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RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

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Preface

FM 3-98 provides doctrinal guidance and direction for Cavalry organizations and reconnaissance and security organizations. This field manual establishes the foundation for the development of tactics and procedures in subordinate doctrine publications. This publication applies across the range of military operations. The focus of this field manual is Cavalry formations within the units listed below; however, all maneuver formations must be able to conduct reconnaissance and security operations.

- Armored brigade combat team Cavalry squadron (ABCT).
- Infantry brigade combat team Cavalry squadron (IBCT).
- Stryker brigade combat team Cavalry squadron (SBCT).
- Battalion scout platoons.
- Combat aviation brigade air Cavalry squadron.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance platoons.
- Engineer reconnaissance platoons.

The principal audiences for FM 3-98 are commanders, leaders, and staffs responsible for the planning, execution, or support of reconnaissance and security operations as well as instructors charged with teaching reconnaissance and security operations.

Commanders ensure that their decisions and the actions of their units comply with applicable United States, international, and host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders ensure that their Soldiers operate according to the law of land warfare and the rules of engagement. (Refer to FM 6-27 for more information.)

FM 3-98 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-98 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which FM 3-98 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 3-98 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of FM 3-98 is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the Doctrine and Collective Training Division, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Send your comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine and Collective Training Division, ATTN: ATZK-TDD, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410; by email to usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction

FM 3-98 provides the commander and staff of Cavalry formations with doctrine relevant to Army and joint operations. This publication explains how effective reconnaissance and security operations generate depth, allow commanders reaction time and maneuver space, fight for information and collect information through stealth, protect forces against surprise, ease the forward movement of follow-on forces, and provide commanders with flexibility and adaptability. The doctrine in this publication is applicable across offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This publication provides doctrinal guidance for all formations assigned to the Armored brigade combat team, the Infantry brigade combat team, and the Stryker brigade combat team. The following is a summarization of each chapter of this manual:

- Chapter 1 addresses the role of Cavalry in offensive, defensive, and stability operations and Cavalry organizations.
- Chapter 2 addresses peer and near peer threats, threat reconnaissance, and security tactics.
- Chapter 3 discusses the updated concepts of command and control relating to commanders’ reconnaissance and security guidance, the operations process, an understanding of the threat, potential threat groups, and threat characteristics.
- Chapter 4 discusses the fundamentals of reconnaissance, types of reconnaissance operations, and a reconnaissance handover.
- Chapter 5 discusses the fundamentals of security operations, counterreconnaissance, and the types of security operations.
- Chapter 6 discusses reconnaissance and security stability planning, stability principles and frameworks, and stability tasks.
- Chapter 7 describes considerations for planning and executing sustainment operations.

To comprehend FM 3-98, the reader must understand the operational art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP 1, Volume 2, JP 3-0, and ADP 3-0. The reader should understand how the offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities’ tasks describe carry over and affect the conduct described by each task (in ADPs 3-07, 3-28, and 3-90). Readers should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process relates to the Army’s military decision-making process and troop leading procedures described in ADP 5-0. The reader must also comprehend the concepts associated with mission command and command and control as described in ADP 6-0. Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding FM 3-98.

While doctrine provides leaders at all echelons with authoritative principles to consider before, during, and after execution of reconnaissance and security operations, FM 3-98 is not a substitute for common sense, professional military judgment, and leaders’ imperatives to act aggressively. As in any combat operation, success during offensive, defensive, and stability operations depends mainly on leaders and Soldiers who are tough, disciplined, and competent and who take the initiative consistent with the mission, commander’s intent, and the principles outlined within this manual.
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Chapter 1

Cavalry Organizations and the Operational Environment

Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to the execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) conduct reconnaissance and security operations to develop the situation and identify, create, and preserve options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Reconnaissance and security operations allow BCTs to achieve positions of relative advantage. Effective reconnaissance and security operations confirm or deny the commander’s and staff’s initial understanding and visualization of the tactical and operational situation. Reconnaissance and security operations develop the intelligence picture for the BCT so the commander can describe, direct, lead, and make effective decisions.

Reconnaissance and security operations provide a continuous flow of combat information and intelligence that assist commanders with uncertainty, make contact under favorable conditions, identify opportunities, prevent surprise, and make timely decisions. Reconnaissance and security operations provide BCT commanders with freedom of movement and action to create advantageous conditions for future operations to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.

SECTION I – OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

1-1. Reconnaissance operations allow commanders to understand the situation, visualize the battle, and make decisions. Security operations provide commanders with reaction time and maneuver space to make decisions and protect the force from anticipated and unanticipated dangers. Reconnaissance and security operations answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), mitigate risk, identify enemy weaknesses, and isolate the enemy from sources of strength.

1-2. Cavalry units conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close contact with enemy organizations and civilian populations. Cavalry organizations employ appropriate combinations of mounted and dismounted tactics and to fight for information and develop the situation based upon the mission variables of METT-TC (I): mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations.

HISTORICAL ROLES OF CAVALRY UNITS

1-3. Armies have used Cavalry forces to capitalize upon their significant advantage in mobility, making them well suited for long-range reconnaissance and security operations. The Cavalry forces’ fighting ability make them well suited for shaping subsequent fights and giving the commander time to make decisions. Reconnaissance and security operations provide commanders the ability to concentrate forces at decisive points while protecting against surprise. A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Cavalry continues to play key roles, such as—

- Conducting reconnaissance operations to detect enemy weaknesses and strengths.
- Conducting security operations to provide early warning and maneuver space.
- Covering retreats.
- Countering enemy reconnaissance forces.
Counterattacking enemy infantry attacks.

Administering the decisive blow through isolation and pursuit.

1-4. For example, the operations of the newly organized Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac during the Gettysburg campaign were an essential factor in the Union’s success in that pivotal battle. At Gettysburg, the Union Army employed an effective Cavalry force that worked directly for the commanding General of the Army. Below is information that highlights an example of a historical role that Cavalry units have played on the battlefield.

**Shaping the Battlefield with Cavalry: Gettysburg, the First Day**

In June 1863, as General Robert E. Lee led his Army of Northern Virginia through the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland and Pennsylvania, almost one half of the confederate cavalry forces under Major General J.E.B. Stuart were conducting independent operations. The absence of Stuart and his reconnaissance and security force would disadvantage Lee as he concentrated his forces in south central Pennsylvania near the town of Gettysburg.

The Union Army of the Potomac moved north in several columns, screened by its cavalry. The westernmost column benefited from the protection of Brigadier General John Buford’s Cavalry division, a combined arms force. On 29 June, this formation moved to a nexus of roads near Gettysburg, leaving one of its brigades to cover the Catoctin Mountain passes to protect the army’s flank. After a brief encounter with Confederate forces, Buford led his remaining two brigades and one battery of artillery into Gettysburg the following day. He bypassed initial contact to focus on his reconnaissance objective—the location and actions of Lee’s army.

Aware of a Confederate concentration of forces to his west but lacking detailed information, Buford dispatched scouts to conduct area reconnaissance west and north of Gettysburg. They reported completely and accurately the locations and lines of march for all three corps of Lee’s army. Buford immediately transmitted the collected information to General Meade and made recommendations to the Union Army commander. Buford’s reports allowed Meade to understand and visualize the terrain surrounding Gettysburg before occupation. Based on his scouts’ reports, Buford deployed his division to cover the primary approaches to the town from the north and west. He also ensured local security by implementing martial law, the arrest of a suspected spy, and the prohibition of alcohol sales to his soldiers. Buford understood his mission to delay the Confederates and deny them access to the heights overlooking the town so the Army of the Potomac could occupy that position.

Having pinpointed and identified their lines of march and probable objective (Gettysburg), Buford undertook preparations to delay the Confederate forces (after identifying their advance) as long as possible. He prepared his two brigades to cover a seven-mile arc outside the town stretching from the west to the northeast. His main effort focused on the Chambersburg Pike that reached Gettysburg from the west where the closest Confederate forces were encamped. A series of ridgelines crossed the road, and Buford used these to add depth to his position. His main position lay upon McPherson Ridge, where he deployed much of one brigade, which he supported with his artillery battery. A series of picket lines and small four- to five-man patrols occupied the ridgelines forward of this position to a depth of nearly two miles. At their most advanced point along Whistler’s Ridge, Buford’s pickets laid only a half mile from their Confederate counterparts. In Gettysburg’s Lutheran Seminary, Buford established his signals officer in the high cupola, which permitted observation of the town and its surroundings.

Buford’s operations lay in complete contrast to those undertaken by the Confederates. When a North Carolina brigade approached Gettysburg and discovered the Union Cavalry in the town, its commander withdrew and reported the contact to his division and corps commanders. Neither officer considered the enemy’s presence in Gettysburg to be
significant and determined to evict them the following day. They lacked detailed information of Buford’s force, and they were under orders not to trigger a general engagement before the arrival of the rest of Lee’s army. A thorough reconnaissance of Gettysburg might have provided a more realistic assessment of the Union position. With much of the Confederate Cavalry on detached service, they were not available to locate and track the movements of the Army of the Potomac, much less conduct a deliberate reconnaissance of Gettysburg thus depriving Lee of vital information.

In the early hours of 1 July, Confederate Major General Henry Heth led elements of his division down the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg. Heth’s forces quickly encountered Buford’s forward picket line. Large numbers of Confederate skirmishers deployed to engage the pickets, while an artillery battery provided fire support. Buford’s pickets withdrew slowly, keeping the enemy engaged and unable to make a rapid advance. Buford reinforced his forward lines causing further delays for the Confederate advance. Buford’s actions caused the Confederates to deploy their brigades prematurely to prepare for a general assault and commence an artillery bombardment of the Union positions. Confederate deployment allowed the Army of the Potomac the opportunity to gain positions of tactical advantage and retain initiative.

Buford and his division set conditions for Meade’s success. As more U.S. formations arrived on the field, other Union forces relieved Buford’s division. Buford’s actions ensured that the Army of the Potomac secured the high ground. Over the next two days, General Lee’s army would shatter itself in repeated attacks upon these heights. Reconnaissance operations to identify Confederate forces and key terrain, along with security operations delaying Confederate advances and protecting the main body, proved decisive at The Battle of Gettysburg.

CURRENT ROLE

1-5. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. Army’s Cavalry is to set conditions for successful operations of their higher headquarters. These roles are not necessarily missions themselves but translate into mission statements. Cavalry units conduct the following to set conditions for successful operations:

- Enable combat operations.
- Provide accurate and timely information to the operations process.
- Operate as combined arms air-ground teams.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Preserve combat power and achieve economy of force.
- Facilitate movement and transitions.
- Fight for information.

ENABLE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-6. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to all successful operations. BCTs conduct continuous reconnaissance and security operations mainly through their organic Cavalry organizations. BCTs must defeat adaptive and determined enemies as well as consolidate tactical gains. Effective reconnaissance and security operations improve situational understanding and enable commanders to—

- Identify or create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
- Achieve situational understanding.
- Visualize operations in the context of mission variables of METT-TC (I).
- Develop the situation through action in close contact with enemy and civilian populations.
- Execute operations with higher degrees of flexibility, adaptability, synchronization, and integration.
- Understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics within an area of operations.
Chapter 1

**Provide Accurate and Timely Information to the Operations Process**

1-7. Accurate and timely reporting allows the BCT to seize and retain the initiative and to concentrate combat power at the right time and place. The BCT commander requires accurate and timely information on enemy, terrain, and the civilian population as they affect the mission. To understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess combat operations, the BCT commander relies on information collection units and capabilities, including national intelligence sources, military intelligence units, special purpose reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), aviation, electromagnetic warfare, cyberspace operation platforms, and any unit in contact. These units and capabilities support intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the operations process, and adjustments during operations. During IPB, the staff considers how the adversary or enemy utilizes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to achieve their objective. The commander and staff’s best means of visualizing and understanding their area of operations, if battlefield circulation is not possible, is through reconnaissance operations.

1-8. Commanders require timely and accurate information during the execution of operations to maneuver and direct combat operations against the enemy. The primary source of information for the commander during battle is the reconnaissance and security organization—the Cavalry.

1-9. Cavalry units—

- Detect and counter enemy tactical deception efforts.
- Provide a capable means of assessing terrain.
- Operate actively not passively. Cavalry not only finds the enemy but can also develop the situation and force the enemy to reveal more information including enemy intentions and fighting ability.
- Disseminate relevant information immediately to commanders.
- Develop recommendations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
- Answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
- Shape the battlefield.

1-10. A key task for the Cavalry is to shape the battlefield. In this context, shaping is to set conditions for the success of the supported commander’s plan through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Shaping occurs in all domains and can have physical, cognitive, and informational effects. For example, in security operations the Cavalry may vary the engagement and disengagement criteria of their battle positions to shape an advancing enemy formation into the supported commander’s chosen engagement area. In reconnaissance operations, the Cavalry may use different levels of aggressiveness on different avenues of approach to shape the enemy’s decision-making regarding where to array their defense. Shaping the battlefield is rarely a specified task but is an implied task that occurs during all operations. Cavalry commanders must balance the implied shaping effect with the achievement of specified reconnaissance and security tasks.

1-11. To shape the battlefield, the Cavalry commander must understand the supported commander’s scheme of maneuver and decision points. However, the supported commander may not have completed their plan before the Cavalry commences their reconnaissance or security operation. Therefore, the Cavalry commander must be prepared to extrapolate the desired shaping effect from the available information, as well as be prepared to adapt their plan during execution.

1-12. The desired shaping effect may change which type of reconnaissance or security the commander selects. For example, a Cavalry commander may elect to conduct a guard rather than a screen to maximize their ability to shape the enemy’s avenue of approach. Commanders must also consider the shaping effect when creating reconnaissance and security guidance. In particular, varying engagement and disengagement criteria is key to shaping enemy maneuver effectively.

**Operate as Combined Arms Air-Ground Teams**

1-13. Cavalry organizations are combined arms teams that, when paired with aviation units, form air-ground maneuver teams that utilize appropriate combinations of mounted, dismounted, and aerial operations to accomplish their mission. Air-ground operations are the simultaneous or synchronized employment of ground forces with aviation maneuver and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The organization is equipped, organized, and trained to identify enemy locations to improve the BCT’s situational awareness and
to provide the BCT with security. Cavalry units must move continually and at times rapidly to positions of relative advantage to observe and fight. Cavalry units require organized, integrated, and synchronized support from all warfighting functions to ensure effective reconnaissance and security operations.

1-14. Cavalry units employ all available combat power to answer the commander’s PIRs. While the enemy seeks to protect or conceal vital information and key assets, Cavalry units overcome these efforts and fight for information within their capabilities to develop the situation rapidly and report the specific details of the tactical situation accurately. Air-ground teams allow reconnaissance efforts to develop the situation in multiple domains to maximize information collection and assist the commander in visualizing and understanding the area of operations. Combined arms air-ground operations answer PIR, create options, and develop the situation to set conditions for a reconnaissance handover or decisive engagement.

1-15. Effective air-ground operations are built upon relationships, mutual trust, and a common understanding of the operational environment, operation, and mission. Air-ground operations require detailed planning, coordination, and synchronized employment of ground, air maneuver, and fire to achieve the commander’s objectives to ensure freedom of movement and action.

1-16. Aviation assets are an integral member of the combined arms team that significantly increases the relative combat strength of Cavalry squadrons. These limited assets must be utilized effectively to help achieve the commander’s intent. BCTs must know their capabilities, employ them appropriately, and synchronize their operation to accomplish the mission.

**PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE**

1-17. The BCT’s Cavalry squadron develops the situation by fighting for information to buy the time and space required for an effective response to enemy actions. The Cavalry squadron conducts reconnaissance operations to develop the situation forward or to the flanks of the main body to prevent the BCT commander from fighting at a disadvantage. The Cavalry squadron conducts security operations to provide the commander with maneuver space so they can respond to unanticipated enemy actions or developments within the BCT’s area of operations. Security operations provide the commander with time to assess the situation, determine a course of action, issue orders, make continuous assessments, issue additional fragmentary orders, and maneuver.

**PRESERVE COMBAT POWER AND ACHIEVE ECONOMY OF FORCE**

1-18. Cavalry organizations provide security for the BCT main body to protect and preserve the combat power of the BCT. In offensive operations, effective Cavalry operations prevent the premature deployment and loss of critical combat power. In defensive operations, an effective Cavalry operation provides early warning, destroys enemy reconnaissance forces, and fixes the lead elements of enemy organizations within the capabilities of the respective Cavalry organization.

1-19. *Economy of force* is the employment and distribution of forces to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts (JP 3-0). The Cavalry’s flexible capabilities allow the commander to conserve their BCT’s combat power to use at a time and place of their choosing. Based on METT-TC (I), when augmented with additional combat power, the BCT’s Cavalry organizations can provide the BCT with a critical capability based on the economy of force principle of joint operations.

**FACILITATE MOVEMENT AND TRANSITIONS**

1-20. Cavalry units assist movement and transitions by executing reconnaissance and facilitating coordination and contact between units. Scout platoons occupy contact points, passage points, and coordinate with higher and adjacent units to ensure seamless transitions and cross-unit coordination.

1-21. Effective reconnaissance operations ease transitions in plans, phases, and priorities of effort for the BCT and mitigate information gaps between units. Reconnaissance operations assist commanders in employing the most appropriate forms of maneuver to envelop, turn, dislocate, and ultimately defeat enemy forces.

1-22. Transitions mark a change of focus and priorities between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. The shift in priority between offense, defense, and stability operations
involves a transition. Cavalry units are instrumental in providing the commander with information to make transitions as seamless as possible. They provide protection for the main body transitioning from offense to defense. However, Cavalry units are vulnerable to enemy threats, unanticipated changes to the situation, and the danger of relaxing discipline and safety standards during their own and higher transitions. As a result, commanders should establish clear conditions for mission execution.

**Fight for Information**

1-23. The information friendly forces seek is generally of equal importance to the enemy who will act to protect the vital information. In addition, Cavalry units can satisfy some threat-based intelligence requirements only by learning from the enemy’s reactions. While preserving their freedom of maneuver, Cavalry units overcome these efforts and fight for information within their capabilities to develop the situation rapidly and to report accurately the specific details of the tactical situation.

**SECTION II – UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

1-24. BCTs develop an understanding of operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT], and mission variables of METT-TC (I) through reconnaissance and information collection to enhance situational awareness and an understanding of competing interests. The G-2 or S2 is responsible for defining the cyberspace and the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE), which enables the BCT commander and staff to visualize both friendly and enemy cyberspace and EW assets through the three layers of cyberspace and the EMS. Understanding competing interests within the area of operations allows the commander and staff to frame specific problems. BCTs seek to understand motivations and to recognize that each interest has multiple perspectives. To operate effectively under conditions of complexity and in close contact with enemies and populations, BCTs consider political interests from multiple perspectives.

1-25. Understanding interests requires analysis of the operational (PMESII-PT) and mission variables of METT-TC (I) within a particular region. To communicate effectively, BCTs must develop an understanding of the local audience’s cultural communication techniques. BCTs must understand the most important aspect of cultural communication is how the population receives the information rather than how the unit transmits the information. Determination of valued interests within an area provides options for BCTs to establish programs that incentivize cooperation leading to mission accomplishment. Comprehension of interests allows for understanding to implement disincentives that seek to coerce and persuade adversaries, enemies, and neutral parties who have interests counter to the objectives of the brigade and higher. The understanding and acknowledgement of interests frame information operations in future operations.

1-26. Efforts to understand interests begin before deployment. Country studies, analysis of the social demographics, constructs of local, sub-national, and national governance, and understanding of key personalities and organizations within a brigade’s future area of operation provide a baseline knowledge to increase situational awareness and identify potential areas of friction before a brigade deploys. BCTs consider the elements of PMESII-PT within their area of operations to gain understanding of the interests and motivations particular to enhance situational awareness. Unified action partners, Army Special Operations Forces (SOF), and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations are key resources all units use to develop situational understanding during shaping efforts leading to a sustainable security environment. The military information support operations assets organic and attached to the BCT can assist in conducting adversary, information message analysis, and exploitation. The military information support operations staff planner can obtain division or higher-level military information support operations support to counter the adversary information activities as necessary. Analysis of these considerations allows informed leaders to identify information gaps and develop courses of action that increase situational understanding within their area of operation.

1-27. BCTs conduct information collection through reconnaissance operations focused on information requirements to bridge information gaps. Gaps identified during IPB develop into information requirements through continuous reconnaissance. BCTs define and collect information requirements that develop situational understanding of the interests within a particular area by focusing civil considerations within the construct of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. BCTs employ a range of
integrated capabilities to understand the cultural implications of conducting military operations among indigenous populations and institutions. The BCT or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9) develops plans, policies, and programs to further the relationship between the BCT and the civil component in the assigned area of operations. The S-9 provides a mechanism for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication within the BCT area of operations. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) staff elements work with the brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) to analyze the CBRN threat in the operational environment. The BCT may meet gaps in understanding the CBRN threat with taskings to the CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon.

1-28. Commanders and staffs consider culture and pillar organizations that influence the civil considerations of the operational environment. Culture is the shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Pillar organizations are organizations or systems on which the populace depends for support, security, strength, and direction. Examination of culture provides insight to the motivations and interests of people and organizations. Consideration of culture is imperative to successful shaping operations that set conditions for future success. A thorough understanding of group and individual interests allow for informed and viable courses of action that seek to shape the environment favorably and contribute to positive outcomes and objectives within the brigade’s area of operations.

1-29. Host-nation security organizations and political partners provide invaluable insight into values, beliefs, and interests. These organizations are composed of the people they secure and govern; their native fluency in the customs, courtesies, cultures, beliefs, interests, and ideals provide the partnering BCT with cultural perspective and intelligence that develops their understanding of the operational environment. Close, positive relationships with host-nation partners breed trust, which lead to an understanding of the operational environment.

SECTION III – SHAPE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-30. Commanders and staffs consider the competitive environment of their area of operations in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and set conditions for future success. Different political entities and personalities, tribal dynamics, religious interests, economic motivations, sources of security, and potential havens of refuge for adversaries contribute to the competitive nature of the operational environment. Furthermore, not all interests are parallel and mutually supportive of the objectives and end state for a particular region. Shaping the environment requires BCTs to develop situational understanding and influence personalities and organizations through engagement to achieve specific objectives. BCTs also persuade and empower other personalities and organizations to modify behaviors and actions consistent with friendly forces’ intent and objectives, and conduct limited offensive operations to maintain initiative. Shaping is an enduring process throughout all operations and is not separated by phases.

1-31. Commanders actively seek to understand the competitive interests within their area of operations and to understand how local interests influence desired outcomes and objectives. Some interests and motivations support the BCT’s objectives and others conflict, counter, and disrupt supportive efforts to the desired end state. BCTs must have a thorough understanding of the threat to identify conflicting interests and information collection requirements developed through reconnaissance and security operations. BCTs actively seek answers to information gaps through the development of information requirements that are satisfied through active reconnaissance operations within a given area. Through information collection and analysis, staffs develop options for the commander to inform the population, influence various actors, seize opportunities, and maintain initiative.

1-32. Analysis of the motivations and interests of personalities and organizations provide insight to future psychological operations activities seeking to modify behaviors counter to friendly force objectives. Supporting efforts empower key influencers and organizations and persuade neutral audiences to bolster legitimacy and secure vital interests and objectives. BCTs use coercive efforts to counter adversary and enemy information activities and isolate adversaries from their support base to begin the psychological breakdown of enemy organizations. BCTs shape conditions for objectives that are in line with host-nation government interests.

1-33. The BCT’s shaping activities derive success from how effectively they persuade the populace and empower the host-nation government. All efforts focus on bolstering the legitimacy of the rule of law and the host nation’s ability to provide for effective governance. Persuasion and empowerment demand
engagement strategies that deliver connections and relationships with pillar organizations and individuals who control and influence the local community. Engagements secure common and clearly defined goals and ideals that provide a common reference point for future engagements and activities. Engagements seek to reinforce the authority of legitimate leaders and pillars and restore or solidify confidence in host-nation security forces, governance, and the rule of law. Persuasive efforts utilize a compelling narrative that justifies and explains friendly actions while delegitimizing motivations and behaviors of adversaries and those entities opposing positive gains within the area of operations. Additionally, persuasive efforts specifically target neutral or fringe entities with the goal of tipping neutrality to a favorable alliance.

1-34. Shaping the operational environment requires understanding the competing dynamics within the BCT’s area of operations. Commanders and staffs gain an understanding through analysis of mission and operational variables enhanced and developed through information collection and both reconnaissance and security operations. Understanding and analysis are continuous tasks not bound by phase or operation.

SECTION IV – CAVALRY EMPLOYMENT IN LARGE SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-35. Commanders and staffs at the BCT, division, and corps level determine the reconnaissance requirements for the operation. The commander issues reconnaissance-planning guidance early to ensure that reconnaissance operations can precede the mission and identify options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Reconnaissance operations often begin before the course of action analysis completion so that the Cavalry unit can inform the planning effort. For division Cavalry operations at echelons above brigade (EAB), refer to appendix A.

1-36. Reconnaissance and security are vital operations performed in conjunction with other operations during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Not only reserved for the Cavalry squadron, the BCT should incorporate reconnaissance and security into all aspects of operations. Figure 1-1 illustrates how reconnaissance and security is fundamental to all aspects of decisive operations.
BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CAVALRY UNITS

1-37. The core competencies of Cavalry forces are to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations. These competencies allow the BCT to accomplish its core missions. Cavalry forces facilitate the supported commander’s ability to concentrate superior combat power against the enemy at the decisive time and place, and take appropriate actions to consolidate gains while preparing for the next mission.

1-38. For reconnaissance and security operations to be most effective, they must be initiated early in the planning process for BCT-level missions and continued throughout the mission. Consequently, commanders and staffs develop information requirements throughout the operations process and assess, add, or delete requirements continuously during planning and execution.

1-39. Cavalry commanders conduct operations consistent with reconnaissance and security fundamentals. The BCT commander uses reconnaissance and security fundamentals to identify gaps or weaknesses in the plan as well as opportunities to exploit and improve situational understanding. Reconnaissance and security operations answer PIRs and enable the commander to make decisions and direct forces to achieve mission success. Both reconnaissance and security operations enable successful offense, defense, and stability tasks. Commanders and staffs first identify information gaps during the military decision-making process (MDMP) and continuously assess, adapt, add, and delete requirements throughout the operation. Staffs identify specified, implied, and essential tasks necessary for mission success during mission analysis, reviewing available assets, and identifying resource and information shortfalls.

1-40. During mission analysis, staffs identify critical facts and assumptions aiding in the development of the initial CCIRs, which is comprised of PIRs and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), facilitating timely decision-making. PIRs are information requirements necessary to understand the adversary or
operational environment. PIRs identify information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations that the commander considers most important and impact upon future decisions. FFIRs identify information about friendly forces and supporting capabilities, which affects future courses of action and decisions from a friendly perspective. (Refer to chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of CCIRs.)

1-41. Based upon identified information requirements, staffs assign tasks to prioritize, manage, and develop the collection of information requirements leading to future decisions. As staffs identify requirements necessary for successful execution, they recommend and assign tasks to Cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance and provide answers allowing the commander to make decisions and capitalize on opportunities.

GENERAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY UNITS

1-42. During operations, the commander and staff’s time and resources are balanced between four major activities in a continuous learning and adaptive cycle called the operations process, including planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.) Operations process activities are sequential but not discrete; all overlap and recur as circumstances demand.

1-43. Commanders implement early information collection and security to protect and prepare the force for execution. Cavalry units should deploy in the planning phase to shape preparation activities and execution. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)

1-44. Commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding before execution of the mission, which requires aggressive and continuous information collection from Cavalry forces. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection capabilities and forces to collect timely and accurate information to meet CCIRs and other information requirements.

1-45. The force as a whole is often vulnerable to surprise and enemy attacks during preparation, when forces are often concentrated in assembly areas (AAs). Security operations (screen, guard, cover, and area security) are essential during preparation. Cavalry units assigned to security operations execute missions while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation.

1-46. When a Cavalry unit’s higher headquarters is conducting offensive operations, the Cavalry unit develops the situation for the higher commander. For example, in a brigade movement to contact, the Cavalry squadron may be the lead element conducting zone reconnaissance.

1-47. During defensive actions, a higher headquarters typically tasks the Cavalry unit with conducting security operations to provide early warning and reaction time, deny enemy reconnaissance efforts, and protect the main body. The commander tasks the Cavalry unit to execute security operations based upon the degree of protection required by the higher headquarters.

1-48. Every operation integrates stability tasks, which are critical to sustaining or establishing civil security and control over areas, populations, and resources. Cavalry units focus on reconnaissance and security operations that enable its higher headquarters to develop a better understanding of the situation. Cavalry units are critical to successful execution of stability tasks and the units’ ability to consolidate tactical gains.

1-49. Commanders task-organize Cavalry units with the combat power necessary to accomplish the mission based upon mission variables. If a higher headquarters is conducting security operations, it assigns appropriate security operations to the Cavalry unit and ensures the Cavalry unit is appropriately task organized to accomplish their mission. Augmentation may include an aviation task force (TF), armored and mechanized Infantry units, additional Cavalry units, engineer units for mobility and reconnaissance, artillery in direct support, close air support, military intelligence units, air defense units, CBRN reconnaissance units, and logistical elements. Reconnaissance and security operations often precede the main operation in time and space; therefore, commanders can task-organize enablers organized with Cavalry units from divisions and corps to provide reconnaissance and security at EAB. Subsequently, BCT commanders must be judicious when detaching combat power from the Cavalry squadron, such as designating the squadron Armored company as a BCT reserve, based on the importance of the BCT commander’s information and security requirements. This loss of combat power inhibits the scope of the squadron’s possible security tasks,
especially for the conduct of a guard. Mission variables and the commander’s intent determine which additional capabilities the Cavalry unit requires.

**BRIGADE OPERATIONS OFFICER AND SQUADRON EMPLOYMENT**

1-50. BCT commanders and their staff integrate operations and intelligence when conducting reconnaissance and security operations. A commander focuses information collection, combined arms, sustainment and signal organizations, and reconnaissance efforts to answer the commander’s PIRs through the BCT or brigade operations staff officer (S-3).

**BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM S-3**

1-51. The BCT S-3 is responsible for coordinating and synchronizing information collection with reconnaissance and security operations. The BCT S-3 allocates organic, attached, and supporting information collection capabilities to answer PIRs or refine reconnaissance objectives. The S-3 ensures reconnaissance operations enable the commander to make decisions as to how to employ the BCT’s combat power and achieve desired outcomes and objectives. In concert with the brigade and subordinate staffs, the BCT S-3 ensures operations conducted by the Cavalry squadron and other information collection units are nested, complementary, and focused on mission accomplishment.

1-52. BCTs establish coordination within the staff and collaborate with the Cavalry squadron staff to synchronize reconnaissance and security operations. The brigade reconnaissance cell might include an S-2 (intelligence community/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), an S-3 plans, a fire support officer (field artillery battalion), a brigade logistics staff officer (S-4), a brigade aviation element, brigade sustainment assets, and the Air Force’s tactical air control party who can coordinate with close air support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel (see figure 1-2, page 1-12). The Cavalry squadron can provide a staff officer, whose loss will not degrade squadron staff operations, to serve as a liaison officer to the brigade reconnaissance cell. To achieve intent, the BCT commander task organizes the Cavalry squadron with the necessary combined arms, engineers, military police, CBRN, sustainment, and signal organizations to execute the mission. At the conclusion of mission analysis, the BCT publishes the commander’s intent, including reconnaissance and security guidance and a fragmentary order to initiate reconnaissance and security operations. Usually, the Cavalry squadron is the lead element in the brigade. Parallel, integrated, and collaborative planning between the Cavalry squadron and BCT staffs is essential to the timely execution of operations and the integration of intelligence collection with reconnaissance and security operations.
1-53. The BCT commander employs the Cavalry squadron based on mission variables. The squadron can operate in its own area of operations, unassigned deep areas in the BCT area of operations, or across another maneuver battalion’s area of operations.

Assignment of Cavalry Squadron’s Area of Operations

1-54. When the BCT commander assigns the Cavalry squadron a specific area of operations, squadrons must be prepared to perform the following actions (see figure 1-3):

- Terrain management.
- Information collection.
- Civil-military operations (with attached civil affairs forces).
- Movement control (air-ground).
- Clearance of fires.
- Security.
Personnel recovery.
- Manage airspace users.
- Minimal essential stability tasks.

1-55. Assignment of an area of operations provides the squadron with the maneuver space necessary to execute its assigned mission. The BCT commander and staff ensure the squadron is task organized with sufficient assets to accomplish the squadron’s assigned mission.

![Figure 1-3. Squadron in its own area of operations](image)

**Within BCT Deep Areas**

1-56. The squadron can also operate in BCT deep area. In noncontiguous areas of operations, the deep area is the area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous areas of operations. (Refer to ADP 3-0 for more information.) A commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate units’ boundaries out to the limits of the commander’s designated area of operations. The purpose of operations in the deep area often is tied to setting conditions for future events. The BCT commander may assign urban areas to maneuver battalions thus allowing them to focus on that area while the Cavalry squadron conducts operations in the open areas. The BCT may have deep areas due to—

- A decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.
- Areas not assigned to battalions are sparsely populated or the terrain is compartmentalized.
- Insufficient combat power to assign all areas to subordinate battalions.

1-57. The BCT is responsible for controlling deep areas within its area of operations. The BCT commander may direct the Cavalry squadron to operate in the deep area (see figure 1-4, page 1-14). Squadrons operating in the BCT deep area are not usually responsible for the entire deep area. The squadron in the deep area generally operates in one of the following ways:

- In a contiguous portion of the unassigned area.
- In multiple, noncontiguous area of operations within the unassigned area.
- Within focused target areas of interest (TAIs) or named areas of interest (NAIs).
Across Another Battalion’s Area of Operations

1-58. The squadron may conduct operations in front of and across another battalion’s operation area, such as during an area security mission or in preparation for offensive or defensive tasks (see figure 1-5). In this case, the BCT commander assigns the entire area of operations to subordinate units or battalions. The BCT commander retains control of the squadron by assigning an area of operations in front of and across the maneuver battalions (for example, along a route). The squadron commander retains command and control of the squadron and its significant information collection capabilities. Conditions may include hybrid threat networks operating across brigade boundaries. During transitions to offense or defense, the BCT commander can direct the squadron commander to place troops under tactical control to the maneuver battalions (for example, one troop in front of each maneuver battalion’s scout platoon). The squadron remains focused on collecting information to assist in answering the higher commander’s PIRs or other information requirements.

When operating across other battalion’s area of operations, higher headquarters still assigns specific missions to squadrons.
EMPLOYMENT METHOD COMPARISON

1-59. On a contiguous battlefield, the Cavalry squadron may have an area of operations forward of the battalions or operate across the BCT area of operations. On a noncontiguous battlefield, the Cavalry squadron may operate in the unassigned area inside the BCT’s area of operations. On a contiguous battlefield where there are no unassigned areas, the Cavalry squadron may employ elements within the BCT area of operations or across battalion areas of operations to answer information requirements that cross battalion boundaries, such as a route security mission that spans the BCT area of operations (see figure 1-6, page 1-17). The squadron may have an area of operations to meet an economy of force role in areas where the primary mission is reconnaissance and security. Table 1-1, page 1-16 is a comparison of the three general employment methods.
Table 1-1. Squadron employment comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Options</th>
<th>Tactical Tasks</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assignment in its own area of operations</td>
<td>Route reconnaissance</td>
<td>Least restrictive.</td>
<td>Broader area may require significant augmentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area reconnaissance</td>
<td>Focuses squadron efforts in one area.</td>
<td>Broad knowledge of area of operations rather than deeper understanding.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zone reconnaissance</td>
<td>Covers a broader area.</td>
<td>Provides limited view of networks (cannot operate across boundaries).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recon in force</td>
<td>Limits risk of fratricide.</td>
<td>Difficult fire support.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>Provides greater freedom of action and maneuver.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>Simplifies sustainment.</td>
<td>Mitigates some risk to BCT in the unassigned areas.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cover</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allows BCT to focus battalions in smaller area of operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Potentially enables ability to identify networks across larger area.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Route security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allows the BCT commander to weight the main effort.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Convoy security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requires significant and constant coordination with maneuver battalions and BCT.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hasty attack</td>
<td></td>
<td>Restrictive to freedom of action.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Greatest risk of fratricide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation in the BCT deep areas</td>
<td>Route reconnaissance</td>
<td>Mitigates some risk to BCT in the unassigned areas.</td>
<td>Most restrictive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area reconnaissance</td>
<td>Allows BCT to focus battalions in smaller area of operations.</td>
<td>Increased risk of fratricide.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Area security</td>
<td>Potentially enables ability to identify networks across larger area.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Route security</td>
<td></td>
<td>High coordination with adjacent units and BCT headquarters most difficult sustainment operations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Convoy security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Most difficult fire support.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hasty attack</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations across another battalion's area of operations</td>
<td>Route reconnaissance</td>
<td>BCT commander can focus squadron where needed most.</td>
<td>Requires significant and constant coordination with maneuver battalions and BCT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area reconnaissance</td>
<td>Enables detailed coordination with maneuver battalions and BCT.</td>
<td>Restrictive to freedom of action.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area security</td>
<td>Battalions can provide rapid transition to offensive and defensive tasks.</td>
<td>Greatest risk of fratricide.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Route security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increases sustainment complexity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convoy security</td>
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</table>

Legend
- **BCT**: brigade combat team
- **SPT**: support
BCT RECONNAISSANCE AND COLLECTION TEAMING

1-60. BCT reconnaissance and collection teaming is the pairing of collection assets to conduct integrated reconnaissance and security operations to answer CCIRs. Commanders do not keep their reconnaissance and information collection assets in reserve. The commander forms reconnaissance and collection teams to complement reconnaissance and intelligence collection capabilities. These teams consist of appropriate combinations of Cavalry Soldiers and multidiscipline intelligence Soldiers.

1-61. The BCT’s military intelligence company provides multidiscipline intelligence operations. Multidiscipline intelligence operations include limited signals intelligence (SIGINT), electromagnetic warfare, interrogation of prisoners of war, multidisciplinary counterintelligence, tactical human intelligence (HUMINT), and air reconnaissance from tactical unmanned aircraft systems (known as TUASs). BCT commanders build reconnaissance and collection teams to execute offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

1-62. The BCT’s organic military intelligence company can be used to augment the Cavalry squadron based on mission variables and PIRs. They operate together to secure collection assets and provide the appropriate combat information and intelligence necessary to answer the PIRs of the supported commander. These brigade reconnaissance, collection, and security teams provide the supported commander with the ability to separate combatants from noncombatants more effectively under conditions of uncertainty.

1-63. The military intelligence company includes multifunctional teams comprised of all sources of HUMINT and SIGINT disciplines, HUMINT collection teams, counterintelligence teams, SIGINT platoons, and operational management teams that coordinate the various team missions. (Refer to ATP 2-19.4 for more information.) BCT commanders can augment the squadron to ensure they have secure access to the local population, which is essential for military intelligence discipline collection tasks by the brigade.
COMPOSITION OF COLLECTION TEAMS

1-64. The lowest level for task-organizing Cavalry units with additional assets and capabilities is the section. However, most assets operate under the operational control of a Cavalry troop or scout platoon. For example, a scout platoon from the Cavalry squadron can receive an attached or operational control SIGINT/electromagnetic warfare. Intelligence and reconnaissance teams provide enhanced security for military intelligence teams, facilitate its movement, and expand the capability of reconnaissance during a mission. Reconnaissance and collection teams combine and integrate collection and reconnaissance specialties to accomplish the mission. Teaming allows rapid communication and sharing of information as teams work together to answer critical information requirements.

SECTION V – ORGANIZATIONS

1-65. Cavalry units are essential to the brigade. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to all successful large-scale combat operations. Through effective information collection and continuous reconnaissance, brigades develop and sustain the understanding to defeat adaptive and determined enemies. Reconnaissance and security operations assist brigades in adapting to uncertainty. Reconnaissance and security operations allow the brigade to understand the tactical, human, and political environment; visualize operations; develop the situation, and identify or create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Cavalry units provide flexibility, adaptability, and depth to the maneuver commander’s operations.

1-66. Cavalry units provide information to the commander about the enemy location, disposition, and composition (see figure 1-7 and figures 1-8 and 1-9 [page 1-20]). Cavalry units preserve the BCT’s freedom of maneuver. Successful reconnaissance allows the BCT commander to initiate combat under advantageous conditions to defeat the enemy and accomplish the mission. Roles and organizations listed in this manual depict habitual attachments and augmentees.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-67. The BCT is the Army’s fundamental combined arms organization and its primary close combat force. The BCT includes units and capabilities from every warfighting function; it is task organized to meet specific mission requirements.

1-68. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s main asset for executing reconnaissance and security operations at the brigade level; however, each subordinate organization of a BCT is responsible for information collection, local reconnaissance, and security within their assigned area of operations. When the BCT assigns reconnaissance or security missions to a subordinate element, it task organizes subordinate elements and allocates the resources necessary to meet mission requirements. To perform reconnaissance or security operations, the BCT commander may allocate armored and mechanized Infantry units, reconnaissance units, engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs), aviation units, air defense units, artillery, close air support, intelligence systems, and sustainment units.

1-69. In addition to the Cavalry squadron, the military intelligence company serves as a BCT organic collection capability. The military intelligence company is organic to the brigade engineer battalion (BEB). Most of the intelligence personnel and assets within the BCT are assigned to the military intelligence company. The BCT commander and staff task organize the military intelligence company based on mission variables of METT-TC (I). The military intelligence company deploys and provides single-source collection, TUAS capabilities, and collected intelligence processing capabilities to the BCT and maneuver units. HUMINT, SIGINT, and TUAS capabilities within the military intelligence company are used habitually to augment the Cavalry squadron during reconnaissance operations to maximize rapid and accurate information collection. (Refer to FM 2-0 and ATP 2-19.4 for more information on the capabilities of the military intelligence company.)

1-70. Armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) have the following reconnaissance units and habitual enablers within their organizations:

- One Cavalry squadron.
  - Three Cavalry troops within the Cavalry squadron. Two scout platoons within each Cavalry troop.
  - One Armored company within the squadron. Three tank platoons within the Armored company.
Cavalry Organizations and the Operational Environment

- Three combined arms battalions. Each combined arms battalion has one scout platoon within the headquarters and headquarters company.
- One CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon organic to the BEB.
- One TUAS platoon from within the military intelligence company.
- Two combat engineer companies within the brigade engineer battalion. Each combat engineer company can create ad hoc ERTs from within its organic platoons and squads or from those tasks organized by echelon above the BCT engineer units. (Refer to ATP 3-34.81 for more information on engineer reconnaissance capabilities.)

**Figure 1-7. ABCT Cavalry units and enablers (shaded)**

1-71. Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) have the following reconnaissance units and habitual enablers within their organizations:

- One Cavalry squadron:
  - Two motorized Cavalry troops within the Cavalry squadron. Three motorized scout platoons within each Cavalry troop.
  - One dismounted Cavalry troop. Two dismounted scout platoons within the dismounted troop.
- Three Infantry battalions. Each Infantry battalion has one scout platoon within the headquarters and headquarters company.
- One CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon organic to the BEB.
- One TUAS platoon from within the military intelligence company.
- Two combat engineer companies within the brigade engineer battalion. Each combat engineer company can create ad hoc ERTs from within its organic platoons and squads or from those tasks organized by echelon above the BCT engineer units.
1-72. Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) have the following reconnaissance units and habitual enablers within their organizations:

- One Cavalry squadron:
  - Three Cavalry troops. Two scout platoons within each Cavalry troop.
  - One weapons troop consisting of three antiarmor platoons.

- Three maneuver battalions. Each maneuver battalion has one scout platoon within the headquarters and headquarters company.

- One CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon within the BEB.

- One TUAS platoon within the military intelligence company.

- Two combat engineer companies within the BEB. Each combat engineer company can create ad hoc ERTs from within its organic platoons and squads or from those tasks organized by echelon above the BCT engineer units.

Figure 1-9. SBCT Cavalry units (shaded)
CAVALRY SQUADRONS

1-73. Cavalry squadrons conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations. They maintain contact with the enemy to fight for information while preserving their own freedom to maneuver. They shape the battlefield for the commander to allow the BCT to close with and destroy the enemy through maneuver and superior firepower at a time and place of the commanders choosing.

1-74. All ground Cavalry squadrons possess the following capabilities:
- Fight for information within unit capabilities.
- Gather information about all categories of threats.
- Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely reconnaissance in complex terrain.
- Rapidly develop the situation.
- Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the higher headquarters commander to avoid contact or to achieve overwhelming combat power.
- Assist in shaping the area of operations by providing information or directing precision joint fires to disrupt the enemy commander’s decision cycle and deny planned or future options.
- Conduct collaborative and parallel planning that fully integrates with higher and adjacent units and results in employment of reconnaissance and security assets to support higher headquarters operations.
- Reestablish command and control through two distinctly different situations listed below:
  - Repel an enemy attack that disrupted command and control.
  - Retransmission of information for units or elements out of communication range of the main body.

1-75. All ground Cavalry squadrons are constrained in that—
- They require augmentation to perform effective offensive and defensive actions as an economy of force role.
- Wheeled vehicle-equipped squadrons lack direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and need augmentation when arrayed against enemy armor.
- Medium-wheeled vehicles have limited cross-country mobility.

AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON

1-76. As an element of the combat aviation brigade, the air Cavalry squadron (known as ACS) provides accurate and timely information collection, provides reaction time and maneuver space, and destroys, defeats, diverts, or disrupts enemy forces to support the combined arms team. Although the ACS is fully capable of conducting attacks, the integration of RQ-7B UASs at the troop level makes the ACS the best formation for conducting reconnaissance, security, and movement to contact as primary missions, with attack operations as a secondary mission.

ORGANIZATION

1-77. The ACS consists of a headquarters troop, three air Cavalry troops (known as ACTs) equipped with eight AH-64s and four RQ-7B Shadow UASs each, an aviation maintenance troop, and a forward support troop. Figure 1-10, page 1-22 provides ACS organizations.

CAPABILITIES

1-78. The ACS conducts the following tasks:
- Zone, route, and area reconnaissance.
- Reconnaissance in force (when task organized).
- Screen.
- Guard and area security (when task organized).
- Movement to contact.
- Attack.
Chapter 1

AIR CAVALRY TROOP

1-79. The primary mission of the ACT is to conduct reconnaissance and security operations. The ACT extends the aerial reconnaissance and security capabilities of the BCT with the use of long-range optics, organic UAS for manned unmanned teaming, and trained scouts. ACTs provide timely combat information concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather throughout the area of operation and early warning against enemy observation or attack. ACTs augment ground forces when conducting guard and cover operations. The ACT possesses strengths and limitations that must be clearly understood for their effects to be maximized.

