RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS

MAY 2021

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Foreword

As the Army refocuses its readiness efforts from prevailing in counterinsurgency to prevailing in large-scale combat operations, we must detail those functions that allow U.S. forces to execute prolonged campaigns against peer threats. During large-scale combat operations, losses of personnel and materiel will exceed those experienced during the three decades following the end of the cold war. The Army’s ability to continue operating as it absorbs losses is essential to its success in future armed conflict. Reconstitution operations are essential to rebuilding the combat power of a degraded unit. These operations require a combined arms approach and require resources from the rest of the Army. Reconstitution operations exceed the resource requirements that normal sustainment operations can provide. Additionally, reconstituted units require some degree of training prior to reemployment in combat operations.

Reconstitution operations are those activities commanders take to reestablish the effectiveness of forces within their command. Due to the extreme complexity of reconstitution operations, all elements—commanders, staffs, and executing units—must plan and prepare for reconstitution before they confront it. Commanders may reorganize by reassigning personnel within the command, combining units, or internally rotating forces assigned to them. Higher-level commanders can choose to regenerate units within their command by committing external resources, specifically personnel and materiel, to restore the combat power of units degraded by combat losses.

In most instances, this will be an operational regeneration, shifting resources from within the total force to regenerate a unit committed to a specific theater or operation. In doing so, senior leaders assume risk elsewhere. In extreme cases, strategic force generation may be required. Strategic force generation involves large-scale mobilization of national-level resources, new production of equipment, and either significantly increased recruiting or conscription in order to regenerate significant force structure. To generate units at the strategic or national level would require national mobilization of the industrial base and increased personnel assessments to meet equipment and personnel demands, respectively.

Reconstitution is an operation. As with all operations, success begins with planning. Sustainers will provide the personnel and equipment required to provide an attrited unit with potential combat power. It is the responsibility of commanders and leaders to turn that potential combat power into an effective force through individual and collective training. Just as Army units train prior to deployments, regenerated units will need to train collectively prior to employment.

Resource constraints make replacement for all losses in a formation unlikely. As long as a unit remains capable of performing its next mission, commanders continue to reorganize, as they deem necessary, and continue to function. Regeneration is reserved for those units which, in a higher commander’s opinion, have been rendered too combat ineffective to continue with their follow-on mission. Commanders and staffs focus on restoring these units not to their original strength, which is improbable, but to a sufficient capability to accomplish their next mission.

Overall, reconstitution operations are complex endeavors requiring input from all staff sections to succeed. Integrating reconstitution planning into the overall planning process is vital to ensuring that our Army retains its campaign quality. With effective planning and execution, reconstitution can extend the operational endurance of units, maintaining the combat power available to the commander for as long as it takes to prevail against determined enemies.
This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).
This page intentionally left blank.
# RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>THE RECONSTITUTION PROCESS</strong></td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section I – Overview</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section II – Reconstitution Principles</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section III – Major Elements</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reorganization</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regeneration</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section IV – Limiting Factors</strong></td>
<td>1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section V – Command and Control</strong></td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section VI – Reconstitution Process</strong></td>
<td>1-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>RESPONSIBILITIES</strong></td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section I – Responsibilities of the Attrited Unit</strong></td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reorganization</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regeneration</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Section II – Responsibilities of the Unit Directing Regeneration</strong></td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-1—Personnel Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-2—Intelligence Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-3—Operations Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-4—Sustainment Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-5—Plans Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-6—Signal Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-8—Financial Management Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G-9—Civil Affairs Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer Staff Officers</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical Staff Officers and Surgeons</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provost Marshals</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Affairs Officers</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Officers</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Contents

Chaplain Sections ................................................................. 2-7  
Rear Command Post............................................................ 2-7  
Sustainment Commands ....................................................... 2-7  
Medical Commands ............................................................. 2-7  

**Section III – Responsibilities of the Regeneration Task Force** ................................ 2-7  

**Chapter 3**  
**PLANNING AND PREPARATION** ............................................. 3-1  
**Section I – The Planning Process** ........................................... 3-1  
Standard Operating Procedures .............................................. 3-1  
The Reconstitution Plan .......................................................... 3-1  
**Section II – Planning Considerations** ..................................... 3-2  
Contingency Manning Standards .............................................. 3-3  
Decontamination .................................................................... 3-3  
Security .................................................................................. 3-4  
Regeneration Task Force Composition ....................................... 3-4  
Site Selection ......................................................................... 3-5  
Non-Like Replacement Items ................................................... 3-6  
Sustainment Planning Considerations ......................................... 3-6  
**Section III – Training to Conduct Reconstitution** ......................... 3-7  

**Chapter 4**  
**EXECUTION** ...................................................................... 4-1  
**Section I – Internal Assessment** ............................................ 4-1  
Assessment Areas .................................................................... 4-1  
A-Rating Determination ........................................................... 4-2  
**Section II – Movement to and Establishment of the Regeneration Site** ............. 4-3  
**Section III – External Assessment** ......................................... 4-5  
**Section IV – Command and Control Establishment** ....................... 4-5  
**Section V – Sustainment Activities** ......................................... 4-8  
Logistics ................................................................................. 4-9  
Personnel Services ................................................................. 4-13  
Financial Management ............................................................. 4-15  
Army Health System Support ................................................... 4-15  
**Section VI – Training of the Regenerated Unit** .......................... 4-16  
**Section VII – Regeneration of Low Density Units** ..................... 4-19  

**Appendix A**  
**STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE** .................................. A-1  

**Appendix B**  
**EXAMPLE RECONSTITUTION OPERATION PLAN** ................... B-1  

**Appendix C**  
**EXAMPLE REGENERATION TASK FORCE ELEMENTS** ............. C-1  

**SOURCE NOTES** ................................................................. Source Notes-1  
**GLOSSARY** ........................................................................... Glossary-1  
**REFERENCES** ....................................................................... References-1  
**INDEX** ............................................................................... Index-1
Figures

Figure 1-1. Reconstitution decision-making process map ................................................ 1-3
Figure 1-2. Reconstitution elements and subelements vs. training and sustainment required ..... 1-5
Figure 1-3. Notional tank company .................................................................................. 1-7
Figure 1-4. Notional tank company after contact ............................................................... 1-8
Figure 1-5. Integrating individual replacements ................................................................. 1-8
Figure 1-6. Integrating subunit replacements ...................................................................... 1-9
Figure A-1. Standard operating procedures—reconstitution............................................... A-1
Figure B-1. Example reconstitution operation plan ............................................................. B-1

Tables

Introductory table-1. New and modified Army terms ........................................................ ix
Table 4-1. Assigned mission manning and assigned mission equipping criteria .................. 4-2
Table 4-2. Assigned mission levels (A–Levels)................................................................. 4-3
Table C-1. Regeneration task force elements .................................................................... C-1
Table C-2. Additional support elements .......................................................................... C-2
This page intentionally left blank.
Preface

ATP 3-94.4, *Reconstitution Operations*, provides guidance on reconstitution. It defines reconstitution; describes the planning, training, decision-making, and execution processes; and establishes responsibilities. The intent is to provide commanders facing reconstitution on the battlefield with guidance on how to maintain maximum combat power within situational and resource constraints.

This manual is applicable to all theaters and levels of command. The principles are adaptable to all levels of conflict intensity at the operational and tactical levels of war. However, the manual’s primary focus is regeneration of battalions and brigades. Although the wording of the text may focus at times on reconstitution of combat units, the principles in this manual are equally valid when commanders reconstitute other units. Chapter 4 provides some considerations unique to reconstituting these other types of units.

This manual is based on doctrine in FM 3-0 and FM 4-0. FM 3-0 outlines how the Army will conduct operations. FM 4-0 overviews the sustainment system for supporting the Army in the field. ATP 3-94.4 focuses those elements of doctrine that will be necessary to conduct successful reconstitution operations.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war, and rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C).

ATP 3-94.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-94.4 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text, terms for which ATP 3-94.4 is the proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and the definitions are boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. Subsequent uses of the term are not italicized.

ATP 3-94.4 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard, Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for ATP 3-94.4 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to the Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ATP 3-94.4), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to: usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works.

Vignette from “Recollections from Colonel Michael Paulick.” Copyright © 1996 by the Audie Murphy Research Foundation (AMRF), all rights reserved.

Vignette excerpted from Loss and Redemption at St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge by Gregory Fontenot. Copyright © 2019 by the University of Missouri Press. Used by permission.
Introduction

The shift in readiness focus for the Army from counterinsurgency to preparedness to conduct large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against a peer threat has driven a change in many processes that would support such operations. The chaotic and violent nature of LSCO will likely produce losses of personnel and equipment on a scale not seen in generations. In order to have the capability to retain the initiative and continue the fight, the Army must be able to rapidly reconstitute units, quickly restoring combat power before our enemies can counter our operations. Reconstitution operations are vital, as they integrate replacement equipment and personnel with veteran units and conduct mission-focused training prior to returning to the battle. Doing so has historically increased the effectiveness of reconstituted units, vice committing new units to replace attrited formations.

The doctrine contained in this manual is based on historic reconstitution doctrine and lessons learned from major wars and conflicts in our Army’s history. This doctrine details how successful reconstitution operations have involved training to integrate replacements into the formation, after the sustainment efforts to replace personnel and materiel. This manual also provides some tools to help commanders assess their unit and guide their decision making.

ATP 3-94.4 contains four chapters and three appendices:

Chapter 1 introduces the key terms and concepts of reconstitution and outlines the process.

Chapter 2 defines the responsibilities of the three key organizations in reconstitution operations—the attrited unit, the units that controls the regeneration of the attrited unit, and the regeneration task force which assists in the regeneration of the attrited unit on behalf of the controlling commander.

Chapter 3 details considerations for commanders and staffs as they plan and prepare to execute reconstitution operations.

Chapter 4 outlines the execution of reconstitution operations, beginning with reorganization at the attrited unit level and progressing through regeneration, likely at the corps or army level. This chapter also includes considerations for commanders for assessing their command, both from an objective viewpoint and from an in-depth knowledge of their Soldiers.

Appendix A provides an example standard operating procedure for reconstitution operations.

Appendix B contains an outline of a reconstitution operations plan.

Appendix C lists suggested elements for a regeneration task force.

The introductory table-1 outlines changes to Army terminology reflected in ATP 3-94.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reconstitution</td>
<td>Assumed proponency for term from ATP 3-21.20. Modified for clarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>redistribution</td>
<td>New term and definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regeneration</td>
<td>New term and definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reorganization</td>
<td>Assumed proponency for term from FM 3-90.1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 1
The Reconstitution Process

This chapter lays the foundation for understanding Army reconstitution operations. As the Army shifts its focus toward large-scale combat operations against a peer competitor, losses of both equipment and personnel can far exceed what the Army has become conditioned to over the last several decades. When conducting combat operations under such circumstances, units will periodically be reconstituted to remain an effective fighting force.

SECTION I – OVERVIEW

1-1. **Reconstitution** is an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions. Reconstitution is an operation based on a command decision, typically made two levels above the unit being reconstituted, and is conducted across all warfighting functions, using existing systems and units to do so. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution. Reconstitution requires the full support of commanders and staffs at all levels to achieve the necessary results commensurate with future mission success.

1-2. Reconstitution encompasses more than accumulating personnel and weapons systems and projecting them forward. Because of the likely heavy casualties during large-scale combat operations (LSCO), surviving leaders are likely to assume new roles in a reconstituted unit. Platoon sergeants may become platoon leaders, and platoon leaders may find themselves as executive officers or commanders. In addition, a reconstituted unit may consist of 25 percent or more personnel new to the unit. To ensure success, units undergoing reconstitution need to train collectively to adapt to leaders in new positions, develop unit cohesion, develop and learn standard operating procedures (SOPs), and ensure unit members can function as a combined arms team.

1-3. Commanders have several important decisions to make when reconstituting a unit. They weigh the mission variables against future missions, set priorities, determine the amount of combat power needed for future operations and the level of training necessary for a unit before it is employed, and choose where to assume risk. These decisions provide a framework for commanders and staffs to execute the reconstitution plan.

1-4. Reconstitution has three elements: assessment, reorganization, and regeneration. In most instances, units will undergo some form of reorganization before requiring regeneration.

1-5. Assessment refers to a commander’s estimate of the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. The assessment must include the commander’s judgment of all factors. While some factors, such as personnel and equipment availability are easily and objectively defined, the unit commander is in a unique position to judge the less quantifiable aspects of the unit. Leadership, morale, discipline, motivation, and other factors are as important to a unit’s success as the physical presence of personnel and materiel.

1-6. **Reorganization** is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability. At any level, reorganization is accomplished internal to an organization and does not require significant resources from higher echelons to accomplish. Reorganization does not significantly increase combat power within a degraded unit. An effective reorganization does, however, make most productive use of available resources and leadership. Since no resources beyond normal sustainment and replacement operations are committed to the unit, the net increase in combat power is minimal. However, the unit becomes more likely to perform effectively.
Regeneration is the rebuilding of a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, including the reestablishment of essential command and control and the conduct of mission-essential training for the unit. Depending on the type and echelon, unit regeneration can require significant external support and resources from the theater and national level. New personnel may arrive from the training base. Units from other organizations deploying into theater may be assigned to replace lost subordinate elements of a formation. New or refurbished equipment may arrive from sustainment-level maintenance activities, perhaps missing critical components or subsystems such as communications. Personnel and materiel must be integrated into the formation and the unit must be trained before being employed in combat. Because of the time required for regeneration activities and the space and resources needed for units to train, regeneration usually occurs at the corps level and above, out of contact with enemy forces.

Strategic considerations determine whether reconstitution can occur. The strategic decision to expand the Army, whether to generate new units or to provide the personnel and equipment to enable reconstitution is extraordinary, requiring significant lead-time to recruit additional personnel, expand the industrial base to produce materiel, and perform underlying budgeting processes. In the absence of such a strategic-level series of decisions, Army leaders must reallocate available units to provide resources for reconstitution. Reconstitution is a deliberate operation in a theater using a combination of intertheater assets and intratheater assets. In an immature theater, insufficient resources may disallow any regeneration. In this case, planners decide in advance if and when regeneration may be possible.

The resources required to regenerate a unit will likely place severe constraints on a commander’s decision to regenerate and the degree to which those units will be restored. To regenerate a severely attrited unit, a commander may have to divert resources from elsewhere in the command, change priorities, or request assistance from higher headquarters. Due to resource constraints, commanders most likely will be unable to replace losses in a one-for-one fashion or replace losses in all units. In large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, units that are still combat effective continue to fight understrength. Units no longer combat effective are the primary candidates for reconstitution.

In some cases, a unit may be attrited to such a point that the resources required to regenerate sufficient combat power and return the unit to an effective fighting force can exceed the resources available to the commander. In such a case, the commander may decide to redistribute the remaining combat power of that unit to other units. Redistribution is the reassignment of unit personnel and equipment among other units within the command, either as individual replacements or as subunits.

Unit status is key to initiating reconstitution. A commander decides to reconstitute a unit when it has become combat ineffective. Reconstitution restores the unit to the required level of combat effectiveness to accomplish its future mission. Besides normal support actions, reconstitution may include—

- Removing a unit from combat.
- Using external assets to assess the unit.
- Reestablishing the chain of command.
- Training the unit for future operations.
- Reestablishing unit cohesion.

Such an undertaking requires deliberate planning. Commanders and staffs at each level should treat reconstitution as a standing branch or sequel plan. Commanders and staffs develop decision points that trigger the decision to execute reconstitution and codify them in decision matrices. As part of conducting operations (plan—prepare—execute—assess), a commander uses staff estimates of projected losses or post-engagement reporting to quickly implement a reconstitution plan. This assessment also facilitates decision point development. Figure 1-1 illustrates the reconstitution decision-making process.
1-13. The reconstitution plan must take into account the follow-on mission of the attrited unit. The final decision on whether to reconstitute an attrited unit depends on the mission variables. Mission requirements and available resources, including time, dictate appropriate reconstitution actions.

1-14. Reconstitution is not a sustainment operation, although sustainment plays an integral role. Providing replacement personnel and equipment is only a first step. A successful reconstitution requires training and leadership to develop veterans and replacements into a cohesive combined arms team.

1-15. Units receive sustainment throughout all phases of operations. Sustainment activities help prepare a unit to perform its mission, sustain it during operations, and bring it back to a specified level of effectiveness after an operation. Normal sustainment activities occur throughout operations up to and including reorganization. What distinguishes sustainment during regeneration is that it—

- Occurs along with regeneration activities of reestablishing the chain of command, training, and building unit cohesion.
- Involves very high levels of training and sustainment activities requiring a regeneration task force (RTF). The RTF temporarily dedicates support to the attrited unit, likely requiring a change in priorities of support and the overall concept of sustainment.
- Occurs in a relatively secure regeneration site.
- Requires higher commanders to commit resources (such as Army pre-positioned stocks, war reserve stocks, or reserve units) to regenerate the unit.

1-16. The large degree of resources required to regenerate a unit will usually require dedicated support, meaning those units supporting the RTF will need their normal workload transferred to other units so they can provide direct support to the RTF. The RTF is task-organized from elements under the directing commander’s control. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters designate RTFs in SOPs. While performing regeneration tasks, RTF elements are not performing their normal missions. The commander...
Chapter 1

1-17. Due to the extreme complexity of reconstitution operations, all elements—commanders, staffs, and executing units—must plan and prepare for reconstitution before they confront it. Any maneuver, maneuver support, or force sustainment unit may require reconstitution. Therefore, units across all warfighting functions should develop plans for the eventuality.

SECTION II – RECONSTITUTION PRINCIPLES

1-18. The ability to reconstitute units is vital to maintaining experienced units in large-scale combat. Reconstituting units whenever possible introduces replacement personnel alongside veterans in a unit. Given adequate time for replacement personnel to train with the veterans, a reconstituted unit may likely be more effective than a newly formed, inexperienced unit committed as a replacement for the attrited formation.

1-19. Some general principles follow in paragraphs 1-20–1-28 that apply to reconstitution.

1-20. Reconstitution actions are viewed from the point of view of the attrited unit. While a higher headquarters may reorganize forces to regenerate an attrited battalion, the purpose of doing so is the regeneration of that battalion.

1-21. Reorganization is typically the first step in any reconstitution operation, and the quickest way to meet an attrited unit’s most immediate needs. Reorganization ranges from an immediate reorganization following enemy contact to a deliberate reorganization designed to maintain combat effectiveness until the unit can be withdrawn from the fight to allow for receiving substantial numbers of replacement personnel and equipment.

1-22. Reorganization is accomplished using resources immediately available to the unit. While some personnel and materiel may be assigned to the unit, the net increase in combat power is minimal.

