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Security Force Assistance Brigade

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Preface

ATP 3-96.1 provides techniques for the security force assistance brigade (known as SFAB) to conduct security force assistance (SFA). ATP 3-96.1 provides techniques for leaders who plan, prepare, execute, and assess SFAB operations. The information in this Army techniques publication is consistently reviewed and analyzed against real-world observations of the SFAB.

The principal audience for ATP 3-96.1 is the commanders, staffs, officers, and noncommissioned officers of the brigade, battalions, and squadron, and advisor teams within the SFAB. The audience includes the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command institutions and components, the United States Army Special Operations Command, and joint and Army commands that employ the SFAB in conventional operations. The publication serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine, materiel, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the SFAB.

To understand ATP 3-96.1, the reader must first understand the operational art, the principles of war, and the links between the operational and tactical levels of war described in JP 1, JP 3-0, and ADP 3-0. The reader should understand how the offensive, defensive, and stability operations form the foundation of unified land operations and are described in detail in ADP 3-07, ADP 3-28, ADP 3-90, FM 3-0, FM 3-22, ATP 3-90.1, ATP 3-90.5, and FM 3-96. The reader should understand the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how that process relates to the Army’s military decision-making process and troop leading procedures described in ADP 5-0. The reader must also understand the concepts associated with mission command as described in ADP 6-0. Reviewing these publications assists the reader in understanding ATP 3-96.1.

Commanders, staffs, and advisors ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the commander’s handbook on the law of land warfare. (See FM 6-27.)

ATP 3-96.1 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-96.1 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for ATP 3-96.1 is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing agency is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Doctrine and Collective Training Division, ATTN: ATZK TDD, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410; by email to usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction

SFA has always played a vital role in the U.S. Army’s history. The background nature of these operations relegates them to obscurity behind the large conventional military battles throughout history. However, the Army’s history is full of SFA ranging from training police in Bosnia to large-scale operations in Vietnam and Iraq, all of which provided vital contributions to achieving our nation’s goals.

The increasingly complex nature of the modern security environment increases the need for persistent contact and engagement with allies and partners. SFA is an economy of force method for the United States to prevent conflict, reassure partners, and compete with adversaries.

The SFAB allows the Army to effectively and simultaneously set the theater and shape the security environment across the range of military operations, in cooperation with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners’ efforts. The SFAB complements the Department of State, foreign area officers, special operations, the National Guard State Partnership Program, regionally aligned forces, and other JIIM partner activities to expand access and create options for senior military and civilian leaders.

The SFAB conducts security cooperation and security assistance regional engagement missions. The SFAB facilitates information flow, develops training, and prepares Soldiers, leaders, and formations to conduct effective regional engagement. The SFABs provide the combatant commander and the Army Service component command (ASCC) a responsive, expeditionary force with region-specific training. It has appropriate institutionalized training to support small and distributed operations and provide subject matter expertise with regard to multinational military training. Through regional engagement and maintaining continuity of relationships within one organization, the SFAB builds increased trust, rapport, and confidence with JIIM partners. Finally, the SFAB serves as the institutionalized force executing the majority of the conventional force military-to-military training missions below company-level collective exercises. This allows the brigade combat teams to focus on building decisive action proficiency and executing collective training exercises alongside a foreign security force partner. Ultimately, the SFABs allow the Army to preserve decisive action proficiency and increase regional understanding.

ATP 3-96.1 contains seven chapters:

Chapter 1 describes the SFAB and the higher headquarters structure in theater. This chapter outlines the primary mission and roles of the unit and describes how advisors are organized within the SFAB. The final section describes duties and responsibilities of advisors and staff.

Chapter 2 describes SFAB mission command and its operations framework.

Chapter 3 describes the brigade’s deployment considerations from receipt of mission through post-deployment activities.

Chapter 4 describes advisor team employment planning considerations and advisor team activities.

Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations for permissive and hostile environments. This chapter also describes the various capabilities that may be available through augmentation by warfighting function.

Chapter 6 describes the protection warfighting function and how advisor teams integrate their foreign partners to enhance their own security.

Chapter 7 describes the brigade support battalion organization and its responsibility for tying the advisor teams into the theater sustainment structure in coordination with higher headquarters.
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Chapter 1

Organization and Capabilities

Chapter 1 describes the security force assistance brigade (known as SFAB) and the higher headquarters structure in theater. This chapter outlines the primary mission and roles of the unit and describes how advisors are organized within the SFAB. The final section describes duties and responsibilities of advisors and staff.

SECTION I – ORGANIZATION

1-1. The SFAB is the Army’s dedicated conventional organization for conducting security force assistance (SFA). The SFAB’s capabilities allow it to execute SFA tasks with foreign security forces in conjunction with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners anywhere in the world.

1-2. The SFAB deploys in a variety of ways. This may include assigning individual advisor teams to work in coordination with country teams, rotating advisor task forces to select nations in a regionally aligned combatant command, or by deploying the entire brigade into a theater. Advisor teams can establish relationships among conventional force partners to enable the rapid integration of other multinational forces that may be essential during future operations. Pre-positioned forward, advisors can provide vital information via assessments of partnered forces and the region.

1-3. The SFAB task-organizes its advisor teams to accomplish the SFA mission in a wide variety of environments, the SFAB must task-organize its advisor teams to accomplish its assigned mission. SFAB commanders and staffs plan and execute operations that are outside the scope of a typical brigade combat team (BCT). Soldiers who volunteer for this brigade must possess strong leadership, endurance and effective communication skills, be adaptable and dependable, and exhibit teamwork, empathy, initiative, and discipline.

Note. The SFAB is not a BCT. The organization is significantly smaller and does not have the capability or capacity to execute typical BCT missions.

1-4. While the Army has conducted SFA in the past, the SFAB is a unique organization that the Army has purpose built and resourced to conduct this mission. The organization operates in a wide variety of threat environments, geographic locations, legal agreements, and command structures across the competition continuum. SFABs also allow the U.S. Army to preserve the readiness of its BCTs by primarily conducting SFA missions and persistent engagement with allies and partners in the cooperation and competition below armed conflict sages of the competition continuum. This allows the BCTs to focus on large-scale combat operations.

ORGANIZATION DESIGN

1-5. Each SFAB has two Infantry battalions, a Cavalry squadron, a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a support battalion, and a brigade headquarters and headquarters company. The SFAB’s companies contain slightly higher rank structure than other conventional BCTs. This increased rank structure provides the SFAB with more experienced personnel. This allows SFAB personnel to effectively advise organizations at the same echelon or two levels higher. Figure 1-1, page 1-2, depicts the organizational chart.
1-6. Each infantry battalion contains a headquarters and headquarters company and three maneuver companies. Each cavalry squadron contains a headquarters and headquarters troop and three maneuver troops. The field artillery battalion has two cannon batteries. The engineer battalion has two engineer companies, a military intelligence company, and a signal company. Neither the field artillery nor the engineer battalion has a headquarters and headquarters company. The support battalion has a headquarters support company, which includes a small distribution, maintenance, and support operations section. The support battalion also provides a medical advisor team and an enhanced Role 1 capability through their medical support section. Finally, the support battalion has two logistics advising companies.

1-7. Unlike BCTs, the SFAB’s maneuver elements are composed of advisor teams not platoons. Advisor teams are task-organized, trained, and prepared to address identified requirements throughout the depth and breadth of a foreign security force. Therefore, commanders generally do not divide advisor teams once employed. Figure 1-2 depicts how the approximately 54 maneuver, fires, engineer, and logistics advisor teams are organized by echelon and formation. It also shows the potential six battalion and two brigade advisor teams. Section IV of this chapter describes the organization and capabilities of the advisor teams in detail.
SFAB battalions lack the capacity and capability that comes from equipment assigned to a typical BCT. The maneuver, engineer, and field artillery battalions do not have their branch-specific vehicular capabilities. The support battalion retains some basic equipment and maintenance shop sets required to repair wheeled vehicles and ground support equipment.

ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES, CAPABILITIES, AND REQUIREMENTS

The SFAB conducts tactical and operational SFA tasks to support theater and strategic objectives. The following list depicts the organizing principles of the SFAB. The SFAB—

- Can establish advisor teams at multiple echelons to support partner nations through the execution of SFA tasks.
- Can integrate and employ joint enablers to support foreign security forces and self-defense.
- Works with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational organizations to support the theater security cooperation plan and associated shaping activities.
- Can provide economy of force to the supported theater or assigned joint task force and Army forces commander. The mission tailorable nature of SFAB formations facilitates the distribution of advisor teams to consolidate gains and set conditions for operational transitions.
- Can detach task-organized, mission-tailored, cross-functional advisor teams to support embassy or theater-directed security cooperation activities as required.
- Can share information with other service and JIIM intelligence and collection organizations to facilitate targeting and support situational awareness.
- Can task-organize to provide liaison teams in support of large-scale combat operations.
- Requires sustainment augmentation from external organizations.
- With significant augmentation, can organize as a BCT to conduct large-scale combat operations.
Note. It will likely require months for the requisite amount of equipment and personnel augmentation to arrive before the SFAB can transition to a BCT.

1-10. SFABs develop foreign security forces through their advisor teams while providing command and control of their SFA operations. Tension exists between these two requirements. Greater command and control requirements will reduce the advising capacity of the SFAB. Therefore, higher headquarters must thoroughly analyze command and support relationship requirements prior to SFAB employment to provide the greatest chance of mission success. Section III of this chapter describes these considerations in more detail.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE DOCTRINE

1-11. SFA doctrine exists from joint and multinational through tactical levels. The two primary doctrinal publications applicable to all SFAB Soldiers are this publication and ATP 3-07.10. This publication provides the doctrinal guidance on the SFAB’s organization and employment, while the other provides guidance for the individual advisor.

1-12. At the operational level, FM 3-22 provide helpful tools to plan and execute SFA. This includes SFA tasks, goals and functions, planning, and a discussion on other aspects of security cooperation to include security assistance and foreign internal defense. At the strategic level, ADP 3-0 and ADP 3-07 describe unified land operations and stability operations and how the SFAB nests within the larger Army and defense enterprise. See figure 1-3 for a graphic depiction of these doctrine relationships.
SECTION II – MISSION AND ROLES

1-13. Current and future events around the world require the Army to project combat power and compete through all phases of the competition continuum. The SFAB provides an advising force that is comprised of scalable, flexible, and adaptable advisor teams. The SFAB also provides a robust multinational liaison capability during large-scale combat operations.

MISSION

1-14. The SFAB’s mission is to conduct worldwide SFA operations at the operational and tactical level to develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of theater security cooperation objectives. On order, SFABs conduct liaison activities in support of multinational operations during large-scale combat operations in support of U.S. strategic objectives.

1-15. FM 3-22 describes the SFA tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise and assist, and assess. The SFAB conducts these SFA tasks in conjunction with other unified action partners. The SFAB places emphasis on the SFA tasks of assess, train, and advise and assist. While the SFAB contributes to the SFA tasks of organize, equip, and rebuild/build; external organizations generally lead these efforts.
1-16. Within this framework, SFAB advisor teams develop foreign security forces in support of the larger SFA effort. They do this by placing advisor teams to operate alongside foreign security forces. These advisor teams conduct activities, such as assess, advise, support, and liaise, alongside their foreign counterparts according to chapter 4 of this publication and ATP 3-07.10.

1-17. The SFAB operates alongside foreign security forces, at echelon or two levels higher. The SFAB can detach cross-functional advisor teams to influence foreign security force training and operational activities. Task-organized battalion and company formations support a persistent SFA presence by providing a rotational capability within the SFAB.

1-18. The SFAB’s advisor teams receive support from external organizations for security, intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment. Higher headquarters must formally establish these support relationships at all echelons within the SFAB.

SUBORDINATE UNIT ROLES

1-19. The two most important roles of the brigade, battalion, and squadron headquarters are to advise foreign security forces and coordinate the SFA mission of their subordinate advisor teams. This includes task-organizing advisor teams, assigning partner relationships, coordinating advising themes and messages, managing assessments, and coordinating other relationships in support of their teams and the SFA mission. By placing advisor teams at echelon throughout a foreign security force, the SFAB may guide the synchronization of their foreign counterpart’s mission as well.

1-20. The SFAB brigade and battalions manage, coordinate, organize advisor teams, and supervise the SFA mission of their subordinate organizations. They have the capacity to conduct SFA operations alongside their foreign security force counterparts while managing the larger SFA mission. However, these organizations do not have the capacity or capability to conduct independent operations outside of their assigned SFA mission. Therefore, the SFAB should not be assigned an area of operations.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

1-21. The SFAB headquarters and headquarters company coordinates the SFA tasks of subordinate battalions and manages functional companies and attachments. The headquarters and headquarters company prepares to develop the capability and capacity of its foreign counterparts—generally division level—to plan, coordinate, and synchronize operations. The brigade staff provides limited capabilities in support of various missions and tasks. The staff also coordinates with echelons above brigade for additional assets and capabilities as required.

INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND CAVALRY SQUADRON

1-22. The SFAB Infantry battalions and the SFAB Cavalry squadron advisor teams coordinate the SFA tasks of subordinates companies while their designated battalion or squadron advisor teams conduct advisor team activities alongside their assigned foreign counterparts. The advisor teams of the Infantry battalions and the Cavalry squadron must be prepared to execute tasks with a foreign security force—typically a battalion-level entity—across the range of military operations including military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, limited contingency, and crisis response. The staffs of the Infantry battalions and the Cavalry squadron develop the capability and capacity of their counterparts— typically foreign brigade equivalents—to plan, coordinate, and synchronize operations in addition to managing the common operational picture of the SFA operation.

Infantry Companies

1-23. Infantry companies manage, coordinate, and supervise the SFA mission of their subordinate advisor teams while developing their assigned foreign security forces. Outside of SFA tasks in conjunction with a foreign security force, these companies do not have the capacity or capability to conduct independent operations. Infantry companies may perform duties typical of a conventional command post; however, this will be at the expense of their advising capability. See chapter 4, section 1, for more information on organizational reporting structures.
Cavalry Troops

1-24. Cavalry troops manage, coordinate, and supervise the SFA mission of their subordinate advisor teams while developing their assigned foreign security forces. Outside of SFA tasks in conjunction with a foreign security force, these companies do not have the capacity or capability to conduct independent operations. Cavalry troops may perform duties typical of a conventional command post; however, this will be at the expense of their advising capability. See chapter 4, section I, for more information on organizational reporting structures.

FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

1-25. The SFAB field artillery battalion develops the fires capability and capacity of foreign security forces to conduct targeting, deliver fires, and integrate fires at multiple echelons within the operational environment. Advisor teams advise and train the foreign security forces in the application of indirect fires and must be prepared to support them with indirect fires through coordination of joint fire assets, if necessary. The SFAB field artillery battalion does not have organic cannon or rocket artillery systems.

ENGINEER BATTALION

1-26. The SFAB engineer battalion develops the engineering capability and capacity of foreign security forces to preserve and protect combat power through protection, mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering operations. The battalion trains the foreign security forces on construction tasks and construction operations, as necessary. The engineer battalion also has a small military intelligence company and a signal company that, in addition to their advising role, provide limited technical support to the brigade. Generally, these companies work with and provide support to the brigade staff. The engineer battalion has limited capability and capacity to facilitate friendly mobility without significant augmentation of personnel and equipment.

Military Intelligence Company

1-27. The organization works closely with the brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) and provides additional capabilities to include counterintelligence, geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, all-source intelligence, open-source research, and a staff weather office. The military intelligence company has limited resources, specifically in personnel and time, to analyze and process single-source intelligence. As necessary, Soldiers in this company may be task-organized to augment advisor teams and the brigade S-2 section to provide technical expertise.

Signal Company

1-28. The signal company provides the SFAB with voice and data transmission expertise for its tactical radio network and worldwide digital voice and data communications using organic and external assets. These capabilities allow SFAB commanders to conduct command and control of their SFA missions throughout their area of operations.

1-29. Through small communications support teams, the signal company can provide beyond line-of-sight voice and data transmission capability to SFAB advisor teams. The signal company has limited organic radios; however, the support teams can employ the SFAB’s multiband multimission radios that allow broadband voice and data transmission. The support teams also maintain and employ digital voice and data systems to provide flexibility in a multipartner environment. When necessary, commanders may task-organize Soldiers of this company with advisor teams to provide technical expertise to the team or the foreign security forces.

SUPPORT BATTALION

1-30. The support battalion primarily provides advisor teams to develop the logistics capability and capacity of the foreign security forces. In a joint operations area (JOA), it also coordinates sustainment support between the advisor teams and the theater support structure. The support battalion consists of a headquarters support company and two logistics advising companies. The support battalion maintains a distribution,
maintenance, and support operations section that provides limited support to the advisor teams. The medical support section provides a medical advising capability from Role 1 through Role 3 and a Role 1 medical capability. The logistics advising companies each consist of three logistics advisor teams. Support battalion advisor teams are capable of advising foreign security forces on sustainment operations from brigade through theater level.

SECTION III – HIGHER HEADQUARTERS EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

1-31. Higher headquarters employs the SFAB as a capability to conduct SFA tasks alongside a foreign security force. This section describes considerations for SFAB operations in and outside of a JOA, various higher headquarters command structures, and describes what command and support relationships should look like.

JOINT OPERATIONAL AREAS

1-32. SFABs have the capability to operate both inside and outside of an established JOA. Each scenario presents different legal and operational considerations. SFABs may be integral to an operational area transition.

OPERATING INSIDE A DESIGNATED JOINT OPERATIONAL AREA

1-33. When operating inside of an established JOA, the Department of Defense (DOD) is usually the lead agency with the U.S. Department of State as the supporting agency. In this scenario, SFAB commanders must operate within the DOD-nested concept for SFA. Under most circumstances when operating in an established JOA, assign the SFAB to the joint or combined force land component commander for employment. The joint force commander may retain the SFAB for direct employment. When conducting security cooperation activities under the threshold of armed conflict, the SFAB will, in most circumstances, be under the operational and administrative control of the theater army. Operations inside of an established JOA give the joint force commander significant authorities and responsibilities. The joint force commander assigns subordinate organizations to conduct military operations within those areas of operations. The joint force commander assigns tactical- or operational-level SFA tasks to the SFAB.

1-34. The SFAB requires significant staff augmentation, specifically in current operations, to exercise command and control of forces outside of its SFA mission. Due to its lack of capacity, higher headquarters does not assign an area of operations to an SFAB without significant augmentation. If given responsibilities outside of its primary SFA mission, the SFAB will require augmentation to conduct terrain management, information collection, civil military operations, air and ground movement control, clearance of fires, security, personnel recovery, medical support, and other functions based on the environment. That augmentation can come in the form of other military forces or, in some cases, the foreign security forces.

1-35. The SFAB, operating inside an established JOA, needs an established sustainment network for support. The SFAB has no capability to sustain itself while deployed. Inside the JOA, the SFAB formation depends on the supporting command’s sustainment network for administration control and life support functions Chapter 3 and 7 describe these planning considerations.

1-36. In many cases, the SFAB requires additional support for other warfighting functions as well. These often include security, intelligence, fires, and protection. Higher headquarters must clearly define these support relationships for all advisor teams within the SFAB.

OPERATING OUTSIDE A DESIGNATED JOINT OPERATIONAL AREA

1-37. When operating outside of a JOA, the SFAB operates at the invitation of the partner nation. The ambassador (chief of mission) facilitates the invitation through the combatant commander under the auspices of security cooperation. The partner nation, the ambassador, and the status-of-forces agreement establish the laws and rules under which military personnel conducting SFA operations outside of a JOA operate. Unless otherwise specified, the partner nation is responsible for the security of the personnel assigned to the SFAB formations; however, SFAB personnel always have the right of self-defense.
1-38. The SFAB formation will not have a well-established sustainment network. The SFAB formation depends on the Army Service component command (ASCC) and the partner nation for many administrative control and life support functions (field feeding, all classes of resupply, and field-level and sustainment-level maintenance of all equipment), as well as some religious, legal, force health protection and health service support, finance, postal, personnel, and administrative services. In some cases, the embassy country team contract support, Army contracting command, or the contracting support brigade provides sustainment via contracting support in the particular supporting ASCC’s area of operations. To facilitate SFA operations, SFAB headquarters elements may be collocated with U.S. embassies, the regional ASCC, a theater special operations command, or the combatant commander based on operational and mission variables.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

1-39. The various theater command structures and environments worldwide have significant impacts on the SFAB planning and operations processes. Specifically, the differences between operating within a designated JOA and working outside of a JOA are significant.

THEATER COMMAND STRUCTURES

1-40. Political considerations heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command and control structure in which U.S. forces conduct SFA. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible. All participants must understand missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities. While well defined in U.S. doctrine, command relationships are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the United States may operate in coalition or partnered operations.

1-41. The SFAB may be a supported command—from a theater perspective—while at the same time acting as a supporting command for the foreign security forces. For example, an SFAB may support a joint interagency task force conducting international police training. Another example is a joint command supporting an SFAB with joint fires; intelligence, surveillance, civil-military operations, and reconnaissance; or other capabilities while the SFAB supports the foreign security forces in training or operations. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: lead nation, integrated, or parallel command. Alliance and coalition commands use these structures (see JP 3-16).

1-42. A lead nation command structure exists when all member nations place their forces under one nation’s control. The lead nation command has a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. The command may have an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the commander to draw upon the expertise of multinational or coalition partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

1-43. An integrated command structure provides unity of effort in a multinational setting. An integrated, combined command has several distinguishing features. Besides a designated single commander, the staff consists of representatives from all member nations. To maximize effectiveness, integrate subordinate commands and staffs to the lowest echelon possible.

1-44. A parallel command structure does not designate a single force commander. The coalition leadership develops a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort by using coordination centers. A parallel command structure is the least effective when conducting security force assistance due to the lack of a single commander.

Alliance Command Structures

1-45. Alliance commands address national political objectives within multinational force objectives at the alliance treaty level. Alliance command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. In alliance operations, such as SFA, these structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Alliance command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Senior military officers from member nations often lead subordinate commands. Effective operations within an alliance require senior political and military authorities to agree on the type of command
relationships that govern the operations of the forces. Potential political sensitivities associated with SFA can influence command relationships and operating procedures.

Coalition Command Structures

1-46. Coalitions often form in response to unforeseen crises that occur outside the area of an established alliance, which is often the case for SFA. Coalition command relationships routinely evolve as the coalition develops. Coalitions often have one of two basic structures: lead nation or parallel. For SFA, all participating coalition members should augment the partner nation’s headquarters staff with liaisons. These representatives might include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. Such staffing provides the coalition commander with representative leadership, accessible expertise on the capabilities of the coalition members, and facilitates the planning process. Integrating multinational command elements into the coalition planning process should occur as early as practical.

COUNTRY TEAM

1-47. The country team plays a vital role with respect to SFA. Figure 1-4 depicts the typical country team structure. The country team is the senior, in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (JP 3-07.4). The chief of mission is the highest U.S. civil authority in a foreign country. As the senior U.S. Government official permanently assigned in the partner nation, the chief of mission is responsible to the President for policy oversight of all U.S. Government programs.

![Figure 1-4. Country team structure](image)

1-48. The senior defense official is the principal DOD official in a U.S. embassy as designated by the Secretary of Defense. This individual serves the following roles:
Organization and Capabilities

- Acts as the diplomatic mission's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues.
- Fills the role of the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission.
- Serves as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.

1-49. The senior defense official is the chief of both the security cooperation organization and the defense attaché office in the embassy. The country team works with the partner nation to develop measures to promote security by developing a yearly theater security cooperation plan.

1-50. The theater security cooperation plan links the combatant commander’s regional strategy to military operations. The Foreign Service Act assigns the mission chief to a foreign country with the responsibility to direct, coordinate, and supervise all government executive branch employees in that country, except for U.S. service members and employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander (see FM 3-22 and JP 3-07).

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

1-51. Properly established command and support relationships are critical to the success of the SFAB and its SFA mission. The SFAB’s higher headquarters must consider the following SFAB traits prior to establishing their command relationships:

- Optimized to operate at the advisor-team level. Breaking teams apart degrades their ability to conduct advisor team activities.
- Ability to task-organize advisor teams from across the brigade against unique foreign security force requirements by location.
- Designed to manage, coordinate, and adjust the SFA tasks at the tactical and operational level in support of strategic goals.
- Limited capacity to command and control an area of operations without significant augmentation.
- No capacity to conduct independent combat operations against an enemy force.
- Very limited ability to sustain themselves.

1-52. The SFAB works best when its higher headquarters, in coordination with the partnered nation or security force, gives it objectives for developing a foreign security force. Usually, this is done through a tactical control relationship between senior SFAB commanders and their next higher headquarters. This allows the SFAB commanders and staffs to utilize their advisors and resources against those objectives in a manner best suited to accomplish the SFA mission.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

1-53. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving—

- Organizing and employing commands and forces.
- Assigning tasks.
- Designating objectives.
- Giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish missions (JP 1).

1-54. Operational control normally includes authority over all aspects of operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions. It does not include directive authority for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. The combatant commander must specifically delegate these elements of combatant command. Operational control does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate joint force commanders (see FM 6-0).

1-55. In almost all circumstances, it is preferred for senior SFAB commanders to maintain operational control of their own forces. Building effective advisor teams requires that SFAB commanders and staffs have the ability to task-organize teams from across the brigade as necessary to achieve the objective that the ground
force commander has requested. Foreign security force advising requirements vary by each location and mission. This requires a flexible organization, much of which is lost when subordinate units are under the operational control of other commands.

1-56. The SFAB conducts SFA tasks. When other commands operationally control SFAB formations or advisor teams, it allows them to reorganize the SFAB units and use them in ways that may distract from the SFA mission and is not consistent with their skills and training.

**Tactical Control**

1-57. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command may delegate and exercise tactical control. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Tactical control does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive. (See FM 6-0.)

1-58. In most cases, the SFAB’s higher headquarters should direct its operations through a tactical control relationship. This allows the higher headquarters to direct the required effects while enabling the SFAB commanders and staffs to task-organize and apply their advisor teams to meet the SFA mission. Used in this manner, the SFAB provides an advising capability to its higher headquarters. The SFAB forces will be able to focus on completing the SFA mission with a foreign security force instead of other external requirements distracting them from their primary mission. Figures 1-5 and 1-6, pages 1-13 and 1-14, illustrate how these command relationships may look when the SFAB is providing an advising capability to a theater.

**Support**

1-59. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A superior commander establishes supported and supporting relationships between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting relationships is important. It conveys priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing operations. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support. (See FM 6-0.)

1-60. Advisor teams must receive support from other organizations. This will include security, intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment. Every advisor team must understand whom to contact to receive this support. In a JOA, this will generally come from a support relationship with sustainment brigades and BCTs. In a non-JOA environment, coordination through the ASCC, embassy country team, contracting support brigade, or other methods provide the required support. During large-scale combat operations, advisor teams provide direct support to their foreign security force counterparts.
1-61. While figure 1-5 and 1-6 show graphic depictions of command relationships, they do not adequately describe the additional supporting relationships which are just as important to an advisor team’s success. Due to the limited staff capability of the SFAB, many of the typical staff supporting functions simply do not exist in sufficient capacity to accomplish the same tasks those staff sections would do in a typical BCT. Additionally, advisor teams are often distributed widely across the operational area, with large physical distances between other advisor teams and their higher headquarters. Particularly in a JOA, higher headquarters should assign support relationships to other U.S. or allied units that are co-located with or near an advisor team. This general or direct support should include functions that a typical BCT staff would provide its subordinate units, such as intelligence, fires, sustainment, movement, and other support as required. Due to the dispersed way in which the SFAB typically operates, command and support relationships must be codified into operational orders so supporting organizations clearly understand their responsibilities.
1-62. Through their influence with the foreign security forces, advisor teams provide the combat power of the SFAB. Composed of technically and tactically competent Soldiers, these teams must be creative, flexible, resilient, and prepared to conduct decentralized operations in austere environments located far away from U.S. support bases.

**SECTION IV – ADVISOR TEAMS**

1-63. Advisor teams are the primary SFAB organizations that influence foreign security forces through the execution of SFA tasks. The SFAB contains maneuver, fires, engineer, and logistics advisor teams along with trained medical advisors in the medical support section. Advisor teams conduct advisor team activities alongside their foreign counterparts in support of their assigned SFA tasks.

1-64. Advisor teams are composed of experienced, motivated, highly skilled, and trained Soldiers. Advisor teams provide the knowledge and experience to develop foreign security forces across the warfighting functions and in any operational environment. Advisor teams operate at echelon or up to two levels higher. At each echelon, advisor teams generally organize into an operations and support section to facilitate command and control while executing operations.

**TASK-ORGANIZED ADVISOR TEAMS**

1-65. Task-organized advisor teams include all the necessary enablers to accomplish their assigned mission. This includes receiving any required augmentation from outside the SFAB, security elements being the most
common. Other common members include logistics, signal, engineer, fires, and other technical experts in their specific fields. Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations in more detail.

**MANEUVER ADVISOR TEAMS**

1-66. Majors or captains lead maneuver advisor teams. These maneuver advisor teams—located in Infantry battalions and Cavalry squadrons—have a greater variety of advisors already assigned to their teams relative to other battalions. These additional advisors include Soldiers from logistics, signal, fires, medical, maintenance, and other fields, providing these advisor teams with organic flexibility and depth. The fires, engineer, and logistics advisor teams are specialized in their requisite skills and do not have the same breadth of specialties as the maneuver advisor teams. Therefore, SFABs generally task-organize their advisor teams with the maneuver advisor teams to provide their required technical expertise for the specific mission. Maneuver advisor teams must be versed in staff operations. These maneuver advisor teams are capable of conducting operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.

1-67. Maneuver advisor teams are the base element in the SFAB and are unique among conventional Army formations. Commanders and team leaders assign personnel to the advisor team based on operational and mission variables. Once higher headquarters assigns personnel to the team, the leader will organize the element to facilitate command and control while executing operations. Figure 1-7, page 1-16, depicts an example of a task-organized maneuver advisor team.

**FIRES ADVISOR TEAMS**

1-68. Majors or captains lead fires advisor teams. Fires advisor teams provide technical and tactical fires and targeting expertise to their foreign security force counterparts.

1-69. The fires advisor teams do not have the same depth of organic advisors as maneuver advisor teams. Therefore, SFABs generally task-organize their fires advisor teams with maneuver advisor teams to provide their required technical expertise for the specific mission. When operational and mission variables allow, they may operate independently as well. Fires advisor teams must be versed in staff operations. These advisor teams have the capability to conduct operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.

**ENGINEER ADVISOR TEAMS**

1-70. Majors or captains lead engineer advisor teams. Engineer advisor teams provide technical and tactical expertise in protection, mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering to their foreign security force counterparts.

1-71. The engineer advisor teams do not have the same depth of organic advisors as maneuver advisor teams. Therefore, SFABs generally task-organizes their engineer advisor teams with maneuver advisor teams to provide their required technical expertise for the specific mission. When operational and mission variables allow, they may operate independently as well. Engineer advisor teams must be versed in staff operations. These advisor teams are capable of conducting operations at the company, battalion, or brigade level.
LOGISTICS ADVISOR TEAMS

1-72. Majors or captains lead logistics advisor teams. Logistics advisor teams develop foreign security force logistics processes, procedures, and systems. As with all advisor teams, they are task-organized with the necessary external enablers and security necessary to complete their assigned mission.

1-73. The substantial difference between a typical advisor team and a logistics advisor team is the emphasis given to the sustainment advising capability. These advisor teams must be versed in staff operations. Logistics advisor teams operate at the brigade through corps echelons (or their equivalents), and in some cases, even at the theater and depot level.

MEDICAL ADVISORS

1-74. SFAB commanders may task-organize advisors in the medical support section to other advisor teams across the brigade to provide specialized medical advising capability. When appropriate, the medical support section may also establish a medical advisor team. The medical advisors are capable of developing a foreign medical treatment unit or facility that provides Role 1 through Role 3 care. Medical advisors retain the responsibility of providing basic medical care to advisors within their formation.
BATTALION AND BRIGADE ADVISOR TEAMS

1-75. The brigade, battalion, and squadron headquarters have a number of trained advisers that provide the core of their advisor teams. The field artillery, engineer, and support battalions have less personnel and are generally task-organized to provide technical expertise to other advisor teams. Using U.S. force structure as a guide, battalion advisor teams operate at the battalion, brigade, or division level while the brigade advisor teams can advise up to the corps level.

1-76. Mission analysis will determine the structure of the battalion or brigade advisor teams. After assessing the SFA mission and foreign security force requirements, the SFAB organizes these higher echelon brigade and battalion advisor teams. These task-organized teams will generally include security and any other external augmentation required for the specific mission.

ECHELON OF ADVISING

1-77. While the capability exists to advise two echelons higher, mission analysis determines whether that is appropriate. An experienced, professional, and well-established foreign security force generally requires pairing at the advisor team’s organic echelon or perhaps one level higher. Less experienced foreign security forces allow the advisor teams to advise one, or even two, echelons higher. During mission analysis, commanders and staffs must weigh the foreign security forces experience level, the effects the SFAB is trying to achieve, resources and time available, and other relevant factors to determine the best distribution of the advisor teams. As with all missions, commanders must assess risk, which includes considering whether the teams have the appropriate experience to advise their counterparts versus being able to influence the maximum number of foreign security force organizations.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1-78. Commanders task-organize advisor teams to meet the unique requirements of a mission based on analysis of operational and mission variables. Every theater and operation has unique characteristics that determine the required team capabilities. The following list contains common additional team training and operational capabilities that leaders should consider prior to executing any mission:

- Field ordering officer and pay agent duties.
- Electromagnetic warfare team equipment training.
- Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training.
- Foreign weapons and equipment training.
- Language training and familiarization.
- Cultural awareness and history.
- Foreign disclosure officer training.
- Defense strategic debriefing course.
- Battle staff training.
- Joint fires observer certification.
- Biometrics training.
- Unmanned aircraft system training.
- Air assault and pathfinder certification.
- Contract officer representative.
- Sling load inspectors course.
- Antiterrorism/force protection level II.
- Master gunner qualification.
- Advanced situational awareness.
- Information collection planners’ course.

1-79. Following is a list of additional advisor team qualifications and responsibilities that should be considered and assigned to internally support the team’s deployment:

- Unit movement officer.
Air load planner.
- Ammo handler.
- Field sanitation officer.
- Container control officer.
- Hazardous material inspector.

1-80. The Army designed, staffed, and equipped the SFAB to conduct SFA tasks alongside foreign security forces. Soldiers serving in this unit, in any capacity, have an expectation to serve as advisors when necessary. Regardless of individual advisor qualifications, all SFAB Soldiers are prepared to support the development of their foreign counterparts.

1-81. Soldiers in SFABs must understand the broader context of U.S. national foreign policy in which they operate. The SFA mission is critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives and continues to be a primary tool when developing foreign security force capability and capacity in support of shared U.S. and partner security interests.

SECTION V – DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1-82. SFAB operations require leaders, staffs, and advisors to operate in unfamiliar situations influenced by a wide variety of variables. Therefore, it is not possible to generate a list of all-inclusive duties and responsibilities for all positions and situations. This section provides a basic framework for typical duties and responsibilities for advisors and staff. Units must further refine these responsibilities through direction, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and task-organization.

1-83. The following section describes typical responsibilities of advisors when working with a foreign security force. Maneuver advisor teams are task-organized to meet specific requirements identified through initial or ongoing assessments of the foreign security forces. Therefore, the team leader and the task-organization will determine the specific duties and responsibilities of each member.

1-84. Generally, the team leader will organize the team to include at least two subordinate leaders, usually a senior advisor in charge of an operations and support section. This method facilitates control and provides efficiency when working with the foreign security forces.

1-85. Advisor functions are divided into two areas, internal and external, as described below:
- **Internal functions** directly support the advisor team. These functions include planning, operations, administrative, maintenance, and supply.
- **External functions** pertain to the advisor team’s mission as it relates to the foreign security forces. These functions may be narrow in scope or apply across warfighting areas. External functions illustrate a method of dividing responsibilities among advisors but are not all-inclusive or appropriate for all situations.

MANEUVER ADVISOR TEAMS

1-86. Maneuver advisor teams provide the bulk of the SFAB’s tactical operations advising capability and capacity with a foreign security force. These flexible, scalable, and well-rounded advisor teams provide the expertise to advise and assist a foreign security force across the warfighting functions. These teams often receive additional augmentation, to include security, engineer or fires advisor teams, or other external enablers. They often receive direct or general support from other organizations outside the SFAB to include contracting, logistics, and even external staff support for processing intelligence, requesting fires, and submitting movement requests. Section III of this chapter describes the command and support relationships in more detail. The following personnel form the typical maneuver advisor team.

TEAM LEADER

1-87. The team leader is directly involved with advising the foreign security forces commander and senior staff. The team leader is responsible for leading the team through the execution of battle drills. The team leader performs the following internal functions:
Organization and Capabilities

- Leads all team operations, planning, and actions.
- Assesses the foreign security forces’ capabilities.
- Approves all outgoing reports.
- Provides input for, and submits, the foreign security force training and readiness reports.
- Ensures the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.
- Conducts operations in a safe manner through the integration of risk management (see ATP 5-19).
- Accounts for team equipment.
- Educates self and team on the culture, region or country, history, and key figures in the operational environment.

1-88. The team leader performs the following external functions:
- Advises the counterpart commander.
- Liaises with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Conducts cross-cultural negotiations with the foreign counterparts.
- Supports the foreign security force with capabilities.

TEAM NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER IN CHARGE

1-89. The team noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) is the senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) on the advisor team. The team NCOIC is responsible for monitoring daily operations of the advisor team. Team NCOICs assist the team leader and fill the team leader role in their absence. The team NCOIC performs the following internal functions:
- Leads the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Plans training to ensure the team’s combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare.
- Reviews the team’s operations and training calendars.
- Coordinates staff actions before they reach the team leader.
- Directs the team’s budget.
- Manages and directs interpreters.
- Writes outgoing reports and messages.

1-90. The team NCOIC performs the following external functions:
- Represents the team in the absence of the team leader.
- Advises the foreign security forces’ leadership.
- Assists the senior NCO counterpart with enforcing the commander’s intent, maintaining discipline, and conducting precombat checks.
- Provides input for the foreign security force assessments.
- Reviews training prior to execution.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

SENIOR ADVISOR, OPERATIONS SECTION

1-91. Senior advisors for the operations section are responsible for advising the operational functions with their counterparts to include intelligence, maneuver, fires, engineering, and explosive hazard operations. When conducting battle drills, this Soldier controls the operations section. The senior advisor of the operations section performs the following internal functions:
- Leads and controls the operations section.
- Leads section in the daily routine to ensure all mission requirements take place.
- Assists the team leader with developing an operations schedule for the team including a synchronization matrix. Maintains the team operations calendar.
- Assists the assistant team leader with writing and reviewing required reports.
- Ensures team equipment is serviceable.
Ensures uniform standards are met.

1-92. The senior advisor for the operations section performs the following external functions:

- Advises the counterparts on operations to include current and future operations planning, battle tracking, and reporting.
- Advises the foreign security forces staff in base defense, traffic control posts, detainee operations, and other relevant operations.
- Advises the foreign security forces on the basic tenets of troop welfare.
- Provides input to the counterparts on maintaining readiness.
- Adheres to the principles of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the foreign security forces with capabilities.

ASSISTANT OPERATIONS ADVISOR

1-93. Assistant operations advisors are responsible for assisting the team leadership with establishing command and control systems and managing administrative functions. They provide operational advice to the foreign security forces. When necessary, they advise their counterparts on basic human resource functions. The assistant operations advisor generally reports to the senior advisor for the operations section and performs the following internal functions:

- Provides input for training evaluations.
- Establishes and maintains the team’s operations center.
- In most cases, serves as the advisor team pay agent according to combatant command guidance and procedures.
- Ensures team members are administratively ready to deploy (wills, powers of attorney, insurance, record of emergency data, emergency notifications, and so forth).
- Prepares personnel accountability and morning reports.
- Maintains a team administrative records book.
- Manages promotions, reenlistments, pay issues, mail, and awards.
- Monitors family readiness and maintains team social roster.

1-94. The assistant operations advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advises the foreign counterparts on human resource operations including military pay and personnel accountability.
- Assists the foreign security forces develop personnel procedures.
- Trains the counterpart administrative personnel.
- Assesses the foreign security force’s personnel systems and operations.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

MILITARY POLICE ADVISOR

1-95. The military police advisor is responsible for providing technical advice and guidance to the team leader and foreign security forces in conducting police operations. The military police advisor is also responsible for assisting the team leadership with establishing command and control systems and managing administrative functions. The military police advisor generally reports to the senior advisor for the operations section and performs the following internal functions:

- Provides input for training evaluations.
- Provides technical and tactical advice regarding police operations.
- Identifies, assesses, and mitigates force protection vulnerabilities.
- Coordinates force protection.
- When necessary, establishes and maintains the team’s operations center.
In most cases, serves as the advisor team pay agent according to combatant command guidance and procedures.

Ensures team members are administratively ready to deploy (wills, powers of attorney, insurance, record of emergency data, emergency notifications, and so forth).

Prepares personnel accountability and morning reports.

Maintains a team administrative records book.

Manages promotions, reenlistments, pay issues, mail, and awards.

Monitors family readiness and maintains team social roster.

1-96. The military police advisor performs the following external functions:

- Provides technical and tactical advice regarding police operations to the counterpart foreign security forces. (See ATP 3-39.10.)
- Liaises with other military and civilian law enforcement agencies.
- Provides support to site exploitation.
- Provides support to security and mobility support operations including gap crossings, civil disturbances, checkpoint operations, and straggler control.
- Provides guidance and oversight for military police intelligence operations.
- Advises the foreign counterparts on human resource operations including military pay and personnel accountability.
- Assists the foreign security forces with processing personnel to support operations, which includes casualty tracking.
- Trains the counterpart administrative personnel.
- Assesses the foreign security force’s personnel systems and operations.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

Note. Generally, advisor teams will have either an assistant operations advisor or a military police advisor per team. Therefore, their duties and responsibilities listed above overlap.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARD ADVISOR

1-97. Explosive hazard advisors are qualified by the U.S. Army to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). These NCOs who are responsible for providing explosive hazard technical and tactical advice to the advisor team leader. They provide the same advice to their foreign counterpart, which includes training the foreign explosive hazard personnel when appropriate. In addition to their explosive hazard responsibilities, they are responsible for managing the team’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) equipment. They generally serve as an operations team member and report to the senior advisor of the operations section. The explosive hazard advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Provides input for training evaluations.
- Provides explosive hazard technical and tactical advice.
- Provide immediate action to mitigate an explosive hazard to prevent the loss of life when no other EOD capability can reasonably respond.
- EOD operations must be limited to immediate lifesaving measures and reported via the EOD Information Management System as an EOD response.
- Assists the advisor team leader when coordinating for external EOD assets.

1-98. Explosive hazard advisors perform the following external functions:

- Provide explosive hazard technical and tactical advice to the foreign security forces to increase their ability to identify, render safe, and exploit explosive ordnance and other explosive threats.
- Consolidate their counterpart’s external EOD support requests.
- Adhere to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
Support the foreign security forces with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR**

1-99. The intelligence advisor is responsible for preparing team intelligence reports, conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), assisting the team leader in building an information collection plan, and requesting external resources. The intelligence advisor assists the foreign security force with the same functions. Intelligence advisors generally serve as an operations team member and report to the senior advisor of the operations section. The intelligence advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Advises the team leader on intelligence.
- Monitors routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, and recent activities).
- Provides reach back capability to leverage multidiscipline, multiechelon intelligence enablers in support of advisor team operations using existing intelligence programs of record.
- Maintains the cultural calendar and advises the team of key dates and significant activities.
- Trains and advises the team in the use of biometric and forensic equipment used in tactical site exploitation.
- Advises on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield to support operations.
- Advises on the preparation of the information collection plan.
- Assists the team with collecting information for required reports during missions.
- Coordinates through higher headquarters for counterintelligence support for insider threat, antiterrorism, and force protection assessments.
- Provides input for training evaluations.
- Assists with monitoring the accountability for, and welfare of, interpreters.