1-80. The ACT has the following capabilities:

- High degree of maneuverability.
- Increased lethality and ability to provide target acquisition.
- Demonstrated flexibility in changing battlefield situations.
- Adds depth in all reconnaissance and security missions.

1-81. The ACT has the following limitations:

- Limited operations in adverse weather or zero visibility conditions.
- Limited, continuous 24-hour-a-day operations.
- Limited situation time due to refueling and rearming requirements resulting in increased situation updates as aircraft rotate in and out of the area of operation.

CAVALRY TROOPS

1-82. Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security missions throughout their area of operations. The Cavalry troops provide the BCT commander and staff with an all-weather information collection capability. Use of long-range optics, organic UAS, and trained scouts enable Cavalry troops to answer information requirements and create an accurate operational picture of the area of operations. That operational picture can focus on any mixture of the METT-TC (I) variables required by the BCT and Cavalry squadron commanders.

1-83. The Cavalry troop’s operational picture forms a squadron common operational picture. The common operational picture allows commanders within and external to the BCT to assess the situation and develop their situational understanding of the correct courses of action. This discussion focuses on the Cavalry troops of the BCT organizational variants of the ABCT, the IBCT, and the SBCT.

TROOP MISSIONS

1-84. Regardless of organization, Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security missions to support the information collection plan outlined in Annex L of the BCT’s operation order (OPORD). Cavalry troops
can develop the situation in close contact with civilian populations. They can conduct security force assistance, and multinational reconnaissance and security tasks.

1-85. Cavalry troops can perform limited offensive and defensive tasks though they typically support higher-level offensive and defensive task completion through reconnaissance and security missions. The commander considers the troop’s capabilities and limitations before employing the troop in any specific mission.

ROLES AND ORGANIZATION

1-86. As the squadron commander’s eyes and ears, the Cavalry troop is the squadron commander’s primary reconnaissance and information collection asset. Reconnaissance units provide the combat information the commander needs to conduct informed planning, direct operations, and visualize the area of operations. The unit skillfully conducts reconnaissance and security missions to collect information on enemy locations, dispositions, compositions, and battle damage assessments. In turn, these operations allow the commander to shape the area of operations proactively and accept or initiate contact at times and places of the commander’s choosing.

1-87. Cavalry troops conduct reconnaissance and security missions throughout the squadron area of operations. The troop develops the situation by focusing on the reconnaissance objective in a designated area of operations. All types of troops can do this through the task organization of additional combat power to provide the ability to fight for information and increase lethality in security operations. The task organization of tank platoons to an ABCT Cavalry troop allows the use of the hunter-killer concept for reconnaissance and security. An SBCT Cavalry troop can receive similar augmentation from antiarmor platoons from the SBCT weapons troop.

COMMON CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

1-88. All types of BCT Cavalry troops have the following capabilities:
- Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely information through the combined use of long-range advanced scout surveillance systems, UASs, and mounted and dismounted scouts.
- Gather information about enemy threats.
- Rapidly develop the situation and direct reconnaissance tasks to answer PIRs.
- Overcome enemy deception and cover and concealment by employing integrated information collection and reconnaissance and surveillance systems.
- Employ joint fires to include the fires support team, weapons locating radar, and UASs.
- Conduct stealthy reconnaissance or fight for information against light and motorized forces or, if reinforced, against armored forces.
- Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the squadron to avoid contact or achieve a combat power advantage if contact is necessary.
- Assist in shaping the area of operations by providing information or directing fires to disrupt the enemy.

1-89. BCT Cavalry troops can have the following limitations, which can be mitigated with careful employment or augmentation:
- When there are limited dismounts within the scout sections, sections may have to combine to generate the required dismounts to conduct the following:
  - Long-duration observation posts.
  - Long-duration screening.
  - Dismounted tasks associated with zone, area, or route reconnaissance.
- Limited direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability (IBCT Cavalry squadron).
- Require augmentation to perform technical engineer reconnaissance tasks.
- Speed of movement is generally equal to that of the main body, making it challenging to stay ahead while on the march.
- Limited counter-UAS assets and communications jamming.
Chapter 1

ARMORED COMPANY

1-90. The ABCT Cavalry squadron has an organic Armored company. The Armored company is comprised of a headquarters and three tank platoons that organize, equip, and train to fight with organic assets or as a task organized company team. The headquarters element has two tanks commanded by the commander and executive officer.

1-91. The Armored company’s mission is to close with the enemy utilizing maneuver to destroy or capture the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and engage in close combat and counterattack. The company maneuvers in all types of terrain, weather, and visibility conditions. The company capitalizes on long-range, direct fire combat with enemy mechanized or armored units in open terrain with speed and shock effect.

1-92. The Armored company in the Cavalry squadron enables reconnaissance and security. It provides the BCT commander with flexibility, adaptability, and depth to the Cavalry squadron’s scheme of maneuver by synchronizing and integrating combined arms. The Armored company enables the squadron to fight for information and develop the situation in and out of contact against a broad range of threats, adversaries, and enemies.

CAPABILITIES

1-93. The Armored company has the following capabilities:

- Conducts operations requiring firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.
- Employs a combination of fire and maneuver to destroy enemy tanks, fighting vehicles, antiarmor systems, and emplacements.

LIMITATIONS

1-94. The Armored company has the following limitations:

- Lack of resources to operate a functional command post.
- Very high consumption rate of classes III, V, and IX (petroleum, oil, and lubricants/ammunition/repair parts and components for equipment maintenance).
- Dependency on logistics packages (LOGPACs) from the forward support company (FSC) to maintain continuous operations.
- Limited recovery assets across the squadron.

WEAPONS TROOP

1-95. The SBCT Cavalry squadron has an organic weapons troop. The SBCT weapons troop’s role is to provide direct fires to facilitate maneuver. The formation adds depth to the Cavalry squadron by enhancing maneuver to deliver direct fires at the decisive point. Employed correctly and synchronized with other maneuver units, they facilitate the Cavalry squadron’s ability to conduct effective reconnaissance and security operations.

1-96. The SBCT weapons troop has antitank guided missile platoons. The troop has a headquarters section with an assigned Infantry carrier vehicle. Habitual attachments include a fires support team with a fire support vehicle from the field artillery battalion to manage indirect fires and medics with a medical support vehicle.

1-97. The weapons troop in the Cavalry squadron enhances the reconnaissance and security capabilities of the Cavalry squadron. The weapons troop provides the BCT commander with flexibility, adaptability, and depth so the squadron can fight for information and develop the situation against a broad range of threats, adversaries, and enemies throughout the area of operations.

CAPABILITIES

1-98. The weapons troop has the following capabilities:

- The SBCT antiarmor platoon engages the enemy through long-range, antiarmor fires and maneuvers to destroy or to repel assaults by fire and counterattack.
- Many of the Stryker vehicles can be transported by C-130 and heavier aircraft.
The TOW system provides direct fire against armored targets out to 4,500 meters and bunkers out to 3,000 meters.

LIMITATIONS

1-99. The weapons troop has the following limitations:

- Lack of resources to operate a functional command post.
- By design, the Stryker family of vehicles does not have the level of protection necessary to fight against heavily armored vehicles.
- The antitank guided missile variant must rely on their mobility and maneuverability, in coordination with other units, to effectively engage targets and then displace.

SCOUT PLATOON

1-100. The fundamental role of the scout platoon is to conduct aggressive reconnaissance to satisfy the battalion and brigade CCIRs. The Cavalry troop commanders and the combined arms battalion commanders give missions to the scout platoons and the platoons progressively build situational awareness of the commanders’ operational environments. The critical information the platoon provides enables the commander to develop situational understanding, make comprehensive plans and decisions, and direct follow-on or future operations. Scout platoons of the combined arms battalion provide the link from forward reconnaissance elements to the main body maneuver units.

CBRN RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLATOON

1-101. The CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon in the IBCT provides dismounted CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance and site assessments to protect the force and support offensive operations. They can execute missions in restrictive terrain and in dense urban and subterranean environments. The CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon in support of the ABCT and SBCT provides early warning of CBRN hazards with the advantage of speed and protection offered by the nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance vehicle. While conducting reconnaissance operations, CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoons capitalize on their observation of NAIIs to answer PIRs in addition to their CBRN specific tasks.
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Chapter 2

Threats

The various actors in any area of operations can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Threats become enemies when they execute their capability to do harm to the United States.

An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An enemy is a combatant and therefore is treated as such. An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). During offensive, defensive, and stability operations, a neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces (ADP 3-0). A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADP 3-0). (Refer to ADP 3-0 and JP 3-0 for more information.)

SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT

2-1. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy able to oppose U.S. forces worldwide effectively while enjoying a position of relative advantage in a specific region. These threats can generate equal or temporarily superior combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat also may have a cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them with relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary. They generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges, an order of magnitude more challenging militarily than other adversaries. (Refer to ADP 3-0 for more information.)

Note. Threat forces use the term electronic warfare, which differs from U.S. doctrine’s use of electromagnetic warfare. Electronic warfare consists of the measure’s threats conduct to control or deny friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its use by the threat. For U.S. forces, electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85).

2-2. Understanding threats, enemies, and adversaries, to include both state and nonstate actors in the context of the operational environment, is essential for the BCT commander to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations. To develop and maintain estimates of the situation as the basis for continuous adaptation, commanders and staffs consider their own forces in the context of threats, enemies, and adversaries as well as the mission, terrain, friendly forces, and civilian populations. The BCT must be prepared to engage in close combat with adaptive enemies and adversaries while operating in complex terrain and among civilian populations. Actors in the operational environment may include regular or irregular forces, or agents of—

- Other nation-states.
- Political parties and officials.
- Transnational criminal organizations.
Chapter 2

- Media.
- Indigenous governmental security forces.
- International and private security organizations.
- Multinational corporations.
- Joint, interagency, international, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations.

2-3. Current and future combat operations require the BCT to fight and win in large-scale combat operations and limited contingency operations in various types of environments. These environments may be mountainous, urban, jungle, desert, arctic, Antarctic, or subterranean environments. Besides the physical challenges presented by complex terrain, the continuous interactions of numerous threats, each with their own agendas, objectives, interests, and allegiances, influence the operational environment and mission accomplishment.

2-4. The human and political dynamics in a peer or near peer fight increases the complexity of BCT operations. Commanders and staffs work to understand the complex relationships and interactions between threats that produce tactical challenges and opportunities in their favor. Understanding a peer or near peer threat is critical to seizing, retaining, and exploiting each echelon in deep operations to consolidate tactical gains to achieve sustainable outcomes consistent with the mission.

2-5. Nation-states organize, train, equip, and employ regular forces to defeat an enemy's armed forces, destroy an enemy's war-making capacity, seize territory, and defend territory. Regular forces often possess technologically advanced weapon systems that can match the capabilities of U.S. forces' weapon systems. These weapon systems are integrated into mechanized or motorized combined arms formations as well as light infantry forces. BCTs are prepared to defeat enemy forces that include armored fighting vehicles, antiarmor systems, air defense systems, manned and unmanned aircraft, indirect fire systems, mines, digital communications systems, and cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare activities. (Refer to JP 3-85 for more information.) Regular forces also may possess CBRN capabilities and may have access to space capabilities. Regular forces' organizations are hierarchical (for example, companies, battalions, brigades, and so forth) with a generally centralized command and control structure. Regular forces can conduct long-term campaigns and employ combinations of conventional and unconventional tactics. Examples of regular forces include—

- People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China.
- Russian Army.
- North Korean People’s Army.
- Islamic Republic of Iran Army.

**Note.** Near peer threat comparison of the People’s Liberation Army combined arms brigade organization structure resembles that of a U.S. Army BCT to include the organic reconnaissance force. (Refer to ATP 7-100.3 for more information.)

2-6. Enemy threat organizations employ conventional, unconventional, and terrorist tactics and methods to achieve their strategic goals and political aims. Nontraditional threats combine regular and irregular threats or criminal elements unified (or allied) to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Additional threats may include nation-states that employ regular as well as proxy forces. Conventional threats can operate under a centralized or decentralized command and control structure.

**IRREGULAR FORCES**

2-7. Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. Irregular forces employ unconventional, asymmetric methods to counter U.S. advantages. Unconventional methods may include terrorism, tactics, and guerrilla warfare. Weaker enemy organizations often use unconventional methods to exhaust the United States collective will through protracted conflict. They usually employ sophisticated strategies that combine economic, political, and informational initiatives to subvert U.S. partners, strengthen their own organizations, and disrupt U.S. efforts to accomplish their mission. Irregular forces or complex threats are often combinations of
paramilitaries, guerrillas, and criminal organizations and networks. Irregular forces often work in concert with regular forces to support their objectives.

2-8. Irregular forces or complex threats usually have political objectives motivated by ideologies or grievances. These grievances may be real or perceived. Identifying their objectives and motivations is often difficult because—

- There may be multiple untraditional threats groups with differing goals and motivations.
- Leaders change and the organization’s goals shift over time.
- Movement leaders may have different motivations from their followers.
- Organizations hide their true motivations and make false claims.

2-9. Irregular forces customarily operate in small, dispersed, decentralized formations or cells (team and squad size) within a decentralized command and control structure while retaining the ability to concentrate forces if they perceive weakness. They establish local, regional, and worldwide support networks. Irregular threats’ military capabilities often include small-arms weapons, antitank weapons, man-portable air defense missiles, mortars, short-range rockets, homemade radio frequency weapons, rudimentary robotics, UASs, and land mines. Some irregular threats possess significant financial means, including state sponsorship, and can acquire advanced weapon systems and technologies. Irregular forces that have engaged in recent armed conflict include the—

- Revolutionary Army Forces of Columbia-People’s Army (1964).
- Palestine Liberation Organization in the West Bank (2001).
- Al Qaeda in Iraq (2007).
- Iran’s Quds Force support to nonstate threat in foreign countries.

Note. Russia’s version of hybrid warfare is built for limited war in which nations do not pursue strategies of annihilation but instead seek to impose their political will without destroying the political institutions of their adversaries. Russian hybrid warfare is a byproduct of the information age that seeks to operate in multiple domains to find methods to achieve a relative position of advantage in relation to an adversary, or to perpetually conduct operations aimed at weakening the adversary from the inside out. To do so, Russia leverages information, cyber, and electronic operations in addition to employing special operations forces to sow the seeds of discontent within the target population.

2-10. Combat experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other recent conflicts (such as those in Lebanon, Mali, Syria, Gaza, Northern Nigeria, and Southern Thailand) reveal a migration of capabilities, tactics, and techniques previously associated only with military forces of nation-states to state-sponsored and nonstate threat organizations. This migration of capabilities presents BCTs with challenges that extend beyond defeating an enemy’s regular force. Threats combine regular and irregular warfare and include adopting strategies, tactics, and techniques to evade and disrupt U.S. advantages and to gain tactical advantages within the physical, cognitive, informational, and political dimensions of armed conflict. As a result, the BCT must be prepared to assess the situation continuously and adapt to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

STATE AND NONSTATE THREATS

2-11. The BCT must prepare to defeat determined state and nonstate threats that combine conventional and unconventional tactics to avoid the U.S. forces’ strengths (such as mobility, long-range surveillance, and precision fires capabilities) while attacking perceived vulnerabilities (such as the difficulty in distinguishing the enemy from the civilian population). Threats combine a variety of means, including conventional combined arms operations, nontraditional tactics, political subversion, and information warfare, to accomplish objectives and attack U.S. forces. Enemies and adversaries exploit perceived U.S. and coalition
military, political, social, economic, and information vulnerabilities as they seek to seize the initiative and dictate the terms and tempo of operations in their favor.

2-12. Enemy organizations employ countermeasures to limit U.S. forces’ ability to develop the situation, avoid decisive engagements, and initiate contact under advantageous conditions. Enemy organizations employ technological countermeasures to reduce their signature on the battlefield and degrade U.S. forces’ ability to detect, engage, and destroy them. Many hostile nation-states continue to procure conventional capabilities, such as armor and antiaircraft, manned aircraft, and air defense systems, which are increasingly available to nonstate enemy organizations and enemy threats. Enemy forces also integrate emerging technologies, such as robotics, UAS, loitering munitions, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum technology, and nanotechnologies. Enemies and adversaries combine conventional and unconventional tactics to counter, evade, or disrupt U.S. forces’ efforts across the range of military operations.

2-13. The BCT commander must understand the threat in the context of local conditions that affect the mission. Such a contextualized understanding allows commanders to identify emerging opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

SECTION II – THREAT CAPABILITIES, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES

2-14. Peer threats can employ resources across multiple domains to create lethal and nonlethal effects with operational significance throughout an operational environment. They seek to delay deployment of U.S. forces and inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short period to achieve their goals before culminating. A peer threat uses various methods to employ their instruments of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. (Refer to ADP 3-0 for more information.) Five broad methods, used in combination by peer threats, include—

- Information warfare.
- Preclusion.
- Isolation.
- Sanctuary.
- System warfare.

Note. The People’s Liberation Army employment of system warfare supports the development of several traditional military strategies, such as preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary throughout all domains and at all levels of war. Preclusion is achieved by keeping enemy commanders and forces off balance through asymmetric means, such as deception and information warfare, while simultaneously denying them the use of wide geographic areas through long-range reconnaissance-strike capabilities.

2-15. Peer and near peer threats can employ effects that include communications and navigation disruption and partial or total loss of space capabilities. Developing and maintaining these capabilities requires extensive recruitment, training, and outsourcing of personnel with the required skill set to conduct such attacks.

2-16. Enemy organizations employ tactical and technical countermeasures to counter U.S. operational and tactical advantages. Tactical countermeasures include deception operations, dispersion, and concealment. The enemy employs technological countermeasures, such as cyberspace attacks, Global Positioning System jamming, and other forms of electromagnetic warfare. Technical countermeasures can be used to create a denied, degraded, and disrupted space-operating environment to evade and disrupt the U.S. forces’ ability to operate effectively.

2-17. BCT commanders and staffs anticipate enemy capabilities. Commanders and staffs determine the enemy’s capabilities across multiple domains or contested aspects of the mission including the physical, cognitive, and informational dimension. This allows the BCT commander and staff to request the proper enablers required to counter enemy capabilities and augment reconnaissance forces to enable early detection of these threats.
PHYSICAL DIMENSION

2-18. Enemies operate within complex terrain to evade U.S. weapon systems and advanced, combined arms air-ground capabilities while trying to gain a tactical advantage. Even with regular forces, the enemy can operate in and among populations to evade detection, preserve combat power, and retain freedom of movement. The enemy looks to gain the same tactical advantages as U.S. forces such as control of key terrain and the civil populous.

2-19. To achieve and maintain any tactical advantage, the enemy resorts to a multitude of tactics to include establishing relationships with local, regional, and transnational criminal organizations and contract military organizations to finance their operations and gain access to illicit trafficking networks for the movement of weapons, munitions, people, narcotics, or money. The enemy also can use these organizations to conduct reconnaissance and early warning to preserve the combat power of regular forces.

COGNITIVE AND INFORMATIONAL DIMENSION

2-20. Enemies recognize the importance of public perception and its impact on the conduct of operations. The enemy attempts to influence the will of the American people, key allies, and the conflicting populations through enemy information activities and attacks on U.S. and allies’ assets at home or abroad. The enemy uses information for effect. The enemy spreads misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda to shape local and international public opinion and perception against the United States, host-nation, or coalition forces by undermining ongoing stabilization efforts, marginalizing friendly successes or exaggerating enemy successes, exploiting instances of friendly force missteps, and fabricating or exaggerating friendly force cultural shortcomings. Enemy organizations attempt to manipulate local, regional, and worldwide news and social media outlets to achieve their goals. The psychological operations planners assigned or attached to the BCT or squadron have the resources to analyze and counter the enemy’s actions. Functioning cell phone networks are key terrain within the information dimension. The population can use smartphones to document friendly operations that may aid enemy collection or propaganda efforts.

COUNTERING ADAPTATIONS AND RETAINING THE INITIATIVE

2-21. Countering enemy adaptations and retaining the initiative in future, armed conflict requires forces that understand the threat and the operational environment. Reconnaissance operations must overcome increasingly sophisticated area-denial actions and capabilities to develop the situation. Combined arms and joint capabilities must be integrated effectively to seize the initiative and dominate an increasingly challenging and complex environment.

2-22. Commanders and staffs must understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics associated with current and future armed conflict because of the requirements and challenges of the near, close, and deep operational environment. They must understand enemy organizations’ dynamics and capabilities within all operational environments. Identifying and distinguishing these groups and the associated dynamics is extremely difficult and requires a detailed, in-depth information collection effort through every phase of the operation. Only through an effective information collection effort can the BCT gain the understanding necessary to defeat an adaptive and determined enemy on current and future battlefields.

SECTION III – RECONNAISSANCE DISRUPTION, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES

2-23. The enemy employs combinations of lethal (for example, offensive and defensive tasks, assassination, and ambushes) and nonlethal (political subversion, propaganda, and intimidation) actions to disrupt U.S. forces to shape the environment, influence key actors, and to consolidate gains and efforts to accomplish the mission.

2-24. The following vignette demonstrates how a peer-threat employed a new and effective reconnaissance-strike model during recent military operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War’s Donbas campaign. The Donbas campaign was a conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatist groups. The 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War was an unconventional approach of warfare for Russia. Russia used irregular fighters, disinformation tactics, conventional military support, and Russian troops to destabilize the Donbas Region. The following vignette introduces new and emerging threat tactics that near peer threats have brought forth on today’s battlefield.
Russian’s Reconnaissance-strike Model

During the Russo-Ukrainian War’s Donbas campaign, Russia’s use of drones, supported with Russian indirect fire assets, proved to be an effective method to dominate land battle and gain the tactical advantage against their peer threats. On July 11, 2014, Ukrainian forces began to uncoil from their AA and prepare for offensive operations. Russian forces used drones cued by electronic signature-tracking systems to identify Ukrainian force positions to target them when they were most vulnerable. At approximately 0400 hours, when it was still dark and Ukrainian forces were disorganized, Ukrainian forces heard drones overhead. Shortly after, the Ukrainian tactical radio network fell silent. All Ukrainian communication systems were simultaneously jammed followed by volleys of accurate and deadly indirect fire strikes directly on Ukrainian force positions. The bombardment lasted four minutes and the Russians bombed Ukrainian force positions with a barrage of rockets and artillery. By the end of the attack, Ukrainian forces suffered over 30 soldiers killed in action with several others severely wounded, and over 2 battalions worth of combat power destroyed and rendered combat ineffective.

This revamped tactic is known as the Russians’ reconnaissance-strike model which is a mixture of drones, rockets, artillery fire, special reconnaissance, cyber capabilities, and geo-locating technology to find, fix, and destroy the enemy on the battlefield in near-real time. Russians demonstrated the effective use of this type of reconnaissance-strike model and they continually use this model on the battlefield today. Russians believe in an “artillery destroys, infantry occupies” mentality, and they could be expected to use their indirect fire systems to destroy their enemy at the first opportunity. The slaughter of Ukrainian forces at Zelenopilla demonstrated how the Russians have updated and improved their tactics using technology and enhanced military capabilities like accurate, long-range artillery and rockets to destroy their enemies without much tactical risk to themselves.

During reconnaissance and security operations, forces must be aware of how the battlefield of the 21st century has changed, and how surveillance systems like drones or UAS are an effective tool when the system is observing for an artillery battery. Sensors are now able to scan for a unit’s electronic signature, which provides the enemy with accurate locations on the battlefield. Near peer and peer threats have developed new and emerging tactics and reconnaissance and security operations must develop ways to counter these enemy disruption techniques and tactics. Peer and near peer threats have refined their reconnaissance fire system where they could have reconnaissance to engagement using high-precision, long-range weapons tied to immediate and real-time data.

Disruption techniques and tactics are designed to disrupt, destroy, and change the course of military operations against the enemy during large-scale combat operations. This vignette provides an example of how the enemy can rapidly gain and maintain contact through multiple means. Near peer and peer threats do not want to be vulnerable; therefore, they use aggressive counterreconnaissance methods to destroy ground reconnaissance forces early. The Ukrainian army was unable to defend the eastern region of Ukraine after this attack. Emerging threats group their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and their indirect fire units around each other, which usually provides a location for a high-payoff target, if identified.

2-25. Enemy forces use deception, cover and concealment, and obscuration to achieve positions of relative advantage. They may move in different types of units, groups, or formations to avoid obvious detection and to concentrate against perceived weaknesses. Irregular and regular forces often conduct short engagements and attempt to break contact before U.S. forces can bring indirect fire or other capabilities to bear. The enemy employs deception measures to reduce U.S. forces’ information collection efforts. Deception measures include enemy formations, hardened and buried facilities, and multispectral decoys to mask the signatures of
high-value systems (for example, short-range, ballistic missiles, and surface-to-air missile launchers). Deception may also include the enemy’s ability to mask their signature in the EMS preventing U.S. forces from being able to discern between an enemy’s electromagnetic signature and that of a host nation or civilian signature.

2-26. The enemy exploits safe havens within hostile states or in ungoverned areas and takes advantage of subterranean infrastructures (for example, tunnels, underground facilities, sewers, and drainage systems) to avoid detection. Enemies evade precision fires by employing Global Positioning System jammers around possible targets, preventing accurate engagements. As enemies evade U.S. and coalition forces, they simultaneously seek to expand their freedom of movement through intimidation and coercion.

Note. Russia conducts counterreconnaissance by locating, defeating and destroying enemy reconnaissance efforts. They will use dummy positions and radio nets, conduct false movement, and camouflage real and dummy positions. Create a false forward edge of defense. Check the effectiveness of camouflage habitually and particularly from the air.

OVERVIEW ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

2-27. The enemy conducts reconnaissance operations to assess a BCT’s strengths and weaknesses, identify opportunities, achieve positions of relative advantage, and to neutralize a BCT’s mobility and firepower strengths. Enemy security operations protect their key elements of combat power, giving their commanders information and decision space, and enable affective risk assessment. A conventional enemy executes tactical reconnaissance in which ground reconnaissance forces use one or more forms of reconnaissance to meet intelligence collection requirements.

2-28. Russia’s utilization of drones is an example of peer and near peer threat reconnaissance tactics. The employment of drones and UAS is not to conduct aerial observation exclusively; instead, they are part of a highly-integrated system that benefits from operating under the protection of a dense, integrated air defense system coverage and long-range strike capability. The Russians’ reconnaissance-strike model is an amalgamation of drones, armed UAS, rocket and artillery fire, and special reconnaissance. Russian’s cyber capabilities have geo-locating technology that delivers impressive tactical and operational results. This strike may focus on friendly reconnaissance elements, or it may focus on command and control, fires, or sustainment elements necessary to support reconnaissance.

2-29. Enemy reconnaissance elements execute multiple forms of reconnaissance to include combat reconnaissance in which ground reconnaissance forces conduct direct action against an opposing force to force the other commander to make a decision. Other forms of reconnaissance include reconnaissance by fire and technical reconnaissance in which electronic intelligence and signal intelligence capabilities are used to support collection efforts through surveillance of the electromagnetic spectrum. Similar to U.S. ground reconnaissance forces, enemy conventional forces augment their ground reconnaissance forces with a host of enablers that support rapid and aggressive information collection.

2-30. Enemy reconnaissance elements can operate among the civilian population to avoid detection. The enemy can employ regular or irregular forces amongst the civilian population to gain and maintain contact with an opposing force while avoiding a direct engagement. Enabled with UAS, SIGINT, or electromagnetic warfare capabilities an enemy reconnaissance force hidden among a civilian population can conduct effective information collection that can result in accurate indirect fires or degradation of friendly force’s command and control systems.

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

2-31. The enemy conducts deliberate counterreconnaissance tasks to deny the BCT their ability to develop the situation in close contact or close operations with the enemy and civilian population. Conventional enemy counterreconnaissance efforts include antiaircraft and antipersonnel ambushes, indirect fires, UAS capabilities, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, electromagnetic countermeasures, cyberspace attacks, raids, and spoiling attacks to degrade a BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations.
2-32. Additionally, the enemy conducts propaganda and disinformation to discredit the BCT and to generate popular opposition to U.S. and coalition efforts. The use of proxy forces and contracted forces by the enemy to conduct reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance has become a more common tactic in an effort to preserve combat power and avoid casualties amongst regular forces. The enemy can integrate proxy forces and contracted forces easily into a civilian population to either influence the local populous or remain concealed to gain and maintain contact with an opposing force.

2-33. The enemy augments the tactical capabilities of combined arms teams with inexpensive countermeasures (such as land mines and fire and smoke as a weapon system) to impede U.S. forces. The enemy seeks to leverage commercial and military technologies for precision strike capability, satellite imagery, forward-looking infrared, and electromagnetic warfare systems or platforms. The enemy looks to conduct aggressive counterreconnaissance operations to preserve combat power and deny a BCT’s ability to collect information and make timely decisions.

UNDERSTAND BEING MATCHED

2-34. The force structure of peer and near peer threat reconnaissance forces is almost identical to reconnaissance forces within a BCT. BCT commanders and staffs should understand that the BCT’s reconnaissance and security efforts are matched in the disruption zone of the battlefield with similar capabilities if not superior capabilities. Any BCT reconnaissance and security force makes contact early with the enemy through multiple forms of contact. BCT commanders and staffs must anticipate threat tactics in order to augment reconnaissance and security forces with enablers that allow the BCT to succeed in maintaining an advantage over enemy forces.

2-35. Regular, irregular, and nontraditional forces present formidable tactical challenges to BCTs through area denial, artillery munitions, land mines, and antiaircraft systems. The enemy emphasizes deception, cover, infiltration techniques, mobility, and most importantly, depth for its defense and operations. Together, regular, irregular, and nontraditional forces on the current and future battlefield employ significant combined arms capabilities that seek to disrupt BCT operations and dislocate BCT combined arms capabilities. The enemy is adept at employing electronic warfare and cyberspace capabilities to identify and target friendly reconnaissance elements for high volumes of fires.

2-36. In addition, enemies are proficient at establishing and maintaining communications as well as disrupting U.S. forces’ automated command and control systems and combined-arms capabilities through combinations of Global Positioning System jamming, cyberspace attacks, data pirating, and potential satellite neutralization. The use of these anti-access and area denial capabilities and techniques are to prevent advance and freedom of action for allied units terrestrially, as well as creating a denied, degraded, and disrupted space-operating environment.
Chapter 3
Mission Command

BCT and squadron commanders apply mission command principles to develop the situation in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. Commanders use the mission command principles exercising command and control of subordinate units to build their understanding, visualization, and description of the operational environment, the terrain, local populations, and the enemy. At the same time, commanders use the information gained from reconnaissance and security operations to modify existing or developing plans and to reallocate BCT assets as they refine their direction, leadership, and assessment of both reconnaissance and security operations and the BCT’s decisive operations.

The role of reconnaissance and security operations in mission command is essential. Mission command requires the BCT and squadron commander to convey a clear commander’s intent and clear reconnaissance and security guidance. Commander’s guidance becomes essential in reconnaissance and security operations where multiple operational and mission variables interact with the lethal application of combat power. Such dynamic interaction often compels subordinate commanders to make difficult decisions in unforeseen circumstances. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of the operations during planning and make adjustments throughout operations as Cavalry forces develop the situation or conditions change.

SECTION I – MISSION COMMAND FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

3-1. Military operations are complex human endeavors. The threats, enemies, and adversaries that U.S. forces face in combat consist of capable, adaptable, and determined enemies who resist U.S. forces actions, employ countermeasures to our strengths and capabilities, and seek to impose their will on all actors within the operational environment. Army forces conduct operations among civilian groups who are influenced by military operations. As a result, Army forces encounter a wide variety of political agendas and changing perceptions throughout an operational area. As operations progress in close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations, commanders face thinking and adaptive enemies, changing civilian perceptions, and differing agendas of various organizations and actors. The result of the continuous process of interactions is an uncertain environment.

PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND

3-2. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command includes visualizing the current situation and the future end state, then formulating operations concepts to employ offensive, defensive, and stability operations to move from one state to the other. Mission command is one of the foundations of the Army’s operating concept. When contrasted with detailed command, mission command emphasizes centralized intent and decentralized execution through disciplined initiative.

3-3. Mission command assists commanders and staffs in countering the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders understand some decisions must be made quickly and are better made at the point of action. Further, mission command is based on mutual trust and a
3-4. Shared understanding and purpose between commanders, subordinates, staffs, and unified action partners. The following principles enable successful mission command:

- Competence.
- Mutual trust.
- Shared understanding.
- Commander’s intent.
- Mission orders.
- Disciplined initiative.
- Risk acceptance.

**Note.** Refer to ADP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the principles of mission command.

3-5. Mutual trust, shared understanding, clear intent, mission orders, and disciplined initiative fosters agile and adaptive forces. Commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue within their organizations and with unified action partners to facilitate unity of effort. Commanders provide clear intent and use mission orders to identify information gaps, to describe their reconnaissance guidance, assign tasks, and allocate resources. Predicated on the commander’s guidance, subordinate units take appropriate actions to develop the situation, answer identified information requirements, identify, create, and exploit opportunities, anticipate change, and perform the necessary coordination without requiring new orders.

3-6. The nature of military operations requires responsibility and decision-making at the point of action. Mission command demands leaders who can adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation. Mission command demands agile and adaptive Cavalry organizations that can develop the situation through action in close contact with the enemy and civilian population to set conditions for future success. Although BCT and squadron commanders and staffs must accept that they may often have to act despite significant gaps in their understanding, focused reconnaissance and security operations answer the prioritized information requirements that seek to eliminate information gaps. The resulting combat information and intelligence allow commanders and staffs to make timely adjustments in response to changes.

**EXERCISE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL**

3-7. The principles of mission command and the exercise of command and control enable BCT and squadron commanders to develop the situation while in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. These help to develop their understanding, visualization, and description of the operational environment, also. Through effective information collection and continuous reconnaissance and security operations, BCTs develop and sustain the necessary tactical and operational understanding to defeat adaptive and determined enemies as well as set conditions to consolidate tactical gains. Reconnaissance and security operations improve situational understanding and enable commanders to—

- Understand the tactical, human, and political dynamics within an area of operations.
- Visualize operations in the context of mission variables of METT-TC (I).
- Describe the commander’s decisive operations in time, space, and purpose with a greater degree of detail, accuracy, and fidelity.
- Direct the execution of decisive operations with higher degrees of flexibility, adaptability, synchronization, and integration.
- Lead the BCT to concentrate its strengths against enemy weakness.
- Assess progress through continuous reconnaissance, monitoring, and evaluation.
- Modify existing or developing plans and reallocate BCT capabilities or units based on changing tactical situations.
- Achieve tactical depth.
- Identify and create options to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
3-8. Based on their initial understanding of the operational environment and the tactical situation, BCT and squadron commanders generate information requirements for the BCT and its organic Cavalry organizations. Commanders visualize how the Cavalry squadron and other reconnaissance and security capabilities or units (including national-level intelligence assets, surveillance assets, joint enablers, and SOF) can work together to contribute to the overall success of the mission. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s primary unit to develop the situation and provide the combat information that ultimately refines subsequent courses of action for the BCT’s decisive operations. As a result, the BCT commander, working with the staff, the BCT S-3 (see chapter 1), and the Cavalry squadron commander, directs reconnaissance and security operations to address information requirements and intelligence gaps.

3-9. Effective reconnaissance and security operations create opportunities that allow commanders to confirm or deny assumptions, make decisions, and take action. Commanders establish the CCIRs, and continuously update information requirements based on changing battlefield conditions. Commanders and their staffs first identify information gaps and continuously assess, adapt, add, and delete requirements throughout the operation. As staffs identify requirements necessary for successful execution, they recommend and assign tasks for Cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance and provide answers that allow the commander to make timely and effective decisions. As commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets to answer the commander’s CCIRs and other information requirements, they must—

- Develop and continuously update a list of intelligence requirements.
- Identify and update the CCIRs.
- Tie the CCIRs directly to the scheme of maneuver and decision points.
- Limit the CCIRs to only critical intelligence and combat information needs.
- Seek higher echelons’ collection of and answers to information requirements.
- Ensure CCIRs include the latest time information is of value (LTIOV) to aid timely reporting and decision-making.

3-10. The commander sets reconnaissance and security priorities early, as reconnaissance and security operations precede main body movement, which minimizes the Cavalry unit’s time available for troop leading procedures, including planning and rehearsal times, precombat checks and inspections, and maintenance. The commander sets priorities in the warning order (WARNORD), establishing the focus, reconnaissance tempo, security duration, and engagement and disengagement criteria. Missions without focus degrade the collection capabilities of the Cavalry unit. Improper utilization of assets can leave the force vulnerable or a catastrophic threat undiscovered.

3-11. Reconnaissance and security operations are most effective when command and control elements integrate multiple combined arms and air-ground teams. Reconnaissance and security operations require quick dissemination and execution of orders. Reconnaissance leaders must be decisive, make plans quickly, pass information available to subordinates, report to higher headquarters accurately and rapidly, and be responsive to changing conditions on the battlefield.

3-12. The following historical example illustrates the value of a flexible Cavalry force that directly contributed to effective mission command. The operations of Napoleon’s cavalry corps during the 1806 campaign against the Prussian Army demonstrate how cavalry, particularly when operating in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations, were essential in Napoleon’s successful campaign.

**Napoleon’s Cavalry and Mission Command**

On October 12, 1806, the French Cavalry swept through the little Saxon village of Zeitz, 25 miles south of Leipzig. Napoleon’s light cavalry, which was his principal cavalry force, was executing an advanced guard forward of the lead corps of the Grande Armée. As the cavalry secured the town, scouts and commanders immediately collected critical combat information for their emperor. Marshal Joachim Murat, Napoleon’s chief of cavalry, and his staff halted temporarily to interrogate the local postmaster, priest, mayor, and essential civilians concerning the location and disposition of the Prussian Army, key terrain features, and critical civilian activities. In Zeitz, a French spy emerged from the crowd of onlookers and reported that the enemy lay to the west and south, near Erfurt.
A scout produced pen, paper, and a field desk from his kit, established a hasty command post and rapidly converted the spy’s initial report into multiple copies of an important message that contained the critical combat information that the reconnaissance organization knew their commander and the emperor needed. Murat approved the report and handed it to a series of riders who maneuvered along a series of connecting files that relayed the message to Napoleon.

That night the report reached Napoleon. The emperor and his staff quickly analyzed the combat information, updated situation maps, and then, in a rush of rapid, harshly accented orders, updated the plan and issued a series of fragmentary orders. By the next morning, all of Napoleon’s subordinates received the same word; the enemy was massing to the west around Erfurt and Weimer. Two days later, elements of the Grande Armée, operating decentralized but still within mutual support, and taking advantage of the effective reconnaissance and security operations of its cavalry screen, crushed the Prussian Army in the battle of Jena-Auerstadt.

SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-13. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1, Volume 2). Command and control alone does not destroy an enemy force, secure an objective, or resupply an element. However, none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve the maximum effect, without effective command and control. The countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction executing command and control. The ultimate goal of command and control is mission accomplishment.

3-14. The operations process is the Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action. The operations process consists of major command and control activities performed during reconnaissance and security operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). To function effectively and have the greatest chance for successful mission accomplishment, commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to drive both conceptual and detailed planning. Conceptual and detailed planning is necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

3-15. The operations process and reconnaissance and security operations are mutually dependent. Just as the planning, preparation, and assessment of the operations process informs and directs reconnaissance and security operations, the BCTs and squadrons conduct reconnaissance operations during all phases of the operations process. The BCTs and squadrons provide the necessary information to complete plans, preparations, adjust the execution of operations, and provide further assessments of the tactical situation and the operational environment. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation overlap and recur as the circumstances of the tactical situation and operational environment demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances (and timely reports from Cavalry units). Preparing begins during the planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to gain a position of relative advantage. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)

OPERATIONS PROCESS

3-16. Commanders and staffs use the operations process to integrate numerous tasks executed by the BCT’s organic Cavalry organizations and other subordinate units. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to plan, prepare, execute, and assess reconnaissance and security operations while simultaneously planning, preparing, and assessing the BCT’s decisive operations.

3-17. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following to employ the operations process effectively:
- Commanders drive the operations process.
- Commanders and staffs actively collaborate to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations.
- Commanders and staffs build and maintain situational understanding.
- Commanders and staffs apply critical and creative thinking.

**Commanders Drive the Operations Process**

3-18. The commander is the central figure in the operations process. While the staff performs essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, the commander is ultimately responsible for accomplishing assigned missions.

3-19. Commanders encourage disciplined initiative through a clear commander’s intent while providing enough direction to integrate and synchronize the force at the decisive place and time during reconnaissance and security operations. Early dissemination of intent is important as Cavalry operations precede main body movement and the conduct of decisive operations. The commander relies upon subordinates to respond quickly to mission-type orders and to execute disciplined initiative. Figure 3-3, page 3-15 provides a graphical depiction of how the commander’s primary tasks are aligned with elements of reconnaissance and security planning. To this end, the commander performs six primary tasks. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for additional information.) These tasks are to—

- Understand.
- Visualize.
- Describe.
- Direct.
- Lead.
- Assess.

**Understand**

3-20. Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. Moreover, understanding is essential to effective decision-making during planning and execution. Analysis provides the information used to develop understanding and frame the tactical problem in the context of the operational environment. In addition, detailed planning assists commanders in developing their initial understanding of the operational environment and the tactical challenges further. To develop better understandings of operational environments, as well as the specific characteristics of mission variables of METT-TC (I), commanders circulate within their areas of operations and collaborate and consult with subordinate commanders, Soldiers, and key staff officers (such as the BCT S-3 outlined in chapter 1). Using their own training, experience, education, and inputs from others (including running estimates from the staff and unified action partners), commanders improve their understandings of operational environments and specific tactical problems throughout the operations process.

3-21. Reconnaissance and security operations, as part of the BCT’s information collection efforts, are indispensable to building and improving the commander’s understanding of the situation. As commanders refine their understanding, they must quickly formulate the CCIRs, keep them current, determine where to place key personnel, and arrange for liaison teams to contribute further to improving the commander’s understanding. In short, greater understanding of the situation enables commanders to make better decisions throughout the conduct of operations.

**Visualize**

3-22. As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the tactical problem, they visualize potential solutions and their desired end state. A commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0). The process of commander’s visualization applies to both the BCT’s primary mission (its decisive operation) as well as the collective visualization of reconnaissance and security operations that influence the BCT’s decisive operations.
3-23. Close collaboration between the BCT commander and the Cavalry squadron commander, as well as close synchronization between the BCT staff and the squadron staff, are critical to developing the BCT’s visualization of reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.) Assignment of a mission focused on specific reconnaissance and security objectives provides the focus for developing the commander’s visualization that, in turn, provides the basis for developing plans and orders. During preparation and execution, the commander’s visualization helps commanders (and their subordinates) make timely decisions as they adapt to changing conditions and the updated information reports produced by the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations.

Describe

3-24. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization; modifications informed by continuous reconnaissance and security operations in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the unit’s mission. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms refining and clarifying their visualization, as circumstances require. Commanders express their visualization in terms of—

- Commander’s intent.
- Planning guidance.
- CCIR.
- Essential element of friendly information (EEFI).
- Reconnaissance and security guidance.

Commander’s Intent

3-25. Commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command and provides focus to the staff. Commander’s intent assists subordinate and supporting commanders in achieving the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (Refer to JP 3-0 and ADP 5-0 for more information.)

3-26. The commander’s intent statement describes what constitutes success for the reconnaissance and security operation including the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the conditions that define the end state. Intent links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs disciplined initiative.

3-27. The commander’s intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by commanders and staff two echelons lower in the chain of command. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of writing the commander’s intent statement.) The more concise the commander’s intent, the easier it is for everyone to recall and understand. Commanders develop and personalize their intent statement using the following components:

- Expanded purpose.
- Key tasks.
- End state.

3-28. When describing the expanded purpose of the reconnaissance and security operation, the commander’s intent does not restate the why of the mission statement. Rather, it addresses the broader purpose of the operation and its relationship to the force as a whole. Often, the commander’s intent incorporates how the operation relates to one or more of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. The commander’s intent clearly conveys the expanded purpose of an operation.

3-29. Key tasks are those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state (ADP 6-0). Key tasks are not specified tasks for a subordinate unit; however, they may be sources of implied tasks. During execution when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no longer fits the situation, subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired end state.
3-30. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation concludes. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, other friendly forces, and civil considerations. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners.

**Planning Guidance**

3-31. Commanders provide planning guidance to the staff based upon their visualization of the current situation, their experience, and their professional military judgment. Planning guidance reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding with sufficient detail, context, and clarity. Planning guidance broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders maximum latitude, which allows the BCT staff and the Cavalry squadron staff to develop flexible and effective options in parallel, simultaneous, and complementary efforts. Leaders within the BCT’s Cavalry organizations, the leaders who execute the reconnaissance and security missions in support of the BCT, must clearly understand the BCT commander’s planning guidance so they know what and when to report as they identify combat information, fill information gaps, and answer PIRs.

**Commander’s Information Collection Effort**

3-32. The commander’s information collection effort answers CCIRs (specifically PIRs and FFIRs). Figure 3-1 illustrates the key doctrinal terms and definitions used throughout this manual.

![Figure 3-1. CCIR and EEII breakdown](image_url)

3-33. A commander’s critical information requirement is specific information identified by the commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making (JP 3-0). The CCIRs consist of PIRs focused on the adversary and environment, FFIRs focused on friendly forces and supporting capabilities, and EEFI.

3-34. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-0). PIRs identify information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations the commander considers most important and impact on future decisions. Normally, PIRs are tied to either an NAI or a TAI. PIRs become the central focus for the Cavalry organizations conducting the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations. LTIOV is the time that the planning Staff needs information collected in order to answer PIR and inform the commander to make a decision. Therefore, LTIOV is the primary planning factor when determining the reconnaissance tempo for information collection operations and will dictate the level of detail to be collected and the stealth required (see ATP 2-01).

3-35. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). FFIRs identify the information about the
mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important.

3-36. *Essential element of friendly information* is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0). Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish elements of information to protect rather than elements of information to seek or collect. EEFI identification is central to prioritizing units, information, or activities focusing on security tasks. Cavalry units’ use of operations security process develop EEFI associated with unit operations, capabilities, activities, limitations, and intentions that require protection.