1-23. Regeneration requires a decision from the commander controlling the required resources. No Army unit or other resource exists solely to perform regeneration. Regeneration uses existing systems and units.

1-24. Regeneration is a proactive, planned action. Planners should develop a base reconstitution plan as a branch plan during the formal planning process. Key elements, such as the RTF, should be identified and key tasks such as identifying possible regeneration sites need to be addressed before the need arises.

1-25. Generally, units are regenerated from corps levels or above. A committed division probably cannot regenerate any subordinate unit. Even if it is not committed, a division needs significant help from an expeditionary sustainment command (known as ESC) or theater sustainment command (TSC).

1-26. Units cannot successfully regenerate while in direct or indirect fire contact. Units must be moved. This requires planners to work out the details to allow it to disengage and move to the regeneration site. Commanders and staffs take into account that the unit may continue to take losses during disengagement and movement to the regeneration site.

1-27. Regeneration requires time, especially for training and developing unit cohesion. Commanders must be aware that a distinct time versus regeneration level trade-off exists. An RTF may conduct a lesser regeneration effort quickly. A major regeneration effort takes time. Regenerating a brigade can easily take two weeks or more.

1-28. Individual situations dictate when to regenerate a unit. Commanders may establish baselines for their units in SOPs, adjusting criteria as necessary in operation orders (OPORDs). However, general criterion guidelines may include, for example personnel casualties of 30 percent or major weapon system losses of 35 percent.

SECTION III – MAJOR ELEMENTS

1-29. Reconstitution begins with a commander’s assessment of the unit with a focus on its next mission. Reconstitution’s major elements are assessment, reorganization, and regeneration. Figure 1-2 depicts the major elements and subelements of reconstitution as they relate to the varying degrees of training and sustainment required to execute. Generally speaking, the more degraded or combat ineffective a unit
becomes, the greater the sustainment effort and amount of individual and collective training the unit will require to return to combat effectiveness.

Figure 1-2. Reconstitution elements and subelements vs. training and sustainment required

ASSESSMENT

1-30. Assessment measures a unit’s capability to perform its mission. A commander must weigh the current capabilities of the unit against its mission. Two types of assessment exist—internal and external. Internal assessments are the responsibility of unit commanders who continually assess their units before, during, and after operations. External assessments are conducted at the direction of a higher headquarters of the attrited unit, typically by an element of the RTF.

1-31. Internal assessment of a unit is a continual process executed by commanders. Commanders evaluate available resources and how best to organize the unit to maximize available combat power. If, by conducting either immediate or deliberate reorganization, a commander believes sufficient resources exist to accomplish the next mission, the commander directs the reorganization and continues with the follow-on mission. If, after conducting an internal assessment, a commander determines the unit is no longer mission capable, the commander notifies the next higher echelon. (Considerations for conducting assessments are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.)

1-32. Upon notification of a unit’s inability to conduct its mission due to degraded combat power, the higher headquarters can either change the mission of the unit to match its degraded capability or remove it from combat as the higher headquarters assesses reconstitution possibilities. This will likely require an external assessment.

1-33. To determine available options to reconstitute a unit, a commander will likely direct an external assessment of the unit after it disengages. To accomplish this, the commander will likely activate a portion of the reconstitution plan and direct key elements of the RTF. The assessment element should be identified
in the reconstitution plan so it can rapidly come together and perform its mission. Since the RTF assessment element comprises personnel from several organizations, it is key to ensure all units and personnel are aware of their role in the process and are familiar with the SOP. RTF responsibilities are detailed in Chapter 4.

1-34. The RTF assessment provides the directing commander with a more thorough evaluation than the internal assessment to estimate the resources required to regenerate a unit. Armed with this detailed information from the RTF external assessment, and knowing the resources available, the commander can make an informed decision whether to regenerate a unit, conduct a further deliberate reorganization, or use that unit in other ways to contribute to the larger mission.

REORGANIZATION

1-35. Commanders of all types of units at every echelon conduct reorganization. Typically, units will undergo some degree of reorganization before regeneration. Reorganization may be immediate or deliberate. Both methods may include such measures as—

- Cross-leveling equipment and personnel.
- Matching operational weapon systems with crews.
- Forming composite units (joining two or more attrited units to form a single mission-capable unit).

1-36. Immediate reorganization is the quick and usually temporary restoration of degraded units to minimum levels of effectiveness. Normally, a commander implements immediate reorganization in the unit’s current combat position or as close to that site as possible to meet near-term needs. To accomplish this, commanders use information in OPORDs (such as succession of command) and unit SOPs (such as battle rosters, redistribution criteria, and contingency manning standards) and immediately available assets. An example of immediate reorganization is “consolidation and reorganization on the objective.” When an infantry platoon seizes an objective, the platoon leader inspects the platoon, moves Soldiers to fill gaps, and directs replenishment or cross-leveling of ammunition. This is the essence of immediate reorganization; it shifts readily available assets to increase combat power.

1-37. Deliberate reorganization is conducted when more time and resources are available. It usually occurs farther to the rear than immediate reorganization. Procedures are similar to those for immediate reorganization, but some replacement personnel and equipment may be available, and the unit has additional time to conduct resupply and maintenance activities.

1-38. With both methods of reorganization, the goal is to improve the unit’s capability until the tactical situation permits a more resource- and time-intensive effort. Because reorganization involves activities internal to a unit, it is the most expedient means of maintaining combat power. In forward units, it remains the most expedient method throughout the conflict.

1-39. Normal sustainment operations continue throughout the reorganization process in accordance with priorities set by the commander. With this support, reorganized units, even if under strength, may remain effective for extended periods. Commanders may be able to delay or avoid the need to regenerate.

REGENERATION

1-40. Regeneration is the rebuilding of a unit. It requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, which will require further reorganization to integrate with the unit. The commander directing the regeneration is the first commander in the chain of command who controls or can rapidly obtain the resources to accomplish the task. Regeneration also involves reestablishing or replacing the chain of command and conducting mission-essential training to get the regenerated unit to standard with its new Soldiers and equipment. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs at a regeneration site after the unit disengages and requires help from higher echelons. Since regeneration typically requires large quantities of personnel and equipment, commanders carefully balance these needs against others in the command.

1-41. Two methods of regenerating a unit exist: incremental, and subunit. Each method has its advantages and drawbacks, notably in how combat experienced Soldiers and leaders are dispersed in the formation, the degree of reorganization required, and the training time required to achieve some proficiency before
recommitting the unit to combat. In instances where losses are relatively few and dispersed across the formation, incremental regeneration may be sufficient. In cases where there are significant losses, not just in terms of personnel and equipment, but also in unit leadership, subunit regeneration may be the preferred option. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages a commander must consider along with the mission variables when making a decision.

1-42. Incremental regeneration focuses on individual replacements, either personnel or equipment, to replace losses in the unit. In a prolonged conflict, these replacements are likely to be new recruits, with minimal if any practical experience. This will often require veterans to assume new roles in the unit, such as a platoon sergeant becoming the platoon leader, and the new replacements assuming the junior positions.

1-43. As the name implies, subunit regeneration differs from incremental regeneration in that subunits are integrated into the organization as complete units, not as individuals. The veteran members of the unit are typically consolidated so the unit can receive a trained subordinate formation, such as a new platoon arriving to a company. The differences are described in the following example and illustrated in figures 1-3, 1-4 and 1-5 (on page 1-8), and 1-6 (on page 1-9):

1-44. Company A loses 4 of 14 tanks in an engagement with enemy forces. Two are lost from the first platoon and one each from the second and third platoons. Under incremental regeneration, Company A would receive four replacement tanks, with crews and ammunition. These may or may not exactly match the rank and level of experience of the crews lost. Individual tanks and their crews would be sent to each of the platoons to replace those lost. Under the subunit regeneration construct, Company A would consolidate its remaining tanks into two platoons and receive a complete platoon—consisting of the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and their wingmen—that had already conducted collective training as a platoon.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO</th>
<th>commanding officer</th>
<th>XO</th>
<th>executive officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1-3. Notional tank company
Chapter 1

Figure 1-4. Notional tank company after contact

Figure 1-5. Integrating individual replacements

1. The unit receives four tanks with crews. The unit has requested replacements of the grade and experience to match losses, but the replacement system can only guarantee fully-trained crews.

To ensure seniority among leadership positions, the following moves are made:
• 2nd PSG becomes 1st PL.
• 1-2 becomes 1st PSG.
• 2-3 becomes 2nd PSG.
• 3-2 becomes 3rd PSG.
Each platoon now has a new PSG, and all wingmen are either new or in a new position.

Merits
• Maintains combat experience in each platoon.
• Leadership all familiar with chain of command.
• Can be implemented regardless of replacements received.

Drawbacks
• Crew are in new roles in the formation (PL and PSG).
• Requires some degree of training to integrate individual systems into each platoon.
REDISTRIBUTION

1-45. Given the nature of LSCO and the possibility of significant losses of personnel and equipment, insufficient time and resources will exist to regenerate all attrited units. This is particularly true if a unit were to suffer greater than 50 percent losses. The resources required to regenerate one severely attrited unit may be able to regenerate two other less impacted units. In such circumstances, a commander may face the difficult decision to not regenerate a unit and use its remaining combat power in other ways such as—

- Forming individual and subunit replacements for other attrited units.
- Creating a smaller, composite unit from the remnants and using it to reinforce another unit or main effort.
- Reassigning the unit to a different mission, such as working with coalition partners or forming a cadre.

1-46. The decision to redistribute a unit is difficult to reverse while combat continues in an area of operations. Once a unit’s assets and personnel have been reassigned to other commands, reforming the unit would be extremely difficult.

SECTION IV – LIMITING FACTORS

1-47. Several factors limit commanders’ ability to reconstitute units, particularly during LSCO. The inability to replace experienced combat leaders and combat systems as fast as they can be destroyed can limit commanders’ ability to reconstitute a degraded unit back to its original capability and capacity.

1-48. As a conflict continues, one of the most precious resources is combat-experienced leaders. For example, a typical World War II division from June 1944 to May 1945 experienced 200–300 percent personnel turnover as it received replacements on its eastward advance. In the early stages of conflict, a unit may receive personnel with the rank and experience requested, but as a conflict continues, that likelihood
decreases. Commanders may therefore decide to promote from within their ranks to distribute experienced leaders across the organization.

1-49. Due to the technological complexity of current equipment and weapon systems, the industrial base will be unable to produce materiel as quickly as it is destroyed during LSCO against a peer adversary. As noted in paragraph 1-1, the Army does not have reconstitution-specific resources nor is there an endless supply of personnel or equipment available to maintain combat power indefinitely. While the Army can regenerate an operational force, to regenerate a large force structure at the strategic level requires a full national mobilization of the industrial base and increased personnel assessments into the force. Each decision to reconstitute a unit, and to regenerate in particular, commits resources not easily replaced in the short term. In the latter half of 1944, the U.S. produced approximately 70 combat vehicles per day, but average losses were about 30. The increasing technological complexities of today’s combat systems makes it unlikely that a similar production rate will be achieved in future conflicts.

1-50. Similarly, a unit might receive equipment replacements that match losses early on, but in a prolonged conflict, units may receive older equipment models than what they lost. This presents problems for operators, because the older equipment may not function the same as the equipment that was lost (and that the operators trained on). Sustainers may also encounter difficulties because older equipment may require different parts; test, maintenance, and diagnostic equipment; or ammunition than the newer equipment that was lost.

1-51. Finally, time may be the largest constraint on a commander’s ability to regenerate combat power. Commanders must attempt to balance the regeneration of a unit without ceding the initiative. Commanders must weigh the time it will take to rebuild the combat power of the attrited unit against the need to maintain tempo and accept risk accordingly.

SECTION V – COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-52. Three commanders have roles in regeneration. These are the commander directing the regeneration, the RTF commander, and the commander of the attrited unit.

1-53. The first commander in the chain of command who controls or can rapidly obtain the resources to accomplish the task directs regeneration. In most cases, this is the commander at least two echelons higher than the attrited unit. Even then, this commander typically requires assets from higher echelons to assist. All divisions have a very limited ability to conduct any regeneration. However, a division commander may control a battalion regeneration (with significant help from the echelon above division assets) if the division is not committed. If the division is committed, the corps or theater army controls the regeneration. A corps with theater army help or the theater army itself controls brigade and higher regeneration operations. For highly technical units which will likely require a significant amount of sustainment maintenance, such as an aviation brigade, the theater army will typically control regeneration operations.

1-54. The commander directing the regeneration will direct the execution of the branch plan mentioned in paragraph 1-12 and stand up the RTF to begin execution of regeneration operations. Chapter 3 discusses the composition of the RTF. The directing commander appoints the RTF commander. The RTF commander’s job has two aspects: controlling the process as directed by the regeneration order, and controlling support to the elements occupying the regeneration site. Controlling the process includes—

- Assessing the unit.
- Reestablishing command and control.
- Requisitioning, receiving, and issuing all required materiel.
- Receiving and allocating all personnel.
- Maintaining equipment.
- Providing other services.
- Managing the unit’s training.
- Evaluating the unit’s combat effectiveness at the end of training.
1-55. Support to the regeneration site includes providing the infrastructure to operate the site. This includes—
  - Terrain management within the site.
  - Security coordination.
  - Power generation.
  - Communications.
  - Control of training areas.
  - Movement control.

1-56. Support to the site also includes all required services such as power generation, mail distribution, and provision of water and rations.

1-57. Internal command of the attrited unit remains with the unit if a viable chain of command exists. If the chain of command is not viable, the unit in control of the process reestablishes the chain of command as a first step. Chapter 4 discusses this process. If the unit physically leaves its higher headquarters area of operations, command of the unit transfers to the appropriate headquarters. For example, if a battalion moves to the division rear area for regeneration, the division headquarters commands the battalion directly rather than through the brigade. If a brigade regeneration site is in the corps rear area, the brigade is attached to the corps.

SECTION VI – RECONSTITUTION PROCESS

1-58. This list presents an overview of the reconstitution process:
  - Units develop SOPs and train for reconstitution.
  - Units include reconstitution in operation plans (OPLANs).
  - Unit commanders continually assess unit effectiveness (internal assessment) and reorganize as required.
  - When unit commanders and their higher headquarters determine that reorganization cannot restore a unit to its required level of effectiveness, they recommend regeneration.
  - An element of the RTF begins to establish the proposed regeneration site and begins the external assessment based on available information. The directing headquarters adjusts the regeneration plan as necessary based on this estimate.
  - The attrited unit reestablishes minimum essential command structure as necessary and moves to the regeneration site. Elements of the RTF typically link up with the unit to provide supplies and services to help it move. The RTF elements also continue the external assessment process.
  - The RTF receives the unit at the site and provides essential Soldier sustainment. At the same time, the assessment element completes the external assessment of the unit. It identifies the resources required to regenerate the unit.
  - The first commander in the chain of command who controls all resources required to regenerate the unit (typically two levels above the unit requiring regeneration) decides whether to regenerate the unit, carry out further deliberate reorganization, or redistribute the resources elsewhere in the command.
  - If the commander decides to regenerate the unit, the RTF and the attrited unit simultaneously carry out the following four activities during the actual execution of the regeneration process:
    - The RTF and attrited unit complete the reestablishment or reinforcement of the chain of command and its control over the unit as required.
    - The RTF and attrited unit provide the required personnel, equipment, supplies, and services.
    - The unit conducts individual and collective training facilitated by the RTF.
    - The RTF evaluates the unit’s combat effectiveness for future operations.
The 28th Infantry Division at Schmidt

In October 1944, the U.S. First Army had torn two large holes in the German Siegfried Line at Aachen and Roetgen. Hard fighting by the U.S. V Corps’ 9th Infantry Division had opened the way to the Roer River valley. The V Corps’ follow-on attack was given to the 28th Infantry Division, whose objective was the town of Schmidt. The attack would be through the heart of the Huertgen Forest.

The 28th “Keystone” Division had arrived in Europe in July 1944 and seen considerable combat in Operation Cobra. Commanded by Major General Norman D. “Dutch” Cota, the division was composed of three infantry regiments, the 109th, 110th, and 112th. In cold, wet, overcast conditions on 2 November, the division went into the attack. The battle quickly deteriorated from the American perspective as strong, well-sited German defensive positions took advantage of the thick, virtually impassable terrain to halt the advance. Deadly German artillery fire and the support of German armor inflicted heavy losses on the 28th. After ten days of fruitless struggle, the unit had to be withdrawn to be replaced by the 4th Infantry Division.

The 28th began the battle with 825 officers and 13,107 enlisted men. On 13 November, it reported losses of 214 officers and 4454 enlisted, a total of 4,668 personnel. During the battle, the division received 115 officer and 3728 individual replacements, virtually all barely trained infantrymen. Despite a near equal replacement of losses, the unit rapidly became combat ineffective. In the latter stages of the battle, the new replacements suffered the majority of the casualties. Removed to a quiet sector of the V Corps area of operation, the 28th was reconstituted under conditions removed from contact with the enemy. The men received regular hot meals and slept in sheltered tents and billets. Regular visits by senior leaders were designed to raise morale and validate the sacrifices of the men. The program proved effective as the 28th performed admirably when a month after the debacle in the Huertgen Forest the Keystone Division more than held its own when attacked and outnumbered during the Battle of the Bulge.
Chapter 2
Responsibilities

Reconstitution decisions belong to commanders. All commanders assess how to employ available combat power to accomplish the mission. The commander of the attrited unit decides to reorganize when required and begins the reconstitution process. Regeneration is the most complex element of the reconstitution process, requiring extensive coordination among organizations. Therefore, most of this chapter focuses on regeneration responsibilities of three units: the unit being regenerated, the unit directing the regeneration, and the RTF.

SECTION I – RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ATTRITED UNIT

2-1. During reorganization, the attrited unit is typically the only unit involved, as reorganization is conducted with predominantly internal resources while the unit receives routine sustainment from its normal sustainment channels. During a regeneration, the sheer volume of sustainment and training an attrited unit receives can easily overwhelm the unit, requiring an RTF to manage regeneration operations until the attrited unit is capable of resuming control.

REORGANIZATION

2-2. Commanders continually assess their unit against current and projected missions to determine if sufficient combat power exists to accomplish their objectives. As needed, commanders reorganize their force to meet the needs of the mission. Following contact, commanders consolidate and reorganize to defend against possible counterattack or to prepare for follow-on missions. These actions are considered immediate reorganizations, executed to maximize available combat power within the command in the short term.

2-3. In instances where a unit is severely attrited, but resources or time do not allow for replacement operations or regeneration, commanders may consider a deliberate reorganization. A deliberate reorganization allows for more detailed cross-leveling of assets and personnel within the command and may include forming a composite unit from the remnants of two or more attrited subunits.