1-100. The intelligence advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advises the foreign counterpart intelligence section.
- Advises the counterparts on using intelligence assets.
- Advises the foreign security forces on processing tactical information into predictive analysis.
- Supports intelligence for the counterpart’s combat operations.
- Supports intelligence briefings to the foreign security force commander.
- Integrates intelligence reporting with JIIM partners’ intelligence enterprises, where allowed.
- Shares intelligence and information with JIIM partners according to foreign disclosure officer approval when allowed.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

**FIRES ADVISOR**

1-101. The fires advisor is responsible for developing a team fires plan, requesting external fires and assets, and assists the team leader with the clearance of fires. The fires advisor assists the foreign security forces with many of the same functions. Fire advisors usually serve in the operations section and report to the senior advisor for the operations section. The fires advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Assists the team leader with fires planning and coordinates with higher headquarters to verify and request the availability of fire support assets.
- Requests fire support assets to support the team.
- Provides team training on fire support procedures, assets, and capabilities.
- Assists the team leader with tracking all partnered force elements in the area of operation.
- Provides input for training evaluations.

1-102. The fires advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assists with planning, coordinating, and employing fire support for the counterparts.
- Trains and assists the foreign security forces with improving their fire support processes.
- Supports counterparts with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
• Assists the foreign forces in the clearance of U.S. or joint fires prior to execution.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

SENIOR ADVISOR, SUPPORT SECTION

1-103. The senior advisor for the support section is responsible for advising the foreign security force on the support functions that generally include medical, maintenance, logistics, and signal. This position controls the support section while executing battle drills. The senior advisor for the support section performs the following internal functions:
• Leads and controls the support section.
• Assists the team leader with developing a training and support plan to include a training schedule. Consolidates information into the team synchronization matrix.
• Maintains a weekly training calendar.
• Assists the assistant team leader with writing and reviewing required reports.
• Ensures all team members can train and advise foreign security forces.
• Manages the team’s driver training program.
• Coordinates for team religious support.
• Ensures team equipment is serviceable.
• Ensures uniform standards are met.

1-104. The senior advisor for the support section performs the following external functions:
• Advises and supports the foreign security forces’ support plans.
• Advises foreign counterparts on the basic tenets of troop welfare.
• Consolidates and coordinates the foreign security force’s external religious support requests.
• Provides input on the counterpart training plans and execution.
• Adheres to the principles of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the foreign security forces with capabilities.

LOGISTICS ADVISOR

1-105. Logistics advisors are responsible for managing the team’s logistics and advising the foreign security forces on issues that include property accountability, managing funds, and processing external support requests. They generally serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The logistics advisor performs the following internal functions:
• Advises the team leader on logistics.
• Collects, processes, and coordinates for team logistics support through the next higher headquarters.
• Maintains equipment accountability and conducts periodic inventories of team equipment.
• Assists the assistant team leader with managing team funds.
• Assists with tracking and monitoring contracts and deliverables.
• Coordinates with the supporting contracting organization on service delivery.
• Serves as the team armorer.
• Provides input for training evaluations.

1-106. The logistics advisor performs the following external functions:
• Advises the foreign security forces on logistics, specifically supply and transportation.
• Assists counterparts with establishing and maintaining a system to track their deceased Soldiers.
• Advises the foreign security forces on how to track and monitor contract deliveries.
• Adheres to the principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

MEDICAL ADVISOR

1-107. Medical advisors are responsible for providing medical support to the advisor team and advising the foreign security forces on triage procedures, first responder medical training, field sanitation, food sanitation, medical logistics, medical planning, and force health protection. They serve as a support team member and generally report to the senior advisor for the support section. The medical advisor performs the following internal functions:

• Provides input for training evaluations.
• Assists the advisor team leader with medical planning.
• Maintains principal responsibility to instruct point of injury care, self-aid, buddy-aid, combat lifesaver, and tactical combat casualty care procedures, principles, and fundamentals.
• Trains medical evacuation concepts from point of injury through continuum of care.
• Assesses, conceives, and implements mass casualty concept.
• Gathers and disseminates information on known health threats within the area of operations.
• Advises on medical capabilities of nearby assets.
• Stabilizes patients and prepares them for medical evacuation.
• Trains and assists the team in managing field sanitation.
• Maintains class VIII (medical) supply.
• Verifies faults, requests class VIII parts, and maintains maintenance records of team medical equipment.

1-108. The medical advisor performs the following external functions:

• Trains the foreign security forces on rapid trauma assessment and trauma medicine, point of injury care, medical evacuation, mass casualty operations, and concepts of far forward medical care.
• Maintains a medical common operating picture with the foreign partner that supports medical advising efforts.
• Stabilizes patients and prepares them for medical evacuation.
• Advises counterparts on maintaining class VIII supplies and equipment.
• Trains and assists the foreign security forces on field sanitation, field hygiene, preventive medicine, and food preparation.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the foreign security forces with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

SIGNAL ADVISOR

1-109. The signal advisor is responsible for establishing and maintaining communication networks for the team while advising the foreign counterparts on building a communications network, developing communication contingency plans, and conducting communications maintenance. Signal advisors generally serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The signal advisor performs the following internal functions:

• Provides input for training evaluations.
• Advises on radios and communications capabilities.
• Provides communications maintenance support for the advisor team’s vehicles and communications equipment.
• Verifies faults, requests class IX parts, and maintains maintenance records of communications equipment.
• Manages communications security.

1-110. The signal advisor performs the following external functions:
• Advises the foreign security forces on communications planning, training, management, and communications security.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

MAINTENANCE ADVISOR

1-111. The maintenance advisor is responsible for verifying faults, ordering parts, and conducting repairs on the team’s vehicles. Maintenance advisors assist the foreign security forces with developing a maintenance SOP, establishing service schedules, ordering parts, and training their maintenance personnel. They serve as a support team member and report to the senior advisor for the support section. The maintenance advisor performs the following internal functions:
• Provides input for training evaluations.
• Provides limited field-level maintenance support and services for the advisor team vehicles and equipment, other than medical and communications equipment.
• Verifies faults, requests class IX (repair) parts, and maintains maintenance records other than medical and communications equipment.
• Collects, processes, and coordinates for team maintenance requests through next higher headquarters.

1-112. The maintenance advisor performs the following external functions:
• Assists foreign security forces with developing a maintenance program to include routine maintenance and service schedules, mechanic training, troubleshooting, and ordering parts.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

FIRES ADVISOR TEAMS

1-113. Fires advisor teams enhance the SFAB's fires advising capability and capacity with a foreign security force. While a number of the team members have the same or similar functions as described above, there are a few positions that are unique to fires advisor teams. The internal and external responsibilities of those positions are described below.

GUNNERY SERGEANT ADVISOR

1-114. The gunnery sergeant advisor is responsible for howitzer operation considerations within the fires advisor team. The gunnery sergeant advisor assists the foreign security forces with firing unit advanced party operations. The gunnery sergeant advisor performs the following internal functions:
• Assists the team leader with mission planning.
• Forecasts and requests necessary classes of supply.
• Manages the team’s maintenance program.
• Provides team training on military occupational specialty-specific tasks to include laying platoons and batteries, platoon and battery defense, and degraded operations.
• Provides input for training evaluations and programs of instruction for towed, self-propelled, and rocket weapon systems.

1-115. The gunnery sergeant advisor performs the following external functions:
• Assists with planning, coordinating, and employing fire support for the counterparts.
• Trains and assists the foreign security forces with improving their fire support processes.
• Supports counterparts with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
• Assists the foreign forces in the clearance of U.S. or joint fires prior to execution.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

**SENIOR FIRE CONTROL ADVISOR**

1-116. The senior fire control advisor is responsible for all aspects of fire direction for the fires advisor teams. The senior fire control advisor assists the foreign security forces with fire direction operations. The senior fire control advisor performs the following internal functions:

• Assists the team leader with the advising scheme.
• Provides team training on the fundamentals of fire direction to include manual and automated processes.
• Assists the team leader with training management.
• Provides input for training evaluations.

1-117. The senior fire control advisor performs the following external functions:

• Assists with planning, coordinating, and employing fire support for the counterparts.
• Trains and assists the foreign security forces with improving their fire support processes.
• Supports counterparts with U.S. fires within the scope of the mission and assets available.
• Assists the foreign forces in the clearance of U.S. or joint fires prior to execution.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

**ENGINEER ADVISOR TEAMS**

1-118. Engineer advisor teams enhance the SFAB's engineer advising capability and capacity with a foreign security force. While a number of the team members have the same or similar functions as described above, there are a few positions that are unique to engineer advisor teams. The internal and external responsibilities of these positions are described below.

**COMBAT ENGINEER ADVISOR**

1-119. The combat engineer advisor is responsible for providing mobility, countermobility, and survivability technical and tactical advice to the team leader. Combat engineer advisors provide the same advice to their foreign counterpart, which includes training the foreign engineer personnel when appropriate. They generally serve as an operations team member and report to the senior advisor of the operations section. The combat engineer advisor performs the following internal functions:

• Provides input for training evaluations.
• Provides mobility, countermobility, and survivability technical and tactical advice.
• Provide survivability support within their explosive ordnance clearance agent capability to isolate blast and fragmentation danger areas of any identified explosive ordnance.
• Assists the advisor team leader when coordinating for external EOD assets.

1-120. Combat engineer advisors perform the following external functions:

• Provides mobility, countermobility, and survivability technical and tactical advice to the foreign security forces.
• Consolidates their counterpart's external EOD support requests.
• Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
• Supports the foreign security forces with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

*Note.* Engineer advisors are not organically filled positions on maneuver advisor teams. However, they are often used in place of an explosive hazard advisor.
CONSTRUCTION ENGINEER ADVISOR

1-121. The construction engineer advisor is responsible for advising foreign security forces on vertical and horizontal construction projects and construction-related training. The construction engineer advisor assists the foreign security forces with revising, planning, resourcing, and execution of construction projects. Additionally, the construction engineer advisor provides basic light and heavy equipment training. The construction engineer advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Assists the team leader with advising foreign security forces on their construction projects.
- Requests status of equipment and materials for the foreign partner’s construction projects.
- Provides team training on technical construction equipment and processes.
- Enables the team leader to be able to understand the foreign partner’s construction needs.
- Provides input for training evaluations.

1-122. The construction engineer advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assists with training, planning, resourcing, and execution of construction requirements.
- Trains and assists the foreign security forces with light and heavy construction equipment.
- Supports counterparts with planning and preparation of construction projects.
- Assists the foreign forces in the execution of construction projects and training.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

TECHNICAL ENGINEER ADVISOR

1-123. The technical engineer advisor is responsible for advising foreign security forces on construction site development in areas such as technical investigation, surveys, drafts, and construction plans and specifications. They also advise foreign security forces on conducting land surveys, map making, and preparing detailed plans for construction projects. The technical engineer advisor assists the foreign security forces with project management. The technical engineer advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Assists the team leader with performing field and laboratory tests on construction materials, surveys, and drafts.
- Requests geodetic and construction surveys and results.
- Provides team training for survey and design work as well as construction site management.
- Assists the team leader with technical designs.
- Provides input for training evaluations.

1-124. The technical engineer advisor performs the following external functions:

- Assists with training, planning, designing, resourcing, and executing construction projects.
- Trains and assists the foreign security forces with survey and design tools.
- Supports counterparts with construction site development.
- Assists the foreign forces in conducting land surveys, map making, and preparing detailed plans for construction projects.
- Adheres to the principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures of effective cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.

LOGISTICS ADVISOR TEAMS

1-125. Logistics advisor teams enhance the SFAB’s logistics advising capability and capacity with a foreign security force. While a number of the team members have the same or similar functions as described above, there are a few positions that are unique to logistics advisor teams. The internal and external responsibilities of those positions are described below.
LOGISTICS WARRANT OFFICER ADVISOR

1-126. Logistics warrant officers serve as technical experts for the logistics advising company and battalion. They serve as the senior technical advisor to the advisor team leader and the foreign security forces, specifically in regards to logistics systems and processes. They are responsible for the integration of systems and processes across the tactical and operational domain and facilitate support relationships with higher echelon sustainment organizations. The logistics warrant officer provides the following internal functions:

- Assists the logistics advisor team leader or commander in developing the advising strategy and objectives for the foreign security forces.
- Synchronizes sustainment support between logistics advisors in supported SFAB organizations and the higher echelon of sustainment.
- Serves as the executive officer (XO) for the logistics advising company, managing systems and processes that support the organization.
- Develops and provides logistical analysis and running estimates to support the logistics advising company.
- Tracks and analyzes sustainment trends and issues for the logistics advising company and other supported organizations.

1-127. Develops and provides logistical analysis and running estimates to support the logistics advising company. The logistics warrant officer performs the following external functions:

- Serves as the senior technical advisor for logistics systems and processes with the foreign security forces.
- Provides input and guidance on maintaining readiness to the foreign counterparts.
- Adheres to the principles of cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the foreign security forces with capabilities as appropriate.

AMMUNITION LOGISTICS ADVISOR

1-128. The ammunition logistics advisor is responsible for managing the team’s ammunition and advising the foreign security forces on issues that include ammunition accountability, compatibility, net explosive weight, certifying storage sites, managing funds, and processing external support requests. The ammunition logistics advisor performs the following internal functions:

- Advises the team leader on ammunition operations, transportation, and explosive safety standards.
- Collects, processes, and coordinates for team ammunition support through the next higher headquarters.
- Maintains ammunition accountability and conducts periodic inventories of operational loads maintained by the team.
- Provides input for training evaluations.

1-129. The ammunition logistics advisor performs the following external functions:

- Advises the foreign security forces on logistics, specifically ammunition transportation and explosive safety hazards.
- Advises the foreign counterparts on tracking and monitoring contract deliveries.
- Adheres to the principles of cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the foreign counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

LIQUID LOGISTICS ADVISOR

1-130. The liquid logistics advisor is responsible for managing the team’s liquid (fuel and water) logistics and advising the foreign security forces on issues that include fuel accountability, storage, receipt and issue documentation, and processing external support requests. The liquid logistics advisor performs the following internal functions:
Organization and Capabilities

- Advises the team leader on fuel and water logistics.
- Collects, processes, and coordinates for team fuel support requests through the next higher headquarters.
- Maintains fuel accountability and provides guidance on transportation safety standards.
- Provides input for training evaluations.

1-131. The liquid logistics advisor performs the following external functions:
- Advises the foreign security forces on logistics, specifically fuel and water transportation, accountability, and safety standards.
- Advises the foreign counterparts on tracking and monitoring contract deliveries.
- Adheres to the principles of cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the foreign counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

ARMAMENT MAINTENANCE ADVISOR

1-132. Armament maintenance advisors are responsible for verifying faults, ordering parts, and conducting repairs of the team’s weapons systems. They assist the foreign security forces with developing a maintenance SOP, establishing service schedules, ordering parts, and training their maintenance personnel. Armament maintenance advisors perform the following internal functions:
- Provide input for training evaluations.
- Provide limited field-level maintenance support and services for the advisor team weapons and other equipment within their capabilities.
- Verify faults, request class IX parts, and maintain maintenance records.
- Collect, process, and coordinate for team maintenance requests through the next higher headquarters.

1-133. The armament maintenance advisor performs the following external functions:
- Assists the foreign security forces with developing a maintenance program to include routine maintenance and service schedules, mechanic training, troubleshooting, and ordering parts.
- Adheres to the principles of cross-cultural communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution.
- Supports the foreign counterparts with capabilities as operational and mission variables allow.

BRIGADE AND BATTALION STAFF

1-134. Due to the size difference, the SFAB’s staff capacity is significantly less than a typical BCT. While staffs focus on conducting SFA with their counterparts, they still have staff work that typically involves organizing advisor teams, assigning partner relationships, coordinating advising themes and messages, managing assessments, and coordinating other relationships in support of their teams and the SFA mission. Additionally, staffs are critical to guiding the advisor team command and support relationships early in a deployment and monitoring those relationships throughout the mission. As with most SFAB entities, more emphasis placed on advising a foreign security force results in less capacity to perform other tasks.

1-135. The SFAB staff supports the commander, assists subordinate units, and informs units and organizations outside the headquarters. The staff supports the SFAB commander's understanding, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress. The staff makes recommendations and prepares plans and orders for the commander. The staff establishes and maintains a high degree of coordination and cooperation with staffs of higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. The staff does this by actively collaborating and communicating with commanders and staffs of subordinate and other units to solve problems. The staff keeps civilian organizations informed with relevant information according to their security classification as well as their need to know. The basic SFAB staff structure includes an XO and various staff sections. A staff section is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, personal, or special staff officer. (See FM 6-0.)
1-136. Before the mission, staff members advise and assist foreign counterparts in preparing staff estimates and assess courses of action for essential tasks. The staff helps write tentative plans and/or orders based on foreign counterpart commanders’ planning guidance and their foreign security force’s SOPs. Plans, depending on the situation, may include primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans.

1-137. During execution, the staff helps foreign counterparts coordinate and assess the execution of tasks. The staff assists in the dissemination of foreign security force plans and/or orders to senior and adjacent staff sections and supporting elements as required. The staff helps notify higher, lower, or adjacent staff sections of modified estimates and plans. The staff—led by the operations staff officer (S-3), S-2, and their foreign counterparts—helps update the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) with the latest information and future requirements.

*Note.* The following staff positions vary by organization and mission and simply serve as a guide for planning purposes.

**COORDINATING STAFF**

1-138. Coordinating staff officers are the commander’s principal assistants who advise, plan, and coordinate actions within their area of expertise or warfighting function. Coordinating staff officers may also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers. Coordinating staff officers are the personnel staff officer (S-1), S-2, S-3, logistics staff officer (S-4), signal staff officer (S-6), financial management staff officer (S-8), and the civil affairs operations staff officer (S-9).

**Personnel Staff Officer**

1-139. The S-1 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning human resources support (military and civilian). Specific responsibilities include manning, personnel services, personnel support, and headquarters management. The S-1 has coordinating staff responsibility for the civilian personnel officer and the equal opportunity advisor and prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. When planning an operation, the S-1 provides accurate information regarding replacement personnel and ensures the rest of the staff includes all attachments or other assets into any plan or operation. (See FM 1-0 and ATP 1-0.1.)

1-140. When working with foreign counterparts, the S-1 provides advice, guidance, and recommendations related to human resources. The S-1 monitors the foreign security force strength, personnel accountability, disposition of casualties, unit morale, and possibly postal activities. The S-1 may provide guidance concerning the foreign pay system, leave procedures, and casualty pay procedures.

**Intelligence Staff Officer**

1-141. The S-2 is chief of the intelligence warfighting function. The S-2 is the principal staff officer responsible for providing intelligence to support current operations and plans. The S-2 gives the commander and the S-3 the initial intelligence synchronization plan, which facilitates reconnaissance and surveillance integration. The S-2 helps the S-3 to develop the initial reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The S-2 is responsible for the preparation of Annex B (Intelligence) and assists the S-3 in preparing Annex L (Information Collection). The S-2 helps the staff, XO, and commander determine which courses of action the enemy might choose. The information collection plan will solve gaps in intelligence, further shaping the planned friendly course of action. The S-2 attempts to see into the mind of the enemy forces to identify tactics the enemy will use based upon their disposition and friendly actions. (See FM 2-0 for additional information.)

1-142. The S-2 monitors of foreign security force operations security to protect classified and sensitive material and operations. As needed, the S-2 provides operations security recommendations to the foreign security forces. By helping the foreign counterpart update the situation map, the S-2 helps to keep both commands up to date on the current situation. The S-2 assesses and recommends improvements to the SOPs of the command post communications framework so the intelligence section receives situation reports. The S-2 helps the counterpart monitor the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and the dissemination of information. The S-2 assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material. The S-2 helps gather
and disseminate intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all unit operations assets. The S-2 works with operations advisors to develop reconnaissance and surveillance plans with their counterparts.

1-143. The brigade S-2 serves as the senior intelligence officer for the brigade. As the senior intelligence officer, the brigade S-2 maintains tasking authority of intelligence personnel assigned to the military intelligence company. The senior intelligence officer is responsible for task-organizing the SFAB’s intelligence personnel in support of command and control, advising, and augmentation according to mission requirements.

Note. Train two personnel in every staff section and advisor team on foreign disclosure. Interaction with host nation and foreign security forces, even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or other coalition allies, requires foreign disclosure officer approval.

Operations Officer

1-144. The S-3 is responsible for coordinating movement and maneuver warfighting function activities. The S-3 is the primary staff officer for integrating and synchronizing operation for the commander. The S-3 integrates reconnaissance and surveillance during plans and operations. The S-3 synchronizes reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the operations process, and develops plans and orders and determines potential branches and sequels. The S-3 coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions in all plans and orders. Additionally, the S-3 is responsible for and prepares Annex L (Information Collection) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination). The S-3 prepares Annex A (Task Organization), Annex C (Operations), and Annex M (Assessment) to the operation order. In conjunction with the knowledge management officer, the S-3 prepares Annex R (Reports) and Annex Z (Distribution). The S-3 ensures proper dissemination of the plan. The S-3 identifies the best spots on the battlefield for the commander's locations to lead the fight. In addition, the S-3 identifies key intersections in canalizing terrain and timed events for key transitions in phases or decision points. (See FM 6-0 for additional information.)

1-145. The S-3 helps the foreign counterpart to prepare tactical plans and orders using estimates, predictions, assessments, and information. The S-3 monitors command and communications nets, assists in preparing all plans and orders, and helps to supervise the training and preparation for operations. The S-3 assists foreign security forces in engaging friendly, neutral, and threat networks through the operations process. (See ATP 5-0.6 for more information) The S-3 monitors the planning process and makes recommendations consistent with the foreign security force’s objectives and goals.

Logistics Staff Officer

1-146. The S-4 is the principal staff officer for logistics planning and operations, supply, maintenance, transportation, services, field services, distribution, and operational contract support. S-4s determine supply priorities and coordinate for requisition, acquisition, and storage of supplies and equipment. The S-4 develops, monitors, and actions the unit’s logistics status reports and develops plans for intratheater movement and the deployment of personnel and equipment. The S-4 prepares Annex F (Sustainment), Annex P (Host Nation Support), and Annex W (Operational Contract Support) to the operation order. The S-4 works closely with the brigade support battalion (BSB) support operations officer to integrate the SFAB into the theater sustainment plan. The S-4 identifies requirements for external and higher echelon support requirements and, along with the support operations officer, coordinates for those assets. (See FM 6-0 for additional information.)

1-147. The S-4 conducts SFA tasks alongside their foreign counterpart to maintain equipment readiness, monitor the support provided to the foreign unit, and recommend improvements. The S-4 helps to supervise the use of transportation assets.

Signal Staff Officer

1-148. The S-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning network operations, jointly consisting of DOD information network operations and applicable portions of the defensive cyberpace operations. The
S-6 provides network transport and information services, conducts network operations to operate and defend the network, enables knowledge management, manages land warrior and combat net radio assets in the area of operations, and performs spectrum management operations. The S-6 prepares Annex H (Signal) of the operations order and participates in preparing Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) with input from the S-2 and in coordination with the S-3. (See FM 6-02 and ATP 6-02.70 for additional information.)

1-149. The S-6 advises and assists the foreign counterpart for all matters concerning network operations, network transport, information services, and spectrum management operations within the SFAB's SFA mission. The S-6 monitors communications security throughout planning, preparation, and execution of SFA and foreign security force activities. The S-6 trains personnel in the protection of sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials during the execution of SFA operations. The S-6 identifies communications requirements, obtains communications resources for austere locations, and ensures redundant and backup systems are available and tested.

1-150. The S-6, in coordination with the higher headquarters signal officer, continuously assesses and refines information management coordinating, archiving, and sharing among participating interagency partners and other organizations. The S-6 assesses the communications synchronization plan between the SFAB, its foreign counterparts, and other unified action partners. The S-6 uses foreign disclosure procedures and information sharing processes to disseminate information with interagency partners and other organizations.

Financial Management Officer

1-151. The S-8 is the principal staff officer responsible for financial management within the SFAB. The S-8 is the focal point in planning financial management support that allows the SFAB to accomplish its mission. The S-8 prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment). (See FM 1-06 for additional information.)

1-152. The S-8 is the principal financial management advisor to the SFAB commander. The S-8, in coordination with legal representatives, advises the commander regarding laws and financial management regulations governing obligations, expenditures, and limitations on the use of funds within SFAB's SFA mission. The S-8—

- Coordinates financial management policies and practices with U.S. counterparts in the contracting command.
- Identifies, certifies, and manages funds available for immediate SFA operations expenses.
- Integrates all financial management requirements into SFA planning.
- Analyzes total cost to develop SFA funding requirements and submit requirements to the division or higher headquarters.
- Monitors and reports status of funding and spending plans.
- Coordinates contracting and financial management disbursing support for field ordering officers and pay agents.
- Monitors execution of the contract expenditures.

Civil Affairs Operations Officer

1-153. The S-9 ensures each course of action effectively integrates civil considerations. The S-9 considers not only tactical issues but also logistics support issues. Care of dislocated civilians is of particular concern. The S-9 analysis considers the impact of operations on public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation operations, security cooperation assistance, and protection of culturally significant sites.

1-154. The S-9 enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the area of operations to ensure mission success. The S-9 has staff planning and oversight responsibility for—

- Managing assigned and attached civil affairs forces.
- Coordinating all aspects of the relationship between the military force and the civil component in the supported commander's operational environment.
Coordinating, synchronizing, and de-conflicting unified action partner activities with the commander's civil military operations.

Training and advising foreign security force counterpart staff elements to enable them to engage and build rapport with civilian unified action partners, indigenous populations and institutions, and independent foreign agencies.

Promoting foreign security forces' capabilities to assess interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of civilian unified action partners, indigenous populations and institutions, and independent foreign agencies in the operating environment; and reduce interference of noncombatant civilians with combat operations.

Advising the commander on the effect of military operations on the civilian populations.

Minimizing civilian interference with operations. This includes dislocated civilian operations, curfews, movement restrictions, or deconflicting civilian and military activities with due regard for the safety and rights of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Advising the commander on the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of military operations on civilian populations.

Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating civil-military plans, programs, and policies with national and combatant command strategic objectives.

Advising on prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid; commander's emergency response program; payroll; and other funds dedicated to civil affairs operations objectives. The S-9 ensures subordinate units understand the movement, security, and control of funds. The S-9 coordinates with the fund controlling authority/financial manager to meet the commander's objectives.

Coordinating and integrating contingency planning for civil affairs operations–related products.

Managing additional personnel assigned to the civil affairs operations staff.

Coordinating and integrating environmental assessments in support of civil affairs operations.

Supporting emergency management and civic action projects.

Supporting protection of culturally significant sites.

Supporting foreign humanitarian assistance.

Supporting emergency distribution of food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians.

Supporting populace and resources control operations.

Coordinating the staff for the integration of civil information from supporting civil affairs units into the common operational picture.

1-155. The S-9 ensures the effective integration of the civil considerations mission analysis into the planning cycle. Like operations and intelligence officers, the S-9 focuses on the operational area. However, they must also focus on logistics issues regarding foreign humanitarian assistance and the care of dislocated civilians.

1-156. To plan and orchestrate unit operations, the S-3 must rely heavily upon items from the S-2 and the S-9, such as—

- Civil inputs to the common operational picture.
- Threat assessments that account for potential enemy actions and reactions to planned civil affairs operations.
- Civil information analysis that identifies concerns of population groups within the projected area of operations and potential flash points that can result in civil strife and violence.
- Cultural awareness briefings.
- Situational and planning maps.
- Overlays (in this instance, overlays of dislocated civilian movement routes, critical infrastructure, and significant social, religious, and cultural shrines, monuments, and facilities).

1-157. The unit's operations officer plans and integrates the overall operations effort. The unit S-9 plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of civil affairs operations issues through direct coordination with the operations officer. Throughout this process, the S-9 staff continuously ensures the fusion of the civil
inputs received from subordinate civil affairs elements, maneuver elements, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and host nation sources to the unit commander’s common operational picture.

1-158. During JIIM operations, civil affairs forces bridge the gap between U.S. military, foreign security forces, and civilian authorities supporting an operation. Staff planning and coordination, as well as interagency activities, are the most likely mission support activities civil affairs personnel undertake in a JIIM environment.

PERSONAL STAFF

1-159. Personal staff officers work under the immediate control of, and have direct access to, the brigade commander. They advise the commander, provide input to orders and plans, and interface and coordinate with entities external to the SFAB headquarters. They also serve as advisors to their counterparts in the foreign security forces. Examples of personal staff officers include the command sergeant major, the brigade judge advocate, the surgeon, the public affairs officer, and the chaplain. Personal staff responsibilities are described below.

Command Sergeant Major

1-160. The command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer who advises the commander on issues related to the enlisted ranks. They provide a wealth of knowledge, experience, and advice to the commander and other Soldiers within the unit. The command sergeant major carries out policies and enforces standards for the performance, training, and conduct of enlisted Soldiers. During operations, a commander employs the command sergeant major throughout the area of operations to extend command influence, assess the morale of the force, and assist during critical events.

Executive Officer

1-161. XOs observe and provide advice to their foreign counterpart regarding organizational analysis of the foreign unit and coordinating their staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process. With the counterpart, XOs assist foreign staff sections as they develop estimates and plans. In addition, the XO advisor coordinates and liaises with the foreign security force’s higher headquarters.

Unit Ministry Team

1-162. The unit ministry team consists of a chaplain and a religious affairs specialist. The chaplain serves as a personal staff officer with direct access to the commander. The unit ministry team provides religious support to all assigned or attached service members, family members, and authorized civilians. The team provides religious, moral, and ethical advisement to the command as they impact both individuals and the organization’s mission. They coordinate with higher, subordinate and adjacent unit ministry teams and chaplain sections for area and denominational coverage requirements. The unit ministry team prepares a portion of Annex F (Sustainment) to the operations order. (See FM 1-05 and ATP 1-05.01 for additional information).

1-163. When appropriate, the chaplain provides advice to the foreign commander and staff on issues related to ethics, morality, and religion as it influences their forces, operations, and the local population. Understanding the impact of religion upon the operations, foreign security forces, and the local population is pivotal to the success of the SFA objectives. Chaplains train to conduct leader engagements with key religious leaders as well as foreign military counterparts. Additionally, chaplains provide guidance regarding religious affairs both directly and via reach-back capability through supervisory channels as well as networked relationships with the combatant commander and the ASCC chaplain offices.

Judge Advocate

1-164. The judge advocate is the senior legal advisor to the SFAB commander. The judge advocate advises the commander and staff on military justice, administrative law, fiscal law, and other areas of the law as required and ensures the delivery of legal services to the brigade across the core legal disciplines of the judge
advocate general corps. The brigade judge advocate prepares a portion of Annex C (Operations) and Annex F (Sustainment) to the operation order. (See AR 27-1 and FM 1-04 for additional information.)

1-165. The legal team consists of one judge advocate and one paralegal NCO. The legal team can perform advising tasks for foreign security force legal personnel at the direction of the SFAB commander. The brigade legal team is not a source of official legal advice to any foreign commanders or personnel.

Public Affairs Officer

1-166. The public affairs officer develops strategies, leads, and supervises the conduct of public information, community engagements, and command information. The public affairs officer’s principal role is to provide advice and counsel to the commander and the staff on how affected external and internal publics will accept and understand the unit’s operations. The public affairs officer understands and coordinates the flow of information to Soldiers, the Army community, and the public and prepares Annex J (Public Affairs) to the operation order. The public affairs officer coordinates closely with the combatant commander, country team, or theater command public affairs office, and the SFAB information operations officer to publicize SFA activities as appropriate to achieve specific effects within the information domain. (See FM 3-61 for additional information.)

Surgeon

1-167. The surgeon is responsible for coordinating health service support and operations within the command. The surgeon is the lead medical advisor and responsible for establishing medical advising efforts in support of the commander, synchronizing the medical advising efforts, and developing the partnered force capability and capacity.

1-168. The surgeon provides and oversees medical care to Soldiers, civilians, and detainees. The brigade surgeon is responsible for the technical supervision of all medical activities in the command. As part of the special staff, the surgeon provides advice to the commander on all medical or medically related issues. The surgeon informs the commander on the Army Health System support for the unit, the health of the command to include the foreign counterparts, plans for medical training with the foreign security force, and an assessment of the medical training status. (See ATP 4-02.3.) The surgeon prepares a portion of Annex E (Protection) and Annex F (Sustainment) of the operation order. The surgeon provides the S-4 with recommendations on the medical plan and subordinate unit plans for air and ground medical evacuations, medical facility locations, and other considerations regarding health service support. (See FM 4-02 for additional information.)

1-169. The brigade surgeon plans and coordinates for the following Army Health System activities:

- Medical intelligence requirements.
- Local population assessment.
- Development of the foreign security force medical capabilities and capacity.
- Medical evacuation by organic assets, area support medical evacuation provided by the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, or U.S. Navy resources or resources from the civilian community (contract), host nation, and multinational resources.
- Medical treatment including hospitalization in role 3 medical treatment facilities the Services, multinational forces, or host nation establishes. This includes medical treatment facilities afloat.
- Dental services.
- Veterinary food safety and security inspection, animal care, veterinary preventive medicine activities of the command, and civic assistance programs within the local community.
- Medical advise and assist missions.
- Preventive medicine services.
- Medical laboratory services.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance programs.
- Behavioral health and combat and operational stress control programs.
- Army Health System assessments, estimates, and plans.
1-170. The surgeon advises the foreign counterpart in health service support and force health protection activities including deployment of medical assets, establishment of tactical- and operational-level medical treatment assets, development of patient evacuation routes, procurement and distribution of medical supplies, and implementation of force health protection measures to reduce disease and nonbattle injury. Surgeons work with their counterpart and the civil military advisor to train the foreign security forces on the development and employment of health service support and force health protection capabilities.

1-171. The surgeon's staff includes a medical operations officer, an environmental science engineering officer, a medical logistics officer, a behavioral health officer, a physical therapist officer, a nurse officer and a senior health care NCO. While assigned to the BSB, these personnel retain the responsibility to perform their respective medical functional area under the supervision of the surgeon. The surgeon's staff is responsible for assisting the unit surgeon with planning, coordinating, advising, and synchronizing Army Health System support operations and requirements. In addition, the section is responsible for assessing the foreign security forces' medical requirements including medical training and support in the brigade's area of operations. For augmentation of Army Health System assets, the brigade surgeon's section coordinates through the higher echelon headquarters with the medical force provider in the area of operations.

**SPECIAL STAFF**

1-172. Every staff organization has special staff officers. The number of special staff officers and their responsibilities vary with authorizations, the commander’s desires, and the command’s size. Special staff officers include the brigade engineer, the air liaison officer, the brigade aviation officer, the CBRN NCO, the military information support operations staff planner, the brigade EOD officer, the electromagnetic warfare officer, and the provost marshal. Paragraphs 1-171 through 1-188 describe special staff officers' responsibilities as well as any advising requirements with their foreign counterparts. (See FM 6-0 for additional information.)

**Air Liaison Officer**

1-173. The air liaison officer is the senior Air Force officer with each tactical air control party. The air liaison officer plans and executes close air support according to the SFAB commander’s guidance and intent. The air liaison officer is responsible for coordinating aerospace assets and operations, such as close air support, air interdiction, air reconnaissance, airlift, and joint suppression of enemy air defenses. (See JP 3-09.3, FM 3-52, and ATP 3-52.1 for additional information.)

**Aviation Officer**

1-174. The aviation officer is the airspace control officer for the SFAB S-3 who plans and synchronizes aviation into the commander’s scheme of maneuver. The aviation officer standardizes unmanned aircraft systems employment for the SFAB and advises and plans the use of reconnaissance, attack, air assault, air movement, sustainment, and medical evacuation. As the aviation subject matter expert, the aviation officer is responsible for advising the commander and staff on the status and availability of aviation assets, their capabilities, and limitations. The aviation officer recommends and helps coordinate priorities and allocations of aviation assets, helps determine the priorities for their employment, and participates in targeting. The aviation officer helps prepare portions of Annex C (Operations) and portions of Annex D (Fires) of the operation order. (See FM 3-52 and ATP 3-52.1 for additional information.)

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Officer**

1-175. The CBRN officer is responsible for CBRN operations and CBRN asset use. The CBRN officer leads the CBRN working group. When established, the CBRN working group includes members from the protection working group, subordinate commands, foreign security forces, and other unified action partners. The CBRN officer prepares a portion of Annex E (Protection) and a portion of Annex C (Operations) of the operation order. (See ATP 3-11.36 for additional information.)
Cyber Electromagnetic Warfare Officer

1-176. The cyber electromagnetic warfare officer plans, integrates, synchronizes, and assesses electromagnetic warfare functions, to include cyber electromagnetic activities. The cyber electromagnetic warfare officer coordinates through other staff members to integrate electromagnetic warfare and cyber electromagnetic activities into the commander’s concept of operations. The cyber electromagnetic warfare officer prepares Appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) to the operations order and contributes to any section that has cyber electromagnetic activities. (See ATP 3-12.3 for additional information.)

1-177. As the cyberspace planner, the cyber electromagnetic warfare officer is responsible for understanding policies relating to cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, and spectrum management operations. This expertise provides the commander with the ability to plan, coordinate, and synchronize cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, and spectrum management operations.

Engineer Officer

1-178. The engineer officer is the senior engineer on staff responsible for coordinating engineer support. The engineer officer integrates specified and implied engineer tasks into the plan. Engineer officers ensure mission planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities integrate supporting engineer units. The engineer officer prepares Annex G (Engineer) to the operation order. (See FM 6-0 for additional information.)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer

1-179. The EOD officer is responsible for activities in support of foreign security force EOD, defeat and counter-improved explosive device (C-IED), and enablers. The EOD officer leads the development of manning, equipping, training, and policies based on foreign security force enablers at echelon to support defeat the device, attack the network, and train the force. EOD officers also provides subject matter expertise in direct support to planning, preparing, executing, and advising SFA missions for EOD, improvised explosive device (IED)-Defeat and C-IED efforts across the range of military operations. The EOD officer leads effort to determine requirements and develop training programs to build partner nation capacity. The EOD officer enables SFAB staff C-IED efforts through exploitation, intelligence-based operations, weapons technical intelligence, targeting, and force protection. The EOD officer provides expertise on explosives safety for foreign ordnance and weapons systems employed by the foreign counterpart’s protection programs.

Fire Support Officer

1-180. There is no organic fire support officer on the SFAB brigade staff. However, the brigade staff uses the fire support coordinator in the SFAB field artillery battalion when required.

1-181. The fire support officer serves as the special staff officer for fires and integrates fires into the scheme of maneuver for the commander. The fire support officer leads fire support planning for the delivery of fires to include preparation fires, harassing fires, interdiction fires, suppressive fires, destruction fires, and deception fires. The fire support coordinator leads the brigade’s targeting process to synchronize effects across all domains with SFAB and partner security force operations to achieve the commander’s objectives. The fire support officer leads the fire support cell (when established), prepares Annex D (Fires) of the operation order, and coordinates with the electromagnetic warfare officer and the air liaison officer. The S-3 coordinates this position. (See ADP 3-19 for additional information.)

Force Management Officer

1-182. Force management officers are trusted advisors who serve as subject matter experts on the technical processes of force management. Force management officers are experts at force development, designing operational and institutional force structure, identifying and allocating authorized resources, and force integration
Information Operations Officer

1-183. The information operations officer coordinates and integrates information-related capabilities for information operations, including cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. This staff officer is the primary advisor to the commander on shaping operational activity through the information and cyberspace environment that will degrade enemy and adversary decision-making and protect friendly forces.

1-184. The information operations officer is responsible for synchronizing and deconflicting information-related capabilities employed in support of operations. Led by the information operations officer, the staff synchronizes capabilities that communicate information to audiences and affect information content and flow of enemy or adversary decisionmaking while protecting friendly information flow. The information operations staff planner prepares Appendix 15 and a portion of Appendices 12, 13, and 14 to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order. (See ADP 6-0 for additional information.)

Property Book Officer

1-185. The property book officer is the primary advisor to the command and supported units on all property accountability and organizational-level supply matters. Property book officers develop, execute, monitor, and provide input to the budget. They coordinate funds availability and oversee the small purchase program for standard and nonstandard equipment. They manage materiel through record adjustments, issues, turn-ins, property losses, and status reports. The property book officer applies for, coordinates, and manages the unit DOD Activity Address Codes.

1-186. The mission of the property book officer is to ensure all authorized equipment is on-hand or on requisition for all units to accomplish their mission. Typically, all property (except real property) requires continuous detailed accounting from the time of acquisition through an item's lifecycle until the property is disposed of or consumed. The property book officer maintains the property records for all accountable assets issued to supported units. The officer controls all input to and output from the automated processes supporting the property book system. The property book officer processes documents, such as financial liability investigations, adjustment reports, statement of charges, cash collection vouchers, and managerial reports the command requires.

Provost Marshal

1-187. The provost marshal is responsible for planning, coordinating, and employing all organic, assigned, or attached military police assets. Usually, provost marshals are the senior military police officer in the command. They augment the staff, typically within the S-3. The provost marshal develops antiterrorism, force protection, and personnel recovery plans. The provost marshal prepares a portion of Annex C (Operations) and a portion of Annex E (Protection) to the operation order. (See FM 3-39 for additional information.)

Psychological Operations Officer

1-188. The psychological operations officer is responsible for planning, synchronizing and coordinating influence activities with other staff, higher headquarters and appropriate foreign counterparts. The psychological operations officer assists in adversary information analysis and exploitation as well as coordinates for division or higher-level influence support to counter adversary information activities as necessary. The psychological operations officer prepares Appendix 13 (Military Information Support Operations) and a portion of Appendix 14 (Military Deception) and Appendix 15 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the operation order. (See FM 3-53.)

Staff Weather Officer

1-189. The staff weather officer is an Air Force officer or NCO subject matter expert who coordinates operational weather support and weather service matters through the S-2 and other staff members. Staff weather officers lead a team of Air Force weather personnel that collects and analyzes environmental intelligence to produce and disseminate mission tailored products. These products can include an environmental running estimate, mission execution forecasts, and weather watches, warnings, and advisories. They integrate weather effects into planning and execution along with responding to weather requests for
information. Weather effects information and products contribute to the SFAB Commander’s situational understanding, decision making, and risk management. Although aligned to the SFAB, the Air Force weather personnel remain under administrative and operational control to the air component commander. The SFAB, through the S-2, ensures aligned Air Force weather personnel receive required Army equipment. The staff weather officer prepares Tab B (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) and should be included in reviews of operations orders. (See FM 2-0 for additional information.)