3-37. A CCIR directly influences decision-making and facilitates the successful execution of flexible military operations or decision point tactics. Commanders decide to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on probable decisions and their visualization of the course of the operation. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, both the BCT and the Cavalry squadron staff may recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessments. A CCIR is—

- Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
- Applicable only to the commander who specifies it (or their subordinates executing reconnaissance and security tasks to support the commander).
- Situation dependent, directly linked to a current mission or a decision that will create a new mission, branch, or sequel to the current mission.
- Time-sensitive.
- A design and planning requirement.

3-38. BCT commanders prioritize and limit the number of CCIRs to focus Cavalry assets to support BCT operations. With fewer prioritized CCIRs, subordinate units can apply greater concentrations of combat power and reconnaissance focus to each information requirement. At the same time, fewer prioritized CCIRs facilitate timely and accurate reporting and provide the commander with the required information sooner.

3-39. Throughout an operation, the list of CCIRs constantly changes. BCT commanders, through their staffs, effective liaison teams, the tactical network, and direct communications with their subordinate commanders constantly refine and develop their information requirements. Commanders can add and delete CCIRs based on the information needed for specific decisions.

**Commander’s Reconnaissance and Security Guidance**

3-40. Reconnaissance and security operations are enduring missions conducted by Cavalry units; therefore, commanders provide clear reconnaissance and security guidance that enables freedom of action to develop the situation and adequate direction to ensure their organic Cavalry organizations can accomplish stated reconnaissance and security objectives within the required timeframe. The commander’s reconnaissance and security planning guidance is nested with the higher commander’s intent. The reconnaissance and security guidance provides a clear understanding of the Cavalry organization’s task, purpose, objective, and how the Cavalry organization will effectively answer information requirements on enemy and terrain to enable the higher commander to make timely decisions.

3-41. Reconnaissance guidance explains the focus, reconnaissance tempo, and guidelines for engagement. The commander develops the planning guidance based on the BCT mission, timeline, and intents to satisfy information requirements and to identify opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The commander specifies different reconnaissance guidance for each phase of an operation and can adjust the components of the guidance throughout an operation as the situation changes or develops. BCT and maneuver battalion commanders include their reconnaissance and security guidance in, Annex L, Scheme of Information Collection, paragraph 3 (Execution). Commanders of organizations that focus on reconnaissance and security (such as reconnaissance and security TFs, or Cavalry squadrons) include reconnaissance and security guidance in Annex L, paragraph 3 (Execution), commander’s intent, found in Annex L. It is critical that initial reconnaissance and security guidance is published as part of WARNORD #2 to provide Cavalry formations sufficient time to collect the required information to inform their higher headquarters’ decision-making process. As the BCT commander and staff become more aware of the situation, they can
publish refined reconnaissance guidance in the OPORD and updated Annex L to provide all ground reconnaissance forces with detailed and specific information. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance and how it is issued to the Cavalry squadron is not prescriptive; however, it is critical that the BCT establishes some form of guidance for the Cavalry squadron that enables them to focus on what the BCT needs to know about enemy, terrain, and the decisions to be made. A dialogue between the BCT commander and the Cavalry squadron commander will suffice as long as the result of the dialogue is a mutual understanding of the overall commander’s intent. For more information on the commander’s dialogue, refer to paragraphs 3-66 through 3-68 of this chapter. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance consists of three elements—

- Focus.
- Reconnaissance tempo.
- Engagement criteria and disengagement criteria, both lethal and nonlethal.

**Focus**

3-42. Reconnaissance focus defines the Cavalry organization’s area of emphasis and has four categories: threat, civil, terrain, and weather effects. The higher commander’s intent serves as the basis for establishing the focus for reconnaissance tasks. The Cavalry organization uses focus to narrow the scope of tasks in order to get the most important information to develop the situation for future operations. Like many elements within the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, the focus can change during different operation phases.

3-43. Commanders orient their reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective in the area of operations. The reconnaissance objective is the most important result desired from that specific reconnaissance effort. The reconnaissance objective could be a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, or other mission or operational variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. For example, if the reconnaissance operation is threat focused, then the reconnaissance objective could be a specific type of equipment, or an entire system, such as an integrated air defense system. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a reconnaissance objective. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on PIRs resulting from the IPB process, which should directly support the end state as defined in the commander’s intent. The reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographic location (such as the cross-country trafficability of a specific area), a specific enemy or adversary activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy or adversary unit to be located and tracked. When the reconnaissance unit does not have enough time to complete all the tasks associated with a specific form of reconnaissance, it uses the reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities.

3-44. Additionally, a reconnaissance objective may include gaining an awareness of how the local society affects military operations. Cavalry organizations may have to conduct reconnaissance to gather information on the size, location, composition, and political temperament of the society. Such reconnaissance focuses on developing an understanding of the cultural and human factors that affect friendly as well as adversarial perceptions and operations, such as religion, ethnicity, language, and political or tribal organizations. Civil considerations also address infrastructure—the systems that support the inhabitants, economy, and government of a specific area. Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events compose the civil considerations potentially included as a component of reconnaissance focus. Regardless of its focus on terrain, the enemy, or civil considerations, the reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by stating the most important result of the reconnaissance effort.

**Reconnaissance Tempo**

3-45. The reconnaissance tempo is the level of detail and level of aggressiveness required to accomplish reconnaissance operations. The level of detail is conveyed using the terms “rapid” and “deliberate” to establish the necessary number of tasks required, based on the amount of time available, in a reconnaissance operation to sufficiently answer the supported commander’s PIR. The level of aggressiveness addresses the necessity to avoid either detection or engagement and is conveyed through the terms “forceful” and “stealthy”. Commanders analyze the mission variables of METT-TC (I) to assist them in determining the best reconnaissance tempo for a specific type of reconnaissance.
3-46. The level of detail assigned will naturally impact the depth of information collected. Commanders identify the number of tasks associated with a type of reconnaissance. In a rapid reconnaissance, commanders prescribe the minimum number of tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. By assigning a rapid reconnaissance, the commander is accepting a reduced number of tasks and specificity of information associated with the assigned tasks. This is more easily accomplished with a greater understanding of the operational environment, or when only specific information is needed to facilitate the supported commander's decisions. The limitation of rapid reconnaissance is a higher risk to the force due to reduced specificity and less detailed information about the operational environment.

3-47. A deliberate reconnaissance implies all tasks for that type of reconnaissance must be accomplished to ensure mission success and to answer PIR. This is usually necessary when the understanding of the operational environment is vague. A deliberate reconnaissance tempo is inherently more time intensive due to the amount of required information to collect and tasks to complete. It requires meticulous information collection, and is conducted when there is limited enemy presence, when more time is available, or the commander requires more detailed information about the operational environment. The limitation of a deliberate reconnaissance is that it may require augmentation to include more detailed information collection assets and may require more deliberate sustainment planning.

3-48. The level of aggressiveness in a reconnaissance is how the commander directs a reconnaissance force's reaction to contact with the enemy. In a stealthy reconnaissance, units are governed by more restrictive engagement /bypass criteria. This is appropriate when time is available and the unit is either unable to fight for information based on relative combat analysis, dismounted scouts are unable to sustain direct contact, the commander wants forces to remain undetected, or when a higher headquarters is unwilling to accept a higher threshold of risk with reconnaissance forces as a means of achieving economy of force.

3-49. A forceful reconnaissance requires a reconnaissance force to develop the situation through action and they are governed by more permissive, aggressive engagement criteria. This is appropriate when favorable relative combat power analysis permits, when limited time necessitates, or when aggressive engagement is necessary to gain the required information. Commanders may also select a level of aggressiveness based on their desire to shape the operational environment and influence enemy decision-making.

3-50. Rapid and deliberate are mutually exclusive levels of detail, as one cannot be rapid and deliberate at the same time. Similarly, stealthy and forceful are mutually exclusive levels of aggressiveness. This provides commanders with four sets of reconnaissance tempos they can assign as seen in figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2. Reconnaissance tempo

3-51. For context, a rapid and forceful tempo for route reconnaissance might entail hastily assessing the trafficability of bridges and bypasses; hastily observing for threat indicators (rapid movement results in hasty assessments); and engaging two enemy platoons or less (forceful due to the permissive engagement criteria). Whereas a deliberate and stealthy tempo might entail committing engineer assets to classify (time-consuming and deliberate) the bridges along a route (concerned with the complete task of bridge classification), while engaging any threat lesser than a squad (stealthy due to restrictive engagement criteria).

3-52. It is less important that commanders use the specific terms (rapid or deliberate, forceful or stealthy) to communicate an organization’s reconnaissance tempo. Instead, commanders should strive to provide guidance within each area of tempo to assist subordinate units in understanding how the reconnaissance effort is nested within the supported organization’s operating tempo. Generally speaking, commanders should let reconnaissance forces know how much information that pertains to enemy and terrain that they need to gather, how quickly they need to gather the information, and how aggressive they can be in the pursuit of that information.

Engagement Criteria

3-53. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force (FM 3-90-1). They can either be restrictive, limiting the freedom that leaders allow their subordinates during engagements, or permissive, allowing subordinates their own judgment in initiating and completing engagements with threat forces. The squadron commander visualizes engagement criteria through an analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC (I).

3-54. Commanders must define the size or type of enemy force they expect their subordinate units to engage or avoid, and they must specify the conditions. These decisions drive the planning for direct and indirect fires, as well as the establishment of bypass criteria. Bypass criteria are measures established by higher echelon headquarters that specify the conditions and size under which enemy units and contact may be...
avoided (ADP 3-90). The establishment of bypass criteria requires the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders to develop a plan and allocate resources to maintain visual contact with bypassed or bypassing threat elements. Commanders visualize how they expect engagements to be conducted and create their engagement criteria to both retain freedom of maneuver and prevent a decisive engagement. The squadron commander must consider information engagement and how the squadron interacts and influences the local population.

3-55. Merely defining engagement criteria using terms like “aggressive” or “discreet” is not sufficient. Engagement criteria should be defined using precise doctrinal terms. Again, the squadron commander issues specific planning guidance to define the engagement criteria. Commanders use size and description of the enemy composition to create an understanding for their unit of the engagement criteria. The staff and subordinate commanders refine that guidance into specific execution information. Examples include the following:

- Engagement criteria.
- Engagement priorities.
- Direct fire control measures to mass fires and control fire distribution.
- Guidance for actions on contact.
- Bypass criteria.
- Reconnaissance handover criteria.
- Priority of fires.
- Rules of engagement or rules for use of force.
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Weapons control status.

Disengagement Criteria

3-56. Disengagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances where a friendly force must break contact with the direct fire and observed indirect fire to prevent decisive engagement. The commander develops the disengagement criteria for reconnaissance operations. The disengagement criteria are enemy-based and given in quantifiable terms. The disengagement criteria are well-thought-out, developed in the planning process to prevent Cavalry units from becoming decisively engaged, and allow them to retain freedom of maneuver. A disengagement involves moving to a location where enemy forces cannot engage friendly forces through direct fire contact or observed indirect fires. The disengagement criteria indicate the conditions or size of enemy forces such that contact may spoil mission objectives or enemy forces may overmatch the Cavalry unit.

Commander’s Security Guidance

3-57. Although similar to the reconnaissance guidance, the commander’s security guidance has unique components that require additional consideration and planning in addition to the reconnaissance guidance. Commanders provide clear security guidance that offers freedom of action and direction to ensure their organic Cavalry organizations can accomplish the stated objectives within the required timeframe. The commander’s security planning guidance provides a clear understanding of the Cavalry organization’s task, purpose, and objective, and the security operation’s protection requirements. The components of the commander’s security guidance are—

- Focus.
- Security duration.
- Engagement criteria and disengagement criteria.

Focus

3-58. The security focus defines what the Cavalry organization is to protect and why. The focus describes the expected results of the security operation and has four categories: threat, terrain, civil, and friendly. (Refer to chapter 5 for additional information on security operations.) The security focus could change during each phase of the security operation.
3-59. The security focus allows the commander to determine specific tasks, their priority, and their relation to the intent and end state. Moreover, focus allows subordinate commanders to narrow their operations to acquire the most important information for higher headquarters and protect the most critical activities.

3-60. Commanders orient their security assets by identifying a security objective in the area of operations. The security objective is the most important result desired from that specific security effort. The security objective clarifies and prioritizes the tasks for the Cavalry unit nested within the maneuver plan of the protected commander. The BCT commander provides focus to the protecting force’s efforts to accomplish the mission efficiently and effectively. As an example, the security objective may constitute locating and defeating enemy reconnaissance forces, confirming or denying the commander and staff’s initial assessment, providing early warning and reaction time to the main body, or protecting the main body from enemy observation and engagement.

**Security Duration**

3-61. Clearly articulating the duration of security operations allows the commander to establish associated time requirements that drive security operations planning, such as the method of establishing observation posts (either mounted or dismounted), battle positions, length of UAS rotation, and required logistical and communications support necessary to execute the mission. The security durations are short (less than 12 hours) and long (greater than 12 hours). Duration can also relate to depth, especially in screen missions, as time is needed to deploy properly into screen areas to achieve the required depth throughout the area of operations. Commanders consider tasks, their CCIRs, the LTIOV, tactical risk, movement techniques, reconnaissance methods, and formations when articulating the security duration. The two observation posts that Cavalry units employ are described below:

- **Short duration:** Cavalry organizations establish and staff short duration observation posts for less than 12 hours. Cavalry units establish short duration observation posts quickly, so commanders can take advantage of available time and mass reconnaissance assets by maximizing the number of observation posts and associated observing forces on the ground and in the air for a short period.
- **Long duration:** Cavalry organizations establish and staff long duration observation posts for greater than 12 hours. Significantly, the number of observation posts decreases as platoons and troops must allocate additional forces to each observation post to manage a deliberate rotation schedule and rest plan. Units must coordinate for adequate resupply of all supply classes to support observation posts that operate for extended periods.

**Engagement and Disengagement Criteria**

3-62. Just as the commander issues guidance for engagement and disengagement criteria in reconnaissance guidance in paragraphs 3-51 to 3-54 (page 3-11), the same criteria apply to security operations.

3-63. The BCT commander provides the security force with engagement and disengagement criteria for the operation. Engagement criteria direct the squadron either to engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance assets or to allow enemy reconnaissance assets to pass in order to identify, disrupt, or isolate the enemy’s second-echelon forces with direct and indirect fires. The BCT and security force must still have a plan to maintain contact with enemy reconnaissance assets that bypass the security force.

3-64. Engagement criteria identify two specific themes: under which conditions the protecting force can attack enemy forces, and what the security force can attack within its capabilities and task organization. A protecting force has a restrictive engagement criterion when the BCT desires the protecting force to remain hidden in order to report on the enemy composition and disposition. Likewise, a protecting force has an unrestricted engagement criterion and may destroy enemy reconnaissance assets within their capability when friendly forces overmatch enemy forces or when the commander requires an aggressive counterreconnaissance effort.

3-65. The commander develops the disengagement criteria in conjunction with engagement criteria for security operations. Similar to reconnaissance guidance, the disengagement criteria for security operations are well thought out and developed in the planning process to prevent a security force from becoming decisively engaged. A disengagement involves moving to a location where enemy forces can no longer engage the security force through direct fire contact or observed indirect fires. The disengagement criteria
indicate the conditions or size of enemy forces such that contact may spoil mission objectives or enemy forces may overmatch a security force. Disengagement criteria in security operations is often tied to planned transitions that are based on conditions for the security force to break contact with the enemy or the anticipated duration of the security operation. For example, a security force may meet its disengagement criteria to avoid a decisive engagement or enemy overmatch ahead of a planned transition such as a forward passage of lines or rearward passage of lines resulting in the protected force having to commit forces earlier than anticipated. The disengagement criteria for a security force must be clear, concise, and understood at the lowest echelon to anticipate potential transitions and allow the protected force to maintain reaction time and space. For more on transition planning, reference chapter 5, section IV of this manual beginning on page 5-41.

**DIRECT**

3-66. Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commanders’ intents, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

- Preparing and approving plans and orders.
- Establishing command and support relationships.
- Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task organization.
- Positioning units to maximize combat power.
- Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure effective command and control.
- Allocating resources to exploit developing opportunities and counter emerging threats.
- Committing the BCT reserve, as required.

**LEAD**

3-67. Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers. The commander’s physical presence is necessary to lead effectively. During reconnaissance and security operations, the BCT commander balances the time between leading the staff through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders and Soldiers forward of the command post. Once the Cavalry squadron initiates their reconnaissance and security missions, the Cavalry squadron commander commands the squadron from where they can best conduct command and control of the squadron’s assets while maintaining communication with the BCT main body as the Cavalry squadron develops the situation.

3-68. BCT commanders conduct a commander’s dialogue with subordinate commanders to provide effective guidance to ensure a shared understanding of the commander’s intent and essential tasks assigned to subordinate elements. To be effective, the commander’s dialogue should be a face-to-face event; however, the situation may prevent a face-to-face meeting, which means the BCT commander identifies other communication means to ensure the execution of a dialogue with subordinate commanders. The BCT commander’s dialogue with the Cavalry squadron commander occurs early and often throughout the operations process and the execution of the BCT mission. The BCT commander initiates a commander’s dialogue with the Cavalry squadron commander as early as the BCT’s receipt of mission.

3-69. The dialogue between the BCT commander and the Cavalry squadron commander at the beginning of the operations process is critical as it has the potential, especially in a time constrained environment, to serve as the BCT commander’s primary opportunity to issue the essential reconnaissance and security guidance that the Cavalry squadron requires to effectively enable the BCT commander to make decisions. The BCT staff develops reconnaissance and security guidance that is refined and approved by the BCT commander and then published in WARNORD #2. The BCT staff refines the guidance throughout the MDMP as the Cavalry squadron answers information requirements. The BCT staff publishes the refined guidance in the OPORD. However, the BCT commander uses the commander’s dialogue to provide the Cavalry squadron commander with the CCIRs based on the BCT commander’s understanding of the mission and the mission variables. The dialogue also provides the Cavalry squadron commander the ability to assist the BCT commander in refining the CCIRs based on the Cavalry squadron commander's understanding of the BCT commander’s intent and the mission variables. The reconnaissance and security guidance issued from the BCT commander to the Cavalry squadron commander may not cover all of the components of the
reconnaissance and security guidance, but it should contain enough information to allow the Cavalry squadron commander to refine the guidance in order to issue more detailed reconnaissance and security guidance to the Cavalry squadron subordinate commanders that is nested with the BCT commander’s intent.

3-70. The primary attendees for the BCT commander's dialogue are the subordinate battalion and squadron commanders. However, BCT staff members, at a minimum the S-2 and S-3, should be in attendance to ensure synchronization of efforts across the BCT. The presence of subordinate battalion commanders at the dialogue when the BCT commander issues reconnaissance and security guidance to the Cavalry squadron commander enables the other battalion commanders to understand the tasks being executed by the Cavalry squadron and how that effects the main and supporting efforts of the other battalions. The presence of the BCT S-2, S-3, and other staff primaries enables the synchronization of all information collection assets to include the Cavalry squadron and battalion scout platoons. Staff presence at the commander’s dialogue ensures a shared understanding of the BCT commander’s intent and any changes that may be a result of the BCT commander’s dialogue with the subordinate commanders.

**ASSESS**

3-71. Commanders continuously assess situations to understand current conditions and to determine how operations are progressing. Commanders use continuous assessment to anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances. Commanders incorporate staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners into their assessments of situations. Based on their assessments, commanders modify plans and orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances (see figure 3-3).

![Figure 3-3. Development of guidance for reconnaissance and security tasks](image-url)
COMMANDERS AND STAFFS COLLABORATE TO PLAN, PREPARE, EXECUTE, AND ASSESS

3-72. The operations process consists of the major activities of command and control conducted during operations, which are planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Commanders drive the operations process while remaining focused on the major aspects of operations. Staffs conduct the operations process; they assist commanders with the details of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing.

3-73. The continuous nature of the operations process, as well as the critical combat information and timely and accurate reports provided during reconnaissance and security operations, allow commanders and staffs to make adjustments. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate activities and operations throughout BCTs and squadrons as they exercise mission command. Throughout the operations process, commanders develop an understanding and appreciation of operational environments and tactical situations. They formulate plans and provide purpose, direction, and guidance to BCTs. Commanders then adjust operations based on changes to the operational environments and tactical situations. Adjusting operations allows commanders to gain positions of relative advantage over the enemy. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.)

3-74. Throughout the entire operations process, the staff supports the commander and subordinate commanders in understanding the situation, so they can make recommendations and implement decisions throughout the conduct of the operation. The staff does this by conducting the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), and knowledge and information management.

PLAN

3-75. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). An Army leader plans to create a common vision among subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners. Planning results in an order that communicates a commander’s vision clearly and directs actions to synchronize forces in time, space, and purpose for achieving objectives and accomplishing missions.

3-76. All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future. Planning cannot predict the operation’s outcomes, describe with precision the enemy’s behaviors, or anticipate the civilian population’s responses to military operations. The understanding and learning that occur during planning have great value, even if operations do not proceed precisely as envisioned, because that process of planning results in the improved situational understanding that facilitates future decision-making. Leaders use plans and planning to—

- Understand and develop solutions to problems.
- Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.
- Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.

Understand and Develop Solutions

3-77. The commander and staff conduct conceptual planning (using the Army design methodology) to understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment and the operational approach to the problem. The Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of the operational environment and an operational approach that serves as a link between conceptual and detailed planning. The methodology may also result in an initial problem statement, an initial commander’s intent, and a commander’s initial reconnaissance and security guidance. Based on their understanding and learning gained while using the Army design methodology, commanders issue planning guidance, including an operational approach, to guide more detailed planning with either the MDMP or the rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP). (Refer to FM 6-0 and ADP 5-0 for more information.) The BCT and Cavalry squadron’s planning efforts use the MDMP to create a synchronized plan that provides mission-type orders to subordinate units, including the BCT’s Cavalry squadron.

3-78. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP integrates the activities of the commanders, staffs, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to decide on a course of action that accomplishes the mission and to produce an OPORD for execution. Leaders use the MDMP to apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to
understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. Commanders, staffs, and others use the MDMP to think critically and creatively while planning. Using the MDMP results in an improved understanding of the situation and an order that guides the force through preparation and execution.

3-79. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step of the MDMP has various inputs, a method (step) to conduct, and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation and facilitate the next step of the MDMP.

3-80. The MDMP facilitates collaboration and parallel planning. The BCT headquarters solicits input and continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, WARNORDs, OPORDs, and fragmentary orders. Commanders encourage active collaborations to build shared understandings of situations, participate in course of action development and decision-making, and resolve conflicts before publishing orders.

3-81. The MDMP also drives preparation. Since time is a factor in all operations, commanders and staffs conduct time analyses of their planning and preparation activities early in the planning process. Time analysis may require the commander to direct subordinates through a series of WARNORDs to start necessary movements, conduct task organization changes, begin reconnaissance and security operations, and execute other preparation activities before completing the plan. For example, to support reconnaissance and security operations, the Cavalry squadron commander and staff must conduct parallel planning with the BCT staff, as seen in figure 3-4, page 3-18.
3-82. The commander is the most crucial participant in the MDMP. More than merely a decision-maker in the process, a commander uses his or her experience, knowledge, and judgment to drive staff planning efforts. During the MDMP, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing.

3-83. The staff’s efforts during the MDMP focus on assisting the commander in understanding the situation, making decisions, and synchronizing those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis. Commanders use the products the staffs produce during mission analyses to understand situations and develop a commander’s visualization. The mission analysis products also define the staff’s input into the initial phases of the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations.

3-84. The RDSP is a decision-making and planning technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution when available planning time is limited. (See FM 6-0 for more information regarding the RDSP.) The MDMP is a time-intensive systematic process that provides the optimal solution, while the RDSP seeks a rapid and effective solution within the commander’s intent. The RDSP is a time-friendly decision-making and synchronization process that allows leaders to combine experience and intuition to understand situations quickly and develop courses of action. The Cavalry squadron staff most often executes...
a RDSP following completion of their MDMP as they execute operations within the BCT’s MDMP planning cycle, in addition to the Cavalry squadron’s continuously transitioning between reconnaissance and security operations. The RDSP does not take the place of the MDMP; however, the RDSP supplements the MDMP when time is limited and the staff is unable to conduct the full MDMP. The RDSP includes the following five steps:

- Step 1. Compare the current situation to the order.
- Step 2. Make the determination that a decision is required and determine the type.
- Step 3. Develop a course of action.
- Step 4. Refine and validate the course of action.
- Step 5. Issue and implement the order.

**Anticipate Events and Adapt to Changing Circumstances**

3-85. Cavalry squadrons are the eyes and ears of the BCT. The BCT commander, the squadron commander and staffs must assist the BCT commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the area of operations and the tactical situation. The squadron’s primary purpose is to answer the BCT commander’s PIRs (see figure 3-5, page 3-20).

3-86. Outputs of the IPB, such as the enemy situational templates, the event template, and the BCT and squadron commanders’ CCIRs are critically important to assisting the BCT in anticipating events and adapting to changing situations. As commanders articulate, assess, and refine their information requirements, the BCT and squadron staffs further refine the commanders’ information requirements into specific information collection plans.

3-87. As described previously in this chapter, PIRs are intelligence requirements that drive decision points. (Refer to FM 1-02.1 and ADP 3-90 for additional information.) For example, the BCT commander could establish PIRs concerning enemy capabilities and disposition as well as PIRs concerning civil considerations in conjunction with a series of FFIRs about the BCT.

3-88. The BCT commander requires information about the enemy to make informed decisions, such as—

- When will enemy artillery be in range of our main body?
- Where is the enemy main body?
- Where are civilians on the battlefield?

3-89. The BCT commander requires information about FFIRs (the things we know about ourselves) to make informed decisions, such as—

- Completion and status of defensive preparations.
- Loss of communications with the Cavalry squadron.
- Loss of key weapons system.
- Significant maintenance issues.

3-90. The Cavalry squadron staff further refines the BCT commander’s PIRs into discrete groups and indicators. *Indicators*, in intelligence usage, are items of information that reflects the intention or capability of an enemy and/or adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). Indicators are collected within NAIs or TAIs. In the below example, the BCT commander needs to know, “will the enemy attack within the next 72 hours?” After developing PIRs into groups and indicators, the staff and troop commanders then assign specific information requirements (SIRs) to facilitate tasking by matching requirements to asset capability. The staff and troop commanders develop SIRs for each information collection asset based on capabilities of the asset and the expected threat activity (see figure 3-5, page 3-20). SIRs provide specific information about specific threat activity (or lack thereof) at specific locations. Cavalry units should have access to all information requirements at the lowest level to enable them to timely and accurately report to the commander, which assists the commander in developing his or her situational understanding. After doing an analysis of probable firing positions given the terrain, the groups’ indicators, and SIRs for their respective area of operations could include the following:
PIR 1: Will the enemy attack within the next 72 hours?
- Group 1.1: Positioning of air defense artillery (ADA) assets.
  - Indicator 1.1.1: Are there any ZSU-23s present?
  - SIR 1.1.1.1: Report any transmissions across the J frequency band.
  - SIR 1.1.1.2: Report light tracked vehicle with satellite dish.
- Group 1.2: Positioning of fires assets.
  - Indicator 1.2.1: Are there three or more BM-21s?
  - SIR 1.2.1.1: Report intercept of low angle fires.
  - SIR 1.2.1.2: Report wheeled vehicle with rocket tubes.
  - SIR 1.2.2.1: Report tracked artillery.
  - SIR 1.2.2.2: Report intercept of medium angle fires.

Figure 3-5. Priority intelligence requirement breakdown

3-91. The Cavalry squadron has a supporting relationship to the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operation. The squadron staff often operates on a parallel planning timeline with the BCT staff during the operations process.

Note. The development of CCIRs (both PIRs and FFIRs) is an operations function led by the BCT S-3 in collaboration with the BCT S-2 and refined by the BCT commander.
Task Organize the Force and Prioritize Efforts

3-92. Task organization is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (ADP 5-0). Commanders task organize the force by establishing command and support relationships according to their analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC (I).

3-93. BCTs task organize and assign command relationships for their Cavalry formations to execute combined arms, air-ground operations to accomplish their assigned mission in their anticipated operational environment. The BCT establishes conditions for reconnaissance and security operations by enabling the Cavalry squadron with aviation support, joint and organic fires, and additional intelligence collection assets. This may include partnering with and access to joint and national-level intelligence assets. The more sufficient the task organization, the more capable the reconnaissance organization is to develop the situation through action, especially in an unclear operational environment. Similarly, in stability tasks, task organizing the squadrons with assets specific to collecting information for follow-on operations (such as civil affairs, translators, engineers, and infrastructure assessment teams) allows commanders to receive relevant information in a timely fashion.

3-94. When task organizing, commanders and staffs should clearly define the command and support relationships between organizations. The type of command relationship relates to the nature of the operation and the expected duration of the organization. The duration of the task organization and command and support relationships should be defined by transition points where the unit changes mission or priority of support.

3-95. When task organizing, commanders and staffs should consider the various information collection and combined arms reconnaissance and security assets available to BCTs. Information collection assets can be categorized several different ways. Table 3-1, page 3-22 outlines organic capabilities of BCT units.

3-96. Additional combat power enhances the Cavalry squadron’s ability to gain and maintain contact and execute reconnaissance and battle handover. Additional combat power provides the Cavalry squadron with an increased capability to defeat enemy reconnaissance and security organizations and survive chance encounters. Task organizing additional combat power with the BCT’s Cavalry squadron gives the brigade a marked advantage during decisive operations.

3-97. Although properly task organized, Cavalry organizations can produce effects that outweigh the diversion of combat power from the main body, such as achieving an economy of force. The BCT commander should consider that dedicating these additional capabilities to the Cavalry squadron comes at the expense of capability for potential follow-on operations. Therefore, commanders should carefully consider the risks of executing reconnaissance operations as an economy of force.
### Table 3-1. Available reconnaissance and security information collection capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Squadron</td>
<td>Conduct combined arms, air-ground reconnaissance, and security missions as needed to meet information requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct area, zone, route reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, or reconnaissance as part of a security operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In difficult terrain, conduct area, zone, and route reconnaissance or reconnaissance in force by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Arms Battalion, Stryker Infantry Battalion, and Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Conduct combined arms and air-ground operations as needed to meet information requirements. These operations include the reconnaissance and security missions conducted by the battalion scout platoon as well as providing additional combat power (through task organization) to reinforce the brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) organic Cavalry squadron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Cavalry Squadron and Attack Battalion (attached from the Combat Aviation Brigade [CAB])</td>
<td>Conduct aerial reconnaissance and security missions in close coordination with the BCT’s Cavalry squadron (through task organization).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Company</td>
<td>Supports the BCT and its subordinate commands through collection, analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducts analysis, full motion video, signals intelligence, and human intelligence collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducts situation development, target development, and support to lethal and nonlethal targeting, indications and warning, assessment, and protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducts intelligence reach for transmission and receipt of intelligence products from national to tactical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Battalion</td>
<td>Fire support personnel report combat information and assessment of the effects of fires. Weapons locating radars locate the positions of threat firing elements for engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Support Battalion</td>
<td>Provide additional information collected during conduct of primary missions. Can provide information on types of wounds or injuries, diseases, and the health and welfare of a population that refines understanding of the operational environment or enemy capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Reconnaissance Teams</td>
<td>Conduct technical engineer reconnaissance missions to fulfill information requirements. Engineer reconnaissance teams typically identify obstacle, mobility, and infrastructure information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Platoon</td>
<td>CBRN platoon conducts reconnaissance missions to detect, identify, mark, and report the presence of CBRN hazards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PREPARE**

3-98. *Preparation* is those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. Preparation requires commanders, staffs, and units to ensure that the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations.

3-99. During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding prior to execution of their decisive operations. The BCT and its organic Cavalry squadron must be prepared to execute aggressive and continuous reconnaissance and security operations during the preparation phase of the operations process.

3-100. At the same time, the BCT is often most vulnerable to surprise and enemy attacks during preparation, when forces might be concentrated in AAs. While leaders are away from their units and concentrated together for rehearsals, part of the force could be moving to task organize. Required supplies may be unavailable or being repositioned. As a result, security operations are essential during this phase of the operations process.
3-101. Commanders and staffs must revise and refine their initial plan during preparation. The commander’s situational understanding changes over the course of the operations process as enemy actions require them to revise their plan. The ongoing reconnaissance and security operations generate both applicable combat information and unforeseen opportunities. During preparation, commanders confirm or deny assumptions made during planning. Commanders must revise and refine their operational plan when reconnaissance and security operations provide significant new information from PIRs or FFIRs.

3-102. Finally, commanders and staffs conduct effective confirmation briefs and rehearsals. A *confirmation brief* is a brief subordinate leaders give to the higher commander immediately after the operation order is given to confirm understanding (ADP 5-0). The brief is the leaders’ understanding of the commander’s intent, their specific tasks, the BCT commander’s reconnaissance guidance, and the relationship between their mission and those of the other units in the operation (see ADP 5-0). Ideally, the commander conducts confirmation briefs in person with selected staff members.

3-103. A *rehearsal* is a session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution (ADP 5-0). Both confirmation briefs and rehearsals are essential to ensure that subordinate commanders and staffs understand the concept of operations and the commander’s intent. Rehearsals and confirmation briefs allow leaders to practice synchronizing operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals and confirmation briefs solidify the sequence of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding throughout the unit. During preparation, commanders and staffs must ensure that the BCT and the Cavalry squadron are—

- Securing and protecting the force.
- Conducting aggressive reconnaissance to improve commanders’ situational understanding.
- Revising, refining, and rehearsing the operational plan.
- Integrating, organizing, and configuring their task organized, combined-arms, air-ground teams.
- Ensuring forces and resources are ready for execution.

*Note.* The BCT and the Cavalry squadron should also conduct a reconnaissance and security rehearsal to ensure that the BCT reconnaissance and security plan meets the commander’s intent and is synchronized throughout the BCT. The BCT commander, executive officer, S-2, S-3, fire support coordinator, Cavalry squadron commander, military intelligence company commander, and other BCT staff cells (for example, sustainment, information operations, and mobile communications) should attend. The rehearsal should last no longer than 1 hour and should focus on rehearsing reconnaissance and security tasks that address each decision point and PIR, and their associated NAIs.

**EXECUTE**

3-104. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for more information.) In execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. During execution, the tactical situation changes rapidly. Operations the commander originally envisioned during planning may bear little resemblance to actual events. Subordinate commanders require maximum latitude to take advantage of unforeseen situations in the form of both opportunities and challenges to execute actions on contact, develop the situation through action, and meet the commander’s intent, even when the original order no longer applies.

3-105. Cavalry organizations assist BCTs in developing the situation through action. Cavalry organizations within the BCTs must effectively seize the initiative through combined arms, air-ground teams and execute decision point tactics.

**Seize the Initiative through Combined-Arms, Air-Ground Team**

3-106. Reconnaissance and security operations, by their nature, are combined arms, air-ground operations. These operations provide the commander with information and intelligence to reduce uncertainty and enable rapid decision-making. Moreover, the same combined arms, air-ground teams can present enemy forces with multiple forms of contact, forcing them to react continuously. Aviation assets provide critical complementary
Chapter 3

Effects to the BCT’s organic Cavalry squadrons during reconnaissance and security operations. Specifically, air assets provide direct fire, extensive observation capabilities, and facilitate the rapid movement of supplies and personnel during reconnaissance and security operations. Attack and reconnaissance rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft employ guided and unguided munitions, while Army attack aviation and fixed-wing assets can provide close air support to ground forces to strengthen the ground Cavalry squadron’s ability to retain freedom of maneuver and action to conduct counterreconnaissance operations. Additionally, these assets can quickly transition to conduct interdiction missions by destroying high-value and high-payoff targets within a TAI or as identified during reconnaissance or security operations. Rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft can provide additional observation to assist the Cavalry organization in maintaining contact.

3-107. For a combined arms air-ground team to enable the conduct of reconnaissance and security operations properly, it must coordinate the allocation of sufficient indirect fires. The squadron must augment their organic mortars with rocket and cannon artillery either in a direct support relationship or through priority of fires. This provides mobility and survivability for the aviation TF by enabling them to avoid, suppress, or kill air defense threats. This also allows attack aviation to conserve critical munitions by using cannons to shape the disruption zone for the squadron’s ground maneuver and rockets to destroy or neutralize high-payoff targets in the deep area.

3-108. Effective air-ground operations build upon relationships, mutual trust, application of joint and Army doctrine, and a common understanding of the operational environment, operation, and mission. They require detailed planning, coordination, and synchronized employment of ground and air maneuver and fire to achieve the commander’s objectives and ensure freedom of movement and action. Air-ground operations require detailed planning of synchronized timelines, aviation element task and purpose, and airspace close air support employment.

3-109. The key to implementing aviation assets into reconnaissance and security operations is early integration into the supported commander’s operations process. The supported commander and staff must understand the capabilities and limitations of the aviation unit, the types of aircraft available, and the doctrinal missions and roles that aviation can support. Regardless of the type of reconnaissance or security operation, integrating aviation into the early stages of planning allows the supported commander, staff, and subordinates to leverage the capabilities and deconflict issues critical to the effective use and synchronization of aviation in a combined arms environment. The aviation commander’s plan must be nested and deconflicted with the ground scheme of maneuver. Aviation-specific information includes the location of aerial observation posts, battle positions, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), ingress and egress corridors and routes, UAS launch and recovery sites, and other airspace coordinating measures. These locations and assets must integrate with the ground scheme of maneuver, ground observation posts and artillery positions, and other airspace restrictions, such as UAS restricted operations zones, so they do not interfere with indirect fires, maneuver by other units, or aviation use. Consideration to the positioning and securing of the aviation unit’s maintenance and support assets in a forward location is essential to minimize distance traveled yet still maintain supportability. Coordinating airspace for the rapid and efficient use of fires and aviation is essential and must be reviewed often. Once planning is complete, all ground and aviation units must be using the same common operational picture to prevent fratricide and to conduct operations efficiently.

3-110. The BCT’s combined arms, air-ground teams operate and disperse over wide areas to evade enemy surveillance and strike capabilities, to deceive the enemy, and to achieve surprise. Aviation units can quickly reconnoiter terrain that is difficult or hard to reach with ground vehicles, large swaths of open area (such as desert plains and open valleys), or the dead space between ground observation posts and battle positions. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units are ideally suited for reconnaissance and security operations due to the superior speed, mobility, and firepower inherent to aviation. Attack and reconnaissance aircraft have advanced day and night observation and target acquisition systems, long-range digital and voice communication capabilities, and can integrate with UAS platforms for increased situational awareness and information collection. Attack and reconnaissance aviation enable the BCT to concentrate rapidly against decisive points to attack enemy weaknesses, isolate the enemy from sources of strength, or strike the enemy from unexpected directions.
Execute Decision Points

3-111. The commander and staff’s ability to anticipate changing conditions on the battlefield is key to mission success. Commanders and their staffs must see themselves and other friendly forces in addition to the terrain, threats, enemies, and adversaries, and the population. Reconnaissance and security operations allow commanders to anticipate changing conditions accurately. Cavalry organizations confirm or deny the commander’s and the staff’s initial anticipatory assumptions. For example, during course of action analysis, commanders and staffs focus on critical events that directly influence mission accomplishment. In addition, the commander may identify PIRs that answer the commander’s decision points during these identified critical events. The decision support matrix coupled with the decision support template is the result of a commander and staff’s ability to visualize the battlefield and identify critical points where transitions or decisions must occur.

3-112. A decision point is a point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). A decision support template is a combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of war-gaming that depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (JP 2-0). A decision support matrix is a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points (ADP 5-0).

3-113. The decisions commanders and staffs must make during the execution of operations are either execution decisions or adjustment decisions. (Refer to ADP 5-0 for additional information.) Execution decisions involve options anticipated in planning and outlined in the OPORD. Adjustment decisions involve options that commanders did not anticipate—they respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats and require implementing and synchronizing unanticipated operations. Adjustment decisions may include a decision to develop an entirely new plan.

3-114. Cavalry organizations answer SIRs to support the brigade’s PIRs and decision points. Answering SIRs provides the commander with the flexibility necessary for mission accomplishment. During mission execution, the staff is continually updating their critical facts and assumptions based on reports from reconnaissance and security operations. The technique of using decision points to influence critical events on the battlefield highlights the necessity for continuous reporting during mission execution.

3-115. The location of commanders and their tactical command posts should facilitate the rapid and effective decision-making under the anticipated tactical and operational decisions contained within the decision support matrix, the decision support template, and updated assessments of the situation. To create, identify, and seize fleeting opportunities, squadron and BCT commanders must be capable of commanding forward and take advantage of tactical networks (frequency modulation, long-range, and digital networks) to confirm combat information, update their understanding, visualization, description, direction, assessment, and leadership of combat operations to make timely and effective tactical and operational decisions.

ASSESS

3-116. BCT, squadron commanders, and their staffs prioritize information collection activities by providing their reconnaissance guidance and intent early in the planning process, establishing CCIRs, and updating information requirements based on changing battlefield conditions as reported by their Cavalry organizations. While doing so, commanders and their staffs must ensure that the CCIRs directly inform decisions associated with their scheme of maneuver to provide flexibility and agility as they develop the situation and determine the disposition, intent, and capabilities of enemy organizations. Commanders and staffs must aggressively seek higher echelons’ collection of, and answers to, the information requirements as well as identify the time sensitivity of their CCIRs with the LTIOV and resulting decisions to ensure timely decision-making.

MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

3-117. Successful operations demand timely and effective decisions based on available information provided by effective reconnaissance and security operations. As a result, commanders and staffs must build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Building and maintaining situational understanding is essential.
to establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making effective decisions throughout the operations process. (Refer to ADP 6-0 for more information.)

**ENCOURAGING COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE**

3-118. Throughout the operations process, commanders encourage continuous collaboration and dialogue among the staff and with unified action partners to plan, execute, and assess reconnaissance and security operations. Collaboration and dialogue develops shared understanding throughout the force. The operations and intelligence-working group comprises designated staff officers that coordinate and integrate information collection activities and provide the commander and the BCT S-3 with recommendations. The operations and intelligence-working group develops and refines the information collection plan as part of the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)

3-119. The BCT S-3 directs the operations efforts of coordinating and integrating special staff officers. The S-3 integrates and synchronizes plans and orders and supervises management of the CCIRs. The BCT S-2 works with the entire staff to prepare the information collection plan and identify information collection requirements for inclusion. The intelligence staff, with input from the staff representatives, assists the brigade S-3 with developing the information collection matrix by recommending methods or assets to task for collection. The BCT S-2 identifies intelligence assets and resources that can provide answers to the CCIRs, including HUMINT, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and SIGINT.

3-120. The intelligence cell manages intelligence operations to support the overall unit mission. The staff weather office provides planning expertise on weather conditions and effects for friendly and enemy forces to inform FFIRs. The staff weather office assists with the planning and execution of air, ground, and space operations and provides services in accordance with responsibilities outlined in AR 115-10.

3-121. The BCT S-3 is the primary information collection tasking and directing staff officer within the unit, tasking the organic and assigned assets for execution. Before publishing the information collection plan, the S-3 coordinates with other command post staff to ensure synchronization with the other elements of the OPORD. The operations and intelligence working group is represented by the following:

- Assistant brigade engineer.
- Air defense airspace management representative.
- Aviation officer.
- Air liaison officer.
- Military intelligence company commander.
- Cavalry squadron S-3.
- Cavalry squadron S-2.
- Cavalry squadron liaison officer.
- Fire support officer.
- Cavalry squadron signal staff officer (S-6).
- Cyber-electromagnetic warfare officer.
- CBRN officer.
- Sustainment cell representative.
- Information operations officer.
- Civil affairs officer.
- Judge advocate general (if available).
- Public affairs officer (if available).

3-122. The operations and intelligence working group directly supports the commander with executing command and control of reconnaissance and security operations by performing four primary command and control warfighting function tasks listed below (refer to ADP 6-0 for more information):

- Command forces.
- Control operations.
- Drive the operations process.
- Establish the command and control system.
SECTION III – INTEGRATING PROCESSES

3-123. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions to synchronize the force according to the commander’s intent, reconnaissance focus, concept of operations, and updated combat information provided by the BCT’s reconnaissance and security operations. The integrating processes for reconnaissance and security operations are—

- IPB.
- Targeting.
- Information collection.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

3-124. Reconnaissance and security operations begin with developing and adapting the commander’s IPB. The commander’s IPB including understanding threat capabilities, visualizing enemy courses of actions, and developing associated decision support matrices and templates.

3-125. An IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and other aspects of an operational environment within a specific geographic area. The entire staff participates in the IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. An IPB identifies options available to friendly and threat forces. ATP 2-01.3 discusses IPB in detail.

TARGETING

3-126. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting begins in planning. Targeting is an iterative process that continues through preparation and execution.

3-127. The targeting process is comprised of four basic steps: decide; detect; deliver; and assess. Targeting, nested within the operations process, provides an effective method for matching friendly force capabilities against enemy targets. The decide step sets priorities for intelligence operations, reconnaissance and security operations, and attack planning. The decide step draws heavily on detailed IPB and the timely and accurate reporting of the BCT’s Cavalry organizations to provide a continuous assessment of the enemy situation. Staff develops NAIs and TAIs to support the commander’s decision-making regarding targeting and to effectively target threats.

3-128. To ensure effective targeting, commanders and staffs establish intelligence operations priorities for each phase or critical event of an operation and effectively translate these priorities into clear reconnaissance guidance. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). The loss of a high-value target degrades important enemy functions significantly throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. Priorities depicted using visual products and matrices communicate the importance of specific targets to the enemy’s course of action and those targets that, if destroyed, would contribute favorably to the friendly course of action. The high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). The collection plan guides Cavalry units to answer the commander’s PIRs, including finding those high-payoff targets designated as PIRs.

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST

3-129. A named area of interest is a geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of adversary courses of action (JP 2-0). NAIs provide a graphical method to focus Cavalry organizations as they execute security missions. Significantly, NAIs link most probable and most dangerous threat activities to terrain where those activities may occur. Given the NAIs, subordinate commanders can prioritize the employment and deployment of their forces and assets to provide the most effective observation and coverage throughout the area of operations as they develop their scheme of maneuver and observation plans.
3-130. NAIs should not be tied to specific terrain but developed based on threat locations or suspected locations during the MDMP and IPB. Planners use their event template and event matrices to determine where to place NAIs and TAIs to confirm or deny threat activity and help determine the threat course of action for the commander.