2-4. When a commander assesses that a reorganization of available assets within the command will provide insufficient combat power for subsequent missions, the commander must notify the higher command. The higher command then assesses whether to change the unit’s upcoming mission or assess it for possible regeneration.

REGENERATION

2-5. If a reorganization cannot restore a unit to sufficient strength to continue operations, higher commanders will make the decision to regenerate or redistribute that unit to reinforce or regenerate other units. If a higher commander decides to regenerate a unit, they should immediately reassign the attrited unit’s mission to another unit, move to establish the RTF, and begin execution of the regeneration operations plan. As another unit assumes the mission of the attrited unit, the attrited unit begins to focus its efforts on the regeneration mission.

2-6. Staff elements and personnel of the attrited unit linkup and work side by side with their functional counterparts in the RTF. Organic support elements also work with the RTF assisting in the sustainment effort as much as they are able. In addition, staff officers advise and assist the commander within their functional...
areas. The following discussion summarizes the unit’s duties. Chapter 4 gives details on required unit activities.

2-7. The commander assesses and moves the unit to the regeneration site. This involves the following:
  - Initial assessment of the unit.
  - Moving unit to initial assembly area.
  - Preparing for movement to regeneration site; linking up with elements providing support required to move to the site. The unit also links up with elements required to assist in assessment and to provide liaison with the RTF.
  - Moving to proposed regeneration site.

2-8. The attrited unit, in coordination with the RTF, conducts the following actions:
  - Assumes rear operations role assigned by the rear command post (CP).
  - Coordinates with RTF for replenishment of supplies.
  - Prepares training needs and plans in coordination with the RTF.
  - Schedules unit rest periods.

2-9. Finally, with the RTF operations element, the unit prepares for its follow-on mission. To do so, it—
  - Integrates new Soldiers and equipment into the unit.
  - Trains individual skills.
  - Conducts collective training.
  - Assesses effectiveness.
  - Plans for follow-on mission.

SECTION II – RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNIT DIRECTING REGENERATION

2-10. Units that have the resources to conduct regeneration have many responsibilities. The overall responsibility for regeneration operations falls to the operations staff officers, because this staff understands future operational requirements, coordinates and directs action on behalf of the commander, and has the capacity to manage such a complex operation. All other staff sections support in their own areas of expertise in order to rebuild the maximum amount of combat power in the minimum amount of time.

2-11. Described in paragraphs 2-12 through 2-30 are the responsibilities of commanders, staffs, command posts, and subordinate and supporting commands. Details on how to fulfill these duties appear throughout this manual.

COMMANDER

2-12. Commanders—
  - Include reconstitution considerations in all operational planning.
  - Ensure regeneration SOPs and plans exist.
  - Ensure the unit’s training program includes training for regeneration (see Chapter 3 for a discussion on training events).
  - Set regeneration priorities that align with operational and tactical objectives when more than one unit requires regeneration.
  - Activate RTF assessment teams to evaluate attrited units as required.
  - Determine the follow-on mission.
  - Decide whether to regenerate an attrited unit. If the decision is to regenerate, the commander sets unit effectiveness goals while keeping in mind the time available.
  - Adjust the makeup of the predesignated RTF based on the assessment and the current situation.
  - Select the regeneration site based on the recommendation of the operations staff.
  - Determine specific actions required for the regeneration.
  - Activate the rest of the RTF.
G-1—PERSONNEL STAFF OFFICERS

2-13. Personnel staff officers—

- Determine expected unit losses for specific missions.
- Manage personnel accountability and strength reporting and identify Soldiers with required qualifications. The personnel staff section determines the availability of replacements for current and upcoming operations and develops personnel replacement plans in the operations process.
- Ensure casualty reporting is integrated into current operations tracking in accordance with FM 1-0. Monitor patient tracking and accountability with the surgeon.
- Anticipate increased needs for battlefield promotions and impact awards.
- Coordinate the return to duty (RTD) Soldier management with supporting medical elements.
- Coordinate personnel actions for contingency manning standards.
- Advise the commander and operations staff on the human resources and personnel services for the RTF.
- Ensure plans cover all required functions. Functions at the regeneration site may include legal support; mail; morale, welfare, and recreation; public affairs; and chaplain support.
- Coordinate with commanders and staffs responsible for each function to identify RTF elements and coordinate their efforts.

G-2—INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICERS

2-14. Intelligence staff officers—

- Advise commanders on the threat situation facing candidates for regeneration.
- Assess the threat for prospective regeneration sites.
- Advise the commander and operations staff on the intelligence elements for the RTF. They coordinate intelligence with these elements during the process as required.

G-3—OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICERS

2-15. Operations staff officers—

- Provide to the commander the assessment of an attrited unit.
- Recommend, based on the formal assessment, whether to regenerate a unit and, if so, the extent of regeneration. The G-3 also recommends to the commander unit regeneration priorities, advises on availability of personnel and equipment, identifies critical shortfalls, and plans for employment options to meet contingency needs.
- Serve as the focal point for control and coordination of regeneration efforts as directed by the commander.
- Align regeneration efforts with command priorities and the situation.
- Advise the commander on the necessity, composition, and functions of the RTF. These are coordinated with all other staff sections.
- Advise the commander on security measures for the site. These include the recommended role of the attrited unit.
- Coordinate with the rear operations commander to integrate a unit undergoing regeneration into the rear operations security plan.
- Advise the commander on training needs in units undergoing regeneration, identify required resources, and identify and mitigate risk for the operation.
- Facilitate training for the regenerated unit. (See Chapter 4 for training considerations).
- Manage the operations process for regeneration.
- Coordinate with identified key leaders of the RTF as necessary throughout the reconstitution process, to include the planning phase.
G-4—SUSTAINMENT STAFF OFFICERS

2-16. Sustainment staff officers—

- Provide logistics input for the regeneration part of the OPLAN.
- Identify logistics resources needed to carry out regeneration based on operations staff guidance.
- Recommend, based on command priorities, allocation of critical items of supply (medical and cryptographic items are excluded, as the medical and signal officers, respectively, handle those items).
- Coordinate transportation plans and policies. They identify movement control needs and the elements required for support.
- Determine, as appropriate, host-nation support (HNS) requirements for the regeneration process. They also provide information and help to secure available HNS.
- Recommend to the operations staff, in coordination with sustainment commanders, the general location of the regeneration site.
- Plan for prestocking of supplies and equipment to support regeneration.
- Plan for services essential to the regeneration process. They ensure expeditious handling of remains and personal effects. They also plan for clothing exchange, shower, and laundry operations.
- Recommend, in coordination with sustainment commanders, logistics elements for the RTF and any other allocations of logistics personnel and units during regeneration.
- Recommend the extent the attrited unit’s sustainment activities play in regeneration.
- Integrate medical, personnel support, and finance and comptroller requirements into the concept of sustainment for regeneration.
- Maintain current and projected equipment availability and serviceability status as the unit regenerates.

G-5—PLANS STAFF OFFICERS

2-17. Plans staff officers—

- Include regeneration in OPLANs based on expected losses and future missions.
- Recommend, based on the formal assessment, whether to regenerate a unit and, if so, the extent of regeneration. They recommend unit regeneration priorities, advise on availability of personnel and equipment, identify critical shortfalls, and plan for employment options to meet contingency needs.
- Serve as the focal point for control and coordination of regeneration efforts as directed by the commander.
- Align regeneration efforts with command priorities and the situation.
- Recommend regeneration sites after coordinating with the logistics staff, sustainment commanders, and others with relevant information. (See Chapter 3 for site selection considerations).

G-6—SIGNAL STAFF OFFICERS

2-18. Signal staff officers—

- Recommend employment of signal units and resources to support regeneration.
- Recommend allocation of critical communications and cryptographic equipment.
- Coordinate communications needs for liaison elements, the RTF, and units being regenerated.
- Advise the operations staff on any signal considerations for site selection.

G-8—FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF OFFICERS

2-19. Financial management staff officers—
• Provide support for contracted services that may be part of the RTF.
• Provide Soldier pay support to the RTF as necessary.

G-9—CIVIL AFFAIRS STAFF OFFICERS

2-20. Civil affairs staff officers—
• Coordinate host-nation facility and resource requirements for logistics, engineer, and other staff officers. They must identify needs early. HNS may include Class I and Class III supplies and field services. Civil-military operations officers also advise the commander and the operations staff on host-nation considerations that may affect the location of a regeneration site.
• Coordinate HNS for the regeneration process. They advise the commander, staffs, and the RTF on HNS availability. Civil affairs elements help conduct area surveys and help coordinate contract support and other support from local sources.
• Coordinate the temporary augmentation of language-qualified personnel to help obtain HNS at all levels.
• Coordinate dislocated civilian operations with the unit responsible for the area of operations. The provost marshal and others assist.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

2-21. The staff judge advocate section—
• Advises the commanders and staff on the application and effect of international law, law of armed conflict, national law and policy, and regulations on operations and proposed plans.
• Provides legal support to operational contracting.
• Provides legal support to acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.
• Provides fiscal legal review on proposed expenditures.
• Plans and executes training on the rules of engagement for commanders, subordinate units, staffs, and Soldiers.
• Advises the commander and staff on constraints, limitations, and restricted approval authorities contained in the rules of engagement that will impact current and future operations as units assume their new mission.

ENGINEER STAFF OFFICERS

2-22. Engineer staff officers—
• Recommend to the commander and operations staff the allocation and redistribution of engineer units, personnel, and equipment during regeneration.
• Participate in site and terrain reconnaissance, assist in site selection, and determine site preparation needs.
• Recommend engineering elements for the RTF.
• Coordinate engineer efforts at the regeneration site. Engineers may support the construction of ranges and other training facilities, perform area damage control, and conduct mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering support.

MEDICAL STAFF OFFICERS AND SURGEONS

2-23. Medical staff officers and surgeons—
• Recommend, in coordination with the medical command, allocation and distribution of medical personnel, materiel, and units during regeneration. This includes the composition of the medical element of the RTF, including treatment and evacuation assets, combat and operational stress control (COSC), preventive medicine personnel to inspect water sources and dining facilities, and veterinary personnel to inspect Class I supplies. They also ensure the RTF has enough Class VIII supplies and medical equipment.
- Anticipate an increase in combat and operational stress reactions and other issues related to reconstitution and advise commanders on force health protection or preventive medicine aspects of regeneration. This includes the availability and use of COSC personnel and mental behavioral health teams.
- Advise commanders on the effects of accumulated radiation exposure and possible delayed effects from exposure to chemical or biological agents. They identify resources required for patient decontamination.
- Advise commanders on the disposition of personnel exposed to lethal, but not immediately life threatening, doses of radiation or chemical and biological agents.
- Obtain medical intelligence on the site for the command surgeon to evaluate to identify health threats prevalent in the region and the prophylaxis needed to mitigate those threats.
- Coordinate with personnel staff on evacuation policy and RTDs.
- Advise the operations staff on any health service support (HSS) and force health protection (FHP) considerations for site selection. These may include proximity to medical facilities.

**PROVOST MARSHEALS**

2-24. Provost marshals—
- Coordinate military police support to conduct area security, reconnaissance, main and alternate supply route enforcement, and military police assets required at regeneration sites. They do this in conjunction with the rear CP. Provost marshals coordinate host-nation military and civil security implications with civil-military operations as required.
- Coordinate to adjust existing traffic control plans or establish a traffic control plan. Military police focus on route reconnaissance and traffic control posts and coordinate straggler and dislocated civilian control, as planned by the G-9.
- Advise commanders and movement managers on route and area security considerations for selecting and moving to regeneration sites.
- Advise commanders on detainee considerations unique to the regeneration site. They also ensure units selected for regeneration are relieved of any detainee responsibility as soon as possible.

**PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS**

2-25. Public affairs officers—
- Recommend public affairs policy to the commander.
- Provide a public affairs team to advise and assist in dealing with public information and press requirements.
- Ensure information flows to the team at the regeneration site.
- Monitor the flow of information out of the regeneration site through media operations, to include press pools if used.

**CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OFFICERS**

2-26. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officers—
- Coordinate decontamination needs and use of chemical support elements.
- Plan for and coordinate the establishment of a linkup point and decontamination site on the route to the regeneration site, if required.
- Coordinate nuclear and chemical route and regeneration site reconnaissance.
- Coordinate with the logistics staff for resupply of chemical defense equipment.
- Maintain radiation exposure data and status.
Responsibilities

**CHAPLAIN SECTIONS**

2-27. Chaplain sections—
- Provide unit pastoral support, particularly to those who have lost comrades and friends.
- Coordinate needs for worship and memorial ceremonies and services, sacramental acts, and counseling.

**REAR COMMAND POST**

2-28. Rear CP—
- Integrates the unit being regenerated, any replacement units, and the RTF into the rear operations plan; it also provides other appropriate support.
- Considers low-risk rear operations missions for units undergoing regeneration; these can enhance unit training and restore the unit’s confidence. The rear CP coordinates these missions with operations staff. They ensure plans are consistent with the commander’s overall projected use of the regenerated unit.

**SUSTAINMENT COMMANDS**

2-29. Sustainment commands—
- Coordinate with the logistics staff of the directing headquarters on the availability and applicability of logistics elements for the RTF. They also provide the supply and equipment status of these units.
- Coordinate the integration of higher-level logistics elements into the RTF.
- Recommend regeneration sites in concert with the logistics staff of the directing headquarters. They advise on the availability and mobility of support facilities.
- Coordinate the move to the site for subordinate elements in the RTF and support operations at the site, as required.
- Provide materiel management capability for the RTF and a means for it to linkup with the supporting sustainment command. The sustainment command ensures materiel is distributed according to the priorities set by the commander directing the regeneration.
- Provide movement control capability.
- Advise commanders and staffs on the availability of replacement personnel. They identify personnel with critical military occupational specialties (MOSs).
- Direct and monitor the replacement flow per the fill plan and command priorities.
- Coordinate with replacement and transportation agencies to move replacements to the site.
- Provide personnel services support elements for the RTF.

**MEDICAL COMMANDS**

2-30. Medical commands—
- Coordinate with the medical staff to ensure that Army Health System assets are properly allocated and positioned.
- Coordinate needs for medical materiel and supplies for onsite support through the medical materiel activity.
- Provide oversight for cross-leveling of medical supplies and equipment or shifting HSS and FHP assets of attrited units to improve their ability to provide Army health support. (Refer to FM 4-02 for additional information.)

**SECTION III – RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE REGENERATION TASK FORCE**

2-31. The RTF executes regeneration. It ensures that regeneration actions comply with the plans and priorities of the commander directing the regeneration. The RTF has two interrelated roles: it performs the
formal assessment of the attrited unit and assesses effectiveness at the end of the regeneration process, and it conducts the activities required to regenerate the unit. Some elements of the RTF are involved in both functions.

2-32. To execute regeneration, the RTF must include both an operations element and a sustainment element. The operations element helps reestablish or reinforce the chain of command of the attrited unit, assesses unit effectiveness, and aids in planning and executing the unit’s training. The operations element should include Soldiers from the same branch as the type of unit being regenerated. For example, a logistician cannot plan a tank battalion’s training nor assess its effectiveness.

2-33. The sustainment element provides the extensive logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support activities required to regenerate the unit. Chapter 3 describes specifics of RTF composition; Chapter 4 details its activities.

2-34. Generally, the RTF commander has responsibilities in three areas. First, the commander deploys the RTF when directed by the commander controlling the regeneration. The RTF commander—
- Coordinates the move of RTF elements to the regeneration site.
- Arranges to move major end items, supplies, personnel replacements, and evacuation assets to the site, based on the initial assessment.

2-35. Second, once the attrited unit arrives at the site, the RTF—
- Verifies and adjusts regeneration needs.
- Sets up the RTF CP and control of the regeneration site. This process includes fulfilling the rear operations role coordinated with the rear CP.
- Reestablishes or reinforces the chain of command of the attrited unit.
- Conducts the sustainment operations of the regeneration.

2-36. Third, the RTF provides support for training and preparing the unit for its follow-on mission. The RTF—
- Coordinates training needs and facilities.
- Provides sustainment for training.
- Plans for distribution or return of supplies and deadlined equipment.
- Evaluates the unit at the end of the regeneration.
Chapter 3  
Planning and Preparation

The commander’s mission role is paramount in reconstitution planning, decision-making, and execution processes. The higher commander’s plan establishes the intent, concept, and priorities. These guide subordinate commanders as they develop their reconstitution plans. Subordinate commanders incorporate the entire reconstitution process, including reorganization, assessment, and regeneration, into a standing branch plan that can be updated as needed prior to execution. Reconstitution should be a preconceived action, guided by orders and SOPs. Waiting until the need to reconstitute arises to begin planning wastes valuable time before a unit can regain combat effectiveness and return to combat operations.

SECTION I – THE PLANNING PROCESS

3-1. Just as units conduct training to increase operational proficiency, the complexity of reconstitution operations requires units to plan, train, and rehearse in order to ensure success. This is particularly true with regard to regeneration operations. The formation of an RTF will likely require a change in several existing command and support relationships to bring together the required personnel to train and sustain the attrited unit. The same tools and methods the Army uses to build expertise for other operations are applicable to reconstitution operations as well.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

3-2. Unit SOPs should address reconstitution. SOPs need to establish the means to continue operations through reorganization and the methods to shift to more extensive regeneration efforts. A template for a reconstitution SOP is in Appendix A. Key items in the SOP are—

- Information requirements enabling commanders to make reconstitution decisions.
- Reporting procedures.
- Assessment procedures and responsibilities. For an organization that may direct a regeneration, the SOP includes functions and composition of the RTF assessment element.
- Battle rosters, to include assignment of and training for alternate duties. This is crucial for low-density, highly technical areas. The SOP also covers contingency manning standards.
- Critical tasks for overall mission accomplishment.
- Procedures to reestablish or reinforce command and control (C2) systems.
- Reorganization procedures, criteria, and priorities.
- Techniques to maintain unit cohesion.
- Personnel and equipment replacement procedures.
- Procedures for transitioning to regeneration.

THE RECONSTITUTION PLAN

3-3. The OPLAN for a specific mission should include a branch plan for reconstitution in the same way it includes a concept of operations and a concept of support. The OPLAN should also include information
requirements and decision points to enable commanders’ decision making. Planners base a reconstitution plan on—

- The unit’s current condition.
- The unit’s assigned mission.
- Guidance from higher headquarters.
- Expected intensity of the conflict and levels of loss.
- Anticipated future missions.

