Preface

America’s Army serves to protect the Nation and preserve the peace. Historically, this has always meant preparing for – and when necessary, fighting and winning – the Nation’s wars. The Army must always be ready to fight and win. In this era of great power competition, the Army must also compete aggressively to protect our national interests.

America has long preserved the peace through its military strength. A large portion of this strength comes from the ability to deter war, provided by a strong and capable Army, coupled with strong and capable partners throughout the world.

Although our Army still maintains overmatch, it is fleeting. In the face of determined adversaries and accelerating technological advances, we must transform today to meet tomorrow’s challenges. Future conflicts will manifest at longer range, across all domains, and at much greater speed, both physical and cognitive. We must therefore continue to implement a 21st century talent management system, develop and field new weapon systems, transform our doctrine, build new organizations, and change the way we train. **This bold transformation will provide the Joint Force with the range, speed, and convergence of cutting edge technologies that will be needed to provide future decision dominance and overmatch required to win the next fight.**

The Army provides unique contributions to the Joint Force to help protect our national interests and ensure the security of the American people at home and abroad. In competition, our Nation’s goal remains winning without fighting by leveraging all elements of national power. Deterrence is one critical part of competing successfully. To deter aggression, the Joint Force must have an irrefutable, demonstrated ability to fight and win. To advance our interests in competition more broadly, the Army maintains forward presence and fosters enduring land power partnerships around the world. The Army also leverages an array of capabilities to operate in the information space and ensure that the nation can consistently win with the truth. We provide mobile long range fires, sustainment, protection, and forces able to maneuver within an adversary’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) layer. And we boost the credibility of our deterrent message with our demonstrated commitment to closely integrate with the rest of the Joint Force.

As demonstrated in 2020, the Army’s high readiness levels and breadth of expertise allowed us to provide timely and effective support during times of crisis. In January, we helped demonstrate American strength and resolve overseas to deescalate and prevent conflict. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Army scientists supported national vaccine, therapeutic, and testing efforts; the Army Corps of Engineers aided mayors and governors in developing emergency treatment facilities; and our Army medical and operational units provided urgently needed support across the country. Army units also provided significant professional support to countless American communities, including responding appropriately to civil unrest, hurricanes, wild fires and floods.

The United States Army faces an inflection point that requires innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship in the application of combat power. Our Nation’s adversaries have gained on the Joint Force’s qualitative and quantitative advantages. If the Army does not change, it risks losing deterrence and preservation of the Nation’s most sacred interests. I set an **Army Aimpoint for 2035** as the date at which the Army will be modernized and prepared to dominate our adversaries in sustained Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). **2028 is our Waypoint**, a
point at which we comprehensively reassess our assumptions about the future and adjust our investments accordingly.

Change requires institutional, organizational, and conceptual momentum towards shedding those practices or platforms which are no longer relevant. These transformations will increase Army capabilities and expand our effects into the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains. The future battle space will be truly multi-domain, fast-paced, technology-driven, and the Army will be ready. As we look to the future, one factor remains constant: people are the lifeblood of the Army and of the Joint Force; people enable the critical relationships we forge with our Allies and partners; and people, our adaptive Soldiers, are the premier capability that provides us with the decisive advantage in military operations.

People First! Winning Matters! Army Strong!

[Signature]

James C. McConville
General, United States Army
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I. Introduction

The United States is facing an unprecedented set of challenges to our national interests. China and Russia continue to challenge the rules-based international order. Both have become increasingly more assertive in an effort to advance their agendas, aimed at supplanting the U.S. globally. By 2040 China and Russia will have weaponized all instruments of national power to undermine the collective wills of the United States, Allies, and partners, while simultaneously cultivating their own security partnerships. This will lead to an unstructured international environment where the line between conflict and peace is blurred. As China and Russia continue to modernize their militaries, the Joint Force will find it increasingly difficult to deter their illicit and aggressive actions.

Our adversaries have developed asymmetric approaches to undermine our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. The most striking example of this is their investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to prevent the U.S. from projecting military power. Technological advances have enabled the integration of space, cyber, information, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities that can halt American power projection before it begins. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, and robotics will continue to change the character of operational campaigns, resulting in a battlefield that is faster, more lethal, and distributed. In conflict, our adversaries will add to stand-off through the employment of modern chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. This layered approach erodes Joint freedom of maneuver and reduces the effectiveness of other instruments of national power. The urgent need for transformational change to meet these emerging challenges cannot be overstated. **The Army is poised to deliver this change.**

The Multi-Domain Army of 2035 introduces a transformational change to joint warfighting. By 2035, the Army will enable the Joint Force to maneuver and prevail from competition through conflict with a calibrated force posture of multi-domain capabilities that provide **overmatch through speed and range** at the point of need. Dynamic employment and posture of Army forces during competition will provide range in depth to penetrate complex A2/AD systems and achieve cross-domain effects—creating opportunities and providing options to deter, deescalate, or promptly transition to win the first battle. Army formations and capabilities will provide the necessary speed, both physical and cognitive, to achieve decision dominance required for a faster-paced, distributed, and complex operating environment. The Multi-Domain Army will set the conditions for the Joint Force to fight and win integrated campaigns necessary to defeat state actors.

Now and in the future, first battles are decisive to the outcome of campaigns. Winning the first battle or preventing a *fait accompli* in crisis will be necessary to prevent prolonged conflict and escalation. Ground forces will decisively shape the first battle by leveraging positional and capability advantage to rapidly deliver options for crisis response, and to win in conflict. Resilient, mobile, integrated, and survivable ground forces will offer the Joint Force Commander with an array of asymmetric options for deterring and defeating adversaries in all domains. Dynamically postured forward, in concert with the collective effort of Allies and partners, ground forces can defeat sophisticated adversary defensive schemes from inside
positions, creating corridors for air, maritime and all-domain forces to exploit. In all domains, Army capabilities will sustain, enable, extend, and expand the reach of both defensive and offensive actions.

In competition, the Army provides the Department of Defense (DoD) with foundational capabilities and capacity to shape the environment. Army forces pursue relative positional and capability advantage to support Joint and political objectives. The former is gained primarily through expanding the Global Landpower Network, in conjunction with Allies and partners. The latter is gained through the development of capabilities, force structure, doctrine and training to support multi-domain operations (MDO) at the speed of innovation. Demonstrations of joint assured power projection enhance the credibility of military deterrence, enabling policy makers to employ the right mix of diplomatic, economic, and information levers to prevent a conflict before it starts.

*Army Multi-Domain Transformation* describes why and how the U.S. Army must transform to enhance our core competencies and become a multi-domain force, with the right capabilities in the right place to enable the Joint Force to win, from competition through conflict. It further describes the application of the Multi-Domain Operations Concept, first published in 2018, across competition, crisis response, and conflict to support Joint All Domain Operations.
II. The Emerging Military Problem

The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) asserts that by 2040, the decline of the 20th century international order will lead to an unstructured international environment where the line between conflict and peace is blurred. America’s adversaries, enabled by the proliferation of new technologies, will restrict our freedom of action and erode our strategic advantages. By 2040, our adversaries will develop novel asymmetric capabilities. Of these, China presents the most enduring strategic challenge, and is most likely to reach military parity with the Joint Force by 2040. If we fail to address these emerging threats, the Joint Force will face significant risk of being outflanked in competition, globally contested, fractured, and disintegrated.

a. Outflanked in Competition

Adversary attempts to outflank the Joint Force in competition will require us to reinforce our relationships with Allies and partners. The United States’ alliances and partnerships are a decisive advantage in competition, but our ability to maintain this advantage is not preordained in this era’s contest for regional and global leadership. To this end, mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to success. By building upon mutually beneficial relationships, the Army enables the Joint Force to provide timely response options in every contingency.