**TARGET AREA OF INTEREST**

3-131. A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (JP 2-0). Commanders use TAIs to apply a specific effect against a specific target with a specific outcome. Unit staffs develop TAIs during the MDMP. Commanders designate TAIs for any organic or supporting system including lethal and nonlethal effects.

**TIMELY REPORTING AND ASSESSMENT**

3-132. During mission planning and mission execution, Cavalry organizations provide timely and accurate combat information through combined arms operations and their associated reports. These reports allow the staff and the BCT commander to update their running estimates based on the most recent and accurate reports reconnaissance and security operations generate. At the same time, Cavalry operations execute assigned security missions while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation. The force as a whole is often vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation, when forces are often concentrated in AAs. Security operations (screen, guard, cover, and area security) are essential during preparation.

3-133. Commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding before execution of the mission. Cavalry forces aggressively and continuously collect information to improve situational understanding. Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces to collect timely and accurate information to satisfy the CCIRs and other information requirements.

3-134. The commander and staff’s ability to anticipate changing conditions on the battlefield is key in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. To be effective, the intelligence and operations staffs base the information collection plan on the initial IPB and modify it as the intelligence running estimate changes. Other staff sections’ running estimates may contain requirements for inclusion into the information collection plan. Additionally, the staff plans synchronization into the scheme of maneuver and adds updates as that scheme changes. Properly synchronized information collection planning begins with developing and updating the IPB including threat characteristics, enemy templates, enemy course of action statements, and an enemy event template or matrix.

3-135. During course of action analysis, the staff focuses on critical events that directly influence mission accomplishment. During these critical events, the staff may identify PIRs that answer decision points. The decision support matrix coupled with the decision support template is a result of a staff’s ability to visualize the battlefield and identify potential points of friction.

3-136. As execution of the plan progresses, the staff refines decision point timelines used as the basis for the LTIOV. The staff stays alert to the need for recommending changes in the information collection plan due to refinements. As the need for change arises, the intelligence staff coordinates with the appropriate staff sections to update the products required to refine the information collection plan.

**CUE COLLECTION ASSETS TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS**

3-137. The intelligence and operations staffs at the BCT and Cavalry squadron track the status of collection assets, cross-cueing them as needed, and teaming assets together as appropriate to answer PIRs. For example, a Soldier reports the absence of normal activity in a normally active market area. In that case, the staff could recommend redirecting UASs or other surveillance means to monitor the area for a potential threat.

**ELIMINATE SATISFIED REQUIREMENTS**

3-138. As an operation progresses, the operations and intelligence cell tracks the status of each collection task, analyzes SIRs, and monitors tasks for the satisfaction of requirements. The staffs pay particular attention
to assets not producing required results, which may trigger adjustments to the information collection plan or require the reallocation of collection assets.

3-139. The operations and intelligence staff eliminate satisfied requirements and irrelevant requirements from the collection plan, even if unsatisfied. In this case, the operations staff, in coordination with the intelligence staff, relieves the collection assets of further responsibility to collect information on the original task.

3-140. The staffs must still periodically reassess whether or not satisfied requirements remain satisfied due to changing conditions, the introduction of enemy reinforcements, or other changes to mission variables.

RETASK CAVALRY ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSETS

3-141. As the situation changes, or when Cavalry organizations meet the initial information requirements, the commander and the staff should redirect the focus of reconnaissance and security operations. Retasking is assigning an information collection asset or a Cavalry unit with a new, modified, or refocused task and purpose. Generally, retasking is accomplished at the squadron level through a fragmentary order published by the S-3. Retasking occurs—

- Upon completion of its initial requirement.
- When an original task becomes irrelevant.
- On order, after the LTIOV, and having not satisfied the original requirement. (Adjusting the LTIOV may be required.)
- As planned to support a branch or sequel.
- To respond to a change in the tactical or operational situation.

DEVELOP AND ADD NEW REQUIREMENTS

3-142. As the operation progresses and the threat situation develops, commanders generate new requirements. The intelligence staff begins updating requirements planning by identifying and prioritizing new requirements, evaluating resources based on priorities, and making appropriate recommendations to the commander and operations officer.

TRANSITION

3-143. Updating information collection taskings may result in a change of focus for several collection assets. Collection assets may require rest and refit, or lead-time for employment to effectively transition from one mission or operation to another.

UPDATE THE COLLECTION PLAN

3-144. The staff updates the information collection plan as the reconnaissance assets answer requirements. Evaluation of reporting, production, and dissemination identifies the need for focus or refocus and assigning or reassigning collection assets. As the current tactical situation changes, adjustments are made to the overall information collection plan to keep collection tasks synchronized. Listed below are the steps for updating the information collection plan. These steps are collaborative efforts by the intelligence and operations staffs. Some steps predominately engage the intelligence staff, others the operations staff, and some steps may require coordination with other staff sections:

- Keep information collection activities synchronized to operations.
- Cue assets to other collection requirements.
- Eliminate satisfied requirements.
- Develop and add new requirements.
- Retask assets.
- Transition to the next operation.
SCREEN REPORTS

3-145. The staff uses the criteria listed below to screen incoming reports to determine whether the collection tasks have been satisfied:

- Relevance: Does the information address the collection task? If not, use this information to satisfy other requirements.
- Completeness: Is essential information missing? (Refer to the original collection task.)
- Timeliness: Has the asset reported by the LTIOV as established in the original task?
- Opportunities for cueing: Can this asset or another asset take advantage of the new information to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall information collection effort?

CORRELATE REPORTS TO REQUIREMENTS

3-146. Correlating and evaluating intelligence reports to the original requirement is essential to effective requirements management. Timely requirements management includes dissemination and receipt of reports and related information to the original requesters and other users.

3-147. The staff tracks which specific collection task originates from which requirement, ensuring the collected information provided to the original requester (and to all who need the information) is timely. For efficiency and timeliness, the staff ensures they receive the proper collection assets to determine which requirements have been satisfied and which require additional collection.

3-148. The staff address the following potential challenges:

- Large volumes of information that could overwhelm the staff’s capabilities.
- Reports that partially satisfy collection tasks.
- Assets reporting information without referring to the original tasking.
- Circular reporting or unnecessary message traffic.

3-149. Information collection assets do not submit reports that state nothing significant to report. They should report collection occurred but observed no activity thus satisfying the information collection task. Lack of activity might be a significant indicator. “Nothing observed” states more plainly that information collection activities occurred.

ASSESSMENTS

3-150. Commanders and staffs should conduct assessments before and after each engagement to update information collection guidance and increase their own understanding of the situation. Feedback is essential for maintaining effectiveness and alerting leaders of deficiencies.

3-151. Following each assessment, staff sections should work together to tailor the information collection plan making it as seamless as possible by removing information sharing barriers. Feedback reinforces whether collection or production satisfies the original task or request, provides guidance if it does not, and aids in the redistribution of assets to capitalize on opportunities or fill identified voids.
Chapter 4
Reconnaissance Operations

Cavalry formations conduct combined-arms, reconnaissance operations to determine enemy composition and disposition as well as to gather information on the operational environment. Reconnaissance operations enable all units to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative across the range of military operations by identifying, creating, and capitalizing upon opportunities, providing them with information facilitating decision-making, and the concentration of unified efforts against decisive points.

SECTION I – RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS, METHODS, MANAGEMENT

4-1. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). Conducting reconnaissance before and during other combat operations provides information to the commander so they can confirm, deny, and modify the concept of operations. Within the BCT, the Cavalry squadron is the principal reconnaissance organization.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS

4-2. Planning and executing reconnaissance operations consists of seven fundamentals. Paragraphs 4-3 through 4-9 (page 4-2) describe each fundamental.

4-3. Ensure continuous reconnaissance. BCTs require continuous information collection throughout all phases and critical events of all operations. Commanders direct information collection throughout all operations and task-organize Cavalry assets to collect required information vital to enhancing the commander’s ability to make informed decisions. Continuous reconnaissance provides commanders with a constant flow of relevant information to identify and seize key terrain, confirm or deny enemy composition, disposition, strength, and courses of action. Continuous reconnaissance also provides reaction time and maneuver space for unpredicted enemy actions.

4-4. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Continuous and focused collection efforts require an efficient mix and redundancy of reconnaissance assets; however, this does not mean employing all assets and capabilities simultaneously. Commanders maximize employment of their reconnaissance assets and capabilities to answer their CCIRs. BCTs task and position reconnaissance assets and capabilities at the appropriate time, place, and in the right combination (human, sensor, and technical means) to maximize their impact, allow for timely analysis of information, and aid decision-making at the appropriate echelon.

Note. This does not mean Cavalry units should not have a reserve. Instead, Cavalry units should generate a reserve from nonreconnaissance units (for example, the tank company in an ABCT, an antitank guided missile platoon from the weapons troop in an SBCT, or a platoon from a weapons company in an IBCT).

4-5. Orient on the reconnaissance objective. Commanders establish the reconnaissance objective with a specific task, purpose, and focus to direct reconnaissance efforts. The reconnaissance objective specifies the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort and clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort. Cavalry formations use NAIs to focus information collection to answer PIRs. However, observing NAIs is just a means of collecting information or the initial assessment as to where information and indicators
might be collected. Orienting on the reconnaissance objective helps Cavalry formations understand when and if it should adjust information collection of an NAI.

4-6. **Report all required information rapidly and accurately.** Commanders develop plans and make decisions based upon the analysis of information subordinate units collect. Commanders require quick and accurate reports to make informed decisions on the proper application of forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs maximum time to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information requirements tied to decision points with an LTI triggered date-time group provide focus for units collecting information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.

4-7. **Retain freedom of maneuver.** Tactical mobility and maneuver drive the success of reconnaissance operations. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of maneuver to retain the unit’s ability to maneuver. Reconnaissance operations confirm or deny assumptions about terrain and enemy made during mission analysis and IPB to identify opportunities and maintain freedom of maneuver for the BCT. Counterreconnaissance operations retain freedom of maneuver by denying enemy collection efforts and identifying opportunities for the command to seize, retain, and exploit initiative. Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest possible element and to avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further. Commanders consistently balance the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.

4-8. **Gain and maintain enemy contact.** Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy on terms and conditions of their choosing. Using at least one of the nine forms of contact (visual, direct, indirect, nonhostile, obstacles, aircraft, CBRN, influence, and electromagnetic warfare), commanders and staffs plan for and integrate aerial and ground sensors, manned platforms and unmanned systems, dismounted operations, SIGINT, geospatial intelligence, HUMINT, and visual observation to gain contact with the enemy using the smallest element possible. Intelligence units can provide a wide array of support to assist Cavalry forces in detecting and tracking the enemy, such as UAS imagery and full motion video or geo-location provided by SIGINT collectors. Once units make contact, Cavalry forces maintain contact, until specific orders are given, a change of mission occurs when directed by a higher headquarters, or the unit conducts a reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time information of the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength, and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make recommendations to the commander.

4-9. **Develop the situation rapidly.** Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the commander’s situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian population. Effective Cavalry forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of information requirements supports the commander’s decision-making. The reconnaissance scheme of maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements. Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations while selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.

4-10. The following vignette highlights a Cavalry organization’s use of reconnaissance fundamentals to locate an opposing force during the Civil War.

### Reed’s Bridge

*In the days preceding the battle of Chickamauga, the roads in northwest Georgia were filled with columns of marching and countermarching soldiers as the Union Army of the Cumberland and the Confederate Army of Tennessee maneuvered in preparation for battle. By mid-September, General Rosecrans had begun to concentrate Union forces, but the action took time. Most of his army remained south of Chattanooga, while smaller forces garrisoned the town and occupied key locations nearby. General Bragg’s Army of Tennessee sought to engage and destroy a portion of Rosecrans’s army before it could be reinforced. Alternatively, he sought to interpose his Confederate Army between Rosecrans and the main Union supply depot at Chattanooga, forcing an engagement. Critical to Union planning lay the determination of Bragg’s location and intent. Therefore, mounted forces, including Colonel H. G. Minty’s Cavalry brigade were...*
dispatched to find the Confederates. Minty’s mission also included screening the northern or left flank of Rosecrans’s consolidating army.

On 15 September, the Union cavalry crossed Chickamauga Creek at Reed’s Bridge and pushed patrols eastward toward Ringgold. Minty’s troopers initially found little sign of Confederate activity, but they did identify several potential crossing sites over the Chickamauga that enemy forces might use. On the 17th, a probe toward the town by Union infantry encountered a concentrated force of Confederates and retired. Minty also noted the enemy presence and the apparent northward shift of Bragg’s army in preparation for a thrust across the Chickamauga into the left flank of Rosecrans’s still consolidating forces. This information concerning Confederate activity was reported to Minty’s chain of command. Colonel Minty also maintained patrols to observe the Confederates at Ringgold. His actions triggered the dispatch of additional Union mounted elements to cover crossings over the Chickamauga on each of his flanks.

Ensure continuous reconnaissance. The regular use of small patrols during the day and at night to monitor activities at Ringgold enabled Minty to accurately locate, monitor, and forecast Confederate intentions and forces.

Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Minty’s Cavalry brigade managed reconnaissance patrols with a redundancy of day and night small patrols to answer the corps commander’s information requirements.

Orient on the reconnaissance objective. Minty remained focused upon obtaining information on enemy troop locations and movements, resulting in his correct identification of the Confederate concentration at Ringgold and its likely purpose.

Report all required information rapidly and accurately. Minty provided at least nine reports to his corps commander in four days with most of the reports arriving across several miles within a few hours. He also sent reports to other Union commanders in his vicinity to keep them apprised of the tactical situation. He relied upon a network of dispatchers to sustain these communication links.

Retain freedom of maneuver. Minty’s success in finding and tracking Confederate forces stemmed from his ability to avoid becoming decisively or unnecessarily engaged in combat operations.

Gain and maintain contact. Minty’s reconnaissance patrols located and tracked Confederate troop movements into and around Ringgold in accordance with his original instructions.

Develop the situation rapidly. The nine reports that Minty provided his corps commander over a four-day period allowed his higher headquarters to develop the situation rapidly and employ combat power accordingly.

COMMANDER’S RECONNAISSANCE GUIDANCE

4-11. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance should consist of the reconnaissance focus, tempo, and engagement and disengagement criteria. In providing this guidance, the commander describes, shapes, and prioritizes the intended vision of the reconnaissance effort supporting the overall scheme of maneuver and the specific roles of the Cavalry unit. Echelon must understand the commander’s guidance and the importance of accomplishing the mission.

4-12. Detailed information on the commander’s dialogue and the commander’s reconnaissance guidance is in chapter 3 of this manual.

RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES

4-13. Two reconnaissance techniques commanders employ to answer information requirements are reconnaissance-push and reconnaissance-pull. Commanders employ these techniques based on their level of
understanding of the operational environment combined with the time available to refine their understanding. In selecting one technique over the other, the commander considers the following:

- Degree of the situational understanding of the enemy.
- Time available to collect the information.
- Leadership ability of subordinate commanders.
- Proficiency of subordinate units to plan and rapidly react for uncertain situations.

4-14. Reconnaissance-push is reconnaissance that refines the common operational picture, enabling the commander to finalize the plan and support shaping and decisive operations. Commanders use reconnaissance-push when they have relatively thorough understandings of the operational environments. In these cases, commanders “push” reconnaissance assets into specific portions of their areas of operations to confirm, deny, and validate planning assumptions affecting operations. Reconnaissance-push emphasizes detailed, well-rehearsed planning.

4-15. Reconnaissance-pull is reconnaissance that determines which routes are suitable for maneuver, where the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist, thus pulling the main body toward and along the path of least resistance. Commanders use reconnaissance-pull when they are uncertain of the compositions and dispositions of enemy forces in their areas of operations, information concerning terrain is vague, and time is limited. In these cases, reconnaissance assets initially work over broad areas to develop the enemy situations. As they gain an understanding of enemy weaknesses, they then “pull” the main body to positions of tactical advantage. Reconnaissance-pull knowingly emphasizes opportunity at the expense of a detailed, well-rehearsed plan, and unity of effort. Commanders base plans on several viable branches or courses of action triggered by decision points that reconnaissance assets operate to answer associated CCIRs. Leaders at all levels must understand and rehearse branches and sequels.

**RECONNAISSANCE METHODS**

4-16. Cavalry units use appropriate combinations of dismounted, mounted, aerial (manned and unmanned), reconnaissance by fire methods, and space assets to accomplish their missions during reconnaissance operations. No means is mutually exclusive of another, since the greater number of capabilities and units applied to information collection increases the operation’s effectiveness. All units conduct reconnaissance using a combination of dismounted, mounted, aerial, and reconnaissance by fire methods, augmented with brigade and higher echelon technical sensor capabilities.

**DISMOUNTED**

4-17. Dismounted reconnaissance is the most time-consuming method used by ground units but permits the most detailed information collection about the enemy, terrain, civil considerations, and infrastructure. The commander considers using dismounted reconnaissance when—

- Stealth is required, or security is the primary concern.
- Time is available.
- Detailed information is required.
- The reconnaissance objective is a stationary threat, fixed site, or terrain feature.
- The unit expects, or has made, enemy contact through visual and/or electromagnetic means.
- Reconnaissance vehicles cannot move through an area due to terrain or threat.
- The terrain creates a visual dead space that prevents using optics or sensors.
- Vehicles are not available.

**MOUNTED**

4-18. Mounted reconnaissance enables a more rapid tempo while increasing the potential compromise of reconnaissance efforts. Mounted reconnaissance should take advantage of standoff capabilities provided by surveillance and weapon systems to observe and engage from greater distances. Successful reconnaissance operations mix mounted and dismounted methods based on the enemy situation and time available. The commander considers mounted reconnaissance when—
Reconnaissance Operations

- Time is limited.
- Distances require mounted movement.
- Stealth and security are not primary concerns.
- Detailed information is not required, or the mounted method affords the same scope as the dismounted method.
- The nature of the reconnaissance objective allows vehicles to approach, such as a terrain feature or road intersection in stability tasks.
- The enemy location is known.

AERIAL

4-19. Aerial reconnaissance conducted by Army or joint aviation assets serves as a link between sensors and mounted or dismounted reconnaissance. Commanders use aerial reconnaissance to cue other reconnaissance methods to specific areas, thereby increasing the operation’s overall efficiency. Aerial reconnaissance assets can rapidly transition to hasty attack or security operations without necessarily becoming decisively engaged due to their mobility, speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and precision. Complex terrain, adverse weather, enemy air defense systems, and deception and countermeasures degrade the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance. The commander considers aerial reconnaissance when—

- Weather permits.
- Time is extremely limited, or information is required quickly.
- Ground reconnaissance elements are not available.
- The objective is at an extended range.
- A target requires verification.
- The enemy locations are known and extremely dangerous (high risk) to ground assets or are vague but considered high risk to ground assets.
- The terrain is complex.

RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE

4-20. Reconnaissance by fire is a technique in which a unit fires on a suspected enemy position. Reconnaissance by fire requires reconnaissance elements to place direct or indirect fire on positions reasonably suspected of enemy occupation. The goal is to cause the enemy to react by moving or returning fire, thus disclosing their disposition or willingness to fight. Leaders use this reconnaissance method when enemy contact is expected and time is limited, or when the unit cannot maneuver to develop the situation. Commanders consider reconnaissance by fire when the unit—

- Identifies a natural or manufactured obstacle with suspicion of enemy nearby.
- Detects an obvious kill zone.
- Identifies a suspected enemy position that fits the situational template.
- Determines signs of recent activity, such as track marks or trash.
- Locates probable enemy bunker complexes.

4-21. Reconnaissance by fire eliminates the element of surprise the Cavalry element may have had, and it may give the enemy detailed knowledge of their location. However, reconnaissance by fire may reduce the chance of ambush within established kill zones. Disciplined troops in prepared positions might not react to the fires, particularly if the fires are ineffective and do not inflict damage or casualties. As a result, reconnaissance by fire should not entail the indiscriminate use of direct and indirect fires at all wood lines and hilltops with the hope that the enemy will react.

Note. Commanders are required to avoid the targeting of neutral or civilian objects. Unless civilian objects on a possible target location are engaged in hostilities, they would not be valid targets.
RECONNAISSANCE MANAGEMENT

4-22. The Cavalry unit commander and staffs manage assets by cueing, mixing, and redundancy. Reconnaissance management allows the unit to collect the most critical information with multiple perspectives at the appropriate time. The BCT S-3 manages and synchronizes all capabilities and units to support the brigade and Cavalry squadron execution. Cueing, mixing, and redundancy maximize collection efforts and allow the primary focus to be on reconnaissance objectives that may yield the most information. The details of cueing, mixing, and redundancy are as follows:

- **Cueing** is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide information that directs follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system. These systems may signal other ground or air reconnaissance assets to investigate specific areas in order to confirm, deny, or verify information. For example, a dismounted observation post may observe an NAI along avenue of approach 1, while an unmanned ground sensor surveys avenue of approach 2. Upon activation of the unmanned ground sensor conducting surveillance of avenue of approach 2, the observation post is retasked to observe avenue of approach 2 to confirm or deny enemy presence or movement along the avenue of approach.

- **Mixing** is using two or more different capabilities to collect against the same information requirement. Employing different systems is always desirable when the situation and available resources permit. This method increases the probability of collecting information and tends to provide more complete information. Mixing can defeat deception attempts by highlighting discrepancies in information reported by different collection assets. For example, one observation post and one UAS focused on one NAI.

- **Redundancy** is using two or more like capabilities to collect against the same information requirement. Redundancy improves the chances the reconnaissance element collects the required information and provides depth, should one element become compromised. For example, two observation posts focused on one NAI.

4-23. The BCT commander task organizes with additional assets from within or without the Cavalry unit to increase the effectiveness and survivability of a Cavalry asset. For example, the BCT task organizes a Cavalry squadron with a lasing team, a signal retransmission element, and an ERT to improve fires lethality, increase communications range, and enhance mobility capabilities organic to the squadron. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information.)

RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES

4-24. Although the Cavalry scout directly observing the target is the commander’s most flexible reconnaissance asset, the commander maximizes all the collection capabilities and units, manned and unmanned, to assess the enemy and the effects of the terrain on enemy and friendly forces. Besides knowing the capabilities and limitations of these systems, commanders and staffs understand all systems are susceptible to deception and countermeasures.

4-25. The following assets and capabilities integrate into the information collection effort through cueing, mixing, and redundancy. These capabilities provide the commander with critical information at the appropriate time, utilizing the fewest assets.

SENSORS

4-26. Sensors allow flexibility in economizing aerial, dismounted, or mounted capabilities. Commanders use sensors to observe areas where contact may not be expected but is possible, or for surveillance of areas over extended periods. Sensors facilitate ground reconnaissance by providing redundancy and confirmation for other capabilities and units operating in different areas of the battlefield. They can extend surveillance distance between ground reconnaissance and the threat. The commander considers sensor reconnaissance to expand the scope of coverage in a larger area of operations, to conduct missions of an extended duration, to conduct CBRN reconnaissance, or to cue a more thorough ground or aerial reconnaissance of a given area.
**UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS**

4-27. UAS platforms can locate and identify major enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems, and other targets. Additionally, UASs can detect and confirm information on the ground, such as the position of friendly forces or the presence of noncombatant civilians. Besides its organic UASs, the unit may plan and control employment of UASs from supporting organizations.

*Note.* Airspace management and coordination is a critical consideration for the employment of UASs. (Refer to FM 3-52 and ATP 3-52.1 for more information.)

4-28. UAS employment is most effective forward or on the flanks. Employed together, UASs and manned or unmanned ground reconnaissance elements provide excellent surveillance capability. Other capabilities include the following:

- Support target acquisition efforts and lethal attacks on enemy reconnaissance and advance forces.
- Assist in zone, area, and route reconnaissance operations.
- Locate and determine enemy force composition, disposition, and activity.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces.
- Provide target location with enough accuracy to enable immediate target handover and first round fire-for-effect engagements.
- Provide or enhance multispectral sensor coverage of the area of operations.
- Provide information to ground reconnaissance elements, increasing survivability.
- Reduce or eliminate exposure time of ground reconnaissance elements in high-risk environments.
- Support mission duration beyond those of manned systems.
- Provide digital connectivity that enables rapid product dissemination and constant communications.

4-29. While UASs are excellent force multipliers, they have limited effectiveness in locating well-covered or concealed enemy forces. UASs organic to the reconnaissance unit are not suited for deep, long duration searches. Other limitations include the following:

- Vulnerability to enemy fire.
- Weather restrictions, such as cloud cover or turbulence.
- Line-of-sight requirement between the aircraft and ground control stations.
- Limited frequencies for UAS control.
- Airspace coordination issues.
- Limited sensor field of view.
- Limited detection capability in complex terrain.
- Unique class III/V requirements.
- Inability to provide first-hand knowledge of the situation.
- Fragile components.

**SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE**

4-30. BCTs use information developed by the SIGINT systems organic or task organized to the BCT. SIGINT systems can monitor or scan for signals, stop at detected signals, and restart after a predetermined time or when manually cued. The system has on-the-move signal intercept capabilities. Electromagnetic support (ES) and SIGINT often share the same or similar assets and resources, and personnel conducting ES could be required to collect information that meets both requirements simultaneously. The distinction between ES and SIGINT is determined by who has operational control of assets collecting information. (See FM 3-12 for further details.)

**SURVEILLANCE**

4-31. *Surveillance* is the systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). Surveillance
involves observing an area to collect information and observing the threat and local population in an NAI or a TAI. Surveillance may be a stand-alone mission or part of a reconnaissance mission (particularly area reconnaissance). Elements conducting surveillance must maximize assets, maintain continuous surveillance on all NAIs and TAIs, and report all information accurately. A variety of assets (ground, air, sea, and space), means (Soldiers and systems), and mediums (through the electromagnetic spectrum) can perform surveillance tasks. Effective surveillance—

- Maintains continuous observations of all assigned NAIs and TAIs.
- Provides early warning.
- Detects, tracks, and assesses key targets.
- Provides mixed, redundant, and overlapping coverage.

4-32. Cavalry units conduct surveillance as a “task” while conducting reconnaissance operations. Surveillance is similar to reconnaissance, because they both include observation and reporting and involve detection, location, tracking, and identification of entities in an assigned area, gaining environmental data. Surveillance is distinct from reconnaissance in that surveillance is tiered and layered with technical capabilities and systems that collect information. Surveillance is passive and continuous; reconnaissance is active in the collection of information (such as maneuver) and usually includes human participation and fighting for information. Surveillance and reconnaissance complement each other by cueing the commitment of collection capabilities against locations or specially targeted enemy units.

**SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE TYPES**

4-33. The five types of reconnaissance operations are zone, area, route, reconnaissance in force, and special reconnaissance. All types of reconnaissance, driven by the fundamentals of reconnaissance, answer PIRs that allow the commander and staff to understand and visualize the environment, develop the situation, create options, identify opportunities, and make decisions.

4-34. Zone reconnaissance allows intelligence development on threat, terrain, infrastructure, and society within a specified zone of operations. Zone reconnaissance operations are generally large, deliberate, and thorough efforts designed to gain a significant amount of information. Area reconnaissance focuses reconnaissance efforts within a smaller geographic area than zone reconnaissance but requires collecting the same information as for zone reconnaissance, as well as information about dominant terrain outside the specified area from which the threat can still influence friendly operations. Route reconnaissance is a directed operation to obtain detailed information of a specific route and the influential terrain along the route. Reconnaissance in force is an operation to determine the enemy’s strength, disposition, and reactions in a specified area, conducted by battalion-sized TFs or larger elements. Special reconnaissance is an operation conducted by SOF in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance. Special reconnaissance capabilities and assets are not usually available to conventional forces.

*Note.* When the Cavalry unit receives a reconnaissance mission from higher headquarters, the unit may perform a combination of reconnaissance types to answer the higher commander’s information requirements. For example, if the Cavalry squadron’s mission is to conduct zone reconnaissance, their subordinate units may conduct a combination of zone, area, or route reconnaissance missions inside the assigned squadron zone of operations.
Reconnaissance Operations

4-35. Table 4-1 shows which types of Cavalry units could conduct which type of reconnaissance operation. SOF conducts special reconnaissance operations.

Table 4-1. Dedicated reconnaissance units and types of reconnaissance operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Scout Platoon</th>
<th>Troop or Company</th>
<th>Air Cavalry</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadron</th>
<th>BCT</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Special Operations Forces</th>
</tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Area</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance in Force</td>
<td>X (if reinforced)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Special

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

4-36. Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADP 3-90). Any unit can perform zone reconnaissance, though the Cavalry squadron conducts zone reconnaissance in advance of the BCT’s maneuver battalions to develop information and intelligence, affecting the success of current and future BCT operations. A commander assigns zone reconnaissance when the enemy situation is vague or when information related to terrain, infrastructure, or the civil populous is limited. Commanders require specific information from zone reconnaissance to develop or refine their courses of action before deploying additional forces into the zones. In this regard, zone reconnaissance may orient on the main body’s subsequent area of operations or a specific axis of advance. Zone reconnaissance is the broadest and overarching of the reconnaissance types and is an appropriate mission for the BCT’s Cavalry squadron. The more focused types of reconnaissance operations (area and route reconnaissance) may be included as specified tasks during zone reconnaissance.

4-37. Commanders must work to balance available time with critical collection requirements to ensure they provide the necessary information for their higher commanders. To do this, commanders deliberately focus collection requirements and adjust their reconnaissance methods to increase the overall tempo of the operation. However, as tempo increases, so does the risk associated with zone reconnaissance and follow-on operations. Commanders choose to task organize the reconnaissance force to mitigate risks associated with an increased tempo of operations and to provide Cavalry organizations with an ability to develop the situation through action in close contact with the enemy and civilian population.

TASKS

4-38. The Cavalry squadron commander, working with the BCT commander, determines the priority of tasks that best answers PIRs. The commander then focuses the squadron’s collection efforts against these requirements. The primary tasks conducted within capability and associated with zone reconnaissance are—

- Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.
- Clear all enemy forces in the designated, assigned area of the unit conducting reconnaissance in accordance with engagement criteria.
- Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the zone, including built-up areas.
- Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone.
- Inspect and classify all bridges within the zone.
- Inspect and classify overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
- Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Clear them of enemy and obstacles, or locate a bypass.
• Locate fords or crossing sites, or obstacle bypasses, within the zone.
• Locate and clear any mines, obstacles, and barriers in the zone.
• Report reconnaissance information.

4-39. Based on priority, the commander may direct the following:
  • Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone.
  • Reconnoiter specific terrain within the zone.
  • Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas.

BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-40. BCT commanders direct zone reconnaissance to develop the situation for follow-on offensive, defensive, or stability tasks. The Cavalry squadron is the BCT commander’s primary reconnaissance unit to develop the situation and refine subsequent courses of action. Consequently, BCT commanders must provide planning guidance and clear intent for zone reconnaissance operations that offer both freedom of action and adequate direction to ensure their Cavalry squadrons accomplish defined reconnaissance objectives within the required timeframe.

4-41. The BCT commander’s intent for zone reconnaissance provides focus for information collection. Based on the potential scale of zone reconnaissance, commanders prioritize collection efforts on reconnaissance objectives determined during the IPB process. The event template, terrain analysis, and enemy situation template create information requirements that in turn focus collection efforts. These requirements, linked to CCIRs, assist the BCT commander and staff with developing and refining courses of action.

4-42. Regardless of the amount of information known, the BCT commander initially defines and consistently refines the type of information needed (information requirements) and when it is needed. The BCT commander describes how the reconnaissance efforts enable follow-on operations. The Cavalry squadron serves as the BCT commander’s eyes and ears allowing the commander to have a better understanding of the operational environment and have the ability to focus the main effort at positions of tactical advantage. Finally, the BCT commander defines the Cavalry squadron’s role when the squadron transitions from zone reconnaissance to a follow-on operation.

4-43. When reconnaissance assets react to contact, they affect the reconnaissance tempo. Therefore, engagement, disengagement, and bypass criteria are essential considerations from the BCT to the section level. The criteria for which subordinate elements lethally engage or disengage enemy forces help the squadron gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Commanders may direct bypassing or handing off certain sizes or types of units to maintain the tempo of the operation based upon subsequent planned operations and guidance from higher. Follow-on forces must understand engagement/disengagement and bypass criteria. Reconnaissance assets direct and rehearse deliberate handover of enemy targets between friendly units as required during engagement, disengagements, and transitions.

4-44. To enable information collection, one of the major considerations for the BCT staff when planning zone reconnaissance is the Cavalry squadron’s task organization. BCTs task organize and assign command relationships for their Cavalry formations to accomplish their assigned mission in their anticipated area of operations. The BCT sets conditions for zone reconnaissance by enabling the Cavalry squadron with additional capabilities, such as rotary-wing aircraft, air defense support, joint and organic fires. The BCT also provides information collection assets, mobility support, increased sustainment capacity, retransmission capability, Infantry, and Armored based upon available units, information collection requirements, and estimates of the enemy’s capabilities and assets. Effective Cavalry is task organized with additional assets that allow them to collect information and intelligence in close contact with the enemy and civilian population without placing the unit in a position of disadvantage or risk of enemy overmatch. A sufficient task organization enables the unit conducting zone reconnaissance to develop the situation through action, especially in an unclear operational environment. Similarly, when conducting operations focused on the conduct of stability tasks, task organizing the squadron with capabilities specific to collecting information for follow-on operations (such as civil affairs, translators, or a complete infrastructure assessment team) provides information in a timely fashion.
4-45. The positioning of sustainment assets depends on the depth of the zone, anticipated duration of the operation, and sustainment requirements during operations. Class III, class V, maintenance collection, and medical evacuation are of primary concern. A forward-positioned FARP reduces aircraft turnaround time. The FARP may be in the squadron zone or in the area of operations of the lead unit behind the squadron.

4-46. Dedication of additional capabilities comes at a potential cost to follow-on operations. Additional combat power enhances the Cavalry squadron’s ability to gain and maintain contact and execute reconnaissance and battle handover while providing an increased capacity to defeat enemy reconnaissance and security forces. Above all other considerations, an appropriately task-organized squadron has the ability to take advantage of situations and opportunities identified during zone reconnaissance. Seizing opportunities provides the BCT with a marked advantage during decisive operations. Therefore, commanders should carefully consider the significant risks assumed in executing reconnaissance operations as an economy of force without appropriately task organizing the Cavalry force.

Note. “Reconnaissance organizations require versatility to adapt to ever-evolving tactical situations and operational realities. Versatility without survivability and combat power has little relevance. Reconnaissance units unable to survive contact with an enemy and incapable of overcoming even light resistance tend to be marginalized either by a threat or by their own commanders. Even stealthy reconnaissance requires an ability to survive a chance contact or an ambush that may occur with little warning.” (Cameron, page 577.)

CAVALRY SQUADRON PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-47. When developing planning guidance, Cavalry squadron commanders incorporate the BCT commander’s intent and concept for follow-on forces into their overall scheme of maneuver. When conducting all the types of reconnaissance, focus, reconnaissance tempo, and engagement/disengagement criteria are critical components of the commander’s reconnaissance guidance.

4-48. The tempo and uncertainty of military operations rarely allows sufficient time to collect all the relevant or required information during zone reconnaissance. Therefore, commanders must focus their formations on specific reconnaissance objectives that validate or invalidate assumptions and confirm or deny planned courses of action. Prioritization allows the Cavalry squadron to increase the speed of collection and accomplish reconnaissance objectives in sufficient time to facilitate the main effort’s movement and maneuver to positions of tactical advantage. Mission analysis and IPB produces terrain analysis, enemy situational templates, and an event template to predict how the military aspects of terrain, mission variables, and civil considerations affect friendly and enemy forces. The squadron uses available information to prioritize tasks and determine factors, such as—

- Speed, movement, and reconnaissance techniques.
- Overall focus of reconnaissance.
- Task, purpose, and focus for subordinate troops, task-organized assets, and boundaries (zones) for ground troops.
- Essential aerial on-station times or locations if available.

4-49. Commanders direct the reconnaissance tempo during zone reconnaissance to enable the timely collection of information and intelligence to facilitate successful subsequent operations. Commanders prescribe the scope to collect against specific reconnaissance objectives, and speed and movement techniques during different portions of the operation, task organization of reconnaissance assets to create efficient collection, and a timeline for collection in their planning guidance. The combination of these factors creates a tempo for zone reconnaissance.

4-50. To control movement, the squadron assigns zones for the ground troops (see figure 4-1, page 4-12). Zone reconnaissance begins at the line of departure and concludes at a specified limit of advance (LOA) with lateral boundaries defining the area of operations. Subordinate zones may not be the same size. The main body frequently orients movement along a major route, especially an axis of advance though travelling directly along the route incurs tactical risk. Reconnaissance of the route becomes a specified task for a troop, typically. Phase lines (PLs) control progress through the zone. Boundaries and PLs are drawn along recognizable terrain. Contact points along boundaries maintain coordinated reconnaissance between adjacent
units. Checkpoints indicate critical terrain features, control reconnaissance movement and reporting, and coordinate air and ground actions.

Figure 4-1. IBCT zone reconnaissance graphics

4-51. Cavalry units conduct detailed fires planning regardless of the assigned task or prescribed tempo. Deliberate fire planning has two components, indirect and direct. A commander deliberately plans and integrates indirect fire support into the scheme of maneuver to enhance the effectiveness of direct fires. Fires integration ensures that templated enemy forces are targeted with the most casualty-producing weapon systems. By setting the conditions to engage the enemy with indirect fires, the commander can degrade the enemy scheme of maneuver without exposing friendly forces to observation and direct fire engagement until necessary. Commanders establish a direct fire plan based on METT-TC (I). Fire distribution allows the commander to achieve massing fires and effects on the enemy to degrade or destroy their ability to command and control their forces. Proper direct fire planning—

- Destroys the most dangerous enemy assets first.
- Uses each weapon system in its best role.
- Concentrates fires and effects on long-range targets.
Reconnaissance Operations

- Takes the best shots and exposes only those combat vehicles that actually need to fire.
- Avoids target overkill.

4-52. Integration of combined arms, air-ground operations are essential to the success of reconnaissance operations. Considerations for the integration of air-ground operations include the following:

- Command and control relationship.
- Rotary-wing employment plan, task, and purpose.
- Ground troops’ missions.
- Tasks performed by air and ground troops.

4-53. Rotary-wing support increases the effectiveness of the reconnaissance efforts by reconnoitering open terrain, reconnoitering forward of the ground troops, screening flanks, and locating enemy forces. Integrated and synchronized aerial reconnaissance allows ground troops to focus on terrain, routes, and reconnaissance of obstacles and enemy. When air and ground reconnaissance efforts are integrated, the squadron develops the situation faster with more fidelity for the BCT commander.

4-54. Usually, the squadron retains control of task-organized reinforcements when the situation is vague. Engineers are typically task organized to maneuver elements along primary and alternate routes to assist in technical reconnaissance, obstacle reduction, and route repair.

4-55. The BCT field artillery battalion has an organic command relationship with the BCT. Priority of fire for artillery to the Cavalry troops is based on intelligence or the main effort. Normally, priority for ADA protects trains, command posts, artillery batteries, and task organized or designated reserve.

4-56. Commanders at all levels position themselves in the best position to command subordinate units and gain situational awareness. Normally, the squadron tactical command post and main command post are operational to ensure continuous communications over extended distances within the squadron and to higher headquarters. Usually, the combat trains command post moves through the center of the zone along a route providing good movement laterally and in-depth. A unit, maintenance collection point is usually co-located with, or near the combat train’s command post. The combat train’s command post can promote security and provide command and control of the unit, maintenance collection point, and role 1. The field trains of the Cavalry squadron either co-locates with the brigade support battalion (BSB) or echelons in-depth behind the combat trains. Command posts and sustainment assets remain mobile and bound forward as the squadron advances.

4-57. The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to move forces forward to conduct operations. A forward passage of lines ensures the maintenance of enemy contact while allowing the relief of previously committed forces. The stationary force controls and secures the area of operations far enough to its front that the moving force can pass through the stationary force and reform into a combat formation before contact with an enemy force. A forward passage of lines allows the Cavalry squadron or units conducting reconnaissance to avoid being harassed or assaulted with hostile intent by enemy forces as they begin operations. Forward or rearward passage of lines can occur during any type of reconnaissance or security operations. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

4-58. Upon completion of the mission, the squadron proceeds with assigned follow-on missions. In the absence of an assigned mission, typically, the squadron conducts security missions in the form of a screen or guard along the LOA or to the flank of a supported unit. If the squadron encounters major enemy formations before the objective and do not find a gap or bypass, the squadron conducts a screen or guard, continues reconnaissance, and prepares to pass main body forces forward.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

4-59. Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). Area reconnaissance is detailed reconnaissance in specific locations that answers PIRs and develops the situation to provide options to the commander. The commander assigns area reconnaissance when information on the enemy situation is more developed, when focused reconnaissance in the given area may yield specific information related to terrain or decision points, or when more detailed information is required in a designated area. The area
targeted for reconnaissance may consist of a future friendly position, such as brigade support areas (BSAs) or position areas for artillery. Frequently, area reconnaissance is defined as an NAI or a TAI to focus the unit on a more specific area, such as a building, bridge, obstacle, or key terrain.

**TASKS**

4-60. Area reconnaissance comprises the same tasks as zone reconnaissance. Based on time and the commander’s intent, the commander may direct reconnaissance for SIRs only. Like zone reconnaissance, the commander should provide focus to the unit in the commander’s intent within the OPORD and list the tasks in the specific instructions. Primary tasks conducted within capability and associated with area reconnaissance are—

- Confirm or deny the commander’s PIRs.
- Determine the trafficability of all terrain in the area, including built-up areas.
- Find and report all enemy forces within the area.
- Reconnoiter specific terrain within the area.
- Report reconnaissance information.

4-61. Other area reconnaissance tasks include the following:

- Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
- Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges within the area.
- Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, defiles, and culverts.
- Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the area.
- Locate bypasses around built-up areas.
- Locate and determine the extent of all contamination in the area, as well as bypasses around contaminated areas.
- Locate any bypasses for existing obstacles in the area that cannot be cleared.

**BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

4-62. The planning considerations for area reconnaissance at the BCT are the same as for zone reconnaissance. The BCT commander provides focus within the area and the reconnaissance tempo. The BCT commander also provides the reconnaissance objective and the engagement/disengagement criteria for the maneuver to the reconnaissance objective.

**CAVALRY SQUADRON PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

4-63. The planning considerations for area reconnaissance at the squadron level are the same as for zone reconnaissance, with some unique considerations. In area reconnaissance, the squadron’s IPB analysis determines the speed, formations, and movement techniques used to travel to the area. Depending on the size of the area, the commander decides the appropriate size force required to reconnoiter the objective. En route to or inside the area, the squadron establishes control measures as in zone reconnaissance (see figure 4-2).

4-64. If another unit occupies an AA, the squadron reconnoiters avenues of approach and mobility corridors leading to the area to support that force. That squadron can secure the area initially; until the unit’s quartering parties arrive. The squadron continues with assigned missions or moves to screen that force as it conducts AA operations. Upon completion of reconnaissance, the troop or squadron departs the area along a different route.

4-65. The squadron establishes control measures for area reconnaissance in the same manner as for zone reconnaissance. The squadron designates the area to reconnoiter with a continuous closed line, usually depicted as an NAI.

4-66. The key distinction between zone and area reconnaissance is not which echelon can conduct either task, or the size of the area or zone to be reconnoitered. The key distinctions, instead, rely on the amount of information known about the enemy and operational environment, as well as the amount of risk the commander is willing to accept. Therefore, the commander might accept risk moving to the NAI or TAI to maximize the amount of time the unit can conduct the area reconnaissance. Whereas, in zone reconnaissance,
the unit would deploy into a maneuver formation at the LD and conduct reconnaissance throughout the zone to mitigate the risk incurred by not understanding the enemy situation.

![Figure 4-2. SBCT area reconnaissance](image)

**ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE**

4-67. Route reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90). A route may include a road, highway, trail, tunnel, bridge, and ferry. Routes include a designated start point and end point. Reconnaissance of a route is essential when intelligence indicates a probability of enemy contact or obstacle along the route, or in the area and surrounding terrain, or when information concerning the surrounding, influential terrain is vague or unknown. The commander assigns route reconnaissance either as a discrete operation or as an implied task during zone reconnaissance. Units collect information about roads, bridges, tunnels, fords, waterways, and other natural and artificial terrain features that can affect mobility. Route reconnaissance provides commanders with more detailed information about the route and terrain that can influence the unit. Commanders use this information to prevent surprise, determine trafficability for follow-on forces, and confirm or deny staff estimates and assumptions made during the operations process. Route reconnaissance is not to be confused with route classification, which can be included in route reconnaissance. Typically, engineer reconnaissance platoons perform a route classification, which requires technical measurements and analysis.
Chapter 4

TASKS

4-68. Certain tasks are required during route reconnaissance, unless otherwise directed by the higher commander. These tasks are not a checklist or arranged sequentially, as some may not be necessary for mission accomplishment. If time is limited, the commander directs reconnaissance for SIRs. The tasks conducted within capability and associated with route reconnaissance are—

- Find, report, and clear all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route in accordance with engagement criteria.
- Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of the route.
- Reconnoiter all terrain the enemy can use to influence movement along the route, such as choke points, ambush sites, and pickup, landing, and drop zones.
- Reconnoiter all built-up areas along the route.
- Reconnoiter all lateral routes.
- Locate bypasses around built-up and contaminated areas.
- Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
- Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Clear them of enemy and obstacles, or locate a bypass.
- Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges on the route.
- Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
- Locate and clear all mines and barriers on the route, and locate bypasses around any obstacles that cannot be cleared.
- Submit route report.

BCT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-69. The BCT commander assigns a route reconnaissance mission when plans call for using a specific route for friendly movement. The planning considerations for route reconnaissance at brigade level are the same as for zone reconnaissance, with additional considerations. BCT commanders assign the Cavalry squadron a single route along the length or width of the area of operations or along multiple, geographically separate routes, albeit commanders seldom assign single routes to squadrons. The squadron can establish its own routes with different functions. Commanders can add those functions as objectives to specify different types of routes. Examples of such routes are portrayed in figure 4-3 and figure 5-4 (page 5-19). The BCT commander provides focus, reconnaissance tempo, and engagement and disengagement criteria as they relate to the main body considerations for reconnaissance or battle handover.