3-4. These factors may affect the extent of reconstitution and the speed or priority of the effort. The reconstitution plan includes enough detail to enable staffs and supporting units to rapidly restore units within command priorities.

3-5. In addition to addressing reconstitution in the OPLAN for a specific mission, planners on the staff of the directing headquarters may write a separate OPLAN for regeneration. This is especially true if a regeneration plan differs significantly from the SOP and sufficient time is available. Time constraints may require use of a fragmentary order. Appendix B includes a template for a reconstitution branch plan.

3-6. The more fully developed a unit’s reconstitution SOP is, the easier it is to develop a reconstitution plan. For a regeneration, the plan answers these questions to the extent to which they differ or are absent from the SOP:

- Who is in charge of the regeneration overall? (See the C2 discussion in Chapter 1 and the RTF composition material in this chapter.)
- Who is in charge of the regeneration site?
- Where do RTF personnel and their equipment come from? (Suggestions are shown below and in Appendix C)
- Does the attrited unit and all of the supporting units have the plan? Does the plan include timelines, responsibilities, and overlays?
- Does a regeneration plan exist for combat support and force sustainment units? (Considerations are described in Chapter 4.)
- What are the specific criteria for considering regeneration in this plan?
- What procedures apply for a contaminated unit?
- Have planners provided for refresher training for units issued unfamiliar equipment? (Planning considerations are described in section II.)

SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-7. Reconstitution is a major operation for any unit. As planners put together reconstitution SOPs and plans that address all the elements cited above, they consider many diverse but interrelated factors. This section covers a number of those factors. Planners may include other considerations as described in the discussion on execution in Chapter 4.

3-8. Some general planning factors are—

- Successful reconstitution requires integration of all aspects of the unit and its support system. This includes most services and classes of supply.
- Trade-offs exist between time and the extent of reconstitution possible.
- The reconstitution effort should be thoroughly planned and understood by all involved. All applicable SOPs and OPLANs are detailed, including timelines, locations, sources of supplies, and responsibilities.
- War-gaming courses of action during the planning process can help identify what units may require reconstitution and when and where to perform the process.
- Planners integrate security for regeneration actions into the overall rear operations plan.
- The commander in control of the process establishes a system to aggressively manage any reconstitution effort and ensure units meet set milestones.
- The RTF commander also keeps the chain of command aware of progress so it can include a regenerated unit in plans for future operations.

**CONTINGENCY MANNING STANDARDS**

3-9. Personnel constraints may prohibit the full-strength manning of primary groups or weapon systems during reconstitution. Therefore, commanders must prepare for the possibility of manning weapon systems or primary groups with less than a full complement of Soldiers.

3-10. For example, a commander may receive 12 qualified tank crew members and 4 tanks. Rather than fielding three fully crewed tanks, the commander may opt to field all four tanks with crews of only three per tank. Further, by maintaining the integrity of crews during reconstitution, commanders may be able to reduce training needs and provide a base for preserving or restoring cohesion. Using contingency manning standards can provide a nucleus of Soldiers with an assortment of critical skills. As a team, they may be able to perform a number of predesignated critical combat functions.

3-11. This technique is an excellent emergency measure, which maximizes combat power with limited personnel. It maintains primary group integrity, reduces training needs, and enhances cohesion. Commanders must remember, however, that they will be fighting with reduced combat capability and lower unit endurance. They must deal with higher risks inherent with this technique.

**DECONTAMINATION**

3-12. Units undergoing immediate reorganization use basic Soldier skills for immediate and operational decontamination of personnel and equipment. Decontamination elements from CBRN companies usually provide thorough decontamination support to units undergoing deliberate reorganization or regeneration. The RTF also plans for needed support, such as station operators, to help the contaminated unit with detailed personnel decontamination. For regeneration, they decontaminate personnel and equipment at a site en route to an uncontaminated regeneration site. In such cases, the RTF commander may send a liaison team to linkup with the unit while it is still contaminated. If not, the commander controlling the resources to direct a regeneration has two undesirable options: make a decision based on limited information from the unit, or wait until the unit can be decontaminated and assessed formally. If a commander decides with limited information, valuable resources may be committed that are ultimately wasted. If a commander waits, the advantage of timely action is lost.

3-13. The unit determines what equipment is contaminated. If the unit lacks that capability, the RTF provides a CBRN survey party. In either case, the CBRN officer of the headquarters directing the regeneration receives the information and coordinates with the RTF. The RTF prepares to receive uncontaminated assets of the attrited unit first. The CBRN staffs of the directing headquarters and the RTF prepare estimates of arrival times of decontaminated assets. These measures assist in planning for use of valuable resources.

3-14. Commanders and staffs consider the time required and options for conducting thorough decontamination. Weathering may be an alternative option to thorough decontamination. Weathering reduces contamination and enables contaminated units to reduce their mission-oriented protective posture and unmask. Weathered equipment must be surveyed with the proper equipment to ensure reduction to negligible risk levels.

3-15. Once the commander decides to decontaminate a unit, decontamination follows set priorities. CBRN personnel coordinate support requirements with operations and logistics personnel, ensuring needed resources are available. The decontamination site should provide for security and adequate water. The RTF coordinates sites selected for decontamination with terrain managers and, as appropriate, host-nation authorities, especially when run-off may contaminate a water source. Host-nation territorial forces may have already established decontamination sites that meet operational and environmental needs.
SECURITY

3-16. Forces undergoing regeneration and elements assisting in the effort are subject to attack by a wide array of rear area threats. They plan for—

- Sabotage from agents, terrorists, and sympathizers.
- Attacks by special operations forces, airborne and air assault forces, and deep strike units.
- Artillery, air, and missile attacks, including nuclear, biological, and chemical munitions.
- Cyber and electronic warfare attacks.

3-17. Units undergoing regeneration are particularly vulnerable because they are tired and depleted. Additionally, the presence of all the sustainment elements to support regeneration creates a lucrative target. The RTF coordinates security with the rear CP. Elements in the regeneration site are responsible for defending themselves against a level I threat. This includes acts of sabotage by agents, terrorists, and sympathizers. Planners also identify a response force to defeat level II threats. The RTF commander closely coordinates responsibilities with the commander of the attrited unit. The attrited unit may need help with security in the early phases of regeneration.

REGENERATION TASK FORCE COMPOSITION

3-18. The commander directing a regeneration appoints the RTF commander. The SOP identifies the choice under normal conditions as well as alternatives. Some possibilities include the deputy or assistant commander, a key member of the operations staff section, or subordinate commanders. The actual choice in a particular case depends on the situation. Factors may include the level of regeneration required, the type of unit being regenerated, and other operations being conducted by the command.

3-19. The RTF includes both operational and sustainment elements to fulfill the responsibilities listed in Chapter 2. The operational element includes personnel of the same branch as the type of unit being regenerated. For example, engineers should be in the RTF regenerating an engineer unit. They will help reestablish command and control, assess the unit in relation to the commander’s effectiveness goals, and assist in the training program.

3-20. The sustainment element also needs enough people and expertise in the required functional areas. Whenever possible, the reconstitution plan designates an existing headquarters element (for example, a support battalion) as part of the RTF as opposed to piecemealing an ad hoc headquarters from various units. While the sustainment unit of the attrited unit may still be able to provide support, it too may require some degree of regeneration. When selecting sustainment elements for the RTF, planners assess how much sustainment the attrited unit can provide for itself.

3-21. An assessment element of the RTF conducts the external assessment discussed in Chapter 4. At least some of the people in that element help execute regeneration. They provide continuity from the assessment phase through the regeneration execution. The knowledge they gain during assessment is useful in facilitating the process. For example, the personnel responsible for assessing the command and control of the attrited unit have a major role in reestablishing the chain of command. They know the status of the unit and the personnel resources available to fill the chain of command. In addition, whenever possible, the core of this assessment element is the element that determines whether the regenerated unit has met the commander’s effectiveness criteria during the training phase of regeneration.

3-22. The RTF also includes a liaison element to linkup with the attrited unit. This element typically begins the external assessment. Therefore, part of the RTF assessment element on the liaison team transmits preliminary requirements to the regeneration site. The liaison element should have adequate mobility and communications capability, which means more than just having the necessary equipment. The liaison element should also have the correct signal operating instructions and a secure voice capability in the networks of higher headquarters, supporting units, and the RTF. The liaison element accompanies the unit to the regeneration site and stays there to assist in further assessment and regeneration execution. Appendix C includes a list of sample candidate elements for an RTF.
SITE SELECTION

3-23. Site selection is an important consideration early in the planning process. The terrain manager for the rear area of the relevant echelon (for example, the division or corps rear CP, in conjunction with the division sustainment brigade or expeditionary sustainment command) evaluates terrain. The commander directing regeneration uses this analysis to select the site. In a joint security area, the TSC commander normally designates a site as directed by theater army. Coordination of a site with host-nation representatives and allied commands is essential in a combined environment.

3-24. The site should not be under immediate enemy pressure. Preferably, the site is as secure as possible from interdiction and harassment. Terrain managers carefully manage the electronics or visual signature of the site. For example, a brigade-sized element and an RTF sharing an assembly area emit a signature similar to two brigades. To a threat intelligence analyst, two brigades in the corps rear may look like the corps reserve. The threat may respond with a direct attack by airborne, air assault, or other deep strike forces. It may also launch an indirect attack with aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles against the regeneration site.

3-25. One consideration often overlooked is traffic control. Due to the large volume of traffic regeneration activities will produce, a traffic control point should be established early in the process, in coordination with the unit responsible for the area of operations.

3-26. A key factor in site selection is the mobility of essential RTF elements. For example, if the regeneration involves a substantial number of aircraft, planners consider a site near an aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) facility, due to the AVIM facility’s lack of mobility. Other RTF elements with limited mobility include ground maintenance, HSS, and ammunition supply assets. Planners must consider regeneration sites with established support areas for these essential RTF elements.

3-27. The following list summarizes key site selection considerations:

- Site out of range of enemy direct support artillery.
- Site near or at an immobile, essential facility required by the RTF, such as an AVIM or large sustainment maintenance facility.
- Distance the attrited unit has to travel is not excessive.
- Size large enough for the unit and RTF to occupy without presenting a concentrated visual or electronic signature.
- Location provides access to communications resources for official (for example, coordination with supporting entities) and unofficial (for example, morale calls, video, email) matters.
- Training space adequate to meet the directing commander’s training objectives for the regenerated unit. The regeneration site should include the capability for both individual and crew-served weapons training, and both individual and collective gunnery for combat platforms. Extensive engineer support may be required if adequate facilities are not available in a host nation.
- Access to military load class 100 road net, railhead, and landing zone or airfield for CH-47s.
- Layout suitable to process equipment as it arrives, including loading and off-loading ramps.
- Layout suitable for use of materials handling equipment (known as MHE).
- Decontamination site available for unit en route to regeneration site.
- Occupational and environmental site assessment to prevent potential exposure of personnel to health hazards.
- Site situated to take advantage of HNS facilities, training facilities, labor, and medical facilities.
- Commercial power available.
- Site situated to facilitate move to follow-on mission site.
- Water sources (both potable and non-potable) adequate.
- Site relatively secure from enemy interdiction and harassment.
- Site beyond enemy’s immediate objective.

3-28. Site layout depends on the size of the unit and all the factors listed above. Considerations for support area layouts at specific echelons are in the sustainment doctrine.
NON-LIKE REPLACEMENT ITEMS

3-29. A unit being regenerated may receive non-like replacement items for several reasons. These include the continued modernization of the force, low-density equipment, and incompatibility of systems fielded in units with materiel in war reserve stocks. Such replacements create problems for regeneration planners and executors.

3-30. Unit personnel may not have trained on or worked with such equipment. In some cases, unit maintenance personnel lack compatible special tools and test equipment; test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment; manuals; and repair parts. They may also lack training on the equipment.

3-31. Non-like replacements also pose difficulties for maneuver commanders and their staffs, especially regarding training packages and dealing with replacement personnel who have never trained on the system they must use. Tactical commanders must firmly commit to providing like equipment to the unit that has used that equipment type previously to minimize problems. Commanders may even shift old equipment to another unit to make the equipment in the regenerated unit all of the same type, thereby minimizing employment and maintenance problems.

3-32. Considerations for the unit and supporting elements go beyond the regeneration process—

- Units may require dual shop and bench stocks.
- The regenerated unit may require additional training time for operators and maintainers.
- Support units may have to adjust authorized stockage lists (known as ASLs) to include new lines.
- Class III and V supply usage changes.
- Maintenance skills required in support units may change.

SUSTAINMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-33. Movement and traffic control personnel and sustainment operators ensure a smooth movement flow within the site. Additionally, they avoid having all of a unit’s logistics assets in one place at the same time, for example, all of a unit’s fuel assets at the fuel point. The signature from such buildups represents a valuable target for enemy aircraft.

3-34. The RTF predetermines field maintenance collection points in the site so terrain managers do not have to find a site suitable for downloading inoperable equipment with limited time available and during hours of darkness. Equipment towed or carried from the battle area goes to a central location known to all, which facilitates sorting of equipment. Special requirements exist for vehicles with low off-road capabilities or that require special road clearances. The RTF addresses this before regeneration execution.

3-35. Planners examine all aspects of human resources and personnel services for applicability in the regeneration of a specific unit. Besides the obvious need for handling personnel actions, planners also consider finance; legal; morale, welfare, and recreation; religious; and public affairs support to the Soldiers of the attrited unit.

3-36. Information relevant to the combat readiness of the unit may be limited or incomplete. This precludes quick identification and provision of needed major assemblies, repair parts, and other materiel. The logistics status reports on hand at the division and corps levels often reflect data that are 24-hours old. These data may be only minimally useful in measuring materiel readiness of an attrited unit. The assessment element requires adequate communications with the attrited unit and the RTF CP to ensure information is current. SOPs and OPLANs include tactics, techniques, and procedures for the flow of unit logistics status to the RTF.

3-37. Planners also use HNS. Host-nation facilities, personnel, and other resources can significantly enhance the regeneration effort. Coordination with host-nation officials is vital.

3-38. Planners consider other sustainment planning areas, as follows:

- Assessment elements do not place any burden for sustainment on an attrited unit.
- Both planners and executors of regeneration actions understand the status of equipment issued from theater reserve stocks. They understand the meaning of the status, such as ready-to-fight or ready-for-issue, and what each dictates regarding logistics actions.
Planning and Preparation

- A movement control team (known as MCT) in support of the RTF may have to orchestrate a unit’s move to the rear.
- SOPs list the information a regeneration candidate unit provides (if possible) to the assessment element. SOPs also dictate what information and overlays the RTF provides to the unit. Information may include equipment on hand shortages, equipment serviceability status for mission-critical and pacing items, and personnel shortages by MOS.
- Reconstitution SOPs and plans reflect procedures for managing replacements of Soldiers with low-density MOSs. These include medics and maintenance personnel who may not be available through normal replacement channels.
- The SOP includes the role of operational stress control elements, such as counselors and psychologists.
- If the unit recovers disabled vehicles from areas forward of the regeneration site, planners also arrange to move the vehicle crews.
- The RTF has 24-hour operating capability.
- The SOP and plan address the role, if any, of the parent organization’s sustainment structure. For example, a property book office representative may assist in the regeneration effort.
- The main CP of the unit being regenerated collocates with or near the RTF headquarters. This facilitates coordination between the two elements.
- The plan addresses decontamination support from the RTF.

SECTION III – TRAINING TO CONDUCT RECONSTITUTION

3-39. Reconstitution training does not significantly add to the amount of training a unit undergoes. All aspects of reconstitution rely on and complement existing systems and programs; this is particularly true of training. The vast majority of tasks critical to reconstitution are already trained under other programs. Commanders need only recognize their value to reconstitution and take advantage of opportunities to focus collective training in accordance with the responsibilities listed in Chapter 2.

3-40. Staff officers and support units at all levels train to plan for reconstitution needs and activities. They train to balance reconstitution needs with overall objectives. They stress quick, accurate assessments and alignment of reconstitution efforts with the priorities, intent, and concept of the commander. Staff training also covers techniques and procedures to ensure continuous operation of the staff or to quickly reestablish a depleted staff.

3-41. Unit training focuses on reorganization techniques and procedures, use of contingency manning standards, and implementation of reconstitution SOPs. Cross training occurs across sections, squads, and crews. It covers all functions critical to maintaining the unit’s combat effectiveness.

3-42. Units cross train Soldiers into low-density MOSs within a unit. This facilitates reorganization and reduces the magnitude of any later regeneration efforts. Cross training is a time-consuming process, which should be complete before a unit engages in combat. Since time is critical during reconstitution, all levels of command identify low-density, highly technical MOSs early. They implement necessary cross training programs during peacetime. This is particularly important in combat support and sustainment units.

3-43. Cross-training of leaders across the spectrum of leader, staff, and commander skills is imperative for smooth reconstitution, particularly reorganization. Units train for succession of command down to the lowest levels. Additionally, staff officers cross train with the unit and train to assume the duties of their counterparts at the next senior headquarters.

3-44. The human aspect of reconstitution operations cannot be ignored. It is one thing to surge to provide large amounts of equipment, supplies, and maintenance in a training exercise—it is another to do that while integrating vast numbers of replacements into the unit, dealing with widespread battle fatigue, reestablishing command and control, and training the unit all while the command is conducting other operations. Inclusion of reconstitution training into high-paced training events should be undertaken whenever possible.

3-45. Commanders should be creative in developing reconstitution training venues. Commanders and staff can gain a tremendous amount of understanding using virtual training venues such as a classroom environment
and using a digital map of an area of operations. All units required for reconstitution participate. In this environment participants can discuss facts, assumptions, planning considerations, critical information requirements, additional units necessary, coordination requirements, and trigger points to execute a reconstitution branch plan. The staff can use the digital map to identify potential reconstitution sites, ground and air lines of communication, sustainment sites, and training sites. In this way the commander avoids problems that may otherwise prevent or constrain reconstitution training. Whenever possible, personnel designated for the RTF and directed unit leadership formulate the training plan together. The directing headquarters approves the plan prior to its implementation.
Chapter 4

Execution

The intent of this chapter is not to provide an all-inclusive execution checklist for reconstitution operations, but rather to present the types of information commanders should use to base their decision making with regard to reconstitution. A commander must receive an accurate staff analysis and assessment from the subordinate commander, then apply the principles of mission command to best use available resources to accomplish the mission.

SECTION I – INTERNAL ASSESSMENT

4-1. The commander is in the best position both tactically and technically to assess the combat effectiveness of a unit. Assessment is an ongoing process throughout a conflict and is a command responsibility conducted whether or not a unit requires reconstitution. Staff and higher headquarters assist the commander in making the assessment.