Our adversaries will likely prefer to avoid direct conflict with the United States, or to limit conflict in both scope and duration. This intent, paired with emerging capabilities to hamper U.S. intervention, means that our adversaries will deliberately position themselves to achieve their strategic goals without fighting, or to seize their objectives quickly as a fait accompli, before they breach the U.S. threshold for armed conflict.

b. Contested Globally

Since Operation Desert Storm, China and Russia have studied the American conduct of war, and have designed concepts and capabilities to counter our strengths and exploit our weaknesses, particularly in force projection. The Joint Force can no longer assume that the homeland is a sanctuary, or consider the ‘global commons’ uncontested. Joint Force deployment will be contested from fort to port to foxhole, eroding our ability to project power. The Army and the Joint Force must consider how to mobilize, project, and sustain combat power to provide Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with required forces and equipment.

The Chinese and Russian armed forces seek to overwhelm U.S. and partner forces through systemic, sustained pressure, that takes away friendly decision space and overwhelms U.S. platforms. In their near abroad, our adversaries benefit from shorter operational reach which allows them to create dense A2/AD networks and fight from a strategically advantageous defensive posture. By 2035, China will have extended its global reach, establishing the need to secure their lines of communication and bases with air, maritime and ground forces. The Joint Force must be prepared to disrupt and defeat this approach from all domains.

The Joint Force will confront persistent contact across the battlespace due to increases in range, speed, lethality, and precision of adversary weapon systems as well as adversaries’ global
presence, basing, and operations. Permissive spaces will be rare, and the homeland will no longer be a sanctuary, which will hinder force generation and deployment efforts.

**c. Fractured and Disintegrated**

Adversaries recognize the importance of joint and combined integration to the U.S. way of war, and will employ unique multi-domain combinations to break Joint Force linkages. Adversary attempts to fracture and disintegrate the Joint force will manifest in three broad ways: attacks on foundational military infrastructure, intensive multi-domain warfare, and diverse adversary force designs.

In competition and conflict, joint operations will experience continuous disruption of command and control (C2) from the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), space, and cyber domains. Lack of effective joint C2 will isolate distributed units and risk defeat in crisis and conflict.

Our adversaries will present new capabilities that offset, or even outpace, Joint Force capabilities. These capabilities will emerge through the advent and democratization of dual-use, disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, materials science, and biotechnology. As our adversaries integrate 21st century military capabilities, the Joint Force must offset these capabilities, or risk a decreased deterrent effect on adversary behavior and increased battlefield risks in combat.

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**The Military Problem**

- **In competition and crisis**, how does the Joint Force maintain freedom of action, and impose its will against peer adversaries in all domains to deter conflict while re-establishing a position of strategic advantage?

- **In conflict**, how does the Joint Force fight operational campaigns across all domains to defeat state adversaries by winning first battles and avoiding global and strategic escalation?
III. MDO During Conflict

a. The Future Challenges of Large-Scale Conflict

In future conflict, Army forces will be presented with two fundamental challenges: time and distance. Our adversaries will seek to leverage these challenges against the Joint Force in order to rapidly seize their objectives before the United States can mount an effective response. Physical distance, or stand-off, created by our adversaries’ growing range and speed of integrated A2/AD networks, creates the window of opportunity for malign action. Once conflict has begun, our adversaries will globally contest our movement in order to buy time to consolidate gains and de-escalate before U.S. expeditionary forces arrive. The fundamental physics of distance, and the corresponding time required to marshal and deploy forces into theater, cannot be resolved with technological advancement alone.

To win the operational fight in forward theaters, the Joint Force must be postured and ready forward with the right mix of capabilities to converge at range and speed. Fighting state actors from a cold start by projecting power from the homeland over many months is no longer a viable course of action. There is no alternative to the dynamic presence of formations in contested theaters. Army forces are uniquely structured to establish this presence, with a suite of capabilities that provide depth of range and speed, and benefit from extensive landpower networks with partner armed forces. Competitive, calibrated force posture (CFP) is an explicit requirement for the Joint Force to be able to transition to crisis or conflict. Being out of position at the onset of crisis will gravely undermine the ability of national decision makers to impose their will upon state actors, who will not afford the United States the time necessary to mobilize and deploy combat power. The Army’s MDO concept addresses these challenges in asymmetric ways to ensure success in conflict.

The Military Problem

In conflict, how does the Joint Force fight operational campaigns across all domains to defeat state adversaries by winning first battles and avoiding global and strategic escalation?

Operation TORCH: Enabling Joint Force Overmatch

During the early days of WWII, Allied maritime forces struggled to protect assets in the Mediterranean and Middle East (namely, Gibraltar and British forces in Egypt). Limited operational footprints and the need for sustained resupply of troops in Egypt led the Allies to cede control of much of the Mediterranean Sea to the Axis, allowing them to dominate North Africa. It was not until the Allied ground invasion of North Africa – Operation TORCH – that the Allies were able to push back Italian and German ground forces, open airfields for Allied aircraft, and secure vital ports and sea lanes. This enabled subsequent Allied operations to liberate southern Europe. Allied landpower enabled the transformation of the Mediterranean into an Allied “lake” by the middle of 1943.
b. Landpower Advantage During Conflict

The Multi-Domain Army will transform joint warfighting. In 2035, the Army – exercising dominant land power – will enable the Joint Force to penetrate complex, high-end adversary defensive systems. MDO is the Army’s contribution to Joint All Domain Operations (JADO). The Army’s MDO concept informs, and is in turn informed by, the Joint Staff’s emerging Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC). By 2035, the Army will transform the way we fight in order to:

- Sustain the Fight
- Expand the Battlespace
- Strike in Depth Across Domains
- Gain and Maintain Decision Dominance
- Create Overmatch
- Prevail in Large-Scale Combat

\textit{at speed and scale}

i. Sustain the Fight

Prior to conflict, Army forces establish the theater architecture that enables the Joint Force. In 2035, this requirement will not change, but the way in which Army forces establish theater architecture will fundamentally transform. The Army will develop robust, resilient webs of communication, protection, and sustainment that enable the Joint Force to prosecute conflict.

Modernization of theater architecture and sustainment is necessary, but it will not fundamentally change the problems of time and distance in force projection. Therefore, the Army must leverage innovative approaches to dynamically posture units, equipment, and personnel to rapidly close with our enemies in the first battle and win from the outset. In all warfighting domains, Army capabilities will sustain, enable, extend, and expand the reach of both defensive and offensive actions.

The Joint Force must move away from synchronizing sustainment using archaic structures that are time and manpower intensive. By 2035, sustainment nodes will be survivable and capable of rapidly moving logistics to enable the Joint Force. The Army will provide the foundation for the Joint Force theater sustainment system that is integrated in real-time, enabled by data-informed decision making, and coupled with an anticipatory intuition for Army and Joint sustainment requirements.

ii. Expand the Battlespace

The Army will leverage emerging capabilities and forward posture to expand the battlespace by maneuvering in areas “inside” and “outside” the traditional theater geometry. Inside forces operate inside the adversary’s A2/AD zones to provide credible, survivable capabilities that undermine area denial stratagems. Outside forces consist of regional and global expeditionary, surge, and homeland defense formations required to control terrain, consolidate gains and secure strategic support areas. An expanded battlespace provides Joint Force
Commanders more options to exploit both strategic and operational indirect approaches in a globally integrated operation against a peer adversary.

Operating as the Joint Force Commander’s “inside force,” the Army provides an asymmetric counter to the challenges posed by near-peer adversary militaries, through unique, land-based, foundational capabilities. The asymmetric advantages are based on the ability of landpower to maneuver and communicate rapidly, strike at range, and survive in complex terrain – leading to greater decision dominance and overmatch.

At the operational level, Army “inside forces” will conduct persistent cross-domain maneuver to conduct flanking attacks and turning maneuvers. Army forces in distributed forward positions, will attack by strikes and raids across intra-theater lines of operation to create operational mobility corridors. Simultaneously, Army forces will slow, disrupt, disperse, or destroy follow-on enemy forces across domains and at global ranges, to set conditions for decisive all-domain operations and enable the Joint Force to seize the initiative.