CAVALRY SQUADRON PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-70. The planning considerations for route reconnaissance at the squadron level are the same as for zone reconnaissance, with some unique considerations. When a squadron conducts route reconnaissance of a single route, one troop acts as the main reconnaissance unit with the other troops operating abreast on the flanks to reconnoiter terrain features that dominate or influence the main route. When deciding how much terrain on each flank of the route to reconnoiter, the commander determines possible danger areas and the nature of the potential threat. The squadron then determines the task organization and command relationships of any combined arms attachments, based on the IPB and mission analysis.

4-71. When the squadron conducts route reconnaissance of multiple routes whereon enemy contact is probable, a troop conducts reconnaissance of one route while the other troops secure their flanks. If contact is unlikely, the troop may reconnoiter with assigned scout platoons through multiple routes, which must be close enough together for the troop commander to control the operation. Integrated air and ground reconnaissance provides for faster and more complete reconnaissance. The squadron establishes control measures for route reconnaissance by creating an area of operations for the unit conducting reconnaissance. The commander places lateral boundaries on both sides of the route far enough out to allow reconnaissance of all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along the route. An LD is placed perpendicularly to the route, and at a starting point at the beginning of the route. Figure 4-3 illustrates a start point. The LD creates the rear boundary of the area of operations. The commander then places an LOA far enough beyond the route’s release point to include terrain from which the enemy could influence the route.
The start and release points define that section of the route where the unit collects detailed information. The commander places PLs and checkpoints to maintain coordinated reconnaissance, control movement and maneuver, or designate critical points. The commander places additional control measures to coordinate indirect and direct fire, as necessary (see figure 4-3).

Figure 4-3. SBCT route reconnaissance mission

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

4-72. The commander integrates ground, air, and other technical assets to allow for either faster or more detailed route reconnaissance. The commander orders aerial reconnaissance if the squadron must complete the reconnaissance mission quickly. When time is limited, aerial reconnaissance is essential in determining areas clear of enemy forces and obstacles and in cueing ground reconnaissance about where to focus efforts.

4-73. The commander establishes priorities of fire and indirect fire control measures if enemy contact is possible or expected. The squadron considers built-up areas, protected sites, and civilians in both the planning and execution of indirect fires.

4-74. If the commander requires detailed information on a route, ERTs can conduct deliberate reconnaissance of critical points along the route more quickly and accurately than route reconnaissance conducted by a Cavalry unit. If the commander anticipates significant obstacles or is required to determine a hasty classification of bridges, fords, ferry sites, and tunnels, engineers are normally task organized to the squadron.
4-75. If CBRN contamination is expected, CBRN reconnaissance assets should accompany the force conducting ground reconnaissance. They can detect, identify, and locate CBRN hazards more accurately and quickly than organic Cavalry units.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

4-76. *Reconnaissance in force* is a type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information (ADP 3-90). Usually, reconnaissance in force is a limited objective operation conducted by a battalion-sized TF, Cavalry squadron, or larger force. The commander assigns reconnaissance in force when the enemy is operating within a specific area and the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by other means. Reconnaissance in force is an aggressive reconnaissance, which develops information and intelligence in contact with the enemy to determine and exploit enemy weaknesses. The commander plans for both the retrograde and reinforcement of the friendly force (in case it should encounter superior enemy forces) and for the exploitation of its success.

4-77. During reconnaissance in force, the subordinate elements of the Cavalry unit conduct offensive tasks and zone, area, and route reconnaissance operations. The Cavalry squadron often conducts reconnaissance in force in advance of a BCT movement to contact in order to allow the main body freedom of maneuver and mass combat power.

4-78. BCT commanders order squadrons to conduct reconnaissance in force as a stand-alone operation or as the lead in conjunction with a brigade attack. Based upon enemy composition and other METT-TC (I) variables, the Cavalry squadron may require augmentation with maneuver and fires elements to conduct reconnaissance in force as a stand-alone operation. Cavalry forces need to retain freedom of maneuver while conducting tasks during reconnaissance in force operations.

**TASKS**

4-79. Tasks for reconnaissance in force include the following:

- Penetrate the enemy’s security area, and determine its size and depth.
- Determine the location and disposition of enemy forces.
- Attack enemy positions, and attempt to force the enemy to react by using local reserves or major counterattack forces, employing fires and specific weapons systems, and adjusting positions.
- Determine weaknesses in the enemy’s disposition to exploit.
- Locate obstacles, and create lanes as specified.
- Enter areas of operations in complex terrain not previously occupied by friendly forces, such as urban environments.

**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

4-80. The planning considerations for reconnaissance in force are the same as for zone reconnaissance. The control measures of reconnaissance in force are the same as for offensive tasks. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information.)

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

4-81. *Special reconnaissance* is characterized as reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance tasks support the collection of the joint TF commander’s PIRs. A special operations liaison may provide a responsive reporting capability in situations wherein the special operations TF commander has been requested to collect intelligence information that supports the intelligence requirements of a conventional force commander.

4-82. An SOF element conducting special reconnaissance supports the joint TF commander’s overall information collection efforts. The SOF element does not suspend or alter their collection efforts to support another collection plan unless the joint TF commander directs them to do so. SOF are equipped and possess
capabilities to conduct reconnaissance on denied and hostile areas normally inaccessible to other forces or assets. Special reconnaissance activities include—

- Environmental reconnaissance.
- Armed reconnaissance.
- Target and threat assessment.
- Post-strike reconnaissance.

4-83. Commanders establish mutual liaison capacity within both the brigade and SOF to understand collection task prioritization and to understand associated reporting requirements and mechanisms. Special reconnaissance may occur prior to conventional forces entering a designated area of operations. Commanders and staffs must understand when, where, and why special reconnaissance operations are being conducted to establish unity of purpose and provide any necessary additional forces. Detailed coordination is imperative between SOF and conventional elements in order to support the operational element appropriately. (Refer to ATP 3-18.4 for more information on special reconnaissance.)

4-84. Electromagnetic reconnaissance (ER) is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations (energy) (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic reconnaissance is an action used to support information collection and is an element of the tactical task reconnaissance. Information obtained through electromagnetic reconnaissance assists the commander with situational understanding and decision-making. (See FM 3-12 for more information on ER.)

SECTION III – RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER

4-85. A reconnaissance handover is the action that occurs between two elements to coordinate the transfer of information and responsibility for observation of potential threat contact, or the transfer of an assigned area from one element to another. A reconnaissance handover occurs between the BCT and other BCTs, SOF, foreign military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, or indigenous persons. A reconnaissance handover occurs between the BCT’s Cavalry squadron and battalion scouts, as well as maneuver battalions. Reconnaissance handovers could occur between manned and unmanned elements, like the ACS.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-86. Reconnaissance and security operations require the unit conducting the handover to coordinate with higher, lower, and adjacent units. Planning for these operations requires the reconnaissance handover coordination to start at the higher echelons and execute at the lowest element. A reconnaissance handover ensures information requirements are transferred between units to maintain initiative and tempo and to ease transitions. Well-planned and executed reconnaissance handovers ease transitions in plans, phases, and priorities of effort and mitigate information gaps between units.

4-87. Planning for a reconnaissance handover takes place as part of a change of mission before or during operations. When planning before an operation, commanders review the completed plan for layered, redundant reconnaissance and security, using all available capabilities and units. Commanders and staff direct control measures, such as a reconnaissance handover line between units or potential designated coordination, points to facilitate ground linkup, along with other graphic control measures that aid in command and control. A reconnaissance handover line is a designated phase line on the ground where reconnaissance responsibility transitions from one element to another.

4-88. A reconnaissance handover is typically associated with a trigger, a coordination point, or PLs designated as the reconnaissance handover line to ensure positive control and chain of custody from the initial force to the force assuming responsibility and control. A reconnaissance handover prevents gaps or seams from emerging that the enemy can exploit. Once handover is complete, the force transferring control either passes to the rear through the main body, assuming responsibility for the reconnaissance objective as a rearward passage of lines, or continues farther into the zone to continue their reconnaissance mission.
EXECUTION AND TASKS

4-89. A reconnaissance handover involves transferring physical, visual, electromagnetic, or digital observation in a number of combinations. Reconnaissance assets, such as ground sensors and UASs, may transfer responsibility during the reconnaissance handover. A reconnaissance handover is similar to a battle handover in that its conduct is in conjunction with other tasks, such as relief in place, linkup, and passage of lines (see figures 4-4, 4-5 [page 4-22], and 4-6 [page 4-23]).

4-90. Leaders and planners at all levels coordinate and execute reconnaissance handover tasks while considering the following:

- Redundant surveillance to assist in maintaining enemy contact.
- Location and criteria for a reconnaissance handover.
- Communications plan between handover elements.
- Exchanging operations and fires plans.
- Exchanging intelligence and information collection assets.
- Identifying and coordinating for target handover, as necessary.
- Contact points or linkup points.
- Collocating command posts.
- Transfer and acceptance of command between units.
- Rehearsals.
- Recognition signals.
Reconnaissance Operations

Figure 4-4. Reconnaissance handover

1. Cavalry troop identifies enemy forces within follow-on combined arms battalion area of operations.
2. Cavalry troop sends spot reports to squadron and calls for indirect fire on enemy positions. Scout platoons move into positions to refine enemy dispositions and confirm BDA.
3. Cavalry troop continues reconnaissance and cross talk with combined arms battalion scouts.

LEGEND
BDA BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT  D DESTROY  NAI NAMED AREA OF INTEREST
CP COMMAND POST
Figure 4-5. Reconnaissance handover between squadron and combat aviation brigade

4 Cavalry troop conducts reconnaissance handover with the battalion scouts and continues forward with reconnaissance. Squadron command post displaces.

5 Battalion scouts establish observation posts and maneuver to maintain contact with enemy elements.

LEGEND

D DESTROY  NAI NAMED AREA OF INTEREST  TAC TACTICAL COMMAND POST
4-91. Based on their forward proximity in the area of operations, reconnaissance forces may often be the first friendly units to encounter SOF units. (Refer to chapter 6 for more details.) Conventional reconnaissance forces may operate in conjunction with SOF. Depending on the command relationship, a reconnaissance handover may be required to conduct a relief in place with SOF, conduct joint operations with SOF, or in passing through SOF areas. Units use the same planning steps listed above when conducting an SOF reconnaissance handover.
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Security operations are operations to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their force. Security is inherent in all operations and is always the first priority of work. Commanders use continual reconnaissance and the development of information requirements to provide security. Commanders follow the five fundamentals of security during security operations to ensure early and accurate warning of enemy forces. Security operations provide reaction time and maneuver space to develop the situation and determine the most effective use of force to neutralize, defeat, or destroy enemy forces. There are four types of security operations: screen, guard, cover, and area security. Each security type provides varying levels of protection to the main body. The commander weighs operational and mission variables with the end state to select the appropriate security type.

SECTION I – SECURITY BASICS

5-1. Security is an essential part to all BCT operations. Maneuver units perform security missions as part of a larger security force or operate independently with task-organized attachments. The main difference between security operations and reconnaissance operations is that security operations orient on the protected force, area, or facility to be protected, while reconnaissance is enemy, infrastructure, terrain and weather effects, and society oriented. However, security operations cannot be divorced from reconnaissance missions as one of the fundamentals of security is to perform continuous reconnaissance.

5-2. Security operations prevent enemy reconnaissance assets from determining friendly locations, strengths, and weaknesses. Every tactical echelon requires a specially trained organization that can execute security missions to preserve freedom of action for the main body.

SECURITY

5-3. Security operations provide information about the enemy and terrain while preserving the combat power of friendly forces. Security operations provide information about the size, composition, location, and the enemy forces’ direction of movement. Information collected by the squadron gives the main body commander time to react and maneuver to prepare for future operations or to deploy to engage the enemy. Security prevents the enemy from surprising the main body, which allows the commander to preserve the combat power of maneuver forces and mass effects and combat power at the decisive point in time. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

5-4. Security along a common boundary with another friendly unit is the responsibility of the unit assigned to that zone or sector. Liaison with the protected force is critical during security operations. Constant communication and liaison ensures both the security force and the protected force remain informed of the full situation and maintains synchronized operations.
SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS

5-5. The fundamentals of security, similar to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, provide a framework for security operations. Reconnaissance operations, because they are continuous throughout all operations to develop the situation through information collection, are essential to successful security operations. The fundamentals of security are applicable to each type of security. The method in which each type of security achieves the fundamentals is different. This is important to understand when determining which type of security operation the security force should conduct. The following fundamentals guide security operations.

5-6. Provide early and accurate warning. The security force provides early warning by detecting the enemy force quickly and reporting information accurately to the main body commander. The security force operates at varying distances from the main body based on the mission variables of METT-TC (I). The earlier the security force detects the enemy and answers PIRs, the more time the main body has to assess the changing situation and react. Therefore, the security force should operate as far away from the protected force as the mission variables allow without opening seams or gaps that the enemy could exploit.

5-7. Provide reaction time and maneuver space. The security force operates at a distance from the main body and offers resistance to enemy forces to provide the main body with enough reaction time and maneuver space to respond effectively to likely enemy actions. The commander determines the amount of time and space required to respond effectively from information provided by the IPB process and the main body commander’s guidance regarding time the main body requires to react to enemy courses of action based on the mission variables of METT-TC (I). This includes providing time to the protected force to allow them to execute decision point to maximize firepower at their decisive point. The security force that operates farthest away from the main body and offers more resistance provides more time and space to the main body. The security force attempts to hinder the enemy’s advance by acting within its capabilities and mission constraints.

5-8. Orient on the protected force, area, or facility to be secured. The security force focuses all its actions on protecting and providing early warning to the secured force or facility. The security force operates between the main body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as the main body moves and orient on its movement. The security force commander must know the main body’s scheme of maneuver to keep the security force between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security force hinges on the protection it proves to the main body commander. This fundamental serves as a counterbalance to the expectations that are implicit in “provide early and accurate warning.”

5-9. Perform continuous reconnaissance. Implicit in this fundamental is that the squadrons need to prioritize answering brigade PIRs to facilitate decisions to allow the commander to achieve a position of relative advantage. Therefore, the security force aggressively and continuously seeks the enemy and reconnoiters key terrain. Terrain information focuses on the security force’s possible use by the enemy or the friendly force, either for offensive or defensive operations.

5-10. Maintain enemy contact. Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact unless the main force commander specifically directs them to do so. By using depth, recon management, and utilizing different methods of reconnaissance, the security force is able to maintain contact with one asset while allowing others to displace. The security force must continuously collect information on the enemy’s activities to assist the main body in determining potential and actual enemy courses of action and to prevent the enemy from surprising the main body. This requires the security force to maintain continuous visual contact, to be able to use direct and indirect fires, and to maneuver freely, which requires the security force to have depth in space and time. In specific circumstances, electronic contact could be sufficient to “maintain enemy contact.” However, if the enemy is in obstacle contact, and there are no assets able to observe that contact, then this fundamental has not been achieved.

5-11. The following vignette highlights a Cavalry squadron’s use of security fundamentals to protect a BCT’s flank during combat operations.
3-7 CAV Security Mission at Objective Lions 2003

U.S. military action in Iraq during March and April 2003 focused upon reaching the nation’s capital in Baghdad and eliminating the resistance of Saddam Hussein’s combat forces. By early April, the 3rd Infantry Division had reached the city’s outskirts from the south. Its subordinate BCT began to seize key objectives on the outskirts of the urban area. Baghdad International Airport, designated as OBJECTIVE LIONS, constituted one of these objectives. Its seizure would ensure a steady flow of supplies, easing a difficult logistical effort to support the division.

On 3 April, the 1st BCT commenced operations to seize the airport. The divisional Cavalry squadron, 3-7 Cavalry (known as CAV), moved to provide flank security against any threat from the north or west, centering its position on the intersection of Highways 1 and 10. Highways 1 and 10 were 2 of the main arteries feeding into Baghdad. The squadron established a screen that consisted of a series of checkpoints to interdict movement.

Initially, the squadron’s positions began to attract enemy attention, but activity dropped during the evening and nighttime hours. The early hours of 4 April, however, witnessed a steady increase in hostile combat operations. By 0435, 3-7 CAV positions had already destroyed several T-72 tanks and other armored vehicles. The Iraqis also sought to pass through the screen, using a combination of buses, pickup trucks, and an array of civilian vehicles to carry combatants through the squadron’s positions. These efforts constituted part of a larger Iraqi effort to prevent the capture of Baghdad International Airport. However, 3-7 CAV employed a mix of direct fire, close air support and artillery and all Iraqi efforts to reach the airport failed.

As the attacks finally diminished, the squadron received reports from observation posts of a battalion of Iraqi tanks 3 kilometers north of the screen. The squadron planned an attack while aircraft and artillery hammered the suspected target. Low visibility conditions hampered efforts to observe the effects of the bombardment. Therefore, Apache troop received instructions to move forward and conduct a damage assessment.

The troop’s lead platoon advanced cautiously in a staggered column. The platoon leader noted a berm and the possible location of enemy tanks. The platoon leader reported this information just before several gunners in the platoon began to engage hostile vehicles that were positioned behind the berm and spaced at intervals of 50 meters. The berm had protected the enemy platforms from significant damage from the air and artillery attacks.

The Cavalry troop quickly engaged the tanks, which received support from Iraqi mortars, artillery, and ADA. As the firefight escalated, the troop directed artillery upon the enemy positions and withdrew. Later, the troop was found to have destroyed much of an Iraqi Republican Guard battalion, including 16, T-72 tanks in an action lasting approximately 15 minutes. The Cavalry squadron’s flank security mission had succeeded, blocking all Iraqi attempts to interfere with the seizure of Baghdad International Airport.
Security Fundamentals

Provide early and accurate warning
The ability of Apache troop and the observation posts to directly observe Iraqi tanks north of the screen provided situational awareness to 3-7 CAV and ultimately 1st BCT, 3rd Infantry Division.

Provide reaction time and maneuver space
The ability of Apache troop and the observation posts to identify a battalion of Iraqi tanks north of the screen provided the squadron with ample time to plan an attack while aircraft and artillery engaged the suspected targets.

Orient on the force or facility to be secured
3-7 CAV protected the flank of 1st BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, ensuring that the seizure of Baghdad International Airport occurred without interference. The squadron did so by operating between the BCT and the threat of Iraqi intervention from the north.

Perform continuous reconnaissance
The combination of checkpoints and the forward movement of Apache troop ensured continuous monitoring of the surrounding area. It was through this troop’s actions that the Iraqi tank force was located and destroyed.

Maintain enemy contact
The checkpoints provided a means of monitoring the surrounding area and maintaining contact once the Iraqis sought to penetrate the screen. In most cases, the troop maintained contact through a mix of observation posts and direct fire engagements employed through the squadron’s combat power mix of tanks and Bradleys. Additionally, when aircraft identified a tank force north of the screen, the troop maintained contact through the application of air strikes and artillery, followed by the dispatch of Apache troop to ascertain the impact of this bombardment.

COMMANDER’S SECURITY GUIDANCE

5-12. The BCT commander’s guidance should consist of the security focus, duration, and engagement and disengagement criteria. In providing this guidance, the commander describes, shapes, and prioritizes the intended vision of the security effort supporting the overall scheme of maneuver and the specific roles of the Cavalry unit. As with the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, this guidance and the importance of accomplishing the mission must be understood at echelon. (Refer to chapter 3 of this manual for detailed information about the commander’s security guidance.)

SECTION II – COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

5-13. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information.) The purpose of counterreconnaissance is to destroy, defeat, or repel all enemy reconnaissance elements within capabilities and following engagement criteria. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all types of security operations. Counterreconnaissance denies the enemy commander the ability to conduct reconnaissance and develop their situational understanding. Successfully countering enemy reconnaissance is the first and possibly most important step to ensure the BCT can successfully execute its mission.

5-14. Counterreconnaissance is an inherent task in all security operations. Counterreconnaissance keeps enemy reconnaissance forces from observing the main body by defeating or blocking them. Units organize to defeat enemy reconnaissance forces without requiring reinforcement. Additionally, units consider enemy reconnaissance capabilities to determine if additional maneuver or sustainment assets are required.

5-15. The counterreconnaissance plan should address how to acquire and defeat enemy reconnaissance elements. The intelligence section provides key input into the planning process. The intelligence section identifies avenues of approach into the unit’s sector, which type of enemy reconnaissance elements the unit expects in the sector, and when they are most likely to move into the sector. The commander of the squadron or counterreconnaissance force uses this information to formulate the counterreconnaissance plan and to task
units to execute it. Often, the counterreconnaissance plan requires a unit to conduct a screen mission to acquire, identify, and defeat enemy reconnaissance forces.

5-16. The counterreconnaissance force must be task organized to accomplish its mission with the enemy. Whatever option the commander employs, the counterreconnaissance fight should be firmly controlled, monitored at the higher headquarters level, coordinated early, and thoroughly rehearsed. An effective counterreconnaissance fight suppresses the enemy reconnaissance effort, forcing the enemy to attack without information about the friendly force disposition.

SECTION III – SECURITY TYPES

5-17. Leaders categorize security operations in terms of the degree of security provided and the amount of combat power required. (Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information.) The four primary types of security operations are—

- Screen.
  - Stationary.
  - Moving (flank and rear).
- Guard.
  - Advance guard (stationary and moving).
  - Flank guard (stationary and moving).
  - Rear guard.
- Cover.
  - Offensive cover (advance and flank).
  - Defensive cover (front, flank, and rear).
- Area security.
  - Route security.
  - Convoy security.

5-18. The four types of security operations provide varying levels of protection to the protected force and are dependent upon the size of the unit conducting the security operation. Screen operations provide early warning to the main body. Guard operations prevent enemy observation and direct fire on the main body. Cover operations protect the main body from enemy observation and effective direct fire. Area security protects friendly installations, routes, units, and facilities within a prescribed area. All types of security operations provide protection and early warning to the protected force, which in turn, provides reaction time and maneuver space to the commander and preserves freedom of action. Commanders should consider the following when assigning a security mission and employing a security force:

- Force or area to secure.
- Location and orientation of the security area.
- Initial location and types of observation posts, if applicable.
- Time allocated to establish the security operation.
- Criteria for transitioning from the security operation to BCT decisive operations.
- Task organization and augmentation of security forces.
- Level of protection and minimum warning time requirements.
- Threat considerations, such as the smallest enemy element allowed passage without engagement or the threat’s capability to influence main body activities.
Chapter 5

Note. Local security is a priority of work and the responsibility of all units as a force protection measure. Local security is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADP 3-90). Local security involves avoiding detection or deceiving the enemy regarding friendly actions, positions, and intentions. Local security includes finding enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible. Units use active and passive measures to provide local security. Active patrolling and continuous reconnaissance are active measures that provide local security. Passive measures include using camouflage, movement control, noise and light discipline, proper communication procedures, ground sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights.

5-19. Security operations are extremely important when engaged in large-scale combat operations. The historic Arracourt vignette below demonstrates how incorporating security and applying security fundamentals in battle can lead to victory.

**Applying Security Fundamentals at Arracourt**

In September 1944, the 4th Armored Division constituted part of an operation intended to cross the Moselle River and isolate the city of Nancy. This operation concluded with elements of the 4th Armored Division playing a significant role in disrupting German rear area elements and reinforcements to Nancy. The division then transitioned into an exploitation mission, heading further east into Lorraine and creating more havoc for German efforts to mount a coherent defense.

The threat posed by the American armored division led the Germans to counterattack with elements drawn from the Fifth Panzer Army on 18 September. Part of their objective lay in destroying the scattered U.S. armored forces in and around the town of Arracourt. The German action triggered a series of fast moving and freewheeling engagements. These encounters placed the 4th Armored Division at a disadvantage. The Germans employed superior tanks, practiced infiltration tactics, and benefited from ground fog that protected them from allied aircraft. However, despite these advantages, the Germans suffered a significant defeat at Arracourt. They were generally out maneuvered and outfought by aggressive American, small unit tactics.

American armored teams employed basic security measures to offset the initial surprise of the German attack. C Company, 37th Tank Battalion, for example, employed outposts to provide early warning of enemy activity. One of these outposts reported the noise of an enemy column shortly before midnight on the 18th. The outpost dispatched a patrol to investigate. When it identified tank tracks, a second patrol followed the tracks and pinpointed the German tanks in a bivouac position. The patrol directed artillery fire onto the enemy tanks and adjusted onto a nearby crossroads through which the tanks had to move as they retired.

The following morning another C Company outpost reported contact with German forces. This outpost included a tank section and a smaller outpost further forward. The latter remained in contact with the tank section via a landline. The smaller outpost provided the tank section with early warning of approaching vehicles. Armed with this information, the American tank section quickly destroyed two of the German tanks as soon as they came into view.

In this instance, C Company demonstrated the fundamentals of security. Outposts provided early and accurate warning of approaching enemy armor. The outposts provided reaction time and maneuver space that permitted the tank section to maneuver and destroy two enemy tanks. Positioned between the enemy and the main body of C Company, the outposts were oriented on the force to be secured. In each case, the outposts were able to perform continuous reconnaissance by reporting and tracking hostile movements. In the first example, the outpost maintained enemy contact using foot patrols that were able to track the enemy armor column and direct indirect fire upon it.
5-20. Cavalry squadrons organize and equip to perform screen, guard, and area security operations. Cavalry squadrons participate in a cover operation as part of a larger element with external assets task organized to the squadron and perform guard operations with combined arms augmentation. Usually, commanders assign security operations (screen, guard, cover) at EAB to BCTs. Table 5-1 shows typical sizes of security forces at various echelons in relation to their operation.

### Table 5-1. Typical echelon of security forces for a given operation at echelon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Security Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Screen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion task force</td>
<td>Scout platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade combat team</td>
<td>Company team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Cavalry squadron, combined arms battalion, or battalion task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Combat aviation brigade (CAB), combined arms battalion, battalion task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelons above corps (joint force land components or numbered Army)</td>
<td>CAB, armored brigade combat team, Stryker brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCREEN**

5-21. **Screen** is a type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force (ADP 3-90). Screen operations provide less protection than guards or covers. Screen operations are defensive in nature. The screen force uses a series of observation posts and patrols to ensure observation of the assigned sector. The screen force gains and maintains enemy contact consistent with the security fundamentals. The screen force conducts counterreconnaissance to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units. The depth of the screen is critical to allow a reconnaissance handover from one element to another without displacement from established observation posts. Friendly forces use depth to conduct counterreconnaissance to delay, impede, and harass the enemy with indirect fires causing them to deploy early while preventing enemy forces from identifying, penetrating, and exploiting the screen.

5-22. Screen missions are appropriate when operations have created extended flanks; gaps exist between major subordinate maneuver units, or when required to provide early warning over gaps not considered critical enough to require security in greater strength. The BCT commander maximizes the security effort where contact is expected.

5-23. A unit may conduct a screen in all directions for a stationary, protected force within supporting range of indirect fire assets. Units perform a screen to the flanks or rear, but not in front of a moving force. Zone reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, and guard are missions given to units in front of a moving force.

**BCT Planning Considerations**

5-24. When planning the screen, the Cavalry squadron commander or maneuver battalion commander considers the number of routes required, the number of observation posts or patrols needed (depth, width,
duration, and orientation of the screen), the time needed to occupy the observation posts and to establish the screen, and the ability of indirect fire assets to range NAIs and TAIs to provide security to the protected force. Both BCT and squadron commanders and staffs consider conditions to facilitate reconnaissance handover or battle handover with the BCT. The commanders consider the time required to conduct the handover along with the time and distance needed for subordinate elements to maneuver to subsequent positions.

5-25. A rearward passage of lines is similar in concept to a forward passage of lines. A rearward passage of lines continues the defense or retrograde operation and maintains enemy contact while allowing for recovery of security or other forward forces. A unit may or may not conduct rearward passage of lines under enemy pressure. Usually, the stationary unit assumes control of the area of operations forward of the battle handover line (BHL) after two-thirds of the passing force’s combat elements move through the passage points. A battle handover line is a designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force and vice versa (ADP 3-90). Cavalry squadrons and security forces conduct extensive coordination enabling rearward passage of lines, especially while under fire. Passage of lines may occur during any reconnaissance or security operation. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

5-26. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units screen forward, to the flanks, or to the rear of a stationary main body and to the flanks or to the rear of a moving main body. The ACS is able to provide the maximum amount of reaction time and maneuver space when conducting screens, across either a wide frontage or operating in-depth with manned-unmanned teams at the ACT or squadron level. Aviation units conduct zone reconnaissance forward of a moving body. Aviation units conduct continuous reconnaissance to gain contact with the enemy force unless the supported commander directs otherwise.

5-27. Based on the BCT commander’s security guidance and intent, a screening aviation unit impedes and harasses the enemy with organic and supporting fires. Within its capabilities, the unit destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance elements without decisively engaging. Upon enemy contact, the aviation unit reports the enemy location, maintains contact with the enemy force, and uses its maneuverability and fires to develop the situation. The BCT provides priority of fires to the aviation unit so it does not have to rely on its own direct fire weapons and risk becoming decisively engaged. Aviation units do not bypass enemy forces without the permission or direction of the main body commander.

5-28. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units maneuver to the enemy’s flanks and rear to locate and exploit enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses and to conduct offensive engagements, such as hasty attack operations. However, commanders must weigh the benefit of aviation units conducting an offensive operation against the benefit of retaining aviation units in a reconnaissance and security role.

**GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS OF A SCREEN**

5-29. Screens, even for a stationary protected force, are active operations of which stationary, observation posts and surveillance assets are only a part of the overall mission. A screen requires employment of mounted and dismounted patrols, aerial reconnaissance, and observation posts positioned over extended distances in-depth. Inactivity in a stationary screen yields identifiable and exploitable gaps for the threat.

5-30. The BCT commander provides purpose and guidance to the Cavalry squadron commander. The BCT commander states why the screen is important to the BCT mission and how it fits into the scheme of maneuver of the BCT mission.

5-31. Depth provides the BCT commander with more time to react to approaching enemy ground units and allows for a reconnaissance handover from one element to another with minimal displacement. Depth prevents the threat from easily identifying and penetrating the screen, prevents gaps from occurring when observation posts displace, and facilitates the destruction of enemy reconnaissance elements without compromising critical observation posts. A unit employs depth by positioning observation posts and other information collection assets between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and the rear boundary of the security force.

5-32. The wider the area to secure, the less the security force can take advantage of increased depth, because it has fewer forces to position in-depth. Once the BCT determines the width and depth of the security area, the initial screen, and probable avenues of approach, the security force orients on the protected force, area, or facility.
5-33. Maneuver of the screen elements to subsequent positions is event-driven. The approach of an identified and specified threat element that answers PIRs, relief by a friendly unit, or movement of the protected force may dictate displacement. Collapsing the screen, executed by well-rehearsed drills performed at all levels, provides security, and maintains contact for the unit as it displaces. The BCT commander can place a time requirement on the duration of the screen if the intent is to provide a higher level of security to the BCT or to provide a tentative period for subordinate unit planning and follow-on missions.

SCREEN TASKS

5-34. Execution considerations guide screen planning. Execution considerations for a screen include the following and are conducted within capability:

- Maintain continuous observation of all avenues of approach that affect the main body’s mission.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy, defeat, or disrupt all enemy reconnaissance elements according to engagement criteria. Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen undetected and unreported.
- Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the enemy’s order of battle based upon the IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
- While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report threat activities.
- Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flank.
- Detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass through the screen, both ground and aerial, and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces, and report activity in the assigned area.

5-35. To enhance the effectiveness and depth of the screen, the squadron’s subordinate elements conduct reconnaissance handover or battle handover to pass contact from one element to another. In this way, the methods of reconnaissance management (cueing, mixing, and redundancy) and task organization maintain threat contact and protect the main effort following the commander’s intent.

STATIONARY SCREEN

5-36. A squadron executing a stationary screen mission (see figure 5-1, page 5-10) requires the following guidance:

- General trace of screen and time it should be established.
- Commander’s security guidance.
- Information collection plan.
- Width of the screened sector.
- Identity of screened force.
- Rear boundary of the screening force.
- Possible follow-on missions.

5-37. The tasks required of a screening unit are minimal compared to other security missions. Therefore, the screening force may have a wide frontage. Usually, units deploy abreast with troops established in-depth.

5-38. A PL placed along identifiable terrain graphically indicates the FLOT and can serve as an LOA. When screening forward of the BCT, this PL represents the forward line of the screening unit troops. A boundary depicts the rear limit of the screen. The screening force is responsible for the area between the screened force and the rear screen boundary. The boundary may serve as a BHL or a reconnaissance handover line. The screening force uses other PLs to control forward and backward displacements of subordinate units of the screening force and to aid in reporting and orientation. The screening force designates sectors to control lateral movement of subordinate units.
5-39. Given the higher commander’s guidance (security objective, focus, duration, and engagement criteria), commanders and staffs consider the following during planning:

- Location of the initial screen.
- Movement or maneuver to occupy the screen.
- Assigned area of operations for subordinate elements.
- Air and ground integration.
- Surveillance and acquisition assets.
- Fires.
- Protection.
- Command and control.
- Sustainment.
- Control of displacement to subsequent positions.
- Reconnaissance handover between screening elements.
INITIAL SCREEN

5-40. The BCT establishes the general location of the initial screen. To prevent fratricide, the squadron or screening unit adjusts closer to the protected force only with coordination. The initial screen often represents the FLOT. The initial screen is a restrictive control measure requiring coordination when units move beyond it to conduct aerial surveillance or ground reconnaissance. If operations forward of the screen are required, the commander establishes a PL to designate the security unit LOA. Key considerations include determining fields of fire and observation, requirements to observe specific NAIs or TAIs, and the range of supporting indirect fire assets.

5-41. With permission from the BCT, the squadron or screening unit can adjust the initial screen to meet these considerations. Time available and the threat situation determine the method of occupying the screen.

AREAS OF OPERATION FOR SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

5-42. The squadron or screening unit commander designates areas of operations for subordinate elements to include responsibility for NAIs and TAIs. The commander positions attack and reconnaissance aviation, UAS or ground-based sensors, and SIGINT systems to provide additional depth. Reduced depth is the trade-off when screening extended frontages. The commander may assign specific terrain to attack and reconnaissance aviation units and UASs, which should not be along critical high-speed avenues of approach. The commander’s plans include reconnaissance management (cueing, mixing, and redundancy) to maximize coverage and effectiveness. Commanders specify how to adjust ground observation posts or positions to compensate for the absence of visual observation with aerial assets, such as in adverse weather.

5-43. Attack and reconnaissance aviation and UASs, or attached, manned aviation assets may conduct reconnaissance forward, to the rear, or on the flanks of ground elements to add depth and extend the capabilities of the ground screen. Aerial assets patrol along exposed flanks or in gaps between ground observation posts, augment the surveillance of NAIs, and add redundancy and depth within the sector. Aerial reconnaissance units extend a ground screen or provide an independent screen to protect ground forces. Aviation assets provide continuous observation of threat elements allowing ground forces to displace to subsequent positions.

5-44. Using its own or the BCT’s organic surveillance and acquisition assets, such as UASs and ground sensors, the screening unit develops a plan to provide early warning on the probable avenues of approach. Nonorganic, higher assets, such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems, provide earlier acquisition information to cue unit assets.

Note. Most probable avenues of approach are not necessarily the high-speed avenues of approach. The factors of METT-TC (I) influence the most probable avenues of approach.

5-45. BCT assets aid the squadron or screening unit when it is collapsing the screen and is most vulnerable, and they assist with regaining contact with the threat when contact is lost. If the squadron screens extended frontages, these assets can operate in an economy of force role by conducting periodic surveillance on less probable areas the threat may use and by maximizing ground combat power along probable avenues of approach.

5-46. Fires planning include the integration of direct and indirect fires, attack aviation, and close air support. The commander’s intent drives the screen’s purpose, which is to report, disrupt, delay, or destroy specific elements of the threat’s formations. The staff plans targets at chokepoints along probable avenues of approach in areas where the threat movement may be restricted or severely restricted, such as those areas with natural or manufactured obstacles. Commanders designate engagement areas to focus fires along likely threat avenues of approach where the fires have the greatest likelihood of achieving the desired effects. The higher headquarters must clearly identify the command and support relationship of supporting artillery available to the screening force. Annex D of the OPORD articulates the fire support tasks and communication means (including voice and digital), additional fire support coordination measures, and planned position areas for artillery.

5-47. Engineers provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability capabilities for specific tasks, such as improvement of roads and trails for mobility, emplacement of obstacles, and observation post survivability. Reserve obstacles are planned and prepared but are not executed until time or event criteria are met.
Generally, engineers use rapidly emplaced obstacle systems, which meet the commander’s intent during screening operations. Situational obstacles disrupt and delay the threat, in conjunction with fires, to protect elements of the screening unit and main body.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SUSTAINMENT**

5-48. Commanders position themselves and their command posts to support command and control forces over extended distances and to maintain communications and digital linkages with higher headquarters and subordinate elements. Initial and subsequent locations of the command posts integrate into the BCT communications plan to ensure continuous digital connectivity. BCT and squadron commanders place themselves in positions that maximize their ability to command their units and gain situational awareness.

5-49. Prepare sustainment assets for operations in both time and space. Units screening forward or to the flanks of the BCT may require support from the closest battalion. Priorities and sources of support are determined early in the planning process to allow the supporting sustainment unit time to conduct planning, coordinate with adjacent units, and position assets to provide sustainment to the screening units.

5-50. The screen’s scheme of maneuver, engagement, and disengagement criteria nested within the BCT plan defines the conditions or time criteria triggering transition. PLs and checkpoints control transition. Transition of a screening unit is a decision point that marks a shift from security operations to offensive or defensive operations.

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**Note.** As stated earlier in chapter 4, the BCT or squadron commander may establish additional routes as a control measure to conduct transitions while maintaining freedom of maneuver and controlling maneuver forces without slowing or congestion of one single route (see paragraph 4-70, page 4-16).

**MOVING SCREEN (FLANK AND REAR)**

5-51. A squadron or screening unit executes a moving screen by implementing movement techniques. The screen movement relies upon time and distance factors associated with the BCT’s movement. Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the front of the BCT’s lead combat element, and ends at the rear of the protected force excluding front and rear security forces. The screening unit, typically the Cavalry squadron, may conduct moving flank screens or screen the rear of the BCT.

5-52. As with a stationary screen, PLs, checkpoints, contact points, and lateral boundaries aid to orient and control the screening unit’s movement. The LD, which is the same for the protected force, initiates the screen mission and becomes the rear boundary of the moving screen.

5-53. The planning considerations discussed earlier for stationary screens apply to a moving screen. However, emphasis may shift because the BCT is moving. As the BCT force moves, the screening unit occupies a series of successive screens, regulating movement to maintain the time and distance factors the main body commander desires. As with the stationary screen, integrating attack and reconnaissance aviation units and UASs into the screen affords increased flexibility, fires platforms, and sensors to the mission.

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**Note.** Cavalry units do not conduct a moving screen to the front of a stationary force or a stationary screen in front of a moving force. They could conduct an advance guard, reconnaissance in force, or zone reconnaissance to the front of a moving force.

**GUARD**

5-54. *Guard* is a type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). Units conducting a guard cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional support assets of the main body. A commander assigns a guard operation when the BCT expects contact or has an exposed flank that requires greater protection than a screen can provide. The guard force conducts reconnaissance, attacks, defends, delays, and screens as needed to provide reaction time and maneuver space.
to the protected force. A commander may assign a guard operation to protect a stationary or moving force. There are
three types of guard operations—

- Advance guard.
- Flank guard.
- Rear guard.

5-55. A Cavalry squadron, maneuver battalion, or BCT performs guard operations. A guard force operates
within the range of the main body’s indirect fire weapons. A guard force accomplishes all the tasks of a
screen, but then deploys over a narrower front to permit the concentration of combat power. Squadron-sized
elements or higher generally conduct guard operations due to the protection and assets required. A BCT
conducts guard for the division and corps.

5-56. Staffs consider augmenting the guard force based on the anticipated threat and tasks for the guard force.
Dependent on the BCT type, the guard force has different combat power capabilities than the parent force it
protects. Additionally, BCT commanders consider and plan for the integration of assets and enablers across
all warfighting functions.

5-57. The guard force differs from a screen in that the guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat,
cause to withdraw, or fix lead threat elements before they can engage the protected force and forces the
enemy main body to deploy early. A guard force is appropriate when contact is expected, there is an exposed
flank or a threat to the rear, the protected force is conducting a retrograde operation, or there is a requirement
for greater protection than a screen provides.

5-58. Attack and reconnaissance aviation units supporting a guard operation accomplish all the tasks of a
screen, zone reconnaissance, and hasty attack mission. Units place emphasis on the early development of the
situation along the main body’s axis of advance. Early contact with the enemy may cause enemy forces to
deploy prematurely providing opportunity to the main body to counterattack a vulnerable enemy force. Aerial
assets support the guard force by screening between and in front of battle positions as they are established.
Aviation reconnoiters the area between the guard or cover force and the main body, assists in maintaining
contact between the security force and the main body, and protects the flank guard force to allow it to
concentrate on its security or battle position tasks. When supporting a moving force, aviation units
reconnoiter along the flanks of advancing ground units by conducting any type of reconnaissance to
successive screen areas, observation posts, or battle positions.

GUARD TASKS

5-59. BCTs, maneuver battalions, and squadrons conduct the following guard tasks within capability:

- Detect and report all enemy elements attempting to pass through the guard, both ground and aerial
  and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements according
to engagement criteria.
- Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
- Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces missions.
- Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the
  enemy’s order of battle based upon the IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
- While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report
  threat activities.
- While displacing, impede and harass the enemy to provide the protected force commander with
  additional time and maneuver space.
- Cause the enemy main body to deploy prematurely.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the assigned area.
- Deny ground observation, and prevent direct fire contact on the protected forces.
- Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body.
5-60. Following are additional tasks if encounter turns into a meeting engagement:

- Destroy enemy reconnaissance and lead elements of the main body.
- Determine the location of enemy assailable flanks.
- Fix enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around the enemy strengths or through weaknesses.

5-61. Staffs consider whether subordinate units conducting a guard operation require augmentation to execute their mission. Additionally, squadron commanders and staffs analyze requirements and notify the BCT commander of those tasks they cannot accomplish. The protected force commander then task organizes more augmentation or provides guidance on the prioritization of tasks.

**BCT Planning and Execution Considerations**

5-62. BCT commanders, or higher echelon commanders in the case of a TF or reconnaissance and security BCT conducting a guard, may augment the guard force with internal and external assets. Attack and reconnaissance aviation assists the guard force by gaining contact with enemy forces and reporting the enemy’s composition, disposition, and strength. Aerial assets can maneuver and assist in destroying enemy ground forces over large areas to weaker sections to maintain the guard. Aerial assets can be a quick reaction force to destroy enemy ground forces and reinforcements through Army attack aviation that canalize the enemy towards areas that the guard force fires plan supports. Indirect fire considerations are the same as in a screen, though the guarding unit may have more indirect fire assets at their disposal. BCT engineers conduct countermobility and survivability tasks to assist the guard force.

**Advance Guard (Stationary and Moving)**

5-63. An advance guard for a stationary BCT deploys forward and defends the main body. Once the unit makes contact, they continue to defend or delay within the area of operations consistent with the BCT commander’s intent.

5-64. An advance guard for a moving force is offensive in nature, finding and defeating enemy units along the axis of advance. Units conducting an advance guard provide for the uninterrupted movement of the protected force. The advance guard engages in offensive tasks and movement to contact as needed to accomplish the mission. If the advance guard encounters enemy forces beyond its capability, the advance guard transitions to a defense to protect the BCT, continues reconnaissance to develop the situation, and prepares to pass elements of the main body forward. If the BCT is advancing as part of a division advance along widely separated axes, the advance guard moves with the main effort based on the factors of METT-TC (I). The supporting effort provides its own security (see figure 5-2).
Figure 5-2. ABCT advance guard mission

Organization of Forces

5-65. An advance guard performs continuous reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance, maintains continuous observation of enemy avenues of approach (when stationary), and destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance and security forces. An advance guard defeats, disrupts, or fixes enemy ground forces before they can engage the main body with direct fires. In coordination with the protected force commander, the advance guard commander clarifies the interval between the advance guard and the main body. The advance guard maintains the interval from the protected force and leads the main body within the protected force commander’s intent. The advance guard guides the main body through gaps in the enemy force to take advantage of opportunities.

Integration of Enablers

5-66. In planning and conducting an advance guard, the BCT commander and staff considers the factors of METT-TC (I). BCT and squadron staffs conduct collaborative and individual planning considering the missions and the area of operations assigned to subordinate units. The staff plans fires to support the maneuver plan and integrates aerial assets to enhance the capability of the advance guard to find, fix, and defeat enemy reconnaissance assets. The staff must integrate engineer assets to provide mobility, countermobility, and survivability support. Staffs deliberately plan for the positioning of command and
control nodes to support advance guard operations and the positioning of support and sustainment assets to allow seamless logistical support to maintain the momentum of the advance guard.

5-67. Additionally, the BCT commander identifies a unit to serve as a reserve for the advance guard. A reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). By allocating forces to field a reserve, the commander preserves the freedom to exploit opportunity or reinforce friendly elements as required. For a BCT conducting a guard, the reserve is a maneuver company from one of the maneuver battalions. If the Cavalry squadron is performing a guard, BCTs consider providing a maneuver company from a maneuver battalion to serve as the squadron reserve so the squadron does not place a reconnaissance asset in a reserve role.

**FLANK GUARD**

5-68. A flank guard protects an exposed flank of the main body. In performing this operation, the flank guard operates beyond the assigned zone or sector of the protected force. The flank guard’s responsibility begins at the trail element of the advance guard or at the lead combat element of the main body. The flank guard ends at the rear of the protected force or lead element of the rear guard. The higher commander tasking the flank guard specifies the boundary. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

**Stationary Flank Guard**

5-69. A flank guard for a stationary force performs zone or area reconnaissance when establishing the initial security line positions allowing the flank guard to become familiar with the terrain they will defend. Upon reaching their initial positions, the flank guard establishes a defense and goes through the steps of engagement area development. Once the flank guard makes contact, they continue to defend or delay when necessary, according to the commander’s intent. As with the advance guard, the commander must allocate forces to serve as a reserve (see figure 5-3).
Figure 5-3. IBCT Cavalry squadron stationary flank guard

Moving Flank Guard

5-70. Units must consider many factors for the organization security force of a moving flank guard, which is similar to organizing an advance guard. The BCT establishes conditions for reconnaissance and security operations by enabling the security force with aviation support, joint and organic fires, and additional intelligence collection. This may include partnering with and access to joint and national-level intelligence assets (see paragraph 3-91, page 3-20). The security force commander designates roles to each subordinate unit, in coordination with the protected force commander. For example, if a Cavalry squadron is tasked to provide a moving flank guard for a BCT, the security force commander is the squadron commander and the protected force commander is the BCT commander. The moving flank guard maintains a large enough interval from the protected force and protects the main body within the protected force commander’s intent.