4-2. Staff elements routinely provide advice in their functional areas. For instance, the S-1 identifies personnel issues that affect the mission and individual Soldiers. The S-1 estimates the number of casualties for the next battle and coordinates with the unit surgeon to determine expected returns to duty from medical treatment facilities. The S-4 provides similar advice in logistics areas. While the staff provides advice in their respective area, the commander must weigh all the factors in determining what decision to make when reconstituting the unit.

4-3. The higher headquarters may rely totally on submitted reports and the unit commander’s assessment, or it may visit the unit’s area and quantify the assessment. If the assessment indicates that the unit is not mission capable, the commander reorganizes if doing so will enable the unit to perform its mission. If reorganization cannot accomplish this goal, the unit may be withdrawn from combat by the unit’s higher headquarters and assessed for possible regeneration. In either case, the need for reconstitution should not surprise commanders. A detailed staff estimate can inform commanders before a mission begins of the threat facing each unit and the required reconstitution probability for each.

4-4. The commander’s assessment draws on both tangible and intangible factors. Tangible factors form the basis for the objective portion of the assessment and include strength reports, equipment availability, and planned missions. Intangible factors such as morale, fatigue, and leadership effectiveness form the subjective portion of the assessment.

ASSESSMENT AREAS

4-5. There are two major areas for assessing a unit’s ability to continue with its current or follow-on mission: assigned mission manning (AMM) and assigned mission equipping (AME). Together, these two ratings combine to provide an objective view of a unit’s status referred to as an “A Rating.” For maneuver units, the AMM and AME will normally be the unit modified table of organization and equipment (known as MTOE) authorizations. For units conducting other missions, they may be quite different. The process for determining the AMM and AME status and subsequent A rating is the same procedure outlined in AR 220-1.
ASSIGNED MISSION MANNING

4-6. To determine a unit’s AMM level, a commander considers two factors: total percentage of personnel available and percentage of leadership available compared to the unit’s authorized strength. Once calculated, these percentages should be compared to table 4-1 to determine the AMM rating for the unit.

**Table 4-1. Assigned mission manning and assigned mission equipping criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Mission Manning (AMM)</td>
<td>≥ 90–100 percent of mission required personnel and ≥ 85–100 percent of mission required senior grade personnel currently are available</td>
<td>≥ 80 percent of mission required personnel and ≥ 75 percent of mission required senior grade personnel currently are available</td>
<td>≥ 70 percent of mission required personnel and ≥ 65 percent of mission required senior grade personnel currently are available</td>
<td>&lt; 70 percent of mission required personnel or &lt; 65 percent of mission required senior grade personnel currently are available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Mission Equipping (AME)</td>
<td>≥ 90–100 percent of mission required equipment items currently are available</td>
<td>≥ 80–89 percent of mission required equipment items currently are available</td>
<td>≥ 65–79 percent of mission required equipment items currently are available</td>
<td>&lt; 65 percent of mission required equipment items currently are available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ASSIGNED MISSION EQUIPPING

4-7. Just as the commander evaluates the personnel status within the unit, the status of a unit’s equipment is an equally important factor. A unit’s AME is determined by calculating the availability of mission-essential systems to the MTOE authorization. Only mission-capable and field-level repairable systems should be considered available for this calculation. Once the percentage of available systems has been determined, the appropriate AME level can be determined from table 4-1.

4-8. Once the objective AME level is determined, commanders consider additional factors to determine the unit’s combat power. Some factors include—

- Availability of components of the end item, such as communications equipment and other accessories.
- Availability of critical support equipment, such as fuel tankers in an armored unit.

A-RATING DETERMINATION

4-9. After determining the objective ratings for a unit and considering the subjective related factors, a commander then determines the A-rating for the unit. The start point for the A-rating equals the lower of the AMM or AME assessment. This gives the commander the latitude to subjectively adjust the rating based on their assessment of the unit’s ability to complete its next assigned mission. Normally, a subjective change should not be more than one number from the objective rating without a significant justification from the reporting commander to the higher headquarters. The unit’s A-rating should correspond with criteria in table 4-2.

4-10. In additional to an objective rating level, commanders also consider—

- Number and type of casualties, including battle fatigue.
- Weapon system crew status and level of training.
- Effectiveness of unit leadership (all leaders, not only chain of command).
- Soldier morale and personnel readiness.
- Esprit de corps.
- Commitment.
- Unit history.
Execution

- Training.
- Discipline.
- Cohesion—total length of time the Soldiers have been in combat.
- Nature and intensity of the most recent combat experience.
- Physical condition of Soldiers. This includes their nutritional status, number and status of minor and environmental injuries, and accumulated radiation dose.
- Psychological condition of Soldiers.

4-11. Objective assessment of these factors is extremely complex. However, commanders need to know their Soldiers and be sensitive to their needs in order to detect the first subtle shifts in morale that could ultimately undermine their authority and destroy the unit. Only through personal interaction with their Soldiers can commanders adequately assess the esprit de corps of the unit, which will provide insight beyond the statistics of equipment and personnel losses.

4-12. Commanders do not rely solely on casualty figures. Although these figures often provide the best guide for evaluating the status of forces, casualty figures cannot give a total picture of the effectiveness of a unit. Still, these reports are probably the best single determinant of the need for reconstitution. Although the strength level required to present a credible force varies, 65–70 percent may be used as a starting point, to adjust as necessary.

Table 4-2. Assigned mission levels (A–Levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A–Level 1</th>
<th>A–Level 2</th>
<th>A–Level 3</th>
<th>A–Level 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The unit is fully trained and possesses the resources required to undertake the assigned mission.</td>
<td>The unit is trained and resourced to undertake most of the assigned mission.</td>
<td>The unit is trained and resourced to undertake many, but not all portions of the assigned mission.</td>
<td>The unit requires additional resources or training to undertake the currently assigned mission; however, it may be directed to undertake portions of the assigned mission with the resources on hand.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-13. Generally, units reporting A-1 or A-2 should be able to conduct some level of reorganization and continue their mission. Units reporting A-3 will likely need their next mission modified or changed commensurate with available combat power. Units reporting A-4 should be considered immediate candidates for regeneration if resources are available and, in severe instances, may become candidates for redistribution.

SECTION II – MOVEMENT TO AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REGENERATION SITE

4-14. Once a higher commander decides to remove a unit from combat and formally assess it for possible regeneration, the commander and staff adjust the regeneration plan and activate the RTF. An advance party from the RTF moves to the proposed regeneration site. This party has the assets to prepare the site to receive the unit and to complete the external assessment. It should arrive 12–24 hours before the attrited unit, whenever possible. The advance party establishes a reception area, an RTF command post, and points to provide initial Soldier sustainment functions. The party plans positioning of units within the site. The provost marshal representative adjusts the traffic control plan as required. The RTF begins to establish local security and camouflage according to the defense plan coordinated with the rear CP. The size of the regenerated unit may dictate the need for additional security forces. The party also moves supplies that had been pre-positioned to the supply points in the regeneration site. The RTF does not fully establish the site, however, until the directing commander decides to regenerate the unit.

4-15. The attrited unit is responsible for moving itself to the regeneration site. If the unit lacks the transportation assets required for the move, it requests transportation support for personnel and specific types
of equipment through its parent unit. While the unit disengages, normal battlefield procedures continue. These include—

- Passage of lines.
- Relief in place.
- Decontamination.
- Battle damage assessment and repair.
- Recovery of damaged equipment.
- Treatment and evacuation of casualties.
- Evacuation of remains to the mortuary affairs collection point.
- Resupply of items such as fuel, water, rations, and ammunition, which the attrited unit needs to move to the site.

4-16. Often the unit needs help with some of the functions it would normally do itself. The RTF should be ready to send elements forward to a designated linkup site to provide support and the initial liaison between the attrited unit and the RTF. The liaison function entails sending back preliminary needs and assessments to the RTF to expedite the regeneration process. This liaison and assessment element may include a battle damage assessment team like those used in normal support operations. If using such a team, the RTF commander task-organizes this team from assets under the commander’s control.

4-17. Support elements may also help recover and evacuate wounded personnel and damaged equipment. Mortuary affairs personnel may provide limited identification and evacuation of human remains. During movement, the unit may transfer certain materiel and supplies to other units. This both eases the backhaul mission and makes the supplies available to sustain operations in the main battle area. The unit also may require decontamination, as discussed in Chapter 3.

4-18. Elements of the RTF use organic transportation assets to move to the regeneration site. If the RTF needs additional assets, it requests them through the G-4, as designated in the SOP or OPORD. Planners should understand that this request might represent considerable requirements for transportation. For example, if a maintenance facility must move to the site, it needs significant aid from a transportation unit. Planners can minimize such requirements by, whenever possible, carefully selecting a site at or near an established support area for non-mobile RTF elements.

4-19. Once the attrited unit arrives at the site (after decontamination, as appropriate), the RTF receives personnel and directs them to their areas. It directs damaged, repairable equipment to the maintenance collection point and operable equipment and usable supplies to a marshaling, storage, or staging area with the supply unit of the RTF. The RTF also begins essential support services to surviving personnel. Support includes provision of—

- Hot meals (with fresh bread and pastries, if possible).
- Sundries.
- Water.
- Health services (to include casualty treatment, combat stress care, and preventive medicine).
- Laundry and bath support.
- Individual equipment replacements.
- Chaplain support.
- Morale, welfare, and recreation activities.

4-20. The RTF provides additional support services as well. Finance and legal support are available, as required. Public affairs information, such as news contact with families at home, is offered as soon as possible, and Soldiers have the opportunity to communicate with families and friends. The RTF provides Soldiers a safe, dry place to sleep. Sleep loss recovery takes time. Twenty-four hours of sleep and rest are required to recover from 36–48 hours of complete sleep loss under a heavy workload. Soldiers experiencing 72 hours of acute sleep loss require 2–3 days of rest to recover. As much as possible under time constraints and for the first several days, the commander gives the unit no responsibilities beyond the receipt of these services and, within its capabilities, security actions.
SECTION III – EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

4-21. During this initial period, the assessment element thoroughly evaluates the attrited unit. This external assessment is a detailed, formal assessment. Elements external to the attrited unit conduct an assessment whenever the commander proposes regeneration as a result of the internal assessment. External assessment begins during the move to the regeneration site and provides extensive details on resources required to regenerate the unit. For example, not only does it confirm that 25 tanks are inoperable, but external assessment provides information on the time and resources required to return them to serviceability. This assessment validates and modifies, as required, the regeneration plan developed before the onset of the operation.

4-22. This detailed assessment and, later, control of the regeneration process is normally beyond the capability of a unit’s next higher headquarters if the organization is still in contact with the enemy. A team from division or corps normally assesses a battalion; a team from corps or theater army assesses a brigade. (See Chapter 1 for discussion of command and control of regeneration and Appendix C for suggestions on team composition.)

4-23. One assessment task is to evaluate how much the attrited unit should assist in its own regeneration. This determination should take into account the trade-off involved. On the one hand, war-weary and stressed Soldiers need rest and recuperation. They may not be able to contribute much to a regeneration effort. However, if survivors are uninvolved, they may feel a loss of pride in the unit and in ownership of its equipment.

4-24. In any situation, an assessment element should consider two factors concerning the unit’s participation. First, whenever possible, survivors should have at least a brief recuperation period, as described above. Second, the assessment element should work closely with the staff of the attrited unit throughout the process, beginning with their linkup on the move to the regeneration site.

4-25. The assessment element evaluates five major areas—C2, personnel, equipment, supply, and training—therefore, the assessment team includes both operational and sustainment personnel. The team identifies both the magnitude and criticality of shortfalls within the unit. Unlike the internal assessment, the external assessment factors in estimates of replacement equipment and personnel available (including those forecasted to RTD from the medical system). It also adjusts repair times to match equipment availability.

4-26. The assessment element works as quickly as possible. Delays in the process and subsequent decision making can be extremely costly as battlefield conditions can rapidly change the effectiveness status of the unit.

4-27. The result of the external assessment is a detailed report coordinated with the attrited unit’s commander. The report informs the assessment team’s headquarters on the status of the attrited unit and the resources required to return it to a mission-capable level. The commander with control of the required resources decides whether to commit the resources to that regeneration effort or employ them elsewhere to maximize the command’s capability to achieve its mission. If the decision is to regenerate, the RTF finishes preparing the regeneration site and begins execution of the regeneration order.

SECTION IV – COMMAND AND CONTROL ESTABLISHMENT

4-28. The key to any successful reconstitution is a viable C2 structure. Accordingly, C2 elements are the first the RTF assesses and reinforces or reestablishes. Effective command of units undergoing regeneration relies heavily on having clearly defined succession of command procedures and techniques in SOPs and OPORDs. Units also follow guidance in SOPs to reestablish staffs. Normally, these plans and procedures provide for use of subordinate echelon assets. Whenever possible, the remaining unit leaders retain command of the unit to maintain unit cohesion. Only when the unit leadership proves to be nonexistent or unable to exercise command should the RTF take temporary charge of the unit. The RTF retains control only until it can reestablish the unit’s C2 structure.
LOSS OF KEY FORMAL AND INFORMAL LEADERS AND UNIT VETERANS

4-29. Commanders should know their key leaders, but they are unlikely to have intimate knowledge of the informal leaders who emerge during combat operations. These informal leaders are often key to the reconstitution of a unit. The surviving members of the command will often look to them as being the most credible, having endured the same experience as they. Consideration should be given as to the best way to capitalize on their experience and leadership whenever possible.

4-30. Another potential problem involves replacement of leaders. Even if the unit receives replacements, their acceptance could be a problem. Veterans may resent their presence, feel they are being cheated out of promotions, or that newcomers cannot adequately replace veterans. This underscores the importance of conducting collective training before a unit returns to operations.

4-31. Replacements for lost leaders may come from several sources. If resources and time permit, they may come from the normal replacement system and may include returns to duty from medical facilities. Leaders may also be pulled from organizations under control of the directing commander. This commander should put clear direction for personnel replacement in the regeneration order. The supporting human resources element should be able to provide information on the responsiveness of the replacement system and what personnel with the requisite qualifications are available. Planners should anticipate losses of key commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior non-commissioned officers and plan for replacements.

A STORY AUDIE MURPHY NEVER TOLD
Colonel Michael Paulick was Sergeant Audie Murphy’s battalion commander in the 3d Infantry Division. Colonel Paulick recalls why he chose to recommend Murphy for a battlefield commission here in his own words:

"In the fall of 1943 American forces were attacking the outer defensive outposts of the German Cassino Line, an action that would develop into one of the toughest in military history. I was the newly assigned battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, and it was my first tour of inspection that I recall meeting a slight, freckle-faced sergeant of Company ‘B’ whom I was destined to know a great deal better—Audie Murphy.

I did not really get to know Audie then, but by the following February at Anzio we had a great deal more in common. It was there that I came upon Audie’s company with the company commander wounded, and only two inexperienced lieutenants left. I took command of the company, and we continued the attack for three days. At the end of those three days, fewer than 30 men survived. Audie was the only non-commissioned officer left, and there were no officers except myself. If I had never seen Audie Murphy again, I would remember him from that action. He was a soldier, a born leader, potentially a fine officer.

Soon after this Audie was promoted to platoon sergeant, normally the second-in-command to a first or second lieutenant in a full-strength platoon. But … more often than not there was no platoon leader other than Audie for his platoon. In the next few months Murphy distinguished himself again and again, was wounded and decorated with two Silver Stars and the Distinguished Service Cross. …

After the landing in South France late in 1944 and the subsequent drive up the Rhone Valley, we were again fighting in mountainous terrain with a casualty rate daily mounting. The shortage of officers was desperate, and no replacements were available. To meet the crisis the Seventh Army Commander announced a policy designated to speed-up battlefield commissions to enlisted men. I called in my
company commanders, explained the situation…. I told the commander of ‘B’ Company that there was one name I wanted to see on his list … Audie Murphy.

A few days later the list came up, and Murphy’s name was not on it. There was no time for questions then, but I made up my mind that the company commander had better have some good answers when I next saw him. The company commander’s reason for the omission … was the best in the world: Audie flatly refused a commission.

With every decoration for valor his country could give him except the Congressional Medal of Honor, and daily commanding a platoon in some of the toughest combat of World War II, Audie did not consider himself officer material. He was embarrassed by his lack of formal education on the one hand. Perhaps more important was the fact that he did not choose to leave the men he had fought with so long. (To simplify the problems of command it was customary for a newly commissioned enlisted man to be transferred out of his old outfit.) No reasoning from the company commander would change Murphy’s mind, but he did volunteer the information that he would be happy to continue to lead his platoon—as a sergeant!

It was as a sergeant that Murphy continued to lead his platoon in Company “B”, and my next personal contact with him came after our fight through France had led into the Vosges Mountains. At this stage the whole division was again short of officers and men. It was the mission of our battalion to defend a densely wooded mountain and to clear out a portion of that same mountain in an attack. A complete battalion could easily have been used on either mission. I had to try to clear that area with Company ‘B.’

Company ‘B’ attacked for several days with no hope of reinforcements to replace casualties and no sign of weakening either of the German resistance or of pressure on me, as battalion commander to get the job done. I decided to take a much closer look at the terrain. One morning just before dawn I went to Company “B” and asked the company commander for a patrol to take me out to an observation point overlooking Cleurie Quarry—a point we had controlled briefly, but which was lost to enemy counterattacks. Audie’s platoon was directed to supply this patrol for the protection of myself, my operations officer, and the company commander, who would accompany us. Four men were assigned to the patrol, and we moved out.

Dawn was just breaking … as we approached within sight of the observation point located over a sheer drop of about 50 feet into Cleurie Quarry. We had reached the edge of a wooded area. A clearing approximately 50 yards wide and perhaps 50 more yards of wooded terrain separated us from our objective. We approached the clearing carefully, then keeping low and moving fast we started across the clearing and I remember being only yards away from the wooded area when a burst of machine gun fire, coming from a point some 30 yards or so down the hillside, splattered the terrain. We hit the dirt and scrambled into a depression which afforded some cover.

The way to the observation point was clear now, but the route back to Company ‘B’ was closed. A German combat outpost saw to that. Machine gun bullets ricocheted around us and the sound of our guns returning the fire kept our ears ringing. I remember thinking that we must have caught the German outpost asleep, else they would never have missed us with the first burst. I thought, too, that the only way we would ever cross that clearing alive would be when they slept again and that possibility seemed remote.
It was then that I heard a familiar voice over the noise of battle. One by one he called the names of every man in the patrol, waiting for an answer. It was Audie. I realized then that he must have some sort of plan in mind and that our positions had something to do with it. Perhaps half a minute later the first of a series of grenades shattered the outpost. After the last explosions we rushed the position to complete the elimination. We found a machine gun, four dead Germans, and three wounded.