Advanced adversary capabilities and capacity will necessitate large amounts of low signature, distributed, lethal “inside forces” that maneuver rapidly, aggregating and dispersing as required. In large scale combat operations, these low-signature forces will replace static, high-signature operational outposts while constant displacement will be the norm: units will tend to have broad fronts, will rarely have secure flanks, will engage in compartmented battles, and will not have air and naval superiority. This will be a non-contiguous battlespace where commanders must be able to integrate long range precision fires, and create effects across multiple domains.

In addition to providing an “inside force”, the Army will provide “outside forces” at the strategic and theater level, that will have the capability and capacity to secure global key terrain, strategic choke points, lines of communication, threaten an adversary strategic flank, or hold their interests at risk. The combination of these inside and outside forces will be critical to addressing the threats posed by peer adversaries with global reach and land-based expeditionary capabilities.

The future non-linear battlefield opens opportunities for asymmetric approaches. The Army of 2035 will further expand the battlespace by using these approaches to obtain positions of relative advantage and create multiple operational dilemmas for the enemy. Army forces will seize and retain key terrain, control resources, and secure populations through forcible entry, raids, and close fights, especially in compartmentalized terrain. When properly exploited, asymmetric approaches provide the Joint Force opportunities to strike deep against a numerically superior, technologically equivalent enemy.

## iii. Strike in Depth Across Domains

The capability to strike in depth with lethal and non-lethal cross-domain effects is critical to creating overmatch in operations against a peer adversary. Army multi-domain forces will be organized and equipped to extend land-based effects into other domains, providing a suite of tools to integrate in the joint fires process, from the onset. This includes short, mid, and long range precision fires to engage and destroy adversary land, air, and sea capabilities in depth.
Operations at strategic, operational, and tactical depth are essential against a peer enemy that enjoys superiority in numbers and complex A2/AD defensive systems. Tactical operations will reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy forces not yet in contact to allow for more favorable correlation of forces in the close area. Interdiction at operational and strategic depth will produce broad operational effects.

Deep operations allow Army leaders to leverage the unique characteristics of unmanned systems to achieve surprise, simultaneity, and speed. To strike targets of the highest operational value, those that are able to or preparing to launch offensive attacks against our forces, deep operations must maximize flexibility. Advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), bolstered by machine learning, will improve the flexibility and responsiveness of deep operations. Most importantly, deep operations are necessary to disrupt, desynchronize, and defeat the enemy’s operational scheme.

Army cross-domain maneuver and effects in depth provide an asymmetric advantage that will penetrate A2/AD systems and enable greater combined / Joint Force freedom of maneuver to fight and win campaigns.

iv. Gain and Maintain Decision Dominance

The expanded battlefield, coupled with the requirement to conduct cross-domain strike in depth, necessitates a transformation of how command control is executed at every echelon—what the Army calls decision dominance. Decision dominance is a desired state in which commanders sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster and more effectively than their adversaries. Decision dominance is enabled by convergence, the ability to see, sense, communicate, shoot, and move at speed and scale, connecting all sensors with the best shooter and the right C2 node.

The requirement for decision dominance drives the Army’s programs in support of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) focused on system data standardization, cloud migration and software-based experimentation with the joint community. The objective of convergence is for warfighting systems to be capable of autonomously interacting across Intelligence, Operations and Fires functions. The use of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) informed computing will unburden Commanders and staffs from performing time-intensive cognitive functions, and focus their efforts on accelerated, optimized decision-making.

The Army Corps is the best option to assume the CJADC2 integrated command post function. A Multi-Domain Corps provides the Joint Force a tailorable theater-level command post for integrating and synchronizing operations across all domains. The Multi-Domain Corps will integrate the cross-domain tactical fights while maintaining persistent all-domain operational and strategic attacks across the expanded battlefield for the Joint Force.
Multi-Domain Divisions and tactical units, equipped with continuously interacting sensors and weapon systems, will provide a technologically enhanced decisive advantage in complex terrain to close with and destroy the enemy. The ongoing development and experimentation housed in our first Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) will provide the analysis to address these functions at scale.

v. Create Overmatch

By expanding the battlespace and striking across domains in depth, the Army leverages speed, range, and the convergence of cutting edge technologies to provide Joint Force Commanders with decision dominance and the overmatch necessary to prevail in large scale combat.

Army forces will create overmatch for the Joint Force Commander of the future by executing and enabling nonlinear operations. Given expansive geometry of globally contested operations, and a numerically superior adversary, Army forces create overmatch by their ability to attack throughout the depth of the battlespace – and to survive adversary counter-strikes.

Turning complex terrain to advantage, Army forces will attack and defeat land, air, and maritime targets by integrating joint sensors and platforms. The enemy’s will to resist is overmatched using simultaneous maneuver, fires, and information employed from mobile operational attack positions. This operational approach of land attack positions capitalizes on the strengths of nonlinear warfare.

vi. Prevail in Large-Scale Combat

The Army of 2035 will continue to fulfill its strategic roles for the Joint Force and the American people. The Army’s most foundational strategic role is the capability and capacity to prevail in large-scale combat. The Army will significantly contribute to the Joint Force’s success at the outset of conflict, and will cement victory in the only way possible – by winning the close fight.

Army forces prevail in large-scale combat by integrating all-domain effects to seize and secure key terrain. In globally integrated campaigns, Army forces secure global key terrain, such as the Panama Canal and the Malacca Straits, and provide the foundation for Homeland Defense. As operational campaigns progress, Army forces consolidate the gains of the Joint Force. This capability to win is what enables national policymakers to employ other elements of national power, achieve strategic objectives, and end the conflict on favorable terms.
IV. MDO During Crisis Response

a. The Future Challenges of Crisis Response

Crisis lies at the high end of the competition continuum – the bridge, and often, the spark, between competition and conflict. In the years ahead, the Army, as part of the Joint Force, will continue to be challenged in this band of the competition continuum. Our adversaries will remain free to exploit the space below our threshold for armed conflict if we, as a Joint Force, cannot present credible deterrent options and demonstrate the ability to impose costs on malign action. Our adversaries will attempt to achieve their strategic goals without fighting, or to seize their objectives quickly as a fait accompli. From the perspective of U.S. policymakers and combatant commanders, these attacks will manifest as rapidly developing crises that require either a U.S. response, or tacit acceptance of the new status quo. The Army’s MDO concept provides Joint Force Commanders and national policymakers additional, credible options in a globally integrated, rapidly developing crisis, while simultaneously enhancing assurance for Allies and partners.

b. The Added Value of Army MDO During Crisis

The Multi-Domain Army will satisfy a critical joint gap in crisis and add a broad array of options for Combatant Commanders to:

- Maintain Contact in All Domains
- Hold Adversary Interests at Risk
- Impose Costs on Malign Actions
- Enhance Assurance
- Persist Inside Adversary A2/AD
- Facilitate Transition to Conflict

i. Maintain Contact in All Domains

The Army will provide the capability to conduct continuous surveillance and reconnaissance for joint targeting and enhanced situational awareness. These capabilities will provide Combatant Commanders with a “multi-domain theater screen force” that gains contact in competition and maintains that contact in crisis. These formations will enable the Joint Force Commander to sense adversary actions – across all domains – first, and initiate movement to spoil or prevent adversary attacks before their objectives are realized.