5-71. As part of the planning and execution phase, the security force commander decides on one of the two methods of execution. These methods are based on how the main body crosses the LD. The security force should not make its own penetration of the line of contact when facing prepared enemy defenses. To do so may prevent or significantly delay the security force in the assumption of the flank guard.

5-72. In the first method, the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body and deploys to perform the mission. This method keeps the two forces from interfering with one another and is faster. This method is appropriate when another force has penetrated the line of contact or the main body is not in contact with the enemy.
5-73. In the second method, the security force crosses the LD with the main body and then deploys out into the zone. This method is appropriate when the division makes its own penetration of the enemy defenses along the line of contact. The security force may follow the lead battalion TF of the protected force through the gap and deploy when the situation permits. Alternatively, the security force follows the combat elements of the lead brigade. This method is slower but provides security for the security force before it begins their flank guard mission.

5-74. The security force regulates movement along the route of advance by the pace of the protected force, distance to the objective, and the enemy situation. There are three methods of movement that the security force may use:

- Successive bounds.
- Alternate bounds.
- Continuous marching.

5-75. Table 5-2 summarizes these methods. If the protected force stops, the security force occupies blocking positions. As the speed of the main body changes, the security force changes movement methods. The security force commander must not allow the security force to fall behind the main body or present a lucrative target by remaining stationary along the route.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Successive Bounds | • Enemy contact likely  
• Main body slow  
• Bound by troops in succession or simultaneously | Most secure                                     | Slowest                                           |
| Alternate Bounds  | • Enemy contact likely  
• Main body slow  
• Troops bound from rear to front | More secure than continuous marching, faster than successive bounds | Slower than continuous marching, less secure than successive bounds |
| Continuous Marching | • Enemy contact not likely  
• Main body fast  
• Troops remain in march column on route, air screen on flank | Fastest                                          | Least secure                                      |

5-76. The moving flank guard is an incredibly complex operation requiring detailed planning. A moving flank guard has many of the same considerations as the moving flank screen; however, while conducting a moving flank guard, the unit occupies a series of battle positions along the axis of advance. The security unit also occupies a series of observation posts forward of the battle positions and those observation posts are either designated by the security force commander or delegated to subordinate commanders. The tasks for the moving flank guard include maintaining continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach, reconnoitering the zone between the main body and the flank guard’s position, maintaining contact with the lead combat elements of the main body, defeating enemy reconnaissance forces, and defeating, disrupting, or fixing enemy ground forces before they can engage the main body with direct fire.

5-77. The lead element of the security force performs a critical three-fold mission. They must maintain contact with the protected force, reconnoiter the zone between the main body and the security force route of advance, and reconnoiter the security force route. The lead element performs zone reconnaissance to accomplish these three tasks. The speed of the protected force determines how thoroughly to perform reconnaissance. Planners must consider METT-TC (I) during the planning phase to identify their formations’ lead unit capabilities to determine if augmentation is required. When the zone exceeds the organic capability of the lead element (typically 10 kilometers for an armored Cavalry troop in open terrain), units augment the lead element with additional forces to ensure the lead element maintains contact with the protected force, does not become over tasked, and can match the tempo of the protected force. During planning, the staff
conducts course of action analysis to determine whether the task assigned to the lead element exceeds the capabilities of the unit. The lead element does not reconnoiter the battle positions or occupy them unless required when contact is made; follow-on elements reconnoiter their assigned battle positions before occupation.

**Note.** If available, air Cavalry forces are well suited to maintain contact with the main body and to perform reconnaissance forward of the security force lead troop if available. However, there is inherent risk involved when ground forces rely on aviation assets to maintain communications with the main body on their behalf.

5-78. The remainder of the security force maneuvers along the route of advance and occupies battle positions as necessary. Criteria for the route are the same as in a moving flank screen. Troop or company-sized battle positions are designated parallel to the axis of the main body, outside the route of advance, and along avenues of approach into the security force. Follow-on elements reconnoiter assigned battle positions before occupation. Scouts occupy observations posts along a screen line forward of the battle positions.

5-79. Since the squadron is moving in one direction and orienting in another, the security force commander plans control measures that facilitate this dual orientation. The commander may assign an objective for orientation or to secure the flank of the main body objective. One set of control measures control the security effort, and another set of control measures control movement in parallel to the protected force (see figure 5-4).

![Figure 5-4. Moving flank guard mission](image-url)
5-80. The security force’s combat trains move with the flank guard force. The field trains move with the BSB or the nearest brigade.

5-81. If the security force anticipates being overextended, the commander informs the main body commander and recommends one of the following courses of action:

- Reinforce the flank guard.
- Reduce the area of operations.
- Screen a portion of the area and guard the rest.

5-82. Figures 5-5 and 5-6, figure 5-7, page 5-22, and figure 5-8, page 5-23 demonstrate a moving flank guard operation. The scenario highlights the tasks, actions, and considerations in regard to a moving flank guard operation.

### Moving Flank Guard Scenario

The 4th Infantry Division, which consists of a division headquarters, two SBCTs, one ABCT, a combat aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade, and a division artillery are conducting an attack against a defending enemy brigade. The 3rd ABCT (3/4 Infantry Division) is the division decisive effort with the task to seize OBJECTIVE KING. The ABCT commander tasks the organic Cavalry squadron (4-10 CAV) to conduct a moving flank guard along PL NEW YORK (LOA) between PL COWBOYS (LD) and PL STEELERS (LOA) to enable freedom of maneuver of the 3/4 Infantry Division main body.

The 4-10 CAV augments with the following additional forces to support the moving flank guard mission: an armor company, an air attack and reconnaissance troop, an artillery battery, an air defense platoon, a CBRN reconnaissance platoon, and a TUAS platoon. Figure 5-5 depicts the task organization.

![Figure 5-5. 4-10 Cavalry task organization](image)
Upon receiving the mission from brigade, the squadron planners begin collaborative and parallel planning with the BCT staff and augments liaison officers. Based on the threat, the squadron works to mask its forces, minimize the electromagnetic signature, and ensure proper coverage of counter-UAS systems. The squadron prepares to react to all forms of contact with the enemy, but primarily focuses on direct fire, aerial, and electromagnetic contact. The squadron commander task organizes the three reconnaissance troops with one tank platoon each from D/4-10 CAV and one Avenger section from 1/C/5-5 ADA. To execute the moving flank guard, the squadron commander directs the squadron to move separately from the main body and execute successive bounds as they move along their route of advance.

Alpha Troop, 4-10 CAV is the lead troop to cross the LD and has the three-fold mission, which is to maintain contact with the main body, to reconnoiter the zone between the main body and the squadrons’ route of advance, and to reconnoiter the squadron’s route. Alpha Troop conducts zone reconnaissance accomplishing the three tasks for the squadron as seen in figure 5-6.

![Figure 5-6. Moving flank guard, simultaneous deployment into zone](image)

Bravo Troop, Charlie Troop, and Charlie Company 1-68 Armor move into their designated area of operations across the eastern flank of the main body. Simultaneously, the squadron main command post, along with the artillery battery, move to their predetermined locations. Alpha troop continues to bound and clear throughout the zone moving north to tie in the screen, oriented east. The artillery battery has preplanned and designated rectangular position areas throughout the squadron’s area of operations to cover all engagement areas.
Bravo and Charlie Troops move into their assigned boundaries and maneuver to PL NEW YORK, which is the LOA. The troops identify and establish battle positions oriented toward the anticipated direction from which the enemy will attack. They have continuous observation to the east between the ground observation posts, TUAS, and the attack reconnaissance troop allowing the troops to conduct engagement area development. The artillery battery and Charlie Company 1-68 Armor have moved north and are prepared to defend if the enemy attacks from the east. Troops are arrayed in defensive positions between PL KENTUCKY and PL NEW YORK (LOA) using the TUAS and attack reconnaissance troop to screen east to observe NAIs 101, 102, and 103 (see figure 5-7).

Figure 5-7. Squadron guard operation on phase line New York
The squadron has established their moving flank guard. The troops maneuver their elements to protect the main body from direct fire. The squadron uses preplanned positions to maintain observation of designated NAIs. The TUAS platoon moving from east to west through NAI 103 observes an enemy reconnaissance unit. The squadron made the decision to use fires, air, and armor to defeat the enemy reconnaissance force as they move into engagement area two as seen in figure 5-8.
Bravo Troop conducts a fire mission with A/3-29 Field Artillery. Upon completion of the fire mission, Bravo Troop coordinates with Charlie Company to move two tank platoons into battle position 1 and battle position 2. Bravo Troop conducts a linkup and a battle handover with Charlie Company using a rearward passage of lines. Once the last vehicle moves through the passage point, Bravo Troop moves their forces north and conducts an alternating bound to take over the northern most area of operations. This allows them to destroy the enemy force while allowing the moving flank guard’s tempo to continue uninterrupted. If a larger force were observed, then the squadron commander would have to relay to the brigade commander to address the composition and disposition of the enemy force moving towards the flank of the squadron, brigade, and division.

Once the brigade secures OBJECTIVE KING, the squadron transitions to a screen operation and begins consolidation and reorganization tasks. The division adjusts the task organization in preparation for follow-on operations and the attachments no longer under the squadron’s control are escorted to their next location. The squadron uses the time to conduct sustainment operations.

**REAR GUARD**

5-83. A rear guard protects the exposed rear of the main body. Rear guards are appropriate when conducting offensive tasks, when the protected force breaks contact with flanking forces, or during a retrograde. The rear guard deploys and defends for moving and stationary main bodies. The tasks described for a stationary flank guard apply. The rear guard for a moving force displaces to successive battle positions along PLs in-depth as the main body moves. The nature of enemy contact determines the scheme of maneuver for displacement. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.) The commander establishes the rear guard during retrograde operations in two ways:
- The guarding force relieves other units in place as they move to the rear.
- The guarding force establishes a position in-depth behind the main body and passes those forces through.

**MOVEMENTS INTO SECURITY AREAS FOR STATIONARY SECURITY MISSIONS**

5-84. The security force establishes stationary security mission in a similar manner. In deploying into the security area, the security force must address competing requirements; to establish the security area quickly to meet mission requirements, and to provide the necessary level of security for itself. The security force moves into the security area using one of the following three methods listed below:

- Tactical road march.
- Movement to contact.
- Zone reconnaissance.

**Tactical Road March Method**

5-85. The fastest but least secure method of deploying is a tactical road march from the rear boundary of the security area to the initial positions. The security forces move to a release point on the rear boundary. From the release point, subordinate elements deploy to occupy initial positions, moving by the quickest means possible. This method is appropriate when the security force commander does not expect enemy contact, time is critical, or previous zone reconnaissance of the security area conducted by aviation units found no enemy in the security area.

**Movement to Contact Method**

5-86. In the second method, the security force conducts a movement to contact from an LD (usually the rear boundary of the security area) to the initial positions. This method is slower than a tactical road march but more secure. It is appropriate when enemy contact is likely, time is limited, the situation does not require detailed reconnaissance of the terrain, or aviation elements or other assets conducting zone reconnaissance forward of the ground element detect enemy forces in the security area.

**Zone Reconnaissance Method**

5-87. The most secure method for moving into the initial positions is for the security force to conduct zone reconnaissance from the security area’s rear boundary to its initial security line positions or the forward limit of the security area. Given adequate time, this method is preferred because it allows the security force to clear the security area and become familiar with the terrain that it may have to defend. The security force reconnosiers potential subsequent positions and fire support system firing positions as it moves to its initial positions. A zone reconnaissance is appropriate when time is available and information about enemy forces or terrain is unknown. While this technique provides information of tactical value on the enemy forces and terrain in the area, it also consumes time. Using air reconnaissance forward of the ground units increases the speed and security of the movement.

**MOVEMENT DURING MOVING FLANK SECURITY MISSIONS**

5-88. There are three techniques of occupying and moving in a flank security area for moving security missions. These techniques are based on how the security force crosses the LD—

- Separately from the main body and deploys to perform the mission.
- Separately from the main body, lead elements conduct a movement to contact.
- With the main body and conducts zone reconnaissance out to the limit of the security area.

5-89. Commanders should not require the security force to make its own penetration when it faces prepared enemy defenses. This may prevent or significantly delay the security force from assuming its duties. They often combine the three techniques described in paragraphs 5-90 through 5-92 (pages 5-24 through 5-27).

**Security Force Crosses LD Separately from the Main Body and Deploys to Perform Mission**

5-90. In this first technique, the security forces cross the LD separately from the main body and deploy to perform the mission, as seen in figure 5-9 and figure 5-10 (page 5-26). The security force then conducts a
tactical road march, an approach march, or tactical movements parallel to the main body and drops off observation posts or occupies battle positions along the flank of the main body. This technique keeps the two forces from interfering with each other during deployment. When another force penetrates the line of contact, and the main body is not in contact with the enemy and is moving quickly, it is appropriate that the LD is uncontested. The IPB process indicates that enemy contact is not likely in the area through which the security force is moving. It is the fastest but least secure technique.

Figure 5-9. Security force crossing the LD separately to establish a flank screen
Security Force Crosses LD Separately from the Main Body and Deploys to Perform Mission

5-91. In this technique, the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body, and its lead elements conduct a movement to contact, as seen in figure 5-11. Follow-on elements occupy positions as they reach them. This technique is appropriate when the main body is moving slower than in the first method (separately from the main body and deploys to perform the mission), the LD is uncontested, and the IPB process estimates possible enemy contact. This technique is slower than the previous technique (separately from the main body and deploys to perform the mission) but provides better security.
Security Force Crosses LD with the Main Body and Conducts Zone Reconnaissance out to the Limit of the Security Area

5-92. The final technique is when the security force crosses the LD with the main body and conducts zone reconnaissance out to the far limit of the security area, as seen in figure 5-12, page 5-28. This technique is appropriate when the LD is also the line of contact, the main body makes its own penetration of the enemy defenses along the line of contact, the main body is moving slowly, and leaders do not clearly understand the enemy situation. The security force may follow the lead element of the main body through the gap and deploy when the situation permits. This technique provides increased security for both the security force and the main body; it is also the most time-consuming technique.
5-93. A cover is a type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90). Commanders use the cover task offensively and defensively. A cover is a brigade-level, force-oriented mission that protects the division or corps main body from detection or engagement by enemy forces attempting to delay or disrupt friendly operations. A covering force may be offensive or defensive in nature. The nature of the cover mission reflects the type of operation conducted by the division or corps. All covering force operations are aggressively executed making maximum use of offensive opportunities. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. (Refer to FM 3-90-2 for more information.)

5-94. A covering force is an independently operating, self-contained force conducting the cover mission. The covering force operates away from the main body to develop the situation, prevent enemy ground observation, and protect the main body from direct and indirect fires. METT-TC (I) factors determine the distance from the main body. To protect the main body from effective ground observation and direct fires, the BCT may execute operations as far as 50 to 60 kilometers from the main body. The covering force denies the enemy information by conducting counterreconnaissance to destroy enemy reconnaissance and enemy forces within the security zone. A covering force develops the situation earlier than a guard force, fights longer and more frequently, and defeats larger enemy forces than a guard force. Furthermore, a covering force reconnoiters, screens, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary. The covering force does not allow enemy forces to bypass and affect the main body.
5-95. Division or corps headquarters determine the requirements for a covering force built around a brigade. Maneuver, enabling, and sustainment assets reinforce the covering force so it can accomplish its mission. Reinforcements increase the distance and time the covering force can operate away from the main body and enhances the covering force’s ability to fight. Reinforcements typically revert to their parent organizations upon the passage of the covering force (see table 5-3).

Table 5-3. Typical command and support relationships for cover operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTACHMENT</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>PARENT ORGANIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Task Force</td>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Squadron</td>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Cavalry Squadron/Attack Battalion</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
<td>Division/Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>Attached or Direct Support</td>
<td>Division/Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalion</td>
<td>Attached or Direct Support</td>
<td>Division/Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>Attached or Direct Support</td>
<td>Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Sustainment Units</td>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Division/Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-96. A covering force may be offensive or defensive in nature, but a covering force executes all covering force operations aggressively to maximize offensive opportunities. The covering force executes its mission as it would in zone reconnaissance or reconnaissance in force in that it is force-oriented.

**OFFENSIVE COVER**

5-97. An offensive covering force seizes the initiative early, allowing the main body commander freedom of maneuver. While conducting offensive tasks, a covering force may operate to the front or flanks of the main body. Offensive covering forces conduct reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance. They deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body, destroy, disrupt, or fix enemy forces and reconnaissance assets in the security zone forces, develop the situation to determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, and disposition, and exploit opportunities until main body forces are committed. Advance cover and flank cover are two types of offensive covers.

5-98. The following are a list of offensive tasks Cavalry units could conduct within capability during offensive cover missions:

- Destroy, disrupt, or fix enemy forces and reconnaissance assets in the disruption zone.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements. Must prevent ground observation and direct fire against the main body.
- Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
- Gain and maintain contact with enemy forces, and report activity in the assigned area.
- Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces’ mission.
- Locate and identify enemy forces in the battle zone, and conduct handover to follow-on forces.
- Cause the enemy to commit resources to counter the cover force that would have been used against the main body.
- Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body.
- Determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, and disposition, and exploit opportunities until main body forces are committed.
- Clear or bypass enemy forces in the assigned area according to engagement criteria.
- Conduct reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance.
- Penetrate the enemy’s disruption zone to locate enemy main defensive positions.
- Locate gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive scheme.
- Defeat or repel enemy forces as directed by the higher commander.
5-99. If encounter turns into a meeting engagement—

- Destroy enemy reconnaissance and lead elements of the main body.
- Determine the location of enemy assailable flanks.
- Fix enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy strengths or through enemy weaknesses.

### Advance Covering Force

5-100. An advance covering force is an offensive cover operation. An advance covering force is task organized to locate and penetrate the security zone and forward defenses of an enemy force deployed to defend and to destroy enemy reconnaissance, advance guard units, and first-echelon units of a moving enemy force.

### BCT Planning and Execution Considerations for Offensive Cover Missions

5-101. The BCT advances on a broad front and conducts operations similar to that for zone reconnaissance or movement to contact. Staffs determine the width of the zone to cover during mission analysis and IPB. Typically, aviation assets task organized to the covering force reconnoiter forward of the advancing ground elements. Upon enemy contact, air assets engage and destroy enemy forces according to the covering force commander’s intent. They report the enemy’s location, composition, and disposition to the ground forces while maintaining contact with the enemy. Aviation assets conduct target handover to ground forces when required. Ground forces from the covering force attack to defeat enemy forces. The covering force must have approval of the main body commander to bypass enemy forces.

5-102. If the covering force finds a gap in enemy defenses, they prepare to penetrate the integrity of the defense. The covering force immediately reports to the main body to divert follow-on forces. Covering forces prepare to defeat enemy counterattack during penetrations due to the opportunities hasty attacks provide to the defender.

5-103. When the BCT covering force can advance no further, they transition to a defense and prepare to execute a forward passage of lines of the main body. The covering force continues to perform reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps or vulnerable flanks. The covering force conducts target and reconnaissance handovers to guide the main body as they attack through or around the covering force. If the covering force is successful, the main body commander can attack enemy vulnerabilities at the time desired with previously uncommitted main body forces.

5-104. The covering force must retain a reserve. At the brigade level, a reserve should consist of attached attack aviation assets and a maneuver company. The reserve must be an uncommitted force and ready to deploy at a decisive moment anywhere in the covering force’s zone.

### Flank Covering Force

5-105. A flank cover is an offensive covering force mission. If the main body commander perceives a significant threat to one of the unit’s flanks, the commander assigns a flank cover. A BCT or reconnaissance and security BCT conducts a flank cover much the same as a flank guard. The main difference between the two missions is the scope of operations and the distance the covering force operates from the main body (see figure 5-13).
5-106. The flank covering force clears the area between its route of advance and the main body the same as
the flank guard. The flank covering force maintains contact with an element of the main body specified by
the main body commander. The commander assigning the mission designates the area of operations for the
flank covering force and the protected force (see figure 5-14, page 5-32). The flank covering force clears the
area between its route of advance and the main body.

5-107. Integration of aviation assets are essential to a cover mission. Aviation assets may assist in clearing
the area between the covering force and the main body, assisting in maintaining contact with the protected
force, and screening to the front of the units conducting the flank covering force.
DEFENSIVE COVER

5-108. A defensive covering force prevents the enemy from attacking at the time, place, and combat strength of their choosing. The defensive cover forces the enemy to reveal their main effort, to disrupt the enemy’s attack, destroy their initiative, and set the conditions for their defeat. Defensive covers maintain continuous observation of avenues of approach. They destroy or disrupt enemy reconnaissance and security forces to deceive the enemy of friendly disposition, and the location of the main defensive effort. The defensive forces determine the size, strength, composition, and direction of the enemy’s main effort, and maintain contact and force the commitment of enemy second-echelon forces. A defensive covering force operates to the front, flanks, or rear of a main body deploying to defend. Defensive cover is performed most frequently forward of the main body.
5-109. The following are a list of defensive tasks Cavalry units could conduct within capability during defensive cover missions:

- Detect, report, and destroy all enemy elements attempting to pass through the cover, both ground and aerial, and provide the protected force commander early warning of enemy activities.
- Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy or defeat all enemy reconnaissance elements.
- Maintain observation of avenues of approach that affect the protected forces’ mission.
- Maintain contact with the protected force and other forces operating on its flanks.
- Maintain contact with enemy forces, and report activity in the assigned area.
- Locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemy’s main attack, as prescribed in the enemy’s order of battle based upon the IPB (when facing an echeloned enemy force).
- While displacing, determine the direction of enemy movement, maintain contact, and report threat activities.
- While displacing, impede and harass the enemy to provide the protected force commander with additional time and maneuver space.
- Cause the enemy main body to deploy prematurely, and then, report their direction of travel.
- Deny ground observation, and prevent direct fire against the main body.
- Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and location of the main battle area.
- Determine enemy strengths, weaknesses, and disposition, and exploit opportunities until main body forces are committed.

Planning and Execution Considerations for Defensive Cover Missions

5-110. The planning and execution considerations are applicable to all types of defensive cover. Usually, the division or corps commander uses a BCT or designates a reconnaissance and security BCT as the foundation covering force. The commander reinforces and augments it with combat power to increase the length of time it can fight the covering force battle and to give it the capability to destroy larger enemy forces. The amount of augmentation the covering force receives depends upon the intent of the main body commander (see figure 5-15, page 5-35). The BCT commander always designates reserves to seize the initiative during the early stages of an enemy attack.

5-111. The main body commander designates the forward and rear boundaries of the security force with PLs. Normally, the lateral boundaries of the security area are extensions of the main body boundaries. The rear boundary of the security force is the BHL, which is within range of the main body artillery. The BCT commander designates additional control measures as needed to control the operation.

5-112. The BCT commander assigns an area of operations to each subordinate. Covering force missions delay and defeat enemy forces to allow maximum time for the main body to prepare and execute offensive or defensive tasks. If certain terrain is crucial to the operation, the commander may assign battle positions to TFs. Subordinate commanders have the same options in the deployment of their units. If the terrain and situation permit, the covering force boundaries are extensions of the boundaries of corresponding main body units to simplify the battle handover.

5-113. The BCT conducts zone reconnaissance or movement to contact to the forward PL in the security area. The BCT may be required to fight through enemy resistance to establish control over the security area. If the unit encounters heavy enemy resistance, the main body commander orders the covering force to occupy a new defensive line and conducts the cover. Planning for such contingencies is critical to the success of the covering force mission.

5-114. Battle handover and passage of lines are inherent in the conduct of defensive cover. Battle handover and passage of lines may not occur simultaneously for all covering force units. As some units begin passage, others may still be taking advantage of offensive opportunities in other parts of the security area. The BCT prepares to continue fighting in those portions of the security area where forces are successful to set up offensive opportunities for the main body. Disengagement criteria established by the division or BCT commander dictate when covering force units may begin battle handover and passage of lines.
5-115. Organic and attached aviation assets are invaluable assets in assisting disengagement of ground units during the conduct of battle handover and passage of lines with the main body. Additionally, they can assist in reconnaissance of the security area as the covering force moves forward, screening forward of the covering force, covering areas between ground units, and providing additional firepower for disengaging ground units.

5-116. BCT staffs consider communications requirements to maintain contact with the main body and subordinate battalions within the covering force. Covering forces consider use of high frequency and tactical satellite communications to maintain continuous communications with all organic units, adjacent units, and higher. Covering forces may require additional signal assets to provide communications infrastructure support and retransmission.

5-117. Reserves are critical to a defensive cover. They allow the BCT commander to seize the initiative during the early stages of an enemy attack. The covering force commander always designates a reserve. Frequently, reserves are attack aviation units, combined arms battalions, and other operational control maneuver forces. In the absence of attached or operational control maneuver units, the BCT commander may assign a contingency mission to assigned tank companies and dictate employment restrictions to subordinate commanders. The tank company is the battalion-level commander’s primary reserve force. Normally, commanders position ground reserve forces in-depth and prepare them to execute a series of contingency missions, such as counterattack, block, and assume an area defense. Aviation reserves may counterattack in coordination with ground reserves and conduct an attack against enemy forces in close friendly contact. Frequently, the covering force commander designs the defense to shape an enemy penetration causing the enemy to become isolated and to provide opportunities to mass effects to defeat the isolated enemy.
Figure 5-15. Reinforced ABCT performing defensive cover

Flank and Rear Defensive Covering Forces

5-118. The planning and execution considerations for flank and rear defensive covering forces are the same as for a frontal covering force. A rear covering force mission is similar to a rear guard mission. A rear covering force protects a force moving away from the enemy. The BCT deploys behind the forward maneuver units of the main body, conducts battle handover and passage of lines, and then defends or delays. Alternatively, the covering force may conduct a relief in place as part of a deception plan or to take advantage of the best defensive terrain.

5-119. The BCT deploys its subordinate units abreast and in-depth. The subordinate units establish passage points and assist in the rearward passage of the main body as needed. From that point on, the mission is conducted the same as any other defensive covering force operation. As the main body moves, the covering force displaces to subsequent PLs in-depth. If the enemy does not follow the withdrawing forces, contact may be lost eventually. Fighting a defense or delay is necessary if the enemy detects the movement and attacks.
AREA SECURITY

5-120. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). The BCT conducts area security to preserve the commander’s freedom of maneuver, ability to move reserves, positioning of fire support assets, and to provide effective command and control and conduct sustainment operations. Area security degrades the enemy’s ability to affect friendly actions in a specific area by denying the enemy’s use of an area for its own purposes. Area security is essential to all operations, particularly operations in asymmetric environments during stability tasks. Area security enables military support to local governance, reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and the development of legitimate security forces. BCTs conduct area security to establish security around base camps, critical infrastructure, airfields, facilities, main supply routes (MSRs), lines of communication, terrain features, towns, equipment, and high-value assets. Offense, defense, and stability tasks support area security.

5-121. Area security is largely concerned with consolidating gains. Area security is typically phased and ranges in scale. Upon completion or during the execution of a large-scale ground combat operation, area security initially works to defeat bypassed enemy units that could constitute a means for further resistance or impact sustainment operations. As that enemy is defeated, actions transition to the defense of the local population, and finally, stability operations. Effectively, area security establishes the initial basis for wide area security.

5-122. Army forces perform area security to ensure freedom of action and to deny enemy forces the ability to disrupt operations. Commanders combine reconnaissance tasks and offensive, defensive, and stability operations to protect friendly forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities critical to mission accomplishment. Army forces integrate with partner military, law enforcement, and civil capabilities to establish and maintain security. The Army’s ability to establish control is critical to consolidating gains in the wake of successful military operations.

5-123. The commander may task subordinate units to conduct the following to support area security operations:

- Area, route, or zone reconnaissance.
- Screen.
- Offensive and defensive tasks (within capabilities).
- Route and convoy security.
- Security for high-value assets.
- Route or convoy security of critical lines of communications.
- Checkpoint operations to monitor or control movement.
- Patrol to cover gaps between secured perimeters.
- Maintaining an observable presence.

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

5-124. When conducting an area security mission, the security force prevents threat, ground reconnaissance elements from directly observing friendly activities within the area the force is securing. Within capabilities, the security force prevents threat, ground maneuver forces from penetrating the defensive perimeters.

5-125. The commander can have the subordinate troops employ a variety of techniques, such as observation posts, battle positions, ambushes, and combat outposts, to accomplish the security mission. A reserve or quick reaction force enables the commander to react to unforeseen contingencies. The Cavalry squadron can execute ambushes and preemptive strikes with greater precision using the intelligence assets available to the BCT. Figure 5-16 is an example of a BCT Cavalry squadron conducting area security of a village.

5-126. METT-TC (I) determines the required augmentation for the Cavalry squadron. Of particular importance is the need for such assets as aviation, maneuver forces, engineers, intelligence operations assets, Armor, Infantry, and military police. Early warning of threat activity is paramount in area security missions and provides the commander with time and space to react to threats. Failure to conduct continuous reconnaissance may create a vulnerable seam where the enemy can execute an infiltration or attack.
5-127. A unit establishes a perimeter when it secures an area where the defense does not have a supporting unit. Perimeters vary in shape and distribution of assets based upon the results of mission analysis, IPB, and METT-TC (I). A probable direction of attack based on the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action, as determined in the IPB, may require the massing of combat power in that portion of the perimeter to defeat an attack or infiltration. If the perimeter was inward-focused as in stability tasks, the massing of combat power would prevent exfiltration or a breakout from the secured area.

5-128. Usually, the unit establishing the perimeter divides it into subordinate unit sectors with boundaries and contact points. The unit employs integrated observation posts, integrating attack and reconnaissance aviation, ground-based sensors, UASs, HUMINT assets, and mounted and dismounted patrols. Commanders emplace attached tanks and other antiarmor weapon systems to orient on high-speed avenues of approach. UASs and ground-based sensors provide overlapping reconnaissance capabilities at extended distances from the perimeter.

![Figure 5-16. Cavalry squadron conducting area security](image)

5-129. Area security is a frequent mission conducted during stability tasks when circumstances may not permit establishment of clearly defined perimeters. When a perimeter is not feasible, the Cavalry unit secures the area by establishing a presence and conducting reconnaissance tasks throughout the area. Subordinate
units establish perimeters around base camps, critical infrastructure, and high-value assets, while other units conduct operations to establish presence, provide security, and assist in stability or relief tasks. The commander positions reaction forces or disperses the reserve between several secured perimeters. Other missions or tasks that support area security may include the following:

- Route or convoy security of critical lines of communications.
- Checkpoint operations to monitor or control movement.
- Patrolling to cover gaps between secured perimeters.
- Maintain an observable presence.

**ROUTE SECURITY**

5-130. Cavalry units conduct route security missions to prevent enemy forces from affecting freedom of maneuver along a protected route. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route. Route security operations are defensive in nature, and unlike guard operations, are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying traffic along the route. To accomplish this task, the force performs the following functions:

- Conduct continuous mounted and dismounted reconnaissance of the route and key locations along the route to ensure trafficability.
- Conduct sweeps of the route at irregular intervals to prevent emplacement of enemy mines.
- Cordon sections of the route to search suspected enemy locations.
- Establish roadblocks and checkpoints along the route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles, persons, and those entering the route.
- Occupy key locations and terrain along or near the route. If possible, establish a screen oriented to prevent enemy direct fire weapons and observation from influencing the route. This function is known as out posting, also.
- Aggressively conduct ground and aerial patrols to maintain route security.
- Establish observation posts (covert and overt) or ambushes at critical points to watch for threat activity.

**CONVOY SECURITY**

5-131. Convoy security is a subset of area security. Convoy security missions are offensive in nature and orient on the protected force. Typically, a convoy security is a security mission assigned to Cavalry troops, maneuver companies, and maneuver platoons. Commanders order convoy security missions when insufficient friendly forces are available to secure lines of communication in an area of operations. The commander may order troops to conduct convoy security missions in conjunction with route security operations. A convoy security force operates to the front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving along a designated route or integrated into the body of the convoy.

5-132. A convoy security mission has specific tasks that guide planning and execution. The security force accomplishes the following to protect a convoy:

- Reconnoiter the route the convoy is to travel.
- Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the enemy could influence movement.
- Provide early warning of enemy presence along the route.
- Prevent the enemy from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the convoy.

**Organization**

5-133. If possible, the convoy security force is a combined arms organization with integrated air and ground assets (see figure 5-17). Ideally, a convoy security force has sufficient combat power to organize into the following elements:

- Advance guard. The advance guard performs continuous reconnaissance tasks along the main body’s axis of advance or route. The advance guard maintains continuous surveillance of enemy avenues of approach and destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance and security forces to protect the convoy.
- Security element. The security element provides early warning and security to the convoy’s flanks and rear. They may perform duties of the escort element.
- Escort element. The escort element provides close-in protection to the convoy. They may provide a response force to assist in repelling or destroying threat contact.
- Reaction force. The reaction force provides firepower and support to assist the other elements in developing the situation or conducting a hasty attack. They may perform duties of the escort element.

**Figure 5-17. Convoy security organization**
Planning and Execution Considerations

5-134. Convoy security missions generate unique requirements the commander and staff should take into account when formulating a plan. The convoy security commander and subordinates receive a briefing on the latest information regarding the threat situation and the area through which the convoy is to pass.

5-135. The commander formulates plans and issues orders covering the commander’s intent, assignment of security force elements (reconnaissance, screen, escort, and reaction), the movement formation, and intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans for actions on contact. Leaders at all levels should ensure the convoy security force identify and rehearse immediate action drills (such as enemy ambush, obstacle, and react to indirect fire) before movement and can execute them in case of contact.

5-136. The commander may maintain a quick reaction force to support the convoy movement. The Cavalry unit may perform this mission. In addition, the commander assigns the Cavalry unit to set up outposts along the convoy route or movement corridor to provide overwatch and security of the area. Usually, the commander does not assign the Cavalry unit an area of operations but tasks the Cavalry unit to provide security for that segment of the route or corridor.

5-137. Communications are vital to the success of movement. Leaders plan communications with convoy elements and units occupying areas of operations along the route of movement to ensure support assets availability. Visual and sound signals are prearranged. Signals include colored smoke, identification panels, whistles or horn signals, and escalation of force signs. While limited, these communications means are effective when all personnel understand the prearranged signals and responses.

5-138. When possible, units should coordinate fires along the entire route of movement. Adequate fires planning and prior coordination with fire support cells can ensure indirect fire coverage. The fire support officer conducts detailed fire support rehearsals on the fire support net before convoy movement. The officer conducts rehearsals to confirm communications connectivity and to improve the fire support team’s overall understanding of the fire support plan. Planning and coordination must occur among all units involved if the convoy plans to move through multiple units’ area of operations.

5-139. If an air threat is possible, the commander addresses air defense of the convoy in the planning phase. The convoy elements review small arms air defense procedures and establish orientation sectors. The commander orchestrates air defense reinforcements into the movement and defense plan. If the route falls under an existing air defense umbrella, the staff conducts the appropriate coordination with the controlling air defense headquarters.

5-140. Convoy security operations in an urban environment or built-up area require different emphasis and techniques than those in rural areas. The population density and characteristics of the area may require nonlethal weapons and the careful application of lethal weapons in an effort to minimize collateral damage. To ensure they apply minimum essential force to minimize loss of life and destruction of property, leaders conduct detailed planning, coordination, and control. Whenever possible, convoys move through populated areas when these areas are least congested and pose less danger to the security of the convoy. Convoy operations may require assistance from military or local police and other government agencies to secure the route before the convoy enters the built-up area.

5-141. The S-4 and unit commanders plan for sustainment in convoy security operations. Fuel and maintenance elements are included in the convoy itself, or pre-positioned in secure areas along the route. Leaders should perform a detailed, precombat inspection before the convoy starts. Commanders plan casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) along the entire movement route. Commanders maintain coordination between the security force elements to ensure immediate medical support is available including the aid station, unit command post, sustainment command post, and designated units along the route. When operating at extended distances from organic or supporting medical assets, air medical evacuation is the preferred means of evacuation and is planned and rehearsed in detail.

HIGH-VALUE ASSET CONSIDERATIONS

5-142. High-value assets are assets whose capture or destruction by enemy forces could decisively change the course of the operation. Security missions to protect high-value assets are an important component of
area security in major combat operations and stability tasks. Examples of high-value assets to be secured in major combat operations include the following:

- Major power-generation facilities (power plants and dams).
- Airports, seaports, and other centers for mass transit.
- Industrial complexes.
- Cities.
- Dislocated civilian camps.

5-143. High-value assets to be secured in stability tasks include the following:

- Government officials and political and military leaders.
- Government facilities.
- High-value detainees.
- Pipelines and relay stations.

5-144. Considerations the security force should address when it tasks subordinate elements to secure high-value assets include the following:

- Internet protocol address, frequencies, location, and linkup point of the high-value asset.
- Route used in reaching the high-value asset, and the composition and disposition of enemy forces that can influence the route.
- Mission and movement or positioning plan of the high-value asset.
- How easily the threat may detect and target the high-value asset with indirect fire. The security force should consider its own survivability and maintain adequate standoff from the high-value asset.
- Duration of the mission and sustainment considerations.
- Other friendly or neutral forces in the area and their task and purpose.
- Triggers for change of mission from security to reconnaissance, offensive, or defensive actions. Is there an implied reserve mission?
- Ability of the security force to maintain communications with higher headquarters.
- Locations used by enemy personnel serving as forward observers for enemy indirect fire systems.

SECTION IV – TRANSITION PLANNING

5-145. The transition from offensive to defensive operations or vice versa consistently occurs during large-scale combat operations. Cavalry units perform battle handovers by conducting a passage of lines (forward or rearward), a transition using a relief in place, or a change of mission. Passage of lines and relief in place are enabling operations found in ADP 3-90.

5-146. Cavalry units are consistently transitioning from reconnaissance and security operations or vice versa; therefore, planning for transitions begins early in the operations process during the development of the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver in which decision points are identified for when to execute those necessary transitions. The reconnaissance and security efforts by the Cavalry unit answer information requirements that enable the BCT commander and staff to develop transition decision points or refine the same decision points if the Cavalry unit has to transition earlier or later than originally planned based on effects from enemy or terrain. The decision points that drive the transition of the Cavalry unit must be understood at each echelon to ensure the BCT maintains tempo as transitions occur.

BATTLE HANDBOVER

5-147. A battle handover is a coordinated operation between two units that transfer responsibility for fighting an enemy force from one unit to the other. During defensive operations, the battle handover is usually coordinated in advance so that when ordered to occur, the operation requires minimum coordination. In the offense, it is often initiated by a fragmentary order based on the situation at hand. Clear standard operating procedure (SOP) allows units to quickly establish the necessary coordination to preclude a loss of momentum in the attack. A battle handover is typically associated with the conduct of passage of lines (forward or rearward).
BATTLE HANDOVER PLANNING

5-148. Battle handover can occur during either offensive or defensive operations. During defensive operations, the battle handover is usually planned and coordinated in advance to facilitate execution and frequently involves a rearward passage of lines. In the offense, a battle handover is situation dependent and often initiated by a fragmentary order. Normally, a battle handover occurs in the offense when one unit passes through or around another unit. Tactical SOPs containing clear, simple, standardized procedures, and control measures enhance the ability of units to coordinate without experiencing a corresponding loss in momentum.

5-149. Battle handover occurs along a line forward of the stationary force known as the BHL. The BCT commander establishes the line in coordination with stationary and passing battalion commanders. Usually, the stationary commander determines the BHL location. The line is forward of the forward edge of the battle area in the defense or the FLOT in the offense. The BHL is located where elements of the passing unit can be overwatched effectively by direct fires or supported by indirect fires of the forward combat element of the stationary unit until the battle handover is complete.

5-150. Physical handover frequently occurs near the BHL. Events may dictate that a force break contact forward of or behind the BHL; for example, this may occur when there is a gap between echelons of the attacking enemy force. Close coordination (physical, digital, or voice) between the units involved in the handover allows them to coordinate and execute this process at the small-unit level.

BATTLE HANDOVER FLOW

5-151. The battle handover operation begins on order of the commander of the units involved or when a given set of conditions occurs. Defensive handover is complete when the passing unit is clear and the stationary unit is ready to engage the enemy. These actions may occur at the same time. Offensive handover is complete when the passing unit crosses the BHL, which is usually considered the LD for the attacking unit. Until the handover is complete and acknowledged by the commanders, the commander in contact is responsible for coordinating the fight.

5-152. Coordination for battle handover flows from the commander out of contact to the commander in contact. The coordination for a battle handover overlaps with the coordination for a passage of lines; the coordination for both should be accomplished at the same time. The squadron tactical SOP should outline these coordination requirements to facilitate rapid accomplishment.

5-153. Digital information systems assist the squadron staff with its coordination and synchronization efforts for the operation. Each unit transmits or delivers a complete copy of its OPORD and overlays by either digital or analog means. Any changes made after initial distribution are updated immediately. The coordination between the two commanders involves—

- Establishing digital and voice radio communications.
- Providing updates of friendly and enemy situations (digital, voice, and graphical).
- Coordinating passage points and routes and ensuring these are displayed on operational overlays (digital and analog).
- Collocating contact points and exchanging liaison personnel (if required).
- Coordinating fires (direct and indirect) and ensuring the direct fire control measures and fire support coordination measures display on operational overlays (digital and conventional).
- Providing updated obstacle overlays including self-destruct, date-time groups of emplaced family of scatterable mines obstacles and reserve demolitions in the affected area of operations.
- Determining the need for and dispatching contact point representatives.
- Establishing and coordinating recognition signals.
- Exchanging locations of obstacles and related covering fires.
- Exchanging route information, including waypoints.
- Determining sustainment requirements.

5-154. Due to the fluid nature of a battle handover, commanders can use digital systems to speed the planning, coordination, and execution processes. Units should plan voice radio; if digital capabilities are hampered, then units should use frequency modulation to coordinate and execute battle handovers.
PASSAGE OF LINES (FORWARD AND REARWARD)

5-155. Cavalry units usually begin and end reconnaissance and security operations with a passage of lines, or a reconnaissance handover (discussed in chapter 4). A passage of lines is a tactical operation designed to pass one unit through the positions of another unit without interference. A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines. A passage of lines is an inherent aspect of transferring responsibility for the battle between commanders while maintaining continuity of the fight. Cavalry units can be the passing or stationary force.

FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

5-156. A forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy (ADP 3-90). Cavalry units conduct forward passage of lines as a transitional operation, typically before reconnaissance and security missions, when the factors of METT-TC (I) do not provide the freedom of bypassing a forward friendly unit. A forward passage of lines may also be conducted by Cavalry units to—

- Continue the attack or counterattack.
- Envelop a threat force.
- Pursue a fleeing threat.
- Pass between friendly areas of operations during nonlinear operations.

5-157. The passing force uses two techniques. In the first technique, the passing force deploys in its attack formation in the attack positions to the rear of the FLOT and crosses the FLOT in attack formation. This technique is appropriate if there is adequate maneuver space for the passing force to deploy effectively and without disrupting the stationary force’s defensive positions. This technique also allows the passing force to rapidly attack once it crosses the FLOT.

5-158. In the second technique, the passing force deploys after crossing the FLOT. Using this technique, the passing force crosses the FLOT in march column and then deploys into attack formations prior to crossing the BHL. This technique is required by restrictive terrain. If this technique is used, the FLOT should be outside direct fire range of the threat to allow the passing force to deploy before making direct fire contact with the threat.

5-159. Both of the passing force’s techniques require stationary unit scouts on or near the BHL. The passing unit may have their scout platoon link up with stationary unit scouts and continue the mission or they may have combat units deploy along the BHL to overwatch movement of other units. The units on the ground at the BHL must know the scheme of maneuver of the passing force so that they can act accordingly.

5-160. If the stationary unit identifies a gap or weak point in the threat's deployment, they should go about identifying axes of attack for the passing force that take advantage of that weakness (reconnaissance-pull). The premier consideration is that the stationary force should not pass the moving force into the teeth of the threat defense. The passing force must be flexible enough to modify its scheme of maneuver, if necessary, to take advantage of weaknesses in the threat’s defense. Figure 5-18, page 5-44 depicts the graphic control measures associated with a forward passage of lines.
Chapter 5

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

5-161. Historically, Cavalry units conducting a rearward passage of lines have been associated with covering force operations. This remains true in the contemporary operational environment. Additionally, the nonlinear battlefield creates continuing requirements for rearward passage of lines. A rearward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s position while moving away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). This operation may or may not be conducted under threat pressure. An example of a rearward passage of lines is a Cavalry squadron as a covering force conducting a rearward passage of lines with the stationary unit in the main battle area. The covering force (Cavalry squadron) withdraws through the
stationary force, handing off control of the fight at the BHL. Figure 5-19 provides an example of a rearward passage of lines with graphic control measures.

Planning Considerations

5-162. Planning procedures for a rearward passage of lines closely resemble the planning procedures for a forward passage of lines. However, rearward movement is likely to be more difficult because of the following:

- The threat probably has the initiative, which tends to reduce the time available to conduct liaison and reconnaissance and make detailed plans.
- If the rearward moving force has been in action, its Soldiers are tired and possibly disorganized to some degree.
The threat may be applying pressure on the passing force.
Friendly forces may be more difficult to recognize because threat forces may be intermixed with them.

5-163. To facilitate a rearward passage of lines, the stationary force commander develops an overlay. Once the overlay is prepared, the stationary commander transmits it and any amplifying information to the passing force commander by way of digital command and control systems. The following graphic control measures are included in a passage of lines overlay:

- BHL.
- Contact points forward of the BHL.
- Passage points along the forward edge of the battlefield.
- Lanes to the rear of the main battle area.
- Assembly area.
- Release point.

5-164. During a passage of lines, friendly unit density in a relatively small maneuver space may cause problems in the ability of the commander to maintain the common operating picture in relation to the passed and passing units. The stationary and passing commanders should determine the best method of exercising mission command to avoid slowing the tempo of the operation and to reduce fratricide potential.