Strategic Planner

1-190. Strategists lead multidisciplinary groups and facilitate senior leader decisionmaking by assessing, developing, and articulating policy, strategy, and plans at the national and theater levels. Strategists integrate U.S. instruments of power across the Army, DOD, and throughout the joint environment. Strategic planners organize, design, guide, and direct multidisciplinary, joint, and coalition teams dealing with complex and unstructured problems. Additionally, they provide extensive experience and understanding of operations and national security processes, leverage strong networks across the Army, joint force, and interagency and provide clear, simple products to translate the commander’s vision into action by leading planning efforts or allow senior leaders to make a fully informed decision. Within the SFAB, strategic planners advise the commander on aligning SFAB SFA activities with JIIM efforts to support the applicable integrated country strategy while simultaneously achieving theater security cooperation plan objectives. (See DA PAM 600-3 for additional information.)
This chapter describes SFAB mission command and its operations framework.

SECTION I – UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS AND MISSION COMMAND

2-1. Unified land operations, SFA, mission command, and command and control are important Army frameworks within which units conduct operations. This section introduces these frameworks and describes how they apply to the SFABs and their advisor teams.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

2-2. The Army’s operational concept—the central idea that guides the conduct of Army operations—is unified land operations. Unified land operations are the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Army forces do this with combined arms formations possessing the mobility, firepower, protection, and sustainment to defeat an enemy and establish control of areas, resources, and populations. Army forces depend on the capabilities of the other Services as the joint force depends on Army capabilities across multiple domains. The goal of unified land operations is to achieve the joint force commander’s end state by applying land power as part of unified action. During the conduct of unified land operations, Army forces support the joint force through four strategic roles:

- Shape operational environments.
- Prevent conflict.
- Prevail in large-scale ground combat operations.
- Consolidate gains.

2-3. Army forces assist in shaping an operational environment by providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of their campaign plan. Shaping activities include security cooperation, military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. Army operations to prevent are designed to deter undesirable actions of an adversary through positioning of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. Army forces may have a significant role in executing flexible deterrent options or flexible response options. Additionally, Army prevent activities may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater of operations; and development of intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the joint force commander. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat of enemy ground forces. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break their opponent’s will to resist. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the focus of operations after large-scale combat operations have concluded. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of unified land operations.)

2-4. Throughout all four of these strategic Army roles, the SFAB advisor teams play an important role. Whether preventing conflict by developing foreign security force partners or serving as multinational integration liaison teams alongside our allies during large-scale combat operations, SFAB advisor teams perform a valuable and critical role for the Army during the conduct of unified land operations.
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

2-5. Security force assistance is a set of DOD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Foreign security forces include both military and nondefense ministry forces and their supporting institutions. These nondefense forces may include paramilitary forces, border and coastal control forces, special police forces, counterterrorism forces, civil police, information and intelligence organizations, customs organizations and correctional personnel, including the guard force. SFA activities are primarily conducted to assist host countries defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the DOD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country’s security forces or supporting institutions (See DODI 5000.68.) SFA tasks include organizing, training and education, equipping, and rebuilding/building, advising/assisting, and assessing. (See FM 3-22 for more information on SFA tasks.)

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS

2-6. SFA performs three security force functions: executive, generating, and operating. This concept allows planners to identify gaps in partner nation’s abilities at the executive (ministerial) level, force generation, or within the partner nation’s security forces.

Executive Function

2-7. The executive functions include strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resourcing for foreign security force generating and operating functions. The executive function generally occurs at the ministry of defense level and encompasses administrative efforts and processes, as well as disseminates resources to direct and support the foreign security force. Executive functions also include formulating policy, advising political leadership, strategic planning and budgeting, assessing readiness, reviewing and analyzing current and future capability and capacity gaps, coordinating with other departments or agencies, and supervising intelligence activities.

Generating Function

2-8. The generating function occurs across the air, land, and maritime components. The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating force. SFA efforts assist the host nation by identifying, resourcing, and resolving capability gaps in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities.

Operating Function

2-9. The operating function employs military enablers to enhance the skills of a foreign security force via the elements of combat power. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). Warfighting functions are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by higher-level commanders. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

2-10. SFA activities are critical when planning at the operational level. These activities include plan, generate, employ, transition, and sustain. These stages of an operation can evolve over time based on the capability and capacity of the foreign security force.
MISSION COMMAND AND THE SFAB

2-11. *Mission command* is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). SFAB commanders and staffs apply the principles of mission command to lead their organizations. The SFAB’s primary mission is to advise foreign security forces, through the execution of SFA tasks, not to command and control maneuver forces during operations. SFABs are uniquely designed to advise, at echelon, two levels above the SFABs’ organic command structure. They build partnerships to develop understanding of the operational environment, local populations, key actors, and the enemy. This understanding helps commanders visualize the operational environment and provide direction. Commanders use the information gained from advisor teams to modify existing plans, reallocate assets, and refine the SFA operations to assist and enable their foreign security force counterparts.

2-12. Mission command requires competent forces and an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires effective teams and a command climate in which subordinates are required to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Commanders issue mission orders that focus on the purpose of an operation and essential coordination measures rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks, giving subordinates the latitude to accomplish those tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. This minimizes the number of decisions a single commander makes and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks. Successful mission command is enabled by the principles of—

- Competence.
- Mutual trust.
- Shared understanding.
- Commander’s intent.
- Mission orders.
- Disciplined initiative.
- Risk acceptance.

2-13. The mission command approach to command and control is based on the Army’s view that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation. No single person is ever sufficiently informed to make every important decision, nor can a single person keep up with the number of decisions that need to be made during combat. Subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of what is happening during a battle. They are more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities if allowed to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the initial plan to achieve their commander’s intent. Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, a route may become impassable, or units could consume supplies at unexpected rates. Friction and unforeseeable combinations of variables impose uncertainty in all operations. The unit’s command and control approach does not attempt to impose perfect order but rather accepts uncertainty and makes allowances for unpredictability. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on mission command.)

COMPETENCE

2-14. Tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates, and teams are the basis of effective mission command. An organization’s ability to operate using mission command relates directly to the competence of its Soldiers. Commanders and subordinates achieve the level of competence to perform assigned tasks to standard through training, education, assignment experience, and professional development. Commanders continually assess the competence of their subordinates and their organizations. This assessment informs the degree of trust commanders have in their subordinates’ ability to execute mission orders in a decentralized fashion at acceptable levels of risk.
Chapter 2

Mutual Trust

2-15. Advisors rely on teambuilding to build trust. This trust enables SFA. The SFAB expands on this principle by integrating foreign security forces, supporting elements, and other groups of interests under common SFA goals. Commanders must foster trust among all echelons of the command, the foreign security forces, and other supporting agencies. SFAB interactions with foreign security forces significantly influence the level of trust between the organizations. This trust provides a foundation upon which the SFAB and the foreign security forces build a shared end state. Additionally, since advisor teams generally operate in dispersed locations, commanders must develop trust in their subordinates. This mutual trust allows them to issue broad, and sometimes vague, guidance and be confident that their subordinates can execute using disciplined initiative. Teambuilding requires developing mutual trust through shared experience and is sustained through repetition. To capitalize on this principle, these groups must—

- Build a common vision and end state through communication, relationships, and trust.
- Implement repetition in systems, both internal to the SFAB and external with the foreign security forces, other partners, and supporting organizations. Ensure the processes are flexible enough to work with a variety of organizations and environments but consistent enough to build the required trust between the various organizations.
- Demonstrate commitment to the foreign security force, other unified action partners, and supporting agencies.

2-16. Without mutual trust between advisors and their foreign counterparts, advisor teams cannot effectively decentralize operations to the extent necessary to take initiative to capitalize on opportunities and adjust to emerging situations. Centralized control and decisionmaking is perhaps the biggest threat to effective advising for a number of reasons. First, it presumes to effectively control complex and dynamic advising activities based on limited information and contextual understanding that can only be obtained at the advising-team level, which leads to suboptimal results in advising partner forces. Second, it constrains the pace and volume of advisor team activities to the rate of information flow and consumption from the advisor network to the command; this ultimately results in sluggish, untimely advising actions and missed opportunities. Lastly, centralized execution reduces advisors to mere intermediaries who lack sufficient authority and autonomy to make meaningful contributions to their partner forces. This fact will eventually be obvious to their counterparts and ultimately threaten the credibility of advisors in their partners’ eyes.

Shared Understanding

2-17. In an SFAB, developing a shared understanding is vital to mission success and more complicated than in a typical maneuver unit. SFAB commanders must communicate this shared understanding among their own personnel, the foreign counterparts, other unified action partners, and supporting agencies. Complicating this process are differences in language, culture, and organizational constructs. Each of these differences filters the information and may change the original intent. Shared understanding is the foundation upon which the SFAB plans and conducts tasks in support of SFA.

2-18. Advising operations typically occur in environments where friendly forces lack significant control of operational activities and military forces are limited in their physical presence across the area of operations. Under these constraints, obtaining accurate and timely information to create a shared understanding is a significant challenge. A relatively small number of advisors and headquarters staff may receive large amounts of information on the operational environment from a finite number of foreign sources of varying reliability. Many of the advisors’ primary sources of information are also limited in their own access to certain types of information—particularly civil information—making it even more challenging to gain a complete understanding of the environment. Advisor teams and staff will do their utmost to overcome the challenges and will collect, analyze, and disseminate available information in a timely manner in order to build situational awareness and drive decisions. It is crucial that advisors and their higher headquarters are relentless in their efforts to manage information and understand the operational environment. Information management and sharing must be a deliberate effort that is organized, disciplined, and enabled by effective systems and processes that are understood by all parties involved. The disciplined management of high quality, timely, and relevant information is critically important to effective mission command of advising operations.
2-19. Shared understanding in advising operations involves managing the following mission-critical information:

- IPB.
- Information environment.
- CCIRs.
- Partner force disposition, composition, and strength.
- Partner force critical warfighting function capabilities.
- Significant partner force constraints and limitations.
- Partner force leadership strengths, weaknesses, and motivations.
- Partner force future intentions.
- Partner force plans and orders.
- Partner force requests for assistance.
- Advisor team disposition.
- Advisor team capabilities and assets available.
- Advisor constraints and limitations.
- SFA priorities and plans.
- Operational security and force protection vulnerabilities.

2-20. The organization, quality, relevance, and timeliness of this information are very important. A high volume of disorganized, marginally relevant information quickly leads to information overload, which presents a significant hindrance to developing a shared understanding. Advisors use discipline in their reporting to avoid providing excessive information. Commanders have a responsibility for creating an organizational culture and environment that discourages poor reporting practices, including allowing for advisors to occasionally not report due to a lack of sufficient information.

**COMMANDER’S INTENT**

2-21. Commanders must provide a clear intent, which includes an end state for their portion of the SFA mission within the context of the long-term U.S. goals. The commander’s intent must be disseminated and understood at all levels, yet simple enough to allow subordinates to execute confidently when faced with difficult decisions, which may be complicated by language and cultural barriers. The commander’s intent should include an expanded purpose and list key tasks that provide subordinates with enough guidance to achieve the desired end state. The end state should address desired capabilities of the partnered force and effects on the operational environment expressed through the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time, while addressing success for SFAB elements.

2-22. Advising is inherently long-term focused with short-term objectives that sometimes conflict with sustainable goals. Thus, the art of providing clear commander’s intent to advisors is to continuously evaluate and reframe that intent based on new information, changing conditions, competing SFA priorities, and advisor feedback.

2-23. Good, clear commander’s intent to advisors avoids creating advisor dilemmas. Advisor team commanders must ensure, through shared understanding, that their intent is feasible considering foreign security force capabilities and authorities and does not significantly conflict with or undermine earnest foreign partner intentions, leadership direction, or other foreign priorities. Directing advisors to advise their counterparts to act in ways that exceed their capabilities, go beyond their authorities, or undermine their own well-intended efforts or those of their higher headquarters creates inherent tension with the advisor’s implicit mandate to maintain credibility and rapport with their foreign partners. See chapter 4 for more information on advisor dilemmas.

2-24. Advisor responsibilities for facilitating a clear commander’s intent include—

- Routinely demonstrating understanding of the commander’s intent.
- Clearly, candidly, and constructively communicating conflicts between intent, guidance, constraints, and limitations.
2-25. SFAB commanders and higher headquarters have the following responsibilities to their advisor teams:

- Formulate and clearly articulate the commander’s intent.
- Perceive and resolve conflicts between intent, guidance, constraints, and limitations.
- Constantly re-evaluate and reframe intent based on emerging developments in the SFA environment; be open to constructive feedback on intent and willingness to adjust accordingly based on new information.
- Challenge assumptions and control cognitive biases and groupthink.
- Avoid creating advisor dilemmas as described in chapter 4.
- Provide advising guidance to advisor teams, also described in chapter 4.

**MISSION ORDERS**

2-26. Mission orders describe how the commander sees the operation unfolding with sufficient detail, context, and clarity. Mission orders describe when, where, and how the commander intends to employ forces to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders’ maximum latitude to develop flexible and effective options through parallel, simultaneous, and complementary efforts.

2-27. Commanders of advisors issue mission orders in order to communicate the desired outcomes of advisor team activities. They often leave the exact details of how to accomplish these activities to the advisors. In hostile SFA environments, this is important because it allows advisors the flexibility to accomplish their SFA objectives while mitigating risks, conserving resources, and optimizing available time pursuing other priorities and tasks. For example, the decision of whether or not to execute an expeditionary fly-to-advise or drive-to-advise SFA mission depends on the goals and objectives for the mission, the available resources to conduct the mission, and the risks associated with the method of advising. In some cases, the risk-reward analysis may drive advisors to forego face-to-face advising in favor of telephonic engagement. In other cases, the advising tasks and objectives are too complex for telephonic advising to suffice. When commanders direct the precise advising method rather than the desired effect or outcome, they prevent advisors from managing these decisions at their level, where understanding of the risk-reward analysis is more refined.

2-28. Mission orders in advising operations are often generated from SFA priorities that are broader than specific advising tasks and allow advisors maximum flexibility to accomplish their commander’s intent as they see fit. A technique for managing and synchronizing intent, priorities, and mission-type orders is shown below. The commander’s intent drives SFA priorities, which drives mission orders for specific advisor team activities.

- **Intent:** Implement operational readiness cycle.
- **SFA priorities:**
  - Foreign commanders approve and support operational readiness cycle concept.
  - Regional military training center plan and execute operational readiness cycle.
- **Mission order guidance:**
  - Advise and assist combat training center cadre to develop operational readiness cycle program of instruction.
  - Advise and assist corps chief of staff to identify a foreign security force unit to participate in the combat training center’s operational readiness cycle.
  - Train regional military training center’s leadership to request and coordinate training resources to facilitate the combat training center’s program of instruction.

2-29. This broad guidance allows advisors to develop a strategy specifically tailored to their capabilities, limitations, and the foreign security force considerations to accomplish the mission without having to navigate prescriptive or constraining guidance.

2-30. Using mission orders and broad guidance in SFA operations does not preclude detailed planning of advisor team activities. Rather, advisors conduct detailed planning at their level and then share their plan with the advisor network for coordination purposes and situational awareness. Advisor team commanders and staffs have a responsibility to follow up mission orders and guidance to advisors with detailed
coordination and shaping efforts at echelon to enable the detailed advising strategy to ensure its success. Much of the detailed planning and coordinating at the headquarters level is in the form of shaping efforts and conditions setting to assist advisors in accomplishing their SFA objectives. It is vitally important that higher headquarters enables advisors through detailed coordination, to include with other organizations conducting SFA operations at echelon.

**DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE**

2-31. SFAB leaders and advisor teams execute disciplined initiative to seize the tactical advantage in the absence of orders and under changing conditions. Commanders provide their intent, purpose, key task, and desired end state, and then trust their advisors to execute the appropriate actions to achieve that intent. Communication between partners, adjacent units, higher headquarters, and advisor teams is key to successfully executing disciplined initiative.

2-32. Advisors exercise disciplined initiative while conducting advisor team activities when they understand the commander’s intent and aggressively seek opportunities to achieve it. These opportunities are often elusive, infrequent, and time-sensitive. Many times opportunities present themselves without warning or deliberate planning, and advisors miss these opportunities without disciplined initiative to identify and capitalize on them. Other times, advisors must create their own opportunities with partner forces by influencing their partners and implementing creative strategies to make progress on SFA priorities. Missed opportunities occur when advisors or their higher headquarters fail to recognize opportunities or fail to take appropriate action to capitalize on them.

2-33. Missed opportunities erode trust between commanders and advisors and undermine effective mission command. When advisors routinely miss opportunities, either by failing to identify them or by failing to create them, they force commanders to either micromanage their activities or circumvent their roles as advisors in other ways. In many ways, the commander’s sense of missed advising opportunities is as much a matter of perception as reality. The more commanders get the impression—true or false—that advisors are not taking disciplined initiative to accomplish the mission, the more commanders are reluctant to decentralize advisor team activities. For this reason, advisors have a responsibility to inform the commander of their efforts to accomplish the prescribed intent. Advisors do so by routinely providing commanders clear and direct confirmation of actions taken to accomplish their intent. This communication must be proactive, modest, and sincere. To the extent that it is reactive, overstated, or embellished, trust is eroded between the commander and subordinate advisors.

2-34. Advisor initiative must also fall within the commander’s intent. To the extent that advisors misread, disregard, or intentionally undermine the commander’s intent, they compromise their own trust with the commander, and ultimately their autonomy as advisors. Advisors have a responsibility to have frequent candid dialogue with commanders on their intent based on a shared understanding of the mission and the environment and resolve any disagreements of intent before advising with their foreign counterparts. This candid dialogue must be objective, free of bias, and unemotional. It must take into account all the elements of shared understanding previously described.

**RISK ACCEPTANCE**

2-35. SFAB advisor teams can operate in decentralized, austere environments with limited lines of communication. They rely on their training, relationships, and coordination with foreign security forces and other unified action partners for protection. Commanders and staffs must define the acceptable level of risk after identifying and mitigating all hazards. Commanders cannot mitigate all risk. At the appropriate echelon, they make the decision to accept, or not accept, the associated risks.

2-36. Commanders accept prudent risks in SFA operations in order to create opportunities for success. Because uncertainty and risk are ever-present in advising operations, managing and accepting prudent risk are necessary to prevent stagnation and continue to make progress in training, advising, and assisting partner forces. Examples of potential risks involved in tactical SFA operations in hostile environments include—

- Accidental risk of injury to advisors during tactical convoy or air assault or air movement operations.
● Accidental risk of fratricide to foreign security forces while employing joint fires in support of partner operations.
● Accidental risk of civilian casualties while employing joint fires in support of foreign partner operations.
● Disease or nonbattle injury to advisors while executing expeditionary advisor team activities in austere conditions.
● Operational security compromise during combined foreign security force planning and coordination for future operations.
● Insider attacks against advisors while conducting advisor team activities.
● Tactical risk of enemy attacks against advisor outposts and mission support sites.
● Tactical risk of enemy attacks against advisor teams while accompanying foreign security forces during offensive operations.

2-37. Prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost. Accurately judging when SFA outcomes are worth the potential costs requires—
● Dispassionate calculations of external support or enablers required for foreign security force success.
● Conservative expectations of the true impacts of SFA activities.
● Current and comprehensive assessments of potential threats to advisor teams.
● Realistic assessments of the suitability and effectiveness of risk reduction measures.
● Appreciation of the broader implication of potential risks to the SFA mission.

2-38. To the extent SFAB commanders and advisors misjudge what SFA activities are really mission essential, overestimate their true impacts, underestimate potential threats, underplay or dismiss risk reduction measures, and discount the strategic-level consequences of contingencies, they make poor risk decisions in their advising operations. There is persistent professional temptation for advisors and SFAB commanders to overstate the necessity of their role in enabling their foreign counterparts, which compromises good decision-making regarding risks. Similarly, advisors and their commanders may be tempted to be overly optimistic about the true impact of their advisor team activities to the mission, which also convolutes risk decisionmaking. Accurately assessing risks versus potential rewards requires critical thinking and consistent, candid dialogue between SFAB commanders and their advisors to gain and maintain a common understanding of risks to SFA operations. Without constant dialogue, transparency, and critical thinking on these questions, SFAB commanders and advisors may eventually come to disagree on what risks are prudent and necessary to achieve success, which compromises effective mission command in advising.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-39. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Command and control is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single activity in operations is more important than command and control. Command and control by itself will not secure an objective, destroy an enemy target, or deliver supplies. Yet none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve maximum effect, without effective command and control. It is through command and control that the countless activities a military force performs gain purpose and direction. The goal of command and control is mission accomplishment.

2-40. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment (JP 1). Command is personal—an individual person commands, not an organization or a headquarters. Consider command more art than science, because it incorporates intangible elements that require judgment in application. The key elements of command are—
● Authority.
● Responsibility.
● Decision-making.
● Leadership.
2-41. **Control** is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent (ADP 6-0). Commanders exercise control over all forces in their area of operations, aided by their command and control system. Staffs aid the commander in exercising control by supporting the commander’s decision-making; assisting subordinate commanders, staffs and units; and keeping units and organizations outside the headquarters informed. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on command and control.)

2-42. The **command and control warfighting function** is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of power (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, information and leadership) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

**SECTION II – SFAB OPERATIONS PROCESS FRAMEWORK**

2-43. The Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process—the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand their operational environment; visualize and describe the operation’s end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on the Army operations process.)

**ACTIVITIES OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS**

2-44. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. After the completion of the initial order, the commander and staff continuously revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparation for a specific mission begins early in planning and continues for some subordinate units during execution. Execution puts a plan into action and involves adjusting the plan based on changes in the situation and the assessment of progress. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities.

**PLANNING**

2-45. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Planning is both conceptual and detailed. Conceptual planning includes developing an understanding of an operational environment, framing the problem, defining a desired end state, and developing an operational approach to achieve the desired end state. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is commander led. Detailed planning translates the operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of operations and encompasses the specifics of implementation. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering, and directing forces.

**PREPARATION**

2-46. Preparation consists of activities that units and Soldiers perform to improve their abilities to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. Activities of preparation help develop a shared understanding of the situation and requirements for execution. These activities—such as backbriefs, rehearsals, training, and inspections—help units, staffs, and Soldiers better understand their roles in upcoming operations, gain proficiency on complicated tasks, and ensure their equipment and weapons function properly.
EXECUTION

2-47. Planning and preparation enable effective execution. Execution is putting a plan into action while using situational understanding to assess progress and adjust operations as the situation changes. Execution focuses on concerted action to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success.

ASSESSMENT

2-48. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. The focus of assessment differs during planning, preparation, and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information to understand the current situation and developing an assessment plan. During preparation, assessment focuses on monitoring changes in the situation and on evaluating the progress of readiness to execute the operation. Assessment during execution involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using criterion to judge progress toward success. Assessment during execution helps commanders adjust plans based on changes in the situation.

PRINCIPLES OF THE SFAB OPERATIONS PROCESS

2-49. SFAB operations with foreign partners present challenges and demands throughout the operations process. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of information and intelligence, and rules of engagement. Establishing SOPs and liaising with foreign partners are critical to effective command and control.

2-50. Advisor teams parallel plan in conjunction with higher echelon formations, to include those of the foreign security force. The advisor teams generally have a member representing each warfighting function who can conduct analysis and assessments. Advisor teams use the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures independently, in collaboration with the foreign security force, or as part of a coalition or alliance to develop a plan. The next higher commander’s intent, within the SFAB and the foreign security force, should guide plans developed with the foreign counterparts.

2-51. The SFAB follows the principles of the operations process. The operations process, while simple in concept, is dynamic in execution. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to simultaneously plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following principles for the effective employment of the operations process:

- Drive the operations process.
- Build and maintain situational understanding.
- Apply critical and creative thinking.

DRIVE THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

2-52. The commander is the central figure in the operations process. Commanders within the SFAB can hold several roles with disparate responsibilities while deployed. Commanders command their assigned unit and may serve as advisor team leaders. Commanders will likely find themselves providing guidance to their staff one moment, then advising a counterpart commander the next, when working through the operations process. When applicable, nest guidance vertically within the SFAB and horizontally with the foreign security force and supporting organizations. Broad guidance tends to be more effective due to limited personnel, communication, mission complexity, language constraints, and distance between units.

Understand

2-53. Understanding an operational environment and associated problems is fundamental to establishing a situation’s context and visualizing operations. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An operational environment encompasses the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace
domains; the information environment; the electromagnetic spectrum, and other factors. Included within these areas are the enemy, friendly, and neutral actors who are relevant to a specific operation.

2-54. Identifying priorities and common ground among various organizations and partners facilitates a shared understanding. Once built, a shared understanding provides the foundation for the relationships between these groups. Use deliberate planning, coordination, confirmation briefs, backbriefs, and other appropriate forms of communication to verify this shared understanding across organizations. A shared understanding allows the SFAB, in conjunction with other organizations, to build local agreements and SOPs.

Visualize

2-55. As commanders build understanding about their operational environments, they start to visualize solutions to solve the problems they identify. Collectively, this is known as commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0).

2-56. Commanders must visualize their operational environment to include their command, area of operations (including terrain and civilian populations), the enemy, the partnered force, and other relevant considerations. They view all these factors holistically and identify the potential impacts these factors have upon one another. Visualization includes commanders seeing themselves and their likely impact on the operational environment. When operating with a foreign security force, commanders must include their counterparts and their subordinates in this process as well.

2-57. Visualization includes determining an end state. A useful technique for an SFAB commander may be first to determine the end state as desired or described by the foreign security force or their political leadership. Similar to solving a printed maze by starting at the finish and working backwards, commanders can visualize what success looks like for their unit in conjunction with their foreign counterparts. Commanders then work backwards to develop intermediate goals, objectives, key tasks, and a purpose for their organization. As always, commanders ensure that their intent nests with both their higher headquarters and that of the foreign security force and their leadership.

2-58. When developing and describing an operational approach, commanders identify potential problems or friction points between SFAB forces and their foreign counterparts. Many of these friction points involve language and cultural differences. They may also include the foreign security force’s level of training, pay, concept of time, and the political stability of their country. These differences may result in the SFAB and foreign security forces attempting to achieve the end state in an uncoordinated fashion.

Describe

2-59. Commanders describe their visualization to their staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate shared understanding and purpose throughout the force. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the original operation order. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it, as circumstances require. Commanders describe their visualization in terms of—

- Commander’s intent.
- Planning guidance.
- CCIRs.
- Essential elements of friendly information.

2-60. When describing a shared vision with a partnered force, the commander must consider the language and cultural differences that could influence the mutual perception. Choose short, simple, specific, and culturally appropriate language to communicate the vision at all levels within the unit, the foreign security force, and with other supporting organizations.
Commander’s Intent

2-61. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). During planning, the initial commander’s intent guides course of action development. In execution, the commander’s intent guides initiative as subordinates make decisions and take action when unforeseen opportunities arise or when countering threats. Commanders develop their intent statement personally. It must be easy to remember and clearly understood by commanders and staffs two echelons lower in the chain of command. The more concise the commander’s intent, the easier it is to understand and recall.

Planning Guidance

2-62. After visualizing and describing the desired end state, commanders determine an operational approach and provide planning guidance to allow staffs and advisor teams to begin developing a plan, generally in conjunction with the foreign security force counterparts. Goals, objectives, key tasks, and additional guidance will help the staff develop creative and flexible plans with the greatest latitude for initiative by subordinate leaders. Commanders consider the various conditions in which subordinate advisor teams operate when providing planning guidance. Due to the large number of variables, planning guidance is generally broad in scope to allow subordinate organizations and advisor teams the flexibility to develop their plans.

2-63. Commanders must ensure their staffs and advisor teams are flexible, agile, and able to develop solutions to complex problems. They must develop and rehearse techniques that allow their staffs and advisors to perform the identified tasks with battle drill efficiency. Staff and advisor teams must routinely plan, rehearse, review, and incorporate accountability, safety, and protection considerations into operational plans.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

2-64. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). When building plans, the SFAB staffs and commanders identify operational decision points that have a significant impact on the success of the mission. Align commander’s CCIRs to operational decision points. Track these decision points in a decision support matrix. The staff recommends CCIRs, which the commander approves, to facilitate rapid and informed decision-making. Commanders and staffs monitor and update the CCIRs as the operation progresses. Unit SOPs are developed and refined to make CCIR development as efficient as possible. Criteria for CCIRs are—

- Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
- Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
- Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
- Time-sensitive.

2-65. CCIRs change over time and require periodic update and refinement. They should be limited in number to provide clarity and ease of management. Every appropriate echelon must understand and report information that may answer CCIRs per unit SOPs. (See ADP 5-0.) Once approved, a CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements.

2-66. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01). Priority intelligence requirements identify information about the enemy and operational environment that commanders and staffs use to execute predetermined operational decisions. For the SFAB, civilian considerations and information regarding the readiness and relationship with the counterpart force may be as critical to the commander as intelligence regarding the enemy. Generally, align information collection assets to priority intelligence requirements.

2-67. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements
include the foreign security force. Often, SFAB staffs develop two sets of friendly force information requirements: one for the advisor teams and another for their foreign partners. Friendly force information requirements identify information about the mission, troops, support, and time available for friendly forces. Along with priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements drive decisions on the decision support matrix.

**Essential Elements of Friendly Information**

2-68. Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0). Although essential elements of friendly information are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. Essential elements of friendly information establish elements of information to protect rather than elements to collect.

2-69. Essential elements of friendly information may be critical to the success of the SFABs and their mission. Commanders balance developing trust and understanding with the foreign security forces against sharing too much information that could potentially benefit the enemy. Identifying essential elements of friendly information is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information. Advisors practice, train, and monitor operational security for themselves and their counterparts.

**Direct**

2-70. To direct is implicit in command. Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Commanders make decisions and direct action based on their situational understanding maintained by continuous assessment. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

- Approving plans and orders.
- Establishing command and support relationships.
- Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task-organization.
- Positioning units to maximize combat power.
- Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure supervision.
- Allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats.
- Committing the reserve.

**Lead**

2-71. Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Leadership inspires Soldiers to accomplish things that they otherwise might not. Throughout the operations process, commanders make decisions and provide the purpose and motivation to follow through with the course of action they chose. They must also possess the wisdom to know when to modify a course of action when situations change. (See ADP 6-22 for a detailed discussion of leadership to include attributes of effective leaders.)

2-72. SFAB commanders provide leadership to their elements while displaying these traits to their counterpart as an advisor. They do not lead their counterparts; however, they guide and influence the foreign security force’s leadership and soldiers through their counsel, coaching, and professionalism. SFAB commanders know when to lead their own advisor teams, when to provide private support and counsel to their counterpart, and when to provide public guidance to build confidence in both the advisor teams and the foreign security force’s leadership.

**Assess**

2-73. Assessment involves deliberately comparing intended forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and completing tasks. Commanders incorporate assessments by the staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners into their personal
assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment, commanders adjust their visualization and modify plans and orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances.

2-74. Commanders continuously assess the situation to understand current conditions and to determine how the operation is progressing. The SFAB conducts an assessment to determine the initial conditions within the environment, the relationship with the counterparts, status of the foreign security forces, and the requirements of the mission. Follow this initial assessment by continuously assessing the situation and updating the common operational picture through the analysis of assessment metrics. Chapter 4, section II, discusses assessment in more detail.

BUILD AND MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

2-75. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders, staffs, and advisor teams seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Commanders, staffs, and advisors continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work through periods of reduced understanding as a situation evolves. Effective commanders accept that uncertainty can never be eliminated and train their staffs and advisors to function in uncertain environments.

2-76. As commanders, staffs, and advisors build their situational understanding, they share their understanding across the forces and with unified action partners. Creating shared understanding is a principle of mission command and requires communication and information sharing from higher to lower and lower to higher. Higher headquarters ensures subordinates understand the larger situation to include the operation’s end state, purpose, and objectives. Staffs and advisor teams from lower echelons share their understanding of their particular situation and provide feedback to the higher headquarters on the operation’s progress. Communication and information sharing with adjacent units and unified action partners is also multidirectional. Several tools assist leaders in building situational understanding and creating a shared understanding across the force to include—

- Operational and mission variables.
- Running estimates.
- Intelligence.
- Collaboration.
- Liaison.
- Apply critical and creative thinking.
- Cultural understanding.

Operational and Mission Variables

2-77. Operational and mission variables are categories of relevant information commanders and staffs use to help build their situational understanding. Commanders, staffs, and advisor teams use the eight interrelated operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—to help understand an operational environment. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations.

2-78. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders and staffs filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their situational understanding and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Commanders, staffs, and advisors view all the mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed description of the operational and mission variables.)
Running Estimates

2-79. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Running estimates assist commanders and staffs with understanding situations, assessing progress, and making decisions throughout an operation. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on current and accurate running estimates.

2-80. Each staff section and advisor maintains a running estimate within its specified area of expertise (for example, intelligence, fires, logistics, and personnel). When building and maintaining a running estimate, staff sections and advisors monitor current operations and continuously consider the following in context of the operations:

- Facts.
- Assumptions.
- Friendly status including location, activity, and combat power of subordinate units and foreign security forces.
- Enemy status including composition, disposition, and strength.
- Civil considerations.
- Conclusions and recommendations.

2-81. Running estimates cover essential facts and assumptions, including a summary of the current situation. Running estimates always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders and advisor team leaders use these recommendations to select valid (feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete) courses of action for further analysis. During preparation and execution, leaders use recommendations from running estimates to inform their decision-making.

Intelligence

2-82. Intelligence supports the commander and staff in building and maintaining situational understanding during all activities of the operations process. Information and intelligence are essential for developing an understanding of the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Intelligence helps commanders, staffs, and advisors understand and visualize their operational environment and options available to the enemy and the friendly force.

2-83. The intelligence process describes how the intelligence warfighting function facilitates situational understanding and supports decision-making. This process provides a common framework for Army professionals to guide their thoughts, discussions, plans, and assessments. Effective execution of the intelligence process depends on commander and staff involvement and effective information collection. Commanders drive the intelligence process by issuing planning guidance, establishing priorities, identifying decision points, and designating their CCIRs. The intelligence process generates information, products, and knowledge about an operational environment during planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It also integrates intelligence into targeting, information operations, and risk management. (See ADP 2-0 for a detailed discussion of the intelligence process.)

Collaboration

2-84. Commanders, staffs, and advisors actively build and maintain shared understanding within the force and with unified action partners by continually collaborating throughout the operations process. Collaboration is more than coordination. It is multiple people and organizations working together towards a common goal by sharing knowledge and building consensus. It requires dialogue that involves a candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, advisors, staffs, and unified action partners collaborate, share and question information, perceptions, and ideas to understand situations and make decisions.

2-85. Throughout the planning process, commanders, staffs, advisor teams, foreign security force counterparts, and other unified action partners actively collaborate to understand the situation and make decisions. When possible, they conduct collaborative planning during mission analysis, course of action development, and wargaming to resolve conflicts before issuing the operations order. Through collaborative
participation, they improve situational understanding and develop common priorities and objectives upon which to build future efforts and mutual trust.

**Liaison**

2-86. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces and another organization to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Most commonly used for establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison continuously enables direct, physical communications between commands. Commanders use liaison during operations to help facilitate coordination between organizations, deconflict efforts, and build shared understanding.

2-87. The SFAB has an inherent responsibility to coordinate with other unified action partners. Due to the nature of SFA operations, many different organizations will have missions and goals that influence the SFAB’s operations. This will likely include the Department of State, other U.S. and allied military forces, and nongovernmental organizations. The SFAB commanders and staffs must establish a network of liaisons within the theater of operations to coordinate these efforts and ensure supporting organizations are prepared to provide the required support to their advisor teams. See chapter 4 for more information regarding the advisor team activity of liaison.

**Apply Critical and Creative Thinking**

2-88. Thinking includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Thinking is naturally influenced by emotion, experience, and bias. As such, commanders, staffs, and advisors apply critical and creative thinking throughout the operations process to assist them with understanding situations, making decisions, directing actions, and assessing operations.

2-89. Adapting to new and unfamiliar problems creates constant friction for SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor teams. Commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders at all echelons must devise new and creative solutions to problems that they, or their higher headquarters, may not have experienced before. Solutions to these problems may often come from outside sources, such as the partner foreign security force or the local population.

**Cultural Understanding**

2-90. Commanders and advisors consider how culture (their own, their counterparts, and the local population) affects operations when building situational understanding and conducting operations. Cultural understanding is paramount to the SFAB’s success. Culture is composed of shared beliefs, values, norms, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Advisor teams must consider how culture influences not only their actions but also the actions of their counterparts and the local population. Making decisions through a strictly U.S. Army viewpoint may inhibit mission success. Additionally, understanding the culture of other unified action partners is crucial to building mutual trust and shared understanding.

**INTEGRATING PROCESS**

2-91. Throughout the operations process, commanders, staffs, and advisor teams integrate the warfighting functions to synchronize the force according to the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commanders, staffs, and advisors use several integrating processes and continuing activities to do this. The integrating processes are—

- IPB.
- Information collection.
- Targeting.
- Risk management.
- Knowledge management.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

2-92. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). Led by the intelligence officer or advisor, the entire staff or team participates in IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces.

2-93. IPB consists of four steps. Perform, assess, and refine each step to ensure that IPB products remain complete and relevant. The four IPB steps are as follows:

- Define the operational environment.
- Describe environmental effects on operations.
- Evaluate the threat.
- Determine threat courses of action.

2-94. IPB supports all activities of the SFAB operations process. IPB identifies gaps in current intelligence. Due to their small size relative to other conventional organizations, SFAB intelligence sections may have difficulty processing large amounts of information into intelligence and may require reach-back capabilities. IPB products help commanders, staffs, and advisor teams understand the threat, physical environment, and civil considerations throughout the operations process. See chapter 5 for more information regarding augmentation.

2-95. SFAB staffs and advisor teams conduct IPB, internally and with their foreign counterparts. Make efforts to bring the foreign security force into the IPB process to provide training to their commanders and staffs. Staff and advisors adhere to the appropriate procedures and SOPs regarding the classification of material shared with foreign counterparts. If necessary, they alter the specific inputs and outputs associated with the IPB based on information-sharing constraints.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

2-96. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). It integrates the functions of the intelligence and operations staffs that focus on answering CCIRs. Information collection includes acquiring information and providing it to processing elements. It has three steps:

- Collection management.
- Task and direct collection.
- Execute collection.

2-97. Information collection helps the commander and advisors understand and visualize the operation by identifying gaps in information and aligning reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence assets to collect information on those gaps. The “decide” and “detect” steps of targeting tie heavily to information collection. (See FM 3-55 for a detailed discussion of information collection to include the relationship between the duties of intelligence and operations staffs.)

2-98. The SFAB conducts information collection activities in conjunction with their counterpart foreign security forces. Information collection includes information relating to the foreign security forces themselves, to include staffing, equipping, and disposition. This information provides inputs to SFA mission analysis and assessments. Advisors must also maintain an awareness of the foreign security force operational norms to identify environmental changes that may portend increased risk to advisors. The intelligence officer develops indicators, which assist teams in identifying and reporting potential internal foreign security force threats.

TARGETING

2-99. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying enemy resources (targets) that if destroyed or degraded will contribute to the success of the friendly mission.
Targeting begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The steps of the Army’s targeting process are—

- Decide.
- Detect.
- Deliver.
- Assess.

2-100. The SFAB does not have organic fires capability and must coordinate with higher headquarters for fires support. Brigade and battalion fires cells require augmentation if expected to operate a fires cell in the same manner as a typical BCT. Advisor teams must be prepared to assist their foreign counterparts with employing and deconflicting artillery or other joint fires.

2-101. An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. In addition to their own internal control measures, SFAB commanders and advisors assist the foreign security force in establishing the control measures to minimize these risks. Control measures (such as fire support coordination lines, no-strike lists, and airspace coordinating measures) are included in operations orders. Control measures should be coordinated with the foreign counterparts and understood thoroughly at all levels to prevent fratricide, reduce collateral damage, and increase the efficiency of the targeting process.

2-102. The brigade and battalion S-2s coordinate with the U.S. Air Force staff weather office in the military intelligence company, or their closest in-theater counterpart, for weather assessment information and capabilities. The brigade and battalion S-2s should integrate the weather effects information into IPB, MDMP, fires, targeting, building the common operational picture, and information collection activities to enhance the commander’s ability to achieve the desired effects. Share this information with subordinate advisor teams and, when possible, the foreign security force. Coordination with the United States Air Force may not always be available.

**RISK MANAGEMENT**

2-103. Risk—the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss—is inherent in all operations. Because risk is part of all military operations, it cannot be avoided. Identifying, mitigating, and accepting risk is a function of command and a key consideration during planning and execution.

2-104. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Commanders and staffs use risk management throughout the operations process to identify and mitigate risks associated with hazards (to include ethical risk and moral hazards) that have the potential to cause friendly and civilian casualties, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Like targeting, risk management begins in planning and continues through preparation and execution. Risk management consists of the following steps:

- Identify hazards.
- Assess hazards.
- Develop controls and make risk decisions.
- Implement controls.
- Supervise and evaluate.

2-105. All staff elements and advisors incorporate risk management into their running estimates and provide recommendations to mitigate risk within their areas of expertise. The operations officer or advisor team leader coordinates risk management throughout the operations process. (See ATP 5-19 for a detailed discussion of the risk management process.)

**KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT**

2-106. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). It facilitates the transfer of knowledge among commanders, staffs, and advisor teams to build and maintain situational understanding. Knowledge management helps get the right information to the right person at the right time to facilitate decision-making.
Knowledge management uses a five-step process to create shared understanding. (See ATP 6-01.1 for more information on knowledge management.) The steps of knowledge management include—

- Assess.
- Design.
- Develop.
- Pilot.
- Implement.

2-107. Knowledge management is particularly important to an SFAB’s success. Without the ability to aggregate assessments and reports from advisor teams working across a foreign security force, the SFAB commanders and staffs will be unable to manage the larger SFA mission and make adjustments accordingly. Therefore, commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders must put emphasis on knowledge management plans and SOPs prior to employment. These plans should include a mechanism for archiving assessments and information through higher headquarters for future advisor teams and other organizations that may find themselves in the same operational area.

**BATTLE RHYTHM**

2-108. *Battle rhythm* is a deliberate, daily schedule of command, staff, and unit activities intended to maximize use of time and synchronize staff actions (JP 3-33). Commanders and staffs must integrate and synchronize numerous activities, meetings, and reports within their headquarters, with their higher headquarters, and with subordinate units as part of the ongoing operations. Advisors integrate and synchronize their activities with the foreign counterparts. They do this by first understanding the foreign security force’s battle rhythm and then building their battle rhythms to be compatible and complementary with their counterpart’s schedule.

2-109. The SFAB battle rhythm sequences the actions and events within a headquarters by sharing information in support of the decision-making process. With significantly less personnel than a typical BCT, the SFAB must carefully plan its battle rhythm. Otherwise, information and events will quickly overwhelm commanders, staffs, and advisor teams. An effective battle rhythm—

- Facilitates interaction among the commander, staff, and advisor teams.
- Supports building and maintaining shared understanding throughout the headquarters.
- Establishes a routine for staff and advisor interaction and coordination.

2-110. There is no standard battle rhythm for every situation. Different echelons, types of units, and types of operations require commanders and staffs to develop a battle rhythm based on the situation. During large-scale combat, where lethality and time constraints require rapid planning and decision cycles, the unit’s battle rhythm focuses on defeating the enemy. Daily battle rhythm events may consist of a morning and evening current operations update brief, a targeting meeting, and a combined plans and future operations update brief. In operations dominated by stability tasks, where headquarters are often static, the battle rhythm may be more deliberate with daily, weekly, and monthly working groups and boards. While the battle rhythm establishes a routine for a headquarters, the unit’s battle rhythm is not fixed. Commanders modify the battle rhythm as the situation evolves. (See ATP 6-0.5 for a detailed discussion of battle rhythm to include examples of common meetings, working groups, and boards.)

