command functions and subject matter expertise to control and synchronize assigned forces or OPCON to other elements within the theater.
Figure 1-1. CBRNE command organization

1-48. The main command post operates from the home station and continues mission commands of all other CBRNE activities in the CONUS. The main command post supports deployment of the operational command post and coordinates the conduct of homeland defense, steady-state, and/or enduring missions. This configuration is normally employed in support of major contingency overseas operations and usually requires significant CBRNE mission supervision requirements.

**MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND**

1-49. A CBRNE command is assigned and provides mission command to three types of major subordinate commands—CBRN brigades, EOD groups, and the CARA.
CBRN BRIGADE
1-50. CBRN brigades exercise command for 2–6 CBRN battalions and are usually allocated one CBRN brigade command section per division or corps, depending on theater requirements. Subordinate forces in the Active Component include CBRN companies (hazard response) and CBRNE companies (technical escort). In the Reserve Component and National Guard, CBRN brigades are assigned CBRN companies (area support) and CBRN companies (biological surveillance). These CBRN forces conduct CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, characterization, exploitation, contamination control, and CBRN response.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
1-51. EOD groups exercise command for 2–6 EOD battalions and are usually allocated one EOD group command section per division or corps, depending on theater requirements. Subordinate forces include EOD companies, EOD companies (CONUS support), and EOD companies (WMD). EOD forces within a CBRNE command provide support to decisive action by conducting detection, identification, on-site evaluation, render safe, exploitation, and final disposition of all explosive ordnance, including IEDs and WMDs.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES ANALYTICAL AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITY
1-52. CARA supports CCDRs or other government agencies and has four distinct missions (see appendix D). CARA—
- Conducts RCWM operations.
- Performs remediation of formerly used defense sites.
- Provides analytical laboratory support to theater commanders.
- Conducts technical escort of chemical surety and nonsurety material.

1-53. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory section platforms provide theater validation chemical and biological forensics analysis, airborne exposure limits, and monitoring via near-real-time chemical air monitoring platforms. The lab can detect, identify, and quantify chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial compounds and materials, biological warfare agents, and explosives.

SPECIALIZED TEAMS
1-54. The CBRNE command headquarters contains NDTs and WMD coordination teams—two specialized organizations that are individually deployable and functionally separate from the headquarters staff.

NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAM
1-55. An NDT is a team of nuclear experts who are equipped and trained to perform missions that support theater and strategic objectives. NDT (see appendix F) competencies include the ability to—
- Disable nuclear WMD infrastructure.
- Safeguard nuclear and/or radiological materials that pose a threat to friendly forces.
- Collect and transport samples of radiological material or nuclear WMD intelligence for forensic analysis.
- Conduct sensitive-site exploitation operations on nuclear sites.

1-56. The NDT supports counterproliferation and elimination objectives by recommending how to dispose of nuclear material and by conducting special nuclear material (SNM) assessments and exploitation. The NDT is staffed with functional area 52 (FA52) nuclear and counterproliferation officers, CBRN and EOD personnel, a nuclear medical science officer, and health physics preventive medicine noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COORDINATION TEAM

1-57. A WMD coordination team is a specialized, deployable team designed to assist federal agencies and/or combined, joint, or Army commanders with planning and managing CBRNE operations. WMD coordination teams (see appendix E) provide specialized CBRNE staff augmentation and technical subject matter expertise to conduct planning and coordination to counter CBRNE and WMD threats.

1-58. A WMD coordination team is staffed with CBRN, EOD, and FA52 nuclear counterproliferation subject matter experts (SMEs), intelligence analysts, and communications specialists.

OTHER COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1-59. A CBRNE command may utilize other command relationships with CBRN and EOD technical forces within the Active and Reserve Components to improve training and readiness and to ensure support to CBRNE and CWMD missions while maintaining efficiencies in personnel and material management.

1-60. These organizations and their relationships include the AML, which is assigned to a medical brigade for personnel manning and organizational inspection; however, it is under the training and readiness authority of the CBRNE command and the USAR consequence management unit, which is assigned to the 76th Operational Response Command. Portions are OPCON to the CBRNE command upon mobilization and can be activated to support a CBRNE command deployment, similar to a division or corps Army Reserve element.

AREA MEDICAL LABORATORY

1-61. The AML is an analytical laboratory that has a robust diagnostic capability to detect and identify a wide range of environmental contaminants, such as chemicals, biological contaminants, and/or radioisotopes. When deployed, the AML serves the CCDR as a theater level asset that provides laboratory support, health hazard assessment, and force health protection recommendations for Army, joint, or combined forces.

1-62. The AML deploys worldwide as a unit or as task-organized teams to perform surveillance, confirmatory analytical laboratory testing, theater validation identification, and health hazard assessments of environmental, occupational, endemic disease, and CBRN threats in support of force protection and WMD missions. The AML supports CBRN reconnaissance, surveillance, and decontamination missions with theater validation identification of chemical and biological agents.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT UNIT

1-63. The consequence management unit provides unique, multidisciplined USAR consequence management subject matter expertise to support CBRNE command and other CCDR WMD-elimination and response requirements.

1-64. The consequence management unit is a worldwide, deployable asset that supports national objectives during operations involving CBRN response, WMD elimination mass casualty decontamination, and medical management. The consequence management unit mission is to mobilize, deploy, and provide CBRN risk analysis and technical subject matter expertise in support of task force commanders to achieve national objectives for CWMD, CBRN response management, and DSCA. The consequence management unit also conducts CBRN threat and vulnerability assessments to support CWMD objectives.

1-65. Consequence management unit Soldiers are USAR Soldiers. They are a unique composite of CBRN, intelligence, medical service, and other officers and NCOs who possess advanced technical degrees, specialized training, or professional licensing across the CBRN and medical fields in civilian professions. They are specially trained to provide technical analysis and advice to major commands during CBRN response and elimination operations.

1-66. The consequence management unit contains experts who have joint and interagency experience in CBRN response, environmental risk management and safety compliance, civil affairs, counterproliferation operations, force protection, strategic intelligence analysis, strategic planning, civil emergency services and emergency management, linguistics, and exercise development and management.
SECTION III—PARTNERS

1-67. A CBRNE command maintains technical links with appropriate joint, federal, and state CBRN and EOD assets and with research, development, and technical communities to ensure Army CBRN and EOD response readiness.

STRATEGIC JOINT AND INTERAGENCY PARTNERS

1-68. The OE in which a CBRNE command operates involves joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. A CBRNE command conducts deliberate planning and exercises with CCDRs and functional commands, such as the United States Special Operations Command. A CBRNE command has numerous missions that require routine interaction with members of the community of interest, including—

- DOE National Laboratories and the National Nuclear Security Administration.
- The DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center.
- DTRA and the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization.
- The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense.
- The National Ground Intelligence Center.
- The Defense Logistics Agency.
- The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute.
- Headquarters; the DA assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3); the assistant chief of staff, plans; the assistant chief of staff, information engagement; and the United States Army Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency.
- Army Material Command supporting organizations, including the—
  - Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.
  - United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
  - United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense.
  - Chemical Material Agency.
- The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute.

1-69. The various interactions by a CBRNE command and its subordinates are complex and continuous. The following examples describe routine interactions with various strategic partners of the command:

- The command coordinates with the DHS CWMD office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the DOE to synchronize nuclear technical forensics capabilities and operations.
- CBRNE command NDTs conduct training and operations at DOE national laboratories and are directly linked with the DOE triage/reachback center in the ready state and while deployed.
- A CBRNE command main command post monitors EOD emergency response on and off Army installations, requiring interaction with state and local first responders.
- The main command post monitors VIPPSA missions in coordination with the United States Secret Service and the Department of State when overseas.
- A CBRNE command conducts missions, such as the Humanitarian Mine Action and RCWM, in foreign countries requiring interaction with the Department of State.
- The command intelligence section coordinates regularly with partners in the intelligence community, including the National Ground Intelligence Center and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
• A CBRNE command routinely interacts with members of the CBRNE research, development, testing, and evaluation community, including the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense, the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity, the U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency, DTRA, and the Joint Improvised-threat Defeat Organization.

• When the operational command post, WMD coordination teams, and other elements are organized to become a JTF-elimination headquarters, the headquarters may include a combination of functional and technical experts from DOD, the interagency, and other enabling organizations. Additionally, the JTF-elimination interfaces with CONUS-based agencies, national-level scientific and technical experts, and academic research laboratories.

MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS

1-70. A CBRNE command trains and operates routinely with international partners as directed by the Army and United States Army Forces Command. The command has missions to develop partnership capacity and information exchanges in every COCOM through recurring operations, exercises, and planning cycles. Examples include support to COCOM and ASCC level command post exercises and engagements with allied nation CBRN and EOD units.

INTELLIGENCE PARTNERS

1-71. A CBRNE command intelligence section has links to partners throughout the intelligence community in the ready state and while deployed. The command coordinates across the intelligence community to facilitate understanding of the OE, enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations to inform the operations section, from strategic to tactical levels. At the tactical level, reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations are the primary means for responding to CCIRs and support operations. Intelligence analysis from sources such as human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and signals intelligence provide JFCs with the information necessary to leverage military and unified action partner capabilities to deny access, deter use, and defeat adversary CBRNE capabilities.
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Chapter 2
Mission Command

A CBRNE command provides mission command of Army CBRN and EOD assets and capabilities in CONUS under one operational headquarters. A CBRNE command gives the Army and the Nation a scalable response capability with the flexibility to operate in a variety of environments, from urban areas to austere sites across the range of military operations. CBRNE operations detect, identify, assess, render safe, dismantle, transfer, and dispose of UXO, IED, and CBRN hazards. These operations also include decontaminating personnel, equipment, and property exposed to CBRN materials during response. Subordinate elements include organizations that support homeland defense and COCOMs in operations and contingencies throughout the world. By consolidating under a CBRNE command, the Army more effectively commands and controls, trains, organizes, and equips its specialized CBRN and EOD units. This alignment eliminates operational redundancies and allows efficient management and employment of these unique but limited resources.

STAFF FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-1. A CBRNE command staff uses a traditional staff structure to manage its authorities and responsibilities and to exercise mission command to its assigned CBRN and EOD forces. The staff is organized by using the General Staff structure utilized by Army divisions and corps to allow supported and supporting units familiar coordination points between staffs during routine planning and operations. Upon deployment of the CBRNE command in support of CONUS or OCONUS CBRNE, CWMD, or CBRN response missions, the CBRNE command divides the staff into separate command posts to maintain mission command for its Title 10 responsibilities for nondeployed subordinates while also providing a deployable command post for forward operations.

2-2. The primary function of the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) section is to satisfy the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. This is accomplished by planning, conducting, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating reliable and timely all-source intelligence that is pertinent to information operations, targeting, and operational planning efforts. Additionally, predictive analysis enables the command to anticipate key events or reactions and develop corresponding plans or counteractions. Specific responsibilities include—

- Performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield and providing a predictive analysis.
- Providing intelligence support to operational planning.
- Analyzing, collating, and fusing highly technical information from the CBRNE scientific and medical communities into actionable information.
- Serving as the focal point for theater level joint CBRNE intelligence and WMD technical intelligence processes and procedures.
- Providing a rapid, predictive analysis that drives operational decision making regarding CBRNE activities.
Intelligence support to CBRNE and CWMD operations is described further in appendix B. The G-2 also operates the JTAIC. The JTAIC is formed by members of the consequence management unit to provide support to the G-2. When this occurs, the JTAIC assumes responsibility for—

- Preparing hazard prediction models.
- Preparing computer-based simulations to predict outcomes resulting from the execution of various plan branches and sequels.
- Providing technical subject matter expertise during the interpreting of data and the preparation of course-of-action recommendations.
- Serving as the focal point for reachback requests and requests for information for the CBRNE community of interest.

The information operations officer identifies the second and third order of effects when nominating lethal and nonlethal targets. The information operations officer also identifies the means to blanket enemy efforts by influencing commanders, formations, and political and influential leaders who could directly affect the outcome of an operation. In addition, the information operations officer identifies enemy forces and commanders that can be affected through precision military information support operations, military deception during each phase of the operation allowing friendly forces an operational advantage against the objective. Possible outcomes include—

- Civilian noninterference with U.S. operations.
- Enemy formation surrender.
- Enemy commanders who hold their advance due to the receipt of a deception message.

The G-3 operations section coordinates and synchronizes the operations, training, strategy, planning, and prioritization of capabilities, education policies, readiness, deployment, force management, and force protection in coordination with the assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations (G-9) and other information-related capabilities within the command. The operations section also monitors unique missions in support of the Army, joint forces, and the federal government. These include VIPPSAs, installation and regional EOD emergency response units, CBRNE analysis and remediation activities, and surety material technical escorts. Specific responsibilities include—

- Coordinating the training and readiness authority for deploying assets and subordinate units.
- Serving as the intratheater reachback center for deployed forces when serving as a deployed Army or JTF headquarters.
- Performing initial infrastructure assessments, preparing construction estimates, coordinating engineer support with the host-nation/coalition representative, reporting engineering information, and preparing demolition estimates.
- Assisting NDTs with infrastructure assessments of adversary WMD facilities.
- Performing all requirements related to operational law.
- Conducting operations security.
- Coordinating host-nation support for CBRNE operations and contacting local authorities when CBRNE events take place.
- Reviewing, developing, and coordinating the CBRNE aspects of general war and contingency plans.

The assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) section provides specialized logistic support to forces for mission-configured loads, WMD and CBRNE material consolidation planning, hazardous and surety material transportation and shipment, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment oversight, specialized robotics, CBRNE equipment calibration, and specialized contract support. The concept of sustainment for the CBRNE command is described in detail in chapter 4.

The assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) command, control, communications, and computers system section provides the mission command information systems and processes for the CBRNE command. They also provide the personnel to support communication with—and the technical reachback for—the CBRNE command and the forces assigned to it or within theater. The CBRNE command communications concept of
operations, organization, and operational requirements is described in appendix C. The CBRNE command communications concept of operations—

- Develops the information systems plan according to the commander’s guidance.
- Continuously monitors the external information environment and recommends changes in the information systems plan.
- Provides the technical link for communications platforms between the main command post, operational command post, tactical command post, and the supported commander’s operations center.
- Tailors the information management plan to support the operational command post.
- Provides dedicated voice, data, and video links between the operational command post and the main command post to support CBRNE and CWMD reachback to DOD and other agency assets.
- Provides tactical voice communications support between the operational command post and specialized CBRNE and CWMD forces and services that provide the capability for operational command post operations.
- Provides spectrum management.
- Resolves, reports, and coordinates with other agencies to resolve radio frequency conflicts.
- Develops file and data management procedures.

2-8. The CBRNE command communications concept of operations, organization, and operational requirements is described in appendix C.

2-9. The assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1) human resources and the assistant chief of staff, financial management resource management sections perform roles that are similar to those of their division level counterparts, which are described in ATP 1-0.1 and FM 1-06, respectively.

2-10. The G-9 is the principle staff officer responsible for planning, integrating, evaluating, and assessing civil considerations into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and Army design methodologies. The planning encompasses current and future operations. Courses of action are developed through the MDMP that supports the end states and desired outcomes of the commander. The key to successful G-9/battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9) staff support is ensuring that the civil component within the OE is factored into planning and is subsequently captured in branches and sequels based on the anticipated or realized outcomes of current operations. The G-9 is designated to provide the commander with actionable civil information that increases the commander’s awareness and understanding of the civil component; ensures the efficient use of finite resources; and synchronizes the efforts of unified action partners, indigenous populations and institutions, and interagencies within the OE.

EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND POSTS

2-11. The CBRNE command employs tailorable and scalable command posts to exercise command of subordinate forces within the CONUS and to deploy in support of Army and joint headquarters conducting CWMD, CBRNE, and CBRN response missions (see figure 2-1, page 2-4). The command posts allow an echeloned concept of employment and integration for the rapid employment of CBRNE elements with supported units and phased deployment into a theater of operations while also sustaining the enabling technical reachback to the CBRNE community of interest. Deployed CBRNE formations are enabled with technical reachback to a network that empowers the lowest tactical elements with the expertise of the entire CBRNE enterprise by leveraging the power of information available to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. As additional elements deploy and are folded in to the JTF headquarters, the JTF must be able to support a multitude of missions, all having data and telecommunications requirements.

2-12. A CBRNE command exercises mission command through the main command post and an Army headquarters or as a C2 section over a JTF headquarters. The main command post operates in steady-state and has the mission to maintain operations when the operational command post deploys (see figure 2-1). The commander of the operational command post, functioning as an Army or JTF headquarters, commands Army and joint CBRN and EOD forces conducting CBRN response, CWMD, and other CBRNE-related missions.
**Figure 2-1. CBRNE command staff organization**

**MAIN COMMAND POST**

2-13. The main command post operates under the direction of the deputy commanding officer. It serves as the primary planning and coordination command post for CONUS support and provides forces in support of Army and joint forces, CBRNE logistics, and sustainment, to include human resources, resource management, and special staff functions (legal, strategic communications, inspector general support). It also provides mission command of the following operations:

- Provides 24-hour operations from the current operations integration cell (COIC).
- Provides mission command of forces, in conjunction with DOD agency assets, to mitigate hazards resulting from incidents involving the national chemical warfare stockpile.
- Provides mission command for the recovery and disposal of legacy chemical and biological munitions and materials from formerly used defense sites.
- Coordinates air transportation and provides mission command for the technical escort and ground movement of chemical surety materials in support of the management of chemical stockpile and chemical defense research and development.
- Provides forces and technical expertise to COCOMs for WMD-elimination and CBRNE operations.
- Monitors VIPPSA EOD support taskings.

**OPERATIONAL COMMAND POST**

2-14. The command operational command post can be deployed to integrate with and support a geographic combatant commander (GCC) or ASCC headquarters as an Army headquarters or a JTF headquarters and provides mission command over larger-scaled CBRNE operations. The roles and responsibilities of the JTF-elimination headquarters are more clearly defined in chapter 3 and described in appendix A. Figure 2-2 shows an example operational command post structure that is task-organized for CWMD operations. The operational command post can be organized and tailored based on the supported commander’s mission requirements, as described in appendix A.

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**Legend:**
- CFT: cross-functional team
- CG: commanding general
- CoS: chief of staff
- CSM: command sergeant major
- DCO: Deputy Commanding Officer
- FOUPS: future operations
- G-1: assistant chief of staff, personnel
- G-2: assistant chief of staff, intelligence
- G-3: assistant chief of staff, operations
- G-4: assistant chief of staff, logistics
- G-6: assistant chief of staff, signal
- G-8: assistant chief of staff, financial management
- G-9: assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
- LNO: liaison officer
- OPS: operations
- WCT: weapons of mass destruction coordination team

**Figure 2-2. Example operational command post organization**
2-15. On order, a CBRNE command deploys an operational command post to serve as an Army headquarters or as a JTF headquarters. The operational command post is capable of co-locating and integrating with a GCC or ASCC headquarters. The operational command post deploys in whole or as a task-organized staff, depending on the requirement. The operational command post coordinates the phased arrival and integration for rapid employment of CBRNE elements with their supported units into a theater of operations.