**Rehearsal**

5-165. A rehearsal is beneficial to all units responsible in the execution of a passage of lines operation. The rehearsal allows the passing and stationary unit to work through issues commonly found during this complex operation. The rehearsal allows for easy identification of the passage points and routes to and from areas of operations, and for the units to conduct a communication linkup on voice and digital communication systems. Other rehearsal items include the following:

- Fire support observation plan, target execution, communication linkages, and mutual support operations.
- Fire support coordination measures confirmation.
- Unit routes and positioning review.
- Obstacles, lanes, bypasses, and marking locations, and descriptions.
- Passage points, routes, and recognition procedures. Verify these and review number of vehicles by type expected at each passage point.
- Route management, contact points, and use of guide’s confirmation.
- Locations for and movement of sustainment units. Arrange for mutual support and any transfer of supplies.
- Locations of aid stations, ambulance exchange points, and CASEVAC procedures.

**Responsibilities**

5-166. The stationary unit is responsible for providing the passing unit with as much assistance as possible. Indirect and direct fire support from the stationary unit to the passing unit is pivotal to the success of the rearward passage of lines. Stationary unit support is especially important in covering the withdrawal of elements left in contact during a delay. The stationary unit's fire support assets answer calls for fire from the passing unit until battle handover occurs. The passing unit's fire support assets echelon rearward to provide continuous fire support for the passing unit until it successfully transitions. Once the passing unit hands over control of the battle to the stationary unit, the stationary unit initiates and clears calls for all fires forward of its location. The same procedure applies to the dedicated air defense assets of the passing and stationary units.

5-167. The stationary unit’s engineer assets provide support to prepare the defense and execute the passage. Priority of effort initially ensures that the passing unit can move through passage lanes around the stationary unit’s defensive positions. The passing unit shifts to close these passage lanes once the passing unit and any security elements disengage and withdraw through the security area and obstacles. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with the previously coordinated combat service support as far forward as possible. The stationary unit concentrates on providing the passing unit with emergency medical, recovery, and fuel supplies so the passing unit can move through the stationary unit’s positions rapidly.
RELIEF IN PLACE

5-168. A relief in place is an operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). Commanders conduct a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. Cavalry units conduct relief in place operations for the following reasons:

- Reconstitute a unit that has sustained heavy losses.
- Decontaminate a committed unit.
- Rest a unit that has been in prolonged combat.
- Conform to a larger tactical plan.
- Resupply a defending Cavalry unit.
- Assign a new mission to the relieved unit.
- Introduce a new unit into combat.
- Set the stage for resuming the offense.

5-169. Defensive relief is conducted to continue the defense. Cavalry units can relieve a larger force as an economy of force defensive mission. Offensive relief may follow from a follow-and-assume mission requiring a forward passage of lines.

RELIEF TECHNIQUES

5-170. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. A sequential relief is the most time-consuming relief technique but the most secure. Relief proceeds by troop or company team. Normally, units are relieved in place with the relieving unit assuming the relieved unit’s positions and missions. This technique is most common when units have similar organizations or when occupied terrain must be retained.

5-171. The simultaneous relief technique is faster but less secure because all units are moving at the same time. The decentralized nature of a simultaneous relief requires close coordination to prevent excessive battlefield clutter. Once command groups and combat trains are collocated, troops move forward at the same time along designated routes. Relief occurs simultaneously at each location. Relieved units withdraw immediately upon relief.

5-172. A staggered relief occurs when a commander relieves each element in a sequence determined by the tactical situation, not its geographic orientation. A staggered relief occurs with relief elements occupying positions in-depth or adjacent to the relieved unit; this is considered an area relief. This technique is appropriate when units are dissimilar, when the relieving unit performs a different mission, or when improved defensive terrain is away from the line of contact. A staggered relief is also appropriate when the unit being relieved has been contaminated chemically or radiologically. The relieved unit withdraws one unit at a time or simultaneously and conducts a rearward passage of lines through the relieving unit, if appropriate.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

5-173. Fire support coordination and liaison are conducted between the units. If field artillery units are to be relieved, they are the first to collocate and the last to leave. DA Form 5517 (Standard Range Card) target lists, and overlays are given to the incoming unit to ensure the effective delivery of fire. If printed DA Form 5517s are not available, use what you have on hand. Fire support assets of the relieved unit remain in position throughout the relief of maneuver units and are prepared to support both units. Fire support assets of the relieving unit move into positions as quickly as possible so they can support both units during the relief. Combat trains are collocated to facilitate coordination and transfer of equipment, excess ammunition, fuel, water, and medical supplies.

5-174. The relieving unit establishes continuous liaison with the relieved unit immediately upon receipt of the order. The squadron command group moves to the contact point of the relieving unit to coordinate the operation. The relieving unit enters and monitors the command net of the relieved unit. Troops and company teams of both units remain on their internal and parent unit nets. The relieving unit maintains radio listening
silence on all nets until the relief is complete. The sudden increase in radio traffic is a quick indicator to the threat that a relief is occurring. Upon passage of command, the relieving unit returns to its command net and lifts listening silence as necessary. The relieved unit should maintain radio listening silence during its withdrawal.

**MOVEMENT CONTROL**

5-175. A priority of maintaining movement control is designating and ranking routes. The squadron executive officer supervises unit movement. Rally points for the relieved unit are used at company level to quickly organize the unit for withdrawal. Guides are positioned at critical points along the routes. AAs are designated and activities performed in these areas are specified. Separate AAs are designated for the incoming and outgoing units to minimize confusion. Time spent within AAs is minimized to avoid possible compromise.

**PASSAGE OF COMMAND**

5-176. The division or corps order may specify the passage of command as a time when relief is to be completed. At unit level, the commanders mutually agree to the sequence for the passage of command. This is physically accomplished when a specified percentage, normally greater than one-half of the relieving units are in position and report relief. Passage of command at the squadron and TF level is acknowledged face-to-face by both commanders and passed to subordinates.

**CHANGE OF MISSION**

5-177. A change of mission is another type of transition Cavalry units can expect during reconnaissance and security operations. Change of mission is established in the commander’s guidance and planned using branches and sequels. Change of mission is the term used when units transition from defensive to offensive operations or when the unit changes to a different type of security operation.
Chapter 6
Stability

Ultimately, stability is the set of conditions in which a local population regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable (see ADP 3-07). To achieve stability within all operational frameworks, BCTs must understand the operational environment, shape the operational environment through action, and engage local leaders to influence the population. During stability operations, commanders conduct multiple missions and efforts to seek a common goal and end state that nests with the higher command’s objectives.

SECTION I – PRINCIPLES AND FRAMEWORK

6-1. BCTs conduct reconnaissance and security operations during stability tasks to increase the commander and staff’s ability to understand the area of operations. Information collection confirms or denies assumptions made during planning and identifies sources of stability and instability. Reconnaissance and security operations contribute to mission command by answering information requirements, which enhances situational awareness and assists the BCT in applying the stability principles in an acceptable and predictable method. Ultimately, reconnaissance and security operations are vital to assisting the BCT in understanding their operational environment through the context of the stability principles. The four principles of stability tasks are—

- Conflict transformation.
- Unity of effort.
- Legitimacy and host-nation ownership.
- Building partner capacity.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

6-2. Conflict transformation is the process for reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socio-economic aspirations (see ADP 3-07). Transformation aims to set the host nation on a sustainable, positive trajectory in which transformational processes directly address the dynamics causing instability. BCTs contribute to conflict transformation only if they achieve understanding of the causes and influences of conflict and instability within their area of operations.

6-3. Reconnaissance and security operations assist in identifying the drivers of violent conflict and instability. Collected information impacts planning for future operations to help commanders and staffs identify opportunities linking tactical gains to sustainable strategic objectives. Transformation can occur only if the BCT understands the dynamics of conflict within their area of operations from an objective viewpoint and from the perspective of the local population.

UNITY OF EFFORT

6-4. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1, Volume 2). Reconnaissance and security operations require unity of effort and purpose to achieve situational awareness at echelon to enable successful operations throughout the BCT’s area of operations.
6-5. Reconnaissance and security operations assist the commander and staff in developing shared understanding between partners allowing BCTs to foster cooperative environments that focus efforts towards a common goal to achieve stable and sustainable security environments.

LEGITIMACY AND HOST-NATION OWNERSHIP

6-6. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them (see ADP 3-07 for more information). Host-nation ownership is the will or ability of the ruling entity to resolve its own problems and assume responsibility for solutions that it supports and can implement. BCTs conduct reconnaissance operations focused on determining the extent of legitimacy as perceived by the local population and develop an understanding of areas of conflict that degrade, discredit, or erode perceptions of legitimacy.

6-7. Commanders direct reconnaissance operations and engagement activities to understand the mandate, manner, consent, and expectations of legitimate host-nation ownership and perceived legitimacy. (Refer to ADP 3-07 for more information on the four factors of legitimacy.)

6-8. BCTs conduct reconnaissance and engagement in close contact with the civilian population to collect information, reinforce the capabilities of host-nation security and governance partners, and understand the extent of support and acceptance of host-nation partners with the local population. BCTs actively seek sources of conflict and connectivity between the host nation and local population to assist partners in bridging gaps in perception and strengthening relationships.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

6-9. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions (see ADP 3-07). Reconnaissance and security TF collect information to ensure activities are consistent with tactical, operational, and strategic goals, protect key activities, and enable key capabilities to allow host-nation partners to develop and learn. BCTs conduct operations that enable host-nation partners to thrive and eventually develop sustainable capabilities independent of BCT interference or influence.

STABILITY FRAMEWORK

6-10. BCTs conduct stability tasks and operations based upon conditions identified through collection. Reconnaissance operations confirm or deny the conditions and state of stability within the BCT’s area of operations. BCTs identify missions, tasks, and activities about the framework phases using continuous reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.) The three phases of the stability framework are—

- Initial response.
- Transformation.
- Fostering sustainability.

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-11. Usually, activities to stabilize an area of operations are initial response actions. Typically, units perform initial response actions during or directly after a conflict or disaster in which the security situation prohibits the introduction of civilian personnel. Initial response actions aim to provide a secure environment that allows relief forces to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population.

TRANSFORMATION

6-12. Stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity building are transformation actions performed in a relatively secure environment. Transformation actions may occur in crisis or vulnerable states and aim to build host-nation capacity across multiple sectors.
Fostering Sustainability

6-13. BCTs foster sustainability when the security environment is stable enough to support efforts to implement long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation. The BCT consolidates gains to encourage capacity-building reconstruction activities to enable sustainable development. Often military forces conduct these long-term efforts in support of broader, civilian-led efforts.

Section II – Operations During Stability Tasks

6-14. Reconnaissance and security operations are imperative to successful stability tasks. Reconnaissance focuses on identifying enemy forces, human interaction and engagement, and vital infrastructure to collect information necessary to understand sources of stability and instability within the BCT’s area of operations. As the environment changes, so do the sentiments of the population and its key actors. Staffs continuously assess their area of operations based on information collected to provide context to understanding the human dimension of their area of operations. BCTs conduct security operations to establish safe and secure environments that enable positive gains and sustainable stability. Since the complexity of the human context is ever changing and evolving in any environment, reconnaissance and security operations are continuous. Commanders constantly reassess and refine intelligence estimates to determine if they are collecting the right information and developing intelligence to understand the operational environment.

6-15. BCTs conduct reconnaissance and security operations to gain an understanding of sources of stability and instability, and the intentions and capabilities of key actors to shape the BCT’s and unified action partners’ area of operations during stability tasks. Sources of instability are actors, actions, or conditions that exceed the legitimate authority’s capacity to exercise effective governance, maintain civil control, and ensure economic development.

6-16. Enemy forces influence instability sources to create conflict, exacerbate existing conditions, or threaten to collapse failing or recovering states. Sources of instability include catastrophic events, humanitarian crises, foreign power-instigated violence, domestic rebellion, and civil war.

6-17. The following vignette describes utilizing Cavalry squadrons in the execution of reconnaissance and security missions that enabled the BCT’s success during stability operations.

Third Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tall Afar

The city of Tall Afar is located in Northwestern Iraq and is a compact city with a mixed ethnic population of over 250,000 people. In late 2004, the Iraqi Security Forces (known as ISF) in Tall Afar collapsed, allowing enemy threat to impose a grip of terror on the city. Through violence and intimidation, the enemy took control of every aspect of the city and crippled the local government. The city divided, as the population was forced into sectarian boundaries, which helped to fuel sectarian and tribal violence across the city. The enemy’s firm grip on the city, coupled with the city’s geographically central location lying between the city of Mosul and the Syrian border, enabled the enemy threat to utilize Tall Afar and the surrounding region as a training ground and staging base for operations. Foreign fighters flooded in from Syria, finding sanctuary in Tall Afar and the surrounding cities and towns and increasing the enemy threat capacity to conduct operations in Mosul and across Northern Iraq.

In April 2005, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (known as ACR) deployed to the Southern Baghdad area of operations to conduct reconnaissance and offensive operations. For two months, 3rd ACR, partnering with the ISF, successfully conducted counterreconnaissance operations to deny enemy threat the ability to influence political and economic development within the capital city of Baghdad. During this time, 3rd ACR received orders to move their area of operations to the western region of the Nineawa Province. The regiment task-organized itself to conduct multiple operations across separate areas of operations. Ahead of the rest of the regiment, 2-3 ACR (Sabre Squadron) deployed to the Nineawa Province to conduct initial reconnaissance operations of the area of operations, including the city of Tall Afar. The regiment detached 3-3 ACR (Thunder Squadron), an engineer
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platoon, an attack aviation troop from 4-3 ACR (Longknife Squadron), a tank platoon from 1-3 ACR (Tiger Squadron), and Iraqi Army advisors from Tiger Squadron to remain in Southern Baghdad in order to support the 3rd Infantry Division. The remainder of the regiment moved to the Western Ninewa Province to begin operations against the highly organized enemy network that controlled the area.

From May to July 2005, Sabre Squadron developed an accurate intelligence picture of the situation inside the city of Tall Afar through effective reconnaissance operations that, on many occasions, required them to fight for information. The squadron, reinforced by a tank company from Tiger Squadron, took the fight to the enemies, resulting in some of the toughest urban combat seen by American troops up to that point. In the month of June alone, over 210 unconventional enemy attacks occurred within the city, which accounted for over ten percent of all attacks in the Iraqi theater of operations at the time. These attacks targeted the civilian population, with the intents to increase the sectarian divide and create a chaotic situation. Sabre Squadron refused to back down and began building positive relationships with the locals. This initiative led to the collection of accurate intelligence that, in turn, enabled 3rd ACR to understand the composition and disposition of the enemy occupying the city. Ahead of 3rd ACR’s arrival to the Ninewa Province, Sabre Squadron had already begun reestablishing the local government and reconstituting local police to set conditions for the large-scale, combined offensive with the ISF that 3rd ACR leadership understood as necessary to eliminate the enemy threat within Tall Afar.

As Sabre Squadron began to set conditions within Tall Afar, 3rd ACR leadership understood the need to set conditions across the surrounding region by establishing security outside the city. Tiger Squadron established itself in the area west of Tall Afar, where they liberated smaller cities and towns, effectively denying the use of these areas to the enemy threat and securing critical supply routes from the Syrian border to Tall Afar. Moving from location to location, Tiger Squadron reestablished security along the border, within the urban centers, and reconstituted ISF in those areas. Meanwhile, Longknife Squadron, the aviation squadron, conducted continuous reconnaissance and security operations across the surrounding desert region. With security in the surrounding region established, 3rd ACR had engineers construct an eight-foot-high berm around the city of Tall Afar, with the intents of isolating the enemy threat within the city and of funneling traffic through established security checkpoints. Conditions were set for 3rd ACR to execute Operation Restoring Rights.

Operation Restoring Rights was the combined offensive between 3rd ACR and the ISF to take back Tall Afar. Third ACR integrated over 5,500 Iraqi soldiers and police officers into this operation with the augmentation of 1 battalion from the 2nd Iraqi Army Division, 5 battalions from the 3rd Iraqi Army Division, an Iraqi Special Forces battalion, a commando brigade, and the Mosul Emergency Police Battalion. Tiger Squadron conducted reconnaissance from the western portion of the area of operations into Tall Afar, where they conducted a relief in place with Sabre Squadron. Tiger Squadron assumed responsibility of operations on the western side of Tall Afar, while Sabre Squadron conducted operations on the eastern side of the city. Augmented by the 2-325 Infantry Battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division, 3rd ACR’s ground forces began clearing out enemy threat. They actioned on areas and targets throughout the city, using intelligence gathered from the local population and detainees. Precision artillery and close air support enabled ground forces to clear out areas in which they encountered heavy resistance, allowing them to continue to conduct house-to-house searches for enemy threat. From 24 August to 23 September 2005, 3rd ACR and their ISF partners killed over 150 enemy fighters and captured another 800, while the enemy was attempting to flee the city.

The success achieved by the cooperation between 3rd ACR and the ISF emboldened Tall Afar’s population to retake control of the city, thereby denying the enemy the ability to establish another base from which to operate. Following the defeat of the enemy threat, Sabre Squadron and the 2-325 Infantry Battalion maintained security in Tall Afar and simultaneously recruited and trained a legitimate Iraqi police force. Tiger Squadron
maintained a guard along the Syrian border to deny foreign fighters the ability to influence Tall Afar, and they began rebuilding the Iraqi Border Police Brigade. With security reestablished, 3rd ACR then worked to reestablish essential services, and they reconstituted a legitimate, Iraqi local government and security force. ISF inside and outside Tall Afar gained confidence and eventually took the lead in operations across the province. The development of legitimate ISF facilitated increased HUMINT from the local population, which enabled ISF to action quickly on local tips of false passport shops, weapons smugglers, and other activities supporting the nontraditional enemy threats. With little assistance from coalition forces, the ISF successfully denied the enemy threat freedom of maneuver throughout the Ninewa Province.

During stability tasks, Cavalry units operate within the BCT’s area of operations. BCTs employ their Cavalry units to conduct route, area, and zone reconnaissance, as well as screen, guard, and area security (including route security) operations. This activity secures the affected population and answers BCT and higher PIRs. Cavalry units assist the commander and staff in visualizing and understanding the area of operations, and the external factors that may affect the area of operations.

6-18. While BCTs can assign Cavalry squadrons to their own area of operations for a period, the use of Cavalry as a maneuver unit instead of as a reconnaissance and security organization incurs risk of incomplete or inadequate reconnaissance and security operations. When assigned their own area of operations, Cavalry squadrons conduct tasks to support stability in the same manner as other maneuver units. However, the capabilities within the Cavalry squadron and its size make it ideal for employment as an economy of force for the BCT.

CAVALRY UNIT’S ROLE

6-19. The BCT commander relies heavily on the Cavalry squadron to conduct reconnaissance and security missions throughout all phases of stability operations. Force organization plays an integral part in stability operations and the commander uses force tailoring and task organization to get the right military force to conduct sustainment task operations.

SQUADRON

6-20. The Cavalry squadron can conduct reconnaissance and security operations to support stability tasks. The Cavalry squadron achieves these goals during all phases of stability tasks within the entirety of the higher echelon’s area of operations. Additionally, the BCT can assign the Cavalry squadron its own area of operations where it could be placed upon a border or boundary having enemy infiltration routes, which allows the squadron to conduct screen or guard tasks for the main body.

TROOP

6-21. The Cavalry troop conducts reconnaissance and security missions during stability tasks to answer PIRs, develop the commander’s understanding of the operational environment, and enable the squadron to shape the environment in the area of operations. The troop focuses reconnaissance efforts on gaining a detailed understanding of the operational environment’s sources of instability, and the capability and intentions of key actors as the unit moves from the initial response phase to the transformation phase of stability tasks. Specifically, the scout platoons collect information on civil considerations using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events and operational variables (PMESII-PT). Scout platoons work directly with unified action partners to assist in their efforts.

SUPPORT DURING STABILITY TASKS

6-22. Maneuver units require attachments to be optimally effective during stability operations. The nature of stability operations is complex; therefore, it requires diverse organizations with specialties to conduct reconnaissance and security operations.
FIELD ARTILLERY

6-23. Fires require the right amount of force precisely applied to the correct target during the stability operation phases. Fires, often conducted in densely populated areas of operations, create the requirement for well-integrated and rehearsed airspace de-confliction, clearance of fires, and precision strike mission processes. Implementing reasonable fire support coordination measures, updating them continuously, and ensuring highly accurate (typically 10 meter or less target location error) target locations increases the effectiveness of fires in a stability environment. Targeting is an integral part of stability tasks to synchronize nonlethal effects and to conduct engagement planning. Cavalry may use fires frequently to defend key geopolitical sites or strike high-payoff targets located near restrictive fire areas and densely populated locations with precision munitions. Fire support officers and joint fire observers’ ability to plan, coordinate, and execute fires often with precision munitions to support stability tasks are crucial to mission success. Increasing the proportion of precision munitions used in fires and employment of nonlethal capabilities may be necessary to limit collateral damage.

6-24. A precision-guided munition is a guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage (JP 3-03). Precision-guided munitions collectively refer to munitions that strike on reflected electromagnetic energy (such as Hellfire missiles) and precision munitions.

6-25. A precision munition is a munition that corrects for ballistic conditions using guidance and control up to the aimpoint or submunitions dispense with terminal accuracy less than the lethal radius of effects (FM 3-09). Munitions with a precision capability (such as the Global Positioning System-aided Excalibur 155-mm projectile, guided multiple launch rocket system rockets, and the advanced precision munitions initiative 120-mm mortar rounds) have a circular error probable of less than 10 meters. Munitions with a near-precision capability (such as the precision guidance kit fuze for 155-mm artillery projectiles) have a circular error probable between 10 and 50 meters. Area capabilities have a circular error probable greater than 50 meters. Circular error probable is an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. Circular error probable is a factor to determine probable damage to a target. Circular error probable is the radius of a circle within which half of the rounds fired at a target impact. Even at the munitions’ largest anticipated delivery error, the aimpoint is within the munitions’ anticipated radius of direct effects. The employment of precision munitions requires the use of current cryptological key information.

6-26. Rules of engagement often become more restrictive as phases of stability progress. Commander’s guidance for fires requires careful consideration during the development of the rules of engagement and engagement criteria. Units conducting reconnaissance and security operations must carefully consider the benefits and consequences of initiating fires or breaking contact if fires are initiated on the unit.

6-27. The BCT utilizes radars and indirect fire acquisition assets in a sensing mode that allows identifying the point of impact to protect friendly forces from indirect fire. These radars integrate with the air defense radar as part of the counter-rocket, artillery, mortar system that provides sense and warn capability for troop AAs and command posts. In areas subject to collateral damage, counterfire should employ precision munitions against well-located targets. The BCT must carefully consider the use of fires with munitions having only area capabilities due to the possible long-term adverse impact on relations with unified action partners and the indigenous population thereby contributing to sources of instability.

BRIGADE ENGINEER BATTALION

6-28. The BEB provides reconnaissance and security operational support during all phases of stability operations. Engineers provide mobility, countermobility, survivability, technical reconnaissance, and infrastructure assessment capabilities.

ENGINEERS

6-29. Engineer platoons task organize at the squad level to Cavalry units to support mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Engineer platoons can execute route and area reconnaissance organically. The route clearance platoon can provide mobility and limited disposal of mines. The support platoon or section can conduct initial infrastructure assessments and basic horizontal construction to restore services to support governance.
6-30. The engineer companies of the BEB can execute some stability tasks identified in reconnaissance and security operations as an organic unit throughout all phases of stability operations. If required by the commander, the BEB can conduct route and area reconnaissance, area security, patrols, limited raids, assessment and restoration of services and leader engagements.

6-31. Geospatial engineering teams can provide detailed products about the topography of a geographic area. Geospatial teams produce intelligence by analyzing images and geospatial data of terrain and various objects within a unit’s area of operations. These products can be analyzed and provided to Cavalry units to narrow the reconnaissance focus to specific objectives rather than a broad area.

**CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR**

6-32. Each squadron has an organic CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon that can execute CBRN-specific reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. The platoon supports route, zone, and area reconnaissance operations and can assess key infrastructure regarding CBRN hazards. The CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance platoon assesses possible threat locations and confirms or denies the presence of CBRN threats and hazards to assist with security operations.

**INTELLIGENCE**

6-33. Commanders must be involved and knowledgeable of the information collection efforts to narrow the reconnaissance focus and shape the operational environment. Planning for stability tasks is quite complicated, and planners need to balance resources, capabilities, and activities. BCT staffs analyze the significance of various activities over time to maximize their efforts to provide stability.

6-34. Commanders often require detailed intelligence and IPB products to determine how to conduct operations, influence the local population, and mitigate sources of instability. The identification and analysis of actors, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are critical to determining the most effective missions, tasks, and locations for stability tasks. A lack of knowledge concerning the enemy threat, local politics, customs, culture, and differentiating between local combatants often leads to actions that can result in unintended and disadvantageous consequences. To achieve this understanding, the BCT commander attaches collection assets to the Cavalry squadron.

6-35. During stability tasks, the disclosure of military information to host-nation personnel and agencies requires consideration. The BCT S-2 must ensure the BCT has the required amount of foreign disclosure officers. A foreign disclosure officer may approve the disclosure of classified and controlled, unclassified military information to foreign representatives based on the policies, directives, and laws that govern the national disclosure policy and the release of classified information. The officer provides this service to the command and staff and to assigned, attached, and supporting unified action partners.

6-36. Stability tasks occur in and between the local populations, thus human contact with the local population has greater emphasis and importance. Observations and experiences of Soldiers, who often work with the local population, provide depth and context to information collected through reconnaissance and security operations.

**Remote Sensors**

6-37. The BCT uses remote sensors to perform such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance, environmental monitoring (including radiological and nuclear), and target acquisition. Remote sensors are not a military intelligence collection asset; however, they provide information that the BCT uses to cue military intelligence collection assets to activity. The BCT should consider remote sensors when preparing the information collection plan. Soldiers or robotic vehicles hand-emplace them either inside or outside buildings or structures. Their optimal employment is in areas where major movement is restricted to a few key lines of communications, and the traffic pattern of military and civilian activity can be easily discriminated. Remote sensor missions are ideally suited to support relatively stable situations, such as long-term defensive or security operations, where the time and resources are available to develop an extensive sensor network throughout the area of operations.

6-38. The employment of sensors in open terrain or heavily congested urban concentrations requires detailed planning to ensure the sensor network can provide the desired information in those environments. For
stability tasks, sensors can provide surveillance of population centers and key infrastructure areas. They can also provide surveillance along the lines of communications and borders. The supported unit’s information collection plan includes provisions for sensor surveillance. Incorporating remote sensors into the information collection plan utilizes the employment concept and detailed instructions to execute remote sensor missions. BCTs develop requirements for sensor employment along with concepts for the monitoring and dissemination of sensor data and incorporate them into the information collection plan. The establishment of a comprehensive sensor network requires time and a significant investment of resources. During the planning requirements task, the operations and intelligence-working group identify SIRs that remote sensors can answer. As part of the information collection plan, the sensor surveillance plan specifies the—
- Type and location of sensors, relays, and monitoring sites.
- Time of emplacement and unit responsible for emplacing each sensor string and any relays.
- Time of recovery and unit responsible for recovery.

**Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade**

6-39. Expeditionary military intelligence brigades (known as E-MIBs) conduct multi-discipline intelligence operations during large-scale combat operations. E-MIB headquarters are required to exercise mission command over all assigned and attached elements. E-MIB headquarters provide reach capability, establish and maintain the corps intelligence architecture, and execute technical control of various capabilities. The size and composition of the deployed E-MIB and its subordinate organization is dependent on the mission required to be performed in-theater. An E-MIB provides the following capabilities—
- Analysis.
- Processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
- Open-source intelligence.
- SIGINT and electromagnetic warfare integration.
- Counterintelligence collection and activities.
- Multidomain operations sensing and target development.

6-40. E-MIBs can augment corps, division, and BCT intelligence cells, specifically aiding the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of national and theater SIGINT and geospatial intelligence. Instead of deploying the E-MIB as a unit to conduct independent intelligence operations to support the corps, the corps commander, as part of force tailoring during planning, task organizes the E-MIB to support operations. The corps assistant chief of staff for intelligence (G-2) advises the commanders of the E-MIB’s capabilities and recommends how to task-organize its assets.

**SUSTAINMENT**

6-41. Stability tasks require unique sustainment considerations. Commanders must remember that the design of the BSB supports only the BCT’s assigned Soldiers and equipment. Reconnaissance units often identify sources of instability that sustainment efforts can mitigate or shape immediately with a sustainment effort. If the BSB develops stability support plans, the BSB commander must ensure that sustainment estimates differentiate what is supporting internal BCT requirements and what is supporting external stability support mission requirements. Sustainment during stability tasks often involves supporting U.S. forces, multinational forces, and other contributing partners in a wide range of missions and tasks.

**INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES**

6-42. Cavalry and other units conducting reconnaissance and security operations during stability tasks often determine that they are not the first organization operating in the area. Units conducting reconnaissance and security operations can gain a better understanding through coordination and information and intelligence sharing with unified action partners. Below are some unified action partners that units can coordinate with during stability—
- SOF.
- Civil affairs.
- Governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

6-43. Conventional forces build relationships and foster interdependence with U.S. SOF operating in the area. Interdependence is the deliberate and mutual reliance of one unified action partner on another’s inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects. These units execute different tactical tasks to support the operational objectives and end states to stabilize the area. BCTs rely on interdependence with unified action partners and SOF partnerships to combat sources of instability. The exercise of interdependence facilitates shared understanding between the U.S. actors in the operational environment. Interdependence provides a conduit by which the interagency and SOF partners can provide relevant, useful, and timely information. Planning efforts, update briefs, and working groups are specific events where BCTs incorporate their interagency partners. (Refer to FM 6-05 for more information on conventional forces and SOF integration, interoperability, and interdependence.)

**CIVIL AFFAIRS**

6-44. Civil affairs support to stability tasks depends on the nature of the operation and the condition of the affected indigenous population and institutions. The S-9 and civil affairs units continually assess and monitor the host nation’s capabilities and capacity to identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within society and, as required, apply functional skills which are usually the responsibility of civil government. Civil affairs conduct civil reconnaissance and develop civil information through interaction with the indigenous population, institutions, and unified action partners. During the transition from primarily offensive and defensive operations to primary stability operations, civil affairs units place greater emphasis on infrastructure restoration, economic stability, and support to governance expertise.

**GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

6-45. Units conducting reconnaissance operations must recognize the value of governmental and nongovernmental organizations and build effective relationships with these actors. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations could provide subject matter expertise in many essential services and governance topics. They are the primary provider of humanitarian, infrastructure, and essential services in immature operational environments. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations have experience and detailed knowledge of the civil environment and may have an understanding of civil considerations other than indigenous population and institutions. This insight can assist the civil reconnaissance effort in understanding and shaping the environment.

6-46. Understanding where governmental and nongovernmental organizations are on the battlefield and the nature of their activities develops a common operational picture. The common operational picture enables the commander and staff to anticipate changes to the operational environment, to anticipate the effects of governmental and nongovernmental organizations on primary stability tasks and operations, and to anticipate future friction points between the organizations. Building relationships with governmental and nongovernmental organizations may be difficult because these organizations are reluctant to establish associations with U.S. forces. The Cavalry must be mindful of the organizations’ reluctance and establish relationships on terms beneficial to all parties involved. Cavalry units frequently discover governmental and nongovernmental organizations unexpectedly within the operational environment so they should plan to encounter them during their operations.

6-47. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations can bring valuable resources, information regarding the civil population, the operational environment, and alternative perspectives to the brigade’s stability operation. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.) Cavalry units operating with nongovernmental organizations follow these guidelines:

- Military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities.
- Military personnel make prior arrangements before visiting nongovernmental organizations.
- Military personnel do not refer to nongovernmental organizations as “force multipliers” or “partners” or other similar terms.
- U.S. forces respect a nongovernmental organization’s decision not to serve as an implementing partner.
SECTION III – ARMY STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

6-48. Army stability operations tasks are fundamental and are performed across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. Military forces execute Army stability operations tasks before, during, or after conflict to support a legitimate host-nation government, to assist a fragile state, or in the absence of a functioning civil authority. Each situation is unique. Each Army stability task and stability sector contains a number of related subordinate tasks.

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY STABILITY TASKS

6-49. BCTs conduct stability tasks to create conditions the local population regards as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable (see ADP 3-07). BCTs conduct continuous reconnaissance operations during stability tasks to develop information requirements, gain situational understanding of their area of operations, identify sources of conflict and instability, and identify opportunities to consolidate sustainable and positive gains. Reconnaissance and security operations assist the commander and staff with determining short-term impacts and long-term effects on their area of operations. Commanders then assess the effectiveness of their actions and adjust as needed.

6-50. BCT commanders consider each primary stability task and associated subtasks within the context of their particular area of operations (see figure 6-1). They also consider the perception of the local population and host-nation governance and security forces. The six Army primary stability operations tasks are—

- Establish civil security.
- Support to civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct security cooperation.
**Figure 6-1. Stability tasks**

**Establish Civil Security**

6-51. The burden on BCTs for establishing civil security is highest during the initial response phase of the stability framework when the host nation lacks the capability or capacity to provide security. BCTs conduct
reconnaissance operations to collect information and conduct security operations to protect friendly units, the local population, key actors, and key terrain to enable the establishment of civil security. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.) BCTs and subordinate units execute zone and area reconnaissance operations to identify sources of instability affecting civil security. Companies and troops conduct route reconnaissance missions to support area security operations and retain freedom of maneuver within the area of operations. BCTs identify sources of instability and identify key terrain to facilitate the commander and staff’s understanding of the area of operations, and to plan and execute stability mechanisms. The commander uses reconnaissance operations to make informed decisions about allocating resources to each subordinate to establish civil security.

6-52. BCTs conduct security operations to control borders, secure boundaries and provide freedom of movement, and to protect the main body, key personnel, and key facilities. Noncontiguous operations complicate the BCT’s ability to conduct security operations because potential threats use the civilian population as cover. BCTs employ mounted and dismounted patrols, engage with the local population, and employ aerial reconnaissance and observation posts to provide early warning, identify threats, and create opportunities. Security operations facilitate manageable transitions between stability framework phases and create dilemmas for threats that seek to undermine sustainable progress.

6-53. Area security operations are essential to stability tasks because they degrade the enemy’s ability to affect friendly units, host-nation governance and security forces, key leaders, and key facilities. BCTs conduct area security operations to preserve the higher commander’s freedom of maneuver, protect key infrastructure and leaders, and deny threats access and opportunity to disrupt progress. BCTs establish security zones around critical infrastructure, airfields, facilities, MSR’s, lines of communication, towns, equipment, and high-value assets. Combined security operations with host-nation partners enable a transition to the transformation phase of the stability framework by empowering host-nation security and bolstering legitimacy.

6-54. During the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, the host-nation government assumes responsibility for securing its borders and for internal movement control. Remaining Army units consist of advisors or, in some cases, BCTs or battalions positioned as a deterrent against external threats. Advisors continue to help improve host-nation capacities as part of the larger security force assistance program. Potential external threats may cause military forces to conduct operations to confirm or deny threat intentions.

**SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL**

6-55. Civil control centers on rule of law. Civil control provides training and support to law enforcement and judicial personnel to promote efforts to rebuild host-nation judiciary and corrections systems. Units conducting reconnaissance identify critical resources, influential pillar organizations, or leaders, sources of instability, and unified action partners operating in the BCT’s area of operations to support establishing civil control. During the initial response phase, BCTs may be required to assist host-nation partners in building interim solutions to establish civil control, which builds upon host-nation governance. Security gains capacity and capability transitioning to the transformation phase.

6-56. Establishing security and rebuilding justice institutions develops conditions for reconciliation, public confidence, and subsequent economic growth. BCTs secure key infrastructure, identify key actors, and disrupt enemy forces. Reconnaissance tasks identify viable and working systems of government as well as gaps in civil control. Identification of government strengths and weaknesses focus efforts to collaborate with host-nation security forces and assist host-nation governance in providing viable security and services. Units conducting security tasks support civil control by interdicting threat activity seeking to subvert the local rule of law or legitimacy of an interim government through intimidation, corruption, or coercion.

6-57. During the transformation phase of the stability framework, BCTs continue to conduct operations with unified action partners with efforts focused on building partner capacity. Reconnaissance tasks support civil control by identifying local population perceptions and acceptance of host-nation governance and security forces, adequacy of local infrastructure security and viability, sources of corruption, indicators of progress or regression, and acceptance and adherence to the rule of law. Security tasks support civil control by providing early warning to threats on infrastructure, facilities, and leaders and assessments of host-nation capabilities.
6-58. BCTs transition to supporting civil control and host-nation independence during the fostering of stability phases. BCTs maintain an ability to assist host-nation forces when needed and according to the rules of engagement and status of forces agreement restrictions if applicable. Sustainable gains allow host-nation partners to conduct civil control with minimal input from the BCT.

**RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES**

6-59. Using stability operations to restore essential services contributes to the social well-being of the population. BCTs conduct area and zone reconnaissance to identify areas requiring assistance to repair or rebuild, identify public health hazards or outbreaks, and verify locations and dispositions of displaced civilians who require aid and support but have no access to key services. BCTs identify popular perceptions of legitimacy through censuses and engagement with the local population. Route reconnaissance identifies mobility corridors to facilitate sustainment operations, humanitarian services and support to outlying or urban areas, evacuation routes for noncombatant evacuation operations, and freedom of movement and maneuver. Units conducting security operations support the primary Army stability task of restoration of essential services. Units conduct area security operations independently or they partner with host-nation security forces.

6-60. During the transformation phase, BCTs conduct reconnaissance operations in concert with host-nation security partners to identify sources of instability adversely affecting host-nation partners to meet the needs of the populace. Security forces screen or guard infrastructure projects, provide security to outlying areas and local government infrastructure, services, and leaders. Security forces also identify enemy safe havens or sources of support.

**SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE**

6-61. During the initial response phase, the BCT may function as the transitional military authority to establish governmental services and work with established governmental authorities, if any are present, to increase capability. BCTs conduct security operations to protect governing officials, key facilities, and eventually, polling locations.

6-62. During the transformation phase, the BCT begins to transition its responsibility for governance to civilian authority. In some cases, authority transfers to host-nation representatives that may or may not be the same host-nation government before the operation. As host-nation institutions develop, the BCT continues to collect information indicating good governance through advising, assisting, and supporting host-nation partners as well as identifying sources of instability and corruption that seek to disrupt or degrade effective governance. BCTs conduct reconnaissance operations to identify effective and ineffective governing bodies, to identify locations for potential polling and elections, and to maintain freedom of movement and maneuver. BCTs conduct security operations to protect governing officials, key facilities, and polling locations. BCTs conduct guard missions to protect polling boxes and election officials during the transformation phase to prevent enemy disruption on the civilian population.

6-63. BCTs eventually transfer governance to host-nation authorities and authority for governance reducing BCTs’ involvement with established governments and transition partnerships to State or other government agencies. Reconnaissance and security operations transfer to appropriate host-nation security forces though BCTs continue to monitor governance developments and identify concerns to host-nation authorities and U.S. chains of command.

**SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT**

6-64. BCTs identify infrastructure damage early in the stability framework’s initial response phase so commanders have the information they need as they conduct area assessments. While airborne and space platforms may provide imagery of damaged infrastructure, ground-based reconnaissance operations clarify the scope of the problem. BCTs assess the local impact and feelings of people in the area to make recommendations to higher headquarters on the importance of repair and development when multiple pieces of infrastructure need attention. Cavalry units must consider cultural aspects when conducting reconnaissance and shaping the environment regarding key infrastructure.
INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE

6-65. The protection of natural resources and the environment may become tasks for the BCT during the initial response phase. In Iraq the willful burning of oil wells, damage to the oil pipeline infrastructure and the deliberate leaking of oil into the Persian Gulf are examples of incidents during the initial response phase. These incidents resulted in ground forces conducting reconnaissance and security missions over large areas to deter further incidents. The long-term macroeconomic recovery and development of a nation can depend on a small number of critical pieces of infrastructure.

TRANSFORMATION PHASE

6-66. Multiple external specialist agencies participate in this task during the transformation phase. The transformation phase aims to establish the foundation for sustainable economic development and begin to transition control of economic growth to U.S. Government civil agencies, international civil agencies, and host-nation economic officials and entrepreneurs. BCTs’ balance of effort switches to security missions to support specialists who do the detailed work to facilitate economic and infrastructure development. Cavalry units’ probable mission sets include—

- Screen or guard critical infrastructure.
- Screening of a border area to prevent external actors adversely affecting economic development.
- Conducting zone or area reconnaissance with a reconnaissance focus on social and economic indicators.
- Route security so economic activity can take place in a safe and secure environment.

6-67. During the transformation phase, there may be an opportunity to expand the area of interest. Cavalry units continue to report infrastructure issues and economic activity in existing and new areas of operations.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY PHASE

6-68. In the fostering sustainability phase, the goal is to institutionalize a long-term sustainable economic development program and to transition control of the economy to host-nation officials, entrepreneurs, and civil society. This phase includes follow-on steps, which develop and reinforce the successes of the initial response and transformation phase. Steps taken during this phase support sustainable economic growth based on healthy communities and neighborhoods supporting a healthy society.

CONDUCT SECURITY COOPERATION

6-69. Security cooperation is Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners (JP 3-20). The U.S. military’s security cooperation organization often coordinates security cooperation in a country.
Chapter 7

Sustainment

Sustainment units synchronize and execute sustainment operations to support units conducting reconnaissance, security, and stability operations under all conditions. Cavalry squadrons frequently operate in locations distant from their organic sustaining base. These Cavalry squadrons carry a configured load or are task organized with assets to ensure their sustainment until another unit can relieve them. Generally, units conducting reconnaissance and security operations have self-sustainment capability for up to 72 hours. Units conducting reconnaissance and security operations and sustainment staffs must anticipate future sustainment needs. An accurate estimate allows forces to retain freedom of movement and action along the entire width and depth of extended and contested lines of operation.

SECTION I – OVERVIEW

7-1. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). The purpose of the Army’s logistics system is to sustain combat power on a continuous basis as far forward as possible. Sustainment principles and fundamentals, as well as roles and responsibilities, remain the same for all types of operations at the BCT-level and below. (Refer to ADP 4-0 for sustainment principles and fundamentals.) Successful sustainment planning and execution to support reconnaissance and security operations at the BCT level and below provides commanders with the flexibility required to develop the situation in close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations.

7-2. Reconnaissance and security operations executed at the BCT level involve fast-paced, wide-ranging operations requiring a rapid transition from one mission to another. Such operations involve extended lines of support, higher consumption rates, and present unique challenges to the BCT sustainment units’ ability to support and sustain reconnaissance and security operations. Based on the nature of their missions, BCT sustainment units may require EAB support and other nonorganic assets to support reconnaissance and security operations.

7-3. In most cases, a BSB’s FSC is in direct support of a squadron-sized unit conducting reconnaissance and security operations. Smaller reconnaissance organizations may have task-organized forward logistics elements (FLEs) in a direct, support sustainment role. A BCT conducting a cover operation has an organic BSB but may require augmentation from the division sustainment. The key to reconnaissance and security operations is a fully planned, war-gamed, and rehearsed support concept.

SECTION II – PLANNING

7-4. Reconnaissance and security operations present unique challenges to sustainment staff planners. Planners need to consider many factors as they develop their support concepts. Challenges include the terrain and enemy situation, friendly situation, type of reconnaissance and security operation, levels of aggressiveness and pace, and duration of the operation. Planners consider the positioning of sustainment assets based on known friendly and predicted enemy actions, distances, and on-order requirements.

7-5. Sustainment plans for reconnaissance and security operations vary greatly according to the maneuver commander’s guidance for the tempo of the operation. For instance, stealthy reconnaissance operations may require a majority of pre-positioned stocks and the reliance on covered or concealed resupply routes to remain undetected. However, forceful reconnaissance operations where detection is not a concern may facilitate
routine sustainment operations, such as LOGPACs, on any trafficable route at any hour of the day. Sustainment planners should conduct frequent coordination with adjacent units. LOGPACs may be required to pass forward and rearward through other units’ areas of operations and passage lanes beyond the squadron rear boundary. Often, adjacent unit sustainment assets may be closer to units performing reconnaissance and security that can best conduct recovery, evacuation, and emergency resupply.

7-6. Sustainment planners for reconnaissance and security operations must be aware of the enemy situation and threat level as units conduct these missions forward of friendly lines. High-payoff targets to enemy forces include sustainment vehicles, equipment, and support areas (such as fuel tankers, billets, and FARPs, respectively). Planners should consider intervisibility lines, covered and concealed positions for support areas, and covered and concealed routes for logistic package operations.

7-7. The lead sustainment planner in a maneuver battalion or Cavalry squadron is the S-4 assisted by the battalion or brigade personnel staff officer (S-1), a medical planner, and the BSB FSC commander. Representatives from these elements form the sustainment-planning cell ensuring integrated sustainment plans in all operational planning. The S-1 may have a representative at or near the aid station to monitor casualty operations. For reconnaissance and security missions above the battalion level, the majority of sustainment planning occurs in the brigade S-4 in close coordination with the BSB support operations section and FSC commanders.

PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS AND PROCEDURES

7-8. Planners integrate sustainment planning into all operational planning and synchronize the concept of sustainment support with other areas of the operations concept. Planning is continuous and concurrent with ongoing support execution. BCT sustainment personnel (such as the S-4, S-1, surgeon, and FSC commander) actively participate in the unit’s maneuver planning process, including course of action development and war-gaming. The goal is to ensure support during all phases of an operation.

7-9. To provide effective support, sustainment planners and operators understand the mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. The S-4, with input from the FSC and headquarters and headquarters troop commanders, the medical service officer, and the squadron executive officer handles production of paragraph 4 (Sustainment) of the OPORD, which includes the following:

- Commander’s reconnaissance and security sustainment priorities.
- Sustainment overlay.
- Supply routes.
- Logistics release points.
- CASEVAC points.
- Maintenance collection points.
- Class III and class V resupply during the mission if necessary.
- Movement criteria and triggers for logistics nodes.

7-10. To predict support requirements, sustainment planners determine the following:

- Type of support required.
- Quantities of support required.
- Priority of support by type and unit.

7-11. After determining the support requirements, sustainment planners assess—

- Sustainment resources available (organic and supporting).
- Status of the sustainment resources (location, maintenance, and personnel status).
- Time sustainment resources are available to the unit.
- Configuration of resources and methods of distribution available.

7-12. Based on facts and assumptions, planners develop the sustainment estimate for the operation. The sustainment estimate is the formal, detailed analysis of the sustainment that supports an operation. During execution, planners use a running estimate to provide information to the commander.
7-13. To facilitate rapid planning, Force XXI Battle Command, brigade and below provides sustainment planners with reports to assist in planning. Supplemented by their actual operational experience, sustainment planners take advantage of—

- Running estimates, status charts, and automatic estimation tools.
- Updated status reports when the commander issues a WARNORD.
- Established planning factors, historical data, and data tailored for their unit.
- Procedures and organizations specified in the SOPs.