2-111. Commanders and staffs plan and develop tracking and reporting tools to anticipate and monitor changes in the environment. Small changes in operational or mission variables in a partner or host nation could have significant impacts. These may include SFAB security and protection requirements and may affect advisors’ interaction with their counterpart. Advisors maintain situational awareness of the routine activities of foreign security force counterparts to identify potential leading indicators of a significant event. Base these indicators on foreign security force accountability, unplanned changes in their protection measures, and other potential indicators. SFAB staffs and advisors must anticipate these events and have contingency plans in place.

2-112. The SFAB must plan reporting requirements to account for their reduced personnel involved with receiving and processing reports and to account for the unpredictable nature inherent in working with foreign security forces. Challenges, such as scheduling conflicts, personnel availability, language difficulties,
changing protection requirements, and others, add complexity to these reports. Reporting requirements must assist in quickly and efficiently gathering reports, parsing information, and providing the relevant portions to decision-makers.

2-113. Commanders, staffs, and advisors identify critical and routine information requirements and prioritize reporting procedures accordingly. Reports, such as accountability, maintenance status, and the counterpart’s training status, should be routine and simplified. Commanders, staff, and advisors should develop reporting criteria that quickly highlights deficiencies. Important information needs to be apparent, easily identified, and capable of transmitting through multiple mediums at low cost and stress on the communication system.

2-114. Build redundancy into reporting systems and procedures within the SFAB. Network, personnel, connectivity, and even electrical power availability limitations may hinder collecting required reports from a single network or system.

2-115. Commanders adjust the unit’s battle rhythm as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a daily update briefing. As the situation changes, the commander may require an update briefing only weekly. Some factors that influence a unit’s battle rhythm include the staff’s proficiency, higher headquarters’ battle rhythm, reporting requirements, the foreign counterpart’s battle rhythm, operating tempo, the current mission, and planning requirements.

2-116. Commanders also adjust the battle rhythm and staff processes based on advising requirements of subordinate echelons. Due to the inverse relationship of mission command capacity and advising responsibilities, brigade commanders may "flatten" the organization and centralize more staff functions at the brigade level if subordinate battalion headquarters have significant advisor responsibilities.

2-117. Meetings typically consume a large amount of a unit’s battle rhythm. Meetings are gatherings to present and exchange information, solve problems, coordinate action, and make decisions. SFAB meetings must have an agenda and focus on the meeting’s task and purpose. Dispersed locations, lack of personnel, connectivity challenges, and language barriers preclude long, detailed, and complicated meetings. This is especially true for those involving the foreign security force counterparts. Rehearse meetings with the foreign security force with an interpreter to anticipate problems, cultural objections, and identify new terms that may need translation or clarification.
Chapter 3

Deployment and Redeployment

Chapter 3 describes the brigade’s deployment considerations from receipt of mission through post-deployment activities.

SECTION I – PREDEPLOYMENT

3-1. Planning for deployment is one of the most crucial phases of an operation. Personnel shortages, time and equipment limitations, language and cultural differences, dispersed operating locations, and fragile lines of communication challenge units as they begin preparations to deploy. Within the SFAB, deployment planning must be a multiechelon and collaborative effort among commanders, staffs, and advising team leaders. Figure 3-1 shows the recurring steps in the SFAB’s mission cycle.

![Figure 3-1. Mission cycle](image)

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<tr>
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<td>• Pre-Mission Planning</td>
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<td>• Mobility Planning and Certification</td>
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<td>• Movement Training and Certification</td>
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LEGEND

AR Army regulation
AAR After action review
CCV Certification, confirmation, and validation
MOS Military occupational specialty
RSOI Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

3-2. The combatant commander issues guidance to the ASCC, which submits a request for forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The joint staff through the Department of the Army issues the deployment order to U.S. Army Forces Command and ultimately to the designated SFAB. The order includes the plan for the SFAB’s reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; base support; communications integration; and
sustainment. SFAB parallel planning during the ASCC request for forces process is critical to maximizing the predeployment planning and coordination time available, as many planning tasks can be accomplished prior to request for forces approval and force allocation. The SFAB conducts predeployment site surveys (PDSSs) and subsequent coordination for clearance to the theater to facilitate mission planning and sustainment for the duration of the mission.

3-3. SFAB subordinate organizations and elements begin detailed preparations immediately upon receiving their mission. Using known requirements, the unit begins task-organizing and predeployment training immediately. The unit tailors the training to mission specifics gathered during PDSS and/or reconnaissance. The unit obtains supplies, equipment, and training materials to conduct individual, leader, and collective training to prepare for deployment. Units may request or be granted direct liaison authorized with unified action partners as required. The SFAB’s higher headquarters approves direct liaison authority between the supported ASCC and the projected SFAB as early as possible to facilitate parallel planning ahead of force allocation.

INITIAL COORDINATION AND PLANNING EVENTS

3-4. Through mission analysis, SFAB leaders and staffs determine if the unit is sufficiently organized and equipped to meet the mission parameters stated in the order. SFAB staffs refer to the order for the necessary information to begin coordination for entering the country with their required equipment. Leaders and staffs generate information requests for information not contained in the order.

MULTIECHELON PLANNING

3-5. To inform mission planning, the deploying SFAB element identifies the commander’s purpose, intent, and mission statement along with any known constraints, rules of engagement, and implied tasks. The SFAB identifies the initial command and support relationships for the deploying element to determine their command and support relationships while in transit and in theater. The deploying element develops its task-organization and by-name deployment roster to commence critical administrative requirements. The combatant commander provides the ASCC with exercise, training terms, and funding lines available for the deployment and the conduct of the mission. The information provides operational requirements, funding, and authorities linked to the assigned exercise or training missions.

3-6. The SFAB reviews the theater security cooperation plan and the relevant regional or country plans to conduct detailed planning. SFAB commanders and staff define success by focusing on long-term and sustainable goals in support of the theater security cooperation plan. When reviewing the deployment schedule, planners take the operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (seasons, harvests, elections, or referendums)—into account when developing the tempo of the mission and the deployment schedule of headquarters and subordinate elements. With long-term goals in mind, the SFAB develops measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for each potential course of action. This is part of the integrating process of operational assessment mentioned in chapter 4. The aforementioned theater and country plans may contain MOPs and MOEs, but the SFAB must do more than merely refine the higher headquarters’ plans. SFABs must conduct their own analysis and nest their plan with higher guidance ensuring both are conducive to lower-level execution.

FUNDING AUTHORITIES

3-7. The combatant command identifies funding under Title 10, United States Code (10 USC) or Title 22, USC and coordinates with the U.S. Embassy and Department of State to facilitate SFAB deployment and mission support as required by the operational variables of METT-TC. The SFAB S-8 coordinates with the ASCC assistant chief of staff of financial management to identify lines of accounting for deployment-related expenses. The DOD determines if the SFAB executes SFA under Title 10 or Title 22 authorities, which has implications for authorized SFA activities. If under Title 10 authority, the ASCCs (or a designated joint task force) receive funds through the established base budget, overseas contingency operations funding, or funds otherwise appropriated by Congress. If required, the combatant command, in conjunction with the country team, negotiates an acquisition and cross support agreement with the host nation to ensure the host nation
receives payment for logistical support services. Additionally, other bilateral agreements may exist that ensure the availability of appropriated host nation resources. These agreements may include payment to the United States through foreign military sales.

**PREMISSION PLANNING**

3-8. In preparation for deployment, the SFAB identifies and reviews existing campaign plans and country plans from the combatant command, the ASCC, and the chief of mission as well as other documents critical to U.S. interests and strategic goals in the region. The SFAB cross-references and compares these plans to operational and environmental assessments to identify potential gaps in foreign security force capability or capacity. This early information is included in the SFAB’s mission analysis. (See figure 3-2 for a graphic depiction of how these plans influence each other.) (See FM 3-22 for more information.)

![Diagram of mission planning process]

**Figure 3-2. Relationship between country plan, theater campaign plan, and integrated country strategy**

**PREMISSION ACADEMICS**

3-9. Staffs develop and distribute study materials and briefings on the operational area to leaders and Soldiers. These products emphasize host-nation culture and language and provide cultural tips for developing a good rapport with foreign personnel. Advisors reach out to the country team and other regional experts to
gain a better understanding of the history, culture, motivations, and politics of the host nation. Advisors use books, seminars, websites, and other resources to prepare for a pending mission.

3-10. This information provides the inputs into early environmental and institutional assessments of the foreign security force. These initial assessments help the SFAB to identify foreign security force capability or capacity gaps and cross-reference these potential gaps to existing campaign plans and their tentative mission.

**HOST NATION APPROVAL AND COUNTRY CLEARANCES**

3-11. The SFAB can expect delays during the visa application process. Some countries may require a letter of introduction through the supported embassy security cooperation organization. An approved visa is often required for country clearance and can delay the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System approval process. The SFAB S-1 or S-2 is usually responsible for planning and monitoring the visa process. However, due to the small staff, subordinate leaders and advisor team leaders must track this information as well. (The U.S. Passports and International Travel, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs website provides additional information and specific requirements for each country.) The SFABs are likely to require formalized support from their installation passport office to process a high density of passport requirements that are uncommon for conventional forces. Personnel assigned to SFABs must receive a special authorization to request official passports prior to receipt of mission.

3-12. The SFAB submits proposed PDSS dates to the ASCC or country team. The proposed dates include time spent going to and from the combatant command headquarters for briefings and guidance, as well as travel to the host nation. Staff planners must consider encountering delays when transiting through foreign countries. Planners must anticipate passport and visa requirements in those countries as well. Lastly, planners must consider using commercial aircraft or U.S. military aircraft. (See the DOD Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide website for a list of country clearance requirements. See the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System for country clearance issuances.)

**PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY**

3-13. The PDSS aims to present information accurately based on the existing mission variables. The PDSS also provides detailed information on the command and control, support, protection, and sustainment relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission. The site survey coordinates the in-country reception of the SFA forces. The coordination requires all units, outgoing and incoming, to apply a comprehensive approach at all levels of command.

3-14. The SFAB conducts a PDSS 180–270 days prior to deployment. Doing so gives the unit adequate time to plan, conduct, or alter its existing training plan to accommodate the country and theater-specific requirements of its mission. Tailor SFA missions to the needs of the foreign security force or host nation. The PDSS provides an opportunity to gain the information required to address planning requirements and confirms the partner foreign security force expectations. Ideally, SFAB units will be afforded multiple opportunities through initial planning and coordination events, host nation and country team communication and ASCC contact to accomplish PDSS goals and objectives. It is difficult to accomplish all premission analysis in a single PDSS event. Depending on the maturity of the theater, multiple PDSS events may be required or authorized.

3-15. The following paragraphs describe SFAB-specific information requirements that should be determined by the unit to ensure it can properly prepare and train upon return.

**THEATER MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS**

3-16. In addition to coordination with supporting host nation and foreign security force medical assets during the PDSS, consider the medical capabilities in theater and compare them against the SFAB’s requirements. The SFAB mission may require Soldiers to operate outside the capability of conventional force medical support. Key medical considerations for SFAB planners include—

- Individual and collective force health protection measures, including immunizations and chemoprophylaxis.
- Suitability, capacity, and capability of local medical facilities and assets.
- Time and distance factors associated with patient evacuation.
- Availability and suitability of civil and military casualty and medical evacuation assets (include airframe use authorization).
- Suitability of Class VIII supplies and blood products.

**Echelon of Advising**

3-17. The partner nation’s description of its security forces may not align with the SFAB’s assessment during the PDSS. The SFAB updates information during the PDSS and makes any recommendations for changes to the chain of command. Advising at higher echelons requires a focus on staff processes and a knowledge of the partner nation and the foreign security force systems and processes. The SFAB aligns its personnel to appropriate rank structures with the foreign security force (for example, a U.S. major to advise a foreign equivalent of a lieutenant colonel). The SFAB identifies any cultural risks associated with the possibility of giving offense or injuring the partnership based on advisor pairings (considers rank, gender, age, cultural background, personality, religion, race, and ethnicity).

**Foreign Security Force Training Requirements**

3-18. Operational assessments of the foreign security force provide initial training and mission requirements. This information provides data for the SFAB’s mission analysis. The level of proficiency, equipment, and resources may vary widely from mission to mission or even unit to unit. The needs of the foreign security force shape advisor team task-organization and augmentation requirements. The SFAB conducts mission analysis to support a wide variety of SFA tasks including force generation, institutional instruction, or operational assistance. Examples include the development of national-level schools or academies for initial entry Soldiers, professional military education for staff officers, or field expedient tactical training for squads. Chapter 4, section II, describes initial and continuous assessment in more detail.

**Expected Degree of Unit Separation**

3-19. Unit dispersion in theater significantly influences the SFAB mission. Units may consolidate at a single location or spread out across an entire area of operations with advisor teams significantly separated from other U.S. forces. The expected degree to which forces separate affects the risk associated with the mission. Commanders and staffs must consider this separation when determining augmentation and support requirements.

**Personnel Recovery**

3-20. During the site survey, the designated SFAB personnel recovery officer coordinates with the personnel recovery coordination section at the next higher headquarters or the regional security officer of the U.S. Embassy to assess, coordinate, and develop the unit’s personnel recovery plans and procedures. Review and update these plans as necessary prior to each mission. SFAB teams should expect to refine personnel recovery plans at their level to provide bottom-up refinement to the theater personnel recovery plan in geographically dispersed deployments outside of a JOA.

**Advisor Team Task-organization**

3-21. Upon completion of the PDSS, SFAB commanders task-organize advisor teams against the identified requirements. If possible, this should include any external augmentation such as security forces. These task-organized advisor teams conduct the necessary mission-specific training to prepare themselves for the upcoming operation. SFAB commanders and their higher headquarters will determine the deployment certification guidelines for each mission. These will often vary greatly from one region to another. Once certified to deploy, commanders should refrain from breaking up the task-organized advisor team until the mission is complete.
SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT

3-22. When deployed, the SFAB maintains a rear detachment to provide continuity for the unit and to maintain a base of operations for command and control. For each deploying element, the SFABs or their higher headquarters must provide a command and control element to oversee the movement of forces and make coordination with higher echelons and reception organization. Mission variables determine the composition of the command and control element (See TC 3-05.3.)

RECEPTION

3-23. An advance party may deploy to the host nation or partner organization area of operations after the unit completes its mission planning and the commander determines the unit has met all predeployment training requirements. The advance party conducts predeployment activities and coordinates necessary travel documentation and country clearances. The advance party reviews the rules of engagement and any status of forces agreements before deploying. If applicable, the proper staff provides an updated threat briefing to the unit.

3-24. Upon arrival, the advance party processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters and embassy, if required, of its arrival and status. Often the higher headquarters or embassy provides point of contacts to the advance party. These contacts help the advance party obtain the proper identification, documentation, and weapons permits.

3-25. The advance party establishes contact with U.S. and foreign security force commanders and conducts final premission planning activities. The advance party procures secure working, storage, and living areas for the unit. It also coordinates and prepares any initial training sites. The advance party coordinates for special support equipment to unload heavy supplies and transport the supplies and personnel to the training site.

STAGING

3-26. The main body of the SFAB element deploys after completing its planning and the commander determines the main body has met all predeployment training requirements. The unit processes through customs and immediately notifies the higher headquarters of its arrival and status. The unit obtains the proper identification, documentation, and weapons permits as required. Members of the advance party meet the main body on its arrival and brief the main body on any required changes to the operation order.

3-27. The commander or team leader is ultimately accountable for the advisor team’s physical and personal security. The commander or team leader ensures personnel stay with the equipment to guard it. Depending on the threat situation, the commander ensures protective measures are in place to safeguard personnel and equipment.

3-28. The SFAB uses in-theater preparations to finalize critical requirements. From confirming support relationships to establishing personal relationships with the supported higher headquarters, this preparation time is critical for the SFAB and can set the conditions throughout the deployment. Local conditions may require the SFAB to establish command and control, support, and sustainment relationships from outside the area of operations.

ONWARD MOVEMENT

3-29. Upon arrival in the theater of operations, the SFAB may be received by a host-nation greeting party. The greeting party may come from a higher military command, embassy or country team representative, members of the foreign security force, or the local leadership. In most cases, the advance party has established protocol procedures. If greeted by a host-nation greeting party, the SFAB prepares to receive the party in accordance with cultural norms and customs. This could involve ceremonies, exchange of gifts, meals, and commemorations.

3-30. The unit immediately establishes operations security procedures to support its mission execution and establishes the SFAB defense plan. Once protection procedures are in place, the SFAB main body proceeds...
to confirm relationships and mission requirements, adapting the plan as required. SFAB advisor teams then begin movement to their respective locations.

3-31. The unit establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronization. In support of this effort, the unit—

- Identifies the location of the concerned host nation, U.S Government activities, partners, nongovernmental organizations, or other agencies.
- Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.
- Coordinates for interpreter support and linkup.
- Exchanges information or intelligence.
- Confirms or establishes other coordination protocols as necessary.
- Incorporates the newly established or changed procedures into the plans for mission execution.

INTEGRATION

3-32. After receiving a detailed briefing and further guidance from the advance party, unit personnel continue to develop rapport with the foreign security force commander and counterparts. They also assess their working, storage, and living areas for security and verify the location of the training site, communications center, dispensary area, and the foreign security force troop area. With the counterpart commander, the team leader—

- Makes requests for a counterpart linkup.
- Makes initial introductions and begins establishing rapport.
- Briefs the unit’s mission, its capabilities, restrictions, and limitations.
- Begins the assessment process.
- Reviews all unit plans, ensuring tentative plans are completed.
- Recommends a course of action that addresses immediate concerns, achieves the initial training requirements, and provides a path to support SFA goals.
- Informs the higher in-country U.S. commander of any significant changes in the unit’s plan in relation to the foreign security force.

3-33. The advisor team leader or designated individual—

- Supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within the unit and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent units and agencies.
- Monitors the implementation of information collection plans including updating the commander’s priority intelligence requirements, conducting an area assessment, and coordinating for additional intelligence support.
- As required within the guidelines provided by applicable higher authority, establishes liaison with the foreign security force intelligence and security agencies.
- Assesses the intelligence threat and resulting security requirements, which includes coordination with higher headquarters.
- Analyzes the foreign unit’s status to finalize the SFA plan. The plans can include task-organization, staff functions, and other considerations.
- Explains analysis to counterparts and encourages them to participate in analyzing, preparing, and briefing the analysis, if required.
- Prepares and briefs the plans for training, advising, and providing assistance.
- Helps the foreign unit inspect the available facilities to identify deficiencies. If the unit finds deficiencies, prepares courses of action in conjunction with the foreign security force leadership to correct them.
- Supervises the preparation of the facilities with their counterparts and informs U.S. and foreign security force commanders on the status of the facilities.

3-34. The unit establishes security based on present or anticipated threats. Some considerations are improving defensive positions, establishing an internal guard system, communication redundancy, and
dissemination of defensive plans. The unit coordinates defensive measures with its foreign counterparts to develop a mutual defensive plan.

3-35. Advisors discuss security measures with foreign counterparts. Following an analysis of the foreign security forces’ security posture and facilities, the advisors encourage the foreign security force to adopt additional security measures as needed. Advisor teams conduct rehearsals of defensive plans with the foreign security forces. If unable to conduct a rehearsal with its counterparts, the advisors conducts internal rehearsals of their security plans.

MISSION EXECUTION AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES

3-36. As soon as advisor teams have integrated with their foreign counterparts and have clearly established command and support relationships, they immediately begin conducting advisor team activities and refining their initial assessments. These assessments will play an important role in guiding future advisor team planning efforts and missions. Chapter 4 describes the advisor team activities and the assessment process in more detail.

SECTION III – REDEPLOYMENT

3-37. The nature of SFA missions does not provide clearly defined completion points. Historically, the Army and other organizations conduct SFA missions over months and years. Therefore, the SFABs must be prepared to transition, transfer, or terminate their responsibilities. This may include replacing advisor teams from within the organization, transferring responsibility to an external U.S. or allied organization, or transitioning responsibility back to the partner nation. In all cases, take care to ensure a deliberate and thorough transition takes place to maintain gains and provide the best chance of future success for the partner nation and incoming organization.

3-38. Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to home station or a mobilization site. Before redeployment, inventory all supplies and equipment to pass on to a relieving unit or to ship back to home station. Account for all items and ensure the chain of custody for property and equipment is uninterrupted. Unit commanders and staff—

- Prepare a final evaluation report showing their estimate of the foreign unit’s capabilities, which provides an assessment for the relieving U.S. unit and the foreign leadership.
- Discuss the foreign unit’s performance with its commander. The SFAB may submit a copy of the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the next higher foreign security force military commander.
- Provide training schedules, lesson plans, foreign operational records, and the foreign unit’s final evaluation to the foreign unit and, if required, the relieving U.S. unit.
- Present debriefings, after action reviews (AARs), and foreign unit final evaluations to the higher in-country U.S. commander and country team as required.

3-39. The unit foreign disclosure officer ensures commanders, staffs, and advisors understood disclosure requirements by country, category, and classification level and that the authorities and procedures are in place to facilitate this process.

TRANSFER TO FOLLOW-ON FORCES

3-40. A relief in place is an operation directed by higher headquarters in which an incoming unit replaces all or part of another unit and its mission. The authority for determining mission handoff lies with incoming commanders since they assume responsibility for the mission. SFAB units may conduct relief in place with other SFABs, other U.S. military forces, joint military forces, or they may not be relieved at all.

3-41. Commanders of SFAB units may elect to replace teams, elements, or subordinate units for a variety of reasons to provide continuous Army support to SFA. Changes in the host-nation operational variables may require reshaping force packages as situations or operations change. SFA missions occur across the range of military operations and the spectrum of violence. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units. For example, an incoming unit may field new
equipment that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of the reason, mission handoff is necessary and defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

3-42. A relief in place may affect the conditions under which the mission continues. In SFA, this may not entail an in-country relief or transfer of authority. While executing the SFA mission, advisor teams are encouraged to record all relevant information and share it with incoming units. This historical record should serve as part of an initial briefing to incoming units. Disseminate this information through virtual meetings, video teleconferences, or preferably face-to-face commander and staff meetings between transitioning teams or units assisting with achieving continuity of operations. Ideally, execute these briefings in conjunction with the foreign security forces. When it is not possible to do a direct transition to a relieving unit, lessons learned and post-mission debriefings provide a historical record that assists in bridging the gap between activities and operations. These assessments, training plans, briefings, and other relevant topics assist the incoming unit with assuming SFA activities. Units review previous post-mission debriefings prior to conducting their PDSS.

3-43. The relieved unit takes the following actions when planning for a relief in place:
   - Issue an operations order.
   - Maximize operations security to prevent the enemy from detecting the relief operation.
   - Plan for systematic relief of subordinate units to prevent gaps in capability.
   - Plan for transfer of excess ammunition, supplies, petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and other materiel of tactical value to the incoming unit.
   - Provide training on specialized equipment or techniques applicable to the operational environment.
   - Control movement by reconnoitering, designating, marking routes, and providing guides to the relieving unit.

3-44. The incoming and outgoing commanders exchange information regarding the following:
   - Current situational assessments of the outgoing unit.
   - Enemy situation.
   - Outgoing unit’s tactical plan including graphics, fires plans, air-space control, and inter- and intra-theater medical evacuation procedures.
   - Fire support coordination, including indirect fire plans and the time of relief for supporting artillery and mortar units.
   - Number and types of partnerships with foreign security forces.
   - Foreign security force capabilities and limitations.
   - Time, sequence, and method of relief.
   - Location and disposition of obstacles and the time when the commanders transfer responsibility.
   - Transfer of supplies and equipment.
   - Movement control, route priority, and placement of guides.
   - Command and signal information.
   - Maintenance and logistical support processes for disabled vehicles.
   - Identified capability gaps and recommendations to fill those gaps.

3-45. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander, directly or through a liaison, of the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission. When issues arise during a relief in place, and they cannot be resolved between incoming and outgoing commanders, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

3-46. If the incoming unit or the foreign security force is unavailable during the handoff, the advisor team leader or outgoing unit notifies the higher headquarters ordering the exchange. If incoming unit commanders have not assumed responsibility, their unit immediately comes under operational control of the outgoing unit. Outgoing unit commanders and their foreign security force counterpart control the operation. If the outgoing unit commander has passed responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the operational control of the incoming unit, and the foreign security force coordinates its operations with the
new unit. Other unified action partners assigned in support of the units conducting the transfer may need to follow these same procedures to prevent a gap in capabilities.

**TRANSITION OF ACTIVITIES**

3-47. The transition of all activities to the foreign security forces occurs incrementally at multiple echelons over time. Success is defined by fulfillment of the mutually agreed upon objectives of the United States and partner nation. In cases where SFAB activities represent contributions to building a sovereign partner nation’s existing capacity, transition may occur at the SFAB completion of a specified, relatively short program of instruction to the foreign security force. When stabilizing or rebuilding societies post-conflict, SFAB transition may be only one small part of a lengthy, large-scale stability campaign. The intent of security cooperation is to change the security environment by enabling the host nation to provide its own internal defense and development. This leads to strengthening regional security through mutual defense in conjunction with U.S. priorities established in the mission performance plan.

**TERMINATION OF ACTIVITIES**

3-48. Complete termination of SFA activities is rare. When it does occur, it is usually at the end of a drawn out transition process between the U.S. Government and the partner nation. In exceptional cases, termination of SFA activities may happen quickly.

**CUSTOMARY FAREWELLS**

3-49. Upon departure, the host nation representatives may bid farewell to the SFAB. Representatives may come from a higher military command, the embassy or country team, members of the foreign security force, local leadership, and other dignitaries. The SFAB prepares to receive the party and acts in accordance with cultural norms and customs. This could involve ceremonies, exchange of gifts, meals, and commemorations.

*Note.* Submit any gift exchanges for legal review.

**POST-EXECUTION EVALUATION ACTIVITIES**

3-50. SFAB commanders conduct post-deployment debriefs to provide an overview and analysis of the mission and outcomes. Communicate the information at the appropriate levels of clearance with respect to the audience. The brief includes an overview of operational and mission variables, MOPs, MOEs, and an assessment of the tasks the SFAB performed.

3-51. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. The unit undergoes extensive debriefing. The debriefing may occur prior to redeployment or once back at home station. The S-2 typically coordinates with higher echelon intelligence organizations to conduct the returning unit’s debriefing. All deployed personnel, to include attachments, should be available for the debriefing. The Defense Strategic Debriefing Course provides the training to conduct these debriefings.

**POST-MISSION DOCUMENTATION**

3-52. After the debriefing, SFAB commanders and staff prepare three documents: an AAR, a report of lessons learned, and an assessment. The documentation must describe tasks, missions, operations, and capabilities of both the SFAB units and the foreign security forces. This information provides valuable historical information to units deploying to the same region, higher headquarters, the partner nation, and other SFA organizations. Post-mission documentation provides consistency during intermittent operations.

**AFTER ACTION REVIEW AND LESSONS LEARNED**

3-53. Lessons learned validate knowledge and experience derived from observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations. Lessons learned, when further validated, eventually lead to a change in behavior at the tactical level (such as tactics, techniques, and procedures), the operational
level, the strategic level, and in one or more of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) domains. Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the unit submits a report of lessons learned. The report documents the commander and staff’s reflections of the operation and recommendations for the future. Units often prepare the lessons according to the elements of combat power: command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, leadership, and information. This method addresses what did and did not work during the operation and why and recommends changes or substitutions for tactics, techniques, and procedures in the foreign security force.

**SUBMISSION AND ARCHIVING**

3-54. Submit all the post-mission documentation to the office of the SFAB’s Army Capabilities Manager for archiving and further dissemination.

3-55. Per AR 11-33, the SFAB will also submit AARs to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (Combined Arms Center) no later than 90 days after returning to home station after participating in a major Army, joint, or joint combined (multinational) exercise training or security cooperation mission. Units completing combat training center rotations may submit a copy of the relevant portions of their take-home package.
Chapter 4
Advisor Team Employment and Activities

This chapter describes advisor team employment planning considerations and advisor team activities.

SECTION I – ADVISOR TEAM EMPLOYMENT

4-1. The ability to task-organize and employ advisors in a variety of ways and across a wide range of environments is the SFAB’s greatest capability. This section describes additional employment considerations for commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders when planning for operations.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-2. Commanders and staffs must deliberately consider and plan against the operational considerations listed below. These factors will often determine the right and left limits within which advisor teams must operate.

DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS

4-3. The SFAB can expect missions that require the entire brigade deploying to a single country, subordinate battalions to a specific region, or multiple advisor teams across multiple countries. The requests generated from the embassy or the combatant command determines the requirements. Established communication networks, coordination procedures, and reporting structures assist in mitigating the communication challenges associated with decentralized operations. Decentralized forces require additional sustainment support.

PROXIMITY AND FREQUENCY

4-4. The proximity of advisors to the foreign security force is an important planning factor. The SFAB’s mission, authorities, rules of engagement, status of forces agreements, risk assessments and other factors determine how closely the advisor teams work with their counterparts. These factors will determine the initial advising proximity and frequency. This will be adjusted as advisor teams complete their initial assessment and again as they continue monitoring activities over time. Frequent contact generally correlates to trust between the two forces. The relationship can span from advisors living with their counterparts, periodic visits in preparation for specific events or operations, or even advising through video teleconferences.

4-5. The three levels of advising, which describe the frequency advisor teams interact with their foreign security force counterparts, are defined below:

- **Level 1 Advising.** Advisor teams develop their counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity.
- **Level 2 Advising.** Advisor teams work with their counterparts on an episodic, or less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and capability of, the designated counterpart, threat level to advisors, authorities, and resources available.
- **Level 3 Advising.** Advisors provide advice from a centralized location (such as at a regional training center or school), during a battlefield circulation, or a staff assistance visit.
CONFLICT INTENSITY

4-6. Conflict intensity plays an important role in determining the placement and access of SFAB units alongside the foreign security forces. In a less permissive environment, the SFAB is able to disperse advising teams across a larger geographic area.

4-7. In a more hostile or uncertain environment, the SFAB may experience limited operational access associated with higher risk and increased threat. The rules of engagement and the status of forces agreement with the host nation guides the SFAB operations under various conflict intensities, which are further refined by higher headquarters.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

4-8. The SFAB higher headquarters will develop and disseminate rules of engagement. When necessary, SFAB commanders and staffs request modifications to the rules of engagement through the appropriate channels. SFAB leaders must ensure advisor teams understand how the rules of engagement affect the type of support they can provide to their counterparts. Further, advisors must communicate these limitations to the foreign security forces to manage expectations and maintain credibility. SFAB members must also understand the application of self-defense and collective self-defense as it applies to their counterparts. Finally, the SFAB members must understand the variations and caveats to the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement that the foreign security forces operate under.

4-9. Higher echelons of the foreign security force typically develop their rules of engagement. SFAB members train and advise their counterparts to follow the tenants of the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement. Report violations through higher headquarters in accordance with established SOPs.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-10. SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisors must adhere to or consider a number of legal agreements. These may include status of forces agreements, rules of land warfare, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, host nation laws, and other forms of legal authority under which the SFAB is operating. Additionally, advisors act in an ethical manner at all times as representatives of the U.S. Government. When questions of legal authority, obligation, or ethical conflicts arise, advisors contact their designated judge advocate for further guidance.

ORGANIZATIONAL REPORTING STRUCTURE

4-11. The SFAB employs advisor teams in a variety of configurations based on assigned tasks and operational and mission variables. Each of the following configurations provides benefits and drawbacks. The three organizational reporting structures listed below are how the advisor teams within the SFAB generally communicate:

- Horizontal.
- Vertical.
- Mixed.

4-12. These reporting structures describe how the SFAB commanders and staffs manage advisor teams conducting SFA. This includes coordinating themes and messages, coordinating information among the echelon of advisors, gathering and archiving assessments, resolving conflicts between advisor teams and supporting elements or the foreign security forces, and other functions directly related to the success of the SFA mission. They do not describe the various command and support relationships that may be in place.

4-13. Organizational reporting structures apply to the SFAB advisor teams regardless of how many teams are employed. Well-established organizational reporting structures depict how each advisor team communicates with other SFAB units and organizations in theater. This should include guidance on what reports, requests, and other information SFAB elements share between each organization. For example, an advisor team operating in a non-JOA environment may receive its missions through the country team, submit administrative reports through its organic higher headquarters, and request contract support through the
supporting ASCC. All of these considerations must be established and clearly articulated to each advisor team and its supporting organizations.

4-14. Take care when establishing reporting structures to provide maximum decision making authority at the advisor team level. An overly complex process or onerous requirements may risk the credibility of the advisor and slow the decision making process.

HORIZONTAL

4-15. The horizontal reporting structure is the most challenging arrangement to exercise command and control of the SFA mission. Use this reporting structure when employing large number of advisor teams. Disperse company, battalion, and brigade leadership throughout the one or multiple areas of operations. This limits personnel at the command post to receive and disseminate reports, manage current operations, plan for future operations, and to battle track SFA operations.

4-16. When using the horizontal reporting structure, subordinate elements report SFA-related information directly to their battalion main command post. The battalion main command posts serve as the first echelon to receive SFA-related reports directly from advisor teams. For example, if a single Infantry battalion has 13 advisor teams dispersed across an area of operations, the battalion main command post becomes the command and control node where all advisor teams send their SFA mission-related reports.

4-17. The horizontal reporting structure allows the SFAB to apply maximum influence through their approximately 54 advisor teams when operating in one or multiple areas of operations. However, since many of the advisor teams consist of key SFAB leaders, the command post assumes a greater responsibility for receiving reports than the other reporting structures. Additionally, the command post must remain capable of conducting planning for current and future SFA operations, controlling information collection activities, and assisting with emergencies as required.

VERTICAL

4-18. Vertical reporting structures provide the most traditional flow of information and reporting. When using this structure, the SFAB operates command posts in every company and higher organization. Use this structure when the SFAB is less concerned with employing the maximum number of advisor teams and is more concerned with maintaining command and control of its SFA mission. Vertical reporting structures are particularly effective when synchronized by echelon with the foreign security force advisor team template.

4-19. When using this reporting structure, no more than one brigade or battalion-level advisor team is away from the command post at any given time. This allows senior leadership to be present for issuing guidance for current or future operations as required. At the company level, the advisor teams cannot conduct advising operations and maintain a command post without additional augmentation. However, units may organize individual members of the company advisor teams with subordinate advisor teams to provide limited duration technical support.

MIXED

4-20. The mixed structure is a combination of both the vertical and horizontal structures and is used within the same SFAB, at either the battalion or brigade level. For example, one Infantry battalion could establish a horizontal structure with all 13 of its advisor teams reporting to the battalion command post. Another battalion could establish a vertical reporting structure that limits the number of advisor teams to approximately 10 within its area of operations.

4-21. In another scenario, the Infantry battalion designates one company to establish a command post. The other two companies do not operate a command post and instead form maneuver advisor teams. In this case, the Infantry battalion may have nine advisor teams reporting directly to the battalion command post while the remaining three report through their company command posts to battalion. There are situations that may result in advisor teams, within subordinate battalions, reporting directly to the brigade command post due to location, priority of effort, available resources, assets, and other considerations. These situations fall under the mixed reporting structure. Figure 4-1, page 4-4, shows an example of a mixed brigade reporting structure along with vertical, horizontal, and mixed battalion reporting structures.
ADVISOR TEAM ORGANIZATION

4-22. When working alongside foreign security forces, the SFAB may array advisors in a variety of ways. Advisors generally find themselves working with tactical foreign security force commanders and staffs, providing guidance and assistance during planning and operations. However, there are cases when other relationships may be appropriate, to include augmentation and sometimes partnership arrangements. This section describes these relationships.

4-23. After identifying initial SFA requirements, commanders and staffs assign advising teams against those requirements. Augment advisor teams with the necessary personnel to complete the assigned mission. Typically, this includes personnel with technical knowledge, such as signal, logistics, maintenance, and other functions. Along with the required security elements, advising teams coordinate with their assigned counterparts to begin SFA operations. As the mission persists, the advisor force package will likely change as the advising team refines the foreign security force requirements.

4-24. Advising teams maintain continuity with their counterparts during planning and mission preparation. As elements of the foreign security force become more capable, the advisor relationship will shift from training and coaching to observing and advising. The advisor may assist in coordinating resources and assets, as well as oversee some processes, such as close air support, joint fires, medical evacuation, EOD, employment of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and engagements with other unified action partners. These outside enablers may provide capabilities not present in the foreign security force.

4-25. SFAB units may not align with the task-organization of their counterpart foreign security force. Perhaps the counterparts do not have an engineer battalion or field artillery battalion. These battalions and their advisor teams can be task-organized and used to address other areas of concern. For example, if a counterpart force has no engineer capability, the SFAB’s engineer battalion could focus on advising brigade staff, which frees another battalion to focus exclusively on the battalion level and below. In another case, if one region or sector is permissive and the counterpart foreign security force is highly competent, the commander may decide to task-organize a smaller advisor force for this area while creating a more robust capability in another sector.

Figure 4-1. Organizational reporting structure
ADVISING COMMANDERS

4-26. When advising foreign commanders, advisors must stay slightly ahead of the foreign security force and communicate information and guidance within their advisor team prior to the foreign security force commander giving guidance to their subordinate units. This allows advisors to communicate a consistent message with their foreign partners. By accompanying the foreign commander during the receipt of mission from their higher headquarters, the team leader can provide necessary guidance needed to plan and prepare for potential missions. Team leaders provide counsel and guidance to the foreign commander in regards to planning for the mission. The advisor monitors how the subordinate foreign security forces comprehend their commander's intent and all specified or implied tasks. Team leaders continuously compare the information that they receive through their higher headquarters versus what their foreign counterparts receive through their chains of command. This continuous comparison allows that team leaders and their counterpart to operate with a shared understanding and resolve potential issues before they become serious issues.

ADVISING STAFF

4-27. Staff advisors assist the foreign security force with developing operational plans, managing current operations, and integrating warfighting functions. Organize staff advisors across warfighting functions and augment with specialty advisors as necessary based on assessments of counterpart foreign security forces and their requirements. Prior to assigning advisors against staff advising requirements, ensure those personnel have the appropriate experience and training to provide value to the foreign security forces and their mission. This can be challenging, even when advising only one echelon higher. (See FM 6-0 for more information on the MDMP and individual duties and responsibilities.) Figure 4-2 shows an example of how advisor team leaders may array their advisor team to fulfill typical staff roles for internal planning or operating alongside a foreign security force staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisor Position</th>
<th>Warfighting Function</th>
<th>Typical Staff Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team NCOIC</td>
<td>Movement and Maneuver</td>
<td>S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Advisor, Operations</td>
<td>Movement and Maneuver</td>
<td>Assistant S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Advisor, Support</td>
<td>Movement and Maneuver</td>
<td>Assistant S-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fires Advisor</td>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>Fires Support Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Hazard / Engineer Advisor</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Engineer Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Operations / Military Police Advisor</td>
<td>Sustainment and Protection</td>
<td>S-1/Provost Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Advisor</td>
<td>Sustainment and Protection</td>
<td>Medical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Advisor</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>S-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Advisor</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>S-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Advisor</td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>Assistant S-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Advisor</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>S-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-2. Advisor team staff roles, example

4-28. While aligning a specific advisor position against a particular warfighting function or staff section can be effective, advisors should ensure that they maintain awareness of the whole operation and have understanding of the interaction of the warfighting functions and staff sections.

ADVISING COMPANIES

4-29. Advisors sent to elements below battalion level help their foreign security force counterparts analyze the mission and commander’s intent from higher headquarters. They assist the foreign security force in
executing troop leading procedures and similar processes. In addition, advisors assist their counterparts to analyze the mission variables. From these variables, advisors help their foreign counterparts develop a course of action that meets the higher headquarters’ concept of operations and commander’s intent. The advisors report assessments to their higher headquarters. Through their understanding of the broader plan, they identify discrepancies between the lower and higher echelons and resolve issues through coaching their counterparts. Finally, advisors provide guidance and assistance during the conduct of operations.

**ADVISOR TEAM PLANNING MODELS**

4-30. Through the planning process, advisor teams have an obligation to help the foreign security force achieve their objectives in support of U.S. national interests. To do this, the advisor team must understand the U.S. rules of engagement, higher headquarters and national caveats, and the relevant foreign security force authorities. Within this context, advisor teams must develop their foreign counterparts and ensure their long-term success using local, feasible, and sustainable solutions.

4-31. Different sources generate advisor team missions. Advising teams receive some missions through operational or tactical control command relationships. At other times, adjacent units, the foreign security force partner, or the advising team themselves generate missions. Regardless of the origin, the planning process must account for the higher headquarters with tasking authority, the foreign security force, and the advisor team capabilities. All planning steps require a continuous assessment and communication with the foreign security force and higher headquarters.

4-32. Advisor teams must follow orders received from their higher headquarters. When an advisor team receives an order from their higher headquarters, a variation of the following steps occur:

- Higher headquarters issues an order.
- Advisor team receives the mission and begins mission analysis.
- Advisor team develops an initial course of action and nests the plan with the higher headquarters’ mission intent, national objectives, and foreign security force objectives.
- Advisor team executes a course of action analysis and comparison with the foreign security force and communicates the results back to orders issuing authority. Include any foreign security force constraints.
- Higher headquarters issues a fragmentary order or new operation order upon the advisor team receiving course of action approval.
- Advisor team and the foreign security force execute orders production.
- Assessment continues.

4-33. When a foreign security force plans a mission, advisor teams request permission from their higher headquarters to support their foreign counterparts. While the foreign security force does not control the advisor team, the advisors want to support their partners whenever possible. When planning a mission that is initially generated from the partnered foreign security force, the advisor team generally follows these steps:

- Foreign security force issues a plan (advisor team receipt of potential mission).
- Advisor team continues to conduct advisor team activities with their foreign security force partners and assists with their planning process. In parallel, the advisor team requests permission from higher headquarters to participate in the mission and requests resources (mission analysis).
- The advisor team supports the foreign security force course of action development, analysis, comparison, approval, and orders production. During this step, advisor teams also reach back to their higher headquarters for any adjustments to their orders and guidance.
- At a minimum, advisor teams battle track the foreign security force, maintain a common operational picture, communicate to their higher headquarters, and continue to request resources in support of the foreign security force mission.
- Upon mission completion, advisor teams update their foreign security force assessments. In addition, the advisor team recommends follow-on missions, training plan adjustments, and refines support requirements.

4-34. When advisor teams generate a plan at their level, that plan is constrained by both the support of the foreign security force and the higher headquarters. These plans are more difficult to receive concurrence
since they require both the foreign counterpart’s and the advisor team’s higher headquarters approval. However, they are the most useful since these plans are in direct response to identified gaps within the foreign security force. When generating a plan at their level, advisor teams follow a variation of the following steps:

- While conducting advisor team activities, the advisor team identifies a capability gap within the foreign security force.
- The advisor team develops an initial plan to help the foreign security force correct the capability gap (advisor team receipt of potential mission).
- Advisor teams guide the foreign security force to use their doctrine and resources to fill that gap. If the gap is due to a lack of doctrine or resources, the advisor team request support from the appropriate headquarters (mission analysis).
- Before giving U.S. doctrine or additional resources to the foreign security force, the advisor team conducts a full DOTMLPF-P review and assessment to validate the requirements (course of action development, analysis, and comparison).
- Upon completion of the DOTMLPF-P review, the advisor team will develop and communicate a suitable, feasible, distinguishable, and complete plan between the higher headquarters and foreign security force to fill the capability gap (course of action approval).
- Advisor teams then work with their higher headquarters and the foreign security force during orders production and execution.