2-16. The CBRNE command operational command post provides mission command of the following operations:

- Provides 24-hour operations from the joint operations center.
- Provides additional technical intelligence analysis through the JTAIC.
- Provides in-theater CBRNE technical advice and subject matter expertise to the supported commander and subordinate forces.
- Provides a consolidated request for information collection point for technical reachback to the DOD and interagency WMD community.
- Provides mission command of forces assigned or OPCON to the CBRNE command JTF.
- Coordinates intratheater air transportation and provides mission command for the technical escort and ground movement of chemical surety materials if they are discovered during site exploitation.
- Assists in the receiving, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces arriving into theater.
- Assists in developing requests for forces for additional forces or other technical enablers from the DOD or interagency.

TACTICAL COMMAND POST

2-17. A CBRNE command tactical command post is available to provide early entry planning support and CBRNE mission command to assist a supported ASCC or JTF in synchronizing and directing CBRNE and CWMD missions. The tactical command post provides support for operational and tactical planning to manage transitions from shaping and deterring phases to large-scale ground combat operations or to CBRN responses that require deployment of CBRNE command subordinate forces.

2-18. The CBRNE command tactical command post is an element composed of members of the operational command post who deploy more rapidly than the full operational command post and can maneuver with a supported command early entry command post or tactical command post. When the CBRNE command operational command post enters the theater, it assumes the personnel and responsibilities of the tactical command post to continued operations. The tactical command post can also be augmented by a WMD coordination team to provide additional SME support and communications equipment.

CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAMS

2-19. Cross-functional staff organization is employed by the CBRNE command operational command post to effectively employ its assigned staff and joint and interagency augmentees to synchronize and coordinate complex CBRNE and CWMD missions and problem sets for the supported commander. As shown in figure 2-2, page 2-5, the operational command post G-3 section leads the organization cross-functional teams supported by members of the other staff section, WMD coordination teams, and liaison officer teams to synchronize planning, analysis, and liaison to support the maneuver forces and supported command. When supporting a theater Army or JFLCC, liaison officers are usually exchanged with the supported headquarters, other land component corps headquarters, the TSOC or joint special operations task force, and CBRN brigade or EOD group headquarters.

2-20. During smaller-scale contingencies, or during operations with a specific mission focus (such as C-IED or counter-UXO), the CBRNE command or its subordinate can establish cross-functional teams with the supported headquarters to provide direct expertise.

COORDINATION AND LIAISON

2-21. When directed by the GCC, a CBRNE command coordinates with functional CCDRs, ASCCs, and Army corps and division headquarters. A CBRNE command conducts coordination through its mission
command post when the command is not deployed. If a CBRNE command is deployed, it also conducts coordination in the deployed theater of operations by establishing an operational command post to act as a forward headquarters or JTF headquarters element. It also provides WMD coordination teams as planning support and liaison teams when required to engage with functional COCOMs, ASCCs, and other combat support agencies.

**FUNCTIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDS**

2-22. Functional COCOMs include but are not limited to the United States Strategic Command, U.S Special Operations Command, and United States Transportation Command. A CBRNE command coordinates with the COCOM staff to plan for and resource CBRNE and CWMD operations to maintain situational awareness of strategic requirements, develop campaign support plans, and support campaign and contingency plans that require support forces. A CBRNE command utilizes WMD coordination teams as the primary liaison elements to the functional COCOMs.

2-23. A CBRNE command has forces that are in direct support of the Special Operations Command for a range of missions. These forces are retained by the CBRNE command until activated for deployment; then the forces are provided to the TSOC or special operations JTF for employment.

2-24. The CBRNE command coordinates directly with ASCC planning and CBRNE staff to support the development of CWMD, international CBRN response, and DSCA contingency plans. It provides specialized feedback to ensure that the required forces are identified, task-organized, and tailored to support the ASCC commander’s requirements. The CBRNE command provides forces to support security cooperation and build partner capacity, and it participates in command post exercises to validate contingency plan force requirements.

2-25. The theater army also recommends the optimum deployment sequence for Army forces to the GCC’s staff. The GCC’s staff may modify this recommendation in coordination with United States Army Forces Command and the United States Transportation Command based on factors such as available lift, location and readiness of deploying forces, and surface transportation requirements. Since the initial deployment may not match the situation that develops in the joint operations area, the theater Army refines the task organization based on Army force requirements. The theater Army adjusts the support provided by theater assets to match the requirements of the forces on the ground.

**THEATER ARMY, CORPS, AND DIVISION HEADQUARTERS**

2-26. The CBRNE command supports the theater Army headquarters by serving as a subordinate Army headquarters when a corps or division operates as a JTF headquarters when the division or corps is under a JFLCC.

2-27. The CBRNE command supports the theater Army or corps by executing administrative control for all forces in theater and by supporting other service component headquarters, as directed. The CBRNE command assists the supported commander by providing mission command of technical forces when those forces are assigned to divisions. For allocation purposes, the CBRNE command that supports a theater Army or corps is equivalent to a division headquarters.

2-28. CBRN brigades and EOD groups are usually allocated to an Army corps, but they may be assigned OPCON or in direct support to a division for complex CBRNE, CWMD, or CBRN response missions that require maneuver forces for security. When the CBRNE command is assigned to the corps or theater Army, its subordinate forces can be allocated to divisions based on existing rules of allocation for functional support brigades. The CBRNE command may augment the division or the brigade/group headquarters with a WMD coordination team to improve reachback capabilities and SME planning support.

2-29. EOD groups and CBRN brigades maintain a stand-alone headquarters whose mission is to exercise command for up to six battalions or equivalent elements conducting CBRN or EOD operations. The brigade or group supports a division or JTF. The CBRN brigade is employed to exercise command for critical theater sustainment operations or to employ tactical CWMD or CBRN response capabilities to support a CBRNE operational headquarters.
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Chapter 3

CBRNE Support to Decisive Action

A CBRNE command operates at the operational and tactical levels of warfare to conduct CWMD, C-IED, and CBRN response operations. At the operational and tactical levels, these are actions that are undertaken in a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities. A CBRNE command conducts mission analysis and planning and intelligence estimates.

COMMANDER AND STAFF CONSIDERATIONS

3-1. A CBRNE command reviews and coordinates the execution of near-term CBRNE operations and completes contingency planning for operations that the command will execute within the next 72 hours. The plans section develops, reviews, coordinates, and serves as the command’s focal point for CBRNE general war and contingency planning for operations that will occur between 72 hours to 10 days in the future. It also, in coordination with the JTAIC, prepares recommendations to the ASCC for future operations and revisions to target priority lists.

3-2. A CBRNE command supports the CBRNE COP by preparing and maintaining the intelligence estimate to confirm or deny enemy intentions, courses of action, locations, and combat effectiveness and to identify the impact of threat actions on the intent of U.S. and coalition commanders. In this regard, the staff—

- Develops an understanding of enemy technical and tactical CBRNE capabilities based on a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- Develops a graphic overlay that depicts the known enemy CBRNE facilities, explosive hazards, and likely areas of interest.
- Develops a thorough understanding of enemy external support structures that enable the enemy to use CBRNE materials as weapons.
- Maintains a situation map that reflects the most current information and intelligence, to include updated CBRN-, EOD-, and IED-related intelligence.
- Maintains an incident map with graphic overlays that include historical CBRN contaminated areas and IED strike times and locations to facilitate pattern analysis.
- Provides intelligence updates on environmental health threats and hazards to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commanders.

3-3. CBRN and EOD forces also support the entire cycle of joint operations. In Phases 0–I, CBRN and EOD forces provide expertise during military-to-military engagements, humanitarian demining actions, and other theater security cooperation program engagements as a component of CCDR shaping and deterrence operations. During Phases II–III, CBRN and EOD forces provide protection capabilities from explosive ordnance threats and CBRN hazards, and they support the identification and targeting of enemy networks through the exploitation of captured material. In Phases IV–V, CBRN and EOD forces enable security force assistance operations to build Partnered Nation military and civil EOD/C-IED and CBRN resources. Additionally, EOD group and battalion headquarters are capable of providing mission command for C-IED/WMD enablers as JTF/CJTF headquarters for C-IED operations throughout all phases, while CBRN brigade and battalion headquarters exercise command of CBRN and other technical enablers. EOD and CBRN forces also provide support to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, as required.
FORCE TAILORING AND TASK ORGANIZATION

3-4. A CBRNE command supports theater Army and corps headquarters serving as Army forces and land component command headquarters by providing force-tailored and task-organized CBRN and EOD force packages to conduct CWMD, CBRN response, C-IED, or other CBRN and EOD missions.

3-5. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander. (ADRP 3-0) CBRN and EOD forces support the joint force—from early warning, site exploitation, and countering explosive hazards to CBRN response. This evolution of the CBRN and EOD mission over time requires the tailoring of different force packages from within Active and Reserve Components to meet theater requirements.

3-6. CBRN and EOD forces may be task-organized to provide a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. It may also require CBRN or EOD units to be organized under a tactical maneuver unit (such as a company, battalion, or brigade) to support large-scale CWMD operations.

OFFENSE, DEFENSE, STABILITY, AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

3-7. As stated in the introduction, decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. The paragraphs below introduce the concepts of offense, defense, stability, and DSCA to provide understanding of their role in conjunction with a CBRNE command.

OFFENSE

3-8. In the offense, a CBRNE command engages in the assessment and protection of the battlefield. Core functions or tasks associated with assessment and protection include, but are not limited to—
   - CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance.
   - WMD assessment and characterization.
   - Technical nuclear forensics.
   - C-IED, CWMD, and EOD final disposition.
   - Laboratory operations.
   - CBRNE modeling and reachback.

3-9. During the offense, a CBRNE command supports Army or Joint headquarters by synchronizing the employment of CBRN and EOD forces and coordinating CBRNE and WMD information within the AOR. Depending on the theater requirements, the CBRNE command may or may not directly command these forces, depending on the task organization decisions by the supported Army or Joint commander.

DEFENSE

3-10. In the defense, a CBRNE command engages in the assessment, protection, and mitigation of CBRNE effects on the battlefield. Core functions associated with CBRNE defense include, but are not limited to—
   - Exploitation and technical intelligence related to WMD, UXO, and IED intelligence and exploitation.
   - CBRN contamination control.
   - CBRN response.
   - CWMD.
   - Technical and chemical surety escort.
   - Force health protection.

3-11. In the defense, the CBRNE command orients the CBRN and EOD efforts on preserving combat power within the theater or area of operations to achieve economy of force and protect Army and joint forces, critical assets, and infrastructure.
STABILITY

3-12. During stability operations, a CBRNE command engages primarily in the protection and mitigation of CBRNE hazards. Core functions associated with protection and mitigation during stability operations include, but are not limited to—

- CWMD.
- Nuclear facility disablement.
- EOD final disposition.
- Chemical-biological laboratory operations.
- CBRNE modeling and reachback.

3-13. A CBRNE command headquarters can also advise partner nations or host-nation authorities and build partner capacity in establishing and training partner CBRN and EOD forces to provide for civil security.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

3-14. DSCA is support provided by United States Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code (32 USC) duty status in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODD 3025.18). DSCA is a task that is executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. DSCA is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. When DSCA is authorized, it consists of four tasks. (See DODD 3025.18 for the full name of each task.) National Guard forces (32 USC or state active forces under the C2 of the governor and the adjutant general) are usually the Army’s first forces that respond on behalf of state authorities. When federal military forces are employed for DSCA tasks, they remain under federal military C2 at all times. (See DODD 3025.18 for a detailed discussion of DSCA tasks. See ADRP 3-28 and JP 3-28 for discussions of DSCA.)

OPERATE AS A JOINT TASK FORCE

3-15. A CBRNE command provides an operational CBRNE headquarters for command of United States Army Forces Command Active Component CBRNE capabilities packaged into cohesive, modular, and expeditionary formations. Equally important, a CBRNE command provides a worldwide deployable headquarters to serve as the core of a JTF to manage WMD-elimination operations.

3-16. A CBRNE command provides Army commanders, joint commanders, and lead federal agencies an expeditionary CBRNE capability that enables them to execute simultaneous missions for CBRNE/WMD-elimination missions within CONUS and OCONUS across the range of military operations. The following are roles and responsibilities of the JTF (see appendix A):

- Establish a JTF headquarters.
- Execute command of CWMD forces.
- Execute operational intelligence analysis/planning.
- Advise and direct site exploitation operations.
- Assess intelligence from site exploitations.
- Recommend site priorities and dispositions.
- Perform confirmatory laboratory analysis.
- Perform sample/select items packaging and escort.
- Conduct CBRN response planning.
- Integrate coalition/joint forces.
- Maintain the status on consolidation programs.
- Conduct risk management.
- Perform exposure management.
- Conduct WMD risk management.
- Provide CBRNE technical assistance to intelligence assessments and planning efforts.
- Determine early and accurate warnings of potential WMD threats.

**DEVELOP THE COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE COMMON OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE PICTURE**

3-17. Commanders integrate reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and security missions and assets to form an integrated information collection plan that capitalizes on different capabilities; therefore, commanders conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations (see appendix B), and security operations with the same care as any other operation. Many CBRNE-related information collection missions are conducted in the early stages of planning an operation because this information could be vital to the MDMP.

3-18. Tracking adversary activity enables the commander to maintain comprehensive intelligence on adversary capabilities and possibly gain information about their intentions. The intelligence cells at the CBRNE operational headquarters main command post and operational command post maintain visibility of assets, submit requests for information, and provide the commander situational understanding concerning CBRNE-related information. When necessary, commanders should consider requesting assistance from sources outside of their control, including long-range surveillance teams and joint assets. Commanders ensure the synchronization of information collection components to continuously update and improve their situational understanding.

3-19. Monitoring CBRNE programs is often complicated by the dual-use nature of CBRNE materials. Pharmaceutical and petrochemical factories can mask chemical and biological weapon-production programs. Radiological materials are commonly used to support the medical community and nuclear reactors. They can be designed specifically to produce peaceful electric power, weapons-grade material, or plutonium of various grades that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Distinguishing between peaceful civilian industrial use and hostile use requires robust capabilities.

3-20. CBRNE-related information collection is not a one-time effort that achieves a goal and then stops. As units and assets collect information, the staff modifies the collection plan to account for new information and to redirect efforts. The commander and staff continuously review intelligence products and synchronize their information collection efforts that are focused on the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The commander must balance several factors against the need for relevant information, including the—

- Ability of CBRNE collection units and assets to collect information.
- Risk to CBRNE collection assets during the collection of information and samples.
- Ability to sustain the CBRNE collection effort over time.
- Requirement to provide CBRNE collection assets at critical times and places.

3-21. The result of these efforts is a continuous feed of relevant information that facilitates the commander’s situational understanding and ultimately allows the commander to make better decisions to reprioritize efforts and reallocate forces.

**SUPPORT TO THE TARGETING CYCLE**

3-22. The intelligence section performs various functions in support of CBRNE and WMD targeting. Functions include providing target folder development support at the operational/tactical level, collating and reporting battle damage assessments, preforming target analysis, and supporting information requirements from the CCDR or the JTF commander.

3-23. A target folder contains target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. CBRN units conduct deliberate target assessments as part of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and they prepare target folders for each assessed site. They use these folders to war game how they will respond if a CBRNE-related incident occurs at a site and to prepare tentative CBRNE vulnerability reduction measures and response plans for each.
3-24. Pertinent information collected by the units for each target is maintained in the target folder for use in a future response. This information may include floor plans, site maps, routes in and out, potential staging areas, and a determination of prevailing winds to produce downwind hazard predictions. Although there is no standard format for assessment target folders, recommended contents are described in ATP 3-90.40.

**HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION**

3-25. The main command post provides a home station COIC to merge the operations and intelligence functions to provide real-time situational understanding of global CBRNE threats and CBRNE operations. The main command post also coordinates and supports the execution of the command’s current missions, including—

- Technical operations.
- RCWM operations.
- Munitions rule operations.
- Defense support to civil law enforcement agency operations.
- EOD support to federal agencies, to include very important person protection.
- National special security event support.
- Support to site exploitation and elimination operations.
- Contingency planning.
- Shaping operations.
- Military to military support.
- Acting as Army headquarters for CWMD operations (through the operational command post).
- Integrating, coordinating, and deploying trained and ready forces.

**TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FOR SITE DISPOSITIONS AND MATERIAL DESTRUCTION**

3-26. A CBRNE command develops site protocols for WMD site handover, transfer, or bypass and for WMD site release to civil authorities or multinational partners. A CBRNE command provides expertise in several different areas related to CWMD, including—

- CBRNE planning considerations for WMD sites.
- Force protection measures for CBRN threats and hazards.
- Hazard awareness and understanding in the OE.
- WMD-elimination process flow and site release requirements.
- Decontamination operations.
- Sampling operations and management.
- Consolidation operations.
- CBRN and WMD reporting.
- Force health protection measures for CBRN threats and hazards.

3-27. WMD site disposition and destruction require detailed planning and coordination within the supported command within theater and across various federal agency stakeholders, depending on the type of material. Coordination must also be made with the host nation or provisional government and international organizations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or the International Atomic Energy Agency, to ensure the disposition and destruction plan to prevent the violation of international laws or agreements.
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Chapter 4
Sustainment

Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0) Because the command has no organic sustainment capabilities for these operations, it is critical to coordinate with the external logistic organizations that sustain the command and its subordinate units during operations.

PLANNING

4-1. The logistic operations focus of the command is on the maintenance, resupply, and overall sustainment of the equipment required to support site exploitation, EOD, C-IED, CBRN reconnaissance, and decontamination operations. Within the command, the G-4 is the focal point for sustainment to these operations.

4-2. Although CBRNE planning considerations may vary considerably for the type of mission, the planning process is the same. CBRNE task forces operating forward within a supported unit operational area require push-package logistic and maintenance support that are coordinated and synchronized by the sustainment cell. This is especially critical for COTS technologies and perishable supplies, consumables that are not in the normal DOD supply system and equipment that typically cannot be repaired or replaced by supporting maintenance units.

4-3. Logistic plans are integrated with the other staff operation order annexes and are coordinated with the appropriate higher echelon logistic staffs. Sustainment planners must be involved early in the staff planning and undertake an analysis of the logistic support capabilities of each course of action considered. Sustainment planners must also identify those issues unique to the operation by integrating logistic operations with the supported COCOM. Examples include the location and accessibility of key supply points; critical items; bottlenecks (through-put problems); movements (airfield, seaport, and main supply route capacity); civilian and host-nation augmentation; and possibly contracted logistic support.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL AND CBRN FORCES

4-4. The CBRNE command formulates logistic plans to include the integration of CBRNE COTS equipment sustainment into the higher sustainment concept. Sustainment of COTS includes the maintenance and calibration of nonstandard equipment and nonstandard consumables that are used during elimination and EOD/C-IED operations.

4-5. The cross-leveling and distribution of limited supply critical items of equipment are directed in coordination with the supported commander by the CBRNE command assistant chief of staff, G-3 based on operational requirements. Specialized, low-density, mission-critical equipment and expendable materiel are identified by the COIC, and stocks are managed by the G-4. To support initial deployment, the G-4 coordinates industrial base support and obtains adequate quantities to support operational demands until theater sustainment is prepared to assume the management functions for these items. Joint urgent operational needs statements and operational needs statements for new, modernized, modified equipment are processed by the G-3 force management section. This section is located at the main command post for action.