LOGISTICS

7-14. Logistics consist of supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, operational contract support, general engineering support, and distribution. Supply operations consider all classes of supply. For units conducting reconnaissance and security operations, usually classes III (B) (petroleum, oil, and lubricants [bulk]), IV (construction materials), V, VIII (medical), and IX are priority items for replenishment.

7-15. The BCT will limit or suspend most field services during reconnaissance and security operations. Field services are those essential services for enhancing the quality of life of Soldiers. They include clothing repair and exchange, laundry and shower support, mortuary affairs, aerial delivery, and field feeding. The only field service provided to maneuver units during reconnaissance and security operations is field feeding. The FSC provides field-feeding support. Logistics organizations at EAB coordinate and provide all other field services.

7-16. Maintenance is all actions taken to retain material in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. The Army utilizes a tiered, two-level maintenance system composed of field and sustainment maintenance. Field maintenance is on system maintenance, repair, and return to the user including maintenance actions performed by operators (FM 4-30). Mechanics and technicians organic to the BSB FSC maintenance platoon and the BSB field maintenance company perform field maintenance, and at times, from EAB. The unit maintenance officer and FSC, perform maintenance management including determining and utilizing battle damage assessment and repair, evacuation, and controlled exchange. (Refer to ATP 4-33 for more information.) Battle damage assessment and repair occurs at the point of fault or at the maintenance collection point. Battle damage assessment and repair properly applied at the point of fault may immediately return the equipment to a mission-capable status or prolong its functional life, which may be critical to maintaining combat power during reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to ATP 4-31 for more information.) Maintenance planners recognize that an information requirement regarding the decision to echelon the combat trains forward is influenced by the amount of activity in the maintenance collection point. The maintenance collection point should maintain mobility so that it may support the reconnaissance or security mission at extended ranges.

7-17. Transportation support for units conducting reconnaissance and security operations is coordinated through the unit S-4 and FSC to the BSB support operations officer. Many transportation requirements exceed organic assets and require support from EAB transportation units.

7-18. Operational contract support occurs during all phases of operations and has increased emphasis during stability operations and area security missions. Trained and ready contracting officer representatives, field-ordering officers, and paying agents are a necessity to most units. These personnel are part of a larger acquisition team at higher echelons, which include the contract and financial management experts who provide guidance and direction to each field ordering officer and paying agent to meet the unit’s needs.

7-19. The S-4 coordinates general engineering support through the BCT S-3. Engineering support includes engineering capabilities and activities excluding combat engineering that modifies, maintains, or protects the physical environment. Examples include facility construction, repair, maintenance, and operation.

7-20. Logistics distribution to units conducting reconnaissance and security operations is either routine or emergency. Whenever possible, units conduct routine resupply daily based on METT-TC (I) utilizing either throughput, logistics release point, or supply point distribution methods.
Chapter 7

Routine Resupply

7-21. Routine resupply is operations that are planned based on projected or actual consumption rates received through reporting. Routine resupply includes LOGPAC operations, aerial delivery, and operational contract support.

Logistics Package Operations

7-22. The logistic package is a centrally organized resupply convoy originating from field trains. The field trains transport the supplies needed to sustain a unit for a specific time, until the next scheduled LOGPAC.

7-23. Logistics planners utilize anticipation to standardize push packages as much as possible to provide all units with sufficient quantities. Accurate logistics reporting, along with the commander’s guidance and priorities, allows logistics planners to forecast supply requirements quickly. Inaccurate, incomplete, or untimely logistics status and situation reporting can severely handicap efforts to balance unit requirements and available supplies. This reduces the amount of time a unit can continue conducting reconnaissance and security operations. Planners must also consider the likely increased width and depth at which reconnaissance and security operations occur, as this can drastically affect consumption rates and LOGPAC operational timelines.

Aerial Delivery

7-24. Units can use aerial delivery, which is an essential sustainment operation, to support reconnaissance and security missions. Aerial delivery operations reduce the risks associated with conducting ground resupply. Units can conduct aerial delivery in various operational environments where terrain limits access. Aerial delivery operations include sling-load, airdrop, and air-land procedures. The type and availability of aircraft limits aerial delivery. Aerial delivery may also compromise locations of units conducting reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to ATP 4-48 for more information.)

Operational Contract Support

7-25. Units may use operational contract support to assist units conducting reconnaissance and security operations. Operational variables and mission variables are considerations that affect employment of contract support during reconnaissance and security operations. (Refer to ATP 4-10 for more information.)

Emergency Resupply

7-26. Emergency resupply operations may utilize any of the distribution methods with expedited distribution. Units conduct emergency resupply using the fastest appropriate means based on METT-TC (I). Emergency resupply may involve classes I (rations and gratuitous issue of health, morale, and welfare items), III, V, VIII, and IX. Aerial delivery is the fastest method to conduct emergency resupply, but may be limited due to aircraft availability and other circumstances. Usually, the FSC’s supply and transportation platoon located in the combat trains conduct emergency resupply. Pre-rigged loads of standard resupply packages may reduce the response time for emergency resupply. (Refer to ATP 4-45 and ATP 4-48 for details about rigging supplies for airdrop.)

Personnel Services

7-27. Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force, maintain Soldier and Family readiness, promote the moral and ethical values of the nation, and enable the fighting qualities of the Army (ADP 4-0). Personnel services that are essential to units conducting reconnaissance and security operations include personnel accountability and strength reporting, casualty operations, and religious support. The unit S-1 and the squadron unit ministry team provide personnel services to the units. (Refer to ADP 4-0 and FM 1-0 for more information.)

Casualty Operations

7-28. Casualty operations during reconnaissance and security operations present unique challenges to units. Units must rehearse casualty operations before commencement. Casualty operations include production,
dissemination, coordination, validation, and synchronization of information regarding each casualty. Casualty information includes casualty reporting, casualty notification, casualty assistance, line-of-duty determination, disposition of remains, and disposition of personal effects, military burial honors, and casualty mail coordination.

7-29. As casualties occur, the nearest observer informs the unit first sergeant via the most expedient means. The unit first sergeant submits a personnel status report to the squadron S-1 documenting duty status changes. The unit first sergeant classifies casualties by injury type at the casualty collection point and enters them into the medical treatment system. The first sergeant ensures completed DA Form 1156 (Casualty Feeder Card) is forwarded to the S-1 who then enters the data into the Defense Casualty Information Processing System.

7-30. Platoon combat medics record the treatment the casualty received on the casualty’s DA Form 7656 (Tactical Combat Casualty Care [TCCC] Card) by electronic means or by utilizing a DD Form 1380 (Tactical Combat Casualty Care [TCCC] Card), if available. The squadron S-1 receives notifications updating the Soldier’s patient tracking status as changes occur, and in turn, informs the Soldier’s troop for accountability.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

7-31. Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Army. Additionally, as directed, provide support in other Services, agencies, and organizations. This includes casualty care (encompassing a number of Army Medical Department functions—organic and area medical support, hospitalization, the treatment aspects of dental care and behavioral/neuropsychiatric treatment, clinical laboratory services, and treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients), medical evacuation, and medical logistics (FM 4-02). Squadrons have an organic medical platoon consisting of an ambulance squad and treatment squad equipped to provide mobile medical treatment and ground medical evacuation to the combat casualty. Combat medics provide tactical combat casualty care to wounded Soldiers. Squadrons assign combat medics under the operational control of the platoon and under the technical supervision of the squadron surgeon and squadron physician assistant.

7-32. Additionally, a forward resuscitative and surgical detachment may be attached to the BSB medical company to provide a rapidly, deployable, immediate surgical capability as a result of an extended battlefield for those critically injured patients who cannot be transported over great distances without surgical intervention and stabilization. Further Army Health System support at EAB may be available from the supporting medical brigade (support).

7-33. The brigade surgeon, in coordination with the BSB medical company commander, develops the health service support portion of the brigade’s support concept. The S-1, S-4, and medical platoon leader should participate in the concept development rehearsal before execution.

SOLDIER EVACUATION

7-34. Squadrons conduct reconnaissance and security missions over wide and extended areas. The squadron must place careful attention on the location of medical treatment facilities and the availability of medical evacuation platforms (air and ground) against time-distance factors when developing the support operation concept and should realize the nearest aid station may not be their own. Casualties may need to be transported to another battalion’s aid station. This must be considered during planning.

Medical Evacuation

7-35. Medical evacuation is the timely and effective movement of the wounded and injured. Medical professionals perform evacuation using dedicated, standardized, medical evacuation platforms. Medical professionals provide timely, efficient movement and en route care of injured or ill persons to medical treatment facilities. Medical evacuation ground and air ambulance platforms are platforms designed especially for the medical evacuation mission, with allocated medical equipment to provide en route care by trained medical personnel.
7-36. The medical evacuation plan is a crucial part of the medical operational plan or OPORD. The brigade surgeon section handles development of the BCT medical evacuation plan. The medical evacuation plan identifies ambulance exchange points and casualty collection points. Support graphics in Force XXI Battle Command, brigade and below display these locations. Additional ambulance support is coordinated with the supporting sustainment unit operations section and the supporting medical company.

7-37. While the platoon medics and platoon sergeant evacuate casualties from the point of injury to the troop, casualty collection point, the troop first sergeant or troop medics handle medical evacuation of patients from the troop, casualty collection point to the aid station. The squadron conducts reconnaissance and security operations over wide and extended areas ; therefore, the BCT squadron and troop medical planners must consider using adjacent unit aid stations. Ambulance teams from the supporting medical company evacuate patients from the aid station back to the role 2 medical treatment facility located in the BSA. The pre-positioning of ambulance teams with the aid station reduces ambulance turnaround times. Medical evacuation of patients should be no further than their condition requires so they can return to duty as soon as possible.

7-38. The preferred method of medical evacuation is by air, but air evacuation is dependent upon aircraft availability and the mission variables of METT-TC (I). Ground evacuation is the primary method of evacuation. The evacuation platoon provides area support to all units in the supported area. The brigade aviation element and surgeon, in conjunction with higher headquarters, coordinates the use of air medical evacuation (see figure 7-1).

7-39. Medical planners anticipate the potential for high casualty rates, long evacuation distances, and adverse weather when developing the medical evacuation plan. They identify and coordinate ambulance exchange points for all operations, including the locations of ambulance exchange points for all phases of each operation. Medical assets need planned triggers. For example, when the forward element reaches a certain PL, they trigger the medical assets to advance to their next designated location. Planners retain the flexibility to shift nonstandard evacuation assets to support mass casualties or CASEVACs when required. Plans and exercises should include any available air evacuation to transport urgent litter patients.

**Figure 7-1. Process for evacuation of the wounded**

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**Legend:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Ambulance Control Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXP</td>
<td>Ambulance Exchange Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAS</td>
<td>Battalion Aid Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSMC</td>
<td>Brigade Support Medical Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Casualty Collection Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Medical Company (Area Support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Point of Injury</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note. Although the role 3 hospital is a medical brigade asset dependent upon the scenario and area of operations, the combat support hospital could be located closer to the patient or located in the area of operations laterally (central) to a role 2 facility. Depending upon the severity of the injury, location of appropriate medical treatment facilities, and available clinical specialties that the patient may require based on clinical judgment, the role 2 medical treatment facility (with or without fire support task) may be bypassed and a particular role 3 element selected as the medical evacuation destination for a particular patient with particular injuries. (Refer to FM 4-02, ATP 4-02.2, and ATP 4-02.10 for more information.)

Casualty Evacuation

7-40. CASEVAC involves the unregulated movement of casualties using predesignated tactical or logistic aircraft and vehicles. These vehicles and aircraft are not staffed with medical personnel and organic medical equipment for en route care unless augmentation is planned in the operational plan. If the combat medic is not available to provide care en route, the combat lifesaver may accompany the casualties to monitor their condition.

CASEVAC

Casualties transported in nonmedical vehicles may not receive proper medical care during transport. If the casualty’s medical condition deteriorates during transport, or the casualty is not transported to the appropriate medical treatment facility, an adverse impact on prognosis and long-term disability or death may result.

SUPPORT AREAS

7-41. A logistics support area is a designated location where sustainment elements, some staff elements, and other elements locate to support unit operations. Support areas represent an echelon of support. The method employed to echelon support is a deliberate, collaborative decision, based upon thorough mission analysis and the MDMP conducted by the leadership and staffs at the brigade, squadron, and troop levels. The primary support area for units conducting reconnaissance and security operations is the BSA. Trains are echeloned forward to provide fluid support to units conducting reconnaissance and security operations. The positioning of FLEs and FARPs are essential to reconnaissance sustainment planning.

TRAINS

7-42. Trains are a grouping of unit personnel, vehicles, and equipment organized to provide sustainment. Units use the trains concept to arrange their subordinate sustainment elements. Squadron combat trains are usually under the control of the headquarters and headquarters troop commander or the S-4 and assisted by the S-1. Squadron field trains are under control of the FSC commander. Troop trains are usually under control of the troop commander or executive officer. The composition and location of unit trains vary depending upon the number of units attached to or augmenting the unit, as well as other mission variables. Trains have two basic configurations: as unit trains in one location (appropriate when the squadron consolidates during reconstitution and during major movements) or as echeloned trains. Considerations include the following:

- The troop commander determines the troop trains, which may consist of the troop first sergeant, supply sergeant, and troop medical assets. Maintenance teams from the FSC may be included.
- The FSC forms the squadron field trains and portions of the squadron combat trains. The squadron commander and staff, the BSB commander and staff, and the FSC commander must collaborate to determine the best method of employment commensurate with the support brigade concept.

7-43. The trains should change locations frequently depending upon available time and terrain. The trains change locations to provide the forward support to the Cavalry unit, when an area becomes unusable because of environmental conditions, or to follow protection (survivability) operations.
**BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA**

7-44. The BSA is the sustainment hub of the BCT. Usually, the BSA is located near an MSR where there is minimum threat from enemy artillery and mortar fires. For this reason, the BSA usually locates far behind where units conducting reconnaissance and security operations are located. Normally, the BSA includes the BSB (less FSCs as applicable), the alternate command post for the higher headquarters (if formed), the squadron field trains, elements from adjacent units or separate companies, and other sustainment units from EAB.

**FORWARD LOGISTICS ELEMENT**

7-45. An FLE includes task organized, multifunctional logistics assets to address specific sustainment missions, which is characteristic of reconnaissance and security operations. The FLE operates from a forward logistics base or support area. The FLE represents the BSB commander’s ability to weigh the effort for the operation by drawing on all sustainment assets across the brigade. Additionally, the BSB commander may coordinate with EAB to provide support capabilities to augment the FLE in the concept of support. BSB support includes identifying and positioning EAB unit assets in proximity to geographically dispersed forces to extend the operational reach and prolong endurance. The intent for employing an FLE is to minimize tactical pauses to the reconnaissance and security plan and enable momentum for the commander.

**FORWARD ARMING AND REFueling POINT**

7-46. The FSC is organic to support aviation operations as required by the combined arms battalion. The FARPs employ to support aviation operations when the distance covered or endurance requirements exceed normal capabilities of the aircraft. (Refer to ATP 3-04.17 for more information.)

**SECURITY OF SUPPORT AREAS**

7-47. Within a support area, a designated unit provides area security, terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and required tactical combat forces. Area security operations focus on the protected force, base, base camp, route, or area, which allows sustainment units to focus on their primary function. When commanders utilize sustainment units for security operations, logistical operations may be adversely affected. Security of sustainment efforts during reconnaissance resupply is a critical factor to successful operations. (Refer to ADP 4-0 for more information.)

7-48. The security of the trains in the support area is the responsibility of the individual in charge of the trains. The best defense is to avoid detection. The following activities ensure trains security:

- Select sites that use available cover, concealment, and camouflage.
- Enforce strict movement and positioning discipline as well as noise and light discipline to prevent detection.
- Establish a perimeter defense using the occupy procedures for AAs.
- Establish rest plans.
- Identify an alarm or warning system that would enable rapid execution of the defense plan without further guidance. Usually, the SOP includes the alarm, warning system, and defense plan.
- Designate a reaction force.

**ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT**

7-49. Units conducting large-scale combat operations and reconnaissance and security operations require sustainment support from EAB sustainment units, particularly in maintenance and medical support. Typically, an EAB sustainment brigade provides support to units conducting reconnaissance and security operations. The unit conducting reconnaissance and security may require EAB units to provide water purification, petroleum storage, and transportation support. The medical brigade and the multifunctional medical battalion provide additional medical capability as needed. The FSC, in conjunction with the unit S-4, requests EAB assistance through the BSB. (Refer to ATP 4-93 for more information on the sustainment brigade and the combat sustainment support battalion.)
SECTION III – CONSIDERATIONS

7-50. Reconnaissance, security, and stability operations present significant challenges to sustainment organizations. Units conducting reconnaissance and security operations should consider increased days of supply on all vehicles, the location of trains, resupplying forward of the LD and line of contact, increased class V priority on indirect fires systems and class III (B), medical evacuation over greater distances and dispersed areas, and FLEs. Wide and deep reconnaissance and security operations have the potential to contact mass quantities of dislocated civilians and detainees as well as captured enemy ammunition and equipment, all of which require sustainment operational planning.

SUSTAINMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

7-51. Maintaining momentum is the overriding consideration when supporting reconnaissance and security operations. Specific considerations guide planning and preparation. Emphasis, priorities, and requirements may shift as the operation is underway. The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the operation becomes critical as the operation progresses. As reconnaissance elements advance, MSRs lengthen and communications are strained. Units conducting reconnaissance and security operations suspend most field service functions except for the increased distribution of ready-to-eat meals. Sustainment units are often at risk of compromising the stealth of the reconnaissance operation due to their footprint; therefore, reconnaissance plans must consider resupply methods that emphasize cover and concealment and the reduction in the frequency of resupply. Reconnaissance operations plan for the disposition of captured enemy supplies and equipment, particularly ammunition and vehicles.

7-52. Units conducting reconnaissance and security operations may receive support from additional CBRN platoons task organized to provide additional reconnaissance or decontamination support. Sustainment considerations for CBRN units supporting include coordinating push packages for unique equipment repair parts and consumables.

AREA AND ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

7-53. Units conducting area and zone reconnaissance should consider the echeloning of sustainment. Units should plan for the increased consumption of ammunition, petroleum, oils, and lubricants when pre-positioning trains. Planning consideration for refuel on the move, maintenance requirements, and push packages of preplanned and preconfigured essential logistics items should be part of the considerations in sustainment planning. Area and zone reconnaissance plans should account for an increase in vehicular maintenance, especially when operating over rough terrain, and mitigate risk through the positioning of maintenance support teams well forward. Unit distribution should occur at forward locations. Units should plan for aerial resupply. Area and zone reconnaissance plans include dispersed patient collection points and multiple ambulance exchange points. Units should coordinate increased class VIII consumption and augmentation of medical treatment elements. Sustainment units conducting resupply operations for units conducting reconnaissance must plan for and utilize all available resources for cover and concealment to mitigate the risk of enemy compromise.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

7-54. Sustainment for units conducting route reconnaissance consists of the same factors as area reconnaissance. Additionally, units plan for rapidly increasing distances and longer turn-around times for MSR operations. Units should consider recovering damaged vehicles only to the MSR for further recovery by higher headquarters’ assets.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

7-55. Units conducting reconnaissance in force should plan for increased consumption of classes III, V, and VIII, as well as forward located recovery and maintenance support. Direct and indirect fire contact is much more likely, given the nature of reconnaissance in force, which means units must be postured for rapid resupply and maintenance to continue the reconnaissance effort. During reconnaissance in force, unit commanders must also plan for the retrograde or reinforcement of the force, or the exploitation of success
which means estimating a higher consumption of classes III and V, or simply increasing the amount of emergency classes III and V resupply at the combat trains command post.

**SUSTAINMENT OF SECURITY OPERATIONS**

7-56. Security missions tend to be defensive in nature. Security operations must make the best use of available preparation time and sustainment resources. As with reconnaissance, emphasis on any particular consideration varies with the mission assigned and shifts during mission execution. Security missions include screen, guard, cover, and area security. As they are able, units conducting security operations utilize a deception plan for sustainment preparations and operations.

**SCREEN**

7-57. Screen operations can occur at any level. The FSC supports screen operations at the troop level. Sustainment planning for units conducting screen operations includes considerations for increased use of class III (B) and class V. Considerations for the pre-position of limited amounts of ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricant, and barrier material in centrally located forward positions should be included. Screening units conduct resupply during limited visibility to reduce the chance of enemy interference, and emergency resupply well forward duringulls in the battle or as required. Sustainment units supporting screen operations should select MSRs that do not interfere with the movement of maneuver units. Units should plan mobility operations to maintain MSRs. Plans should limit the forward flow of supplies to supplies essential for the operation only and should include the destruction of supplies and equipment (except medical) not evacuated. When time or the enemy situation constrains forward repair of equipment, screening units should prioritize recovery and evacuation of equipment to preclude loss to the enemy. Units should utilize all available noncombat vehicles to tow disabled vehicles.

**GUARD**

7-58. Units conduct guard operations at the battalion level and above. Sustainment planners for units conducting guard operations consider echeloning sustainment assets. Units conducting guard operations should plan for displacement of sustainment assets so uninterrupted support continues. Units conducting guard operations should understand that sustainment units cannot provide support while displacing. Units conducting guard operations use push packages of critical supplies on a scheduled basis and continues routine resupply until the using unit requests otherwise. Sustainment planners request additional sustainment assets from higher headquarters to support attachments or extended operations. Units conducting guard operations plan for displacement of support assets and supplies early to keep routes open and preclude unnecessary interference with maneuver units.

7-59. Since the guard force must protect the main body by fighting to gain time, while also forcing the enemy main body to deploy early, the guarding unit should prioritize forward repair of equipment as much as possible to avoid being decisively engaged. If displacing to avoid decisive engagement, units should prioritize recovery over forward repair until they reach a suitable time and location to continue forward repair. If units have met triggers for transition, they should prioritize recover and evacuation of equipment. In addition, because guarding is defensive in nature, guarding units should also plan for an increased usage of class IV material and supplies.

**COVER**

7-60. The BCT executes cover operations. Cover operations require full BSB sustainment support with the probability of echeloned support from above brigade, such as the sustainment brigade or medical brigade. Sustainment for units conducting covering operations consists of the same factors as the screen and the guard at the BCT level. Cover operations consider additional transportation requirements for the movement of all essential classes of supply. Cover operations consider a plan to compensate for lost sustainment capability, and as missions become more dynamic in execution, determining ways to increase the mobility of forward support assets to maintain pace with the unit. Cover operations anticipate greater numbers of civilians on the battlefield and detainees than screen or guard operations.
AREA SECURITY

7-61. Area security operational plans consider increasing their use of barrier materiel, lethal and nonlethal munitions, and operational contract support. The BSB supports area security missions. Many sustainment considerations in area security operations coincide with sustainment of stability tasks, such as the plan for and anticipation of detainees and dislocated civilians.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

7-62. Stability operations are required when there is no fully functional, legitimate, civil governing authority present in a theater of operations. Stability operations involve comprehensive efforts to stabilize states in crisis and to build the capacity of vulnerable states. Units conducting stability operations conduct a broad range of offensive and defensive tasks under the stability framework phases of initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. The BSB and EAB units support stability operations. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.)

7-63. During the initial response phase, units conducting stability operations should emphasize area security and immediate humanitarian needs. Units should understand medical eligibility of care requirements for the theater of operations, especially regarding civilians, dislocated civilians, and detainees. During transformation, units conducting stability operations may execute border control and boundary security operations over extended lines of communication that may require echeloned and area sustainment support beyond the capabilities of organic sustainment units.

SECTION IV – SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

7-64. Reconnaissance, security, and stability operations requirements are diverse; therefore, units conducting them are likely to receive attachments and detachments. Due to their diverse mission set, units conducting reconnaissance and security operations may consider special sustainment requirements for specific units.

ATTACHMENTS

7-65. When receiving attachments, sustainment planners should receive or obtain some basic information from the sending unit’s S-4 to anticipate support requirements. Planning considerations include—

- Mission.
- Number and type of vehicles, personnel (by specialty), and weapon systems.
- Current status or strength.
- Duration of unit attachment and effective times.
- Support assets accompanying the attachment.
- When and where linkup is to occur, coordination measures for the linkup (such as near and far recognition signals), and who handles the linkup.

DETACHMENTS

7-66. The unit conducting reconnaissance and security may detach a subordinate element to other units or organizations for certain missions. The units use the same considerations that apply to receiving attachments. Company-size detachments deploy with the appropriate level of support to include maintenance, classes III and V resupply, and medical materials based upon length of time the unit is detached. Additionally, this applies to troops operating at a considerable distance from the unit’s sustainment assets but is still attached technically. The S-4 should send the same information as that listed in the preceding paragraph to the receiving unit’s S-4.

7-67. Attachment and detachment reports reflect the addition or subtraction of units if the attachment or detachment is effective for more than 24 hours. Upon notification of pending attachments or detachments, the unit S-4 immediately notifies the FSC and BSB. Sustainment units continue to have an area support capability and responsibility for units in or transitioning through their area of operations.
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Appendix A

Echelons Above Brigade Considerations

A-1. Corps and division commanders depend on situational understanding to seize and retain the initiative. Corps and division commanders require reconnaissance formations to develop the situation through action and in particular, to determine enemy intentions, strengths, and disposition. Commanders require security forces to provide early warning, maneuver space, and time for the employment of the main body. Cavalry forces must be able to deploy to advantageous positions while concurrently developing the situation for the joint TF commander. Cavalry forces regionally aligned to combatant commands ensure the capability is resident throughout all phases of a joint operation.

A-2. All units have the responsibility to conduct reconnaissance and security tasks to support their own operations within their area of operations. Commanders may assign corps or divisions a dedicated reconnaissance and security formation, such as a Cavalry squadron. In the absence of a dedicated formation, commanders can resource the capability from assigned forces. The corps commander may designate and task organize a BCT while simultaneously, a division commander may designate and task organize a Cavalry squadron to perform reconnaissance and security operations. An example is a BCT reconnaissance and security TF, under the command and control of the corps headquarters, conducting a screen along a corps front. If a corps requires capabilities beyond a task-organized BCT (such as for reconnaissance in force, a guard, or a cover), the corps commander may task a division. Another option for corps and division commanders is to assign security requirements to subordinate units for execution. As an example, a division tasks a Cavalry squadron to conduct zone reconnaissance or guard within their respective area of operations.

A-3. Mission analysis is essential to the corps and division commander’s decision to determine how to execute reconnaissance and security operations. Mission analysis evaluates the mission variables of METT-TC (I), the gain received by creating a reconnaissance and security TF, and the operational effectiveness of the formation that resource the reconnaissance and security TF. To enhance the corps or division commander’s ability to plan the execution of reconnaissance and security during mission analysis, the commander forms a reconnaissance cell within the staff headed by the G-3 (assistant chief of staff, operations). The reconnaissance cell is responsible for planning and synchronizing operations for the reconnaissance and security TF to ensure it is properly nested with the commander’s intent and the information collection plan. (See figure 1-2, page 1-12 as an example of Recon Cell.) One determining factor for assigning reconnaissance and security tasks to subordinate units is their ability to accomplish their primary missions, such as attack or defend, while simultaneously executing assigned corps or division reconnaissance and security tasks. Considerations for establishing a reconnaissance and security TF include the following:

- What is the purpose and intent for reconnaissance and security?
- Does the purpose and intent for reconnaissance and security require an independent formation under corps or division control?
- What are the impacts to other subordinate unit missions?
- How does the employment of the reconnaissance and security TF mitigate risks to the mission and enable overall mission accomplishment?
- What are the risks of employment and how does the corps or division mitigate the risks?
- How does the corps or division sustain a reconnaissance and security TF?
- Which additional enablers does the TF require?
- Is the reconnaissance and security TF commander able to control the necessary enablers?
- What is the proficiency of the unit tasked with conducting reconnaissance and security?
- What is the duration of the task organization and mission?
Appendix A

A-4. The decision to employ a Cavalry squadron for reconnaissance and security depends upon the mission variables of METT-TC (I). The division commander considers several factors before detaching a Cavalry squadron from a BCT to execute independent reconnaissance or security operations. These factors are—

- Is the mission distinct from that assigned to the BCT?
- Is the BCT able to accomplish its mission without the Cavalry squadron?
- What sustainment does the detached Cavalry squadron require?
- What additional artillery, aviation, engineer, air defense, electromagnetic warfare, and maneuver forces does the Cavalry squadron require?
- Is staff augmentation required to control necessary enablers?

A-5. Corps and division commanders should consider additional factors when addressing mission duration and unit proficiency. One factor commanders should consider is that reconnaissance and security are enduring and enabling tasks that support all operations and transitions. A second factor to consider is that unit proficiency usually increases as leaders and Soldiers become more competent in the individual and collective tasks associated with reconnaissance and security operations. In addition, habitual task organization and relationships increase cohesion and understanding of SOPs in addition to building trust. Rotating the mission and designation between formations increases unit turbulence and reduces the ability to develop reconnaissance and security expertise within the command. A third factor commanders should consider is that units may require time to adjust to the differing METT-TC (I) factors between offensive and defensive operations and reconnaissance and security operations. There are also adjustments as units that usually operate at one echelon provide support for a higher echelon (such as a Cavalry squadron usually supporting a brigade is now supporting a division).

A-6. Simultaneous with determining the best means for meeting reconnaissance and security requirements, corps or division commanders must determine the necessary task organization to conduct these operations in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. The commander determines task organization during war-gaming supported by a thorough review of the mission variables, IPB, and risks. Commanders must understand that the constantly changing operational environment requires decentralized, combined arms formations capable of working with joint and interagency partners to collect critical information, provide the level of security required in a given situation, and defeat a variety of threats from state and nonstate actors. These various aspects provide a general list of recommended capabilities for reconnaissance task organization. As an example, for reconnaissance in force, commanders place particular emphasis on the maneuver, mobility, and fires requirements since fighting for information is probably a key aspect of the mission.

A-7. Task organizing a reconnaissance and security formation for employment at EAB should include the following capabilities:

- Ground maneuver.
  - Reconnaissance capabilities: dependent on the number of routes or areas; size of the zone or area; anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; speed required; detail required; mobility about the enemy and the main body.
  - Security capabilities: size of the security area or area of operations; anticipated enemy; requirement to defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities. The formation must have the capability to prevent enemy forces from gaining a position of advantage across a division front or flank to collect and target the division and subordinate BCTs. Simultaneously, the formation must protect organic or supporting capabilities. While the force conducts reconnaissance in support of maneuver, it must be able to secure key terrain for follow-on forces without degrading its ability to continue further reconnaissance. The distance between the force and the following BCT must be considered when allocating the proper additional combat power.

- Manned aviation.
  - Reconnaissance capabilities: dependent on the number of routes or areas; size of the zone or area; anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; speed required; terrain.
  - Security capabilities: size of the security area or area of operations; anticipated enemy; requirement to defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities; terrain.
UASs. dependent on unit capabilities, speed required, number and types of NAIs or reconnaissance objectives, and terrain.

Mobility.
- Engineer reconnaissance capabilities: dependent on the information requirement detail and breadth of area reconnoitered; detail of infrastructure required.
- Engineer mobility capabilities: dependent on obstacles anticipated and the requirement to breach; types and number of gaps anticipated and required to cross.

Countermobility. Capabilities: dependent on time available and whether it is a stationary or moving operation; capacity of organic capabilities; obstacle intended affect against enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities.

Indirect fires.
- Planning: planning considerations for task organizing capabilities to support the reconnaissance and security TF with indirect fire support, target acquisition, mobility, and survivability.
- Supporting reconnaissance: dependent on organic capabilities; anticipated enemy and the need to fight for information; distance from the main body or supporting fires capabilities. The division may task a BCT to provide additional artillery support to the reconnaissance and security BCT or Cavalry squadron through augmentation of, at a minimum, a field artillery battery. The corps and division may also allocate other supporting lethal and nonlethal fires including joint fires, such as close air support, electromagnetic attack capabilities, or offensive cyberspace operations.
- Supporting security: dependent on organic capabilities; anticipated enemy; requirement to defeat, delay, and attrit enemy reconnaissance or maneuver capabilities; distance from the main body or supporting fires capabilities.
- Indirect fires radar capabilities: dependent on other units’ ability to provide radar coverage; distance from main body.

Intelligence.
- SIGINT capabilities: dependent on the requirement to collect on specific aspects of enemy communications; distance from the main body and capabilities of SIGINT assets; site exploitation requirements.
- HUMINT capabilities: dependent on time available to collect; specific information required; site exploitation requirements. The theater or corps may task-organize HUMINT capabilities to provide interrogation capabilities down to the brigade.
- Geospatial intelligence capabilities: dependent on time and UAS assets available to collect specific information required.

Protection.
- Air defense capabilities: dependent on the air threats and ability of other ADA units to provide coverage. The division can attach or provide as direct support, mobile short-range air defense capabilities to counter enemy aerial threats, such as fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The division may task-organize additional capabilities as operational control, tactical control, or in a supporting role. These may include radars, counter-UAS, counter-air, or counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar capabilities.
- Survivability capabilities: dependent on the volume of hardening of command-and-control facilities and other critical infrastructure. Potential for the employment of CBRN threats and hazards requiring increased standoff predetonation layers. Examples are enhanced personal protective equipment and posture, such as applying reactive armor to vehicles, sapi plates to fragmentation vests, and mission-orientated protective posture improvements.
- CBRN reconnaissance and decontamination capabilities: dependent on the division receiving CBRN reconnaissance capabilities to its forces. In some cases, the division may task organize a hazard response company to the BCT or Cavalry squadron to provide decontamination and additional CBRN reconnaissance capabilities.
● Sustainment.
  ▪ Capabilities supporting reconnaissance: dependent on the breadth and depth of the reconnaissance mission, organic sustainment capabilities, and duration of the mission.
  ▪ Transportation capabilities: dependent on the mobility of the unit conducting reconnaissance, travel distance, time available, and speed required.
  ▪ Capabilities supporting security: dependent on the breadth and depth of the security area or area of operations, organic sustainment capabilities, and duration of the mission.
  ▪ Transportation capabilities: dependent on the mobility of the unit conducting security, distance required to travel, time available, and terrain.
  ▪ Capabilities to support the unique requirements of all attached enablers in terms of maintenance, recovery, and classes of supply
  ▪ Capabilities to provide health service support in terms of ability to transport casualties over extended distances to role 1 and role 2 levels of care. (See ADP 4-0.)

● Command and control.
  ▪ The staff, which is dependent on the enablers and attachments employed by the Calvary force, should be augmented to provide the requisite capability to enable the commander’s understanding, plan operations, and synchronize the employment of enablers.
  ▪ The level of headquarters is dependent on span of control, unity of command required, and discretion of the commander. Assign the appropriate level of command to the force.
  ▪ The reconnaissance and security BCT and Cavalry squadron S-6 must plan, engineer, install, operate, and defend the tactical portion of the Department of Defense information network-Army, known as the tactical network. The S-6 employs a network defense-in-depth to ensure the availability, protection, and delivery of network resources and critical information. This facilitates the allocation of network services to enable mission accomplishment under all conditions.

A-8. Task organizing a formation for employment at EAB requires detailed planning and staff analysis. Normally, these units are modular forces that require various enablers and augmentation based on METT-TC (I) and staff analysis to answer the division or corps commander’s PIRs.
Appendix B

Annex L (Information Collection)
Format and Instructions

B-1. Appendix B provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing Annex L (Information Collection) in Army plans and orders. Annex L provides a format for the annex that can be modified to meet the requirements of the base order and operations and for an example information collection plan. This annex follows the five-paragraph attachment format.

B-2. The information collection annex describes how information collection activities support the offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authority operations throughout the conduct of the operation described in the base order. Annex L synchronizes activities in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the commander’s intent for reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations (including military intelligence disciplines). The G-3 (S-3), in conjunction with the G-2 (S-2), is responsible for this annex.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking (TS), (S), I, or (U) at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

Include the full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(U) References: List documents essential to understanding Annex L.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

c. Doctrinal references for this annex include FM 2-0 and FM 6-0.

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[CLASSIFICATION]
[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(U) Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan/Order: Write the time zone established in the base plan or order.

1. (U) Situation.
   a. (U) Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) or Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
   b. (U) Area of Operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
      (1) (U) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact information collection. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
      (2) (U) Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact information collection. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
   c. (U) Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
   d. (U) Friendly Forces. Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex C (Operations) as required.
   e. (U) Interagency, Governmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct of operations or implementation of information collection-specific equipment and tactics. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.
   f. (U) Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact information collection activities. Refer to Appendix I (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.
   g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base plan or order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).
   h. (U) Assumptions. List any information collection-specific assumptions that support the annex development.

2. (U) Mission. State the mission of information collection in support of the operation—a short description of the who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. (U) Execution.
   a. (U) Concept of Operations. This is a statement of the overall information collection objective. Describe how the tasks or missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, intelligence operations, and so forth support the commander’s intent and the maneuver plan. Direct the manner in which each element of the force cooperates to accomplish the key information collection tasks and ties that to support of the operation with task and purpose statement. Must describe, at minimum, the overall scheme of maneuver and concept of fires. Refer to Appendix I (Information Collection Plan) to Annex L (Information Collection). The following subparagraphs are examples. Omit what is unnecessary for brevity.
      (1) (U) Movement and Maneuver. Provide the scheme of movement and maneuver for collection assets and any other unit given a key information collection task, in accordance with the concept of operations in the base order (paragraph 3b) and Annex C (Operations). Describe the employment of information collection assets in relation to the rest of the force and state the method forces will enter the area of operations.
(2) (U) **Intelligence.** Describe the intelligence concept for supporting information collection. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(3) (U) **Fires.** Describe the concept of fires in support of information collection. Identify which information collection assets have priority of fires and the coordinating purpose of, priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions on fire support and fire support coordinating measures. Refer to Annex D (Fires) as required.

(4) (U) **Protection.** Describe protection support to information collection. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.

(5) (U) **Engineer.** Describe engineer support, if applicable, to information collection. Identify priority of mobility and survivability assets. Refer to Annex G (Engineer) as required.

(6) (U) **Sustainment.** Describe sustainment support to information collection as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment).

(7) (U) **Signal.** Describe signal support to information collection as required. Refer to Annex H (Signal).

(8) (U) **Soldier and Leader Engagement.** State overall concept for synchronizing information collection with Soldier and leader engagement. Refer to coordinating instructions in Annex C (Operations).

(9) (U) **Assessment.** If required, describe the priorities for assessment for the information collection plan and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.

b. (U) **Tasks to Subordinate Units.** State the information collection task assigned to each unit not identified in the base order. Refer to Appendix 1 (Information Collection Plan) to Annex L (Information Collection) as required.

(1) (U) **Information Collection Support Tasks for Maneuver Units.**

   (a) (U) **Tasks to Maneuver Unit 1.**

   (b) (U) **Tasks to Maneuver Unit 2.**

   (c) (U) **Tasks to Maneuver Unit 3.**
ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(2) (U) Information Collection Support Tasks for Support Units. Direct units to observe and report in accordance with Appendix I (Information Collection Plan) to Annex L (Information Collection).

(a) (U) Military Intelligence. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
(b) (U) Engineer. Refer to Annex G (Engineer) as required.
(c) (U) Fires. Refer to Annex D (Fires) as required.
(d) (U) Signal. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.
(e) (U) Sustainment. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.
(f) (U) Protection. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.
(g) (U) Civil Affairs. Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable or not covered in unit standard operating procedures (SOPs).

(1) (U) Time or Condition When the Plan Becomes Effective.

(2) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. List priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) here, the information collection tasks associated with them, and the latest time information is of value for each PIR.

(3) (U) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) here.

(4) (U) Fire Support Coordination Measures. List fire support coordination measures. Establish no fire areas.

(5) (U) Intelligence Handover Lines with Adjacent Units. Identify handover guidance and parameters; refer to necessary graphics or attachments as required.

(6) (U) Limits of Advance, Limits of Reconnaissance, and Quick Reaction Force Response Instructions. Identify as required, referencing graphical depictions in attachments or instructions as needed.

(7) (U) Airspace Coordinating Measures. List airspace coordinating measures.

(8) (U) Intelligence Coordination Measures. List information such as restrictions on international borders or other limitations and the coordination or special instructions that apply. Identify what unit is responsible for coordinating information collection activities in relation to the area of operations.
[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(9) (U) Rules of Engagement. Refer to Appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(10) (U) Risk Reduction Control Measures. State reconnaissance, surveillance, and security-specific guidance such as fratricide prevention measures not included in SOPs, referring to Annex E (Protection) as required.

(11) (U) Environmental Considerations. Refer to Appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex G (Engineer) as required.

(12) (U) Other Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base plan or order.

4. (U) Sustainment. Describe any sustainment requirements, subparagraphs may include:
   a. (U) Logistics. Identify unique sustainment requirements, procedures, and guidance to support information collection. Specify procedures for specialized technical logistics support from external organizations as necessary. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for information collection logistics support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.
   b. (U) Personnel. Identify unique personnel requirements and concerns, associated with information collection, including global sourcing support and contracted linguist requirements. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.
   c. (U) Health Service Support. Provide information including the health threat (endemic and epidemic diseases, state of health of the enemy forces, medical capabilities of the enemy force and the civilian population), and medical evacuation routes, barriers, and significant terrain features. Refer to Appendix 3 (Health System Support) to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. (U) Command and Signal.
   a. (U) Command.
      (1) (U) Location of the Commander and Key Leaders. List the location of the commander and key information collection leaders and staff officers.
      (2) (U) Succession of Command. State the succession of command if not covered in the unit’s SOPs.
      (3) (U) Liaison Requirements. State information collection liaison requirements not covered in the unit’s SOPs.
   b. (U) Control.
      (1) (U) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts, (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation.
      (2) (U) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Describe information collection reporting requirements for subordinate units. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.
[CLASSIFICATION]

ANNEX L (INFORMATION COLLECTION) TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

c. (U) Signal. List signal operating instructions for information collection as needed. Consider operations security requirements. Address any information collection specific communications and digitization connectivity requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base plan or order.

[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters’ files.

OFFICIAL

[Authenticator’s name]
[Authenticator’s position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachment (appendixes, tabs, and exhibits).

Appendix 1–Information Collection Plan
Appendix 2–Information Collection Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: (if distributed separately from the base order).

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-98 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

### SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AA</td>
<td>assembly area</td>
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<td>ABCT</td>
<td>armored brigade combat team</td>
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<td>armored Cavalry regiment</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
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<td>EAB</td>
<td>echelons above brigade</td>
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<td>EEFI</td>
<td>essential element of friendly information</td>
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**SECTION II – TERMS**

**adversary**
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

**area reconnaissance**
A type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. (ADP 3-90)

**area security**
A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area. (ADP 3-90)

**battle handover line**
A designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force and vice versa. (ADP 3-90)

**bypass criteria**
Measures established by higher echelon headquarters that specify the conditions and size under which enemy units and contact may be avoided. (ADP 3-90)

**command and control**
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1, Volume 2)

**commander’s critical information requirement**
Specific information identified by the commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making. (JP 3-0)

**commander’s visualization**
The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 6-0)

**confirmation brief**
A brief subordinate leaders give to the higher commander immediately after the operation order is given to confirm understanding. (ADP 5-0)

**cover**
(Army) A type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADP 3-90)

**decision point**
A point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 5-0)
decision support matrix
A written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. (ADP 5-0)

decision support template
A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of war-gaming that depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP 2-0)

decisive point
Key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

economy of force
The employment and distribution of forces to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. (JP 3-0)

enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)

engagement criteria
Protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force. (FM 3-90-1)

essential element of friendly information
A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. (ADP 6-0)

field maintenance
On system maintenance, repair, and return to the user including maintenance actions performed by operators. (FM 4-30)

forward passage of lines
Occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving toward the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

friendly force information requirement
Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 3-0)

guard
A type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (ADP 3-90)

health service support
(Army) Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Army. Additionally, as directed, provide support in other Services, agencies, and organizations. This includes casualty care (encompassing a number of Army Medical Department functions—organic and area medical support, hospitalization, the treatment aspects of dental care and behavioral/neuropsychiatric treatment, clinical laboratory services, and treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients), medical evacuation, and medical logistics. (FM 4-02)

high-payoff target
A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (JP 3-60)

high-value target
A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)
hybrid threat  
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADP 3-0)

indicator  
in intelligence usage, an item of information that reflects the intention or capability of an enemy and/or adversary to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 2-0)

information collection  
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

key tasks  
Those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state. (ADP 6-0)

local security  
Low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

military decision-making process  
An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)

mission command  
(Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0)

named area of interest  
The geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of adversary courses of action. (JP 2-0)

neutral  
(Army) A party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces. (ADP 3-0)

personnel services  
Sustainment functions that man and fund the force, maintain Soldier and Family readiness, promote the moral and ethical values of the nation, and enable the fighting qualities of the Army. (ADP 4-0)

planning  
The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about. (ADP 5-0)

precision-guided munition  
A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage. (JP 3-03)

precision munition  
A munition that corrects for ballistic conditions using guidance and control up to the aimpoint or submunitions dispense with terminal accuracy less than the lethal radius of effects. (FM 3-09)

preparation  
Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. (ADP 5-0)

priority intelligence requirement  
An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-0)
rearward passage of lines
Occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s position while moving away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods. (JP 2-0)

*reconnaissance handover
The action that occurs between two elements to coordinate the transfer of information and responsibility for observation of potential threat contact, or the transfer of an assigned area from one element to another.

*reconnaissance handover line
A designated phase line on the ground where reconnaissance responsibility transitions from one element to another.

reconnaissance in force
A type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information. (ADP 3-90)

rehearsal
A session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. (ADP 5-0)

relief in place
An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. (JP 3-07.3)

reserve
(Army) That portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive movement. (ADP 3-90)

route reconnaissance
A type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. (ADP 3-90)

screen
A type of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (ADP 3-90)

security cooperation
Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20)

situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables. (ADP 6-0)

special reconnaissance
Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. (JP 3-05)

surveillance
The systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)
sustainment
(Army) The provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0)

target area of interest
The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. (JP 2-0)

targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

task organization
(Army) A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (ADP 5-0)

threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0)

unity of effort
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1, Volume 2)

zone reconnaissance
A type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. (ADP 3-90)
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