4-35. Risk management has a pronounced role when planning advisor team missions. Due to the nature of these missions, deliberate thought and planning must take place to ensure advisor teams and their higher headquarters have implemented the appropriate contingency plans and risk mitigation steps.

PARALLEL PLANNING WITH FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

4-36. The specifics of the SFAB’s mission determine the character of its parallel planning relationship with the foreign security force. When planning with a foreign security force, the SFAB commander and staff will provide advice and guidance to their counterparts. To do this effectively, advisors must understand the vision and goals of their higher headquarters. While advisors operate in an environment with unique variables, understanding the broad context of their SFA mission allows them to provide advice and guidance to the foreign security force that is consistent with U.S. goals and objectives.

4-37. When planning with a foreign security force, advisors must understand their counterpart’s priorities and end state, higher headquarters’ goals and objectives, and other operational variables. SFAB commanders and staffs must then understand, visualize, and describe their desired goals, objectives, and an end state in relation to their foreign counterparts. Provide this information to subordinate advisors to provide them the necessary context for planning with their counterparts in support of a common vision.

4-38. When advising foreign security forces, SFAB commanders and staffs will conduct parallel planning at all appropriate echelons as dictated by the mission. The SFABs must develop their own internal advising plans while being prepared to coach their counterparts through operations and staff processes.

4-39. Staff sections conduct continuous mission analysis. They analyze the SFA goals against their task-organization, authorities, limitations, and potential problems. Staffs use warfighting functions as a guide to organize this analysis. In some cases, the nature of SFA may require a different model to analyze operations. Staffs may determine they cannot accomplish the mission through cross-leveling resources or task-organization and require augmentation. The command submits a request for forces to its higher headquarters as necessary. Chapter 5 describes augmentation considerations in more detail.

4-40. At a minimum, staffs and advisors should always conduct an abbreviated mission analysis prior to mission planning with the foreign security forces. Mission analysis by the SFAB organizations—

- Gives time to do prior coordination to avoid potential conflicts between the foreign security forces and other unified action partners.
- Provides updated SFA themes and guidance to the advisor team.
• Provides the advisor team time to develop effective teaching and mentoring tools to foster counterpart understanding of the operation.
• Allows advisors to stay with their counterpart throughout the MDMP or troop leading procedures. This requires preplanning and coordination between the advisor team and the foreign counterpart unit.

4-41. SFAB priorities may differ from the foreign security force. Within the boundaries established by the SFAB’s higher headquarters, operational plans should be responsive to the priorities of the foreign security forces and coordinated with other unified action partners through reporting and liaisons. Advisors coach their counterparts to account for other organizations in the area of operations and their priorities as well. Some aspects of planning include—

• Selecting the application of combat power to minimize population casualties.
• Coordinating regional and provisional plans. Disseminating this information to subordinate units.
• Providing time for subordinates to plan and prepare for operations.
• Developing estimates of the situation.
• Coordinating plans with other advisors in the area of operations, to include those outside of the SFAB.

4-42. The outcome of advisors planning with the foreign security force counterparts should be a plan or an order that—

• Fosters mission command through a clear commander’s intent.
• Assigns tasks and purposes to subordinates.
• Contains the coordinating measures necessary to synchronize the operation.
• Allocates or reallocates resources.
• Directs preparation activities and establishes times or conditions for execution.

4-43. The principles of mission command enable commanders to provide broad guidance to their subordinate elements and facilitate disciplined initiative. Building an environment of trust, communication, and initiative among subordinate commanders, staffs, and advisors will facilitate mission command and lead to successful deployment operations, as discussed in the next chapter.

SECTION II – ADVISOR TEAM ACTIVITIES

4-44. Advisor team activities include assess, advise, support, and liaise with foreign security forces and other unified action partners in operational environments spanning the competition continuum. Whether building foreign partner capacity to deter conflict or fighting alongside our counterparts in large-scale combat operations, SFAB advisor teams play an important role in supporting U.S. objectives.

4-45. Advisor teams conduct these activities in support of the SFA tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise and assist, and assess in conjunction with the foreign security force. Each of these advisor team activities applies to each SFA task. For example, when given the SFA task to train a foreign security force, an advisor team will conduct operational assessments, advise the foreign commanders and staffs as they are building their training plan, support the foreign training plan with the appropriate resources, and liaise as necessary with external organizations and higher headquarters. Figure 4-3 shows the relationship between SFA functions, SFA tasks, advisor team activities, and the resources available for the mission. An advisor team’s mission statement should include one of the SFA tasks, the same way the terms “movement to contact,” “ambush,” and “raid” may be used when giving a mission to an Infantry platoon.
Figure 4-3. Security force assistance tasks and advisor team activities

**ASSESS**

4-46. Assess refers to all activities for determining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective using MOEs and MOPs to evaluate foreign security force capability. Once an objective is achieved, the focus should shift to sustaining it. (See FM 3-22.) Assess is both an SFA task and an advisor team activity.

4-47. Assessment is an important and continuous activity for all advisor teams. Advisor teams assess foreign security forces by evaluating, monitoring, and reporting on their foreign counterpart’s activities. Assessments provide information that allows commanders and staffs to properly task-organize advisor teams and weigh efforts to complete the assigned SFA mission. Regardless of the SFA function or task, advisor teams conduct assessments in support of their operations. These assessments form the foundation for the other advisor team activities. They also provide insight for their higher headquarters and external organizations.

**INITIAL ASSESSMENT**

4-48. The SFAB continues the assessment of the theater planners by elaborating on the initial findings and continuing the work of a previous partnered force. The assessments are a part of a continuous process that incorporates input from the higher command, previous partnered forces, subordinate component commands, appropriate country teams, agencies outside the DOD, and post-mission reports from previous U.S. military operations and training missions. (See FM 3-22.)

4-49. Assessments require a command-wide effort, with the commander’s support and leadership being critical for success. Advisors must be the subject matter experts or have input from the appropriate subject matter experts from across the entire staff. For SFA missions, assessments may require close collaboration.

---

**Legend**

- SFA: Security force assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SFA Functions</th>
<th>SFA Tasks</th>
<th>Advisor Team Activities</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Generating and Executive Functions | - Organize  
  - Doctrine  
  - Organization  
  - Personnel  
  - Policy  
- Train  
  - Train  
  - Leadership  
- Equip  
  - Materiel  
  - Equipment  
- Rebuild / Build  
  - Facilities | - Assess  
  - Organizational  
  - Operational  
  - Environmental  
  - Institutional  
- Advise  
  - Coach  
  - Teach  
  - Mentor | - Support  
  - Tactical Lethal  
  - Support  
- Liaise  
  - Multinational  
  - Interoperability | - Advisor Teams  
- Warfighting Functions  
- Funding  
- Authorities  
- Unit Partnerships  
- Joint Exercises |

| Operational Functions | Advise and Assist  
  - Operations | Liaise  
  - Multinational  
  - Interoperability |
with members from various U.S. country teams within embassies, other U.S. stakeholders at the combatant commands and other Army commands, and possibly the partner nation government and other multinational partners.

4-50. Integrate assessments into planning and execution of SFA. While planning is top-down, assessments are conducted bottom-up (see figure 4-4). SFAB staff planners and the advisor teams conducting the SFA mission must work together to ensure that they task and properly develop appropriate MOEs, MOPs, and indicators. Executing these tasks creates effects that achieve objectives to attain end states. Without the proper MOEs, MOPs, and indicators, commanders have difficulty determining if the tasks accomplished their intended purpose.

4-51. SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor teams ensure assessments have both quantitative (numerical) and qualitative (narrative) metrics. Conducting assessments is both an art and science. Advisors must examine the operational environment through multiple perspectives and solicit quantitative and qualitative input from a wide assortment of information and people.

**Figure 4-4. Assessment interaction**

**PLANNING FOR ASSESSMENT**

4-52. An assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessments evaluate and measure the progress of SFA tasks toward a strategic end state. Assessments inform and assist commanders to make appropriate decisions pertaining to plans, resources, and execution. More specifically, assessments—

- Allow commanders to gain situational understanding of the operational environment.
- Outline how conditions have changed over a defined period.
- Are used by commanders and staffs to determine objectives and requirements for mitigating and managing risk.
- Assist commanders in determining progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.

4-53. Some general assessment considerations include—
- Determining what is the appropriate balance of qualitative and quantitative assessments within the campaign plans and country plans. At the strategic and operational levels, assessments typically become more qualitative, and availability of hard data may drive the balance of quantitative assessments.
- Understanding how the specific SFA assessment nests with the theater campaign or country plan assessments helps to leverage and integrate government assessment efforts and to drive the demand for additional missions to support those plans.
- Understanding the balance between the assessments of task achievements (inputs), progress toward intermediate military objectives (outputs), and progress toward theater strategic end states (outcomes).
- Determining the best way to leverage or shape subordinate elements and external stakeholders to inform a holistic assessment. Some methods of achieving this are—
  - Involving commanders in the assessment process to include assessment requirements in plans and orders.
  - Explaining the importance of assessments.
  - Involving everyone in the assessment process and findings.

4-54. While conducting assessments, advisor responsibilities include—
- Provide candid, objective reports, direct observations, and assessments to commanders.
- Clearly distinguish between reports, direct observations, and assessments.
- Avoid bias and pessimism.
- Avoid embellishment, undue optimism, and equivocation.
- Protect sensitive and confidential foreign security force information and sources.
- Consider the source of information.
- Maintain a healthy skepticism of foreign security force information and intent.
- Continue to demonstrate prudent initiative in the face of adversity or uncertainty; avoid intellectual paralysis or apathy.

4-55. When receiving assessments, the higher headquarters should—
- Respect the difference between reports, direct observations, and assessments.
- Acknowledge natural blind spots in advisor awareness.
- Conservatively manage expectations.
- Be patient in pursuit of SFA objectives.
- Avoid creating advisor dilemmas.
- Faithfully relay advisor reports, direct observations, and assessments; reengage advisors to clarify or update reports as needed.
- Protect sensitive foreign information and sources.
- Consider the source of information.
- Maintain healthy skepticism of foreign security forces information and their intent.

4-56. In addition to the considerations listed above, staff must remember that assessments serve the commander. Commanders must ultimately provide guidance and provide buy-in to the methodology. Proper assessment training across all staff elements, extensive time and effort, and rigorous investment in assessment resources are crucial to ensure success.
ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

4-57. The situation and type of operations affect the characteristics of assessment. During large-scale combat, assessment tends to be rapid, focused on the level of destruction of enemy units, terrain gained or lost, objectives secured, and the status of the friendly force to include sustainment. In other situations, such as counterinsurgency, assessment is less tangible. Assessing the level of security in an area or the level of the population’s support for the government is challenging. Identifying what and how to assess requires significant effort from the commander and staff.

4-58. Whether conducting large-scale combat operations or stability operations, the process of continuous assessment consists of the following activities—

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, identifying problems, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.

Note: See ADP 5-0 and JP 5-0 for more detailed information on the assessment activities of monitor, evaluate, and recommend or direct action.

Monitoring

4-59. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commanders cannot judge progress nor make effective decisions without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

4-60. Staffs and advisor teams monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. Staffs and advisor teams also identify information sources outside military channels and monitor their reports. These other channels might include products from civilian, host-nation, and other government agencies. Apply information management and knowledge management to facilitate disseminating this information to the right people at the right time.

4-61. Record relevant information in running estimates. Staff sections and advisor teams maintain a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if operations are proceeding according to the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections and advisor teams use this new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.

Evaluating

4-62. Advisor teams and staffs analyze relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate an operation’s progress. Evaluating is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders and advisor teams determine what is working and what is not working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

4-63. An indicator is, in the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness (JP 5-0). Indicators should be—

- Relevant—bear a direct relationship to a task, effect, object, or end state condition.
- Observable—collectable so that changes can be detected and measured or evaluated.
- Responsive—signify changes in the operational environment in time to enable effective decision-making.
- Resourced—collection assets and staff resources are identified to observe and evaluate.

4-64. The two types of indicators commonly used in assessment include MOPs and MOEs. A measure of performance is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.
MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?”

At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to track task completion. The status of those tasks and subtasks are MOPs. Similarly, operations consist of a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Staffs and advisor teams use MOPs in execution matrixes, checklists, and running estimates to track completed tasks during current operations. Staffs and advisor teams use MOPs as a primary element of battle tracking with a focus on the foreign security force. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer.

A measure of effectiveness is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?” MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans.

Evaluations include analyzing progress. Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. In particular, they address the question of whether or not changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly security force actions. Commanders, staffs, and advisor teams consult subject matter experts, both internal and external to the organization, on whether they have correctly identified the underlying causes for specific changes in the situation. These experts challenge key facts and assumptions identified in the planning process to determine if the facts and assumptions are still relevant or valid.

Evaluating also includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, are no longer achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. Staffs and advisor teams continually challenge the key assumptions made when framing the problem. When an assumption is invalidated, then reframing may be in order.

Recommending or Directing Action

Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may reveal problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander or foreign security force is limited. Ideally, recommendations highlight ways to improve the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions.

Based on the evaluation, the staff and advisor teams brainstorm possible improvements to the plan and make preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those changes. Staff and advisor team members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the commander or foreign security force or make adjustments within their delegated authority. Recommendations range from continuing the operation as planned, to executing a branch, or to making unanticipated adjustments. Integrate recommendations from the staff, advisor teams, and the foreign security forces. Using those recommendations, decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the mission.

Assessment helps identify threats, suggests improvements to effectiveness, and reveals opportunities. The staff and advisor teams present the results and conclusions of their assessments and recommendations to the commander as an operation develops. Just as the staff and advisor teams devote time to analysis and evaluation, so too must they make timely, complete, and actionable recommendations.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

The assessment process must start with an understanding of the operational environment. Specifically, the theater campaign plan and the theater security cooperation plan. The process must encourage unity of effort among unified action partners, guide the efficient use of resources, and anticipate potential counterpart needs. The desired end state accounts for the goals and priorities of the U.S. Government, the foreign security forces, the host nation, and other regional factors and concerns. (See ATP 3-07.10.) Use the assessment steps and framework described below as a guide (see figure 4-5, page 4-14).
Figure 4-5. Assessment framework
Step 1: Assess Objectives and End States

4-73. Assessment begins once the SFAB receives the mission. Specifically, it is necessary to assess objectives, end states, and the need for the effort. The SFAB advisor teams must remain engaged with the SFAB battalion staffs who interact with brigade planners to ensure that objectives, effects, and activities are measurable as a means of evaluating initial resource allocation. Once the SFAB establishes measurable objectives and associated effects, the MOE and MOP development begins.

Step 2: Identify Variables of Interests

4-74. The next step in this objective-led process is to identify variables of interest, which in the case of the SFA operational environment are usually political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time-based metrics. Other frameworks may be useful as well, to include the warfighting functions, DOTMLPF-P, or the mission variables.

4-75. Simply put, this step entails a characterization of the operational environment by teams of planners, operations research analysts, intelligence analysts, and various experts. Resources available (or to be sought out) to accomplish this understanding may include academia, media, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, subject matter experts, social-network sites, and other publicly available information. Step 2 creates the foundation for the baseline assessment. The assessment team identifies relevant assessment products (classified or open-source) that civilian and military organizations produce. With the desired condition established, the assessment teams can generate which metrics to measure to indicate progress towards the planned end state.

Step 3: Data Collection and Examination

4-76. After the assessment team identifies the variables of interest for either the MOP or the MOE, the next step is collecting and examining the data. The assessment team generates a baseline and hypotheses related to the operational environment through careful examination of data. Each variable requires information to populate the data. The team incorporates data collection plans into the operations planning process. This way, data requirements are known prior to the commencement of activity. The plan includes the timing and frequency of data collection, organizations, or personnel responsible for collection, and required special tools, reporting formats, hardware, and software.

Step 4: Develop a Baseline, Hypothesis, and Test

4-77. Step 4 is an assessment of the environmental design and a proposal theory of effort to test that design. The team develops a desired future state to create a baseline model of the operational environment. This desired future state is a baseline reference point for future comparisons. Assess and compare activities, desired effects, and objectives to this baseline. A baseline assessment includes ensuring that stated objectives are clear, understandable, and measurable. A baseline assessment enables the team to assess progression from the baseline to the end state using the stated objectives. A baseline assessment is an opportunity for assessors to apply design theory to the plan by stressing the need for a forward thinking approach to the objectives. Step 4 includes mapping out the design theory (to the best of the assessors’ current abilities) to drive MOP measurement and develop hypotheses as to which MOE these activities influence. Mapping the nonlinear design of the environment and potential effects of activities allows for anticipation of the possibility of the team performing activities well, but not having the desired outcome.

Step 5: Analysis and Assessment

4-78. The analysis and assessment step emphasizes the all-important evaluation of the MOE and MOP relationship analysis. Armed with sufficient data, observations, and hypotheses, assessment teams can begin analysis. The team identifies and highlights gaps in the assessment plan to identify and assign actions needed to adjust collection and analysis plans to improve the assessment process. Understanding current and desired conditions requires acknowledging the underlying assumptions. During the analysis step of the assessment process, staffs continually challenge assumptions they identify during planning. If they subsequently disprove assumptions, then reframing the problem may be appropriate. This step requires tactical patience. Conducting SFA is a complicated undertaking; expect analysis and assessment to take some time. If the success threshold
for the MOE criteria is not met, yet the corresponding (theorized) MOP criteria were met, the assumption as to the impact of those efforts may be false.

Step 6: Roll Up

4-79. When rolling up assessment data, account for the fact that the MOPs and MOEs at each assessment level may vary. As lessons and trends emerge, incorporate the analysis of these MOPs and MOEs into higher-level assessment processes (if applicable). Tactical and operational assessment metrics are likely different from theater-level assessment metrics. However, the effects of various missions feed into a theater-level assessment that must account for all operations within the plan.

Step 7: Report and Recommend

4-80. Following an AAR, the team develops an assessment summary that includes recommendations for future operations, training, follow-up assessments, and factors, which require further analysis. Submit and archive summaries at the conclusion of assessments. When applicable, personnel conducting the assessment consult with all staff members to validate recommendations prior to reporting to the commander.

ASSESSMENTS

4-81. The SFAB performs four types of assessments: operational, organizational, environmental, and institutional (see figure 4-6). Assessments occur at all levels of the foreign security force and are continuous, collaborative, and simultaneous in nature. As explained in the following paragraphs, the four types of assessments seem separate and distinct but may occur simultaneously while a unit is assessing the foreign security force progress and its mission daily.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Assessment</th>
<th>Environmental Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Functions</td>
<td>Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- C2</td>
<td>Geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intelligence</td>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fires</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Movement and Maneuver</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Protection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Sustainment</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Assessment</th>
<th>Institutional Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations Process</td>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Plan</td>
<td>- Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prepare</td>
<td>- Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Execute</td>
<td>- Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assess</td>
<td>- Materiel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Leadership &amp; Education</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-6. Foreign security force assessments**

Organizational

4-82. The organizational assessment compares the current organizational structure and operational state of the foreign security force to the designed or intended capabilities and capacity to execute directed missions. To determine what the organization is designed to do, the organizational assessment answers these questions:
What are the foreign security forces’ roles? What is the foreign security force mission? What are the foreign security forces’ developmental goals and objectives? How reliable are the foreign leaders? Paragraphs 4-83 through 4-85 hold considerations for finding answers to these questions.

4-83. The SFAB starts the organizational assessment during the predeployment phase. Commanders and staffs must focus on objectives and end states of the foreign security force’s higher governing body first rather than the organization. Starting with the organization first is often a planning pitfall. Commanders often make the mistake of organizing their units with the foreign security forces based on similarities of size and capabilities. This is common when the foreign security forces are conducting operations other than military, such as policing or humanitarian aid, for example.

4-84. As the SFAB conducts the MDMP and continues its organizational assessment, task-organization becomes clearer to the commander. The commander advised by staff can determine who is best able to gather the data and complete the remaining steps of the assessment process and advising mission.

4-85. Figure 4-7, pages 4-17 and 4-18, provides an example of an organizational assessment rubric. As with other examples in this chapter, this rubric is not all-inclusive and serves as a starting point for advisor teams as they develop their assessment tools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warfighting functions</th>
<th>C-0 Incapable</th>
<th>C-1 Marginally capable</th>
<th>C-2 Capable</th>
<th>C-3 Fully capable</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>Poorly resourced or untrained staff. Lack of command purpose and direction.</td>
<td>Staff lacking resources but understands basic responsibilities. Commander provides basic direction and purpose.</td>
<td>Most resources available, trained staff but lacks experience. Commander provides purpose and direction.</td>
<td>Fully resourced, fully staffed, and commander provides thorough guidance for current and future operations.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement and Maneuver</td>
<td>Unit lacks resources to employ subordinate elements.</td>
<td>Unit resourced but incapable of employing forces, or unit capable of employing forces but not resourced.</td>
<td>Unit achieves tactical objectives regardless of resource shortfalls.</td>
<td>Commander able to employ combat power to decisively defeat an enemy.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Intelligence collection poorly executed, intel products do not facilitate understanding; collection assets do not exist.</td>
<td>Intel collection limited by lack of collection assets or lack of training, intel products provide minimal understanding.</td>
<td>Intel collection results in products that facilitate basic understanding of the operational environment.</td>
<td>Intel collection, products, and understanding facilitate understanding and enable commanders to make timely decisions.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-7. Organizational assessment rubric, example**
### Figure 4-7. Organizational assessment rubric, example (continued)

#### Operational

4-86. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the foreign security forces’ ability to perform their missions, roles, or functions. It shows how well the foreign security forces can conduct their missions. A clear understanding of the foreign security force’s operational mission serves as the starting point for the operational assessment.

4-87. Effective foreign security forces display the following characteristics and capabilities:

- **Flexible.** A force that can accomplish the broad missions that the nation requires, not just to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression but to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command and organizational structure that is feasible for the partner nation.
- **Proficient foreign security forces**—
  - Can work with adjacent organizations to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
  - Are tactically and technically proficient, can execute their national security mission, and integrate with allies.
  - Are competent in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.
  - Are trained with a modern police ethos to include security procedures, investigation basics, evidence collection, and court and legal procedures.
- Self-sustained. Forces that can manage their own equipment throughout its lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conduct administrative support.
- Well-led. Leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values and who are selected for promotion based on competence and merit.
- Professionalism traits such as—
  - Foreign security forces that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
  - Foreign security forces that are loyal to the central government and serve national interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.
- Integrated into society. A population is less likely to see a security force that represents the nation’s major ethnic groups as the instrument of just one faction. Observe cultural sensitivities toward the incorporation of various groups and ethnicities.

4-88. The capabilities support the overall campaign design. Evaluations of the foreign security force’s capabilities reflect its ability to influence the operational environment to reinforce the overall design. Ultimately, the success or failure of a foreign security force may rest more on its overall influence in an operations area rather than its ability to execute specific tasks.

4-89. Figure 4-8, page 4-20, provides an example of an operational assessment worksheet that an advisor team may use when conducting an operational assessment of a foreign security force. Use this worksheet when designing an evaluation for a foreign security force during the conduct of an operational mission. Advisors use the worksheet as a tool to record key data, observations, and other notes while observing a foreign security force operation. After the operation, advisors use this information to build a more detailed assessment summary per their SOP.

4-90. SFABs must establish standard assessment rubrics, worksheets, summaries, and reports in their SOPs that will aid the advisor teams and facilitate a common understanding across the various echelons of advisors with the foreign security force. Tailor these products to specific countries or regions and their related SFA goals.
# MISSION ENVIRONMENT OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC

## Section I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. UNIT INFORMATION:</th>
<th>b. UNIT NAME:</th>
<th>e. DATE OF OPERATION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1BN, Atrropic Land Forces</td>
<td>INFANTRY</td>
<td>01 07 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. PERCENTAGE PRESENT</th>
<th>d. ECHELON</th>
<th>e. PERSONNEL PRESENT</th>
<th>f. TEAM/Crew</th>
<th>g. SQUAD/SECTION</th>
<th>h. PLATOON COMPANY</th>
<th>i. BATTALION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MISSION TYPE:
- Stability operations/area security

### CONDITIONS:
- Day and night dismounted patrols

### OVERALL CAPABILITY RATING (C-#)

C-0 | C-1 | C-2 | C-3

## Section II

### MISSION PURPOSE:
Prevention of poaching/Illegal ivory trade

### OPERATION CYCLE

#### A. PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATING</th>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
<th>RESOURCES NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-0</td>
<td>Planning met commander's intent, task and purpose were articulated through use of Foreign Security Force (FSF) doctrinal guidance.</td>
<td>Fires were not included in plan, and therefore, no targeting was available to support maneuver plan.</td>
<td>Training staff understanding of Warfighting Functions was limited due to nonexistence of doctrine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Incomplete plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>No sand tables were used to ensure support concepts were followed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Sufficient plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>Plan meets intent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. PREPARE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATING</th>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
<th>RESOURCES NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-0</td>
<td>Extensive use of rehearsals ensured all echelons (company/platoon/squad) understood commander's intent.</td>
<td>Even though well rehearsed, lack of evaluation aids did limit some leader's ability to achieve understanding of the commander's intent.</td>
<td>Institutional—More resources that can assist subordinate leaders with visualizing the intent of the operation will greatly enhance future operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Inadequate resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Adequate resources/partial understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>Fully resources/shared understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### C. EXECUTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATING</th>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
<th>RESOURCES NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-0</td>
<td>Platoons and squads responded well to threats. Company and Battalion were able to communicate and track operations.</td>
<td>Communications infrastructure limited range of operators. All tracking was done analog.</td>
<td>Units lack sufficient Digital Mission Command platforms, which limit commander's ability to assess situations, rapidly. No Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance was available throughout entire operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Marginal mission accomplishment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Partially met commander's intent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>Achieved Endstate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### D. ASSESS

#### RATING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATING</th>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
<th>RESOURCES NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-0</td>
<td>Battalion and company leaders routinely assessed effects of operation with subordinate leadership.</td>
<td>No time was allotted to correct issues during future training events.</td>
<td>Units must take time to retrain on Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) and multiple scenarios in order to perform better in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Aware of shortcomings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Aware/Inadequately resourced solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>Aware/Fully resourced solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 4-8. Operational assessment worksheet, operational mission, example**
4-91. DA PAM 11-31 uses the C ratings in figure 4-8 when describing the strategic capability and capacity of a foreign military. They provide a useful framework for building effective country plans and managing resource tradeoffs in assessing foreign partners’ capabilities and capacities to perform military missions and their interoperability with the U.S. Army. At a strategic level, the capability and capacity of a foreign partner can be delineated using the following four levels:

- C-0. Partner foreign security force is a security importer and cannot contribute forces to multinational operations.
- C-1. Partner foreign security force is capable of providing up to battalion-sized units or niche capabilities to multinational operations.
- C-2. Partner foreign security force can deploy and sustain a brigade regionally or globally with assistance.
- C-3. Partner foreign security force can deploy and sustain a brigade or larger formation and conduct military operations all along the competition continuum upon arrival.

4-92. In addition to the capability and capacity ratings, DA PAM 11-31 also describes multinational force interoperability ratings. Interoperability is the ability of forces of two or more nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks and the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve allied tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. The four levels of interoperability are defined as follows:

- I-0. Partner foreign security force has no demonstrated interoperability with the U.S. Army; command and control interface with the U.S. Army is only at the national level or the foreign force has no regular engagement with the U.S. Army.
- I-1. Partner foreign security force shares information or situational awareness through liaison teams with the U.S. Army, requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms, and has some routine engagement with the U.S. Army.
- I-2. Partner foreign security force has digital command and control capabilities, actively participates in information operations with the U.S. Army, and routinely exercises or operates with the U.S. Army.
- I-3. Partner foreign security force's interoperability is network-enabled through shared situational awareness, mobile command and control, collaborative planning, networked fires, combat identification, intelligence, and reconnaissance.

4-93. The criteria used in the ratings shown above and found in DA PAM 11-31 may not be relevant to an advisor teams’ mission and their assessments. However, they provide an example of what these criteria may look like. Assessment criteria and ratings must be established through the advisor team's chain of command and in conjunction with the foreign security force to provide the most useful and relevant information for future planning and operations. The operational assessment example in figure 4-8 defines C ratings that may be more relevant at the tactical level.

4-94. When evaluating a foreign security force during training events, a similar worksheet can be used to the one shown in figure 4-8. However, instead of using the operations cycle of plan, prepare, execute, and assess an advisor team may use the eight-step training model as the framework to evaluate the foreign unit.

Environmental

4-95. The environmental assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on foreign security force organization. (See ATP 3-07.10.) The environmental assessment validates the suitability of a foreign security force’s directed missions. This also may reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the foreign security forces beyond those normally associated with a similar type of security force. A tactical-level environmental assessment generally uses the operational variables of METT-TC as a framework. A higher level, or operational level, environmental assessment uses the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time as a framework to answer the following questions: What are the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time impacts on the foreign security force? What are the threats? Are there any geographical considerations?
The majority of the information contained within the environmental assessment is gathered during the IPB process. SFAB staffs and advisor teams constantly update this information and exchange information with the foreign security forces to the extent possible without violating security procedures. Figure 4-9 gives an example of what a tactical-level environmental assessment rubric, using METT-TC, may look like.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT RUBRIC</th>
<th>TACTICAL LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area Assessed</strong></td>
<td><strong>C-0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission</strong></td>
<td>Incapable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission is outside the scope of the foreign security force’s (FSF) purpose.</td>
<td>FSF lacks capacity to perform assigned mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enemy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF cannot provide an appropriate response to threats.</td>
<td>FSF responds to threats but lacks capacity to assume the initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Troops</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF does not possess required combat power for assigned mission.</td>
<td>FSF is manned for assigned mission but does not have a reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF cannot conduct movement and maneuver without external support.</td>
<td>FSF can conduct limited movement and maneuver over most terrain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF cannot perform continuous operations more than 24 hours.</td>
<td>FSF can perform continuous operations between 24 and 72 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilians</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local civilians have negative perception of the FSF.</td>
<td>Local civilians have a neutral perception of the FSF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

C Capability and capacity level

*Figure 4-9. Environmental assessment rubric, tactical level, example*
Institutional

4-97. The institutional assessment evaluates the foreign security force’s capabilities by examining DOTMLPF-P or a similar construct to close existing capability gaps. The institutional assessment answers the following questions: Why does the organization have capability gaps and why does the organization have capacity gaps? The best framework to assess foreign security force’s institutions is the DOTMLPF-P framework.

4-98. Figure 4-10, pages 4-23 and 4-24, provides an example of an institutional assessment rubric, which uses the DOTMLPF-P framework and can assist advisors in preparing their assessments. The statements in the rubric provide an initial frame of reference to help evaluate the foreign security force institutions. The rubric contains both objective and subjective analysis and requires the advisor’s interpretation and sound judgment. This rubric is not all-inclusive and is only an example (in this case, an institutional assessment of a foreign military education course).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Assessed</th>
<th>C-0: Does not meet requirements</th>
<th>C-1: Meets some requirements</th>
<th>C-2: Meets most requirements</th>
<th>C-3: Meets all requirements</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Program of instruction (POI) does not support doctrine.</td>
<td>POI partially supports doctrine, but does not prepare students for operations.</td>
<td>POI follows doctrine and prepares students for operations.</td>
<td>POI updated and reflects doctrinal changes; meets the needs of the force.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>No formal chain of command (CoC) in place.</td>
<td>CoC does not meet the needs of the students or facility.</td>
<td>CoC meets the needs of the students and facility with external assistance.</td>
<td>Well-formed CoC adequately addresses needs of students and facility.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>POI not sequenced or poorly phased. Does not facilitate skill mastery.</td>
<td>Parts of POI improperly sequenced or phased. Mitigates skill mastery.</td>
<td>Most portions of POI are properly phased and sequenced. Skill mastery increased.</td>
<td>Students achieve mastery through use of academic rigor, appropriate phasing and logical sequencing of POI.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Limited or no access to training aids or books. Test materials are not controlled.</td>
<td>Limited access to books and training aids. Test materials minimally controlled.</td>
<td>Increased access to books and training aids, test integrity and exams controlled.</td>
<td>Full access to books and full integrity of testing materials maintained. Foreign texts translated.</td>
<td>Filled in by unit to explain assessment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEGEND**

C: Capability and capacity level

Figure 4-10. Institutional assessment rubric, example
Continuous Assessment

4-99. Advisor teams evaluate foreign security forces on a continuous basis. Metrics for evaluating success change as the conditions in the area of operations shift. An advisor team’s ability to learn and adapt leads to a more accurate assessment of the foreign security forces.

4-100. Assessments are a continuous process of examining inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and the impact on objectives. As the assessments are being done, planners and assessors ask the following questions:

- Has the objective been achieved?
- If the objective has not been achieved, are we measuring the objective correctly?
- If the objective has been achieved, what are the impediments to achieving the objective?

4-101. It is important to delineate assessment responsibilities across several stakeholders to account for differing levels of organizational authority and expertise and to maximize the level of objectivity into the assessment process. It is possible for an individual and staff section to have several different assessment roles and responsibilities. Some of the roles and associated responsibilities are listed below:

- Data collectors attend the SFA events and collect relevant information.
- Advisors perform formal assessments of programs and activities.
- Designated personnel review the assessments and certify those assessments as legitimate.
• Staff and advisor team members aggregate assessments to determine where assessment gaps and redundancies exist.
• Advisor teams develop recommendations to the commander and staff, based on the assessment findings of the SFA plans and missions for possible solutions or capability requirements.

4-102. Advisor teams conduct assessments in support of each SFA task. SFA tasks should not begin, progress, change, or cease without conducting assessments. The SFAB staffs and advisor teams, in partnership with the foreign security forces, should spend considerable time updating assessments to shape the operation, consolidate gains, and prevent wasted time and resources on activities that are not reaching the security cooperation objectives.

ADVISE

4-103. As an advisor team activity, advise refers to the process of providing guidance, coaching, and counseling to a foreign counterpart to make their operations or activities more successful. Advisor teams conduct this activity with their foreign counterparts throughout all stages of training, operations, and execution of SFA tasks. This section describes how SFAB advisor teams fulfill their advising function alongside foreign security forces while addressing each of the remaining SFA tasks.

4-104. Foreign security force development through SFA requires effort over time. Measure success by the increase in the foreign security forces’ capability, capacity, competency, commitment, and confidence in areas in which U.S. forces are assisting them. The SFA activities include plan, resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain. Through SFA, the foreign security forces’ capability and capacity to execute these activities should improve over time.

4-105. The ultimate goal of the SFAB is to develop foreign security forces and supporting institutions that are competent, capable, committed, confident, and have the required capabilities and capacities to be successful. The advisor teams work to build the following attributes within the foreign security force:

• Competency—
  ▪ Individually and collectively across all echelons.
  ▪ Across all warfighting functions and systems.
• Capability and capacity—
  ▪ Trained to accomplish missions.
  ▪ Forces are rightsized to sustain operations.
  ▪ Resourced in accordance with validated requirements.
  ▪ Sustainment organizations can keep the force in the fight at its projected peak.
• Commitment—
  ▪ To security of all the people and survival of the state.
  ▪ To preservation of the liberties and human rights of all citizens.
• Confidence—
  ▪ In themselves to fulfill their mission.
  ▪ That their professionalism will instill trust in the citizens.
  ▪ That their government will reciprocate the professionalism and trust they demonstrate.

4-106. While the SFA tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist are placed under this advisor team activity for the purposes of this publication, that does not mean the other advisor team activities of assess, support, and liaise do not have application to these SFA tasks. Advisors execute all four of the advisor team activities as necessary while conducting any of the SFA tasks alongside their foreign counterparts.

ORGANIZE

4-107. Organize refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit and organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning.
(See FM 3-22.) The organize task is an SFA-generating function. To assist organizing a foreign security force, advisor teams must understand their current design, capabilities, and capacities and where they would like to be in the future. Advisor teams may provide advice and guidance to their counterparts to help them through the process. For example, if the mission is recruiting, advisor teams advise and the foreign security force as it sets mission objectives, determines incentives, and develops recruiting material. Advisor teams should pay particular attention to the unique cultural factors and sensitivities of the region while assisting with this task.

**Plan**

4-108. The partner nation’s social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats have significant implications for the organizing effort. Tailor SFA objectives to support the security cooperation goals between the United States and the partner nation in accordance with the theater security cooperation plan. In some cases, this is relatively limited, short duration training and assistance to competent and well-established partners. In other cases, it entails long-term, comprehensive joint and interagency efforts to rebuild fractured societies, which aim to support the creation of an efficient organization with appropriate staff structure and supporting institutions. In addition to developing a standard unit structure across the foreign security forces, the doctrine, policies, systems, and SOPs should ideally be uniform among their units as well. As the foreign security force matures, U.S. leaders and trainers should expect and encourage independent organizational decisions. Ultimately, the partner nation determines the structure of its security forces including approving all organizational designs. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, equipment, and internal organizational designs.

4-109. Supporting infrastructure that provides the organizing and generating requirements of the foreign security forces are key to long-term success. SFAB commanders and advisor teams work with various ministries and organizations that are responsible for the partner nation’s national security. The supported nation may have a variety of representatives participate in organizational planning, including representatives from the ministry of defense, finance, interior, justice, public works, transportation, culture, economic development, and international relations and cooperation just to name a few. SFAB commanders may request augmentation from ministerial advisor teams to assess strengths, weaknesses, and joint requirements of the ministerial-level organizations. When gaps are identified, the joint and multinational ministry teams assist the partner nation in developing the appropriate systems and capabilities. These efforts could include collaboration with other joint and multinational advisor teams and may include a number of topic areas, including procurement, personnel, intelligence, finance, legal, and other national-level management systems.

**Prepare**

4-110. Organizing foreign security forces generally involves assessing and developing the areas listed below. The list below is not all-inclusive:

- Recruiting and hiring.
- Promotion screening and selection.
- Pay and benefits.
- Leader recruiting and selection.
- Personnel accountability.
- Demobilization of security force personnel.

**Recruiting**

4-111. Recruiting is the most basic, yet most important, task when establishing a foreign security force. The recruiting program should assimilate local ethnic, family, and cultural themes that are appropriate for the environment and achieving the end state. Ultimately, a successful recruiting program should bring a composition of people into the security forces that reflect the demographic and ethnic groups of the region. The SFAB command and advisor teams, along with other joint and multinational partners, should encourage and support efforts to recruit from minority populations. Use mobile recruiting teams to target specific areas, ethnic groups, or tribes. Recruiting efforts should encourage moderate groups and factions within hostile or potentially hostile ethnic groups to join the foreign security forces. Often partner-nation governments resist
recruiting disaffected ethnic groups. However, even moderate success in recruiting from these groups can provide an enormous payoff. Effective recruiting programs build the security forces’ legitimacy and may quell legitimate fears of such groups. When possible, disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former enemies or other armed groups should be part of the plan as well.

4-112. A proper recruiting program identifies behavioral, physical, and moral standards for the recruits. Ideally, a foreign security force will centrally screen and induct recruits. Recruiting centers should reside in safe and secure areas since they are often a target of insurgent attacks in uncertain areas. All recruits should undergo a basic security check and be vetted against lists of suspected enemies. Foreign agencies and personnel perform this screening, ideally with oversight or monitoring by outside organizations. Carefully scrutinize recruits for potential membership or affiliation with illegal organizations or extremist groups. Past membership need not necessarily preclude a person from joining the foreign security force; however, any ongoing relationship with an illegal organization requires close monitoring and is generally a discriminator for recruitment. Advise foreign security forces to limit the number of recruits that once belonged to an illegal unit, hostile tribe, and other less-cooperative factions from being concentrated in a particular military or police unit.

**Promotion Screening and Selection**

4-113. There are a number of considerations when developing a promotion system. Ideally, selection for promotion should stem from proven performance and potential for increased responsibility. Objective evaluations are a method to promote on merit and not through influence or family ties. While merit-based systems are preferred, some cultures or regions value the social status of a person’s family or ethnicity more than others do. Therefore, a merit-based system that works well in one country or region may not work well in another.

4-114. Consider the following two basic promotion systems. The first method of selection identifies the most competent performers, trains them, and recommends them for promotion. The second method identifies those with social or professional status within the training group, then trains and recommends them for promotion. The first method may lead to leaders who are more competent but the foreign security forces may provide resistance to this method due to cultural norms. The second method may result in cultural acceptance of the leadership while potentially sacrificing competence. Generally, the most effective solution often falls somewhere between the two methods.

**Pay and Benefits**

4-115. Adequate compensation minimizes a culture of corruption in a foreign security force. Spending the money needed for competitive wages and producing quality security forces is less costly than dealing with the impacts of a corrupt and abusive force that alienates the population and reduces confidence in the government. Paying the police adequately is especially important. Their duties and frequent contact with civilians often expose them to opportunities for corruption.

4-116. Payroll procedures and systems are vitally important. They must be transparent and accountable, which results in the security force members receiving their full pay and entitlements while providing the government with a means to manage and allocate the funds. Centralized administration of compensation through secure and automated systems minimizes the risk for corruption and manipulation; however, the supporting infrastructure may not be in place. If that is the case, encourage the foreign security force to build this infrastructure over time.

4-117. Effective foreign security forces can help improve partner nation social and economic development through the benefits each member receives. Ideally, every recruit should receive a basic education, job training, and ethics instructions, which influences the larger society as the trained security forces interact with the local population and move into other careers after their service.

**Leader Recruiting and Selection**

4-118. Due to the influence officers wield, officer candidate standards should be high. Candidates should be in good physical and mental health and be able to pass an academic test with higher standards than the test
for enlisted recruits. Recruiters carefully vet officer candidates to ensure that they do not have any current or previous ties to radical or enemy organization.

4-119. Ideally, select foreign security force NCOs from the enlisted soldiers who demonstrate leadership potential. Preferably, objective standards, including proficiency tests, should be established and enforced to ensure that promotion to their ranks come through merit. Many armies lack a professional NCO corps; establishing one for a foreign security force may prove difficult and take an extended period. In the meantime, foreign security forces tend to place more responsibility on the commissioned officers that may prevent them from focusing on the most important aspects of their job.

**Personnel Accountability**

4-120. Foreign security force leaders should track and account for personnel. Proper personnel accountability reduces corruption, efficiently uses resources, and ultimately maintains combat power. In countries with unsophisticated financial systems where soldiers receive their pay in cash, recommend establishing additional tracking mechanisms to minimize corruption and properly allocate the resources. In addition to efficiently managing resources, there is intelligence to gain through a properly managed personnel accountability system. For example, if a large number of security personnel fail to report for duty, this can indicate a possible planned enemy attack. Advisors and foreign security force leadership may be able to identify information, such as low unit morale, enemy and militia influences, and other information from well-maintained accountability data.

**Demobilization of Foreign Security Force Personnel**

4-121. Recommend partner nations develop and implement programs to keep a class of impoverished and disgruntled former officers and soldiers from forming. As the foreign security forces mature, encourage the foreign security force leadership to remove officers who perform poorly or fail to meet the standards. Providing some form of government-provided education, grants, or low-interest business loans provides discharged personnel with a way to earn a living outside the military. Recommend pensions or severance payments to soldiers who served for several years to ease their transition to civilian life. While partner nations establish the details of these programs, generally they should not apply to those found guilty of major human rights abuses or corruption. Transition or demobilization planning should start as soon as commanders anticipate the need, which may not be required in all cases. Similar programs may be required when demobilizing nongovernment militias.