4-6. The CBRNE command G-4 formulates and ensures that CBRNE logistic policies conform to higher headquarters guidance, supported command guidance, and guidance promulgated in applicable plans and orders and to applicable laws, regulations, and doctrine.
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION MISSION CONFIGURED LOADS

4-7. A CBRNE command supports GCC requirements to enable the Army to conduct Unified Land Operations and to enable joint forces to execute unified action. The employment of EOD, CBRNE response, hazard response, and nuclear disablement elements is critical to these missions. In the event of a major CWMD operation, numerous EOD, CRT, hazard response company, and NDT specialty elements will deploy simultaneously. These elements require specialized equipment for the missions that involve unique, consumable items for sustained operations. A CBRNE command works closely with the Joint Program Executive Office–Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defense, Army Materials Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and the theater sustainment commands to develop the CWMD mission-configured load for each specialty team (EOD, CRT, hazard response company, and NDT). Each mission-configured load has unique contents for each element that is packaged with a 7-day supply for mobility, convenience, and responsiveness. The mission-configured loads are applicable to any theater or element conducting exploitation missions. Figure 4-1 is a generic mission-configured load concept.

CONSOLIDATION POINTS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION/CBRNE MATERIAL

4-8. A CBRNE command works with the CCDR to determine the best location for consolidation points for WMD and CBRNE material. When planning a destruction/consolidation mission, consideration must also be given to the quantities, sizes, and types of material to be destroyed; exposure criteria; assets available; and the security environment in which the destruction mission will be accomplished. These factors help determine if the materials should be shipped out of country for destruction or if they should be consolidated within the host nation at one or more sites for more efficient destruction operations. Other factors to consider are the transportation of consolidated WMD material to a central destruction facility and the security along the routes. A CBRNE command has the capability to execute consolidation missions, including—

- Conducting planning.
- Selecting sites.
- Coordinating with the host nation (if applicable).
- Coordinating for the movement of samples by technical escort elements to a lab or analytical facility.

Note. Consolidation and consolidation points should not be confused with consolidation of gains or consolidation area, as discussed in ADRP 3-0.

4-9. Consolidation typically requires task-organized teams that are capable of verifying the type, quantity, quality, and condition of CBRNE munitions and materials at consolidation sites and during transit. Teams should consist of EOD, chemical, and additional personnel as required to accomplish tasks. The types of consolidation are listed below:

- **Consolidation.** (Army) Organizing and strengthening a newly captured location to reduce the resources necessary to prevent the use of CBRN munitions or materials by the enemy, to keep accountability, and to reduce security force requirements.
- **Consolidation point.** A location used to quickly combine enemy material, including conventional and/or CBRNE munitions and equipment.
- **Tactical consolidation point.** A temporary storage location for captured enemy CBRNE weapons to prevent proliferation. This site remains active for as limited a time as possible to allow for movement to a regional consolidation point.
- **Regional consolidation point.** A long-term storage location for captured enemy CBRNE material. This site has the capability to provide security, accountability, and CBRN response and remains active until final disposition facilities are constructed or the site is transitioned to a reliable partner nation or agency.
- **Final consolidation point.** A permanent storage location for CBRNE material that facilitates the destruction or final disposition of material. The end state is that these weapons no longer pose a risk to friendly forces or civilians or for proliferation.
Figure 4-1. Mission configured load concept
TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

4-10. A CBRNE command conducts the transportation of HAZMAT through CARA and CBRN technical escort elements. CARA conducts surety escorts of chemical materials. Technical escort units are specifically trained to transport samples to appropriate agencies or transfer points.

4-11. There are specific requirements to effectively transport a sample to the appropriate agency or transfer point. Collected samples may be transported to a sample transfer point, which may also be the decontamination point. Samples are generally escorted during the entire evacuation process to ensure safety and maintain the chain of custody. Technical escort capability is preferred during the transport process, but it may not always be practical due to the limited number of technical escort trained personnel. After the sample has been collected, proper packaging is instrumental during the sample collection operation.

4-12. Those samples specifically designated for transport or delivery to the theater or CONUS laboratories must be stored properly until their arrival at a theater confirmatory laboratory. In general, samples should be stored at 1–4°C Celsius.

4-13. The shipment of CBRNE samples or surety materials may be rerouted to a single sample control site (such as the CARA laboratory) or AML that is responsible for receiving samples and providing theater validation identification. If necessary, the supporting laboratory prepares the sample for shipment to a U.S. laboratory for definitive identification.

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

4-14. Considerations in the sustainment planning process include the nonstandard requirements and the unique equipment that a CBRNE command and its subordinate elements possess. A CBRNE command is equipped with unit-specific and COTS equipment. This may require contracted logistic support to ensure sustainability of these systems. Other unique requirements necessary to support CWMD operations include the oversight of robotics logistic support; the calibration of CBRNE equipment; material handling equipment; engineer assets; ground and air transportation for equipment, personnel, and samples; and logistic support for CWMD forces when there is a requirement to remain on site for 24 hours or more. These are some of the requirements necessary for the successful execution of a WMD-elimination mission. The staff must ensure that, as part of the deliberate planning process, their mission analysis specifically includes these and other similar requirements and that these considerations are included early in the planning process for the proper support and execution of CWMD missions. Deployed elements of a CBRNE command need to plan for and be prepared to support joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational augmentation that they may receive to assist with the CWMD mission.

OVERSIGHT OF ROBOTICS LOGISTIC SUPPORT

4-15. A CBRNE command directs maintenance functions for the command and assists subordinate units as necessary with logistic support. The command coordinates with external logistic organizations that sustain the command and its subordinate units during operations. The command provides advice on the logistic support that can be provided to subordinate units, approved concepts of operation, and situations that affect mission accomplishment.

CALIBRATION OF CBRNE EQUIPMENT

4-16. The type of test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment used by elements in a CBRNE command requires periodic calibration to ensure operation within prescribed standards. The command G-4 oversees the test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment program to ensure that subordinate elements conduct unit level maintenance of their test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment. The test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment standard is a 2 percent or less calibration delinquency rate for all unit equipment.
CONTRACT SUPPORT

4-17. A CBRNE command has command of EOD and CBRN units with numerous different COTS items. The command manages those end items and the contract support for them.

CONTRACT SUPPORT TO SUBORDINATE UNITS

4-18. There are many pieces of COTS equipment used by units and elements within a CBRNE command. These items are generally unavailable through the military supply system; therefore, stocked items may not be maintained. Consumable supplies used in support of elimination operations must be commercially purchased from specialty vendors. Requisitions for this equipment occur through the nonstandard request process, and distribution must occur through the theater distribution model.

SERVICE SUPPORT CONTRACTS ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES

4-19. The JFC establishes field service representatives to provide maintenance support in the joint operations area. Sustainment supports CBRNE activities through reliable and responsive logistic support to CBRN passive defense and EOD operations across the depth of the operational area and by providing capabilities to support the movement and staging of adversary WMD materials during program consolidation and destruction operations.
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Appendix A

Joint Task Force CBRNE

The CBRNE command is designed as a full-spectrum, deployable, operational-level CBRNE command to manage existing CBRNE and EOD response assets. A CBRNE command performs a critical role in CWMD and WMD elimination and integrates, coordinates, deploys, and provides trained and ready CBRN/EOD response forces. A CBRNE command exercises C2 of CBRN/EOD operations in support of joint and Army force commanders. One directed mission for the CBRNE command is to act as a JTF headquarters for WMD-elimination operations. In this capacity, the CBRNE command can exercise C2 for operations along the full spectrum of CWMD activities and tasks, depending on its assigned mission and the joint enablers under its OPCON. A CBRNE command is also capable of serving as a JTF for other CBRNE operations, including CBRN response, C-IED, and EOD operations. A CBRNE command can provide the core elements that, when augmented with critical combat enablers and additional staff, become a JTF-CBRNE headquarters. Examples of the flexible C2 capabilities and the subject matter expertise within a CBRNE command were demonstrated during the employment of Task Force McCall, CJTF Paladin, and DSCA support. Task Force McCall task-organized CBRNE elements with DOE teams to conduct WMD removal in support of the theater JFLCC. CJTF Paladin was a combined JTF for C-IED. The defense CBRN response force was composed of enablers from across the services to provide DSCA after a major CBRN incident.

FORMING THE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A-1. CBRNE and CWMD operations can be global, transregional, or regional in scope. The environment in which actors of concern and associated proliferation networks operate, rather than geographic boundaries, defines the operational area. Operations against the same actor may occur in several geographic AORs simultaneously. Additionally, CBRNE operations often involve a diverse set of requirements for CBRN response, hazard modeling, and subject matter expertise for detailed operational and sustainment planning.

A-2. The JTF headquarters must be capable of conceptualizing and managing the complexity of CWMD operations and the operations in a CBRN environment and of countering IED and UXO threats. This requires an interorganizational approach that is supported by the joint force. A CBRNE command provides a standing headquarters element within the joint force that is capable of operating at the theater level of war to coordinate the efforts of CBRN and EOD forces within the joint land component. The JTF headquarters maintains liaison and coordination with other federal agency stakeholders within the CBRNE response enterprise.

A-3. JTF C2 arrangements for CWMD and CBRNE operations are tailored for the requirements of the operation and are determined by the supported commander. The size, scope, and preplanned integration of these operations determine the requirements for specific functions. Small-scale or less complex CWMD operations may not require the formation of a JTF. The supported command’s preexisting command structure, with limited staff and technical augmentation, may suffice. For a large-scale or more complex effort, CWMD operations may require the formation of a functional JTF for CWMD or CBRNE operations.

A-4. Forces conducting CWMD or CBRNE operations may be a combination of conventional and SOF (support organizations from the Services or combat support agencies) augmented by other United States government or non-U.S. personnel. The CBRNE command JTF headquarters combines DOD functional and technical experts and can be augmented by non-DOD personnel. It maintains a real-time reachback capability to national-level technical experts and exchanges liaison teams with other commands and agencies that
support the theater to improve situational understanding and decision making. When formed, the CBRNE command JTF headquarters may obtain personnel from portions of its subordinate forces and may acquire CWMD or CBRNE SMEs from other commands, Services, or specialized joint activities, including a combat support agency (such as DTRA).

A-5. The JTF establishing authority establishes command relationships between the JTF and other subordinate commands. Other specific C2 relationships within the JTF are determined by the supported commander based on mission requirements. Notional C2 relationships for a CBRNE command-led JTF include—

- Establishing a separate JTF at the COCOM level, with the JTF commander reporting directly to the CCDR.
- Establishing the CWMD JTF under an existing JTF, such as an Army corps or division headquarters.
- Establishing a CWMD task force under a component commander, such as the ASCC.

**CBRNE COMMAND JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF COMPOSITION**

A-6. At a minimum, and as required by the supported commander, the CBRNE command JTF headquarters provides the capabilities to—

- Command, control, and coordinate assigned CWMD or CBRNE operations by assigned United States Army, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces, civilians, and contractors.
- Provide the overall assessment, analysis, and planning for CWMD operations.
- Coordinate CBRNE and CWMD planning activities with other commands.
- Plan for JTF deployment, employment, and redeployment.
- Plan for the transfer of responsibility of CBRNE and CWMD operations to or from the CCDR and to or from other United States government departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and host nations, as appropriate.
- Plan to minimize or mitigate potential CWMD collateral effects.
- Maintain situational awareness of CWMD activities and operations (friendly and actors of concern).
- Recommend prioritization of supported command and JTF resources and forces.
- Integrate into the supported command’s C2 and coordination processes (such as the joint targeting coordination board).

A-7. The CBRNE command JTF is capable of directly augmenting the supported commander’s staff or conducting operations as a subordinate, separate JTF. In either capacity, the CBRNE command JTF supports the JFC through dedicated functional cells and working groups and can establish cross-functional teams to address specific problem sets that cross traditional joint staff lines of effort. (See figure A-1.)
MISSION-ORIENTED ORGANIZATION

A-8. The CBRNE command JTF can function using different staff organization structures, depending on the assigned mission, the scope of requirements and forces available, and the degree of support required by the supported command headquarters staff.

A-9. The CBRNE command JTF utilizes a functional staff organization when the supported command requires a large degree of SME expertise and support from the CBRNE JTF and when the problem set for the CBRNE or CWMD environment is uncertain and rapidly evolving. The functional staff organization allows for the rapid fusion of information and expertise from across the JTF staff to solve new and emerging problems.
A-10. The CBRNE JTF utilizes the mission-oriented organization during smaller-scale, shorter-duration operations, when mission requirements, the scope, and available forces are relatively limited in nature. The mission-oriented organization allows the CBRNE JTF to more directly align its efforts against the assigned mission by supporting mission-aligned staff processes that are not amenable to a traditional J-code structure.

A-11. The CBRNE JTF utilizes the traditional J-code structure during well-defined, long-duration operations, when the JTF staff is required to collaborate regularly without external agencies and commands. Use of the J-code structure allows for long-term continuity by ensuring that joint and interorganizational collaborators have a familiar structure for integration.

A-12. A CWMD cell is formed to manage CWMD processes, capabilities, and activities within a JFC’s headquarters. The CWMD cell provides the JFC with specialized, technical, subject matter expertise to support CWMD operations. The CWMD cell collaborates with interagency and multinational partners as required to develop CWMD situational awareness and to support the planning, coordination, and synchronization of operations.

A-13. The CBRNE/C-IED/counter-UXO/CWMD working group is an enduring or ad hoc organization within the supported command headquarters. It is focused on specific activities to provide an analysis to the commander. The working group consists of a core functional group, such as CWMD cell members and other staff and component representatives, as required.

A-14. The CBRNE command JTF provides functional expertise to other boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups within the supported headquarters. Examples include sustainment and communications cells that may require augmentation to integrate specialized forces into their functional concepts.

A-15. Further discussion on the requirements for forming specific types of JTFs can be found in JP 3-40, JP 3-41, and JP 3-42.

DEPLOYING THE CBRNE COMMAND AS A JOINT TASK FORCE

A-16. A CBRNE command operating as a JTF is composed of various organizations from across the DOD and other government agencies. This composition requires detailed deployment planning and force tailoring to ensure that these forces arrive in the theater of operations before they are needed by the JFC. A CBRNE command supports this by providing a tactical command post for early entry into the theater. The tactical command post assists the supported commander in synchronizing the entry and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of CBRN, EOD, and other technical enablers and the sustainment support required to support their logistic needs. A CBRNE command also supports these requirements from CONUS through its main command post, which supports GCC, ASCC, and Army corps and divisions in developing contingency and operation plans (OPLANs) for CWMD and CBRNE response operations and in ensuring that the CBRNE command and its required enablers are incorporated into the associated time-phased force and deployment data.

EMPLOYING THE CBRNE COMMAND AS A JOINT TASK FORCE

A-17. When employed as a JTF, the CBRNE command can provide CWMD, CBRN response, EOD operation, and C-IED assets and planning support to the JFC. The actual employment of the JTF is determined by theater campaign requirements and the required CBRNE capabilities and is reflected in the organization of the JTF headquarters.

A-18. Many critical CWMD operations and activities are conducted during peacetime shaping operations. These CWMD operations and activities should be included in regional and supporting plans and integrated into tactical command posts for execution. The day-to-day integration of these activities across the three CWMD lines of efforts is an important part of the CWMD campaign. These efforts help shape an environment that prevents an actor from obtaining or successfully employing WMD and may prevent the need to respond to a WMD attack. The C2 of day-to-day operations is per existing C2 relationships established by the JFC and commanders of subordinate commands and forces.
A-19. During the transition to and conduct of large-scale ground combat operations, DSCA, or stability operations, the CBRNE JTF forces can be provided OPCON to other ground force elements to conduct CWMD or CBRNE support as part of a separate JTF. The CBRNE JTF maintains control of technical information reporting, while the supported unit maintains responsibilities pursuant to their OPCON relationship. If an operation requires a large capacity for CBRNE technical forces, the CBRNE JTF can also employ its tactical command post to provide C2 of its subordinates directly.

TRANSITIONS DURING JOINT CBRN AND CBRNE OPERATIONS

A-20. A CBRNE command acting as a JTF supports the JFC in identifying and planning for transitions between operations during CWMD and CBRNE operations. The complexity of these missions can lead to conditions that desynchronize ground force operations due to contamination of forces, large area terrain denial, displaced civilians, or site exploitation requirements over long time frames. Identifying and planning for these friction points—and the transitions between different types of CBRN and EOD support—ensures that these missions can remain synchronized with the overall theater campaign.

A-21. CWMD operations occur across the phases of any operation, from initial shaping operations during peacetime, through large-scale ground combat operations to seize the initiative, to the transitions to stability operations and civil authority. Depending on the assigned mission, CWMD tasks can require support from air, land, and sea forces that would otherwise be employed in another part of the campaign. For example, a brigade combat team providing security for a large WMD site exploitation is unavailable to support offensive operations elsewhere. The CBRNE command JTF provides the supported commander with the information and decision points required to manage the movement and employment of forces to allow transitions from CWMD to other missions.

REDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

A-22. The CBRNE command JTF has special redeployment considerations that must be managed to successfully depart the theater. The most significant are theater clearance decontamination, surety/WMD material redeployment, and residual technical force requirements in theater.

A-23. Units that are subordinate to the CBRNE command JTF regularly operate in contaminated areas and are likely to possess numerous major equipment end items or sensitive items with potential low levels of contamination. The limited-capacity and high-sensitivity standards for theater clearance require early decisions on the disposition of noncritical or nonsensitive equipment to minimize the decontamination requirement. Early coordination to ensure that this support is available when the CBRNE JTF departs the theater with its equipment is also required.

A-24. The CBRNE command JTF encounters HAZMAT and potentially WMD materials, requiring surety controls or special handling to mitigate proliferation risk and threat to forces during transit within theater. Some of this material may need to be sent from the theater to national-level laboratories within the DOD, DOE, or other government agencies for further analysis and exploitation.Movements are time-critical due to the nature of the cargo and are sensitive due to required international reporting and monitoring. The CBRNE command CBRN Analytical and Remediation Activity provides CONUS and OCONUS surety material transportation support and can assist JFCs in planning for this transport.

A-25. CBRNE forces may be required to remain in theater for long durations beyond large-scale ground combat operations or domestic response. These forces provide support to facility disablement and detailed WMD program characterization (NDTs) and to CBRNE staff augmentation to support planning for the transition back to civil authority (for CWMD) or to provide continued SME advice to the local government (for DSCA). The relative size of these forces is much less than a full CBRNE JTF and requires a different task organization and C2 arrangement.
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Appendix B

Intelligence

CBRN and EOD forces leverage strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level intelligence to prepare for and execute the various missions that a task force may be called on to execute. These missions range from CWMD tasks to tasks that provide support for homeland defense and other DSCA missions. Intelligence is a critical component of the commander’s decision making process. The intelligence warfighting function endeavors to provide timely, accurate, predictive, and useable intelligence and identifies where uncertainty and friction may influence operations.

OVERVIEW

B-1. Commanders use intelligence to visualize and understand the OE and to influence the outcome of operations. Intelligence operations must be mission-focused to ensure that leaders understand the full capabilities of the CBRNE and WMD threat. With this understanding, leaders can adopt appropriate countermeasures, operations, and tactics. The strength of the U.S. military lies partly in the diversity and extent of its technology base. While the United States aspires to be the leader in integrating technology, the threat can achieve temporary technological advantage in certain areas by acquiring modern systems, advanced technological knowledge, or specific capabilities. The world arms market is willing to provide these advanced systems and material to countries or individuals that have the resources to pay for them. In many cases, COTS technologies can be modified to perform the same function as technologies generally used for military applications. A concerted intelligence program across all intelligence disciplines (especially technical intelligence) that is focused on threat CBRNE and WMD capabilities is vital to providing a precise direction and purpose within the U.S. research and development process to ensure quick and efficient neutralization of this advantage.