The Army has already developed the organizational centerpiece of Multi-Domain experimentation, the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF). MDTF-1, headquartered at Joint Base
Lewis-McChord, Washington, and aligned to U.S. Army Pacific, represents the first of these units to bring multi-domain capabilities to Combatant Commanders. The MDTF’s All-Domain Operations Center, or ADOC, is currently under construction and will enable 24/7 oversight of adversary contact in all domains. The MDTF is discussed in greater detail on the next page.

ii. Hold Adversary Interests at Risk

Multi-Domain formations, when postured correctly and demonstrated aggressively, send a clear signal to potential adversaries that their interests can be held at risk. The ability to hold their interests at risk is the essence of conventional deterrence. The Army will fundamentally change the risk calculus for adversaries who seek to achieve their objectives through force. In a globally integrated future scenario, networked Army formations will be able to threaten horizontal escalation across different regions and domains, giving adversaries pause before they act.

iii. Impose Costs on Malign Actions

In the event that the collective effort of the United States, Allies, and partners, fails to deter our adversaries, a balance of forward postured multi-domain capabilities with the rapid projection of Army surge forces will demonstrate U.S. resolve to impose costs on malign behavior. Historical analyses, such as the Stimson Center Short-of-War Study, show that dynamic force employment of armed forces effectively coerces competitors and that ground forces are particularly effective against strong, near-peer actors. The Army will offer lethal and nonlethal options across all domains for crisis response. The application of ground forces sends a clear message, to friend and foe alike, that the United States is committed and willing to send our best in harm’s way—when it matters the most. Cost imposition through credible ground forces will complicate adversary decision calculus, and force them to reconsider the escalation risk even for limited objective attacks.

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Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Holding Adversary Interests at Risk

In 1991, the Haitian military overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Despite numerous attempts at peaceful resolution, it was not until the imminent threat of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division landing in Haiti that the military dictatorship capitulated. Aristide was subsequently restored to power. 96% of the forces that deployed to Haiti to support Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were from the Army; their presence was the linchpin in maintaining the peace that followed.
Multi-Domain Task Force

As the organizational centerpiece for modernization, MDTFs accelerate change through experimentation and testing during all-domain maneuver. MDTFs help the Joint Force develop new ways of war, informing DoD’s transformation to Joint All Domain Operations.

As theater-level maneuver elements, MDTFs synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary A2AD networks in all domains, enabling joint forces to execute their OPLAN-directed roles. MDTFs enable Joint freedom of action.

MDTFs are scalable (from operational to theater strategic level) and tailorable for the demands of Joint Force Commanders. They offer supported commanders the ability to plan, integrate, control, track, and assess the effectiveness of Joint counter-A2/AD capabilities.

- In competition, MDTFs gain and maintain contact with our adversaries to support the rapid transition to crisis or conflict. With requisite authorities, maneuver in all domains allows MDTFs to identify and secure positions of relative advantage from which they deny, delay, degrade, and disrupt the adversary.

- In crisis, MDTFs deter adversaries and shape the environment by providing flexible response options to the Combatant Commander. From positions of advantage secured in competition, MDTFs execute combinations of non-kinetic and kinetic maneuver to demonstrate friendly resolve, impose costs, alter behaviors, and deescalate crises back to competition on favorable terms.

- In conflict, MDTFs neutralize adversary A2/AD networks to enable Joint freedom of action. Having set conditions in competition, MDTFs employ synchronized combinations of non-kinetic and kinetic effects to disrupt, defeat, and destroy A2/AD capabilities.
iv. Enhance Assurance of Allies and Partners

In crisis, Army forces on the ground signal commitment, assuring our Allies and Partners and strengthening their resolve in the face of adversary aggression. Army forces will be postured in accordance with host nation access and presence agreements. For long-standing partners, multi-domain capabilities will provide the persistent presence they require and the assurance that only ground forces can offer. For emerging partners, the Army will work in coordination with Combatant Command (CCMD) and DoD leadership to build relationships and set the conditions for future access and presence.

v. Persist Inside Adversary A2/AD Networks

The Army will provide combatant commanders with land forces that are persistent, cost effective, and survivable. Technologically connected and geographically dispersed Army forces deployed across the land – whether archipelagic or continental – present a key operational problem for adversary sensing and targeting. Put simply, land forces are hard to kill.

The key attribute of capable inside forces is resiliency. Resiliency goes beyond hardened bases and encompasses a host of attributes that are mutually supporting. Resiliency for land forces combines mobility, cover, concealment, and deception. With mobility, land forces will be light and agile enough to quickly conduct operations, then reposition along the established nodes of the landpower network within the adversary’s A2/AD zone. Cover includes site hardening against adversary attack, and this must also be augmented with the ability of the unit to conceal itself from detection through physical, electronic and cyber means. Deception will present false targets to the adversary through a combination of electronic spoofing and physical decoys. All of these attributes combine to build the resiliency of inside forces and are critical to providing options to the Joint Force Commander.

The Army will provide forces that are scalable and tailorable to the threat and theater. They will be highly mobile, with alternate and supplemental positions to ensure survivability and unpredictability. This will require dynamic posture initiatives--turn-key or warm start sites to provide opportunities for maneuver without incurring the cost and host nation imposition of traditional basing or permanence. This posture will be optimized to host low-signature forward capabilities on a more ambiguous, distributed, and difficult to target infrastructure.

The Army will persist in the face of adversary aggression – to include the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Our adversaries will not hesitate to employ CBRN weapons if their vital interests or the integrity of their regimes lie in jeopardy. Our adversaries have a demonstrated propensity to develop and utilize CBRN capabilities on the future battlefield, to include “tactical” or Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW), Fourth Generation Agents (FGA), and weaponized biological agents with pandemic causing implications. Army forces must be equipped, trained, and ready to generate forces, and conduct combat and sustainment operations in CBRN battlefield conditions. Army formations will continue to integrate CBRN-defense planning considerations across all warfighting functions. Increasing readiness against current and emerging CBRN threats enables tactical and operational formations to fight, survive, and win on the future battlefield.
vi. Facilitate Transition to Conflict

When deterrence, de-escalation, and cost imposition fail in crisis, Multi-Domain formations will facilitate a rapid transition to conflict by enabling Joint maneuver and setting the conditions to defeat the adversary. The Army enables joint maneuver through a tailorable mix of long range fires, protection, cyber, EW, and other capabilities. Land forces will establish the required “footholds” for maritime, air, and ground forces to operate through and from. These formations and capabilities will be an integral part of the Combatant Command’s joint targeting and integration process, providing additional theater strategic effects as required from competition through conflict. With multi-domain Corps, Division, and other commands at echelon they will be able to plan, integrate, track, assess, command, and control multi-domain capabilities.

vii. Sustainment During Crisis

Army sustainment provides options, extension of operational reach, endurance, and freedom of action which enable Joint Force Commanders to quickly transition to conflict or deescalate back to competition. Future MDO Forces will rely on host nation support, survivable and lightweight power sources, and dispersed caches as a part of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). These small, mobile, and tailorable material and ammunition stores will enable flexible response options for Joint Force Commanders.
V. MDO During Competition

In competition, the Multi-Domain Army sets the conditions for the DoD by pursuing relative positional and capability advantage, ensuring a calibrated force posture—the right capability in the right place to support and shape both Joint and diplomatic efforts. Positional advantage is gained primarily through an expanded global landpower network with Allies and partners. Capability advantage is gained through the development of capabilities, force structure, doctrine and training to support MDO at the speed of innovation. The combination of these advantages, along with demonstrations of assured power projection, enhances the credibility of military deterrence and enables policy makers to employ diplomatic, economic, and information means to prevent a conflict before it starts.

The Army will continue to provide the foundation for DoD security cooperation through the Army’s comprehensive landpower network of Allies and partners. Through the development of resilient, networked, and distributed lines of communication, and increased lethality and mobility of our combat formations (the outside geometry forces), we will continue to demonstrate the ability to rapidly project strategic power globally. The calibrated posture of key multi-domain capabilities will shape the environment in competition, deter escalation in crisis, and determine conditions for the Joint Force to adapt and win in conflict from the first battles. In competition this “inside force” will significantly increase an adversary’s cost and risk threshold while bolstering Allies and partners in both direct and indirect competition.

The Multi-Domain Army will strengthen the Joint Force in competition through a myriad of activities that will:

- Expand the Landpower Network
  - Engage and Train
  - Equip and Enable
  - Advise and Assist
- Demonstrate Capabilities
  - Assured Power Projection
  - Dynamic Force Employment
- Develop New Capabilities
  - Organizations
  - Materiel
  - Talent (Soldiers)

...increase speed and range
a. Expand the Landpower Network

In competition, the Army persistently builds relative positional advantage by cultivating a strong network of Allies and partners. This Global Landpower Network is DoD’s foundation for competition, creating inroads and maneuver space for Joint and whole-of-government strategic engagement.