One member of our patrol was wounded, and we formed a circle around him. ... When the litter arrived [to evacuate the wounded man] we all made our way back to Company ‘B.’ While we waited for the litter I had plenty of time to think about Sgt. Audie Murphy. To me the important thing about what I had just seen was Murphy’s immediate grasp of the situation, his precise thinking, and his uncanny coolness in action. Since he had said that he did not consider himself officer material, I wondered what he thought the U.S. Army was looking for in the way of officers.

...I saw that same alertness and coolness under fire brought into action almost daily against the enemy. The need for officers was still critical. I decided the whole situation was ridiculous and called Murphy in to tell him he had to take a commission. At the end of my spiel, Audie gave me the same answers he had given his company commander before. He told me that if we needed him in battle he was willing to continue to command a platoon. He knew he could do that. But for administration work of a higher order that might come up later, he insisted that he did not have the background. Besides, there was still the matter of leaving his company.

I told him to forget about administration; my own adjutant would help him if necessary. From the regimental commander I secured a waiver of the policy of moving newly commissioned men to new units, and Sergeant. Murphy became 2nd Lieutenant Murphy.”

4-32. In instances where only small remnants of units are intact after an intense engagement or use of mass casualty weapons, assets may be insufficient to regenerate each degraded unit. In this case, the commander directing regeneration may elect to form a composite unit or direct redistribution. The commander who makes this decision is typically the commander two levels above the attrited unit. This commander directing regeneration appoints a commander, ideally from the composite unit personnel, and uses available assets to establish a minimum command structure and designates the chain of command (parent unit) for the new unit. The commander should be aware that either decision has long-term radical effects on force structure.

4-33. In all cases, the reinforced or reestablished C2 structure reinstitutes normal military routines for the unit after its initial recovery period. The routines include reveille, roll call, inspections, drill, physical training, and reestablishment of areas down to platoon level.

SECTION V – SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES

4-34. At the same time that the operational element of the RTF is reestablishing the C2 structure of the unit, the sustainment element is conducting support operations. In many cases, once the RTF and attrited unit are in the regeneration site, the activities of RTF sustainment personnel are similar to the operations they normally perform. What often differs is the—

- Quantities of support required.
- Priorities of support.
- Direct support relationship between the RTF and the attrited unit.
- Emphasis given to certain facets of support.
- Time available to perform the mission.
4-35. When the commander decides to regenerate a unit, the commander directs support to the attrited unit, possibly at the expense of another for many support functions such as field services, maintenance, HSS, and several classes of supply. Army force structure does not have any units dedicated to providing regeneration support. Designating support elements to regenerate an attrited unit means the elements’ habitual customers do not receive their normal level of support. These are the support prioritization decisions that commanders constantly make.

4-36. As soon as the commander decides to regenerate a unit, the RTF initiates requisitions for personnel replacements and equipment required by the unit but not already requisitioned. The RTF also requisitions additional supplies needed that have not already been pre-positioned. Planners should predetermine requisition flows to provide the most expeditious support.

4-37. Using existing sustainment systems, materiel and personnel assets for regeneration come from a variety of sources. If the RTF is a division-level organization, it transmits requirements beyond its capabilities to the corps. The corps, when applicable, identifies replacement needs to theater army support elements through the TSC. Planners should also take advantage of opportunities to contract for supplies and services. Such assets may either play a direct role in the RTF or, more likely, temporarily replace capabilities normally provided by elements forming the RTF.

**LOGISTICS**

4-38. Regenerating units have numerous logistics requirements. Unit basic loads will need to be replenished, and supplies to meet training requirements, particularly fuel and ammunition, need to be forecast, requisitioned, and delivered to the regeneration site. The number of individual movements into and within the reconstitution site, personnel, supplies, and major end items, just to name a few, will require dedicated transportation and movement control capabilities. A large field maintenance effort will be required to repair those systems not destroyed in combat. There may even be some limited sustainment maintenance effort required to maximize the number of systems available to the regenerated unit.

**SUPPLY**

4-39. There are three main focus areas for supplying reconstitution efforts. Initial focus is on those supplies needed to care for Soldiers and begin the reconstitution process. Class I and water, Class VIII, and Class IX will be the early focus. As the reconstituted unit begins to train, Class III(b) and Class V supplies will be required to meet the directing commander’s training objectives for the reconstituted unit. Before the unit is returned to combat operations, supply focus should be on replenishment of the unit basic loads of all classes of supply. The directing headquarters and RTF will need to assure all three are accounted for in the reconstitution plan and in supply forecasts.

**Class I**

4-40. The advance party of the RTF also includes elements to set up a Class I and VI point in the regeneration site. The food service element should prepare unitized ground ration A-ration whenever possible. If the capability does not exist in-theater, the RTF should prepare heat-and-serve rations soon after the unit arrives. The RTF continues to feed the unit until the unit is ready to feed itself. The Class I point also handles sundry packs and Class VI items, if available, and meals, ready to eat to replenish the unit basic load (known as UBL). The water point, located near the Class I point, if possible, conducts normal water purification, storage, and issue operations.

**Class II**

4-41. The RTF will need to assess the requirements for Soldiers RTD from medical care. Soldiers RTD from medical care will likely require new uniforms to replace those they were wearing when evacuated and possibly a significant portion of their field equipment, body armor, CBRN protective equipment, and other table of allowances (known as TA)-50 items. All Soldiers may require clothing direct exchange and issue of clothing bag items.
The unit may require issue of field equipment such as command posts, computers, C2 systems, and similar. Tents; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units; and lighting kits are vital to today’s command post operations.

Class III(b)

If conditions require fuel allocations, the materiel managers of the RTF work with the supporting distribution management center or support operations office to obtain instructions for the regeneration effort from corps or theater army. They also coordinate with the movement control element and provide prioritized shipping instructions to the petroleum supply unit for direct shipment of fuel to the attrited unit or the petroleum activity of the RTF. The materiel management center (known as MMC) can divert products from support stocks to meet needs by submitting the consolidated requirements to the TSC, sub-area petroleum office, or joint petroleum office, as appropriate.

The petroleum battalion or the petroleum group may ship bulk fuel by bulk carriers to the RTF. The transportation medium truck company (petroleum), petroleum supply battalion, delivers fuel to the supply points that RTF petroleum supply units operate in the regeneration site. The RTF may set up refuel on the move sites at both the regeneration site itself and the linkup point on the unit line of march to the site.

Class IV

RTF planners include sufficient Class IV supplies to secure the regeneration site and to replenish the unit basic load of the attrited unit. Additional Class IV supplies are usually required to establish training sites and ranges to allow the attrited unit to conduct individual and collective training.

Class V

If the unit does not require decontamination, it rearms on its way to the regeneration site, drawing just enough ammunition to safely get to the site. Soldiers should remove suspect ammunition from the weapon systems, but this may be difficult because no one capable of evaluating ammunition is normally stationed forward. The team sent forward to linkup with the attrited unit may include an ammunition quality assurance inspector, if the situation requires one and one is available.

At the regeneration site, the RTF includes an element from a supporting ammunition company. Ideally, this element should come from the ammunition company that habitually supports the regenerating unit. However, mission may preclude this type of support. The headquarters directing the regeneration determines which unit provides support and the level of support it provides. In making this decision, planners consider the amount of stocks to be received, stored, and issued for area defense, training, and ammunition basic load replenishment; the amount of materials handling equipment required to conduct the mission; and that ammunition units are not 100 percent mobile with organic vehicles.

If either a corps support area (known as CSA) or ammunition supply point (known as ASP) is near the regeneration site, it could provide support to the operation. The Class V management representative of the RTF coordinates with the supporting distribution management center or support operations office ammunition manager to have ammunition stocks shipped from a designated supply point or corps support area and coordinates turn-ins of stocks from units standing down.

Ideally, Soldiers highly skilled in ammunition inspection are also available. These Soldiers evaluate the ammunition in the surviving weapon systems of the attrited unit.

Class VII

A significant part of regenerating a unit involves replacing major weapons systems and equipment. This can range from tanks and aircraft to individual Soldiers’ weapons and night vision goggles. Class VII supplies come from two primary sources: issuance from stocks or returns from maintenance. As equipment is issued or reissued to the unit, the command should attempt to quickly assign crews and begin the process of forming units so they have the maximum time to congeal as a unit.
Class VIII

4-51. Several major demands exist for Class VIII supplies within the RTF. First, medical units supporting the regeneration effort will need Class VIII supplies for patient care. Combat medic aid bags and treatment sets for Roles 1 and 2 medical role I and II care will be in particularly high demand to both treat Soldiers and regenerate the attrited unit’s basic load. Second, the regenerating unit may require the replacement or repair of Class VIII medical equipment, which requires reestablishment of its unit basic load. Resupply of combat lifesavers and other non-medical personnel performing self- and buddy-aid is also critical for reducing personnel losses and increasing RTDs. Class VIII resupply and medical equipment maintenance support is provided by the brigade medical supply office in the brigade support medical company, medical logistics company, medical logistics management center forward support team, and supporting medical materiel center.

Class IX

4-52. Just as with the other classes of supply, Class IX is required to reestablish the combat spares, shop stock, and bench stock of the regenerating unit and support regeneration maintenance activities. When reestablishing these stocks, managers pay particular attention to what equipment is issued to the unit. Units regenerating may be issued a mix of current and older models of equipment, requiring a change to the shop stock listing (known as the SSL) and authorized stockage list to support. Regenerating supply units also require replenishment of Class IX authorized stockage lists.

FIELD SERVICES

4-53. A unit going through regeneration will require field services which include food service, shower and laundry, and if needed contingency fatality operations. These services enhance unit effectiveness and mission success by providing for Soldier basic needs. Field services during regeneration will help restore the combat strength of the force by providing for its basic needs and promoting its health, welfare, morale, and endurance.

MAINTENANCE

4-54. The maintenance of unit equipment during regeneration includes both the replacement of equipment and maintenance activities to return unserviceable items to serviceability. Maintenance actions include—

- Establishing repair priorities.
- Identifying the degree of maintenance to be performed.
- Identifying parts needed.
- Obtaining repair parts through the Class IX system (including lateral search) and through controlled substitution, cannibalization, and fabrication.
- Repairing vehicles and equipment.
- Coordinating movement of parts to the repair site.
- Coordinating transportation needs.
- Coordinating reinforcing maintenance support.
- Providing periodic maintenance status reports.

4-55. Maintenance requirements for a regeneration can vary dramatically based on several factors, including the—

- Level of regeneration required (the current equipment status of the unit compared to the goals for the unit).
- Commitment of maintenance units, commonly referred to as workload or backlog, needed to sustain the remainder of the supported forces.
- Availability of repair parts.
- Availability of replacement equipment.
- Availability of maintenance personnel, tools, and test equipment.
- Location (the position of units with respect to the overall battlefield, the regeneration site, sources of supplies, and other maintenance units).
4-56. The RTF role in the maintenance effort requires close coordination among the supply and maintenance units, the designated materiel managers, and the personnel replacement element. It is a concentrated, centralized, and intensely managed action. The RTF recovers, repairs, and returns inoperable and battle damaged equipment to the battle. It replaces critical equipment that it cannot repair and return to the unit within the time limitations set by the commander. Units undergoing regeneration may receive priority of effort and resources. Emphasis is on replacing and repairing end items and major components.

4-57. Initial maintenance efforts are assessing damage and establishing priorities for recovery, repair, and cannibalization. Crews and organic unit maintenance personnel in the attrited unit, with help from the RTF as required at the linkup point, use battle damage assessments as a basis for immediate battlefield repairs. Such repairs include cross-leveling and the use of expedient repairs that restore capability or at least enable equipment to move to a collection point. Unit maintainers also concentrate on recovering items to the regeneration site. A unit often needs help in recovering its disabled equipment. If help is not available through the unit’s normal channels, the RTF should be ready to provide recovery assets.

4-58. RTF maintenance elements conduct field maintenance, which is always repair and return to the owning unit. The RTF maintenance element coordinates for sustainment maintenance as required to repair major end items or components of an end item. RTF maintenance and transportation elements arrange to evacuate unserviceable components and end items beyond the repair capability of the unit to supporting units. Supply managers then requisition replacement items through supply channels. If sustainment maintenance is used, the commander directing regeneration exercises the option to return the repaired equipment to the owning unit instead of returning the equipment to the supply system. Repair of end items depends on the replacement of unserviceable components.

4-59. Expediting these requisitions requires the coordination mentioned above among supply and maintenance units and materiel managers. Prompt delivery also requires close coordination with movement managers. Whenever possible, the regenerating unit should have priority for theater war reserve stocks. An Army field support brigade (known as AFSB) supporting the theater reprocesses end items from these reserve stocks at or near the stockage site. Items should be at a low level of preservation so the company can make them ready for issue within a few hours, not the several days required to deprocess them from Level A storage. Movement managers use rail as much as possible to move major end items to the regeneration site. If rail is unavailable, managers use tractor-trailer systems, as required. The Class VII issue point in the regeneration site is at the site’s hub. Maintenance and personnel replacement elements are located nearby whenever possible to facilitate coordination to build crewed systems.

4-60. In addition to replacing and repairing major systems, the RTF also focuses on providing, obtaining, and recovering items needed to make a complete system. These include radios, basic-issue items, installation kits, thermal sights, communications security devices, and machine guns. Further, since the RTF uses all available sources of repair parts, it recovers serviceable components and repair parts by using controlled substitution and cannibalization whenever possible.

4-61. When parts are not in stocks and cannot be obtained through the means described above, RTF maintenance units send requests to the supporting materiel manager, which in turn can leverage both theater- and national-level inventories. Coordination with Army Materiel Command and United States Transportation Command may be required to expedite critical items. These shipments are normally by air to the port of debarkation nearest the requesting unit.

4-62. Any type of reconstitution requiring aircraft maintenance involves AVIM companies. The design, training, and equipment of AVIM companies allow them to effectively support reconstitution. AVIM units include forward support platoons that can break down into teams as needed. These platoons can go forward on the battlefield via organic air or ground assets. They provide a sorting service in the forward area. Trained assessors assigned to the teams examine the condition of the aircraft and determine their airworthiness. The immediate goals are to guarantee that the aircraft are fit to return to battle, document any restrictions or time limits to be observed, and return them to the control of the operator.

4-63. The next step in the system is to perform expedient battle damage repairs needed to get the remaining damaged aircraft back into operation. Using battle damage assessment and repair kits and procedures, the forward support team can provide shop-comparable repairs onsite in the forward areas. If the team cannot
repair and put an aircraft back into the fight, it brings the aircraft to a flyable condition (if possible) and sends it to a rear maintenance facility.

4-64. If personnel cannot return an aircraft to a flyable status, the aircraft is either recovered or evacuated to the rear. To do this, AVIM elements require support through supporting materiel management center and movement control channels. The division sustainment brigade, expeditionary sustainment command, or TSC should identify ground and air assets (to include materials handling equipment) to help in this effort. AVIM units cannot move the quantities and types of aircraft involved in such an operation.

4-65. Whenever possible, planners should locate the regeneration site at or near an AVIM facility if the regeneration involves significant numbers of aircraft. The AVIM unit, which lacks mobility, not only repairs unserviceable items, but also prepares any equipment coming in from the supply system. The time required to move an AVIM unit to a regeneration site is most likely unavailable. The rapid turnaround of aircraft from a fully functioning AVIM facility would probably justify moving other RTF elements to the AVIM site.

**TRANSPORTATION**

4-66. Transportation responsibilities in regeneration are generally the same as in normal operations, with a few exceptions. Transportation differences in a regeneration involve the amount of support required, priorities given to the attrited unit, the urgency of support requirements, and the support relationships between the transportation elements and the attrited unit. The support operations (SPO) section supporting the RTF has materiel managers and transportation operations managers who coordinate supplies to be moved, available transportation assets, and integrates the two.

4-67. Within the regeneration site there is a movement control team, as identified in the corps or theater army reconstitution SOP. The movement control section is the critical link among the movement control center, mode operator, shipper, and receiver. A truck unit may also be placed under operational control to the RTF, to provide support. This command relationship is one of the unusual characteristics of sustainment in a regeneration and may involve restricting support to other units. Therefore, commanders and transportation managers make the same kind of trade-off decisions as when allocating assets. When making these decisions, they consider that, as previously noted, the attrited unit does not require support forward.

4-68. The RTF SPO tasks the transportation unit to provide support for movements within the regeneration site and for outbound movements. It also clears inbound personnel and cargo and plans and coordinates onward movements of the unit once regeneration is complete. If the transportation management system permits, the RTF SPO also maintains liaison with host or allied nation transportation activities.

4-69. The RTF commander and operations element set priorities for the movement of cargo and personnel based primarily on guidance from the commander directing the regeneration. The RTF SPO tasks the transportation system to provide support in accordance with these priorities. If the RTF transportation assets cannot meet a requirement, the RTF SPO requests support through its normal channels.

**PERSONNEL SERVICES**

4-70. Sustaining the Soldier is vital to regeneration efforts. Building an effective unit around the surviving members and integrating new Soldiers requires all aspects of personnel services. It includes human resources, personnel services, and laundry and bath support. It also involves provision of water, personal items, clothing, individual equipment, and the best food available. Rehabilitation of the surviving members of the attrited unit is critical to successful regeneration.

**HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT**

4-71. The chief human resources officer on the RTF is from the organization at least two echelons higher than the attrited unit. For example, if the attrited unit is a brigade, the human resources officer may be the deputy corps G-1. This officer determines the right types and amounts of support required to regenerate the unit to the effectiveness goals within the allotted time and manages the personnel services support activities at the regeneration site, making recommendations to the RTF commander. Potential support and human resource activities are described in paragraphs 4-72 through 4-78.
REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS

A recruit added to them [old regiments] would become an old soldier, from the very contact, before he was aware of it. ... Taken in an economic point of view, one drafted man in an old regiment is worth three in a new one.

General Ulysses S. Grant, letter to President Abraham Lincoln

4-72. The RTF requires a cell of personnel specialists to process the many replacements arriving at the regeneration site. The replacement element assigns the replacements to the attrited unit according to required grades and MOSs. They may be replacements entering the theater or Soldiers returning to duty from the medical system. When exact grade and MOS needs are not available, the cell reviews available assets to find the nearest effective substitutes. The cell works with the attrited unit’s personnel staff to allocate replacements to meet the commander’s priorities. The cell also works closely with a medical representative of the RTF to coordinate RTDs. Whenever possible, RTDs go to their old unit. The replacement cell coordinates with materiel managers to ensure crews are available for combat systems returning from maintenance when required.