**Execute**

4-122. During the execution and monitoring of the organize task, advisor teams must exercise patience. This can be an enduring task and may take several years to reach the desired end state. Establish intermediate goals to track the effectiveness of the organizing plans. SFAB elements should accumulate data pertinent to the task and measure that information through appropriate MOPs and MOEs. As the advisor teams monitor the security force actions while executing this task, they may have to adjust their guidance to the foreign security force as they work towards their stated goals and end state.

**Assess**

4-123. SFAB advisor teams conduct end-of-mission assessments at the conclusion of key organizing tasks and phases. Due to the long-term nature of this process, it may be appropriate to establish recurring quarterly reviews to evaluate progress. Some considerations for conducting an assessment of the organizing tasks are as follows:

- Identify the organizing end state and ensure that the SFAB personnel and the foreign security personnel share the same vision.
- Along with the foreign security force, establish a battle rhythm for reviewing the organizing tasks. This may include updating assessments, reviewing and adjusting milestones, and new planning efforts.
- Advisor teams document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and actions of the foreign security force or government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

4-124. The advisor team completes an AAR and submits it to its higher headquarters. The SFAB staff reviews and submits it to the country team and higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of the foreign security forces’ capabilities.

TRAIN

4-125. Advisor teams advise foreign security forces developing training programs and institutions to facilitate a sustainable improvement in their capacity and capability. (See FM 3-22). The train task is an SFA-generating function.

4-126. Train refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of their security environment. Training may be the priority effort for advisor teams though generally it is simply one aspect of larger foreign security force development plan. Guide and develop the training programs in accordance with the initial and continuous assessments of the foreign security forces.

Plan

4-127. The training task is one of the most important SFA tasks that advisor teams observe and execute. Training is critical to the success of the U.S. mission when working with a foreign security force. Training has applications within most missions that the SFAB conducts.

4-128. Providing guidance to a foreign security force regarding its training plans is a complicated undertaking. First, the foreign security force and SFAB commanders must visualize a shared end state. This shared end state is then refined into goals and milestones by subordinate commanders, staffs, and their foreign counterparts. Next, translate these goals and milestones into training objectives. SFAB commanders, staffs, and leaders use many of the training principles in U.S. doctrine as a foundation for training and providing advice to the foreign security force. The U.S. doctrine is then adapted to the specific needs and variables relevant to their foreign counterparts.

4-129. Using the MDMP, staffs develop long-range training goals based on the foreign security force’s version of its mission-essential task list. The mission essential task list is a U.S. Army construct; however, the foreign force will likely have a list of priority missions it is expected to perform that is used to facilitate planning. The SFAB advisors then coach or lead their foreign staff counterparts through the process of unit training development. (See ADP 7-0 for more information.)

4-130. Following the development of long-range training plans, advisor teams guide their foreign counterparts to develop and execute subordinate training plans. Additionally, staffs and advisor teams coach their counterparts how to plan and execute training, track proficiency, and maintain records.

4-131. Advisor teams work with the foreign security forces to modify training delivery based on their capacity and capability. Language and culture differences, specifically regarding the value of training, between advisor teams and their foreign counterparts may be difficult to overcome. However, advisor teams can mitigate these variables through cultural studies and by developing a good rapport with their counterparts.

Training Methods

4-132. U.S. doctrine uses the crawl-walk-run methodology to teach individual tasks, battle drills, collective training, and field exercises. Advisor teams use this methodology, or an appropriate variation, to develop well-trained foreign leaders and units. Training must take into consideration the foreign unit’s mission to ensure a practical, feasible, and effective training plan. Identifying the foreign commander’s mission and intent, as well as the tasks and purposes of other foreign units in the area, adds context to the training. When feasible, encourage the foreign security force to train with other organizations in the area.
4-133. At a minimum, encourage foreign units to conduct individual and small unit training to improve and sustain basic task proficiency. Collective training requires interaction among small units and larger organizations to perform tasks, actions, and activities that contribute to achieving mission-essential task proficiency and therefore may be more difficult to conduct in some environments. Collective training includes performing collective, individual, and leader tasks associated with each training objective, action, or activity.

- **Individual Training.** Training of individual foreign security force members supports their collective mission requirements. Trainers must consider physical and mental conditioning, tactical training, basic rifle marksmanship, first aid, combatives, and the operational environment when planning their training. Individual training includes tactics and techniques of military operations and the motivation, operations, and objectives of internal and external threats. Tough and realistic training conditions mentally and physically prepare soldiers to withstand the strain of continuous operations. Recommend cross-training on all types of weapons, communications, other equipment, and skills particular to the foreign unit. Personnel losses should not compromise essential skill, capabilities, and capacities due to a lack of fully trained replacement personnel.

- **Small-Unit Leader Training.** During most military operations, small-unit leaders must adjust plans and execute operations with little additional guidance. Therefore, advisors stress small-unit leadership training that can occur concurrently with individual training. Tools to train small-unit leaders include doctrine and historical discussions, vignettes, tactical exercises without troops, simulations, and training missions. Training develops aggressiveness, tactical proficiency, and initiative. Based on their capabilities, small-unit leader training may include procedures such as calling for fire and close air support. Small-unit leadership training must include land navigation in difficult terrain and under conditions of limited visibility. Mission readiness, logistical operations, and the health and welfare of subordinates are continuous parts of the training as well.

- **Collective Training.** Collective training starts at the squad level. Squad battle drills provide key building blocks that support collective operations. Trainers link battle drills and collective tasks through a logical, tactical scenario during a situational training exercise. Advisors must understand the operational environment when training the foreign security force. Collective training accounts for internal and external threats, the civilian population, politics, and other regional factors influence the operational environment. Use the foreign security force’s doctrine in training. Ultimately, advisor teams guide the foreign security force to become more proficient using their doctrine designed for their organizations. Trainers use and modify U.S. doctrine to assist the foreign security force as necessary to fill any gaps in their doctrine.

**Training Leaders**

4-134. Foreign security force effectiveness often directly relates to the quality of its leadership. Building effective leaders requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, NCO, and specialized training. The long-term success of any SFA effort depends on creating competent foreign leaders able to carry the fight to the enemy and develop their national security infrastructure on their own.

4-135. Leader training standards reinforce different levels of responsibility within the foreign security force. Clearly established responsibilities for commissioned officers and NCOs specify expectations of soldiers and leaders. Security forces may need training to understand the role each security force member has in relation to each other. For example, many security forces around the world do not have a history of a strong NCO corps. Therefore, if implementing NCOs, training the foreign force regarding this role may be necessary.

4-136. Advisor teams must maintain their professionalism when interacting with their foreign counterparts. The demonstrated leadership traits of the advisors often influence the foreign leaders. One of the advisors’ jobs is to reinforce desired values in their counterpart’s attitude. This creates a learning organization with professional leaders who are competent and confident. How advisors train these traits and values is the art of advising.

**Prepare**

4-137. Establishing realistic and attainable training goals for the foreign security force and developing plans takes time. There will be pressure to implement training shortcuts, employ quick fixes, and train personnel
on the job. Avoid such approaches as they often create more problems than solutions. However, trainers must resist the temptation to create long, complex training programs based on unrealistic standards. Effective programs account for the foreign counterpart’s culture, resources, and short-term security needs. No timelines exist for the duration of a particular training program. If necessary, trainers use existing and historical training programs to estimate the required duration of training. The enemy threat will influence the training duration as well. After all, it is much more difficult to focus on training while at the same time preparing for the next combat operation. As security improves, time and resources are more readily available to expand training programs.

4-138. Advisor teams provide advice and guidance regarding the training of individual and collective skills common to conventional military operations. All parties should clearly understand the agreed upon tasks, conditions, and standards which are to be measured. Metrics for evaluating a unit’s performance can be quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative evaluation methods or measurements evaluate the foreign security forces’ performance using predetermined metrics or percentages. Qualitative evaluation methods or measurements measure the foreign security forces’ performance using observations without specific metrics or statistics to quantify the data. In all cases, the advisor team should use methodologies that the foreign security force leadership has agreed to.

4-139. Training evaluation standards are predetermined and mutually agreed upon metrics for evaluation of tasks during training. Trainers clearly communicate the task, conditions, and standards. A training and evaluation outline is a summary document that provides information on collective training objectives, related individual training tasks, resource requirements, and applicable evaluation procedures for the specific organization. The training and evaluation outline provides the means to help leaders evaluate task execution and subjectively assess the unit’s ability to perform the task.

4-140. Trainers develop tasks, conditions, and standards suitable for the foreign security force. Do not assume U.S. evaluation standards for a specific task are relevant for a given foreign security force. In some cases, the foreign force may not be mature enough to meet those standards. In other cases, the U.S. training standards may actually be too low for the foreign counterparts.

4-141. Effective training programs require clear standards. These standards consider cultural factors that directly affect the ability of the individual or unit to operate. For example, training a staff or unit to conduct effective operations requires more time in countries where the average soldier is illiterate. Building a security force from the ground up takes far more time than growing a security force around a trained cadre. Using personnel with previous military or security experience to fill key positions within units often proves to be the most effective method of quickly standing up a new unit. Training personnel to fill leadership positions without any previous experience is very challenging, time-consuming, and more likely to fail.

4-142. Historically, poorly trained leaders and units commit more human rights violations than well trained and led units do. Leaders and units unprepared for the pressure of combat operations tend to use indiscriminate force, target civilians, and abuse detainees. These actions can threaten civil support and government legitimacy essential for success. Badly disciplined and led foreign security forces facilitate insurgent recruiting and propaganda efforts. Trainers account for leader experience when planning training, establishing training goals, and evaluating training strategies.

**Execute**

4-143. During the execute phase, advisor teams observe the training of the foreign security forces. Understanding the foreign counterpart’s mission essential tasks, individual and collective training standards, and training objectives, the advisor teams take notes and begin assessing the effectiveness of the training. Generally, foreign security force instructors train their personnel. However, SFAB advisors are more than capable of providing training to the foreign security forces directly when necessary.

4-144. Advisor teams guide foreign trainers to plan and structure the training to address deficiencies identified in the initial training assessment. The training plan identifies and prepares trainers from within the foreign security force, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the process. Finally, the training plan considers the foreign unit’s long-term training readiness. As the foreign security force gains capacity and capability to perform independently, advisors transition from a leading role to a supporting role. Guide the foreign training
plan to build from the bottom up, focus on the basics, use combined arms when possible, and challenge leaders and every echelon.

4-145. As part of the training plan, the advisor team must consider security at the training site. On the day of training, the advisor team receives a situation and threat update from its higher headquarters and the foreign security force counterparts. It then applies its own knowledge, understanding, and situational awareness to—

- Analyze the threat to determine the enemy’s capabilities to attack or collect intelligence on the foreign security force training at each training site.
- Prepare contingency plans to mitigate enemy intelligence collection or defeat an attack.
- Present the foreign security force commander with a risk assessment identifying security concerns. Develop risk mitigation strategies in conjunction with the foreign commander.
- Before each training session ensure that all personnel, both U.S. and foreign security forces, understand the defensive actions to take and operations security measures to execute in the event of an attack. At a minimum, a brief back rehearsal is required.

Note. Deliberately consider the risks of sharing, or not sharing, these internal security protocols. In some environments, advisor teams keep internal security protocols from their counterparts.

4-146. To present the training material properly, encourage trainers to follow the lesson outlines approved and rehearsed in the program of instruction. Training clearly states the mutually agreed upon tasks, conditions, and standards in a manner that assures they are understood by the foreign trainees. Trainers state all warning and safety instructions. Guide the trainers to include demonstrations of each task, ideally through a step-by-step process. Advisor team members monitor the students’ progress during instruction and practical exercises. The advisors pay attention to how foreign trainers correct their students and conduct remedial training.

4-147. Foreign security forces range from trained, professional security forces to untrained and poorly disciplined units. Therefore, the training techniques and methods will vary greatly from one organization to another. Advisor teams must be flexible while monitoring foreign security force training and providing advice. Advisor teams relay the following recommendations to their foreign counterparts when they are conducting or observing training:

- Rehearse all classes.
- Execute the prescribed program of instruction making adjustments as necessary.
- Adhere to the training schedule consistent with the foreign security force’s METT-TC.
- Ensure all training objectives satisfy actual training needs and gaps identified during the analysis of the operational environment and campaign plan.
- Encourage the foreign commanders to ensure all personnel receive training as scheduled.
- Structure training objectives according to applicable foreign counterpart doctrine or, in rare cases, U.S. military doctrine.
- Implement multiechelon training by teaching individual, crew, leader, and collective skills concurrently.
- When possible, demonstrate the execution of the task prior to training.
- Stress the execution of the task as a step-by-step or other systematic process.
- Monitor the foreign security forces’ progress during training and practice. Encourage instructors to correct mistakes. If the foreign instructor makes a mistake, correct that mistake with the instructors in a culturally appropriate manner at the appropriate time.
- Periodically validate translations by using a second or third interpreter to monitor instructions given during training.

Assess

4-148. Advisor teams update relevant assessments at the conclusion of each phase or training event. Training assessments are a collaborative event with the foreign counterparts. However, advisor teams may conduct an additional assessment independent of the foreign security force. Do not automatically share
independent assessments with the foreign security force counterparts. Cultural sensitivities will likely influence how the foreign security force receives the outside assessments. Usually, they are collected, consolidated, and then sent to the higher U.S. headquarters.

4-149. When assessing training, commanders and leaders consider—
- Their own observations and those of subordinate leaders and other individuals.
- Feedback from AARs.
- Results of unit evaluations.

4-150. Leaders incorporate the foreign security forces’ observations into their assessment. The foreign security forces’ observations, based on their cultural perspective, may be more relevant and applicable than that of the U.S. forces.

4-151. One method to capture observations, insights, and lessons learned from the foreign security force is to conduct an AAR. There are several techniques or variations for conducting an AAR. In each case, the advisor team emphasizes to the foreign leadership the importance of participation by all foreign security force members who were involved in the event. Cultural sensitivities may be a factor in consolidated AARs, which may lead to echeloned AARs. For example, it may be appropriate to hold an AAR for the officers, a separate AAR with the NCOs, and finally another with the enlisted personnel. The AAR technique varies based on the event and the maturity of the foreign security force.

4-152. The preferred AAR technique is to have the foreign leadership lead the AAR. This may require a rehearsal with the advisor team prior to conducting the AAR. In some cases, the advisor team may lead the AAR. In these cases, the advisor team should go over the AAR process with key foreign leaders in advance. By doing this, the foreign leaders are prepared prior to participating in the review with their subordinates. Advisors never want to embarrass their counterparts. Another technique is to make the AAR a training event. This may reduce the pressure felt by the foreign leadership and soldiers and allow the advisor team to coach them through the process.

4-153. During the end of a training assessment or at the conclusion of each training phase, compile and send reports of corruption, gross inefficiency, personal who hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or sympathy (proven or suspected) for the threat to the next-higher U.S. commander. At the end of the training assessment or at the conclusion of each phase, advisors—
- Participate in the foreign unit’s AAR.
- Conduct an internal advisor team review to identify recurring or significant problems.
- Modify the SFA plan to correct identified problems.

4-154. Advisor teams report updated assessments to their next higher element. The report should contain quantifiable metrics to describe the current operational state of the foreign counterparts. The higher SFAB echelon analyzes and archive the data. After analysis, SFAB commanders adjust plans and provide updated guidance.

**EQUIP**

4-155. Equip refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through lifecycle management. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization. (See FM 3-22.) The equip task is an SFA-generating function.

4-156. In accordance with authority provided by Congress, the equip task is conducted using formal contracts or agreements between the U.S. Government and an authorized foreign purchaser. (See FM 3-22.) Security assistance is the primary means to enable the equip task and authorizes the United States to build the capacity and capability and improve the interoperability of a partner nation. As with the organize task, SFAB advisor teams have a limited role in the equip task. Generally, this includes ensuring foreign security forces receive the equipment or services agreed upon in the relevant contracts. This may also involve conducting or coordinating new equipment training for the foreign security force. Finally, advisor teams will likely have reporting requirements to their higher headquarters as well.
Plan

4-157. Advisor teams are responsible for identifying shortfalls in the foreign capability, communicating those shortfalls higher, assisting the foreign security force in requesting the appropriate equipment to correct those shortfalls, and ensuring the end user receives the proper equipment and training. The theater security cooperation plan should guide equipment requirements. Equipment should be affordable, sustainable, and suitable for combating the threat. Foreign forces must be able to train on the equipment. Consider interoperability with other unified action partners as well.

Prepare

4-158. The requirements under the equipping task may be as simple as assisting with maintenance of existing weapons or as extensive as providing everything from a soldier’s individual military gear to an entire combat vehicle fleet. The foreign security force should be supplied with equipment that is comparable, or preferably better than, the enemy’s equipment. This may be challenging for police forces in uncertain environments, who are often lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed enemies.

4-159. Primary considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex or expensive equipment. In many cases, having a larger number of versatile vehicles with simple maintenance requirements is often better than having a few highly capable armored vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance. Contractors often perform foreign security force maintenance processes for new equipment. Develop the foreign sustainment and maintenance programs through training, guidance, and supervision.

Execute

4-160. Material and equipment sources include U.S. foreign military sales, multinational or third-nation resale, contracts with internal suppliers, or purchases on the international market. The organizations responsible for equipping the foreign security force should obtain equipment that meets their needs for quality, timeliness, and cost. As part of their training, teach the foreign security force property accountability procedures to reduce corruption and to safeguard resources. Recommend that foreign security forces maintain and safeguard their equipment according to their laws and regulations. In the absence of defined foreign procedures, advise the foreign leaders to implement basic accountability and security procedures using U.S. policies as an initial framework.

4-161. The SFAB should monitor and assist the foreign security force with new equipment training. This may include assisting the foreign security force to establish the appropriate contracts with external organizations, monitoring the foreign security force’s internal new equipment training program, and, in some cases, providing trainers from the SFAB.

Assess

4-162. Advisor teams conduct assessments at the conclusion of key equipping tasks and phases. Some considerations for conducting an equipping task assessment are as follows:

- Identify the foreign security force equipping end state. This should include a comparison of the foreign equipment relative to the enemy’s equipment, identifying gaps, and presenting possible solutions to the foreign and U.S. higher headquarters.
- Along with the foreign leaders, establish a schedule for reviewing the equipping tasks.
- Adjust the equipping plan in conjunction with the foreign leaders.
- Document and report to the next-highest U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions of the foreign security force or government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

4-163. Advisor teams complete an equipping AAR and submit it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB staff reviews and submits it to the country team or higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of foreign security force’s capabilities.
**REBUILD AND BUILD**

4-164. Rebuild and build refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures, such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures. (See FM 3-22.) The rebuild and build tasks are SFA-generating functions. Advisor teams have a limited role in the tasks of rebuild and build. Strategic- and ministerial-level staffs plan, execute, and resource these tasks.

**Plan**

4-165. The rebuild and build task refers to all activities related to restoring and developing foreign security force capability, capacity, and supporting infrastructure. (See FM 3-22.) This task requires an in-depth analysis of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the desired end state and operational environment. The specific tasks vary according to the mission’s goals and objectives in addition to the partner-nation’s priorities, resources, and its ability to maintain the infrastructure. This task often involves construction of facilities, transportation networks, communication systems, utilities, and a wide variety of other infrastructure projects that support the nation. Success largely depends on long-range planning, prioritizing projects, and allocation of sufficient resources through the partner nation or international political process. While every situation is unique, advisor teams could find themselves involved in building and rebuilding tasks.

**Prepare**

4-166. The foreign security force needs facilities for storage, maintenance, training, and shelter. This includes secure facilities that allow for classified information storage, planning, and communications and other facilities, such as barracks, ranges, and motor pools. Training centers and unit garrisons requires a long-term security force-basing plan. The partner nation government and its senior ministries will make these determinations and provide the required resources. As part of their initial assessment, advisor teams will review their foreign counterpart’s security infrastructure.

**Execute**

4-167. Construction takes significant time; therefore, it is ideal if the partner nation invests early in building or rebuilding key facilities. Advisor teams assist the foreign security force with developing plans to protect and maintain infrastructure. Recommend prioritizing facilities for protection and allocating resources accordingly. Key facilities include headquarters buildings, major sustainment facilities, barracks, political institutions, major utilities, police stations, and culturally significant landmarks. The partner nation may need to make large investments in time and resources to restore, create, and maintain the local and nationwide infrastructure necessary to effectively command, control, and maintain its security forces.

**Assess**

4-168. Advisor teams should provide assessments on relevant infrastructure in their counterpart’s area of operations. After the initial assessment, monitoring the building and rebuilding tasks generally consists of sending occasional progress reports higher. The advisor teams should consider the following list of considerations when assessing these two tasks:

- Alongside their foreign counterparts, advisor teams discuss and prioritize infrastructure capability gaps in the area of operations. Submit these priorities through the appropriate channels, request resources, and monitor.
- Advisor teams document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions of the foreign security force or government officials who habitually hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

4-169. The advisor teams complete an AAR and submit it to their higher headquarters. The SFAB reviews and submits the AAR to the country team or higher headquarters to assist in the continued development of foreign security force capabilities.
ADVISE AND ASSIST

4-170. Advise and assist refers to all activities to provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, guidance, advice, and counsel to foreign security forces while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising occurs under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups. (See FM 3-22.) The advise and assist task is an SFA operational function.

4-171. Advise and assist is the primary SFA task that SFAB advisor teams use to influence foreign security forces. The SFA task list, in FM 3-22, pairs advise and assist together due to their close relationship. Through this task, advisors coach and mentor their counterparts to increase their capability and provide capabilities or capacity beyond what is available to the foreign security forces alone.

4-172. When executing the advise and assist task, U.S. forces interact with the foreign security force and other defense organizations in an effort to increase their capability in support of U.S. strategic goals. U.S. forces advising the foreign security force must coordinate their efforts with the combatant command and country team to ensure that the United States presents clear and consistent themes and messages to the foreign forces. At the tactical level, U.S. advisors provide tactical advice regarding the conduct of individual and collective tasks and operations that the foreign security force conducts.

4-173. The SFAB may provide advisors for operating-, generating-, and executive-level positions. The operating level refers to military units. The generating level refers to service-level interactions with a foreign security organization, such as an army, border patrol, defense department headquarters, or academic institution. The executive level refers to government departments or ministries. In almost all cases, SFAB advisor teams work at the operating or generating level within the foreign security force. Advisor teams rely on their experience, judgment, and knowledge of joint and Army doctrine and training principles to coach, advise, and mentor their foreign partners.

4-174. The ways by which advisor teams conduct their advising function varies. When possible, advisor teams should live with the foreign security force they are advising. Whether living near the foreign force or not, advisor teams must make a deliberate effort to establish an effective communication system between the advisor teams and their counterparts to ensure the appropriate communication channels are available when required. Close integration of the advisor teams and their foreign counterparts enhances the trust and confidence between the forces and builds legitimacy for the U.S. forces with the local population.

Plan

4-175. Advisor teams are capable of advising two echelons higher than their organic organization. For example, an SFAB company commander can advise a foreign brigade commander, a brigade staff could advise a foreign corps staff, and so on. This capability drives the increased rank and experience requirements for serving in the SFAB. While the capability exists to advise two levels higher, the mission analysis determines whether that would be appropriate. Generally, an experienced, professional, and well-established foreign security force requires pairing at the advisor team’s organic level or perhaps one level higher. A less experienced foreign force allows the advisor teams to advise one, or even two, echelons higher. During mission analysis, commanders and staffs must weigh the foreign experience level, the effects the SFAB is trying to achieve, resources and time available, and other relevant factors to determine the best lay down for the advisor teams. As with all missions, commanders must assess risk. In this case, that includes considering whether the advisor teams have the appropriate experience to advise their counterparts versus being able to influence the maximum number of foreign security force organizations.

4-176. Planned operations are coordinated with the foreign security force. An indication of an effective advising effort is the amount of personal involvement the foreign security force takes in its own operations. The civilian population should see that its own security forces secure it. This promotes the legitimacy of the host nation government and builds trust and confidence in the security forces.

4-177. SFAB advisor teams teach, coach, and advise in a cycle. As the foreign security forces become proficient in a skill, the advisor can move on to other skills and tasks. Whether the foreign security force struggles and requires retraining on a specific task or quickly learns another task, the advisor team can adjust the training plan in conjunction with the foreign leadership. As the proficiency of the foreign security force
increases, the advisors spend less time conducting training and more time coaching, advising, and monitoring the foreign security force training.

4-178. Advisors must understand the organization of the local government and the influence of their advising activities. Advisor teams commonly operate in complex environments via interdependent operations. Interdependent operations require near-seamless integration of agencies representing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Usually a set of agreements exist between various local agencies, security forces, and the national government. These agreements provide a coordinated effort in servicing the various needs of civilian population. If necessary, the advisor may work with other agencies to assist in getting such agreements made. The brigade civil affairs staff officer can assist with these matters. If such agreements already exist and they are conducive to mission success, advisors should recognize and strengthen them.

4-179. Legitimacy is a concept that goes beyond a strict legal definition; it includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government, group, or organization. A government’s legitimacy is built upon the local and international community perceptions, which are critical in developing and maintaining local and international support. The United States may not be able to sustain a long-term relationship with a nation if it lacks a legitimate government.

**Prepare**

4-180. Defining success in an SFA environment is difficult. Tracking and measuring progress on a day-to-day basis is not easy. Achieving a tactical objective does not in and of itself equate to mission success. Advisors achieve success when the foreign security forces achieve the goals and objectives as described in their commander’s vision. The foreign security forces should plan and execute their own training and operations with an advisor providing advice, coaching, and oversight.

4-181. Advisors prepare for operations by reviewing internal and foreign security force SOPs. They study relevant U.S. doctrine, foreign doctrine, and collective tasks. Advisors must be subject matter experts on a variety of subjects.

4-182. Advisor teams study their foreign counterparts, to include cultural norms, history of the region and people, and other relevant information that allows them to establish rapport. This includes understanding leadership processes, human nature, and motivations. Information may take the form of books, staff rides, videos, reports, discussions, previous operational reports, professional speakers, and other research materials. Qualitatively measure rapport through advisors’ abilities to motivate their counterpart to take a desired action.

**Avoiding Advisor Dilemmas**

4-183. Advisor dilemmas are difficult situations in which advisors receive guidance from commanders that causes undue, avoidable tension with either their partner forces or higher headquarters. Without resolution or amendment, these dilemmas cause advisors to fail to either meet the commander’s intent or compromise their credibility and rapport with their counterparts. There are generally six types of common advisor dilemmas:

- **Conflicts of capability.** Occurs when the partnered foreign security force lacks the capability or capacity to accomplish the commander’s intent of the advisor team’s higher headquarters.
- **Conflicts of intent.** Occurs when the commander’s intent of the advisor team’s higher headquarters contradicts the foreign security force commander’s intent.
- **Conflicts of direction.** Occurs when the commander’s intent of the advisor team’s higher headquarters contradicts the explicit direction of the foreign security force’s higher headquarters.
- **Conflict of authority.** Occurs when the foreign security force lacks the authority to accomplish the commander’s intent of the advisor team’s higher headquarters.
- **Conflict of responsibility.** Occurs when the commander’s intent of the advisor team’s higher headquarters falls outside the foreign security force’s scope of responsibility.
- **Conflicts of priority.** Occurs when the commander’s intent of the advisor team’s higher headquarters is inconsistent with other SFA priorities and guidance received by the advisor team.
4-184. Advisors and their commanders share responsibility for avoiding or resolving advisor dilemmas. Advisors and their commanders avoid advisor dilemmas through clear and open communication, understanding foreign security force capabilities, limitations, intentions, norms, and priorities, and fostering an environment conducive to advisor-commander dialogue.

**Advising Guidance**

4-185. Commanders must provide clear intent to their advisors to allow them flexibility to execute their mission with the foreign security force. As described earlier in this section, the proximity of the advisors, intensity of the conflict, frequency of contact, and various legal considerations will provide the broad context for the SFA operations. Generally, these criteria do not change quickly or dramatically. However, advisor teams will often adjust their integration into the foreign security force’s tactical formations and the support provided, sometimes from one mission to the next.

4-186. Advising guidance allows commanders to specify their intent to their subordinate advisors by describing how they visualize the advisor team operating alongside the foreign security forces. Similar to reconnaissance guidance, advising guidance allows commanders to quickly specify and adjust their intent regarding whether or not the advisors are maneuvering within the foreign tactical formations and whether or not advisors are actively providing access to external U.S. capabilities. The four general conditions under which advisors operate are as follows:

- Accompany and enable.
- Separate and enable.
- Accompany and refrain.
- Separate and refrain.

4-187. Accompany and separate. When directed to accompany, advisors integrate themselves into the foreign security force's tactical formations during the mission. Guidance to separate directs advisors to monitor the foreign operations often from a command post or another location outside of their foreign counterpart's tactical formation.

4-188. Enable and refrain. Enable directs the advisors to actively plan, coordinate, and provide other external U.S. capabilities in support of the foreign security forces and their mission. This external assistance often comes in the form of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; fire support; vertical lift assets; medical evacuation; or other logistical support. Refrain directs the advisors to withhold external U.S. capabilities to the foreign security force. This is often because those resources are not available, the foreign security force has these capabilities, or as part of a larger effort to reduce the foreign counterpart's reliance on U.S. capabilities.

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**Note.** Refrain does not restrict external resources that may be available to support advisor teams themselves.

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4-189. Commanders generally provide advising guidance to maneuver advisor teams. Review and update advising guidance frequently to account for changing operational and mission variables. Figure 4-11 provides additional detail and context.
Execute

4-190. Advisors must know the doctrine, rules, and regulations that regulate their actions while working with the foreign security force. U.S. advisors are masters of U.S. Army doctrine while understanding the doctrine, rules, and regulations that guide their foreign counterparts. Done well, the advisor can readily detect departures from both and recommend adjustments.

4-191. It is important to remember that advisor teams do not command foreign personnel or units. Advisors provide advice, training, and when required, access to coalition resources via the support task discussed later in this section. Advisors do not lead foreign security forces in combat. Advisor teams are responsible for command and control within their own team. Advisors should be prepared to coach the commander of the foreign unit, which could include working side-by-side during a combat engagement.

4-192. Advisors have no command influence over the foreign security forces and must depend on influence and relationships to influence foreign operations through teaching, coaching, and advising. Advisors often work with counterparts of higher rank than themselves. Advisors should consider the foreign unit’s experience and capabilities and carefully choose opportunities to inject or impart knowledge. Advisor teams must be confident in the information they present. Trust and rapport is quickly lost if advisors provide incorrect information. Generally, foreign units value advisors who are subtle in their teaching, coaching, and mentoring. Advisors who create a climate in which foreign personnel feel they are teaching themselves often prove the most effective.

4-193. Advisor teams achieve success by accomplishing their mission through their counterparts. Therefore, they must establish rapport, trust, and relationships with their foreign counterparts to build...
influence. This requires advisors to focus on the Army doctrinal attribute of intellect, which includes an emphasis on mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise. Successful advisors have a genuine interest in other people. They smile, adhere to cultural norms, use proper names and titles, actively listen, discuss their interests, and make the other person feel important.

4-194. Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action is effective only if the counterpart trusts the advisor’s professional competency. Counterparts may question the advisor’s competence if they perceive the proposed solution as unrealistic. Therefore, when laying out course of actions or recommendations, the advisor takes time to explain why the recommendations are executable and effective.

4-195. As the foreign security force achieves success from its efforts and proficiency increases, it naturally will take a greater role in its own matters. The advisor may sometimes feel the foreign leaders want to assume more responsibility than they can effectively manage. Advisors ought to appreciate this growing confidence. Long-term success requires the foreign leaders accept more responsibility. Advisors adjust to the growing desires of the foreign security forces to manage themselves and adjust their advising plans accordingly.

4-196. Trust is a fundamental building block of human relationships and at the core of leadership. Followers must trust their leaders. This is especially true in combat, when subordinates must follow orders immediately to succeed on the battlefield. However, trust cannot be mandated; it must be earned. Advisors must earn the trust of their counterpart and trust them in return. Advisors build this trust over time through consistent, principle-centered behavior and actions that demonstrate honesty, integrity, trust, dignity, and respect for all people.

4-197. The advisor teams must support the morale and confidence of the foreign security forces. Committing poorly trained and badly led forces in combat may result in high casualties and invites tactical defeat. While defeat in a small operation may have little strategic consequence, these cumulative effects of numerous small tactical defeats may have serious strategic consequences. If the foreign security force fails, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the host nation government’s ability to protect it. As much as possible, the foreign counterparts begin with simpler operations. As their confidence and competence grows, the foreign counterparts will naturally assume missions that are more complex. Collaborating with joint, multinational, or other foreign units can help new forces build confidence in adjusting to combat stress.

4-198. Advisor teams carefully monitor and evaluate the operational performance of an inexperienced organization to correct weaknesses quickly. If needed, the employment plan for the foreign security force must allow time for additional training after an operation to address training shortfalls. Gradually introducing units into combat allows advisors and the foreign leadership to identify poor leaders, conduct retraining, or take other actions. Advisors identify competent leaders and recommend them for greater authority and responsibility.

Assess

4-199. The AAR is an essential element of building foreign security force capabilities. The foreign commander, with assistance from the advisor team, should conduct the AAR. The AAR begins with a review of the operation or training goals. Advisor personnel guide the foreign leadership to ask leading questions, identify important tactical lessons, explore alternative courses of actions, keep to the teaching points, and make the AAR positive. Key personnel should be present. Guide the foreign commander to discuss not only what happened, but also why it happened. They should discuss the important tactical lessons learned, alternate courses of action the unit could have taken, and other important teaching points.

4-200. Advisor teams coach the foreign commander to discuss activities and key decision points (sustain and improve) for each phase of the operation including information operations, battle drills, contingencies, and implied and specified tasks. Advisors guide the foreign commander to discuss general positive points with the group. The purpose of the group AAR is not to single out a leader, staff member, soldier, or unit to criticize. Conclude with a plan to follow up and make improvements as necessary.

4-201. The U.S. military culture of AARs to discuss all mistakes works for the U.S. military because our culture accepts the technique. However, many cultures do not accept criticisms of one person or group relative to another. Prior to conducting an AAR, advisors should discuss these issues with the foreign leadership to avoid embarrassing group situations. The advisor should encourage a productive environment for the member or unit to discuss improvements. When an issue is unit-wide or recurring, the advisor
discusses the issue with the foreign leadership to find a solution. The foreign leader implements the agreed upon solution.

4-202. Advisors should never take credit for an idea; they should empower their counterpart instead. They discuss the issue and come to a solution together, even if the advisors think they have the solution beforehand. Advisor teams mentor their foreign counterparts towards operational independence. Empowering foreign counterparts builds confidence within their organization, and advisors build trust with their counterpart. As a result, the foreign counterpart will likely seek advisors’ guidance and more readily accept their view in the future.

4-203. Advisors conduct an internal AAR, focusing on what the team must sustain and improve. Internal AAR (advisors only) topics include—
- Conduct of advisors.
- Conduct of the foreign security force (done prior to the foreign AAR if possible).
- Review rules of engagement, escalation of force, and other protective MOEs.
- Review effectiveness of parallel planning efforts.
- Where did the advisors develop, sustain, and improve foreign capabilities or capacities?
- Where were advisors located during the operation? Was the arrangement successful?
- Were advisors prepared for the operation, such as equipment, knowledge of mission, integration with foreign security forces?

4-204. The advisor team builds, submits, and archives the AAR. The advisor team then reviews and adjusts the assessment and development plan for the foreign security forces as necessary. Finally, advisor teams deliver the report to their higher headquarters along with their analysis of the event relative to the assessment and development plan for the foreign security force. Compile and report acts of corruption, gross inefficiency, foreign personnel who hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or sympathy (proven or suspected) for the threat to the higher U.S. headquarters.

SUPPORT

4-205. Advisor teams support foreign security forces with capabilities and capacity to facilitate mission success. As an advisor team activity, support specifically refers to tactical, lethal, and nonlethal support provided to the foreign security force at the tactical or operational level.

4-206. During mission planning, advisor teams may identify capability gaps within the foreign security force that hinder the ability of the foreign counterparts to achieve mission success. Support may include providing access to capabilities, such as medical evacuation, fire support, or specialized engineer resources. Base the amount of support upon conditions, resources, and time available. Advisors must responsibly coordinate and provide support to the foreign security force so they help achieve success but do not create a reliance on U.S. forces.

PLAN

4-207. Advisor teams aim to assist foreign security forces in reinforcing the legitimacy of their government and building confidence in the local population. When providing support to the foreign security force, advisor teams must first identify all of the resources, systems, institutions, and capabilities that are available to the foreign security forces and themselves in theater. Additionally, advisor teams should understand the mission and operational variables that may influence their operations and ability to provide support. Understanding these factors allows advisor teams to plan for the likely support requirements that their foreign counterparts may ask them to provide. Operational environment conditions can rapidly change. Therefore, advisor teams should anticipate potential support requests as the operation persists.

4-208. Providing support to SFA operations often involves an array of unified action partners, making unity of effort essential for success. SFA includes U.S. conventional and special operations forces, the foreign security force, nongovernmental organizations, and other civilian and military joint and multinational organizations. When planning, staffs and advisor teams pay particular attention to coordinating the various external capabilities to integrate all of them into one cohesive effort. Network engagement tasks can assist
SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor teams with integrating the various entities found within the operational environment into the planning process.

PREPARE

4-209. Advisor teams receive training on the legal, technical, and tactical considerations for providing support to foreign security forces. Training should include information regarding current foreign security force capabilities, theater sustainment and support assets available, rules of engagement for employing fires and attack aircraft, rules or legal guidance for providing supplies, food, medical support, and so forth. Advisor teams and SFAB staffs must become familiar with the foreign security force organizations and equipment, particularly the capabilities of weapons and equipment not found in the U.S. inventory. SFAB commanders and staffs should consider incorporating the following support related topics into their training plans:

- Legal responsibilities and procedures when providing medical care to the foreign security forces, local civilians, and other personnel.
- Financial obligations and limitations when providing logistic and contracting support.
- Regulations and procedures regarding the employment of joint fires in support of the foreign counterparts.
- Understanding legal reporting requirements specifically regarding human rights violations, corruption, and other activities that may be detrimental to mission success or violate U.S. and international laws.
- Understanding foreign weapon system capabilities and limitations to provide appropriate implementation guidance to the foreign security force while conducting operations.

4-210. Like any other operation, advisor teams conduct rehearsals prior to providing support to the foreign security force. In addition to the advisor teams, these rehearsals will often involve the foreign counterparts and representatives from other organizations that are actually providing the capability. For example, if a BCT is providing indirect fires in support of the advisor team’s operations with the foreign security forces, the fires staff of that BCT should be involved in the rehearsals prior to execution.

EXECUTE

4-211. Significant legal review and coordination is required prior to providing support to a foreign security force. SFAB commanders and staffs establish clear guidance and SOPs to the advisor teams to clarify requirements, reduce confusion, and expedite the support that is often critical to the success of a particular operation.

4-212. Support provided to the foreign security force varies across the competition continuum, but generally decreases as conflict transitions to competition or as the foreign security force’s capabilities and capacities increase. While success on the battlefield is critical, especially for the soldiers conducting the fight, SFAB commanders and advisor teams must continuously assess the tactical need of the support for the current fight versus the long-term operational and strategic development of the capability within the foreign security force. If advisor teams provide external support every time a foreign security force makes a request, the foreign security force is less likely to develop its own capability.

ASSESS

4-213. Advisor teams conduct assessments after providing support to their foreign counterparts. When conducting AARs, consider the following:

- Was the provided support or capability organic to the foreign security force organizations? If so, why was it not used? If not, is the capability being developed?
- How often did the foreign counterparts request similar support in the past 30 days? How often was the support provided?
- How significant was the support on the operation? What were the effects? Could those effects have been achieved with another asset or capability? Does the foreign security force have access to support that provides similar effects?
Document and report to the next-higher U.S. commander incidents of corruption, gross inefficiency, violations of human rights, and the actions that hinder operations through incompetence, self-interest, or suspected sympathy for the enemy or adversary groups.

4-214. The advisor teams complete the AARs and submit them to their higher headquarters. SFAB leaders review AARs and submit them to the country team to assist with the continued development of the foreign security force.

LIAISE

4-215. Liaison is the contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces and other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. When advisor teams are working with foreign counterparts and there is a U.S. unit in the same or adjacent area of operations, the advisor teams have a responsibility to liaise and coordinate with the U.S. unit. In addition to the informal liaison via the SFAB advisors, formal liaison and coordination should occur between the foreign security force and the other U.S. unit. This is true regardless of the context. For example, the U.S. unit and the foreign security force may be partners in a multinational force answering to the same commander. In another case, the U.S. unit may have a unilateral mission with a completely separate chain of command. In either of these examples, the foreign security force and the U.S. unit may have exchanged liaison officers at their echelon or between their higher headquarters. Neither of these situations removes the responsibility of the advisor teams to conduct liaison and coordination. From the perspective of the other U.S. unit, the SFAB advisor teams have expert knowledge of the foreign security force that they do not have. This can be critical to avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions. Through liaisons, advisor teams conduct, coordinate, and share information gained from assessments, information analyses, and commander’s guidance.

LIAISON IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

4-216. The SFAB may also perform a liaison function with a foreign security force during large-scale combat operations. In this scenario, the SFAB advisor teams may provide direct support to a foreign security force and serve as an embedded link between the foreign force and other U.S. organizations. For example, if a foreign division is serving within a combined joint task force during large-scale combat operations, SFAB advisor teams may be placed within the division, brigade, and even battalion headquarters of the foreign military division. This increases the capability of the foreign force to integrate into the larger operation, tie into U.S. enablers, and provide greater situational understanding to both the foreign and U.S. forces. When operating in this role, SFAB advisor teams will likely have contact with digital liaison detachments. (See ATP 3-94.1 for more information regarding those organizations.)

4-217. By providing advisor teams to foreign militaries or government agencies during large-scale combat operations, immediate interoperability of command and control is achieved as the SFAB advisor teams possess the necessary network architecture and communications to assist in the coordination and communication required to synchronize operations. Moreover, SFAB advisor teams are capable of ensuring communications interoperability across the joint force as well. By placing advisor teams with adjacent units that may not be fielded with like communications capabilities, the advisor teams can ensure the common operational picture is able to be communicated to the partnered unit and consistent, reliable communication is maintained.

Note. When used in this capacity during large-scale combat operations, the typical guidance of advising at echelon or two levels higher may not apply.

FUNCTIONS OF AN SFAB LIAISON OFFICER

4-218. Liaisons, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the range of military operations. The skill set, rank and experience requirement for an advisor acting as a liaison is a deliberate decision made by the commander. Liaisons should never be the person the organization can spare; it needs to be a critical trusted advisor.
Liaisons should be prepared to perform the following functions:

- **Monitor.** Liaison officers must monitor the operations of both the unit at which they are a liaison officer and the advisor team or SFAB that sent them and understand how each affects the other. As a minimum, the liaison officer must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and are sensitive to parent commanders and the organic SFAB commander’s desires.

- **Coordinate.** Liaison officers facilitate synchronization of current operations/future plans between the sending organization and the unit at which they are acting as a liaison officer. The liaison officer does this through coordination with other liaison officers, members of the adjacent staff, and the parent command. Liaison officers should routinely meet with staff officers and commanders in the headquarters and readily know how to contact them. The understanding and procedures liaison officers build while monitoring the situation help facilitate the synchronization of the SFAB’s operations/future plans with those of the unit at which they are conducting liaison by coordinating the communication process.

- **Advise.** The liaison officer is the receiving headquarters’ expert on the SFAB’s capabilities and limitations. Liaison officers must be able to advise the commander and the staff on the optimum use of the command they represent.