The Army is uniquely qualified to maintain and expand this vital network. Our relationship with Allies and partners is an unmatched strategic and competitive advantage, allowing us to out-think and out-position our competitors. Partner militaries, including their senior leaders, are predominately land force-centric. In the Indo-Pacific, 24 of 29 armed forces chiefs are army officers, and of the 30 NATO member states, 22 have armed forces chiefs from their respective armies. Through this professional kinship, the U.S. Army can play an outsized role in supporting U.S. inter-agency objectives in a whole-of-government approach.

The Army Strategy for Allies and Partners (ASAP) and Calibrated Force Posture plans are aligned and coordinated with DoD and Combatant Command priorities. Together, these documents provide the roadmap for building relationships with Allies and partners to set the conditions for joint or diplomatic efforts.
This persistent and deliberate approach creates multiple dilemmas for our adversaries, who will seek to gain influence with many of the same partners. The U.S. Army, however, offers a decisive advantage—our professionalism, values, and range of security cooperation activities. These security cooperation activities are summarized below.

**Military and Key Leader Engagement (KLEs):** The Army’s relationships begin with senior leader engagement. It drives a relationship forward, breaks through obstacles to partnership, and capitalizes on strategic gains. KLEs are a “first tool” in this regard. In 2020 alone, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army held close to 100 engagements with international counterparts to advance Army initiatives globally. Army Service Component Commanders will continue to provide the persistent engagement required to improve upon security cooperation.

**Education and Training:** The Army helps to train the future leaders of partnered and Allied armies around the world. Utilizing a variety of programs, including International Military Education and Training (IMET) and International Professional Military Education (IPME), the Army establishes rapport and enhances interoperability. These programs have an immense reach: In 2019, the Army trained over 7,100 foreign students in various courses throughout the enterprise. Of those, 1,200 were foreign officers in professional military education courses. The Army will prioritize course allocations to grow our pool of participating partners 50% over the next five years in support of the DoD’s Guidance for the Development of Alliances and Partnerships (GDAP).

**Security Assistance through Foreign Military Sales (FMS):** The Army maximizes this Title 22 program to increase interoperability through the acquisition of U.S. technology and warfighting equipment. As the Army and Joint Force seek to outpace our adversaries, we may also outpace our partners. The Army must ensure that we maintain some degree of interoperability, especially with legacy platforms. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) will continue to work in concert with Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff in this regard.

**Advise and Assist:** The Army has always maintained a world-class “advise and assist” capability through our Special Forces units. Building upon this critical capability, the Army created Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) to provide conventional advise and assist capabilities to Allies and partners. SFABs increase our ability to perform these tasks on a larger scale, with the focus on battalion and brigade sized formations. Additionally, the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) aligns National Guard units with over 84 nations across the globe, creating those habitual Army-to-Army relationships that are vital to achieving Army posture objectives.

**b. Demonstrate Range of Capabilities**

The threat of strategic landpower, in the form of Army readiness to wage operational campaigns, will remain a significant deterrent for adversaries, who prefer to win in competition or crisis and avoid protracted conflict. It is imperative that the Army continues to demonstrate our range of capabilities through new approaches to setting theaters and the globe through
assured power projection and dynamic force employment.

**Assured Power Projection:** It is vital to build the groundwork for theater sustainment while in competition, to respond decisively during crisis and conflict. Sustainment of the Army and Joint Force will be persistently contested across multiple domains. The Army must develop resilient theater architecture consisting of multiple supplemental turn-key nodes that house C2 network infrastructure, APS, and sustainment caches to rapidly project and sustain combat power from fort to port to foxhole. These facilities, hosted by willing partners and allies, will allow the Joint Force to surge and remain resilient inside enemy A2/AD areas. The Army is pursuing five efforts to extend operational reach, endurance, and freedom of action for Joint Force Commanders, from competition through conflict:

1) **Resilient and Integrated Sustainment Mission Command:** Achieves logistics decision advantage, requires refined authorities and command relationships, provides access to protected logistics information, facilitates operating effectively in a disconnected and distributed environment, and develops predictive and push logistics.

2) **Rapid Power Projection:** Protects strategic deployments, provides rapid availability of the Joint Force, facilitates deployment from the contested homeland to the point of employment, demonstrates agile and resilient lines of communication (LOCs), enhances global force posture, and maximizes inter to intra theater transition capabilities.

3) **Set Theaters:** Calibrated forward posture, modernization of APS, building of partner capacity, and increased interoperability.

4) **Industrial Base Modernization:** Modernized and linked industrial base with responsive advanced manufacturing, expansion of U.S. contractors to meet wartime requirements, reduction of U.S. contractor dependence on foreign resources, and supply chain security.

5) **Sustainment for Distributed Operations:** Establishes and sustains a dynamic forward presence in concert with partners, reduces demand, augments mobility with small platforms for distributed operations, protects LOCs, rapidly recovers, and moves.

**Dynamic Force Employment (DFE):** Innovative approaches to dynamic force employment range from large scale DEFENDER series to more discrete capability demonstrations and movement within adversary’s areas of interest. DFE will demonstrate the range of capabilities the Army can provide to support military and political objectives in competition.

Combined exercises not only enhance Army, Joint and multi-national training and interoperability for JADO, they also demonstrate the ability to employ land power rapidly and at scale—a critical tool for joint and political leaders to message resolve. These exercises will also demonstrate the ability to deploy from any installation to anywhere globally and aggregate
quickly. This will require a deliberate approach to Army force employment in support of the Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), executing across geographic combatant command (GCC) boundaries, with cross-domain application, and integration of information, denial, and deception operations.

Discrete activities of multi-domain capabilities will be critical to shaping the competition space in support of GCPs and CCMD plans. Maneuvering during competition and conducting episodic demonstrations within adversary areas of interest assures allies and deters malign actions. The “inside force” will provide much of this through calibrated and dynamic access and posture offered by an expanded landpower network.

c. Develop New Capabilities

The Multi-Domain Army will cement capability advantages during competition through the development and demonstration of new formations and new capabilities, along with improved leaders and Soldiers. The Army has already begun significant transformational initiatives to achieve relative capability and positional advantages over our adversaries. The next chapter outlines these initiatives.
VI. Change: Getting to the MDO Aimpoint

Building the required capabilities and formations for the Multi-Domain Army of 2035 represents the Aimpoint. What follows is a broad description of how the Army orients on the Aimpoint through interim changes or “Waypoints” from now through 2028:

1) Implementing a continuum of analysis to guide MDO concept maturation through comprehensive wargames, experimentation, and scenario development. This iterative process will ensure the MDO concept evolves alongside capability development and stays aligned with the Joint Warfighting Concept.

2) Gaining positional advantage to ensure that the right forces are in the right place at the right time to meet the requirements of Joint Force Commanders. This broad effort includes the implementation of calibrated force posture for each theater, with capable units and APS equipment fielded to support those theaters as they become available. Annex A of the classified version of this document includes an overview of each theater’s Calibrated Force Posture implementation plan.

3) Developing capability advantage to maintain overmatch of our adversaries and enable MDO transformation. First and foremost is the retention of the best talent – our people. Critical to this effort is the realization of the Army’s six modernization priorities. The Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model – ReARMM – provides the unit lifecycle management model that balances current demand with modernization.

a. Army Continuum of Analysis (ACA)

The MDO concept is underpinned by an ongoing continuum of analysis. Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) and corresponding analyses demonstrate the need for “inside forces” as discussed in the MDO operating concept.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings of Joint Wargames</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The Army MDO concept contributed heavily to the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Large portions of the MDO have already been validated in Joint wargames.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Many of these wargames have revealed the utility of “inside forces” postured before conflict begins.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Army inside forces enable timely Joint Fires and resilient command and control in crisis and conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• During competition, forward presence demonstrated resolve to Allies and partners.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Army capabilities converge geographically-distributed effects across multiple domains to win.</td>
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* Note: The classified version of this paper provides greater detail on these findings
Analysis is a critical part of the MDO concept formulation and evolution to affect decisions. Analytic efforts, whether Army-internal, Army-led with Joint participation, or Joint-led with Army participation, provided the crucible that formed, tested, and validated MDO.