B-2. Intelligence support to CBRNE missions has the following primary goals:

- To ensure that U.S. armed forces maintain technological advantage against any adversary.
- To ensure that U.S. armed forces maintain proper protection levels.
- To provide tailored, timely, and accurate intelligence on CBRNE/WMD threats to planners and leaders throughout operations.

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

B-3. The commander’s guidance drives and focuses the intelligence process. The Army intelligence process provides a framework that describes how the intelligence warfighting function facilitates situational understanding and supports decision making. It consists of four steps (plan and direct, collect, produce, and disseminate) and two continuing activities (analyze and assess).

PLAN AND DIRECT

B-4. The plan and direct step of the intelligence process closely corresponds with the plan activity of the operations process. During planning, the commander’s intent drives the MDMP. Intelligence analysts prepare detailed planning products for the commander and staff to provide understanding of the OE and for orders production and the conduct of operations.

B-5. The initial generation of intelligence about an OE often occurs well in advance of detailed planning. Intelligence analysts conduct research, intelligence reach, and analysis to prepare intelligence preparation of the battlefield products and form the initial intelligence knowledge about the OE.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

B-6. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield process consists of the following four steps and is a collaborative staff function that is normally performed in parallel with other higher and lower staffs:

- **Step 1. Define the OE.** During step 1, it is necessary to define the area of operations that is defined as the site or cluster of sites, the area of interest that is defined as the broader WMD network, and the relation of the site or cluster of sites to the broader network. It is also necessary to determine the function of all elements of the site or cluster of sites. The terrain of the facility can be defined by natural terrain features and by the building and infrastructure of the facility.

- **Step 2. Describe environmental effects on operations.** During step 2, it is necessary to determine the prioritization of the elements of the facility or site by intelligence value and by the need to secure the facility or site for CBRNE forces conducting site exploitation, render safe, and dismantlement operations. The determination to secure the facility or site must be based on the risk to forces or the risk of the loss of control. It is also necessary to determine how the weather could affect the operations of CBRNE forces at the facility and the employment or accidental release of CBW agents in or around the area of operations.

- **Step 3. Evaluate the threat.** During step 3, it is necessary to determine the status of the facility and the CBRNE materials that are present at the facility. It is also necessary to determine the hazards to CBRNE exploitation forces that are present at the facility.

- **Step 4. Determine threat courses of action.** Although JTF forces are not involved in the seizing of facilities, there is a need to remain cognizant of the movement of materials in and around facilities before seizure because the proliferation of CBRNE materials is a concern. This includes tracking key personnel associated with the facility who may have direct access to CBRNE materials of concern.

B-7. The Army uses Service and joint analytical tools and considers the operational variables identified in the memory aid political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time to help the commander understand the OE. Upon receipt of the mission, these tools assist the staff in obtaining relevant information that was categorized by the operational variables and to filter it into the mission variables. The intelligence staff is primarily focused on the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations that could have the potential to impact WMD-elimination operations. (See ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.)

Collection Management

B-8. Collection management is the task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets, recommending to the operations staff tasks for information collection assets, submitting requirements for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the information collection plan. Commanders drive information collection activities through their choice of CCIRs derived from information gaps and are essential to decision making during mission execution. The CCIRs are composed of two elements—friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. The CCIRs may change as events unfold and require continuous assessment for relevance to current and future situations. The staff determines—whether by time or event—the point in the operation at which satisfying each CCIR ceases to be critical. Information collection efforts are based on these determinations.

B-9. Information requirements for CBRNE operations fall into two categories—prediscovery of CBRNE material or employment and postdiscovery of CBRNE material/employment. Prediscovery can be described as a situation for which the capabilities to manufacture, produce, and/or store CBRNE materials or weapons in various delivery platforms are known or suspected to exist. Postdiscovery can be described as a situation for which U.S. forces have reliable information which confirms that the enemy has used CBRNE materials or weapons or that there is an incident involving them. Both situations are considered by intelligence analysts but are separately categorized because of the immediacy of a no-notice incident and crisis action planning. Both situations help validate assumptions about the OE and the threat.
B-10. The following are examples of possible prediscovery and postdiscovery information requirements:

- **Prediscovery intelligence requirements include the following:**
  - Is there an individual, group, or nation state that is capable of successfully employing a CBRNE weapon? If so, how?
  - Are there any indications that a specific friendly target has been identified for attack by an enemy CBRNE weapon?
  - If so, how will the weapon be deployed? What is the delivery method for the enemy CBRNE weapon?
  - What is the size/yield of the weapon and/or quantity of material to be used?
  - What are the payload capacities of the enemy CBRNE weapons?

- **Postdiscovery information requirements include the following:**
  - What kind of weapon and material was used or found?
  - What forensic evidence was collected at the site of employment?
  - What were the immediate effects (personnel, equipment, and infrastructure) of the weapon or materials on site?
  - What are the long-term effects of the weapon/material on personnel, equipment, and infrastructure?
  - Is the type and size of the CBRNE weapon used or found consistent with current estimates of the enemy capability?

**Intelligence Reachback**

B-11. CWMD operations, CBRNE CBRN response, WMD interdiction, and IED defeat missions are complex and present highly technical, life-threatening hazards to CBRNE task forces. The JTF staff works in unison with supported headquarters to achieve situational understanding for each mission. The JTF immediately establishes an ongoing dialogue with subordinate unit operations and intelligence personnel to synchronize collection activities.

B-12. A request for information from the CBRNE task force is often in reference to technical information. The CBRNE task force frequently relies on reachback through their chain of command to provide or obtain information to help understand how to best solve technical issues. A request for information may originate from CBRN or EOD units that are providing support to a unit or from the CBRNE task force assigned a more specific mission. The headquarters staff validates, forwards, and tracks requests for information.

B-13. Normally, a request for information is received by the joint operations center operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). If the request for information is specifically intelligence-related, it transitions to a request for intelligence and is processed through the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) for action. The CBRNE operational headquarters staff may identify information requirements that require reachback to national-level resources. An operational or intelligence request for information that cannot be answered by resident SMEs is typically sent to a higher headquarters or to national-level resources using the Community On-Line Intelligence System for end-users and managers.

B-14. The main command post emergency operations center (located in sanctuary) is the primary contact that assists the JTF in resolving technical and scientific issues when direct contact cannot be accomplished with national-level agencies. The intelligence cell evaluates the ongoing operation against the current COP produced by the intelligence preparation of the battlefield products, including forecasts of change and implications for future operations.

**COLLECT**

B-15. The collect, produce, and disseminate steps and the analysis activity of the intelligence process together correspond to the execute activity of the operations process. Collection is synchronized to provide critical information at key times throughout the phases of an operation and during the transition from one operation to another. A successful information collection effort results in the timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate information, which support the production of intelligence.
Intelligence Collection

B-16. Commanders integrate reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and security missions and assets to form an integrated information collection plan that capitalizes on their different capabilities. As such, commanders conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and security operations with the same care given for any other operation. Many CBRNE-related information collection missions are conducted in the early stages of planning an operation because this information could be vital to the MDMP.

B-17. The tracking of adversary activity enables the commander to maintain comprehensive intelligence on adversary capabilities and to possibly gain information on adversary intentions. The intelligence cells at the CBRNE command main command post and operational command post maintain the visibility of assets, submit requests for information, and provide the commander situational understanding concerning CBRNE-related information. When necessary, commanders should consider requesting assistance from sources outside of their control, including long-range surveillance teams and joint assets. Commanders ensure the synchronization of all information collection components to continuously update and improve their situational understanding.

B-18. Monitoring CBRNE programs is often complicated by the dual-use nature of CBRNE materials and production processes. Pharmaceutical and petrochemical factories can mask chemical and biological weapon production programs, or they can be rapidly modified to support chemical and biological weapon production. Radiological materials are commonly used to support the medical community and nuclear reactors. Nuclear reactors can be used for peaceful purposes, such as producing radioisotopes that can be used in the medical field or in numerous industrial applications or as producing power for the electrical grid; however, a byproduct of all nuclear reactors is the production of Pu-239.

B-19. CBRNE-related information collection is not a one-time effort that achieves a goal and then stops. As units and assets collect information, the staff modifies the collection plan to account for new information and to redirect efforts. The commander and staff continuously review intelligence products and synchronize information collection efforts that focus on the CCIRs. The commander must balance several factors against the need for relevant information. This includes the—

- Ability of CBRNE collection units and assets to collect the information.
- Risk to CBRNE collection assets during the collection of information and samples.
- Ability to sustain the CBRNE collection effort over time.
- Requirement to provide the availability of CBRNE collection assets for critical times and places.

B-20. The result is a continuous feed of relevant information that facilitates the commander’s situational understanding and ultimately allows commanders and staffs to make better decisions to reprioritize efforts and reallocate forces.

Site Exploitation

B-21. Site exploitation includes locating, securing, exploiting, reporting, and evacuating or destroying captured enemy material. Military units safeguard captured enemy CBRNE-related material and reports it through operational (command and technical) and intelligence channels in their reporting chain. A CBRNE task force may move to the location of the material or wait until the material is evacuated before verification. CBRN and EOD elements identify, collect, and process samples, as necessary. This includes CBRN samples, media, documents, substances, and materials that are of immediate concern to commanders and authorities. Following the collection, samples that have potential intelligence or evidentiary value are transferred for further processing and the information is reported to the J-2.

B-22. Technical processing can start simultaneously with the collection and identification of a suspected CBRNE or WMD site or the capture of material. CBRNE task force element teams are the primary collectors of CBRNE information and perform the first technical assessment. Their focus is to support information collection requirements by providing situational understanding of threat weapons and programs. They may also conduct technical document exploitation or target exploitation/extraction of immediate/usable information from documents and material before subsequent technical exploitation.
Intelligence Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

B-23. Army doctrine has long recognized the functions of processing, initial analysis, and reporting and the requirement for providing combat information; however, joint and Army doctrine now also recognizes the related functions within the concept of processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). In joint doctrine, PED is a general concept that facilitates the allocation of assets to support intelligence operations. Under the joint PED concept, planners examine all collection assets and then determine if the allocation of additional personnel and systems is required to support the exploitation of the collected information. In Army doctrine, intelligence PED is one of the four intelligence core competencies, along with intelligence synchronization, intelligence operations, and intelligence analysis.

B-24. For the Army, processing, exploitation, and dissemination is the execution of the related functions that converts and refines collected data into usable information, distributes the information for further analysis, and, when appropriate, provides combat information to commanders and staffs. PED is not exclusive to military intelligence organizations; other branches employ sensor collection capabilities. Therefore, PED conducted by intelligence personnel or units is called intelligence PED. PED is the link that ensures the efficient use and distribution of information following collection. It is how the intelligence warfighting function processes collected data, performs some initial analysis (exploitation), and provides information in a usable form for further analysis. While performing these functions, some of the information will meet the criteria of combat information. In those cases, combat information is disseminated to commanders and staffs per standard operating procedures.

PRODUCE

B-25. Production is the development of intelligence through the analysis of collected information and existing intelligence. Analysts create intelligence products, conclusions, or projections regarding threats and relevant aspects of the OE to answer known or anticipated requirements.

B-26. Target studies are produced on each validated target and include researching intelligence databases against known targets to provide current situational understanding. At each successive echelon of exploitation, intelligence analysts add to the overall body of information by preparing new reports that supplement the previous information. The J-2 intelligence cell or other national-level scientific and technical intelligence activities prepare more advanced technical reports and analysis.

DISSEMINATE

B-27. Intelligence and communication systems are continuously evolving in sophistication, application, technology, and accessibility. These increasing capabilities also create an increase in the availability of information at all echelons. Commanders and staffs must have at least a basic understanding of intelligence dissemination systems and their contribution to the intelligence warfighting function.

B-28. Combat information and intelligence that indicates or verifies the existence of CBRNE and WMD threats is critically important to JTF-elimination, the intelligence community, and other national-level agencies. Intelligence is disseminated via the most expeditious means possible. CBRNE-related intelligence reports and products are usually disseminated using the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), operationally dependent coalition networks, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, depending on classification.

ANALYZE AND ASSESS

B-29. Analyze and assess are two continuing activities that shape the intelligence process. They occur continually throughout the intelligence process.

B-30. At the tactical level, intelligence is oriented toward—
- Current, short-term CBRNE and WMD threats.
- The analysis of critical changes in the OE.
- Enemy actions and counteractions.
- The directing or redirecting of collection priorities.
At the operational level, intelligence is required for planning and conducting campaign and other major operations to accomplish strategic objectives. At the strategic level, intelligence is required to produce reports on emerging trends and issues within the OE that are essential to policy makers and strategic decision makers. It is also required to produce information for making assessments and policy recommendations.

Intelligence analysis is conducted at all levels of operations. The CBRNE operational headquarters J-2 incorporates technical analysis with the available intelligence on planned CBRNE and WMD targets to provide accurate targeted situational understanding. The commander and staff consider the analysis to anticipate threat activities.

Intelligence analysts assigned to CBRNE organizations use checklists established by scientific and technical intelligence agencies, laboratories, and the JTF J-2 intelligence cell to analyze the adversary CBRNE material for which intelligence requirements exist. Analysis begins with identifying gaps about the material. The CBRNE operational headquarters and CBRN and EOD forces maintain procedures and plans for sampling, analyzing, and handling material.

The intelligence staff continuously produces assessments based on operations, the information collection effort, the threat situation, exploitation reporting, and the status of relevant aspects of the OE. These assessments are critical to—

- Ensure that priority intelligence requirements are answered.
- Ensure that intelligence requirements are met.
- Redirect collection assets to support changing requirements.
- Ensure that operations run effectively and efficiently.
- Redirect CBRNE site exploitation assets as the enemy WMD program picture develops.
- Ensure the proper use of information and intelligence.
- Identify threat efforts at deception and denial.

The intelligence staff continuously assess the effectiveness of the information collection effort. This type of assessment requires sound judgment and a thorough knowledge of friendly military operations and the characteristics of the area of interest and of the threat situation, doctrine, patterns, and projected courses of action.

**JOINT TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATION CELL**

The JTAIC provides full-spectrum CBRNE technical intelligence assessments and planning expertise in support of the JTF headquarters to enable CWMD operations.

The JTAIC provides support to the operational commander and other subordinate CBRNE enablers, such as chemical brigades, EOD groups, and division level assets tasked with CWMD operations. Tasks include—

- Responding and facilitating requests for information from the operational commander and subordinate CBRNE enablers.
- Serving as the CBRNE technical experts to answer requests for information.
- Advising on site exploitation operations.
- Providing CBRNE technical assistance to intelligence assessments and future operations planning efforts.
- Determining early warnings of potential WMD threats.
- Providing staff planning expertise in WMD, elimination, C-IED, and foreign CBRN response operations.
- Providing technical reachback to CONUS/OCONUS-based SMEs, national laboratories, and academia through dedicated satellite communications circuits.
- Securing satellite communications (voice, data, and video teleconference [VTC] communications) up to the level of top secret–special compartmented information for directly communicating with exploitation forces and other CBRNE enablers.
- Producing intelligence products within 24 hours in support of the operational command post planning efforts.
• Providing CBRNE-related intelligence products and analysis to Army, joint, multinational, and national intelligence activities; law enforcement agencies, and confirmatory and definitive technical laboratories, as directed.
• Developing, refining, and validating WMD threats based on real-time exploitation analysis.
• Establishing an intelligence architecture reachback capability to communicate with the operational command post, national-level intelligence agencies, and confirmatory and definitive technical laboratories.
• Coordinating CBRNE-related geospatial intelligence requirements with operational- and national-level assets.
• Processing time-sensitive information collected from the exploitation of CBRNE operations and disseminating the resultant intelligence.
• Determining information requirements for recommendation as CCIRs.
• Supporting the intelligence community by refining CBRNE-related information into intelligence estimates, intelligence reports, and messages.
• Providing the commander with the CBRNE and WMD aspects of the COP and predictive intelligence assessments.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COORDINATION TEAM

B-38. CBRN and EOD intelligence support to echelons below corps is normally provided by a WMD coordination team or other element subordinate to the CBRNE command, such as the chemical brigade or EOD group intelligence staff (battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer [S-2]) or an EOD or chemical battalion S-2.

B-39. The WMD coordination team or the brigade, group, or battalion level S-2 ensures that CBRNE information is fused with other intelligence and assists the supported unit in synchronizing CBRNE-related information requirements with the higher headquarters and supported headquarters collection plan. WMD coordination team and S-2 members assist the supported headquarters intelligence staff by providing subject matter expertise concerning CBRNE-specific technical intelligence. In this capacity, the primary goal is to determine if the results of the intelligence production meet the unit requirements.

B-40. The WMD coordination team or the S-2 assigned to a supported command contributes to assessing CBRNE-related intelligence products for accuracy and relevance. The WMD coordination team and S-2 personnel conduct analysis to determine if the information answers the commander’s priority intelligence requirements or CCIR. The WMD coordination team or S-2 provides feedback to intelligence analysts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence process. The WMD coordination team and S-2 also assist the supported unit in developing and evaluating the success of information collection efforts and the dissemination of assessments to the JTF-elimination, its staff, and pertinent units or personnel.

B-41. The intelligence cells located in the JTF-elimination main command post and operational command post operate 24 hours a day. These cells maintain situational understanding of the operational area through continuous and redundant communications.

B-42. Roles and responsibilities of the intelligence cell include the following:
• Manages requests for information between the operational command post and deployed units and the main command post.
• Manages requests for information between the main command post and CBRNE laboratories and intelligence centers and agencies based in the homeland.
• Maintains situational understanding of the OE through continuous communications with the JTF.
• Produces intelligence products within 24 hours in support of the operational command post.
• Provides CBRNE-related intelligence products and analysis to Army, joint, multinational, and national intelligence activities; law enforcement agencies; and confirmatory and definitive technical laboratories, as directed.
• Conducts intelligence production, dissemination, and support activities (including special category) across the NIPRNET, SIPRNET, operationally dependent coalition networks, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System.
Develops, refines, and validates WMD threats.

Establishes an intelligence architecture reachback capability to communicate with the operational command post, national-level intelligence agencies, and confirmatory and definitive technical laboratories.

Coordinates CBRNE-related geospatial intelligence requirements with operational- and national-level assets.

Processes time-sensitive information collected from the exploitation of CBRNE operations and disseminates the resultant intelligence.

Determines the information requirements for recommendation as CCIRs.

Develops and refines CBRNE-related information into intelligence estimates, intelligence reports, and messages.

Provides the commander with the CBRNE and WMD aspects of the COP and predictive intelligence assessments.

B-43. Intelligence staffs provide support to targeting for lethal and nonlethal actions. The intelligence staff supports planning and operations against designated targets by one or more weapons. Applications may include the following:

- Support to the joint targeting and coordination board by analyzing targets to enhance military effectiveness and target validity.
- Target development support at the operational and tactical levels.
- Battle damage assessments that have been reported and collated.
- Intelligence requested by the CCDR or the JTF commander.

B-44. Intelligence performs the following functions in support of CBRNE and WMD targeting:

- Provides target folder development support at the operational/tactical level.
- Collates and reports battle damage assessments.
- Performs target analysis.
- Supports information requirements from the CCDR or the JTF commander.