CASUALTY REPORTING

4-73. The personnel element of the RTF assists the attrited unit with casualty reporting as required. It coordinates with the medical element, the supporting human resource company, and the mortuary affairs element to reconcile records.

POSTAL SUPPORT

4-74. The RTF coordinates with postal personnel to ensure delivery and dispatch of personal and official mail. The RTF should include a sufficient number of certified mail handlers to meet projected requirements.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

4-75. Morale, welfare, and recreation is critical to the human dimension of regeneration. It can significantly relieve combat stress. The RTF should provide books, magazines, and newspapers; craft activities; and United Service Organization (known as USO) shows whenever available. If nothing else, the RTF should erect a tent and designate it as a quiet space for Soldiers to write letters and read. Group activities also enhance the cohesion, teamwork, and esprit of newly rebuilt units. The RTF should provide sports equipment with priority given to active group sports that Soldiers play at home, such as basketball, softball, and football.

LEGAL SUPPORT

4-76. Regeneration may involve any of the following areas of legal support: military justice, international and operational law, administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, claims, and legal assistance. However, most regenerations will involve operational law, contract law, and administrative law. The supporting legal section will provide legal guidance to the commander in developing operational plans. Administrative law matters will be prevalent in the regeneration process as well. Contract law requirements will include coordination with the contracting officer to ensure the regeneration site is properly supplied and equipped. Other areas of legal support is likely to be similar to the level of support provided to the unit under normal, non-regeneration circumstances.

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

4-77. Chaplains are important for managing combat stress and assist in the speedy return of surviving Soldiers to full capability. Chaplains provide pastoral counseling and care to the attrited unit and the RTF. They provide rites, sacraments, ordinances, worship services, and services to honor the dead and advise commanders on unit cohesion and morale. The organic unit ministry team of the attrited unit normally provides primary support, but other unit ministry teams may also provide support.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT

4-78. Current battle information, messages from the commander, and newspapers and radio broadcasts help Soldiers of an attrited unit adjust more quickly. Public affairs channels may pass family support group news to the unit; any contact with families at home helps. Public affairs personnel also help regulate news flowing out from the regeneration site. They advise the commander on the release of information concerning the regeneration by balancing the sometimes opposing aspects of the public’s right to know and operational security.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

4-79. Designated finance support teams provide support in the regeneration site. The finance support team provides support in two areas: contract and support activities, and direct pay services. Contract and support activities involve finance support for contracting agents of the RTF to acquire locally available supplies, services, and transportation. Direct pay services to individual Soldiers include combat payments and provision of allotments, and financial advice and guidance, as required.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT

4-80. Army Health System support to reconstitution consists of HSS and FHP. The HSS system is oriented to returning Soldiers to duty as the most efficient way of maximizing the number of trained, combat-hardened Soldiers to the attrited unit. Medical personnel identify RTD patients as early in the evacuation chain as possible, well before movement to the regeneration site. Ambulances evacuate patients to the medical treatment facility in the regeneration site if the triage process determines the facility has the capability to return the patient to duty within the pre-established timeframe. If it cannot, ambulances evacuate patients from Role 1 through successive roles of care in accordance with the theater evacuation flow to a medical treatment facility with that capability. Medical personnel evacuate non-RTD patients rapidly to hospitals by limiting surgery to saving life, and limb, or eyesight, preventing infection, and stabilizing the patient before evacuation. This allows medical personnel in the RTF time to treat RTD patients in support of the regeneration process.

4-81. When the attrited unit arrives at the regeneration site, the unit surgeon meets with the medical representative on the RTF (if they have not already met at the linkup point). They exchange information and finalize coordination procedures for use during the regeneration. At the site, the RTF relieves unit medical personnel from their normal treatment and support roles. The HSS medical element of the RTF is responsible for sick call, patient decontamination, emergency treatment, and evacuation. Although composition of the HSS medical element varies with the situation, it is likely to include treatment elements, a COSC team or company, a preventive medicine team, and ground and air ambulance support. After a suitable recovery period, the medical element of the RTF begins to work with for medical personnel from the attrited unit, the medical element of the RTF to integrate them into HSS medical support operations of the regeneration, beginning with light duties and training new personnel.

4-82. The goal of medical efforts in the regeneration site is to maximize RTDs. Medical personnel coordinate RTDs with the personnel element of the RTF to ensure accurate casualty reporting and appropriate reassignment. As much as possible, Soldiers return to their old unit. The personnel element of the RTF coordinates with the Class II supply point and medical treatment facility to ensure RTDs are reequipped. RTDs may require organizational clothing and individual equipment, individual weapons, and chemical protective equipment before being sent to units. This effort requires extensive planning and manpower.

4-83. A critical area in FHP support to regeneration HSS is combat and operational stress control. The support required depends largely on the effectiveness of a unit’s prevention program. Without a good program, planners can expect one battle fatigue combat and operational stress casualty for every three to five wounded in action or even a one-to-one ratio in intense combat under adverse conditions at company level and below. Active prevention programs that promote unit cohesion, realistic training, and effective leadership can reduce the ratio below one in ten. The commander is responsible for the program, but the noncommissioned officer chain and the organic or supporting medical element do most of the implementation.
4-84. Even with the best prevention program, combat and operational stress is likely a major factor in units attrited so severely that they require regeneration. In highly mobile warfare, Soldiers often continue to function while on the move, perhaps with some impairment. However, many develop disabling combat and operational stress reactions—known as battle fatigue symptoms—after they have withdrawn to a safe area and before they return to battle. Battle fatigue casualties have symptoms so pronounced that they need treatment at a medical treatment facility. Mild and moderate cases may render many more Soldiers impaired, and even combat ineffective, but not require the Soldier to move to the medical treatment facility. These Soldiers recover best when they stay with their units or as close to them as possible.

4-85. The COSC element of the RTF helps veteran and new unit leaders conduct “combat leader-led after action debriefings” at the small unit level. These debriefings reestablish mutual confidence and cohesion. During these meetings, COSC personnel identify Soldiers who show more serious signs of combat and operational stress reaction battle fatigue and provide more individual or group treatment as needed. By treating the entire unit, COSC personnel can restore most Soldiers to effectiveness without having to label and separate them from their friends or evacuate them to the supporting medical treatment facility. COSC elements can also help commanders assess unit morale and cohesion. They can provide educational programs to deal with special problems such as continuous operations, CBRN conditions, and unconventional warfare. Finally, COSC personnel coordinate with support agencies to resolve Soldier problems at home, which may contribute to Soldier stress. (Refer to FM 4-02 and ATP 6-22.5 for additional information.)

SECTION VI – TRAINING OF THE REGENERATED UNIT

We must take time and every opportunity to train our men, and especially our replacements, to perfection in small-unit fire and movement and fire and maneuver. If we do not do this, men will be killed who would not otherwise be killed.

Lieutenant General Hal Moore after the battle at LZ X-Ray

4-86. To raise the newly regenerated unit to a specified level of combat effectiveness requires training. The training program depends on the—

- Time available.
- Combat effectiveness goal.
- Number of replacements involved.
- Level of training of survivors and replacements.
- Use of any non-like replacement items.
- Size and location of the regeneration site.
- Tactical situation.
- Projected mission for the regenerated unit.
- Training needs identified during the assessment process.

4-87. Less tangible but equally important factors include the status of unit leadership and cohesion. History suggests that the newly regenerated unit must have a mission on which to focus for the regeneration to be successful. The training program focuses on the essential collective tasks to perform future missions and the individual skills associated with those tasks.

4-88. Training in regeneration typically involves severe time constraints. Because of this, the RTF and the unit carefully plan training, focusing on the most critical tasks the unit must perform as part of its upcoming mission. The unit must have all doctrine required to train, which may include field manuals, Army techniques publications, training circulars, and Soldier manuals.

4-89. The leaders within the attrited unit are deeply involved in training. The RTF also includes trainers to help leaders in the regenerated unit as necessary with individual, crew, and squad training and provides all other training resources required. For example, the RTF ensures an adequate ammunition supply to support the training program.

4-90. In the early stages of regeneration, while surviving personnel rest and recuperate, the personnel cell of the RTF processes replacement Soldiers. It orients them to the unit and provides initial training in the
positions they will eventually fill. The RTF materiel managers help the unit link this training with equipment maintenance needs. This helps both the training program and the RTF’s maintenance effort.

4-91. As unit veterans rest, the RTF personnel element and the attrited unit leaders integrate replacements into subunits with the veterans with a goal of developing cohesion. They link the subunits with operational equipment to prepare for unit training. If possible, the RTF reunites surviving personnel and equipment to enhance cohesion and confidence.

4-92. As subunits expand through this process, they move to the training area operated by the RTF training element. There, they perform multi-echelon training and prepare for the next mission. Within the guidelines and priorities set by the commander, training emphasizes collective tasks of squads, teams, and crews, and low-density, technical duties to foster cohesion and teamwork. Training should progress from squads, teams, and crews to the highest level that available time, space, and resources permit. Commanders give the unit low-risk security missions when ready. This builds confidence and cohesion, while also contributing to the overall mission.

4-93. While units train at each level, commanders and their staffs train the unit's command and control system using the echelon-appropriate version of TC 6-02.2 or TC 6-02.4. The training tables therein offer commanders a pathway to quickly rebuild the ability to command and control the force. At the same time, they reestablish SOPs for the newly regenerated unit. The unit leadership assumes control of the training as soon as possible. This improves cohesion and leadership and strengthens C2 of the unit.

4-94. The RTF helps the unit commander assess the progress of the unit as it trains. The assessment element provides details to support the commander’s decision if the unit has met the combat effectiveness goals. The assessment element maintains contact with the commander directing the regeneration to update the commander on the status of the unit.
In December 1944, the German army launched a massive counteroffensive in the Ardennes region of Belgium with the intent to split the Allied offensive in two in what became known more famously as the Battle of the Bulge. During the initial days of the battle, Allied defenders were thrown back in the face of a numerically superior concentration of German forces. Among these defenders were the 7th Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General Hasbrouck, as a part of Major General Ridgway's XVIIIth Airborne Corps and Lieutenant General Hodges 1st Army, defending in the vicinity of St. Vith. From the 17th until the 30th of December, the 7th fought a delaying action against the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies, which proved vital to halting the German attack.

After retiring across the Salm River, the 7th took stock of the price paid over the previous two weeks. In all, the 7th's delaying action cost the division over 40 percent of its tanks and 10 percent of its personnel, predominately in the cavalry and armored infantry units. With Hodges already planning the First Army counterattack, there would be little time for Hasbrouck to prepare his division for its next mission. Not only did the division need to receive replacement Soldiers and equipment, Hasbrouck knew he and his subordinate commanders would need to instill esprit de corps into the regenerated unit to turn those numbers into an effective unit once again.

The task of reconstituting the division was daunting. Many units had suffered greater than 50 percent casualties. One such unit, B/87th Reconnaissance Squadron, had made it across the Salm with only 35 Soldiers of its original 135, and 1st Sergeant Ladd, as the sole surviving leader. Many of the replacement Soldiers were either recent inductees with no combat experience, or cooks or anti-aircraft artillerymen, all now becoming infantry. Units would need to be completely rebuilt and then conduct individual, platoon, and up to battalion level training. Focusing on the mission at hand, Brigadier General Hasbrouck determined the use of small combined-arms task forces, consisting of tanks, infantry and engineers, operating decentralized, would be best suited to regaining the ground lost. He specified the training goals for his unit and allowed his task force commanders to integrate and train their units, under the close supervision of surviving leaders like 1st Sergeant Ladd. Individual training focused on reducing obstacles, anti-armor tactics while dismounted. Unit drills focused on platoon gunnery and infiltration, allowing the 7th Armor Division’s M4 Shermans to close to within 200 yards of German positions. Senior leaders attended collective training events, offering both praise and criticism, boosting the confidence and morale of the newly reconstituted unit.

Beginning on the morning of 20 January, 7th began operations to retake the town of St. Vith. Hasbrouck’s plan to employ combined arms task forces and the training conducted proved vital to the success of the operation. By the end of the day on the 23rd of January, the 7th Armored Division was once again in control of St. Vith.

Hasbrouck’s approach to reconstituting his unit, integrating replacement Soldiers and equipment, then focusing on the individual and collective training necessary for the division’s projected mission was vital to the 7th’s success following the losses suffered in late December.
SECTION VII – REGENERATION OF LOW DENSITY UNITS

4-95. Candidates for regeneration are not limited to combat units. With long-range fires, deep air interdiction, and unconventional units operating in rear areas, support and sustainment units are at risk to be destroyed as much as infantry, armor, and cavalry units.

4-96. Regeneration of many support and sustainment units involves unique problems. Such units typically rely on low-density, high technology skills and equipment. Replacements for Soldiers with these skills and the equipment they use are difficult to find. For example, the Infantry branch comprises approximately 18 percent of the Army, while the mechanics who maintain infantry combat systems comprise less than one percent. A dire need for these types of Soldiers and equipment may be just as crippling as a need for infantry personnel, Bradleys, and Strykers. Regeneration of a multifunctional sustainment unit is particularly difficult, as dozens of different skills will be required to restore the unit to near full capability.

4-97. Regeneration of a low-density unit can present unique maintenance challenges. If the affected unit has low-density equipment, obtaining repair parts, qualified mechanics, and technicians present the primary problems. Repairs may require parts fabrication, a labor-intensive process. Regeneration of certain support units may be beyond the capability of division and corps maintenance units, as much of the repair capability exists only in the unit that owns the equipment or a higher-level similar organization. This is especially true if the unit mission involves tools and test equipment that are not repairable at the field level. In these instances, a depot forward repair activity may be required in the theater.

4-98. As most of these low-density units provide intelligence, protection, sustainment, and other critical capabilities to the force, the loss of a capability can have secondary effects across the broader force. Some examples of these are—

- Supply. Even the partial destruction of a sustainment unit can involve loss of larger stocks of supplies. The loss of a supply unit may not be immediately felt, as units will continue to consume their basic loads. Such losses could create substantial supply interruptions without quick intervention by materiel managers at all levels. Failure to quickly prioritize and redistribute remaining stocks in accordance with the commander’s priorities could easily create negative effects.

- Capability. Certain assets, such as intelligence and communications have little redundancy, across the force. The loss of such systems or the Soldiers required to operate them, may require a higher commander to rebalance assets across the larger force, or to prioritize which units will have a certain capability, such as weighting the main effort, possibly accepting risk elsewhere where the principle of economy of force is applied.

- Capacity. When reconstituting a unit, there may be insufficient resources to restore a unit to 100 percent of its original mission capacity. In such a scenario, the higher commander may have to reallocate those support assets to different units, or possibly pool the limited resource at a higher level of command to maximize effectiveness.
This page intentionally left blank.
Appendix A

Example Reconstitution Standard Operating Procedure

A-1. See figure A-1 for a sample reconstitution SOP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copy ## of ## copies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuing headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date-time group of signature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

1. General.
   a. Purpose. The reconstitution standard operating procedure (SOP) gives guidance and assigns responsibilities for accomplishing reconstitution of attrited units. Details for a particular operation plan (OPLAN) are published in the body of the OPLAN as well as the service support annex of that plan or a separate service support plan.
   b. Scope. The SOP applies to all elements of the command when performing reconstitution actions. Commanders modify it where necessary to fit the tactical situation.
   c. Overview. Units should understand what reconstitution is and how it fits into the unit’s overall operations. Reconstitution is those actions that commanders plan for and implement to restore a unit to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. It transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions. It may include removing the unit from combat, unit assessment, reestablishing the chain of command, and training the unit for future operations. Reconstitution is a total process with the major elements being reorganization, assessment, and regeneration. This SOP template concentrates on regeneration.

2. Command and Control.
   a. Organization. This part of the SOP covers the organizations involved in a regeneration at this command level. It should address the items described below.
   b. Unit being regenerated. The SOP should cover the types of units this organization may be involved in regenerating.
   c. RTF. The SOP should identify a generic structure for a regeneration task force (RTF) with significant differences for particular types of units the organization may regenerate.
   d. Internal Command. Internal command of the unit being regenerated remains with the unit whenever possible. The SOP should stipulate how the RTF determines if a viable chain of command exists. Assessment of the unit’s internal chain of command includes the items below.
      (1) Percent fill of command positions (listing of key command positions versus casualties of same).
      (2) Command assessment of percent fill required for combat effectiveness.
      (3) Assessment of key non-commissioned officer leadership positions

Figure A-1. Standard operating procedures—reconstitution
3. Orders and Plans.
   a. Required Coverage. This part of the SOP covers the orders and plans that must address reconstitution operations. They include the OPLANs/operation orders (OPORDs) and the service support annexes to OPLANs/OPORDs or service support plans.

   b. OPLANs/OPORDs. The SOP should require the OPLAN for a specific mission to include a branch plan for reconstitution. If planners anticipate regeneration, then the unit may draft a separate OPLAN to execute regeneration. The OPLAN includes a separate sustainment annex or plan. The plan is based on the following items:
      (1) Unit's current condition.
      (2) Assigned mission.
      (3) Expected casualties, equipment losses, and battlefield situations.
      (4) Method of assessment.
      (5) Regeneration guidance provided by higher headquarters.
      (6) Availability of personnel and resources.
      (7) Unit training requirements.
      (8) Anticipated future missions.
      (9) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions.

   The plan provides for the coordinated action required to carry out a regeneration operation based on the commander's decision. By continuing estimates, analyses, and studies within the overall planning process, planners change, refine, and keep the regeneration plan current. When it comes time to conduct a regeneration operation, they transform the plan into an operation order with the inclusion of any additional facts and the time for execution.

   c. Sustainment Plan. This paragraph gives planners guidance on how to go about writing the sustainment plan for a reconstitution operation. Planners use standard planning factors and formats from such sources as OPLOG Planner, the Quick Logistics Estimate Tool, or the, when computing the logistic requirements. The SOP should also identify any available automated logistics programs that have been developed to help planners quickly and accurately calculate requirements for specific situations. The service support plan is based on the following guidance:
      (1) Projected strength of the unit.
      (2) Minimum/maximum time available.
      (3) Theater reserve stocks available.
      (4) Materiel and services support plan to include available host-nation support (HNS).
      (5) Road movement policy and military police support.
      (6) Reinforcement/replacement plan.
      (7) Possible regeneration sites.
      (8) Medical evacuation and hospitalization plan.
      (9) Maneuver support and force sustainment available.