As the joint operational environment expands across warfighting domains and geography, the warfighting scenarios used to generate, analyze, and evaluate potential decisions for risk and opportunity must evolve. Scenario design must explicitly connect the time horizons of force employment, force development, and force design. This enables the development and evaluation of truly novel ways of warfighting. The ACA prioritizes the Army Analytic Community’s work against the three time horizons. The Army is also creating a Global Near-Peer Scenario as a backbone to the ACA in order to generate a cohesive reference space for Army Senior Leader decisions. The Global Scenario will improve upon existing scenarios in four key contexts:

**Geographic Context:** The Army scenario will be global in focus. Peer adversaries are global actors that have global pressure points. They do not adhere to neatly drawn Combatant Command boundaries. The scenario also acknowledges the requirement for different theories of victory in different geographic settings.

**Temporal Context:** Adversary nations have political structures that enable them to conduct long-term strategic planning in the context of decades, not years. To remain relevant and effective, the Army must expand our temporal context and pursue a consistent intellectual picture spanning from 2028 to 2035 and beyond.

**Strategic Context:** The Global Near-Peer Scenario will span the strategic environments of competition, crisis, and conflict, and will do so with full consideration of whole-of-government implications.

**Institutional Context:** The Army evolves through a confluence of processes, but also through doctrinal evolution and concept development. The Army scenario will be robust enough to facilitate the analysis that shapes DoD institutional investment and decision-making processes.

**b. Gaining Positional Advantage**

Calibrated Force Posture (CFP) presents an innovative approach to forward presence for the 21st century. The Army’s efforts to achieve calibrated posture began in 2020 with a comprehensive strategy, *Transformation of Land Power in the Indo-Pacific*, and the Army is currently developing plans in concert with the other geographic combatant commands.

While enduring capabilities for large-scale ground combat will remain a critical part of forward posture in developed theaters like EUCOM and CENTCOM, CFP will leverage the enhanced technological capabilities of multi-domain formations to achieve the effects required by Combatant Commanders at reduced costs and smaller footprints.

As mentioned before, CFP hinges upon **enduring presence, not permanent presence** – a combination of assigned forces, rotational forces, and access for key capabilities. In INDOPACOM, relatively light multi-domain forces, capable of engaging targets in all domains at operational and even strategic ranges will be prepositioned in parts of the first island chain and
act as the linchpin of effective joint and combined defenses. Joint and combined capabilities in the first island chain will mix anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles to threaten early damage to adversary forces. These operations will be more affordable as they will be conducted in concert with regional partners.

c. Gaining Capability Advantage

i. Army Modernization Priorities (Big 6)

Since the 2018 publication of the Army Vision and Army Strategy, we have pursued materiel modernization across six broad priorities: long range precision fires, next generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, network, air and missile defense, and Soldier lethality. Our congressional, defense industry, and international partners can remain confident that our focus is constant. A deliberate, synchronized approach that modernizes how we fight, what we fight with, and who we are will generate irreversible momentum to build the Multi-Domain Army of 2035.

The six modernization priorities will continue to drive materiel development for the Multi-Domain Army. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts – it is the combination of these capabilities that will allow the Army to implement MDO.

1. **Long range precision fires** enable multi-domain forces to penetrate and neutralize enemy A2/AD capabilities while ensuring military overmatch at every echelon.

2. **Next generation combat vehicles** increase the firepower, speed, and survivability of land forces, allowing them to maneuver into superior positions on the battlefield and team with robotic vehicles.

3. **Future vertical lift** platforms and technologies increase the maneuverability, endurance, lethality, and survivability of Army aircraft – increasing their operational reach and effectiveness against near-peer competitors.

4. **Army network modernization** is necessary to command and control forces distributed across vast terrain, converge effects from multiple domains, and maintain a common situational understanding in JADO.

5. **Air and missile defense** capabilities will defend the Joint Force, Allies, and partners against manned and unmanned air and missile threats.

6. **Soldier lethality** improvements will increase the capability of individual Soldiers to quickly understand and react to emerging situations – increasing their lethality, precision, and survivability.
Within each modernization priority, the Army is actively developing a suite of specific systems and capabilities. The Army’s modernization enterprise is led by Army Futures Command (AFC), and represents a comprehensive campaign of learning. Through iterative, agile development that is informed by warfighting concepts, and in turn influences those concepts, the Army will be positioned to reinforce successful programs and provide advanced capabilities to the Joint Force.

The Army understands the need for deep investment in long-term research. The Army conducts relevant, transformative research rooted in the tenets of discovery, innovation, and transition to deliver science and technology (S&T) solutions. Army S&T maintains focused investments in basic and applied research. The Army aligns its laboratories towards modernization efforts and developing external partnership agreements with research universities such as Texas A&M and Carnegie Mellon. Army S&T has a heavy emphasis on mid- and far-term capabilities, through threat based, concept driven, and capability informed work.

The Army also contributes to a collaborative campaign of experimentation and development with Joint and Combined partners. The Army and Air Force are spearheading pursuit of Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2), through the Air Force’s ABMS (Air Battle Management System) and the Army’s Project Convergence, which constitutes a multi-year campaign of learning. Project Convergence is an experimentation program that teams scientists with Soldiers in the field. Project Convergence involves all Services, and in upcoming years, will include Allies and partners. The Army is also collaborating with the British Army on five priority areas to ensure effective MDO interoperability.

### ii. ReARMM: Transforming While Meeting Current Demand

The Army cannot transform in a vacuum; we must continue to meet the operational requirements of Joint Force Commanders. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) is our unit lifecycle model to balance the production of modernized, highly trained and ready forces for employment.

Higher operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and reduced readiness capacity erode the Army’s ability to provide ready forces for conflict. Amidst the OPTEMPO struggle, units supporting competition with a reduced set of forces will have less time and space to conduct deliberate modernization. The combination of Soldiers and equipment being employed more often will also consume readiness capacity, preventing the development of new platforms, doctrine, and formations to effectively address future challenges set forth in the National Defense Strategy.
ReARMM addresses the problem of OPTEMPO while providing a path for the Army to transition from *evolutionary modernization* – incremental capability improvements to existing platforms – to *revolutionary modernization* that skips generations of capabilities to achieve transformational change and meet future challenges.

ReARMM aligns Army units to primary regions and functions in order to provide forces to Combatant Commanders in a predictable manner while increasing readiness, modernizing into a multi-domain capable force, and maximizing talent management. ReARMM structures the Army to respond to day-to-day competition requirements while posturing to respond to crisis and win in conflict.

ReARMM enhances Calibrated Force Posture efforts by creating a habitual alignment of units. This alignment provides greater institutional knowledge and trust with Combatant Command, Joint, Allied, and partner forces and fosters better understanding of plans, exercises, and relationships. Habitual alignment will provide trained units for the range of military operations but mission-tailored to combatant commander requirements. Additionally, ReARMM seeks to increase power projection capability by standardizing unit type (Stryker, Light, and Armored) in each Division. This alignment provides long term predictability by codifying episodic rotations and enhancing flexibility for Dynamic Force Employment. Finally, this model improves support to globally integrated operations by aligning the right capabilities to the appropriate Combatant Command.

### iii. Aligning Multi-Domain Capable Organization Now

Our aimpoint requires transformation of how we man, train, equip and organize our current force and we must begin now by developing multi-domain capable formations at echelon. In every aspect of Army modernization, we are pursuing joint and combined integration from the outset. The future fight will depend on a new level of joint and global integration, as well as interoperability with our Allies and partners. With the pace and scale of change accelerating, the Army must be able to integrate Joint effects seamlessly and rapidly. To realize this, the Army has begun by aligning Corps and Divisions, SFABs, and the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) to geographic combatant commands.