- **Assist.** The liaison officer must assist on two levels. First, the liaison officer must act as the conduit between the SFAB and the receiving headquarters. Second, by integrating into the receiving headquarters and attending various boards, meetings, and planning sessions, liaison officers can answer their questions and ensure they make informed decisions with the SFAB, their advisor teams, and the foreign security force requirements in mind. (See JP 3-33 for more information.)
Chapter 5
Augmentation

This chapter describes augmentation considerations for permissive and hostile environments. This chapter also describes the various capabilities that may be available through augmentation by warfighting function.

SECTION I – AUGMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

5-1. Commanders at all levels assess requirements for augmentation based on operational and mission variables and coordinate for necessary forces, which include joint, component, or civilian agencies and contractor support. Commanders and staffs evaluate criteria and requirements due to changing conditions involving the civilian population, enemy forces, and infrastructure. The main determination for the type and amount of augmentation required will be in the initial mission analysis determining whether the environment is permissive or hostile. When requesting augmentation, SFAB and advisor team commanders must plan for deliberate integration and synchronization of augmented personnel and equipment. Whenever possible, the augmented personnel should be included in the SFAB predeployment or home station training.

PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

5-2. Upon completion of initial mission analysis, support and augmentation requirements for a permissive environment are very different from those required in a hostile environment. The SFAB is purpose built to self-deploy and conduct partner engagement without augmentation in a permissive environment with a few notable exceptions. First, the SFAB does not possess organic lift or mobility. All movements of advisors will have to be coordinated with an outside agency. Second, the SFAB does not possess logistics or medical capabilities; all logistics and medical support will need to come either from the host nation or off the local economy. Conduct a thorough mission analysis upon receipt of mission to identify all external support requirements. Permissive environment support and augmentation requirements may include—

- Interpreter support.
- Housing.
- Field feeding.
- Mobility.
- Medical support.
- Medical evacuation.
- Security augmentation.

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

5-3. Entry into a hostile environment and defining the needed support requirements will be the most crucial outcomes of mission analysis. Forces available will largely determine augmentation and support availability and whether the SFAB is entering a mature or new JOA. SFABs possess the capability to self-deploy to a hostile environment, but they do not possess the ability to self-secure, move, or sustain themselves. Hostile environment support and augmentation may include—

- Security augmentation.
- Interpreter support.
- Housing.
- Field feeding.
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- Mobility.
- Medical support.
- Medical evacuation.
- Fires.
- Access to a quick reaction force.

COORDINATION

5-4. Augmentation coordination involves higher headquarters, contributing organization staffs, SFAB staff, subordinate advisor teams, and unified action partners. Coordination needs to be as thorough and detailed as possible. All parties must understand the concept of the operation, including detailed coordination instructions. If necessary, coordination includes an interpreter to facilitate explanation and understanding.

5-5. Coordination with higher headquarters involves requests for augmentation, identification of contributing organizations and liaisons with identified organizations, and notification upon arrival. Coordination with subordinate advisor teams involves determining how the augmented support is task-organized within subordinate units and clearly stating the intent and objectives for the augmentee.

5-6. Units determine force requirements when requesting augmentation from unified action partners. Units conduct an analysis to determine additional requirements for working with U.S. forces. The requirements can include the following:

- Personnel considerations including personnel status; health records; accountably rosters; battle roster numbers; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training requirements; threat briefings; and interpreter support.
- Medical requirements including immunizations, medical records, and specific theater medical training and health requirements.
- Training requirements including technical certifications, weapon qualifications, vehicle training, and CBRN requirements.
- Logistics considerations including transportation, fuel, ammunition, recovery, and sustenance. Additionally, any unique requirements including the means to recover, fuel, arm, and repair vehicles and equipment that are not organic to the requesting unit.

MULTINATIONAL AND FOREIGN SECURITY AUGMENTATION

5-7. Each multinational military or foreign force has unique capabilities, methods, and force structure. Conducting allied, foreign, and U.S. forces comprehensive capabilities briefs aids in understanding these variables across the organizations. Previous experience working with one nation does not translate to working with another.

5-8. Detailed communications are key when planning reconnaissance and security operations with a multinational or foreign military partner and begin immediately upon receipt of the mission. Confirmation briefs during planning aid in reducing language, cultural, and military capability barriers. Exchange of liaison personnel, with interpreters as necessary, occurs as early as possible in the planning process. The list below is not exhaustive; however, SFAB units and staffs can use this list of considerations to begin planning for operations with an multinational or foreign security force:

- Command and control—
  - Compatibility of radios and digital systems.
  - Multinational radios encryption capabilities.
  - Communications security requirements (North Atlantic Treaty Organization key).
  - Multinational radio capabilities and limitations affecting U.S. ability to conduct retransmission. Multinational forces’ retransmission capabilities.
  - Digital versus analog. Effective communications planning.
  - Digital collaboration capabilities.
  - SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network capabilities.
- Placement and use of liaison officers and planners.
- Type and frequency of rehearsals.
- Rules of engagement. National caveats that may restrict the force.
- Task organization. Command relationship authorization.

- **Maneuver—**
  - Exchange of tactics, doctrine, and SOPs.
  - Maneuver assets, capabilities, and limitations.
  - Explain operational terms and graphics (and rank structure as applicable).
  - Work to reduce the language barrier to the greatest extent possible.
  - Task-organize changes and impacts of command relationships (if authorized).
  - Incorporate route clearance, mobility, and countermobility.

- **Intelligence—**
  - Classification and authority to release information.
  - Intelligence sharing in both directions.
  - Understand U.S. and multinational information collection capabilities.
  - Interrogation procedures and restrictions, which vary widely from nation to nation.

- **Fires—**
  - Assets, capabilities, and limitations.
  - Cross-boundary fires (approval authority).
  - Call for fire and counterbattery procedures and authorities.
  - Use of precision-guided munitions.
  - Clear understanding of fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures.
  - Established fires and quick fire radio frequencies.
  - Include in rehearsals.

- **Protection—**
  - Multinational CBRN endurance and detection capabilities.
  - Multinational EOD and survivability capabilities.
  - Detainee operations and procedures.
  - Key assets that require engineer support to increase survivability, such as command posts and communications platforms.

- **Sustainment—**
  - Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, which determine national financial obligations.
  - Types of command support relationships and nesting with acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.
  - Resupply of nationally distinct items (specifically classes III, V, IX, and CBRN).
  - Transportation and distribution capabilities or requirements.
  - Medical capabilities.
  - Fuel requirements and compatibility for foreign equipment.
  - Power generation requirements (220/110 volt).

## SECTION II – AUGMENTATION ANALYSIS

5-9. SFAB commanders and staffs use the six warfighting functions of command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection as a framework for conducting analysis and determining what additional augmentation may be required. SFAB staffs may use the warfighting functions to identify requirements and gaps. The augmentation examples provided in paragraphs 5-10 through 5-68 are not all-inclusive. Warfighting functions are a framework to assist the unit with determining augmentation
requirements. Staffs can use any framework with which they are comfortable and proficient to determine requirements.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-10. The SFAB has a command and control structure that integrates warfighting functions into its organization. The command and control structure does this through direct integration (placing team members directly with their counterparts) or decentralized methods (placing various team members throughout the foreign security force at key locations). Direct integration is most useful when the intensity of conflict is high and information requirements drive quick reactions, such as counterfire missions. Use decentralized methods when the SFAB is in regional support or as part of a coalition supporting various nonintegrated forces. Successful mission accomplishment in decentralized methods of augmentation relies on task execution at lower echelons and emphasizes leader initiative and involvement.

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

5-11. The SFAB commander requests additional civil military operation capabilities to engage the civil component of the operational environment. Due to the SFAB’s mission of working through the foreign security forces or partnered nation, the ability to interact with the civilian populace is a key component of success. Support of the civilian populace is imperative to the legitimization of the foreign security force. The civil component of the SFA requires additional specialized expertise in training and developing a foreign partner. Commanders use civil military operations to enhance the relationship among military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present.

5-12. Civil affairs augmentation provides the SFAB with specialty skills to enhance the conduct of civil military operations. (See FM 3-57.) Civil affairs forces execute the following core competencies and their nested functions:

- Civil affairs activities.
  - Civil reconnaissance.
  - Civil engagement.
  - Civil information management
  - Civil-military operations center.
  - Civil affairs operations staff support.

- Military government operations.
  - Transitional military authority.
  - Support to civil administration.

- Civil affairs supported activities.
  - Foreign assistance.
  - Foreign humanitarian assistance.
  - Populace and resources control.

INFORMATION

5-13. Regardless the type of foreign security force, information plays a significant role in executing its mission. From information management to activities in cyberspace, in public diplomacy, and international messaging, how the foreign security forces view and employ information likely permeates everything they do. Therefore, the SFAB must prepare to support the foreign security forces’ information functions.

5-14. The SFAB has a sparse information capability that does not include specialists outside of communications technicians. During mission analysis, when the SFABs determine their own capability gaps and requests external support, they request appropriate personnel or units. These may include cyberspace, public affairs, functional area 30 personnel, and psychological operations or other units and capabilities. The desired capability and capacity of the foreign security force and the analysis of the SFAB’s organic capabilities drives the need for external capabilities.
NETWORK AND COMMUNICATIONS

5-15. Signal operations support the SFAB by providing communications and the digital network to enable command and control. Three network operations tasks of enterprise management, network assurance, and content management, which provide the SFAB with the ability to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain operations, support the SFAB. These capabilities provide the SFAB with access to cyberspace, higher and lower organizations, the DOD information network, the foreign security force, and other unified action partners as necessary. Since the SFAB often operates in austere environments, augmentation is required to ensure reliable communications.

5-16. Network and communication augmentation support is scalable and flexible. The SFAB S-6 anticipates, plans, and coordinates for additional signal capabilities as necessary. (See FM 6-02.) The signal core competencies include—

- Network operations.
- Network transport and information services.
- Spectrum management operations.
- Visual information and combat camera.
- Communications security.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

5-17. The SFAB may require additional maneuver forces to enhance the advisor team’s physical security or to support the foreign security force mission. In an established JOA, the SFAB requests additional maneuver support through the higher headquarters. In some cases, its higher headquarters may direct the SFAB to coordinate directly with unified action partners or the foreign security force for additional maneuver forces. When deployed to a theater that does not have an established JOA, the SFAB coordinates with the host nation foreign security forces or government via the embassy country team for additional security forces.

AVIATION

5-18. Army Aviation conducts air-ground operations as the aerial maneuver force of the combined arms team or as an independent maneuver force to support ground forces conducting decisive action tasks. Army Aviation executes its seven core competencies through the following tactical, enabling, and sustaining tasks: (See FM 3-04.)

- Provide accurate and timely information.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Destroy, defeat, disrupt, divert, or delay enemy forces.
- Air assault ground maneuver forces.
- Air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.
- Evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel.
- Enable command and control over extended ranges and complex terrain.

5-19. When supporting the SFAB mission, attack, lift, and unmanned aircraft system capabilities are the most probable aviation augmentation requirements. When available, Army Aviation augmentation provides the SFAB with the ability to conduct air movement of personnel, leaders, critical supplies, equipment, and systems as well as attack aviation support to combat operations. Due to the flexible nature of aircraft, short-duration and short-notice augmentation can be requested through supporting aviation units. For example, an unmanned aircraft system may be able to provide observation on a suspected enemy indirect fire site while flying back from another mission.

SECURITY FORCES

5-20. The SFAB requests additional security elements when conducting operations in many environments. Due to the SFAB’s limited organic capacity for maneuver against an enemy force, the SFAB requests additional security to provide the appropriate level of combat power necessary to conduct operations alongside a foreign security force. These additional security elements may come from other U.S. military
forces, contractors, or allied nations. In a non-JOA environment, the SFAB may receive additional protection through the local police forces.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

5-21. The SFAB may request special operations forces’ support for a wide variety of operations or tasks. Special operations forces conduct a wide variety of missions and activities including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, SFA, counterinsurgency, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, preparation of the environment, military information support operations, civil affairs operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. (See FM 3-05.)

5-22. Army special operations forces conduct most missions and activities with and through indigenous, foreign, irregular, and regular partners. Army special operations forces engage with many of the same partners and populations SFAB Soldiers encounter. Army special operations forces often conduct similar activities to those of the SFAB but with different partners, at a different scale of operations, and for specific, specially defined purposes. Army special operations forces frequently have pre-established relationships and influence in foreign partner nations. Army special operations forces and the SFAB should be natural and complementary partners.

5-23. Many criteria determine when conventional forces, special operations forces, or combinations are appropriate to conduct SFA. Military-force levels, force characteristics, and other factors present planners with optimal, acceptable, and less desirable force package options when resourcing SFA missions. Deployment of a regionally aligned force for an SFA mission depends on the validated requirement of the combatant commander. Oftentimes, special operations forces are already conducting missions in areas where a nation is requesting SFA. In many cases, the host nation may be expanding the parameters of its SFA request and the SFAB may find itself relieving special operations forces of its mission to allow special operations forces to transition to other tasks. The SFAB and the special operations forces conduct operations independently but collaborate and coordinate when it is determined they have shared interests.

5-24. U.S. operations generally involve both conventional and special operations when conducting SFA. Army doctrine defines command and support relationships of both forces operating in the same area. Recent operational experience has shown that, in improving the effectiveness of the foreign security forces, the supported commander conducting SFA may be either a conventional force or special operations forces commander. Subordinate commanders and staffs of both conventional forces and special operations forces may act in the supporting role to the U.S. ambassador. Typically, the security cooperation organization or the defense attaché at the American Embassy manages this relationship.

**INTELLIGENCE**

5-25. The SFAB commander may require additional intelligence capabilities to support the mission. The SFAB intelligence officer has limited resources, specifically in personnel and time, to analyze and process intelligence. During mission analysis, the SFAB staffs analyze organic intelligence capabilities, restrictions of intelligence activities within the area of operations, available augmentation capabilities, and sustainment requirements of additional intelligence resources. The seven intelligence disciplines are human intelligence, counterintelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, geospatial intelligence, and technical intelligence. In addition to these seven disciplines, there are other complimentary intelligence capabilities as well.

**HUMAN INTELLIGENCE**

5-26. Human intelligence is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0). While the SFAB does not have a full team, it does have a human intelligence technician and collector. This sergeant is assigned to the military intelligence company and may perform limited human intelligence functions. If required, SFAB commanders may request human intelligence collection teams to support and assist with SFA. However, prior to requesting or employing human intelligence collection teams, staffs must examine status of forces agreements, rules of engagement, and political conditions that may restrict the employment of human intelligence collection teams and human
intelligence operations to support foreign forces or environments. Human intelligence tasks include the following:

- Conducting source operations.
- Debriefing U.S. and allied forces and civilian personnel including dislocated civilians, third-country nationals, and local inhabitants.
- Interrogating detainees.

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

5-27. *Counterintelligence* is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-01.2). The SFAB is assigned counterintelligence personnel within the military intelligence company that may perform counterintelligence functions and, if needed, may be augmented with external capabilities. Counterintelligence operations counter or neutralize adversary intelligence collection efforts through information collection, counterintelligence investigations, operations, analysis, production, and technical services and support. Counterintelligence augmentation can assist the SFAB with conducting antiterrorism and force protection assessments. Counterintelligence support is available in a JOA but may require additional coordination in a non-JOA environment. Legal restrictions may prohibit certain counterintelligence activities within the area of operations. The four missions of counterintelligence include—

- Countering espionage, international terrorism, and the counterintelligence insider threat.
- Support to force protection.
- Support to the defense critical infrastructure program.
- Support to research, development, and acquisition.

**SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE**

5-28. *Signals intelligence* is intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0). Signals intelligence provides technical intelligence information, complements intelligence derived from other sources, and is often used for cueing other sensors to potential targets of interest. For example, signals intelligence may identify information used to cue the SFAB or the foreign security forces to confirm potential enemy activity. The discipline is subdivided into three subcategories: communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. (See ADP 2-0.)

**MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE**

5-29. *Measurement and signature intelligence* is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0).

5-30. Depending on the operational environment assessment, the SFAB commander and staff may consider measurement and signature intelligence information to support the SFAB and foreign security force missions. Measurement and signature intelligence information and capabilities are available through the theater or regional intelligence channels by requesting the required information.

**OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE**

5-31. *Open-source intelligence* is relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements (JP 2-0).

5-32. The SFAB commander and staff may assign the additional duty of open-source intelligence specialist to intelligence personnel to support the mission. An analyst with the additional duty may enhance and expedite the analysis of local information.
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GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE

5-33. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-03).

5-34. The SFAB could require geospatial intelligence capabilities to support assigned missions. An example of using geospatial intelligence personnel to support the foreign security force may be providing it with detailed graphics to conduct operations. As with measurement and signature intelligence and the other more technical capabilities, the information these assets provide is generally available for request through theater or regional intelligence channels.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

5-35. Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages (JP 2-0). The role of technical intelligence is to ensure Soldiers understand the threat’s full technological capabilities. With this understanding, U.S. forces and the foreign partners can implement appropriate countermeasures, operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

5-36. The SFAB commander considers augmenting technical intelligence capabilities based on the operational environment and the mission. For example, the area of operations may have the presence of near-peer hostile states conducting concurrent operations. Augmentation of technical intelligence capabilities include personnel and equipment with the ability to monitor threat capabilities, provide technical guidance to commanders, and provide reach back capabilities to other systems and resources. (See ADP 2-0.)

COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

5-37. Complementary intelligence capabilities contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence to facilitate the conduct of operations. The complementary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances at each echelon and can vary across the intelligence enterprise. The SFAB and the foreign security forces may require these additional capabilities. If so, the request will generally be routed through the higher headquarters or country team. These capabilities include but are not limited to the following:

- Biometrics-enabled intelligence.
- Cyber-enabled intelligence.
- Document and media exploitation.
- Forensic-enabled intelligence.

FIRES

5-38. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). Generally, the SFAB relies on nonorganic fires capabilities. When operating in a JOA, the SFAB may request Army fires systems to support offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Deliver fires.
- Integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires.
- Conduct targeting.

5-39. Due to the organization of the SFAB and the absence of organic indirect fires systems, it is critical to establish the fires support communication channels with supporting theater elements to ensure that fire support is available when necessary. Additionally, due to the nature of their mission working with a foreign security force, the clearance of fires, rules of engagement, fire support coordination measures, and airspace coordination measures must be well defined and communicated between all the organizations involved in the operations. (See JP 3-09, FM 3-09, FM 3-96, and ATP 3-09.42.)
**JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL FIRES**

5-40. Joint or multinational fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components or nations in a coordinated action to produce the desired effects to support a common objective. Developing policy, guidance, and plans to employ operational and strategic fires are primarily joint activities. Joint fires include surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires.

5-41. When integrating joint and multinational fires, coordination and synchronization responsibilities are heightened and requests for indirect fire support are elevated to a higher headquarters element. It may be necessary to establish a liaison with the supporting unit, especially with multinational units.

5-42. Fire support coordination in multinational operations requires special arrangements with multinational forces and local authorities. Special arrangements include implementing communications and language standards, exchanging liaison personnel, and adopting interoperability procedures.

**FIELD ARTILLERY**

5-43. *Field artillery* is the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of indirect fire cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers (JP 3-09). Field artillery contributes to operations by massing fires on single or multiple targets with precision, near precision, and area fire capabilities. Field artillery can rapidly shift fires throughout the area of operations to support the scheme of maneuver and to counter unforeseen enemy reaction to achieve the maneuver commander’s desired effects.

5-44. The SFAB has a field artillery battalion that is not equipped with cannon or rocket batteries. In a JOA, SFAB fires personnel must coordinate with a component field artillery headquarters (field artillery brigade and division artillery) or a field artillery unit that has been assigned a support relationship with the SFAB. Field artillery is the maneuver commander’s principle means for providing continuous and responsive indirect fires to support operations. Field artillery provides continuously available fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. Field artillery can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace.

**CLEARANCE OF FIRE PROCEDURES**

5-45. Increase the timeliness of fires clearance through fire support coordination measures and execution of battle drills. Advisors rehearse these battle drills often alongside their foreign partners. Through timely reporting, the foreign security forces and SFAB advisor teams maintain situational awareness to clear their area of operations. The SFAB uses its command systems to relay that information to coalition forces to coordinate, and clear the fires.

**AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY**

5-46. The SFAB has no organic or assigned air defense personnel or equipment. Air defense artillery is a term unique to the Army for its dedicated air and missile defense capabilities and forces. *Air and missile defense* are direct (active and passive) defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01). Commanders assess enemy air threats, and then air defense artillery forces are organized and assigned based on mission and operational variables. In a JOA environment, the SFAB falls under an area air defense plan. When air defense artillery personnel are assigned or attached to the SFAB as augmentation, air defense artillery commanders and staffs brief the supported commander and staff on the capabilities and limitations that the air defense artillery personnel and equipment can provide.

5-47. When necessary, based on the enemy threat assessment, the SFAB considers integrating air defense artillery throughout all phases of major operations. The air defense artillery performs the following essential tasks:

- Integrate air defense artillery assets according to the area air defense plan.
- Allocate available assets throughout the operational area.
- Deploy early warning systems.
- Coordinate airspace control activities with theater, corps, and subordinate air defense artillery cells.
• Recommend air defense artillery tactics and techniques to best counter air and missile threats.

TARGETING

5-48. Targeting is a critical component of the fires warfighting function. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). The fire support coordinator leads the targeting process within the brigade, as required, to integrate lethal and nonlethal effects with SFAB and foreign security force operations. The SFAB staff structure has limited targeting personnel within their staffs, much of this capability resides on the advisor teams. The SFAB staffs rely heavily on subordinate advisor teams to provide targeting information and recommendations to the staff. Higher headquarters can request additional support as necessary. (See JP 3-60 and ATP 3-60 (FM 3-60).)

PROTECTION

5-49. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatant) and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners, including partner nations. Protection is a critical consideration for the SFAB given its potential employment in areas where established protection infrastructure may be limited. The SFAB may receive greater support from theater protection assets within a JOA. Outside of established JOAs, comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring protection planning and coordination are required to ensure sufficient protection. Every operational environment has unique protection planning considerations.

5-50. Protection is an essential consideration for SFAB commanders and staffs and often requires significant augmentation based on assessed threats and mission requirements. In permissive environments, the SFAB relies on protection capabilities and security provided by the foreign security forces. In semipermissive or hostile environments, the SFAB may require augmentation with complementary protection capabilities. Listed below are key protection augmentation elements that may be available to SFABs.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

5-51. CBRN officers and NCOs provide critical support through the core functions of assess, protect, and mitigate. Information obtained through these core functions is linked together through the integrating activity of hazard awareness. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction signifies a growing threat across the world and the SFAB must prepare to operate in this environment. Having no organic CBRN units or equipment to assist with CBRN prevention and response, the SFAB must carefully consider the threat environment and request CBRN augmentation when a significant CBRN threat exists.

ENGINEERS

5-52. Engineers provide technical expertise across their disciplines of combat, general, and geospatial engineering. The SFAB contains an engineer battalion; however, the organic engineers lack most capabilities outside of advising. Engineer battalion individual members have technical expertise in reducing explosive hazards within their explosive ordnance clearance agent capability (conventional and improvised) to enable and maintain SFAB advisor team mobility. As the situation dictates, especially when the SFAB encounters significant construction requirements, commanders and staffs must consider augmentation of the SFAB with additional engineer capabilities or contracted construction support. The engineer battalion commander and staff provide the SFAB with the experience necessary to provide recommendations on engineer support required.

5-53. When available, various types of engineer organizations can provide the following capabilities:

• General engineering (restore damaged areas, construct and maintain line of communications, establish base camps, repair or restore infrastructure, provide engineering assessments, provide master planning for facility and design support, develop and maintain facilities, provide power generation and distribution, and contracted construction oversight).
Augmentation

- Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).
- Geospatial engineering (terrain analysis, terrain visualization, tailored map products, geospatial foundation data, theater geospatial data).

**EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL**

5-54. EOD augmentation provides the SFAB with capabilities to render safe and dispose of explosive ordnance hazards including unexploded explosive ordnance, IEDs, and homemade explosives. Explosive hazard advisors within the SFAB may provide immediate action to mitigate an explosive hazard to prevent the loss of life when no other EOD capability can reasonably respond. However, they do not provide the capability and capacity of a fully equipped and manned EOD team. Therefore, EOD augmentation is required to clear explosive ordnance hazards for the SFAB advisor teams per the rules of allocations pertaining to EOD support.

5-55. EOD augmentation could provide the following capabilities:
- Disposal support.
- Development of an EOD disposal support plan.
- Coordination for EOD disposal support.
- Supervision of EOD operations.
- Render safe procedure support.

**MILITARY POLICE**

5-56. Military police provide police, detention, security, and mobility support capabilities that may augment SFAB protection capabilities to enhance security and preserve combat power. Given the core competencies of policing, investigations, and corrections, military police should be requested to augment the SFAB with police advisors when requirements exist to advise and assist partner nation police or corrections organizations. In recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, military police provided scalable and flexible police development training teams critical to accomplishing police advise and assist missions. (See FM 3-39, FM 3-63, and ATP 3-39.10.)

5-57. Military police provide a unique mixture of capabilities across the military police disciplines that may augment SFAB protection or advisor capabilities including—
- Police operations (law enforcement, forensics and biometrics support, criminal investigations, civil disturbance control, evidence response teams, host-nation police training support, customs support, and support to border control and boundary security).
- Detention operations (confinement of U.S. military prisoners, detainee operations, and host-nation corrections training and support).
- Security and mobility support (area security, base and base camp defense, response force operations, critical asset security, high-risk personnel security, route and convoy security, antiterrorism and physical security support, and military working dogs).

**SUSTAINMENT**

5-58. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment considerations for the SFAB are similar to protection in that SFABs have access to established theater infrastructure in established JOAs but require significant augmentation when employed outside of a JOA. (See chapter 7.)

**OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

5-59. The SFAB may require augmentation that does not necessarily align with the warfighting functions. Higher headquarters may direct augmentation or it could take the form of unified action partners or ministry liaison teams.
UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

5-60. Augmentation from unified action partners depends on the specific requirements of the SFAB’s mission and the participation of other nation’s forces. In uncertain environments, the presence of nonmilitary unified action partners may be limited. Many civilian, law enforcement, and other agencies require a permissive or semipermissive environment before agreeing to participate in on-location SFA operations.

5-61. Potential unified action partner augmentation may include—

- Joint and multinational military partners.
- U.S. federal agencies like the Department of State, Department of Justice, and U.S. Agency for International Development.
- International governmental organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

LANGUAGE SUPPORT

5-62. SFAB operations are highly dependent on foreign language support. Exploiting enemy documents, communicating with the foreign partner, host-nation organizations, and local populations necessitates using interpreters and linguists. Manage this critical asset closely as it is critical to successful operations.

5-63. SFAB staff must analyze linguist needs to determine the minimum level of foreign language proficiency needed including additional requirements for security clearances, specific ethnicities, genders, or other considerations. This includes determining the translation accuracy requirements. While drafting formal documents or conducting formal negotiations requires a high linguistic capability and cultural acumen, the translation of routine documents (with the aid of a dictionary) generally requires less skill.

MINISTRY LIAISON TEAMS

5-64. The ministerial liaison team serves as a single unit collocated with the host-nation ministry of defense, interior, or other institutions to provide continuous advising support to host-nation personnel and leaders. Higher headquarters determines whether to augment the SFAB with a ministerial liaison team.

5-65. The ministerial liaison team may include subject matter experts on operational contract support, budgeting, strategic plans and policy, foreign area officer, provost marshal, strategic intelligence, logistics, force modernization and design, human resources, medical, and legal advisors.

ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION

5-66. Commanders require augmentation when they determine they can no longer accomplish the mission with assigned force structure or equipment. Augmentation allows commanders to accomplish tasks and enables success. In addition to premission planning, commanders must constantly assess operations to determine what augmentation capabilities are required and integrate those forces into their operations as seamlessly as possible. As with any SFAB function, augmentation requires careful consideration with the foreign partners. One area requiring continuous augmentation analysis is protection, which is discussed in chapter 6.
Chapter 6
Protection

This chapter discusses the protection warfighting function and how advisor teams integrate their foreign partners to enhance their own security.

SECTION I – PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

6-1. Protection focuses on preserving combat power. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize protection capabilities and resources throughout the operations process in order to protect the force, enable freedom of action, and identify and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States, allies, and partners. The SFAB must consider all aspects of protection to include internal, external, and foreign security force protection capabilities. The three categories of protection considerations—
- Establishing friendly force protection measures.
- Developing foreign security force protection measures.
- Leveraging foreign security force protection capabilities.

ESTABLISHING FRIENDLY FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AND POSTURE

6-2. The friendly force protects itself through its own actions. Friendly force protection includes measures or tasks executed by the SFAB to preserve combat power. These tasks include establishing internal security measures, implementing a field sanitation program, establishing internal SOPs for conducting operations with the foreign security force, executing preventative medical checks and inspections, conducting risk assessments prior to operations or training events, cyber awareness, and ensuring all personnel are aware of the identified risks.

6-3. Advisor team leaders and commanders balance their time and resources between conducting advisor team activities and protection tasks. As with any endeavor, the more time advisor teams spend performing a function outside of their advisor activities, the less effective they will be in their primary mission. Frequently update protection measures as the area of operations and the threat change.

6-4. Advisors must be able to de-escalate tensions when working with the foreign security force. Commanders and advisors plan for and implement protection capabilities, to include de-escalation techniques. Advisor teams avoid physical and lethal engagements with their foreign counterparts while maintaining their right to self-defense. Maintaining honest, yet respectful, relationships with the foreign counterparts is one of the best ways for advisor teams to maintain their own physical security. (See ATP 3-37.15 for more information on foreign security force threats.)

DEVELOPING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES

6-5. Advisor teams conduct their advisor team activities to develop the foreign security force’s protection capabilities. Advisor teams identify protection-related gaps by assessing their current capabilities and comparing them to the foreign security forces’ end state. The advisor team then communicates with its foreign partner to share its findings, prioritize gaps, identify and verify the end state, and finally help the foreign security force create a plan.
LEVERAGING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE CAPABILITIES TO ENHANCE PROTECTION

6-6. The SFAB uses the foreign security force’s actions to enhance its protection. These activities are apart from and enhance the SFAB’s organic protection capabilities. The SFAB leverages the foreign security force personnel and resources to apply more combat power against the SFA tasks and requirements.

6-7. Protection planning addresses requirements for quick reaction forces, emergency or contingency operations, personnel recovery, and the integration of the SFAB personnel into the foreign security force protection plan. The commander must understand the threat in the operational area. Commanders can accurately assess threats and employ measures to safeguard SFAB personnel and facilities when they have access to intelligence from local, regional, and national resources.

SECTION II – SECURITY

6-8. While protection provides an overall approach to preserving combat power, there are additional protection considerations that the SFAB must address to achieve comprehensive and layered protection. The integration and synchronization of operations security, local security, and area security with the protection tasks enable commanders to protect forces, critical assets, and information. These security considerations include—

- Operations security.
- Local security.
- Area security.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

6-9. Operations security is a significant challenge during SFA activities. The need to protect critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities from hostile elements facilitates the SFAB’s overall security. The nature of the SFA implies that many host-nation officials and the population have information regarding some U.S. activities before they occur, which increases operational risk. However, critical information and key activities can be protected by identifying the operational risk associated with certain types of information, designating the appropriate people with which information can be shared, monitoring the success of the operations security program, and implementing changes as necessary.

6-10. Advisors must consider the possibility of informants within the foreign security force when designing the operations security program. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or sympathizers within the foreign security force acting as informants.

6-11. Higher headquarters should provide extensive operations security in support of their advisor teams and their foreign partners. Communications security is an implied subcomponent of operations security. Communications security is essential throughout the planning and execution of SFA activities. Train advisors to protect sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials. Communications security between the SFAB and the foreign partner can be challenging, as they may not have compatible systems. In cases where the foreign security force lacks capability, advisors establish alternative communications methods in conjunction with the foreign security force. Regardless of how an advisor communicates with its foreign partner, protect sensitive information. This information may lead to unintended consequences.

LOCAL SECURITY

6-12. Local security is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADP 3-90). Local security is an inherent responsibility of every individual, organization, and commander. Local security involves efforts taken to defeat local threats to provide immediate protection to the friendly force. The SFAB contains local security capabilities to retain the ability to defend itself no matter the operational environment. Security tasks—outside of local team security—are beyond the capability of the advisor team and must performed by another security force, which may be the foreign security force. The
foreign security force contributes to the SFAB local security through personnel, equipment, and facilities it may provide to the SFAB.

6-13. Local security includes observation posts, local security patrols, perimeter security, overwatch positions, and other measures to provide close-in security for a force. The SFAB must always place local security in the forefront of its considerations, as the ability to continuously secure itself is critical to its ability to perform its assigned tasks and fulfill its mission. The SFAB routinely works with the foreign security force in small teams and minimal additional security personnel. When necessary, the advisor team employs one of its members to provide overwatch of its members during foreign engagements. The designated member is disengaged from the meeting or training, focusing on the environment and participants. The overwatch personnel must remain vigilant to the behavior and actions of everyone present. The designated member must also be cognizant of customs and courtesies of the foreign counterparts as not to mistake normal behavior and action with aggressive action or conversation tone.

6-14. On those occasions when SFA operations are politically sensitive, successful insider attacks may have a greater strategic effect than a conventional force-on-force attack. Therefore, these attacks are a goal of many enemy organizations and must be considered while planning and conducting SFAB operations. In such cases of increased risk of attack, security measures must be modified accordingly. All SFAB members have a responsibility to contribute to local security. Unless augmented with a dedicated security force, SFAB team members collectively share the responsibility to contribute to continuous local security through constant observation, awareness, and rotational security duties, as necessary.

6-15. The foreign security forces should have the ability to secure themselves and provide for their own local security. Advisors teach their foreign partners the five fundamentals of security:

- Provide early and accurate warning.
- Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
- Orient on the force or facility to be secured.
- Perform continuous reconnaissance.
- Maintain enemy contact.

6-16. Foreign security forces operating consistently with the fundamentals of security detailed in FM 3-98 develop basic local security competencies. Once proficient at these fundamentals, they begin to perform additional forms of security operations, which allow them to prevent surprise and preserve reaction time for commanders and advisor.

AREA SECURITY

6-17. The SFAB has no organic capabilities to perform area security. SFAB advisors enhance the area security operations of the partner foreign security force. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Inside a JOA, area security is usually the responsibility of the commander assigned to an area of operations. The SFAB relies on mutual support from U.S. and foreign maneuver forces for its protection. Outside a JOA, the SFAB’s protection beyond its own inherent local security capabilities relies heavily on the success of partnered area security. Area security often focuses on the following activities:

- Base or basecamp defense.
- Critical asset security.
- Node protection.
- High-risk personnel security.
- Response force operations.
- Lines of communication security.
- Checkpoints and combat out posts.
- Convoy security.
- Port area and pier security.
- Area damage control.
Chapter 6

6-18. Partnered area security is complementary to local security and extends the reach of the SFAB to protect itself beyond the extent of its local security. Advisor teams often operate in austere environments; therefore, their protection often relies on their ability to defeat local threats. In conjunction with their foreign partners, advisor teams defeat threats in the surrounding areas before potential threats can generate combat power and present an overwhelming threat. However, advisors are significantly limited (as well as constrained in non-JOA environments) in their ability to perform area security beyond the extent of their local security. As such, advisor teams achieve protection by collaborating with the foreign security forces to perform partnered area security operations. Partnered area security leverages the strengths of each and thereby achieves synergy to defeat threats in the area beyond the reach of the advisor team capabilities or authorities.

6-19. As part of partnered area security, advisors provide the foreign security force with capabilities that facilitate their area security operations. For instance, while the foreign security force may provide the bulk of the combat power through ground maneuver forces, the advisors provide linkage to U.S. joint or multinational enterprises (such as joint fires, intelligence, or logistics). The ability of the advisors to coordinate support (for example, aviation, EOD, special operations forces) to the foreign security force enhances their ability to accomplish security in areas and populations. The objective of U.S. military operations is to protect partner nation political, economic, and social institutions against immediate threats, and to stabilize the operational environment so the foreign security force can gain and maintain area security. Preserving the legitimacy of the partner nation by developing the foreign security forces to solve their own internal security problems is of strategic importance and essential to attaining long-term security outcomes.

HIGH-RISK PERSONNEL SECURITY

6-20. Categorize personnel as high risk when the chances of targeting them due to their grade, assignment, symbolic value, vulnerability, or other factors are high. Given the advisors mission, there could be circumstances in which high-risk personnel require considerable security planning and potential protective services support. When necessary, the commander and staff plan for appropriate protective services. The protective services support may augment the SFAB for attached high-risk personnel, or more commonly coordinate through the ASCC or combatant commander for a temporary protective services detail to accompany the high-risk personnel for the duration of the mission. Specially trained U.S. Criminal Investigations Command special agents and military police with the protective services additional skill identifier provide continuous executive-level protective services to designated high-risk personnel. (See FM 3-39 and ATP 3-39.35.)

6-21. The foreign security force often requires the ability to secure its own high-risk personnel. Advisors may provide limited training in this capacity. However, training in advanced U.S. protective services techniques is typically limited by its sensitive nature and the outside the scope of the advisor teams.

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

6-22. IEDs can provide the enemy with a tactical advantage in ways that other weapons do not. Tactically, IEDs compensate for a lack of heavy weapons by providing greater lethality, standoff, and survivability than small arms. IEDs provide a countermobility capability against mounted and dismounted units and a means to attack hardened targets, such as armored vehicles and fortifications. Like landmines, IEDs alter the terrain to channelize movement into prepared ambushes. IEDs provide standoff that reduces bombers’ vulnerabilities by keeping them out of the range of U.S. weapons and sensors. The IED’s indiscriminate nature and anonymity make it a fearsome psychological weapon, heightening the combat stress of friendly forces.

6-23. SFAB commanders and staffs will include C-IED into their planning and training processes at home station, take proactive measures to identify and target the IED networks, and reduce the employment of IEDs by increasing the cost to the enemy through attrition. The SFAB must view these activities individually and in conjunction with the other C-IED efforts.

6-24. At a minimum, C-IED activities should include the three lines of efforts of the C-IED framework: network engagement, train the force, and defeat the device. The level of effort varies throughout the course of the operation by phase. The SFAB should develop and execute appropriate C-IED plans to ensure comprehensive support to an operation throughout the execution. (See ATP 3-90.37.)
COUNTER-UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

6-25. Unmanned aerial systems proliferate modern society and range from large government-owned devices to simple and easily obtainable commercial models. These systems provide an adversary the means to detect, observe, and target friendly forces. The enemy will attempt to identify friendly strengths, weaknesses, and key command communications elements. The enemy endeavors to identify and target key communication nodes or critical capabilities that disrupt our ability to maintain security and limit our freedom of maneuver. Therefore, advisor teams must consider the impact these devices may have on their operations. This may include using camouflage and concealment, requesting specialized equipment and training to counter-unmanned aerial systems, and simply maintaining an awareness of this potential threat while conducting operations.

SECTION III – REINFORCING PROTECTION CAPABILITIES

6-26. The list below describes the SFAB’s primary protection tasks. Developing the foreign security force allows the advisor teams to leverage the foreign security force capabilities to provide additional force protection. The tasks that the advisor teams are particularly concerned with are—

- Survivability operations.
- Physical security.
- Risk management.
- Force health protection.
- Antiterrorism.
- Personnel recovery.
- CBRN.
- EOD.

SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS

6-27. Survivability consists of two aspects—avoiding and withstanding. Avoiding seeks to prevent an enemy attack, surveillance, or accurate targeting. Withstanding is minimizing or preventing degradation after having been attacked. Survivability operations conducted by the SFAB seek to avoid and withstand threats and hazards from enemy forces and insider threats. (See ATP 3-37.34.) Friendly survivability operations include constructing fighting positions, hardening facilities, and employing camouflage and concealment. In an advisor-specific context, avoiding includes de-escalation and conflict negotiation.

6-28. Foreign security force survivability operations allow them to avoid or withstand threats and hazards. Due to their close working relationship, advisor teams indirectly benefit from the increased foreign security force survivability measures. Advisor teams should discuss the importance of improving survivability with their foreign counterparts and assist them in conducting assessments, developing improvement plans, and prioritizing resources and projects. When appropriate, advisor teams can provide and coordinate additional U.S. and other agency resources in support of the foreign security force efforts.

6-29. Without augmentation, advisor teams do not have the organic structure to create more than rudimentary protective works for themselves. Therefore, additional resources provided by the foreign security forces are essential to the survivability of advisor teams. These operations are typically resource-intensive and require heavy equipment and significant labor.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

6-30. Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). The Army employs physical security measures in-depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. This approach is based upon continuing evaluation and employment of protective measures including physical
barriers, cleared zones, lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (See ATP 3-39.32.)

6-31. SFAB commanders, staffs, and team leaders consider physical security throughout the planning and operations cycle to ensure that critical areas are secured against likely threats. Within the SFAB, the provost marshal may provide critical expertise to develop physical security plans, direct physical security measure implementation, and coordinate for assets to facilitate physical security. The U.S. Army Military Police School’s Physical Security Course enhances the ability of military police to perform physical security inspections and assessments. Critical areas the SFAB may consider for extensive physical security measures include—

- Bases or base camps.
- Access or entry control points.
- Key command posts, communication nodes, or sustainment facilities.
- Weapons, arms, ammunition, and explosive storage areas.
- Troop housing areas or other high concentration areas, such as dining facilities.

6-32. The SFAB can influence the foreign security forces’ ability to secure its critical assets against unauthorized access, damage, or criminal activity by supporting the foreign partner with physical security inspections and assessments and providing support to implement physical security measures. Foreign security forces that can protect their critical assets can apply greater combat power to the mission. For instance, poor physical security of the foreign bases, weapons, command nodes, and housing areas can severely compromise the SFAB’s mission success by threatening the foreign security forces’ readiness through enemy attrition of personnel, morale, and equipment.

6-33. Physical security measures implemented by both the SFAB and the foreign security forces complement each other and produce an enhanced security posture. Due to the interactive basis of the relationship, the security of one force is directly related to the security of the other. Advisors rely on their foreign partners when they collocate within the foreign bases, operate from their partner’s facilities, or depend on foreign infrastructure to enhance their own protection.

RISK MANAGEMENT

6-34. Commanders and advisor team leaders must manage risk in every operation. Due to the nature of SFAB operations, the unit generally operates under an increased level of operational risk relative to other conventional force units. Leaders must identify potential risks, prioritizing those risks, and then implement mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood and danger of those risks. Commanders, staffs, and team leaders must accept some level of risk in their operations. If properly managed, accepting a higher level of risk may lead to tactical opportunities. Commanders use risk management to identify and mitigate risk. They can reduce the risk through careful planning and foresight. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards (JP 5-0). In other words, commanders assess associated risks by the degree to which the incident affects combat power or mission capability.