TARGET FOLDERS

B-45. A target folder contains intelligence and related materials about the target prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. CBRN units conduct deliberate target assessments as part of intelligence preparation of the battlefield and prepare target folders for each assessed site. The CBRN unit uses the target folders to war game how each CBRN unit will respond if a CBRNE-related incident occurs at a site and how to prepare tentative CBRNE vulnerability reduction measures and response plans for each.

B-46. Pertinent information collected by the units for each target is maintained in the target folder for use in a future response. This information can include floor plans, site maps, routes in and out, potential staging areas, and a determination of prevailing winds to produce downwind hazard predictions. Although there is no standard format for assessment target folders, suggested content includes the following material:

- Target number.
- Threat overview security.
- Site overview.
- Site history.
- CBRNE presence.
- Safety information regarding recommended individual protective equipment and personal protective equipment.
- Simulation analysis.
- Personnel (noncombatants).
- Background information.
- Graphics.
- Drawings.
- Maps.
- Photographs.
- Building plans.
- Site description.
- Site significance.
- Environmental hazards as a result of an incident.
- Terrain.
- Collection strategies.
- Additional site information and intelligence.
- Command guidance.
  - Contamination avoidance and desired end state.
  - Communications and technical reachback procedures.
  - Sample management.
  - Operational exposure guidance and turn-back rate.
- Transportation.
- Roads.
- Analyst comments.
- Projects and agents.

B-47. See ADP 2-0 and ADRP 2-0 for more information on intelligence operations.
Appendix C

Communications

The CBRNE command has a requirement to deploy on short notice in support of CCDRs or other government agencies. The command has the mission to be a JTF headquarters for CWMD operations. The command maintains an operational command post, WMD coordination teams, NDTs, and mobile laboratories that are fully deployable. The mission requires secure and unsecure data, voice, and VTC access to the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN), linking elements from the team level to the JTF headquarters, home station main command, and academia and scientific experts to ensure timely and accurate CBRNE support. In addition, all CBRNE components (while deployed) must be capable of linking into all Army battle command systems.

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

C-1. The CBRNE command is the only standing CBRNE operational headquarters in the DOD. This unit is composed of military and civilian personnel. The CBRNE operational headquarters design includes a main command post located in CONUS and deployable units consisting of the operational command post, five WMD coordination teams, three NDTs, and mobile analytical laboratories. In a deployed environment, the operational command post may be tasked to operate as a JTF headquarters for WMD elimination and the command of CBRNE operations and to provide target information for the joint operational area, control operations for the JTF, and coordination for interagency and multinational support.

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS (COLLABORATION)

C-2. The OE for the CBRNE command involves joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational considerations. When the operational command post, WMD coordination teams, NDTs, and other elements are organized to become a JTF headquarters, the headquarters may include a combination of functional and technical experts from the DOD, interagency, and other enabling organizations. The JTF-elimination must be capable of timely and accurate communication with CONUS-based agencies, national-level technical experts, academia, research laboratories, and scientific experts. They must also be fully connected to Army battle command systems and have the ability to link to supported commanders, DOD agencies, other government agencies, and nongovernment agencies worldwide. This connectivity must be established on short notice and may require an extension to the extreme forward edge of the battlefield. There may situations for which there is no communications infrastructure in place at the forward location to accommodate mission-critical correspondence with CBRNE SMEs in CONUS. Access to the DODIN for Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services is by far the largest CBRNE communications support resource requirement.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

C-3. The following communications support capabilities are required to enable the CBRNE to accomplish its mission:

- Worldwide rapid deployment, with sufficient connectivity access to the DODIN to meet the operational mission needs of a 350-person tactical JTF headquarters.
- Direct connectivity to supported commanders, DOD agencies, other government agencies, nongovernment agencies, and others participating as elements of the CBRNE collaboration team.
- Collaboration capability among the CBRNE operational elements and the collaboration team.
• The capability to integrate deployed CBRNE elements into the AOR mission command structure.
• User applications that are Web-based to the greatest extent possible.
• Reliable access to the DODIN to support CBRNE operations and connectivity to and from the main command post, operational command post, WMD coordination teams, NDTs, and/or mobile laboratories sharing the COP. The DODIN must have the ability to transmit high-resolution images, large secure and unsecure data files, secure and unsecure voice communications, and VTCs.
• Reliable access and throughput to the DODIN backbone to support the above CBRNE mission requirements and provide deployed elements access to the CBRNE collaboration enterprise composed of research centers and SMEs located throughout CONUS.
• The capability to integrate into a JTF or AOR command structure, as required.

SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL ELEMENT REQUIREMENTS

C-4. Communication support requirements are focused on five types of operational elements—the main command post, the operational command post, WMD coordination teams, NDTs, and mobile laboratories. The unique communications requirements for each of these elements are discussed below.

MAIN COMMAND POST

C-5. Until an operational command post is deployed and an operational CBRNE task force headquarters is established (should it be required), the CONUS-based main command post serves as the primary planning and coordination command post for operations, logistics, and sustainment. This includes human resources and legal support, resource management, strategic communications, and inspector general support. It also assists the deployed elements (the operational command post, WMD coordination teams, NDTs, and mobile laboratories) to conduct future planning and analyze current and future operations of deployed forces.

C-6. The main command post provides the following resources to garrison and deployed forces:

• CBRNE enterprise databases, file servers, data mining, and shared drives.
• SharePoint portal collaboration.
• CBRNE SME collaboration for requests for information.
• VTC and VTC bridging services between deployed forces.
• Data continuity of operations service.

C-7. The main command post remains in garrison at headquarters CBRNE command and is connected to the DODIN and by extension to the DOD gateways and teleports. It is capable of continuous operations and performs the following functions:

• Prepares, maintains, and updates command information management estimates, plans, and orders per the command information management plan.
• Establishes procedures for managing relevant information and employing information systems to develop the COP in coordination with the G-3.
• Coordinates with staff sections and cells to ensure that information quality criteria (accuracy, timeliness, usability, completeness, precision, reliability) are maintained.
• Coordinates local information network capabilities and services.
• Coordinates future command, control, communications, and computer operations interface with joint and multinational (including host-nation) forces.
• Installs cable systems (coordinates and supervises team members in the construction, installation, and recovery of cable and wire communication systems and auxiliary equipment).
• Coordinates deliberate modifications to the COIC network to meet the commander’s needs.
• Manages requirements (accepts, validates/endorse, and tracks the headquarters and subordinate unit communications support and equipment [data transport, computers, cellular phones, radios] requirements).
OPERATIONAL COMMAND POST

C-8. The operational command post is the deployable element of the main command post for C2 of the forward CBRNE elements. It is established with other deployable elements to support CBRNE operations. The mission command of forces for CBRNE operations is conducted from the operational command post established in the vicinity of the supported ground force commander, as dictated by conditions; however, initial mission command functions are controlled from the COIC until the operational command post is prepared to operate from its deployed location as part of the CBRNE task force and other necessary deployed elements are functional.

C-9. When no supporting Army signal assets are available, the operational command post assistant chief of staff, signal/command, control, communications, and computer operations cell may be tasked to function as the primary communications provider for a deployed CBRNE task force headquarters. While fly-away communications kits organic to the CBRNE can be employed, communications support usually comes from external sources, depending on specific mission requirements.

C-10. The operational command post has the following requirements:
- Directly communicates with the COIC via the DODIN.
- Deploys the tactical command post within 48 hours, and deploys the operational command post within 96 hours of notification.
- Exchanges time-sensitive information, exercises mission command, and transfers large data files (voice, VTC, high-resolution images) with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- Provides JTF headquarters capability and/or integration into a JTF.

C-11. The WMD coordination team has the following requirements:
- Provides DODIN communications with the COIC and/or operational command post.
- Provides CONUS deployment of WMD coordination teams within 18 hours of notification.
- Exchanges time-sensitive information, exercises mission command, and transfers large data files (voice, VTC, and high-resolution images) with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- Provides the capability to integrate into an AOR C2 structure, as required.

C-12. The service provider must be capable of performing the following functions:
- Provide the technical link between the operational command post and the supported commander’s command post for all communications platforms.
- Provide dedicated data, voice, and VTC links between the operational command post and the COIC to support the CBRNE operational headquarters via the DODIN to DOD and interagency assets.
- Provide tactical data, voice, and VTC communications support between the operational command post, subordinate maneuver forces, and CBRNE operational headquarters forces.
- Incorporate and manage a set of integrated applications, processes, and services that provide the capability for command post operations.
- Support 24-hour operational command post operations.
- Develop file and data management procedures.
- Provide spectrum management requirements to the theater spectrum manager.
- Coordinate satellite access and frequency requests.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COORDINATION TEAMS

C-13. The WMD coordination teams normally obtain support from, and are interoperable with, the supported agency. When assets are unavailable, the WMD coordination teams must be configured to operate autonomously and may be attached to a joint headquarters or other government agency/nongovernment agency. The supported unit or agency must be capable of providing access to the DODIN for DISN services and support for the WMD coordination team end user equipment.
C-14. The WMD coordination team end user equipment includes—
   - Automated data processing equipment.
   - Telephones (plain old telephone service/voice over internet protocol [VoIP]).
   - A VTC suite.
   - Battle command systems. Each WMD coordination team is equipped with six Command Post of the Future systems and one all-source analysis system-light system. WMD coordination teams have a blue force tracking capability to monitor their current operational location while performing CBRNE operations in a joint operations area.
   - Initial entry communications and mission command support limited secure and nonsecure data, voice, and VTC links.

NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAMS

C-15. NDTs rapidly deploy in support of interagency and DOD missions. To ensure effective mission execution, NDTs require a highly transportable, beyond-line-of-site capability to support no-notice, early-entry operations and CBRNE site exploitations. The NDTs support the mission command of deployed NDTs, situational awareness, and the transmission of secure and nonsecure data, imagery, and video from exploitation sites to CONUS SMEs within the CBRNE community.

C-16. The NDT has the following requirements:
   - Requires a communication system to be employed to support the NDT Tactical Operations Center and forward contamination control line.
   - Exchanges time-sensitive information, exercises mission command, and transfers large data files (voice, VTC, high-resolution images) with higher, lower, and adjacent units.

C-17. The NDTs normally obtain services from their supported agency and must be interoperable with DOD agencies, other government agencies, and nongovernment agencies. When command assets are unavailable, NDTs must be configured to operate autonomously and may be attached to a joint headquarters or to other government agencies/nongovernment agencies. In these situations, NDTs may have the following requirements:
   - A general user beyond line-of-site communication system interoperable with the current generation of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical equipment that can be transported when traveling via commercial air.
   - An on-the-move capability that is capable of being dismounted for extended periods during site exploitations.
   - Systems transmit secure and nonsecure data, voice, VTC, and technical reports to the CBRNE enterprise.

MOBILE EXPEDITIONARY LABORATORIES WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MONITORING SECTIONS

C-18. Mobile laboratories obtain services from, and must be interoperable with, the supported agency. When the assets are unavailable, mobile expeditionary laboratories must have the capability to send and receive large volumes of data to the attached headquarters or to other government agencies/nongovernment agencies. The analytical laboratory equipment is largely composed of stand-alone systems.

C-19. The supported unit or agency must be capable of providing access to the DODIN for DISN services and supports the following:
   - Beyond line-of-site, two-way collaborative communications with CONUS-based nongovernment agencies, other government agencies, and SMEs in academia.
   - The ability to receive large data files from the event site.
   - Voice and e-mail communications between laboratory units.
SCOPE AND TIMELINES

C-20. The CBRNE command must be capable of supporting C2 for multiple events in different theaters simultaneously. The command must be able to deploy and operate a WMD coordination team within 18 hours, deploy a second WMD coordination team and a tactical command post within 48 hours, and deploy a third WMD coordination team and the deployable operational command post within 96 hours.

C-21. Support of mobility requirements includes the following:

- Deploy a WMD coordination team as a quick response team to support homeland defense/homeland security.
- Deploy as a SME to support a COCOM.
- Deploy to support DOD or other government agencies.
- Deploy as a JTF to achieve national combating WMD objectives.
- Disperse a C2 brigade size element to multiple sites.

C-22. The G-6 must support communications with brigade combat teams, division and corps headquarters, ASCC, JTFs, COCOM headquarters, national authorities, other government agencies and organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academia, and local authorities/first responders, as required.

C-23. The G-6 must also be able to:

- Rapidly integrate communication systems with United States Army, North (USARNORTH) for homeland defense/homeland security.
- Rapidly establish and maintain scientific and technical DODIN connectivity to SMEs, civil agencies, state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, academia, and foreign governments who do not have access to DISN.
- Integrate communication systems with all COCOMs and maintain DODIN connectivity upon activation of the operational command post.
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Appendix D

CARA

A CBRNE command is the parent unit for the CARA. The CARA consists of a mobile expeditionary laboratory section; two remediation response sections (east and west); and an organic, western hemisphere-based aviation section. Central to the effectiveness of the CARA are the specialists (primarily DA civilians) who provide the subject matter expertise to conduct analytical laboratory operations, escort operations, and remediation and restoration operations. CARA is designed to deploy specialized, tailored packages that go forward to obtain samples of chemical, biological, explosive material of concern rather than waiting for samples to be brought back by other escort elements. The linkage to the organic mobile expeditionary laboratory is designed to provide a time-reduced theater validation identification of the samples taken.

CARA ROLE, ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND DEPENDENCIES

D-1. The CARA supports the joint CWMD mission across all operational phases in laboratory analysis, the safe and secure technical escort of HAZMAT, RCWM, remediation support, and emergency response. CARA personnel include worldwide deployable Army civilian UXO technicians, chemical engineering technicians, chemists, microbiologists, physical science technicians, and support staff.

D-2. The CARA provides advanced technologies for theater level laboratory identification of chemical and biological agents and explosive materials, supporting intelligence gathering to provide timely and actionable support to forces responding to CBRNE incidents. CARA provides analysis on the composition and precursors for chemical, biological, and explosive material, with a primary focus on chemical and biological threat agents. CARA can be employed in close proximity to other defense laboratories to enable the full complement of laboratory capabilities.

D-3. The CARA conducts movement of chemical surety material with organic aviation assets and specially trained escort teams within the United States. CARA technicians are the only civilians authorized to transport chemical surety material within the DOD. For chemical surety, refer to AR 50-6 and AR 190-17.

D-4. The CARA maintains four RRTs to conduct the assessment and remediation of RCWM in the CONUS and OCONUS. These assessments and remediations are predominantly performed in support of cleanup operations at formerly used defense sites and active military installations.

D-5. The CARA maintains two mobile munitions assessment systems and an analytical platform for the nonintrusive analysis of RCWM and for emergency response operations.

D-6. To execute the mission, CARA is composed of four mobile expeditionary laboratories, four near-real-time chemical agent air monitoring platforms, four RRTs, two mobile munitions assessment teams, and an aviation section (see figure D-1, page D-2). Although they are normally noted as being nondeployable, all sections may be deployed in support of large-scale ground combat operations.
CARA CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

D-7. CARA elements can operate in biological and chemically contaminated environments to search, assess, and characterize hazards in support of national CWMD objectives. Additionally, CARA laboratories provide analytic support within the division AOR to provide confirmatory analysis of HAZMAT.

REMEDATION RESPONSE SECTIONS

D-8. CARA has four RRTs that are composed of many former military personnel. Many of these personnel are chemical engineering technicians who hold a senior or master EOD badge (UXO Level III). Remediation response elements of the remediation response section are deployable and require transportation and security support to the site. The RRT—

- Conducts emergency response, chemical accident/incident response, and assistance operations.
- Supports WMD assessments and characterizations of sites.
- Provides technical exploitation team augmentation. CARA remediation response personnel operate the mobile munitions assessment systems owned by the Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel Directorate of the Chemical Materials Agency. The primary focus is to conduct emergency response assessments of RCWM.
- Conducts environmental sampling.
- Conducts stockpile and nonstockpile operations in support of the Army Chemical Materials Activity, Army Corps of Engineers, and installation commanders on active military installations. Operations include HAZMAT handling, the execution of remediation operations of formerly used defense sites, the relocation of bulk stored chemical agents, assessments of containers to determine fill, and the identification of liquid contents.
- Samples, packages, and provides technical escort to ensure the safe and secure movement of chemical surety material, nonsurety material, and RCWM.
• Destroys chemical-biological agents and captures residual contaminants that might be released. Systems employed are tailored to the hazards and mission.

• Assists the Joint Program Executive Office—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and other research and development agencies during the test and evaluation phases of new equipment and technologies.

• Provides remediation operations, to include the neutralization and removal of HAZMAT.

AVIATION SECTION

D-9. The aviation section is capable of using two UH-72 Lakota helicopters and one fixed-wing C12J2 Beechcraft 1900D aircraft to transport chemical surety material in CONUS. The aviation section is also capable of using the C12J2 aircraft to transport nonsurety material, RCWM, and other HAZMAT in the western hemisphere.

CARA MOBILE EXPEDITIONARY LABORATORY SECTION

D-10. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory has four modular, semimobile laboratories and four near-real-time chemical air-monitoring platforms that are composed of scientists who hold advanced degrees in the disciplines of microbiology, chemistry, and physical science. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory is a system that provides staff and commanders the rapid and specific identification of chemical, biological, and explosive precursor and degradation products associated with threat agents. Through the use of advanced scientific technology, chemical, biological, and explosive agents can be identified quickly and with high sensitivity and specificity. This rapid identification enables commanders and staffs to make data-based decisions that govern early warning, intervention, prevention, intelligence, and protection operations. The CARA laboratories can—

• Detect, identify, quantify, and provide theater validation of chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial compounds and materials, biological agents, and select explosives.

• Conduct near-real-time air monitoring of chemical warfare agents at the airborne exposure limits in support of consolidation points, bunker monitoring, and other similar missions.

• Provide a program of record, including standardized training, testing, and processes to ensure an enduring capability.

• Deploy using several different packages, with the ability to combine elements of the chemical and biological configurations within one laboratory. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory lite configuration for short-duration missions consists of a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, a light medium tactical vehicle with a laboratory shelter (M1079A1P2), a towed 30-kilowatt generator, and a theater validation laboratory known as the heavy mobile expeditionary laboratory. This configuration consists of one 20-foot ISO shelter, 10 quadruple containers, two ISU-96R sample storage fridges, two 60-kilowatt generators, and five improved environment control units requiring transportation support.

D-11. The chemical configuration typically consists of trace analytical instruments: gas chromatograph mass spectrometer and liquid chromatography mass spectrometry to identify and quantify the chemical signature of precursors, degradation products, CWA/nontraditional agents, toxins, and explosives in air, solids, swab/wipes, and liquid matrices. Bulk chemistry can include X-ray diffraction, X-ray fluorescence, and Raman and Fourier-transform infrared spectroscopy.

D-12. The biological configuration typically consists of a multiplexed and quantitative polymerase chain reaction, multiplexed immunoassays, liquid chromatograph mass spectrometry, cultures, next-generation sequencing, and biochemical/antibiotic testing for potential biothreat agents of concern.
D-13. Chemical monitoring teams provide support OCONUS to CCDRs and CONUS for emergency response missions following discoveries of RCWM; at remediation sites; and during stockpile and nonstockpile missions that require first-entry monitoring and continuous monitoring for the safety of workers, the local community, and the environment. These teams employ—

- The Miniature Chemical Agent Monitoring System for near-real-time monitoring of chemical agents.
- A gas chromatograph mass spectrometer.
- The CARA chemical air-monitoring section has two CONUS response platforms and four OCONUS tactical M1079A1P2 air-monitoring systems with 30-kilowatt generators for near-real-time low-level monitoring of chemical agent stockpiles, RCWM, and limited toxic industrial chemicals.