- **Corps and Divisions HQs:** These will be multi-domain warfighting headquarters capable of integrating joint fires, intelligence and maneuver. The Corps are already regionally aligned. The Divisions will be aligned by FY22. The 8 National Guard Division HQs will have a habitual relationship with the active component Divisions to enhance training, institutional knowledge, and provide augmentation when required. The combination of these enhanced headquarters will provide Combatant Commands with the capabilities they need to execute JADO from competition through crises. Through habitual alignment, they will develop deep institutional knowledge with Army Service Component Commands, CCMDs, other service and Joint HQs as well as Allies and partners—significantly enhancing situational understanding of plans and the physical and human terrain.
• **Security Force Assistance Brigades:** The Army created six SFABs to serve as special advisory units to train and advise foreign partner armies. The SFAB mission includes training, assisting, and advising partnered nations in hotspots around the world.

SFABs are uniquely capable of advancing America’s relationships across the globe. During competition, SFABs build trust, interoperability, and partner capacity. In crisis, SFABs enable the Joint Force and interagency team to quickly respond by enhancing coordination efforts. In conflict, SFABs enhance coordination with partners and can expand to full mission capable brigades.

Today, SFABs are operating across Africa and Asia. In the future, SFABs will rotate smaller teams, as small as 12-members, into different countries and replace them as needed to establish a sustained military to military presence.

SFABs professionalize security assistance and cooperation missions. As permanent organizations with a standing mission, the units demonstrate a more concerted commitment than previous ad-hoc “advise and assist” formations, while also freeing up conventional brigade combat teams and Special Forces units. SFABs enable the Joint Force’s presence, to build trust and generate the ability to react to future crises.

• **Multi-Domain Task Force:** MDTFs represent agile development embodied in an organization. The conventional force generation construct requires Services to man, train, and equip organizations, and then provide them in their finished state to Combatant Commanders for employment. MDTFs break this mold. Each MDTF will be designed and tailored to operate at the required echelon in order to meet the needs of the supported Joint Force commander. From inception, each MDTF will be assigned or aligned to a Combatant Command, then built, trained, and exercised within the context of the Combatant Commander’s requirements. This agile development will ensure a better, more capable force that enables Combatant Commanders to compete effectively and, if necessary, penetrate adversary A2/AD systems to enable freedom of maneuver for all land, air, and maritime forces. The Army plans to build five MDTFs: two aligned to the Indo-Pacific; one aligned to Europe; one positioned in the Arctic and oriented on multiple threats; and the final MDTF aligned for global response. MDTF 1, aligned to the Indo-Pacific, will be the centerpiece of Project Convergence 2021.

### iv. Sustainment

Army sustainment provides options and enables enhanced operational reach, endurance, and freedom of action to widely dispersed forces operating on an expanded battlefield with extended LOCs from the homeland to the close area. To provide these sustainment options and flexibility to Joint Force Commanders, the Army Functional Concept for Sustainment operationalizes this through five lines of effort: Resilient and Integrated Sustainment Mission
Command, Assured Rapid Power Projection, Set the Theater, Industrial Base Modernization, and Sustainment for Distributed Operations. The Army Functional Concept for Sustainment also identifies three logistics modernization priorities: reducing energy demand and demands on the distribution system, auto-sensing at echelon for the Joint Force (data visibility), and joint multi-modal autonomous / semi-autonomous distribution. The Army intends to achieve this through the following S&T priorities: advanced power solutions, alternative water sources, advanced manufacturing, analytic decision tools / diagnostics, prognostics, and integrated data, autonomous resupply, and next generation material and packaging solutions for munitions.

v. Assured Power Projection

Installations, as capability-based platforms, provide the foundations for the Army’s readiness, resilience and projection. The Army and the Joint Force’s foundation of success in Assured Rapid Power Projection is in the resiliency of Army installations with a special emphasis on Power Projection Platforms (PPPs), Mobilization Force Generation Installations (MFGIs), and Military Ocean Terminals (MOTs), as well as supporting commercial facilities, to continue to operate in a contested and degraded environment.

The Army’s ability to provide adequate forces hinges on the effective execution of all elements of force projection, such as mobilization, force projection, and sustainment of combat power. The output of power projection reform is Assured Rapid Power Projection in an all domain contested environment, under degraded conditions. This will require fiscal and intellectual creativity to ensure Army installations, with a focus on PPPs, MFGIs, MOTs, and commercial infrastructure to include energy and strategic ports of embarkation are ready, resilient, and relevant to enable options for Joint Force Commanders.

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) must be ready immediately, and require constant exercising. APS can no longer be viewed as strategic deep storage, to be used only in conflict. Army formations must practice rapidly projecting forces, linking up with Configured for Combat (CFC) equipment, quickly moving to Tactical Assembly Areas, conducting Pre-Combat Checks, and prepared for immediate employment by Joint Force Commanders.

APS is evolving into more than power projection in crisis and contingency: it serves as a tool in itself to build relationships during competition. For instance, APS in the Indo-Pacific (APS-4) is breaking ground with our emerging regional partners. These facilities bolster relations with local and national host nation governments, and enhance the speed for forces arriving in crisis or conflict.

vi. People: The Army’s Premier Capability

In the past, the Army has enjoyed a competitive advantage over any potential adversary in capital, technology, and people. As competitors reduce the technology gap, our people will provide us with an enduring advantage to remain the world’s most ready, lethal, and capable land combat force.
The Army is committed to innovation and thoughtful leadership in managing talent. Army readiness, modernization, and reform efforts must be supported by a 21st century talent management system and essential quality of life enhancements, fundamentally improving the way we manage our center of gravity – people.

The Army must remain competitive with other professions. Doing so helps the Army advance from the industrial to the information age in order to maintain and extend the Army’s overmatch capabilities. The Army must make people the centerpiece of its competitive advantage by prioritizing human capital investment or risk losing its overmatch capabilities to potential adversaries.

The acceleration of innovation and change will increase the technical and cognitive demands on our personnel. This, in turn, will generate new personnel and training requirements. We are transforming how we fight, what we fight with, and how we organize, but we must also transform how we train. The development of our Soldiers’ and leaders’ technology skills to operate in this significantly more complex environment is at the forefront of the Army’s strategy. There is no substitute for exercises in the dirt, such as at our combat training centers, but we must add to that training with augmented reality and a synthetic training environment that will dramatically increase the quality of training without dramatic cost increases. Investments such as the Army’s data scientist and data technician programs at Carnegie Mellon University and our Software Factory in Austin will bring the necessary digital expertise to Soldiers, allowing commanders to rapidly adapt to the challenges faced on the future battlefield.

vii. Enabling Re-Investment

The Army recognizes that our transformational efforts require hard choices. The Army pursues continuous review of ongoing programs to identify legacy systems that will not contribute to the Aimpoint design. By divesting or reducing these programs, the Army can then re-invest in modernization programs.

In 2020 alone, the Army achieved $2.4 billion in savings across the force to realign funding for Army priorities in fiscal year 2021:

- Reduced or canceled lower priority programs to realign funding toward readiness and modernization.
- Eliminated 41 programs and reduced / delayed 39 programs not tied to the National Defense Strategy or modernization priorities.
- Realigned $200 million through training efficiencies.

The Army will engage with DoD leadership to identify efficiencies, establish priorities, and mitigate risk associated with long-term investment decisions.

“Winning matters, and People are my number one priority. People are our Soldiers – Regular Army, National Guard and Reserve – their Families, Civilians, and Soldiers for Life – Retirees and Veterans. We win through the people, and people will drive success in our Readiness, Modernization and Reform priorities. We must take care of our people.”