Figure A-1. Standard operating procedures—reconstitution (continued)
4. Coordination of Regeneration Operations.

   a. General. This part of the SOP covers the elements involved in ensuring synchronization of the activities of all units participating in a regeneration. The elements include the decision, execution sequence, priorities, and responsibilities.

   b. Decision. The commander and staff decide whether, how, and how much to regenerate a unit. The SOP should designate the role of the staff and any subordinate units in providing input to the decision. In general, regeneration is carried out when a unit becomes combat ineffective for its mission. Planners may include indicators of combat effectiveness and status of command and control (C2) here or as an annex.

   c. Execution Sequence. This paragraph gives units the basic steps they typically follow to perform regeneration. The units may conduct regeneration in three phases with an additional preparatory phase. The paragraphs below summarize the phases.

   d. Preparatory Phase. The staff prepares a draft reconstitution plan. This includes a proposed RTF (an annex gives guidance) and possible sites (another annex presents a checklist).

   e. Phase 1. The commander decides to regenerate the candidate unit, and the staff issues the plan as an operation order. The advance party of the RTF deploys and begins to establish the regeneration site. The RTF begins the assessment and development of requirements. The SOP includes an annex that gives a proposed composition of the advance party.

   f. Phase 2. The RTF main body arrives at the site and begins to reestablish command and control and regeneration sustainment functions.

   g. Phase 3. The RTF assists with training and carries out the combat effectiveness evaluation. Training considerations are in an annex of the SOP. The unit returns to operations, and the rear party of the RTF closes the site.

   h. Priorities. The commander and staff determine priorities based on the tactical situation. Priorities include the order in which regeneration will occur. The SOP also designates the priorities for support types. The priorities for supply are—

      (1) Classes VII, III, and V.

      (2) Classes VIII and IX.

      (3) Classes II and I and water.

      (4) Other classes as required.

   i. Responsibilities. Reconstitution decisions belong to the commander. Generic responsibilities are in chapter 2 of this manual. SOPs should assign responsibilities to specific positions within the unit. These positions include personnel, operations, and logistics staff officers as well as specialist positions such as engineer, signal, military police, chemical, and civil affairs officers.


   a. General. This part of the SOP covers the major elements of the regeneration process including decontamination, assessment, reestablishing command and control, sustainment, and training.
b. **Decontamination.** The SOP describes how contaminated units or parts of units are identified, segregated, and sent on different routes to the regeneration site. It also identifies what chemical units are responsible to decontaminate vehicles and other equipment. The unit being regenerated is responsible for personnel decontamination. The RTF may need to provide additional resources to support personnel decontamination due to unit attrition. Decontamination occurs before personnel and equipment enter the regeneration site.

c. **Assessment.** This paragraph outlines the procedures the assessment element uses to assist the unit commander with a detailed analysis to determine losses and remaining capabilities. An annex of the SOP provides an assessment checklist. The assessment looks at the following five major categories:

1. Command and control.
2. Personnel.
3. Equipment.
4. Supply.
5. Training.

The assessment results, coordinated with the attrited unit commander, go to the directing headquarters that will decide to conduct regeneration or to use required resources elsewhere.

d. **Reestablishment of Command and Control.** The SOP identifies the personnel required so that an adequate command and control capability exists for the execution of a regeneration operation. Key personnel are identified to replace losses in command positions in the unit.

e. **Sustainment Activities.** This paragraph details support procedures at the regeneration site. These include procedures for the request, storage, issue, and distribution of supplies; maintenance; personnel replacements; HSS; HNS; and all other services provided at the site. It also covers how the RTF will support the unit’s move from a forward assembly area to the regeneration site.

f. **Training.** The SOP designates responsibilities for training the unit being regenerated as well as the elements to consider in developing the training program.

g. **Reports.** At the completion of the regeneration operation, the RTF submits a unit status report to its higher headquarters.

h. **Annexes.** The SOP includes the annexes required by the commander. Some possibilities include—

1. Indicators of combat effectiveness.
2. Composition of the RTF.
3. Site selection checklist.
4. Composition of the RTF advance party.
5. Training considerations.
6. Assessment checklist.
Appendix B

Example Reconstitution Operation Plan

B-1. See figure B-1 for example reconstitution operation plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[CLASSIFICATION]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copy # of copies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuing headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date-time group of signature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPERATION PLAN/ [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

(U) References: List documents essential to understanding the operation plan (OPLAN). List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.

(a) List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names, or numbers, edition, and scale.

(b) Reference reconstitution standard operating procedures (SOPs).

(c) List other references in subparagraphs.

(U) Time Zone Used throughout the OPLAN: State the time zone used in the area of operations during execution. When the OPLAN applies to units in different time zones, use Greenwich Mean (ZULU) Time.

(U) Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces (to include attachment and detachments) to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. Identify the attrited unit, elements which comprise the RTF, and all units providing support to the operation. State when each attachment or detachment is effective. Refer to annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated.

1. (U) Situation.

   a. (U) Enemy Forces. This subparagraph gives information on enemy forces as related to the regeneration task force (RTF) mission. Referring to an intelligence annex may be sufficient.

   b. (U) Friendly Forces. This subparagraph discusses friendly forces not covered by this OPLAN if those forces may affect the actions of subordinate commanders.

   c. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Units not listed in the task organization above are included here, along with the times that attachments and detachments are to be made.

   d. (U) Assumptions. Examples of assumptions follow:

      (1) (U) Unit to be regenerated will be attrited to # percent personnel strength and # percent fighting systems at start of regeneration.

      (2) (U) Regeneration will occur no earlier than D+##.

      (3) (U) Minimum time required for the RTF to deploy to the regeneration site and be prepared to receive the attrited unit is # hours.

Figure B-1. Example reconstitution operation plan
OPLAN [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

2. (U) Mission.

(U) This paragraph should state that on order, the RTF deploys to (location) and regenerates the attrited unit to ## percent combat effectiveness during the time duration of ##. The level is set in accordance with time and other resources available.

3. Execution.

a. (U) Commander's Intent. Describe what the RTF must do and conditions the RTF must establish with respect to the percentage of available combat power in the regenerated unit and key tasks the unit must be able to perform after completing the training phase of the regeneration. The commander's intent includes—

   **Purpose**—an expanded description of the operation's purpose beyond the "why" of the mission statement.

   **Key tasks**—those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state.

   **End state**—a description of the desired future conditions that represent success.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. This subparagraph gives the directing commander's concept for how the RTF is to conduct the specific regeneration covered by the OPLAN. The concept clarifies the purpose of the regeneration and discusses various phases of the operation. It should cover the Phase II assessment, linkup of the RTF with the attrited unit, reestablishment of the unit's chain of command, sustainment operations of the RTF, training, and evaluation of the unit's effectiveness at the end of the operation. If the level of detail is high enough, a separate subparagraph may be used to discuss each of these phases of the regeneration. However, the details for specific elements of the RTF should appear in the subparagraphs below, not in this one. Details should not be repeated if they appear in the SOP.

c. (U) Assessment Element. The role of the assessment element is discussed here. Included should be the criteria to use to assess the unit, the assessment reporting procedures, and the time the final assessment is due. The role of the element in evaluating the effectiveness of the unit at the end of the regeneration is also addressed here.

d. (U) Linkup Element. This subparagraph covers the tasks the RTF has to perform to help the unit move to the regeneration site. The tasks are based on requirements submitted by the unit.

e. (U) Advance Party. This discussion tells the advance party of the RTF where and how to begin establishing the regeneration site. It sets the priorities for the various activities the advance party normally performs. The subparagraph also tells the party when to begin its operations and how long it has before it begins receiving the unit.

f. (U) Operational Element. This subparagraph details how the element is to reestablish or reinforce the chain of command of the unit and assist in its training. It should include the commander's guidance on replacement of lost leaders in the unit.

g. (U) Sustainment Element. The specifics on how sustainment operations are to be conducted are included here except as covered in the SOP. The level of detail is similar to that of a service support annex. The areas covered are described below.

h. (U) Supply. Supply point locations and times, type of distribution, and priority of resupply. Controlled supply rates. Theater reserve replacement items distribution plan and crew requirements. Use of captured enemy materiel. Determination of requirements for both the unit and the RTF and replenishment of unit shop stock listing (known as SSL).

Figure B-1. Example reconstitution operation plan (continued)
i. (U) Transportation. Transportation reconnaissance of the regeneration location and development of the transportation infrastructure plan. Transportation control, circulation, facilities, and plan to include—

(1) (U) Main supply route and traffic circulation.

(2) (U) Alternate supply routes into and within the regeneration site.

(3) (U) Locations and capacities of usable rail, road, water, and air terminals.

(4) (U) Proposed location of the RTF headquarters’ helicopter landing zone.

(5) (U) Methods to coordinate all external requests for transport and movement.

(6) (U) Details for airdrop, air resupply, and rerouting changes of stocks should final destination change.

(7) (U) Use of alternate supply routes when the main supply route is blocked for an extended period of time (hours).

j. (U) Services. Permanent construction required and use of local facilities. Laundry and bath points established and operated for the unit. Mortuary affairs collection points on route to and at the regeneration site. Availability of clothing renovation and exchange resources. Use and location of contractors. Chaplain support and operation of religious facilities. Counseling services provided and use of civilian labor.


m. (U) Personnel Service Support. Submission of daily strength reports and changes. Obtaining, receiving, and allocating replacements; replacement of losses to organizations providing personnel to the RTF and the unit; and replacement detachment locations and regulating points. Personnel management including submission of award recommendations and control of civilian personnel. Development and maintenance of morale including granting of leave, special rest, recreation facilities, and religious, postal, financial, and legal services.

n. (U) Miscellaneous. Liaison with civil authorities and dislocated civilian control. Regeneration site boundaries and rear area security. Site management including layout, functional areas, traffic control and circulation, and the security plan. Discipline and law and order, especially speed limits, offenses, and areas off limits. Decontamination. Interpreters. Separate signal nets for logistics operations with call signs, frequencies, and passwords.

o. (U) Coordinating Instructions. This subparagraph gives guidance on coordination of regeneration activities. It describes how the RTF coordinates with both the attrited unit and the directing headquarters. Examples of specifics that may be included here are—

(1) (U) Location of proposed regeneration sites.

(2) (U) Location of proposed linkup and decontamination sites.

Figure B-1. Example reconstitution operation plan (continued)
Appendix B

Figure B-1. Example reconstitution operation plan (continued)
OPLAN [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]

ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title. Army and joint OPLANs do not use Annexes I and O as attachments, and, in Army orders, label these annexes “Not Used.” Annexes T, X, and Y are available for use in Army OPLANs and are labeled as “Spare.” When an attachment required by doctrine or an SOP is unnecessary, label it “Omitted.”

Annex A–Task Organization
Annex B–Intelligence
Annex C–Operations
Annex D–Fires
Annex E–Protection
Annex F–Sustainment
Annex G–Engineer
Annex H–Signal
Annex I–Not Used (Knowledge and Information Management)
Annex J–Public Affairs
Annex K–Civil Affairs Operations
Annex L–Information Collection
Annex M–Assessment
Annex N–Space Operations
Annex O–Not Used (Foreign Disclosure Guidance)
Annex P–Host-Nation Support
Annex Q–Knowledge Management
Annex R–Reports
Annex S–Special Technical Operations
Annex T–Spare
Annex U–Inspector General
Annex V–Interagency Coordination
Annex W–Operational Contract Support
Annex X–Spare
Annex Y–Spare
Annex Z–Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Furnish distribution copies either for action or for information. List in detail those who are to receive the plan or order. Refer to Annex Z (Distribution) if lengthy.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure B-1. Example reconstitution operations plan (continued)
This page intentionally left blank.
Appendix C

Example Regeneration Task Force Elements

C-1. Table C-1 shows example elements that may form the core of the RTF and participate in the execution of the regeneration. While not prescriptive, in nature, they represent the capabilities the RTF will require. Each element will require additional personnel based on an analysis of the regeneration mission.

Table C-1. Regeneration task force elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant division commander (support)</td>
<td>CBRN officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant G-1</td>
<td>Engineer operations officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-2</td>
<td>Deputy provost officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant G-3</td>
<td>Deputy G-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-4</td>
<td>Deputy inspector general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB deputy commander</td>
<td>Unit ministry team(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical operations officer</td>
<td>DSB deputy SPO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy commander</td>
<td>ESC DMC materiel management chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-1</td>
<td>Medical operations officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-2</td>
<td>Assistant CBRN officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-3</td>
<td>Corps engineer operations officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-4</td>
<td>Deputy provost officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy G-6</td>
<td>Inspector general chief and team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESC deputy commander</td>
<td>Unit ministry team(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy commander</td>
<td>Deputy G-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC deputy commander</td>
<td>TMCE representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRSC deputy director</td>
<td>Deputy provost officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer operations officer</td>
<td>Inspector general team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of sustainment</td>
<td>Unit ministry team(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater medical command representative</td>
<td>Chemical brigade or battalion representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant G-2</td>
<td>TSC deputy SPO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBRN</th>
<th>DMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
<td>distribution management center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB division sustainment brigade</td>
<td>ESC expeditionary sustainment command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel</td>
<td>G-4 assistant chief of staff, intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations</td>
<td>HRSC human resource sustainment center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal</td>
<td>TMC theater movement command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO support operations officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC theater sustainment command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C-2. In addition to the elements shown in table C-1, other personnel and units (ideally) also assist in the regeneration effort. Table C-2 shows some of these additional support elements.

**Table C-2. Additional support elements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional support element</th>
<th>Additional support element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat sustainment support battalion</td>
<td>Finance support team(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of the supporting personnel service company</td>
<td>Portions of staff judge advocate section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel commodity managers</td>
<td>Rear area operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field and sustainment maintenance elements</td>
<td>CBRN decontamination and reconnaissance elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVIM element (if required)</td>
<td>Military intelligence systems integrators and maintainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field services providers</td>
<td>Master physical fitness personnel and other MWR personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition technicians and inspectors</td>
<td>Provost marshal/military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement control team</td>
<td>Civil-military team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical triage, treatment, holding, and evacuation elements</td>
<td>Public affairs team(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat and operational stress control elements</td>
<td>Unit ministry team(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVIM  aviation intermediate maintenance  CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR  morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number.


4-16  “We must take...”: Hal Moore, After Action Report, Ia Drang Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 14–16 November 1965.

4-18  The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge. Vignette adapted from Gregory Fontenot, Loss and Redemption at St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge (Colombia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2019).
This page intentionally left blank.
# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with the Army or joint definitions. Terms for which ATP 3-94.4 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*).

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AME</td>
<td>assigned mission equipping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>assigned mission manning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>army techniques publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVIM</td>
<td>aviation intermediate maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSC</td>
<td>combat and operational stress control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>force health protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, signal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-8</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCO</td>
<td>large-scale combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTD</td>
<td>return to duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTF</td>
<td>regeneration task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>battalion or brigade personnel staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>battalion or brigade logistics staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>support operations officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>theater sustainment command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION II – TERMS

*reconstitution
An operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources.

*redistribution
The reassignment of unit personnel and equipment among other units within the command, either as individual replacements or as subunits.

*regeneration
The rebuilding of a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies, including the reestablishment of essential command and control and the conduct of mission-essential training for the unit.

*reorganization
All measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability.
References

All URLs accessed 5 January 2021.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 09 March 2021.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army publications and regulations are available online at https://armypubs.army.mil.
FM 1-0. Human Resources Support. 01 April 2014.
FM 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2017.
FM 4-0. Sustainment Operations. 31 July 2019.
TC 6-02.4. Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function for Divisions and Corps. 10 April 2019.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:
https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
## Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A–B</th>
<th>L–Q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| assessment, 1-5, 1-29–1-34, 4-1, 4-4, 4-9–4-13  
e external, 1-32–1-33, 4-21–4-27 internal, 1-31  
of unit participation, 4-23–4-24 assigned mission equipping, 4-5, 4-7–4-8 assigned mission manning, 4-5–4-6 | large-scale combat operations, 1-2, 1-18–1-28, 1-47–1-51, 4-95  
See also reconstitution, resource constraints |
| C | R–S |
| contingency manning standards, 1-36, 3-9–3-11  
and SOPs, 3-2 and unit training, 3-41 | reconstitution  
and resource constraints, 1-9–1-10, 1-27, 1-47–1-51, 3-9–3-11, 4-29–4-3, 4-35, 4-88 and sustainment, 1-15, 4-37 commander's decision-making, 1-3, 1-12, 1-23, 1-31, 1-45, 4-1–4-4, 4-32 elements of, 1-4, 1-29, 4-28 planning, 1-11–1-13, 1-17, 1-58, 3-7–3-8, 4-31, 4-36 strategic considerations, 1-8, 1-16, 4-96–4-98 training for, 3-39–3-45 reconstitution plan, 1-13–1-14, 1-33, 3-1–3-6, 4-39 and aircraft repair, 4-65 and regeneration task force composition, 3-18–3-21 and sustainment, 3-35–3-38, redistribution, 1-10, 1-45, 4-13, 4-32 |
| D | T |
| deliberate reorganization, 1-37, 2-3 | training, cross, 3-41–3-43 |
| E–H | U–Z |
| equipping, assigned mission 4-5, 4-7–4-8  
and staff responsibilities, 2-15, 2-16, 2-17, and LSCO, 1-8, 1-49–1-50 and incremental regeneration, 1-42 external assessment, 1-32–1-33, 4-21–4-27 | unit training, 3-41  
before conflict, 2-12, 3-1 during regeneration, 1-15, 1-27, 1-29, 2-32, 3-29–3-31 4-81, 4-83, 4-86–4-94 |
| I–K | |
| immediate reorganization, 1-36  
incremental regeneration, 1-42  
internal assessment, 1-31, 4-1–4-4 and commander’s, 1-11, See also assigned mission manning and assigned mission equipping | types of regeneration, 1-40–1-44  
reconstitution site attrited unit responsibilities, 2-8–2-9  
infrastructure and services, 1-55–1-56, 3-33, 4-38, 4-53, 4-70 movement to, 1-26, 2-7, 4-14–4-18 selection, 3-23–3-28 regeneration task force, 1-15–1-16  
assessment element, 1-33, 3-21–3-22, 4-16, 4-21, 4-25–4-27 materiel management, 4-39, operations element, 3-19, 4-28 responsibilities, 1-54–1-56, 2-31–2-36, 3-34, 4-19–4-20, 4-20, 4-56–4-60, 4-69 sustainment element, 3-19–3-20, 4-34, 4-35 reorganization, 1-6, 1-21–1-22, 1-35, 1-37, 2-1 and assessment, 2-2, 2-4, 4-2–4-3 and decontamination, 3-12–3-15 deliberate, 1-37, 2-3 immediate, 1-36 |
| J–O | |
This page intentionally left blank.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2111801

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).