CARA DEPENDENCIES

D-14. CARA elements require significant support, to include the following:

- Communications (including secure and nonsecure digital and voice) when not co-located with CJTF-CBRNE.
- Intelligence analysis and support, including a prioritized list of samples to analyze and firmly establish CCIR to assist the CARA with mission planning, capability allocation, and tasking.
- Life support, interpreters, technical linguists, combat medics, area and large-scale decontamination assets, engineering support, and security (at least route, convoy, and local security). The CARA is neither equipped nor trained to provide its own convoy security, and additional security is required during the transportation of sensitive materials and equipment.
- Site security at each site during the conduct of laboratory operations. Security should remain at the sites until the laboratory departs.
- Sustainment, resupply, and maintenance support for wheeled vehicles, power generation, trailers, weapon systems, communication systems, COTS equipment, and nonstandard personal protective equipment.
- All levels of life support from supported commands for all doctrinal classes of supply.
- As required, CARA enablers, which may include elements or personnel from the DTRA consequence management advisory team, Air Force Radiation Assessment Team, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Chemical Material Activity, CRT, or other agencies. The CARA enablers should be tactical control or OPCON to the same supported unit and attached to the CARA to assure the unity of effort.
- Theater planners to coordinate with non-DOD agencies in support of mission requirements (such as the transportation of surety material in-country or across borders).
- OCONUS aviation support.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

D-15. The CARA executes wartime and peacetime missions, separately or concurrently.

- **Wartime mission.** Provides an on-site or OCONUS deployed analytical laboratory, munitions assessment/recovery, and HAZMAT (to include CBRNE materials) transport (technical escort) capabilities to support the execution of CWMD (to include explosives) operations.

- **Peacetime mission.** Provides emergency response to discoveries of suspect RCWM, including search, assessment, and characterization operations; remediation operations of formerly used defense sites and base realignment and closure sites; stockpile and nonstockpile operations; and technical escorts to transport chemical surety and nonsurety material for various Army laboratories.
COMMAND AND COORDINATION

D-16. Because of the dangers and international ramifications of related operations, CARA operations may be coordinated with multiple agencies. National-level guidance and technical assessments outline the range and depth of the laboratory analysis of samples collected from each individual site or target.

WARTIME (OR WARTIME CONTINGENCY) OPERATIONS

D-17. The CARA normally deploys only as a direct reporting unit of a JTF, usually of a JTF/CBRNE (a CBRNE command operational command post). The CARA is normally co-located with the JTF-CBRNE, which is normally co-located with the ASCC.

D-18. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory is retained in the ASCC support area, which is co-located with the JTF-CBRNE and CARA headquarters. In this configuration, the CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory is in general support of the CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory supporting exploitation operations conducted by the divisions. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratories can detect, identify, quantify, and provide theater validation identification of chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial compounds and materials, biological agents, and select explosives and can conduct near-real-time air monitoring of chemical warfare agents. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory is a program of record laboratory.

D-19. The CARA RRTs are retained by CARA and are employed as dictated by the situation to exploit hazardous bulk and weaponized materials (assess, characterize, and pack); conduct remediation, recovery, and/or demilitarization operations; and, if deployed, to provide technical escort for the movement of CBRNE materials. CARA aircraft are not employed OCONUS; therefore, technical escort and movement of CBRNE materials and samples via air must be coordinated with the respective COCOM. CARA aircraft and RRTs can meet other military airlifts that are carrying CBRNE materials and samples from overseas at the nearest CONUS-based airfield and can then transfer (via chain of custody) and transport the materials the rest of the way to a Level 4 Definitive laboratory in the United States.

STEADY-STATE AND PEACETIME (OR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY) OPERATIONS

D-20. CARA works closely with various organizations and agencies during peacetime operations to hone their wartime critical skills and tasks as worldwide deployable emergency essential employees. These peacetime operations can occur CONUS and OCONUS. A CBRNE command provides CARA direct liaison authorization with many of the agencies because CARA has a long-standing history with them (many of them are DOD civilian-based organizations). Many of these organizations partially fund CARA operations. CARA supports these organizations for RCWM emergency response operations, remediation operations at formerly used defense sites or active military installations, technical escorts of surety and nonsurety material, UXO clearance operations, and laboratory support operations.

D-21. CARA works closely with the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Activity Recovered Chemical Materiel Directorate for the Recovered Chemical Warfare Material Program for emergency response operations. CARA tasks are to maintain the Mobile Munitions Assessment System, which is an analytical platform for the nonintrusive analysis of suspect chemical munitions. This system is deployed during RCWM emergency response operations.

D-22. CARA supports the United States Army Corps of Engineers and Army Environmental Command with remediation at formerly used defense sites and active installations. CARA normally provides nonintrusive assessments of suspect munitions, a personnel decontamination system, chemical casualty processing, and sample packaging and transport.

D-23. According to AR 50-6, many CARA civilians are enrolled in the personnel reliability program so that they can safely and securely transport chemical surety materials. The CARA operations section plans the technical escort missions, and the RRTs and aviation section leads the execution of missions for various organizations in the CBRNE research and development community.

D-24. CARA UXO technicians often support installations and civilian locations upon request through the United States Army Corps of Engineers for UXO clearance, sweep, and removal operations. Since there are numerous UXO hazards and munitions potentially containing explosives, chemicals, propellants, or
pyrotechnics on the surface or subsurface across many installations, the accepted practice from installation safety offices requires a UXO clearance operation or investigation before there is any digging, trenching, or earth disturbance with geophysical remote sensing tools and instruments by certified EOD personnel.

D-25. CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory personnel consisting of microbiologists, chemists, and physical science technicians stand ready to train with units from across the CBRNE command in home station training events or at Army combat training centers where CARA provides support with a mobile expeditionary laboratory, depending on the mission and exercise training objectives. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory also coordinates tactics, techniques, and procedures with other laboratories in the CBRNE community of interests, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Forensic Center laboratories, and the first AML. Additionally, the CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory air-monitoring sections support RCWM remediation sites for near-real-time low-level chemical agent monitoring.

SAMPLE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

D-26. There are four levels of sample analysis. CARA operates laboratories that are capable of providing analysis, meeting the requirements of the confirmatory and theater validation level (see figure D-2).

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**Figure D-2. Levels of CBRN material analysis**

Legend:
- **AML**: area medical laboratory
- **CRD**: chemical reconnaissance detachment
- **CRT**: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives response team
- **HAP**: hazard assessment platoon
- **HMEL**: heavy mobile expeditionary laboratory
- **LMEL**: light mobile expeditionary laboratory
D-27. CARA RRT personnel can support and execute intra- and inter-theater escort and movement of sample material, to include movement to host-nation laboratories, coalition laboratories, international treaty laboratories, and definitive laboratories in CONUS.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

D-28. In response to the mission and situation, elements of a CBRNE command may be task-organized and scaled into tailored mission packages and be attached, placed OPCON, or placed tactical control to supported maneuver units, as required. Although this publication does not represent all possible missions—and although the specific mission configurations are approximations—the missions are representative of the missions that are expected to place analytical and assessment demands on CARA.

D-29. CARA can provide support in each of these mission areas: site exploitation, endemic disease, and CBRN response. As a principle member of the elimination working group, the JTF-CBRNE normally provides periodic recommendations (after consultation with CARA) for the priority of analytical and assessment requirements to the ASCC. CARA schedules the workload across theater laboratories to best meet the ASCC requirements.

SITE EXPLOITATION/DISABLEMENT ROLE

D-30. Operations to exploit and disable operations at WMD sites are actions designed to systematically isolate, exploit, destroy/disable, monitor, and redirect WMD materials, programs, and related capabilities. The objective of these operations is to prevent the looting or capture of WMD and related materials; render harmless or destroy weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate or direct threat to the Armed Forces of the United States and the civilian population; and exploit (for intelligence purposes) program experts, documents, other media, and previously secured weapons and material to counter further WMD proliferation and prevent the regeneration of a hostile WMD capacity. Within this context, CARA supports the CCDRs and other government agencies with CBRNE operations across the operational continuum.

- **Exploitation purpose.** Site exploitation has three purposes—to answer information requirements, to facilitate subsequent operations, and to support criminal prosecution. CARA operations support all three purposes.
  - **Answering information requirements.** In coordination with the JTAIC, CARA prepares answers to the CCIRs to determine the level of capability of hostile forces to employ CBRNE weapons (during contingency operations) and to identify the hazards and risks posed by HAZMAT as they currently exist in the environment.
  - **Facilitating subsequent operations.** CARA informs decisions to be made relative to already planned or not yet anticipated missions.
  - **Supporting criminal prosecution.** CARA provides documentation of CBRNE program acquisition, manufacture, weaponization, employment, or proliferation.

- **Exploitation support.** CARA supports site exploitation characterization with RRTs (if deployed), providing characterization and assessment support; and with CARA mobile expeditionary laboratories (located with the CBRNE brigade task force, which is co-located with the supported division command post), providing rapid analytical laboratory analysis of samples collected from sites.
  - **Characterization and assessment.** If deployed, RRT personnel work closely with the CRTs during the characterization and assessment phase of exploitation operations, facilitating subsequent operations. They identify locations of HAZMAT and contamination; assess the risks associated with further exploitation operations, to include the packing and removal of HAZMAT; and determine the risk to coalition forces and the surrounding populace if further exploitation is suspended and hazards are left unmitigated.
Appendix D

- **Analytical laboratory analysis.** Upon the receipt of samples collected at exploited sites, the CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory that provides direct or general support (as directed by the CARA if analytical demands on the CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory exceed the capability within the time constraints established by the supported commander or CCDR’s guidance) ensures that a chain of custody is maintained and that theater validation testing is completed. Results of the confirmatory analysis are prepared and forwarded to CARA and the supported maneuver unit or task force to answer the commander's CCIR and to support potential criminal prosecution if deemed appropriate at a later time.

- **Destruction/disablement support.** If deployed, CARA RRT personnel (in coordination with the CRT, the EOD team, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center explosive destruction technology teams, and the JTAIC staff) determine the feasibility of the destruction/disablement of HAZMAT on site (to include munitions and facilities) and prepare recommendations for the task force commander facilitating subsequent operations. The CARA mobile expeditionary laboratory provides the analytical laboratory capability to verify the complete destruction/elimination of HAZMAT, likely answering a commander's CCIR.

**ENDEMIC DISEASE MISSIONS**

D-31. Endemic disease operations are actions taken to provide CCDRs with health hazard assessments of environmental, endemic, and emerging diseases and of suspected biological warfare agents in support of force health protection and WMD missions. Additionally, during steady-state operations, these capabilities can be employed as part of a humanitarian task force to assist host countries in gaining control of—and reversing the spread of—highly contagious and lethal diseases.

D-32. Although the primary CARA focus is on confirmatory and theater validation sample analysis of chemical and biological agent samples, CARA (with minimal additional training) can assume the theater sample management responsibility and be the primary ASCC laboratory supporting health hazard assessments of environmental, endemic, and emerging diseases. CARA provides sample analysis of CBRNE threats to Army personnel by reporting through JTF-CBRNE to the ASCC.

D-33. During steady-state endemic disease missions, CARA (or CARA elements, as required) may be deployed in support of (and be attached to or placed OPCON to) a JTF, depending on the administrative control support to be provided by the CCDR and ASCC. When deployed, CARA elements are in direct support of the JTF.

**CBRN RESPONSE MISSIONS**

D-34. The CARA provides support across the site reconnaissance, site assessment/characterization, decontamination (quality assurance), and remediation elements of the CBRN response mission by providing RRT staff (if deployed) and analytical laboratory support.

- **Site reconnaissance.** CARA laboratories evaluate and analyze samples collected by reconnaissance personnel to provide theater validation analysis and identification of the presence or absence of CBRNE materials.

- **Site assessment/characterization.** CARA RRT personnel (if deployed) work closely with CRT or other response personnel, via reachback or on site if a permissive environment exists, to assess existing risk and the mitigation required to reduce (to the greatest extent possible) the hazards to U.S./coalition forces or responding agencies as operations proceed.

- **Decontamination.** CARA laboratories are capable of determining the HAZMAT to which U.S./coalition forces or responding agencies may have been exposed and if remediation efforts meet the requirements at locations from which the samples are taken. They can also validate the thoroughness of decontamination operations conducted in support of United States/coalition forces or responding agencies.

- **Remediation.** CARA RRT personnel perform remediation in support of cleanup operations at formerly used defense sites, active military installations, and when deployed to a theater of operations.
Appendix E

Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Teams

The WMD coordination team acts as a coordinating agency or liaison between a CBRNE command or other supported headquarters for WMD interdiction, WMD elimination, and CBRN response support missions. The WMD coordination team provides supported commanders with expertise in prioritizing and integrating the employment of specialized CBRNE assets within operational and tactical plans. The WMD coordination team does not participate directly in the supported command decision making process, but it does provide the staff with accurate and timely situational understanding and advice regarding CBRN operations gathered from the CBRNE command current operations and future plans sections.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COORDINATION TEAM ROLE, ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND DEPENDENCIES

E-1. The WMD coordination team mission is to deploy and provide CCDRs, lead federal agencies, and supported commanders with a specialized CBRNE staff and technical subject matter expertise to support CONUS or theater-based CBRNE operations, accidents, or incidents and to coordinate the supporting unit assessment, planning, and execution of CBRNE technical operations. CBRNE missions during which a WMD coordination team can provide technical expertise include, but are not limited to—

- The employment of CBRNE area detection systems, such as the Biological Integrated Detection System.
- The assessment of the characterization and exploitation of CBRNE sites.
- C-IED response.
- Assistance with planning for the consolidation of CBRNE weapons and material seized during combat and exploitation operations.
- CBRN response support.
- Special reconnaissance.
- Counterproliferation.
- WMD interdiction.
- CBRNE material sample collection and laboratory analysis.
- Environmental sample collection and laboratory analysis.
- The recovery of chemical warfare materials.

E-2. The WMD coordination team supports the joint CWMD mission in the joint operational area across all operational phases in support of the operational commander to prevent, dissuade, and deny the military strategic objective (MSO). As operations transition into Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority), the WMD coordination team may assist with WMD operations in support of the commander to reduce, destroy, and reverse the MSO.

OPERATIONAL FOCUS

E-3. The WMD coordination team operational focus is to provide technical CBRNE coordination expertise and augmentation to the ASCC, TSOC, or Army corps while maintaining the ability to serve as an advance element for the CBRNE command.
ORGANIZATION

E-4. There are five WMD coordination teams in a CBRNE command. WMD coordination teams are capable of deploying in support of contingency operations OCONUS. The teams may have slight variations of military occupational specialty (MOS) assignments, but each team has a total of 17 personnel. Each WMD coordination team is capable of working independently of the others.

E-5. The WMD coordination team is scalable based on the mission. It is organized into two shifts. Each shift has one operations officer; one operations NCO; and CBRNE SMEs, organic intelligence analysts, and signal support staff. This two-shift capability allows the WMD coordination team to provide 24-hour continuous operations for the supported headquarters.

E-6. The WMD coordination team consists of the following:
- An EOD officer and an NCO (MOS series 89).
- CBRN officers and an NCO (MOS series 74).
- A nuclear operations officer (FA52).
- A military intelligence officer and a NCO in charge (MOS series 35) and a civilian intelligence specialist (general military intelligence analyst).
- A communications NCO and enlisted personnel (MOS series 25).

CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

E-7. The WMD coordination teams provide CBRNE-focused subject matter expertise to the supported commander and staff. They are capable of providing technical analysis and recommendations to support CWMD and CBRNE planning, protect the force, and maximize the use of technical capabilities through coordination and liaison. They assess current and future operations and provide recommendations to commanders and staffs to manage risks and identify exploitation opportunities (see ATP 5-19 for details on risk management). They can maintain and display CBRNE COP to manage and provide information to improve situational understanding and allow the supported commander to direct the conduct of CBRNE or CWMD operations. They support CBRNE and CWMD planning, assessment, and coordination to build, maintain, and project combat power.

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ROLES

E-8. The WMD coordination teams provide the COCOM, ASCC, and corps integrated subject matter expertise and advice across the eight CWMD missions (see Table E-1).

Table E-1. WMD coordination team SME support to CWMD mission areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Area</th>
<th>CBRN</th>
<th>EOD</th>
<th>RAD/NUC</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Comms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Cooperation/Partner Activities</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD Interdiction</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive Operations</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Reduction Cooperation</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD Elimination</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Defense</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN Passive Defense</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN response</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Supported Mission Area ●
Enabled Mission Area ◊

Legend:
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
Comms communication
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
Intel intelligence
NUC nuclear
RAD radiological
WMD weapons of mass destruction
**STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT**

E-9. At the strategic, theater, and operational levels, the WMD coordination teams provide and augment the COCOM, ASCC, and corps (see table E-2).

Table E-2. WMD coordination team SME support to functional staff planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CBRN</th>
<th>EOD</th>
<th>RAD/NUC</th>
<th>Intel</th>
<th>Comms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Expertise</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Planning and Synchronization</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard Prediction Capability</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison to Scientific Reachback</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable Team Communication Functionality and Independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>◊</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.**
- Supported Mission Area ●
- Enabled Mission Area ◊

**Legend:**
- CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
- C-IED counter-improvised explosive device
- Comms communication
- EOD explosive ordnance disposal
- Intel intelligence
- NUC nuclear
- RAD radiological

**Subject Matter Expertise**

E-10. The following shows subject matter expertise that the WMD coordination teams provide for each unit:

- **CBRN unit.** The WMD coordination teams provide technical and subject matter expertise, to include the following:
  - Chemical and biological agent properties.
  - Small- and large-scale nuclear, biological, and chemical agent production cycles; required equipment, facilities, and networks.
  - CBRN response planning, to include decontamination and other mitigation strategies (avoidance, protection).
  - CBRNE-focused intelligence threat assessments.
  - Preliminary hazard prediction modeling.
  - Planning for operational-level CWMD programs.
  - Planning for operations utilizing CBRN capabilities.
  - The employment of units/elements as CBRNE task forces or as part of maneuver unit-led task forces.
  - Force protection guidance against CBRN threats.
  - CBRNE-focused operational threat assessments.

- **Explosive ordnance disposal unit.** The WMD coordination teams provide technical and subject matter expertise, to include the following:
  - The planning for, response to, and conduct of EOD operations.
  - Improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersion devices, and nuclear device hazards and response.
  - Hazards associated with homemade explosive production.
  - Weapons technical intelligence.
- Intelligence collection on WMD targets and at IED sites.
- Hazard prediction modeling/assessments.
- Operational-level CWMD and C-IED programs.
- Force protection guidance and vulnerability assessments.

- **Nuclear/radiological unit.** The WMD coordination teams provide technical and subject matter expertise, to include the following:
  - Intelligence collection on nuclear targets.
  - Hazard prediction modeling/assessments.
  - National-level nuclear and radiological program elimination missions.
  - CBRN response.
  - The employment of NDTs and other units/elements as CBRNE task forces or as part of maneuver unit-led task forces.
  - Nuclear counterproliferation analysis and planning systems.
  - Medical effects of radiation.
  - Joint enabling capabilities planning.