- General James McConville, 40th Chief of Staff, Army
VII. Conclusion

The U.S. Army provides strong, capable, ready, and decisive land power to the Joint Force, at home and operating across the globe with our Allies and partners. By transforming our forward posture, capabilities, and operating concept, the Army can help the Joint Force gain the speed, range, and convergence that will provide decision dominance and overmatch that allows our Nation to continue to compete, win, and advance our national interests. Our commitment to transform today to meet challenges tomorrow will ensure our Nation remains able to assure peace through strength, even against our determined and increasingly capable great power competitors.

As we look to the future, we must not lose sight of the enduring lessons of our past: the American Soldier is the linchpin of our Army’s success. From Lexington and Concord, through the beaches of Normandy, to the mountains of Afghanistan, our People are ultimately what makes us successful. No amount of technological modernization, nor any global positional advantage, nor any other aspect of war-making will be sufficient unless they are wielded by the best Soldiers and Leaders. Our human capital enterprise will transform to ensure that our People remain our premier capability, able to forge relationships, adapt to complex battlefields, persevere, and WIN.
Annex A. Glossary

**Aimpoint 2035:** a future force, *The Multi-Domain Army*, that will be modernized and prepared to dominate adversaries in sustained Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).

**all-domain operations center (ADOC):** Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) command node that will enable 24/7 oversight of adversary contact in all domains.

**anti-access (A2):** action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area. (JP 3-0)

**area denial (AD):** action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational area. (JP 3-0)

**Army Continuum of Analysis (ACA):** a framework and a process to support Army Senior Leader decisions across the continuum of the deep future, force development, force design, force employment, and Program Objective Memorandum development by coordinating and synchronizing efforts across the Army Analytic Community.

**Army Futures Command (AFC):** leads continuous Army modernization transformation to provide future warfighters with the concepts, capabilities, and organizational structures they need to dominate a future battlefield.

**Army pre-positioned stocks (APS):** forward positioned equipment and supplies in climate controlled facilities to enable rapid power projection in support of strategic objectives.

**Army Service Component Command (ASCC):** command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command. Also called ASCC. (JP 3-31)

**Army Strategy for Allies and Partners (ASAP):** Army strategy published in 2020 to guide U.S. Army engagement and cooperation with Allies and partners across the globe in support of broader Department of Defense and U.S. government objectives. Also called ASAP. (Army Strategy for Allies and Partners, 2020)

**calibrated force posture (CFP):** the combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. It includes, but is not limited to, basing and facilities, formations and equipment readiness, the distribution of capabilities across components, strategic transport availability, interoperability, access, and authorities. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)

**chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard (CBRN):** chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements that could create adverse effects due to an accidental or deliberate release and dissemination. Also called CBRN hazard. (JP 3-11)

**combatant command (CCMD):** a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the
Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1)

**combatant commander (CCDR):** a commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 3-0)

**combined joint all-domain command and control (CJADC2, alternatively, JADC2):** the artificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled battlefield management system that integrates allies and the joint force into All Domain Operations to produce overmatch.

**competition continuum:** enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. (Joint Doctrine Note 1-19)

**convergence:** rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)

**decision dominance:** a desired state in which commanders sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster and more effectively than their adversaries.

**DEFENDER series of exercises:** large-scale combined, joint training exercises to increase readiness, interoperability, validate global power projection capabilities and experiment with current and future concepts and capabilities.

**defense planning scenarios (DPS):** constructive simulated environment using key assumptions to develop plans or assess existing plans.

**dynamic force employment (DFE):** a concept to more flexibly use ready forces to proactively shape the strategic environment while maintaining readiness to both respond to contingencies and ensure the long-term viability of the Joint Force. (2018 National Defense Strategy)

**electromagnetic spectrum (EMS):** the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. (JP 3-13.1)

**electromagnetic warfare (EW):** military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. See also directed energy; electromagnetic attack; electromagnetic protection; electromagnetic support. (JP 3-85)

**foreign military sales (FMS):** that portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. (JP 3-20)

**Global Campaign Plan (GCP):** primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated combatant commander arranges for unity of effort and purpose and through
which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatant command areas of responsibility and functional responsibilities. Also called GCP. (JP 5-0)

**global landpower network:** system of army-to-army relationships and partnerships that benefit the larger Joint Force and reinforce other elements of national power.

**Guidance for the Development of Alliances and Partnerships (GDAP):** Secretary of Defense approved guidance document that sets forth foundational direction and priorities for achieving a coordinated strategic approach to align and focus the Department of Defense’s planning, resourcing, activities, and assessments for U.S. allies and partners.

**inside forces:** survivable, resilient multi-domain forces operating inside adversary anti-access area denial (A2/AD) zones to provide credible capabilities that undermine area denial stratagems.

**international military education and training (IMET):** formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors, and the instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called IMET. (JP 3-20)

**international professional military education (IPME):** career training designed to provide or enhance leadership and the recipient force’s capabilities to conduct military planning, programming, management, budgeting, and force development to the level of sophistication appropriate for that force. (Security Assistance Management Manual)

**joint:** connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1)

**joint all-domain operations (JADO):** operations involving one or more Military Departments across all domains.

**Joint Operating Environment 2040 (JOE; JOE 2040):** Analysis published by Joint Futures and Concepts Deputy Directorate, Joint Staff J-7; Defense Technology and Long-Range Analysis Office (TLA), Directorate for Analysis, Defense Intelligence Agency; and Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff J-2, that represents the U.S. Joint Force’s common understanding of the future operating environment over the next two decades describing the future operating environment and its resulting implications for joint warfare.

**Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC):** Joint Staff operational logic for the employment of the Joint Force that also informs force development and design and establishes a baseline for a larger campaign of learning focused on great power conflict and war. (DRAFT Joint Warfighting Concept 27 Jan 2021)

**key leader engagement (KLE):** planned meeting(s) with an influential leader with the intent of building a relationship that facilitates communication and cooperation across a wider population. (FM 3-53)
large-scale combat operations (LSCO): extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. (ADP 3-0)

Mobilization Force Generation Installation (MFGI): Army installations including federally activated State-operated installations designated to provide continuous Regular Component/Reserve Component power projection, combat preparation, post-mobilization training, sustainment capabilities, and pre-mobilization training support. (AR 525-93)

The Multi-Domain Army: Army of 2035, capable of achieving extensive multi-domain effects at speed and scale, across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.

multi-domain operations (MDO): operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary’s (or enemy’s) strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas through the combined application of calibrated force posture; employment of multi-domain formations; and convergence of capabilities across domains, environments, and functions in time and spaces to achieve operational and tactical objectives. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)

Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF): new Army formation able to execute multi-domain operations, designed to deliver long-range precision joint strike as well as integrate air and missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, and information operations in both competition and conflict to provide the Joint Force and coalition with new capabilities to enable the defeat of adversaries’ anti-access and area denial strategies. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)

non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW): low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical and operational use on the battlefield generally not addressed in current arms control treaties. Also known as tactical nuclear weapons.

outside forces: strategic and theater level forces that will have the capability and capacity to secure global key terrain (strategic choke points) or lines of communication, threaten an adversary strategic flank, or hold their interests at risk.

Power Projection Platform (PPP): an installation capable of deploying a brigade-sized force or larger upon notification to meet CCMD OPLAN requirements within 10 days or less. (AR 525-93)

Project Convergence: the Army Futures Command campaign of learning to aggressively pursue an artificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled battlefield management system.

Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM): the Army’s unit lifecycle model designed to balance the competing demands of modernization, training, and operational employment.

Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB): specialized units with the core mission to conduct training, advising, assisting, enabling and accompanying operations with allied and partner nations.
State Partnership Program (SPP): a National Guard program that partners a state’s National Guard with the armed forces or equivalent of a partner country in a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship.

theater screen force: referred to as a Geographic Combatant Command’s forward positioned force, able to gain and maintain contact with an adversary in all domains to gain information, shape the theater battlespace, impose costs on an adversary or delay and disrupt to buy time for joint force action.

Waypoint 2028: the point at which the Army will comprehensively reassess its assumptions about the future and adjust investments accordingly.