- **Intelligence unit.** The WMD coordination teams provide technical and subject matter expertise, to include the following:
  - Target deconfliction and effects.
  - Counterterrorism (Red Team analysis).
  - Intelligence support to DSCA.
  - Intelligence support to joint and multinational operations.
  - CBRNE threat development and analysis.
  - IPB.
  - Geospatial intelligence analysis.
  - Open-source analysis.
  - Underground facility/hardened and deeply buried target analysis reachback capability.
  - Intelligence with CBRNE considerations in support of the commander’s MDMP.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Team Dependencies**

E-11. The WMD coordination team requires operational and tactical support while deployed, to include the following:

- **Technical support.** Interpreters, technical linguists, and communications support.
- **Security.** Site security at each site during the conduct of operations and at least route, convoy, and local security.
- **Sustainment.** Combat medics, resupply, decontamination, and maintenance support for wheeled vehicles, power generation, weapon systems, and communication systems.
- **Supply.** All levels of life support from supported commands for all classes of supply.

**WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COORDINATION TEAM OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

E-12. While OCONUS, the WMD coordination teams execute wartime and peacetime missions separately or concurrently. The missions sets discussed below are not intended to define the sole functions of a WMD coordination team, but to describe the potential employment options that best align with the WMD coordination team unique capabilities.
E-13. When directed by the CBRNE command, WMD coordination teams deploy early in the deployment cycle independently or as part of the operational command post and provide immediate CBRNE augmentation to the ASCC, TSOC, or other headquarters while maintaining contact with follow-on deploying elements/units. Depending on the situation, the WMD coordination team may—

- Relocate to augment an ASCC, corps, JTF, or joint interagency task force headquarters upon their arrival in theater while maintaining contact with the respective COCOM and providing technical CBRNE support to the supported ASCC, corps, JTF, or joint interagency task force for the planning and execution of CBRNE technical operations in the theater of operations. This includes assistance with the planning, coordination, nesting, and execution of all facets of CBRNE elimination operations, from exploitation through disposal.
- Remain at the ASCC throughout the remaining phases of joint operations while maintaining contact with subordinate corps headquarters and the CBRN and forces.

E-14. For CONUS missions, a WMD coordination team deploys early in the deployment cycle to provide immediate CBRNE augmentation to USNORTHCOM or USARNORTH while establishing contact with JTF–civil support. A WMD coordination team also coordinates as directed through USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH, or JTF–civil support with the DHS and designated government agencies, with respect to accident and incident planning in support of crisis and CBRN response operations.

**COMMAND AND COORDINATION**

E-15. WMD coordination teams may be required to coordinate actions with multiple agencies. National-level guidance and technical assessments outline the range and depth of coordination requirements.

- **Wartime (or wartime contingency) operations.** The WMD coordination team deploys OPCON to the CBRNE command operational command post. The CBRNE command operational command post provides direct support to the aligned theater headquarters. The WMD coordination team also provides general support to the ASCC by providing a CBRNE planning and coordinating capability at the corps headquarters. The WMD coordination team can be co-located with the supported unit headquarters and can operate according to the command and support relationship. The WMD coordination team may also function in a liaison capacity between a CBRNE command/JTF-CBRNE and the COCOM or ASCC headquarters.
- **Steady-state and peacetime (or peacetime contingency) operations.** All steady-state/peacetime WMD coordination team missions are coordinated through a CBRNE command. The deployed WMD coordination team normally operates in direct support of USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH, or JTF–civil support.
- **Communications when deployed.** WMD coordination teams possess the following organic tactical radio and tactical satellite communication systems for internal communication:
  - AN/VRC-90F vehicular single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) frequency modulation tactical radio.
  - AN/PSC-5 tactical satellite radio.
  - AN/PRC-50 high frequency radio.
- **WMD coordination team organic communication equipment.** WMD coordination teams possess the following organic equipment, allowing them to efficiently integrate into the supported unit command post:
  - NIPRNET/SIPRNET tactical laptops.
  - Command Post of the Future battle command systems.
- **WMD coordination team communication dependencies.** WMD coordination teams are dependent on the supported unit for the following communication-related support:
  - SIPRNET/NIPRNET or theater-specific computer networks.
  - VoIP telecommunications, theater-specific computer imaging, theater-specific command post communication systems.
CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

E-16. During contingency operations, CBRNE command WMD coordination teams are deployable to integrate into an ASCC, TSOC, and/or corps or division level staff to assist with initial CBRNE planning and execution (see figure E-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE 1 (SEIZE THE INITIATIVE)</th>
<th>PHASE 2 (SECURE THE INITIATIVE)</th>
<th>PHASE 3 (DOMINATE)</th>
<th>PHASE 4 (RENALI CIVIL AUTHORITY)</th>
<th>PHASE 5 (REPLAN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify and recommend employment of CBRNE forces for mission support</td>
<td>Reassessment of CBRNE threats and recommended protection measures</td>
<td>Assist in security cooperation activities through intelligence and SME analysis</td>
<td>Conduct interagency coordination and integration</td>
<td>Provide subject matter expert analysis and recommendations for hand over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct vulnerability assessment and recommend protection measures to build and project combat power</td>
<td>Conduct assessment briefs, operations and CBRNE COP update</td>
<td>Assist with orders development</td>
<td>Provide planning and recommendations for utilization and/or redeployment of CBRNE forces</td>
<td>Provide reachback capability for host nation/interagency/joint combined BME support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify potential CBRNE operational and logistics requirements</td>
<td>Develop CBRNE CP/OPF mission support folders and threat analysis</td>
<td>Subject matter expert input into campaign objective analysis</td>
<td>Provide CBRNE plans and threat assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
CONPLAN contingency plan
COP common operational picture
CPOF Command Post of the Future
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order

Figure E-1. WMD coordination team support to CWMD and CBRNE operations

E-17. This tailor able and scalable echeloned concept of employment and integration allows for the rapid employment of CBRNE elements with their supported units and for phased deployment into a theater of operations while sustaining the enabling technical reachback to the CBRNE community of interest.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Counter-Improvised Explosives Device Role

E-18. The WMD coordination teams assist ASCCs, TSOCs, and the corps as they establish and implement rules of engagement and define responsibilities for the response to UXO, captured enemy ammunition, explosive remnants of war, and IEDs located on the battlefield. The WMD coordination teams can assist with the coordination of plans for—

- Complying with the United Nations Protocol on explosive remnants of war.
- Conducting safe handling, disposition, and storage of ammunition/explosives.
- Managing route clearance responsibilities and coordination of the employment of engineer explosive ordnance clearance agents and EOD personnel.
- Finding, identifying, and disposing of ammunition and explosive caches.
- Collecting explosive ordnance battlefield technical intelligence.
- Employing weapons intelligence teams.
- Conducting WMD-elimination operations.
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and Site Exploitation/Disablement/Destruction Roles

E-19. WMD operations are actions that systematically isolate, exploit, destroy/disable, monitor, and redirect WMD materials, programs, and related capabilities. The objective of these operations is to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials; render harmless or destroy weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate or direct threat to the Armed Forces of the United States and the civilian population; and exploit (for intelligence purposes) program experts, documents, other media, and previously secured weapons and material to counter further WMD proliferation and prevent the regeneration of a hostile WMD capacity. Within this context, the WMD coordination team supports the COCOM commander and other government agencies by providing the coordination of exploitation, disablement, and destruction operations across the operational continuum. The WMD coordination team also provides coordination for destruction operations during steady-state (peacetime) operations.

Endemic Disease Coordination

E-20. Endemic disease operations are actions that provide CCDRs with health hazard assessments of environmental, occupational, endemic, and CBRNE threats in support of force protection and WMD missions. Additionally, during steady-state operations, these capabilities can be employed as part of a humanitarian task force to assist host countries in gaining control of—and reversing the spread of—highly contagious and lethal diseases.

E-21. During contingency operations, the WMD coordination teams assist the ASCC to coordinate and plan for laboratory operations, requirements, and sample collection/management for health hazard assessments of environmental, occupational, endemic, and CBRNE threats to Army personnel.

CBRN Response Missions

E-22. The WMD coordination teams provide CBRNE expertise to the supported unit for the execution of WMD elimination, reconnaissance, decontamination, and contamination avoidance, to include the task organization and allocation of CBRNE forces.

PHASES OF CONTINGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT OPERATIONS

E-23. WMD coordination teams conduct operations and provide planning support during all of the OPLAN phases.

- **Phase 0–Shaping.** WMD coordination teams deploy on a recurring basis during shaping to participate as a player during international exercises of coalition forces to assure and solidify relationships with friends and allies. These exercises are executed with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and to gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. One example of phase 0 operations is the early integration of the Department of State into OCONUS WMD-elimination planning because they are a key component in determining host-nation and regional support.

- **Phase 1–Deter.** Phase 1 begins with the receipt of a deployment order and ends when the deployment is complete with the COCOM and the WMD coordination team is prepared to conduct operations. During this phase, the WMD coordination team deploys as directed to the theater of operations; co-locates with the COCOM, ASCC, or supported corps; and provides technical CBRNE planning support according to the relevant OPLAN. When deployed, the WMD coordination team also serves a liaison function, coordinating between the supported units, the CBRNE brigade task force, and the JTF-CBRNE.
- **Phase II–Seize the Initiative.** Phase II begins with the early and rapid application of offensive combat power to dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of those forces and of their will to fight during the dominate phase. During this phase, the WMD coordination teams may co-locate with the COCOM, ASCC, or TSOC headquarters. The WMD coordination team continues to provide technical CBRNE expertise and coordination support for CBRNE operations throughout the theater. This phase ends when the conditions are set for decisive operations.

- **Phase III–Dominate.** Phase III begins by breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, for control of the OE. During this phase, the WMD coordination team focus is on providing subject matter expertise in support of CBRNE exploitation, WMD consolidation activities, destruction, and disablement. This phase is concluded when U.S. and coalition forces control the operational area and with the culmination of the enemy.

- **Phase IV–Stabilize.** Phase IV begins with the establishment of limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational or intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or U.S. government department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. During this phase, the WMD coordination team focus continues to be on providing subject matter expertise in support of CBRNE exploitation, WMD consolidation activities, destruction, and disablement. This phase ends with the transfer of the regional overall authority to a legitimate civil entity.

- **Phase V–Support Civil Authority.** Phase V begins with the establishment of a legitimate civil authority. During this phase, the WMD coordination team focus continues to be on providing subject matter expertise in support of CBRNE destruction/disablement and WMD consolidation activities. During this phase, the WMD coordination team completes all activities initiated during earlier phases of the operation and then redeploys. This phase ends with the successful redeployment of the WMD coordination team to a home station.
Appendix F

Nuclear Disablement Teams

Potential and current adversaries, to include established nation-states, rogue states, or nonstate actors, have developed or are interested in developing nuclear and/or radiological WMD. Such weapons can be acquired through the diversion of complete weapons, SNM, or radioisotopes; through the development of substantial infrastructure for research, development, production, and assembly; or by the acquisition of nuclear weapon design information or special components leading up to the development of a nuclear weapon. NDTs focus on the second and third pathways—the assessment and characterization of nuclear infrastructure that supports a weapons program. Threat infrastructure can range from facilities that have little potential for immediate use in weapon development (such as mining and milling facilities) to facilities that produce SNM or to advanced facilities that fabricate weapons and assemblies that can deliver finished weapons. The importance of each facility is based on its direct correlation to the nuclear fuel cycle. This importance is increased by the value of the facility and by the potential of its product for use in a weapon. The importance of a facility is decreased by any redundancies in similar facilities. A single facility that makes SNM that can be weaponized or that makes radiological materials is a high priority. A facility that is designated as a key or final assembly point for nuclear weapons may have a higher priority, depending on the confidence in the intelligence on site. Analysis of these factors drive the priority in exploitation, recovery, disablement, and elimination operations. The potential for U.S. forces to face a nuclear/radiological CBRNE incident in an OE poses a serious challenge. Persistent and nonpersistent hazards may result from the release of toxic industrial chemicals or toxic industrial materials found in nuclear infrastructure, the accidental or intentional release of radioactive materials into the environment, the detonation of an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device, or the failure to secure sites that contain CBRN materials. HAZMAT contamination can occur as a result of combat operations, during the exploitation of a facility by untrained personnel, as a result of infrastructure deterioration, or from sabotage by an adversary; further collateral damage could additionally cause environmental contamination.

NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAM ROLES

F-1. The mission of the NDT is to rapidly and efficiently exploit and disable nuclear and radiological infrastructure and components OCONUS in permissive or uncertain environments to deny the near-term reuse capability by enemy forces and to facilitate follow-on WMD-elimination operations.

- **Operational focus.** The NDT operational focus is to conduct site exploitation on nuclear and radiological-related infrastructure and facilities. Within the DOD combating WMD strategy, NDTs execute operations in specialized activities and tasks to control, disable, and dispose of WMD threats to safeguard the force. Additionally, NDTs perform actions to support national strategic postevent objectives, which can also assist incident commanders who manage consequences to support recovery efforts.

- **Mission.** The table of organization and equipment mission statement states to rapidly and efficiently exploit and disable nuclear or radiological WMD infrastructure and components in an OCONUS uncertain or permissive environment to deny near-term capability or reuse by enemy...
forces and facilitate follow-on WMD-elimination operations. NDTs deploy and conduct radiological/nuclear assessment and characterization operations to locate, exploit and, when directed, disable nuclear or radiological WMD infrastructure. With the support of other WMD-elimination forces and combat forces for mission security, NDTs have the capability to disable and/or eliminate the nuclear weapons infrastructure, ensuring that all nuclear materials, mitigating radiological hazards, and radiation sources are secured and contained. NDTs also identify, monitor, and minimize radiological health risks within the AOR.

F-2. NDT capabilities, in coordination and partnership with DOE through reachback, include—

- The exploitation of nuclear facilities and of nuclear fuel cycle, weapon development, and radiological sites.
- When directed, the disablement of nuclear infrastructure to demilitarize by reducing or removing the military weapons capability.
- The characterization of radiological/nuclear material and processes before weapon system assembly.
- The collection, packaging, securing, and evacuation of radiological/nuclear samples that pose an immediate threat to friendly forces and for intelligence/forensics analysis.
- Coordination with higher headquarters to assist with facility and process disablement planning, execution, and other radiological/nuclear operations.
- Advice to the commander regarding radiological/nuclear issues in their AOR and support to other technical forces.

F-3. The primary intent of disablement operations is to deny near-term capability or reuse by enemy forces and to facilitate follow-on WMD-elimination operations. Although the general environment in the area of operations may be defined as uncertain, hostile, or semipermissive, the exploitation task force (of which the NDT is one element) creates or establishes a semipermissive to permissive environment in the immediate area of a nuclear weapons-related site to enable NDT operations. The primary warfighting functions supported by the NDT are movement and maneuver, intelligence, and protection.

F-4. NDTs support the joint mission to counter radiological/nuclear threats in the joint operational area. During Phase III (Dominate) operations, NDTs may execute the specialized activities and tasks of controlling radiological and nuclear materials, disabling and disposing of threat nuclear infrastructure, and managing the consequences of a nuclear-related event. This is conducted in conjunction with other maneuver forces to support the CWMD lines of effort to prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises. As operations transition into Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Support Civil Authority), NDTs continue disabling and disposing the threat nuclear infrastructure.

F-5. Areas of key concern for NDTs include, but are not limited to—

- Foreign nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
- Nuclear engineering or physics laboratories/schools.
- Nuclear test facilities.
- Nuclear weapon component fabrication or assembly facilities.

F-6. NDTs do not participate in weapon render-safe procedure operations. Instead, they focus on disrupting a threat’s nuclear fuel cycle and related infrastructure.

NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAM CAPABILITIES

F-7. NDTs can operate in radioactive and chemically contaminated environments to search, assess, characterize, exploit, and perform the disablement of nuclear/radiological infrastructure in support of national CWMD objectives. Inside an isolated objective, NDTs can operate independently or in conjunction with other forces to expedite site exploitation timelines. NDTs must be augmented with a CRT to properly perform the CBRNE exploitation and disablement of a nuclear facility.
NDT elements form the technical core of a nuclear-specific CWMD element. Each NDT is staffed with members from the following MOSs:

- Nuclear and Counterproliferation (MOS 52B).
- Nuclear Medical Science/Health Physics (MOS 72A or 68SN4).
- EOD (MOS 89E).
- CBRN (MOS 74DL3).

The training and education of the NDT members span the scope of possible infrastructure to be exploited.

NDTs have tactical, theater-deployable wheeled vehicles capable of transporting all related Soldiers and equipment. They deploy with enough organic sustainment to conduct uninterrupted operations for approximately 3 days for Class I and Class V supplies and for approximately 30 days for nonstandard expendable items, such as personal protective equipment.

NDT site exploitation operations can range from the exploitation of a small-scale radiochemistry laboratory (moderate risk of limited contamination) to the exploitation of large sites, such as an industrial size reprocessing facility with a co-located metal fabrication plant (severe environmental and criticality hazards). Large-site operations require significant augmentation, to include battalion size security, multiple CRTs, a CBRN decontamination unit, and dedicated medical support for biomedical monitoring and rapid medical response. During these site exploitation operations, the following enablers may be required:

- Linguists capable of—
  - Translating technical documents.
  - Translating infrastructure equipment controls.
  - Questioning technical personnel.
- Personnel familiar with human signatures (fingerprints, DNA, and so forth).
- Maintenance support personnel for vehicles, communication equipment and armament.

NDT equipment sets include, but are not limited to—

- Technical entry equipment to make highly secured sites safely accessible for exploitation; however, EOD support is required for initial entry and the clearing of explosive hazards. Air- and ground-based wide-area radiation detection systems require an aerial platform for the Aerial Radiation Detection Identification and Mapping System.
- Handheld gamma and neutron dose rate measurement systems.
- High-resolution spectroscopy-based isotopic identification systems, such as high-purity germanium, sodium iodide, or lanthanum bromide gamma detectors (some with integrated neutron detectors).
- Personal dosimeters.
- Personal protective equipment capable of protecting personnel in radioactive, contaminated, low-oxygen, corrosive, and toxic environments, including positive pressure/air purifying respirator hybrid-capable breathing systems.
- Limited and small-scale nuclear disablement tools and equipment.
- Radioactive sample package, store, and transport kits.
- Decontamination, contamination control stations, and cleanup kits for team personal and individual equipment.
- Confined space equipment for conducting limited emergency self-rescue operations in damaged structures.
- Frequency modulation very high frequency voice and data, tactical satellite ultra-high frequency voice and data, very small aperture terminal (ultra-high frequency) data, and wireless secure communication systems.
- Field-deployable, climate-controlled deployable shelters and the power generation capability to support mission command operations, sustainment operations, sample analysis, life support, and equipment storage/preparation.
CAPABILITIES

F-13. NDT capabilities include the ability to—

- Conduct radiological detection and mapping by using air, vehicular mounted, and man-portable detectors for wide-area reconnaissance of suspect radiological/nuclear sites.
- Exploit radiological/nuclear sites in an OCONUS, locally established semipermissive or permissive environment. NDTs characterize the purpose of the site, the types of nuclear and radiological materials present, and the proliferation risk.
- Conduct nuclear infrastructure disablement operations by using techniques that support follow-on elimination operations while preventing the environmental release of radioactive and/or chemical HAZMAT.
- Collect, package, and evacuate samples of SNM or radiological material/WMD intelligence for shipment or forensic analysis.
- Conduct field-confirmatory radioisotope identification and characterization of radiological materials and provide confirmatory results when verified through DOE triage.
- Provide advice on operational exposure guidance (including the identification of which radiation sources have the most potential to pose a hazard to friendly forces) to the supported commander.
- Supervise packaging, transporting, and safeguarding on-site nuclear and/or radiological material that poses a near-term threat to friendly and coalition forces or to local civilian populations.
- Secure potential sources that could be used in radiological exposure devices or radiological dispersal devices.

NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAM DEPENDENCIES

F-14. NDT elements require significant support, to include—

- Intelligence analysis, including a prioritized list of sites to exploit and firmly established CCIR to assist the NDT with mission planning and support.
- Document and media exploitation and human intelligence.
- Interpreters and technical linguists capable of translating technical material.
- Medical support.
- Area/large-scale decontamination and contamination control section support.
- Engineering support.
- Security (route, convoy, and local site security).
  - The NDT is armed for self-protection; however, the supported command must provide route, convoy, and exploitation site security. Site security must remain at the sites until all items of proliferation concern are removed to prevent looting and the loss of positive control.
  - The NDTs require security during the transportation of sensitive materials and equipment if such material is removed from the site.
- One or more CRTs to augment the toxic industrial chemicals/toxic industrial materials identification capability.
- EOD support.
- The Level A/confined space capability.
- Rescue team support.
- Sustainment, resupply, and maintenance support for wheeled vehicles, power generation, trailers, weapon systems, communication systems, COTS equipment, and nonstandard personal protective equipment.
- All levels of life support from supported commands for all doctrinal classes of supply.
- Rotary-wing aviation assets on which to mount an aerial, wide-area search capability (Aerial Radiation Detection Identification and Mapping System) for aerial radiation mapping.
- Theater planners to coordinate with non-DOD such as the DOE, Department of Justice, and Department of State in support of mission requirements, such as the transportation of SNM in-country or across borders.
As required, NDT enablers that may include elements or personnel from the DTRA consequence management advisory team, Air Force radiation assessment team, CRT, EOD, elements of the 21st EOD Company, intelligence community, or other agencies should be tactical control or OPCON to the same supported unit and attached to the NDT to assure unity of effort on the target.

**NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAM OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

NDTs conduct radiological and nuclear assessment and characterization operations and counter radiological/nuclear threats in support of national CWMD objectives. An NDT exploits and disables nuclear or radiological WMD infrastructure and components in an OCONUS locally established semipermissive or permissive environment to deny near-term capability or reuse by enemy forces and facilitate follow-on WMD-elimination operations. ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D and ATP 3-90.15 provide the operational doctrine for NDT operations.

**MISSION COMMAND AND COORDINATION**

An NDT deploys as part of a JTF or of a larger CBRN headquarters. The NDT may be further placed in a direct support role to a designated commander on an area/site-specific basis; however, an NDT can also deploy separately in support of the ASCC or theater commander if the support requirements identified within this appendix are provided.

The NDT coordinates with the supported command, DOE, and other joint and interagency partners for information security and classification requirements.

Because of the dangers and international ramifications of related operations, NDT operations must be coordinated through multiple agencies. National-level guidance and technical assessments outline the range and depth of the site exploitation required at each individual target.

Communications include—
- Frequency modulation and tactical satellite radios that are used to relay information from the objective site(s) back to the team command post.
- An internal mesh network that may transmit data from the team computers and detectors back to the command post in near-real-time. The data includes the location, dose rate, isotope identification, radiological spectra, drawings, pictures, and other mission data and communications.

The NDT uses a COTS communication system for NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and VoIP to communicate with DOE, DTRA, or academia for reachback. Technical support and maintenance for COTS and all other equipment may be required to maintain this capability.

**SITE EXPLOITATION**

Site exploitation has three purposes—to answer information requirements, to facilitate subsequent operations, or to support criminal prosecution. The exploitation of nuclear infrastructure focuses on—
- Answering information requirements (usually the CCIRs).
- Facilitating subsequent operations (already planned or not yet anticipated).

An NDT establishes a command post, contamination control line, and possibly a forward contamination control line when conducting operations. During site exploitation, a NDT organizes teams by effort and scope based on the current site exploitation phase.
DISABLEMENT

F-24. NDTs use one of the following two types of disablement:

- **Hasty disablement.** Hasty disablement is actions that preclude the facility from returning to operation for 1–3 months. Hasty disablement should take less than one week (depending on the size of the facility), but it has an increased risk of accidents, unsecured material, and equipment proliferation.

- **Deliberate disablement.** Deliberate disablement is actions that preclude the facility from returning to operation for over 3 months. It may require foreign assistance and/or the shipment of hard-to-acquire or restricted materials and equipment. It requires extensive time for planning, coordinating, and execution; however, the risk of material proliferation, environmental contamination, and injuries to personnel is lowered. This requires significant coordination with DOE and SMEs through reachback and manpower augmentation from other WMD-elimination elements.

STAGES OF NUCLEAR DISABLEMENT TEAM OPERATIONS

F-25. The following describes the phasing of NDT operations:

- **Stage 0–Planning/Reconnaissance.** Before the NDT deploys to a suspected nuclear site, high-confidence information and intelligence on a WMD site list could dictate that the team should deploy its aerial radiation detection and mapping capability. The Aerial Radiation Detection Identification and Mapping System operator works with planners and aviation assets to isolate the specific buildings or groups of buildings that should be prioritized for exploitation. Similarly, the NDT may deploy its vehicular mounted detection system to isolate the radiation sources and groupings of buildings that have the highest priority.

- **Stage 1–Operational Site Setup.** Stage 1 begins when the maneuver force has isolated the facility and seized and secured the site to be exploited. It ends when the NDT counterproliferation is at full operational capability and the NDT is ready to conduct entry planning. The Stage 1 objectives are to establish the operational footprint and contamination control measures and prepare for Stage 2.

- **Stage 2–Initial Entry Operations.** Stage 2 begins when the NDT initiates planning for entry operations. EOD and CRT support are required to reduce/clear explosive/denial hazards. Stage 2 ends when an analysis of initial entry team products is complete, the identified hazards are reduced to facilitate characterization operations, and the NDT is ready to develop the characterization plan. The Stage 2 objective is to locate and quantify all hazards (radiological, explosive, industrial, and chemical).

- **Stage 3–Site Characterization.** Stage 3 begins when the NDT is ready to develop the characterization plan. It ends when radiological and nuclear materials, equipment, and infrastructure are characterized; critical nodes are identified; and the NDT is ready to conduct planning for disablement operations. (A critical node is part of the facility that is essential to the purpose of the facility. Disablement of the node prevents the facility from producing its intended product.) The objectives of Stage 3 are to locate/identify radioactive materials/isotopes and to characterize the site.
Stage 4—Disablement Operations. Stage 4 begins when characterization of the facility is complete, SNM and sensitive or critical materials and equipment are identified, and the supported command has directed the NDT to begin the disablement and/or evacuation of materiel. A full and complete characterization can take several weeks but may be expedited with near-real-time coordination through reachback to DOE. The JTF or NDT may coordinate with DOE deployed forward mobile uranium or mobile plutonium facilities for the proper packaging and transfer of custody of SNM for final disposition. The supported command, based on recommendations from the NDT and/or technical reachback, may elect to forgo disablement of the facility (if disablement might cause a larger hazard) and instead direct the NDT to conduct access denial. Access denial efforts take place during Phase IV or V. This phase ends when all directed materiel is packaged and prepared for transfer from the NDT to another designated element and all required equipment is disabled. The Stage 4 objectives are to remove fissile materials or radioactive materials suitable for use in a radiological dispersion device or weaponization; disable critical infrastructure; and package material, as necessary.

Stage 5—Preparation for Follow-On Elimination Operations. Stage 5 begins when all directed materiel is packaged and prepared for transfer from the NDT to another designated element and all required equipment is disabled. Stage 5 ends when all directed materiel is transferred to another element for transportation, the facility is secured and transferred to another element, and the NDT is prepared to transition to a follow-on mission. The Stage 5 objectives are to hand over site and seized materiel and to prepare for the next mission.
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Appendix G

Area Medical Laboratory

The AML is the Army specialized theater laboratory that can provide field confirmatory and theater validation laboratory support. Its primary role is to provide theater validation analytical laboratory support for environmental (air, water, and soil) samples, epidemiological samples, food and water security, infectious disease, and CBRN samples. Its focus is the total health environment of the theater—not individual patient care.

MISSION

G-1. The AML deploys worldwide as a unit or by task-organized teams to perform surveillance, analytical laboratory testing, and health hazard assessments of environmental, occupational, endemic, and CBRN threats in support of Soldier protection and WMD missions.

G-2. The AML modular design permits task-organization of AML personnel for limited functional capabilities without the deployment of the entire organization. Modules consist of functional increments that provide the necessary array of analytical, diagnostic, investigative, and consultee capabilities tailored for a specified mission or contingency operation.

G-3. Thirteen medical specialists and physicians are assigned to the AML through the Professional Filler System to enhance subject matter expertise and increase consultation capability. AML Professional Filler System personnel include two nuclear medical scientists, an additional microbiologist, three additional biochemists, an occupational medicine officer, an additional environmental scientist, a veterinary comparative medical officer, a veterinary pathologist, an entomologist, a preventive medicine officer, and an infectious disease officer. The AML Professional Filler System personnel provide the operational commander additional expertise for consultation to assess biological, chemical, occupational, environmental, and endemic disease hazards.

G-4. The AML is capable of incrementally deploying its functional modules as the operational requirement for laboratory support increases. These characteristics enhance the total Army Health System mission and better support split-based operations and rapid force projection without significantly degrading the capabilities of the parent unit. The unit may send portions of the functional modules forward, and that module can operate with local support; however, each functional module cannot be split to operate at more than one location due to the lack of critical equipment redundancy. The functional module can be tailored to accomplish specific missions, if required. The AML may operate with its forward elements located in separate areas; however, mission command should remain with the headquarters section due to the unique support needs of the AML.

G-5. The AML tests air, water, soil, food, waste, and vectors (insects, animals) for a broad range of microbiological, radiological, and/or chemical contaminants under the two basic scenarios shown below.

- As a public health field laboratory (theater validation) with Level IV preventative medicine staff support in support of theater operations, the AML provides—
  - Theater validation level of identification to enable commanders and health care providers to make data-based decisions.
  - Support to multiple medical detachments (preventive medicine and veterinary service) with surveillance/surveillance oversight, sample collection/sample management, and rapid laboratory analysis and validation.
During contingency operations (for example, after use of WMD), the AML provides—

- Immediate hazard identification (presumptive or field confirmatory level of identification) in high-risk environments that have chemical or biological agent contamination, epidemic disease, or industrial contamination.
- Rapid theater validation laboratory analysis of chemical and biological warfare materiel and toxic industrial chemicals and materials and the characterization of hazards posed by radiological materials to assist commanders in making operational decisions.

### AREA MEDICAL LABORATORY CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

G-6. Primary tasks and purposes of the operational medical laboratory function performed by the AML are shown in table G-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Task</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analytical, investigational, and consultative</td>
<td>To identify CBRN threat agents in environmental samples and other samples from the area of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
<td>To assist in the identification of occupational and environmental health hazards and endemic diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special environmental control and containment</td>
<td>To evaluate environmental samples for the presence of highly infectious or hazardous agents of operational concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and data analysis</td>
<td>To support medical analyses and operational decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical laboratory analysis</td>
<td>To support the diagnosis of zoonotic and significant animal diseases that impact military operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional module or team deployment</td>
<td>To interface with preventive medicine teams, veterinary teams; forward deployed Army Health System units; biological integrated detection system teams; and CBRN company elements operating in the area of operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

### LEVEL IV—ARMY LEVEL PREVENTIVE MEDICINE STAFF SUPPORT

G-7. In a deployed setting, theater validation preventive medicine laboratory services are normally provided by the AML that supports the theater. Level IV preventive medicine support refers to the AML and Army level preventive medicine staff support. The AML is a field laboratory that provides rapid health threat identification and assessment within the area of operations. Health threats include CBRN warfare agents, infectious communicable diseases, and occupational/environmental health concerns. The AML is designed to receive and analyze samples from Roles 2 and 3 preventive medicine assets, CRTs, veterinary services assets, and other types of CBRN collection teams.
AREA MEDICAL LABORATORY

G-8. Veterinary service personnel may be assigned individually or as a complete laboratory section to the AML. These Soldiers may provide analysis of food samples and animal specimens submitted by field veterinary units organic to the area of operations, depending on the personnel assigned to the laboratory. They—

- Detect and diagnose diseases that are transmissible from animals to humans.
- Provide histopathological and limited laboratory diagnostic support for military and contractor working dogs.
- Detect CBRN and/or directed-energy exposure in sentinel animal species.
- Provide microbiological and chemical testing for food safety, food defense, and quality assurance.

TESTING, SCREENING, AND COLLECTING FOOD SAMPLES IN THE FIELD

G-9. Testing for chemical contamination, toxins, microbial foodborne pathogens, and biological/chemical warfare agents can be performed at the deployed unit level. Suspect food samples (or those that have a pathogen or biological/chemical agent detected during the screening process) are sent to the AML, DOD Food Analysis and Diagnostic Laboratory, or other U.S. Army Public Health Center laboratory for field confirmatory, theater validation, and/or definitive levels of identification testing. Collecting food samples for laboratory analysis can be accomplished during the procurement, receipt, or surveillance of food items. Either veterinary or preventive medicine personnel may collect food samples from food procurement establishments or dining facilities.

DEPENDENCIES

G-10. This unit is dependent on appropriate elements within the theater for religious, legal, finance, field feeding, and personnel and administrative services and on Army Health System support. It also requires maintenance support on organic equipment, to include communications security equipment and biomedical equipment. Specific dependencies include—

- Communications (including secure and nonsecure digital and voice) when not co-located with JTF-elimination or another JTF headquarters.
- Intelligence analysis and support, including a prioritized list of samples to analyze and a firmly established CCIR to assist the AML with mission planning and capability allocation and tasking.
- Life support, interpreters, technical linguists, medical support, area and large-scale decontamination assets, engineering support, and security (at least route, convoy, and local security). The AML is neither equipped nor trained to provide its own convoy security, and additional security is required during the transportation of sensitive materials and equipment.
- Sustainment, resupply, and maintenance support for wheeled vehicles, power generation, trailers, individual weapons, communication systems, COTS equipment, and nonstandard personal protective equipment.
- Transportation support with military heavy equipment, including a 30,000-pound forklift to load/unload tactical expandable two-sided shelters (isolation shelters) and storage containers to establish the full AML footprint if dictated by specified mission or contingency operations.

Note. Standard frequency modulated and tactical satellite radios are used to relay information to the AML. If deployed, the AML requires an over-the-horn communications package that allows reachback via NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and VoIP tactical satellite capability to the supported commander and other agencies as designated by applicable operation orders.

EMployment

G-11. Because of the dangers and international ramifications of related operations, AML operations may be coordinated with multiple agencies. National-level guidance and technical assessments outline the range and depth of the laboratory analysis of samples collected from each individual site or target.
G-12. The AML normally deploys as a direct reporting unit of a JTF. The AML is typically co-located with the JTF-elimination, which is normally co-located with the ASCC in the ASCC support area.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

G-13. Operations to exploit and disable operations at WMD sites are actions designed to systematically isolate, exploit, destroy, disable, monitor, and redirect WMD materials, programs, and related capabilities. The objectives of these operations are to prevent the looting or capture of WMD and related materials; render harmless or destroy weapons, materials, agents, and delivery systems that pose an immediate or direct threat to the Armed Forces of the United States and the civilian population; and exploit (for intelligence purposes) program experts, documents, other media, and previously secured weapons and material to combat further WMD proliferation and prevent the regeneration of a hostile WMD capacity. Within this context, the AML supports the CCDRs and other government agencies with CBRN operations across the operational continuum.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION EXPLOITATION

G-14. The AML supports CWMD operations and site exploitation to answer requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution.

- **Answering information requirements.** In coordination with the JTAIC, the AML prepares answers to the CCIRs to determine the level of capability of hostile forces to employ CBRN weapons (during contingency operations) and of the hazards and risks posed by HAZMAT as they currently exist in the environment.

- **Facilitating subsequent operations.** The AML informs and provides consultation on decisions that are relative to already planned or not-yet-anticipated missions.

- **Supporting criminal prosecution.** The AML provides documentation of CBRN program acquisition, manufacture, weaponization, employment, or proliferation.

EXPLOITATION SUPPORT

G-15. The AML supports site exploitation with analytical laboratory analysis and expert consult on threat assessments. Upon receipt of samples collected on sites being exploited, the AML ensures that a chain of custody is maintained and that theater validation identification analysis is completed. Results of the theater validation identification analysis are prepared and forwarded to the JTF-elimination and the supported maneuver unit/task force to address the commander's CCIR and to support potential criminal prosecution if deemed appropriate at a later time (attribution).

ENDEMIC DISEASE MISSIONS

G-16. The AML supports endemic disease operations to provide CCDRs with health hazard assessments of environmental, endemic, and emerging disease threats in support of force health protection missions. Additionally, during steady-state operations, these capabilities can be employed as part of a humanitarian task force to assist host countries in gaining control of and reversing the spread of highly contagious and lethal diseases.

G-17. The AML is the primary deployable ASCC laboratory supporting health hazard assessments of environmental, endemic, and emerging disease and of CBRN threats to Army personnel normally reporting through JTF to the ASCC.

G-18. During steady-state endemic disease missions, the AML (or AML elements, as required) may be deployed in support of (and be attached to or placed OPCON to) a JTF.
# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army doctrine reference publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>adjutant general</td>
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<tr>
<td>AML</td>
<td>area medical laboratory</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
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<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>attn</td>
<td>attention</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFT2/JCR</td>
<td>Blue Force Tracker 2/Joint Compatibility Release</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARA</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives analytical and remediation activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<td>CDID</td>
<td>Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command (command authority)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODDD</td>
<td>Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIC</td>
<td>current operations integration cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTS</td>
<td>commercial off-the-shelf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives response team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWMD</td>
<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISN</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Network</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODIN</td>
<td>Department of Defense Information Network</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
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<td>DTRA</td>
<td>Defense Threat Reduction Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>FA52</td>
<td>functional area 52</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, personnel</td>
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<td>G-2</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, signal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAZMAT</td>
<td>hazardous materials</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTAIC</td>
<td>Joint Technical Analysis and Integration Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decisionmaking process</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSCoE</td>
<td>Maneuver Support Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>military strategic objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDT</td>
<td>nuclear disablement team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIPRNET</td>
<td>Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PED</td>
<td>processing, exploitation, and dissemination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCWM</td>
<td>recovered chemical warfare material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRT</td>
<td>remediation response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>battalion or brigade personnel staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-9</td>
<td>battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINCGARS</td>
<td>single channel ground and airborne radio system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>special nuclear material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARNORTH</td>
<td>United States Army, North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSS</td>
<td>United States Secret Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIPPSA</td>
<td>very important person protection support activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoIP</td>
<td>voice over internet protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>video teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION II – TERMS**

*chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives*

Components that are threats or potential hazards with adverse effects in the operational environment. Also called CBRNE.
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