6-35. Advisors train the foreign security forces in the risk management process to enhance their ability to reduce potential incidents that adversely affect their readiness to execute missions. The foreign partner can provide additional capability and capacity to SFAB advisor teams. For example, using foreign heavy equipment to construct protective works. The SFAB preserves combat power and reduces the support requests from other organizations by reducing the residual risk through leveraging foreign security force assets.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

6-36. Force health protection encompasses the measures to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of Soldiers. Force health protection measures create a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. Force health protection encompasses the preventative measures, which include preventive medicine, veterinary services, combat and operational stress control, dental services, and laboratory services.
6-37. Preventing friendly health issues preserves the effectiveness of the SFAB by keeping its members available. Methods to prevent disease begin with personal hygiene, food and water sanitation, waste management, and pest control. Every region has unique health hazards that must be analyzed by the SFAB medical personnel to identify which, if any, vaccines are required prior to deployment. The SFAB medical officers and Soldiers must be aware of seemingly innocuous diseases that friendly forces bring with them to an area of operations, which they may transmit to the local population or their foreign partners. The key to preventive and protective care is information, which provides the SFAB with the capability to assess the current health environment and properly deliver information to the affected human population. Derived from robust health surveillance and medical intelligence, the information addresses occupational, local environmental, and health threats from industrial hazards, air and water pollution, endemic or epidemic disease, CBRN, and directed-energy device weapons (high-powered microwaves, particle beams, lasers). Health service support personnel can acquire, analyze, and disseminate information that is timely and accurate. This information is vital to force health protection.

6-38. Advising and training a foreign partner to improve its force health protection processes supports the foreign security force’s overall health and well-being. In some instances, these practices mirror those of the advisor team. In other instances, these practices may be nation-specific for the operational environment. Often, the foreign security force adapts to its local environment and becomes resistant to diseases prevalent there while the advisors may require inoculation against those same diseases. The reverse is also true. Advisors may have a resistance to diseases that the foreign personnel have not encountered. SFAB medical planners account for all of these considerations during the planning process.

6-39. Regardless of conditions, the SFAB attempts to maintain its internal standards of health protection according to the Army and U. S. Government policy. While modern technology may provide significant defense against disease and hazards, the inability to access technology solutions may require SFAB personnel to adopt rudimentary practices developed by local inhabitants to combat health hazards. In these cases, the SFAB medical personnel identify and adopt these local practices to share among the Soldiers of the unit.

**ANTITERRORISM**

6-40. Antiterrorism is related to physical security and consists of proactive defensive measures used to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defend individuals and property against terrorist acts. These measures include limited response and containment by security forces.

6-41. The SFAB antiterrorism resources include risk management, antiterrorism planning, awareness training, command information programs, validation of defensive plans (counterintelligence), security considerations, and other resources.

6-42. Insider attacks can jeopardize mission success and damage the relationships between the advisor and foreign security forces. As such, advisor teams should be cognizant of the foreign security force's ability to train, monitor, and assess their antiterrorism measures and update the dynamic risk assessment, as appropriate.

**PERSONNEL RECOVERY**

6-43. *Army personnel recovery* is the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). Army forces work together with the DOD and other unified action partners to recover individuals and groups who become isolated. Isolation refers to persons separated from their unit or in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. In addition, Army forces support the recovery of other persons designated by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The personnel recovery mission includes preparing Soldiers, other Service members, Army civilians, and contractors in danger of isolation while participating in any activity or mission sponsored by the United States. The personnel recovery task is particularly important to the SFAB as additional maneuver forces may or may not be present in the operational area where the SFAB is located (within or outside of a designated JOA).

6-44. The SFAB commander assesses the operational variables and typically considers personnel recovery from three perspectives: United States and foreign partner together in tactical isolation, foreign or host nation-led recovery of U.S. and foreign security force combined element, or U.S.-led recovery of U.S. forces only,
because foreign forces are incapable or untrustworthy. The SFAB commander provides personnel recovery planning guidance and isolated Soldier guidance prior to executing all missions. The commander considers four general approaches (sometimes referred to as methods) to conduct personnel recovery: unassisted, immediate, deliberate, or external support. Effective guidance addresses the challenges of isolation within a unit’s area of operations. Effective guidance is concrete enough for Soldiers to implement. Isolated Soldier guidance applies to the entire command since the uncertainty and complexity of military operations expose everyone to risk of isolation, regardless of rank. Isolated Soldier guidance must include the set of circumstances (isolation criteria) under which Soldiers or small elements execute their isolated Soldier guidance and their mission changes from their primary mission to one of evasion (See FM 3-50 for more information).

6-45. The foreign security force or host nation may also employ national police in response to personnel recovery requirements. When foreign or host-nation forces are in the lead, personnel recovery assistance provided by the foreign force to the SFAB facilitates rapid initiation of personnel recovery. The mission is incredibly time-sensitive and high priority. As part of their training and rehearsals with the foreign security force, SFAB commanders, staffs, and advisor team leaders should incorporate these types of operations into the training plan. Generally, the foreign security force is more familiar with the operational environment and population; therefore, a well-trained foreign partner has a higher chance to recover the missing personnel.

**CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR**

6-46. The CBRN protection measures are taken to keep CBRN threats and hazards from having an adverse effect on military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, and facilities. CBRN threats and hazards include weapons of mass destruction, CBRN-enhanced improvised weapons and devices, and toxic industrial material. All of these can cause potential mass casualties and large-scale destruction. Many state and nonstate actors (including terrorists and criminals) possess or seek to possess, develop, and proliferate weapons of mass destruction.

6-47. CBRN protection is primarily focused on defensive measures related to personnel, equipment, and facilities to prevent or mitigate the effects of CBRN hazards. In addition to mitigating the effects of CBRN threats and hazards, the SFAB ensures it identifies and avoids areas where CBRN was previously employed as the effects may linger.

6-48. Development of the foreign CBRN protection capability and capacity allows the foreign security force to preserve combat power. The foreign security may provide early warning and information to U.S. forces, which directly or indirectly reduces the effects of CBRN threats and hazards on advisors. The foreign security force also supports advisors by preventing enemy acquisition of these weapons as well as containing, reducing, and responding to CBRN-related events.

**EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL**

6-49. Explosive hazards remain an easily accessible and inexpensive means to gain strategic effects throughout the world. EOD personnel within the SFAB provide the technical knowledge and applicable solutions to mitigate risk to mission and risk to force from CBRN and high-explosive hazards.

6-50. EOD within the SFAB will manage the EOD training equipment procurement, EOD team leader certification program, and ordnance training aid procurement, accountability and maintenance.

6-51. Due to their unique experiences, training and access to law enforcement sensitive data, EOD personnel are best suited to maintain the improvised explosive device and explosive hazards threats throughout the operational area. They can provide analyses and disseminate information on common enemy explosive tactics, techniques, and procedures, ways to detect for the most commonly occurring explosive threats, and ways to reduce risk to mission and risk to force of the specific threats.
SECTION IV – CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

6-52. Several of the primary protection tasks focus on the commander’s ability to establish civil control, maintain civil order, and influence and control populations to prevent disruption to military operations. These protection tasks include police operations, detention operations, and populace and resource control.

POLICE OPERATIONS

6-53. Police operations involve the application of control measures and enforcement mechanisms within an area of operations to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the population. The Army conducts police operations to maintain order within its communities and formations. When directed, the Army also applies policing activities to civilian populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent. Police operations include law enforcement, forensic analysis and biometric support, criminal investigations, customs support, support to civil security and civil control (includes host-nation police training and support), police engagement, civil disturbance control, traffic management and enforcement, and evidence response team support. (See ATP 3-39.10.)

6-54. Protection of the SFAB includes not only protection against external threats but also protection against criminal threats in the operational environment, criminals infiltrating foreign security forces, or crimes occurring within the SFAB. When the SFAB faces significant criminal threats, the commander and staff coordinate through the provost marshal for necessary military police support to prevent, deter, and investigate criminal activity inside and outside the SFAB formation.

6-55. Police operations may be necessary when the SFAB’s mission includes increasing the capability and capacity of foreign law enforcement organizations. While other unified action partners (such as the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) are often responsible for assisting foreign law enforcement organizations, the DOD may be required to lead the effort when civilian agencies are unable to perform these missions based on the security environment. Given the technical skills required in training police organizations (escalation of force, evidence collection, preservation and storage, forensic analysis, and criminal investigations), the SFAB commanders and staffs should request additional military police support when working with foreign law enforcement agencies.

6-56. A host nation’s ability to maintain civil order and police its population according to the rule of law is critical to SFAB protection. Nations undermine their stability and legitimacy when their police organizations fail to achieve order, enforce laws, and minimize corruption. Failure to achieve public security can significantly degrade the SFAB’s protection and threaten its ability to focus on its primary mission. Assessments may lead to training the foreign law enforcement organizations to prevent, investigate, and disrupt organized criminal activities that threaten order and stability in the host nation or geographic region.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

6-57. Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military operations. Detention operations by U.S. military police include the confinement of U.S. military prisoners, detainee operations, and host-nation corrections training and support. While foreign security forces may use different terms to describe their detention operations, the common tasks to detain, intern, confine, or otherwise exert control over a detained or incarcerated population still exist. (See FM 3-63.)

6-58. While the SFAB has limited or no requirements to perform detention operations itself, it is imperative that its counterpart foreign security forces perform their detention operations according to their nation’s rule of law, while abiding by international laws, norms, and standards. When the SFAB’s counterparts are conducting detention operations, the SFAB commanders and staffs coordinate through the provost marshal to provide technical oversight to prevent violations of human rights, the law of armed conflict, and the Geneva Conventions. The provost marshal should coordinate with the staff judge advocate advisor and host nation law enforcement professionals to provide accurate oversight and have a shared understanding of the applicable laws and regulations. Failure to treat detainees humanely may lead to negative operational and even strategic outcomes.
The primary advisor to oversee detention operations is the provost marshal; however, the technical details and procedures required to perform detention operations to standard may require augmentation by military police correction and detention specialists or designated law enforcement professionals. The SFAB should maintain oversight and awareness of its counterpart’s detention operations to include—

- Ensuring humane treatment of detainees.
- Monitoring and enforcing pretrial correction standards consistent with the rule of law.
- Improving and maintaining health, hygiene, and appropriate social services.
- Establishing and maintaining the appropriate oversight of the corrections system.
- Promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of detainees back into the population.

Foreign security force detention operations contribute to the SFAB’s protection by removing potential threat populations from the operational area. The effectiveness of host nation’s criminal justice systems (police, corrections, and judicial) to adjudicate civil disputes, prosecute violations of criminal laws, and incarcerate convicted criminal offenders is critical to the overall stability and order of the nation and region. In places where legitimate criminal justice systems exist, the SFAB benefits from the protection provided by maintaining stable social and political conditions. When the criminal justice system is undermined by insurgent or criminal activity, corruption of government personnel and institutions, or the presence of competing governance structure (criminal, terrorist, or insurgent), the SFAB’s protection is significantly reduced by the surrounding instability, disorder, or criminalized power structures. The ability of the host nation foreign security forces to achieve legitimate civil order is essential to preventing conflict and consolidating gains to achieve long-term U.S. strategic objectives.

**POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL**

Populace and resource control are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, legitimate authorities define, enact, and enforce populace and resources control measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ populace and resource control measures to varying degrees when conducting military operations.

Populace control measures are a key element in executing stability tasks related to civil security and civil control. Populace control involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires military forces to establish a safe and secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. Executing populace control measures require a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions that support a stable environment.

The movement, activities, and actions of populations can disrupt military operations. Units consider populace and resource control when planning and executing operations. Ideally, the host nation conducts populace and resource control with support from U.S. forces. The SFAB’s role in populace and resource control most often comes in the form of its advising capacity, which likely requires augmentation with civil affairs staffs or units to provide dedicated advisors to oversee populace and resource control operations. (See FM 3-57.)

A host nation’s ability to uphold governance and protect its population depends on its ability to control its own populations and resources, while abiding by international laws and norms. A government’s inability to control its population and resources undermines its ability to govern. For foreign security forces, the SFAB can provide the advice, expertise, and supervision necessary to implement effective populace and resource control. Finding the right balance between the use of force to uphold legitimate government authority and protect the population versus the abusive use of force that ignites public grievance and resistance is a delicate balance in achieving U.S. strategic ends. This balance is often difficult to achieve when internal and external threats are pervasive.

The ability of the foreign security forces to perform populace and resource control contributes to SFAB protection by reducing the disorder in the operational environment and mitigating the disruptive impact a population may have on operations. As with area security, only when the foreign security forces are capable,
willing, and legitimate in exerting control over their populations and resources can the SFAB expect to derive the protection necessary to operate in austere and potentially hostile environments to fulfill its mission.
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This chapter describes the SFAB’s BSB organization and its responsibility for tying the advisor teams into the theater sustainment structure in coordination with higher headquarters.

SECTION I – SFAB BSB ROLE AND ORGANIZATION

7-1. As described in chapter 1, the primary two functions of the SFAB BSB are coordinating sustainment support between the advisor teams and the theater support structure and providing advisor teams to develop the sustainment capability and capacity of the foreign security forces. The SFAB BSB provides limited distribution operations, field-level maintenance, and enhanced Role 1 medical care. The SFAB BSB is an expeditionary, multifunctional sustainment battalion with limited organic Army Health System support that can operate at the tactical and operational level in support of developing foreign security forces.

7-2. The SFAB BSB provides SFA-related command and control of the support battalion’s headquarters support company and the two logistics advising companies. The SFAB BSB develops foreign security forces on logistics and health service support. Its design contains minimal organic ability for internal sustainment. The SFAB receives its sustainment support from one or more of the following entities: the host nation, operational contract support, the ASCC, an embassy country team, area support from a contracting support brigade, a maneuver brigade support battalion, and/or and BSB or combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB).

7-3. When an SFAB operates inside a combatant commander’s designated JOA, the brigade nests with established sustainment structures. Inside a JOA, the expeditionary sustainment command typically conducts and oversees the distribution management, transportation operations, material management, personnel services, and operational contract support. The SFAB BSB S-4, along with the support operations section, will initially coordinate sustainment support through their higher headquarters or from a BCT’s BSB or CSSB through its area support mission and responsibilities. Operating inside a JOA allows the SFAB BSB to utilize established sustainment systems and distribution networks.

7-4. When an SFAB operates outside a combatant commander’s designated JOA or when there is no JOA established, the brigade may not have traditional Army sustainment systems and distribution networks to rely on for resupply, distribution, maintenance, transportation, and Army Health System support operations. With no other conventional forces in the JOA, the SFAB BSB S-4 and the support operations section must coordinate sustainment support through their higher headquarters to access contracting support, host nation support, or support from the Defense Logistics Agency, embassy, or the ASCC for their location. These entities support administrative, sustainment and life support functions. Once in the JOA, the BSB must coordinate with one of these entities for the resupply of all classes of supply, medical evacuation, maintenance support, field feeding, finance, postal, and any other type of support needed. (See chapter 1.)

SFAB BSB ORGANIZATION

7-5. The support battalion consists of a headquarters support company and two logistics advising companies. The support battalion maintains a distribution, maintenance, and support operations section that provides limited support to the advisor teams (see figure 7-1, page 7-2). The medical support section provides a medical advising capability from Role 1 through Role 3 and an enhanced Role 1 medical capability. The logistics advising companies each consist of three logistics advisor teams. Support battalion advisor teams are capable of advising foreign security forces on sustainment operations from brigade through theater level.
BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT STAFF

7-6. The SFAB sustainment staff plans, directs, controls, and coordinates sustainment in support of operations. Key members of the SFAB’s sustainment staff include the S-1, S-4, property book officer, brigade surgeon, and the S-8. These staff sections perform common staff responsibilities described in chapter 1. The staff develops internal brigade policies and plans in its respective technical areas and provides guidance, priorities, and allocations to subordinate commands.

7-7. Due to the limited organic sustainment capability within the SFAB, the brigade S-4 and support operations section have unique roles relative to other conventional BCTs. The brigade S-4 conducts mission analysis, consolidates sustainment requirements, and communicates those requirements through their higher headquarters or other sustainment entities. Once the required support relationships are established, the support operations section assists in synchronizing the support provided by these external sustainment organizations.

7-8. The relationship between internal support and coordination is inversely proportional to the level of advising of the sustainment staff. If the support and coordination requirements place a high level of demand on these staffs, their capacity to conduct advising decreases.
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS

7-9. Support operations is the staff function of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment in support of units conducting decisive action in an area of operations (ATP 4-93). The support operations section provides centralized and integrated planning for all support operations within the brigade. Support operations functions generally include transportation, maintenance, ammunition (see ATP 4-35.1), Army Health System support, supply and field services, and distribution operations. In some cases, Soldiers of the support operations section may develop foreign security forces in sustainment operations in addition to coordinating external sustainment operations for the brigade.

7-10. The support operations section coordinates the brigade’s logistics and provides the technical supervision for the logistics mission of the BSB. The BSB support operations section is the principal staff section responsible for coordinating and synchronizing distribution, transportation, replenishment, and maintenance support from across the sustainment enterprise for all units assigned or attached to the SFAB. The brigade S-4 identifies requirements through daily logistic status reports, running estimates, and mission analysis.

7-11. The brigade S-4 is the logistics planner for the brigade, focusing on midrange to long-range planning. Support operations straddle midrange (future operations) to short-range planning and focus on coordinating the execution of the sustainment plan. The support operations section also develops the concept of support (in coordination with the brigade S-4) and the distribution plan, which includes logistics package operations.

7-12. The BSB support operations is the key interface between the brigade and any supporting sustainment unit and agencies such as the expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, Defense Logistics Agency, CSSB, or BSB from a BCT. The support operations section is responsible for coordinating external SFAB support requirements with an expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, CSSB, or BSB support operations.

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT COMPANY

7-13. The headquarters support company’s primary mission is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize logistics and Army Health System support for the SFAB. The headquarters support company has a secondary mission to develop foreign security forces in sustainment operations as necessary. The headquarters support company has a small maintenance section, distribution section, and a medical support section. The BSB’s headquarters support company provides SFA-related command and control, administrative, and logistics support for all organic units to the BSB.

Distribution Section

7-14. The BSB distribution section’s role is to provide limited execution and oversight of supply distribution and associated contracts in support of the brigade. Additionally, the distribution section’s secondary mission is to assess, advise, support, and liaise with the foreign security forces regarding distribution and supply support operations. The squad manages the distribution of supplies to the brigade and provides limited distribution capability for class I, II, III, IV, V, and IX. In rare cases, the BSB distribution section may assist in the daily receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply through a small supply support activity.

Maintenance Section

7-15. The BSB maintenance section’s role is to perform limited field-level maintenance on equipment or weapon systems within the SFAB. Generally, this includes limited field-level maintenance support to the brigade headquarters company and the support, field artillery, and engineer battalion headquarters companies. This includes monitoring associated maintenance contracts in support of SFAB units. The maintenance team’s secondary mission is to assess, advise, support, and liaise with foreign security forces regarding field-level, and potentially sustainment-level, maintenance operations depending on the foreign security force requirements.

7-16. Field-level maintenance includes the replacement of unserviceable line replaceable units, components, modules, or parts. Field-level maintenance is not limited to simple remove and replace operations. When authorized and in possession of the required skills, tools, repair parts, references and time, the operator or
ornance trained maintainers should repair the equipment on-site. Do not evacuate the equipment for sustainment maintenance. Field-level maintenance is typically repair and return to user.

7-17. Units utilize sustainment maintenance when crew, operator, operator-maintainer, or ordnance corps trained maintainers lack the requisite skills, special tools, proper repair parts, or references to complete repairs using field maintenance. Based on the extent of damage to the specific item, leaders must decide the best course of action based on operational and mission variables. There is no absolute checklist. Field maintenance is the preferred method of repair. The intent of sustainment-level maintenance is to perform commodity-oriented repairs to return items to a national standard. Equipment sent for sustainment maintenance is, only in rare instances, returned to the original unit.

Medical Support Section

7-18. As trained advisors, the primary mission of the medical support section is to assess, advise, support, and liaise with foreign security force medical elements. The medical support section is required to have a thorough knowledge of other Services and multinational forces’ Army Health System capabilities, limitations, organizations, and procedures. The medical support section serves as the medical subject matter experts for the SFAB advisor teams.

7-19. The SFAB possesses reduced organic Army Health System assets that provide Role 1 medical care. However, the brigade will likely deploy as separate and small units in disparate locations. Consequently, it is not possible to assign Army Health System support dedicated assets to every advisor team. Therefore, the brigade will require Army Health System support on an area basis for role 2 and higher medical care.

LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

7-20. The SFAB BSB has limited capacity to provide logistics support to the SFAB. The SFAB BSB is dependent upon theater sustainment forces, host nation, or operational contract support to meet support requirements. Logistics support relationships are critical to the SFAB’s success and must be defined, managed, and updated as necessary. SFAB units often receive support from other theater logistics units tasked with area support responsibility.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

7-21. As described in chapter 1, command and support relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities between higher headquarters, subordinate, supported, and supporting units. Clearly defined support relationships are critical for the successful employment of the SFAB, which has no organic higher sustainment unit dedicated to logistics support. When it is not in a designated JOA, the SFAB must rely on support relationships with adjacent conventional units or other entities, such as host-nation support, the Defense Logistics Agency, a contracting support brigade, or the chief of mission through an embassy.

7-22. Support relationships will determine the flow of logistics reports and requests. In some cases, the advisor teams will work directly with the supporting sustainment organizations. This may include sending supply, maintenance, and recovery requests directly to the external supporting organization. At other times, advisor teams route requests and reports through their battalion S-4 or the senior logistics section to the support operations section who will then coordinate the support from the external supporting organization. In all cases, the senior logistician and support operations section must clearly define these processes throughout all echelons of the SFAB in conjunction with the supporting sustainment organizations.

AREA SUPPORT

7-23. Area support is a task assigned to a sustainment unit directing it to support units within or passing through a specified location. Sustainment units, such as a BCT BSB or CSSB from a sustainment brigade, can provide area support to the SFAB units located in or passing through their assigned areas of operation. A sustainment unit tasked to provide area support provides support for all units within a set geographic boundary. The geographic boundary may cross multiple battalion or other unit boundaries.

7-24. A BCT’s BSB and a sustainment brigade’s CSSB may find themselves providing area support for small, unique units such as an advisor team. Area support may be habitual or conducted on a limited basis.
depending on mission variables and orders. The senior SFAB logistics section or officer, generally the S-4, projects and communicates support requirements to the supporting BS or CSSB so they can provide the required support.

7-25. When an SFAB requires resupply through area support from a BS or a CSSB, support operations coordinates with the supporting unit’s support operations, S-4, or other sustainment planner to integrate their requirements into the concept of support and to synchronize support operations. (See ATP 4-90.)

DISTRIBUTION, REPLENISHMENT, AND RESUPPLY OPERATIONS

7-26. The distribution section of the BS has the primary mission to manage and assist with distributing class I, II, III, IV, V, and IX of supply for the brigade. The distribution section has limited personnel and supply transportation capability to support the SFAB. When appropriate, the BS distribution section coordinates and synchronizes logistics operations on a limited basis.

7-27. The battalion S-4 gathers logistics requirements that the advisor teams generate (which are outside of the unit’s organic capacity) and relays the requests to the brigade S-4 and support operations section. The support operations officer plans cell coordinates and synchronizes distribution operations to meet the support requirements using internal BS assets or external assets provided by a CSSB, sustainment brigade, expeditionary sustainment command, or contract logistics support as dictated by the theater sustainment structure.

7-28. Resupply operations require continuous and close coordination between the brigade and the supporting units when operating in a JOA. The SFAB may establish accounts and relationships with additional sustainment units in the JOA such as an expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, or a CSSB to receive additional transportation, ammunition resupply, support and field services, and distribution support.

7-29. In an area where a JOA and traditional military echelons of support have not been established, the brigade may need to contract for transportation, ammunition, supply and field services, and distribution operations. Additional means of resupply to the brigade might include aerial delivery, support delivered directly from the Defense Logistics Agency, coordination for support through the ASCC or embassy, or other nontraditional military resupply means. These techniques may not be applicable to all situations when operating outside of a JOA.

LOGISTICS PACKAGE OPERATIONS

7-30. A logistics package is a grouping of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander (FM 3-90-1). The logistics package technique is a simple and efficient way to accomplish routine, planned resupply between units. The distribution section from the BS coordinates and synchronizes logistics operations generally involving emergency resupply. Scheduled logistics packages usually contain a standardized allocation of supplies based on the concept of support, synchronization matrix, and the supported force’s consumption rates. The logistics package operations are usually coordinated by the support operations section through an external supporting organization.

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

7-31. The primary purpose of maintenance is to ensure equipment readiness and to generate combat power by repairing damaged equipment as quickly and as close to the point of failure as possible. SFABs have very limited capacity to repair their systems with the maintenance assets organic to the BS’s maintenance section. SFABs evacuate their equipment that requires field-level maintenance to other organizations or echelons of support, such as a support maintenance company of a CSSB or BS field-maintenance company serving in an area support role.

7-32. The maintenance advisors located in the advisor teams must stress the importance of crew and operator preventative maintenance checks and services to keep equipment in an operational status. The maintenance advisor will make every attempt to repair nonmission capable equipment. The battalion S-4 can establish a maintenance collection point in its battalion area of operation to provide a consolidation point for damaged equipment, hasty repairs, or to perform battle damage assessment and hasty repair. If authorized by the commander, maintainers can also utilize battle damage assessment and repair. The battalion S-4 or senior
maintenance advisor will generally coordinate with the support operations section to evacuate nonmission capable equipment to the organic maintenance section or to an external organization, such as a BSB field maintenance company.

7-33. Maintenance advisors in the advisor team initially requests class IX repair parts and maintenance support through their next higher headquarters maintenance personnel for any nonmission capable equipment. If maintenance advisors cannot fix the piece of equipment or do not have the repair parts, time required, or tools required, they can request additional support through their higher headquarters to the BSB’s support operations section. The BSB support operations section then coordinates additional maintenance support if needed through its maintenance section or an external organization, such as a supporting BCT’s field maintenance company.

7-34. In an area where a JOA and traditional military echelons of support have not been established, the SFAB may need to contract additional maintenance personnel, purchase local class IX repair parts, or request replacement equipment, end items, and repair parts through the ASCC to the contracting support brigade or other Army contracting organization. These techniques may not be applicable to all situations when operating outside of a JOA.

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

7-35. Recovery is the process of repairing, retrieving, and freeing immobile, inoperative materiel from the point where it was disabled or abandoned. SFAB commanders must emphasize the use of self and like vehicle recovery methods to the greatest extent possible. These practices minimize the use of the BSB’s limited recovery assets for routine recovery missions. The maintenance advisors, maintenance warrant officer in the support operations section, and supported battalion S-4 prioritize the overall repair effort, available resources, and the tactical situation to coordinate recovery operations.

7-36. The SFAB BSB has limited recovery assets located in the maintenance section. These are the only recovery assets in the brigade. When possible, the BSB maintenance section recovers the brigade’s organic equipment. Generally, recovery operations are coordinated by the support operation section with external organizations. Maintenance planners must establish recovery priorities. The battalion S-4, the support operations maintenance warrant officer, and the maintenance advisors are responsible for developing the repair and recovery plans. The maintenance plan includes battle damage assessment, priority for support, tactical situation, forecasted workload, and availability of maintenance and recovery personnel.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

7-37. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. The austere nature of the SFAB creates a tremendous need for this capability. Part of planning an SFAB’s mission, when host nation, embassy, or adjacent unit general support is unavailable, is to determine which type of contracted support best meets the brigade’s sustainment needs. In any contracting support option, the SFAB is required to provide contracting officers’ representatives and receiving officials for contracted logistic services and commodities.

CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE, FIELD ORDERING OFFICER, AND PAY AGENT

7-38. The contracting officer representative is an employee, military or civilian of the U.S. Government, a foreign government, or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization and coalition partner appointed in writing by a warranted contracting officer and serving in the position as an extra duty. Contracting officer representative responsibilities include monitoring contract performance and performing other duties specified in their appointment letter. (See ATP 4-92.)

7-39. The field ordering officer’s role is to procure authorized, urgently needed supplies and services from local sources during operations because normal supply channels are either not available or cannot provide them in a timely manner. Field ordering officers derive their purchasing authority from a warranted contracting officer. Field ordering officers have authorization to purchase supplies or nonpersonal services immediately available up to the established micropurchase threshold.
A pay agent is an extension of the finance office’s disbursing officer at the unit level. The deputy disbursing officer or disbursing agent trains the pay agent to account for government funds and make payments in relatively small amounts to local vendors. The pay agent is paired with a field ordering officer and cannot be appointed as a field ordering officer, certifying officer, order or request goods or services (such as contract for), or hold other accountable positions such as a property book officer. (See ATP 1-06.1.)

SECTION II – ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT

The Army Health System provides healthcare to U.S. Soldiers across the entire range of military operations from austere environments to well-staffed and well-equipped medical treatment facilities. The Army Health System is responsible for the operational management of the health service support and force health protection missions for training, predeployment, deployment, postdeployment, and where applicable, advising and training the foreign security force.

Although some features of the SFAB’s medical capabilities are common to maneuver BCTs, there are many differences. The most important of which is the medical assets available. Medical planners should review lessons learned from prior SFA missions and the associated elements to ensure successful Army Health System support for the brigade and its mission. (See FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2.)

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to ensure force health protection. Additionally, as directed, the Army Medical Department provides support to other Services, agencies, foreign security forces, and authorized organizations and includes casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics. Casualty care encompasses a number of Army Medical Department functions, such as organic and area medical support, hospitalization, treatment aspects of dental care, behavioral and neuropsychiatric treatment, clinical laboratory services, and treatment of CBRN patients. (See FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2.)

The amount of health service support available depends on the area of operations, the operational environment of the SFAB and whether the brigade is operating within a designated JOA, and whether the advisor teams are operating within or outside a designated JOA. Operations outside a designated JOA may not have a well-established sustainment network and depend on the ASCC and the host nation for life support functions, force health protection, air medical evacuation, and other health service support requirements.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

Force health protection encompasses measures to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. These measures also include the prevention aspects of a number of Army Medical Department functions, such as—

- Health promotion including the performance triad (sleep, activity, and nutrition) and tobacco cessation.
- Preventive medicine including medical surveillance and occupational and environmental health surveillance.
- Veterinary services including food inspection and animal care missions, and the prevention of zoonotic diseases transmissible to individuals.
- Combat and operational stress control.
- Dental services (preventive dentistry).
- Laboratory services (area medical laboratory support). (See FM 4-02 and ATP 4-02.2.)

MEDICAL SUPPORT SECTION

The support battalion’s medical support section may provide enhanced Role 1 Army Health System support to the SFAB and the foreign security forces, if authorized. Authorization for Army Health System
support to foreign partners is coordinated, approved, and promulgated with and by appropriate U.S. and host-
nation authorities.

7-47. The medical section leader is responsible for operational and clinical activities the section conducts
and serves as the brigade medical operations officer. When working with a foreign security force, the section
leader is the core advisor within the medical support section. The field surgeon provides medical advice and
direction for the medical element and accompanies the medical section. The section leader provides
assessments of the medical support and training requirements of the foreign security force to higher
headquarters. The section leader requests appropriate materiel and personnel support from higher, adjacent,
and subordinate elements to support the foreign mission. The medical section leader assists the subordinate
maneuver battalion and Cavalry squadron medical sections in planning, coordinating, and monitoring Army
Health System support operations.

7-48. The medical section sergeant assists the section leader and medical operations officer and supervises
the operations of the section. Section sergeants advise their assigned foreign counterpart. The medical section
sergeant is vital to effective supervision of the medical section activities including maintenance of section
equipment, requests for general categories of supplies, and class VIII supplies. The medical section sergeant
prepares reports of medical section activities and functions with the section leader. (See ATP 4-02.3.)

MEDICAL SUPPORT SECTION CAPABILITIES

7-49. The medical support section may provide limited routine medical care and advanced trauma
management for Soldiers of the brigade and, when authorized, the foreign security forces. The section may
support SFAB brigade elements without organic medical support. When providing medical support to the
brigade, the dispersed nature of SFAB operations make it impossible to physically support each advisor team.
However, they may employ alternative methods of care, such as telemedicine, to bridge the gap.

7-50. The medical support section leader determines the general set-up and security of the medical support
section’s area of operations in consultation with the BSB commander and appropriate medical leadership.
The medical support section leader directs, coordinates, and supervises team operations based on the
brigade’s Army Health System support plan. Medical team leadership, in consultation with the brigade
surgeon’s section, determines medical requirements, directs the medical activities of the brigade’s Role 1
medical treatment facility, and monitors class VIII and blood requirements.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE CAPABILITIES

7-51. The environmental science engineering officer provides preventive medicine, advice, and consultation
in the health threat assessment area, force health protection, environmental sanitation, epidemiology, sanitary
engineering, and pest management. Through routine surveillance, inspection of potable water supplies,
inspection of field feeding facilities, and the application of pest management practices, environmental science
engineering officers identify actual and potential health hazards, recommend corrective measures, and assist
in training advisors and the foreign security forces in disease and nonbattle injury prevention programs. The
preventive medicine personnel provide field sanitation team training for both the advisors and the foreign
security force personnel and are valuable resources for the promotion of health in the unit and affected host-
nation entities. In an advising capacity, the environmental science engineering officer provides medical
intelligence related not only to threat estimates but also to combating the potential exploitation of partner
nation medical resources by negative influencers.

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CAPABILITIES

7-52. The SFAB has limited organic behavioral health capability. Request additional support through
supporting Army Health System assets. The behavioral health officer supports commanders in the prevention
of combat and operational stress reaction through the SFAB’s behavioral health activities. The behavioral
health officer delivers advice and assistance in the areas of behavioral health and combat and operational
stress control. The behavioral health officer collects and records social and psychological data and counsels
personnel who suffer from personal, behavioral, or psychological problems. The concept of behavioral health
support is to provide care at the Soldier’s location to the greatest extent possible as this expedites treatment
and minimizes both lost time and evacuation of Soldiers out of the brigade area of operations. General duties
include assisting in a wide variety of psychological and social services, such as providing classes in stress control, compiling caseload data, and providing counseling to Soldiers experiencing emotional or social problems. In addition, the behavioral health officer refers Soldiers to higher roles of care, when indicated, and provides individual case consultation to commanders, NCOs, chaplains, surgeons, and physician assistants within the supported area of operations. The behavioral health officer may consult with the commander concerning individual and group dynamics within the area of operations. (See ATP 4-02.5.)

**BRIGADE MEDICAL SUPPLY CAPABILITIES**

7-53. The brigade medical logistics section provides the brigade with class VIII coordination, synchronization, and execution of medical logistics support for the medical team and the supported brigade.

7-54. Operational class VIII organizational assets in the brigade are fixed and deploy with assigned Army Health System support units. Operational medical logistics support relies on the application of the class VIII supply chain that is agile, responsive, and swift. The supply chain possesses situational understanding of the supported organizations, the operational environment, mission, and the area of operation. During the initial deployment phase, the medical support section receives medical resupply mainly through preconfigured push packages, medical resupply sets from the supporting medical logistics company, a higher logistics support activity.

7-55. Due in part to long supply lines, limited storage, and the limited transportation assets available, medical logistics planning is critical to the SFAB’s success. Consider potential medical logistics support to local nationals, the foreign security forces, and friendly armed forces as well.

**MEDICAL EVACUATION**

7-56. The SFAB has very limited organic medical evacuation resources and is highly dependent upon the JOA medical units for augmentation of their Army Health System support. When deployed outside a JOA, coordination with the appropriate nodes—United States, host nation, and other capability providers—are critical prior to and during deployment. To ensure that the brigade receives timely evacuation of casualties, a continuous assessment of available capabilities is required. Area evacuation assets are preplanned, coordinated, and synchronized outside of a JOA, such as through various U.S. entities, host-nation assets, multinational, or contract evacuation assets. Early coordination and communication is vital to the success of Army Health System evacuation support to SFAB operations.

**MANEUVER BATTALION AND CAVALRY SQUADRON MEDICAL TREATMENT TEAMS**

7-57. A medical treatment team is organic to the maneuver battalions and the Cavalry squadron. These medical treatment teams’ mission is to provide Role 1 Army Health System support to the maneuver element. The medical treatment teams have similar configurations for the maneuver battalions and Cavalry squadrons. The field artillery and engineer battalions have no organic medical treatment teams. The medical treatment teams may perform the additional mission of providing one medical evacuation team for the maneuver elements, though this action detracts from doctrinal medical treatment team capabilities. The medical treatment team is dependent upon the maneuver elements to which it is assigned for all logistic support (with the exception of class VIII supplies), such as communication; administrative; petroleum, oil, and lubricants; and life support, such as food and water.

7-58. The medical treatment team forms the battalion or squadron aid station and provides role 1 unit medical support including sick call, tactical combat casualty care, and advanced trauma management. The medical treatment team has access to the battalion communications network. Through the network, the medical treatment team has access to all major elements of the battalion and with other supporting and supported units. The medical treatment team personnel include the physician assistant, the senior medic, and an emergency care NCO. The treatment team trains to provide tactical combat casualty care and to assist with advanced trauma management procedures commensurate with its training.

7-59. The physician assistant is the clinical professional and medical officer in charge of the maneuver battalion and Cavalry squadron medical sections. Medical providers within the battalion or squadron provide medical advice and direction for the medical element and accompany the medical treatment team. The
physician assistant is advanced trauma management qualified and works under the professional supervision of the brigade field surgeon. Physician assistants—

- Provide medical treatment for sick and injured patients within their scope of practice and abilities, refer those patients requiring treatment beyond the physician assistant’s capability to the supervising physician or to a higher role of care.
- Provide advanced trauma management for wounded patients.
- Provide clinical and medical advice and support to their foreign medical counterparts.
- Establish and recommend requirements for medical NCOs training in self-aid, buddy aid, tactical combat casualty care, and other medical techniques and procedures within the advisor teams.
- Recommend specific medical training for the foreign security force personnel.

7-60. The medical treatment team NCOIC is a sergeant first class. This NCO assists the physician assistant and supervises the operations of the medical treatment team. Medical treatment team NCOICs advise and assist their foreign counterparts as required. The NCOIC supervises the medical treatment team activities including maintenance of team equipment, requests for general categories of supplies, and class VIII supplies. The NCOIC prepares reports of team activities and functions for the physician assistant.

COMBAT MEDIC TEAM

7-61. Every maneuver company and Cavalry troop, aside from the headquarters company or troop, is assigned an organic combat medic team. The combat medic team consists of one emergency care staff sergeant and three emergency care sergeants. Additionally, the field artillery and engineer companies, aside from the headquarters company, are assigned an emergency care staff sergeant. These medics generally operate as part of the advisor teams. Combat medics provide tactical combat casualty care and role 1 medical support to the elements to which they are assigned. Combat medics also advise their foreign counterparts if assigned. Technical supervision of the combat medics is provided within the headquarters company or by the brigade field surgeon. The combat medics perform the following medical functions:

- Triage and provide tactical combat casualty care for the wounded.
- Arrange medical evacuation for litter patients and direct ambulatory patients to the casualty collection point or to the battalion aid station.
- Initiate a DD Form 1380 (Tactical Combat Casualty Care [TCCC] Card) for the sick and wounded. As time permits, assists in preparing a DD Form 1380 for deceased personnel.
- Screen, evaluate, and treat, within capabilities, those patients suffering from minor illnesses or injuries.
- Provide limited primary care in austere environments.
- Keep the company commander and the battalion or squadron physician assistant informed on matters pertaining to the health and welfare of the Soldiers.
- Manage class VIII resupply for the unit’s combat lifesavers, vehicle first aid kits, and warrior aid and litter kits.
- Maintain sufficient quantities of medical supplies to support the tactical situation.
- Serve as a member of the unit field sanitation team. In this capacity, advise the commander of the advisor team leader and supervise unit personnel on matters of personal hygiene and field sanitation.
- Develop and maintain combat medic and Soldier medical skills. This includes subordinate medics and other SFAB Soldiers.
- Maintain tactical combat casualty care skills for a broad range of emergencies.

MEDICAL EVACUATION

7-62. Medical evacuation is the process of moving any person who is wounded injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities while providing en route medical care (FM 4-02). Medical evacuation consists of collecting, sorting, transporting, and providing en route medical care. Patients are evacuated from the lower role of care to the higher role of care. Due to the brigade’s limited assets and area of operations where the SFAB may operate, using dedicated internal medical evacuation assets will generally not be
possible. The SFAB planner must integrate the use of disparate (contract, multinational, other Service) evacuation assets into the medical evacuation plan.

7-63. An efficient and effective medical evacuation system for the brigade rapidly and efficiently moves the sick, injured, and wounded to a medical treatment facility to minimize mortality. A medical evacuation system also serves as a force multiplier as it clears the operational area enabling commanders to continue their mission with all available assets. A properly executed medical evacuation system improves Soldier morale by demonstrating that care is quickly available if they are wounded. An efficient medical evacuation system also—

- Builds rapport with the foreign security force by coordinating or providing rapid medical evacuation of the foreign soldiers when wounded, injured, or ill.
- Provides en route medical care that is essential in improving the prognosis and reducing the disability of the wounded, injured, or ill Soldiers.
- Provides medical economy of force.
- Provides connectivity of the Army Health System to the military health system.

7-64. The evacuation team, either internal or external to the SFAB, provides ground medical evacuation of patients from supported units to the medical support section. The evacuation team provides tactical combat casualty care, prepares patients for medical evacuation, and provides en route care for patients. The evacuation team operates and maintains assigned platforms, communications equipment, and medical equipment sets.

7-65. The medical evacuation team performs route reconnaissance (by map, aerial reconnaissance, coordination with the S-2 and S-3, and vehicular route reconnaissance), develops, and issues all necessary route and navigational information. The evacuation team maintains situational understanding and uses all available navigational tools to ensure quick and secure evacuation of patients.

**Casualty Evacuation**

7-66. Nonmedical units use the term “casualty evacuation” when referring to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical platforms without en route medical care.

**WARNING**

_Casualties transported in this manner may not receive proper en route medical care or be transported to the appropriate medical treatment facility to address the patient’s medical condition. If the casualty’s medical condition deteriorates during transport, or the casualty is not transported to the appropriate medical treatment facility, an adverse impact on the casualty’s prognosis and long-term disability or death may result._

7-67. Since casualty evacuation operations can reduce combat power and degrade the efficiency of the Army Health System, units should use casualty evacuation to move Soldiers with less severe injuries when medical evacuation assets are overwhelmed. Medical planners ensure the operation plan and the operation order address casualty evacuation operations as a separate operation, as these operations require preplanning, coordinating, synchronizing, and rehearsing. The casualty evacuation plan ensures casualties with severe or life-threatening injuries are prioritized for evacuation and are evacuated on dedicated medical evacuation platforms.

7-68. When possible, augment nonmedical vehicles and aircraft transporting casualties with a combat medic or combat lifesaver. The following factors limit the type of en route monitoring, medical care, and first aid provided:

- Skill level of the individual providing care. The emergency care sergeant and healthcare NCO can provide emergency medical intervention; whereas, the combat lifesaver can only monitor the casualty and ensure the basic lifesaving first aid tasks are accomplished.
Medical equipment available.
- Number of casualties transported.
- Accessibility of casualties. If a nonstandard evacuation platform is loaded with the maximum number of casualties, medical personnel or combat lifesavers may be unable to attend to the casualties while the platform is moving. If the condition of the casualty deteriorates and emergency measures are required, the platform must stop to permit care to be given.

7-69. Casualty evacuation and medical evacuation are complementary capabilities that reduce Soldier mortality. Casualty evacuation platforms do not negate the need for planning for and using organic medical evacuation assets. When outside a JOA, casualty evacuation does not negate the need for planning and coordinating for area support medical evacuation assets (air medical evacuation). As complementary capabilities, casualty evacuations enhance SFAB commanders’ options and ability to clear their wounded from the engagement area, allowing the more severely wounded and injured access to the increased lifesaving capabilities of the medical evacuation platform.
Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms and acronyms for which ATP 3-96.1 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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<td>after action review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSB</td>
<td>brigade support battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSB</td>
<td>combat sustainment support battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA PAM</td>
<td>Department of the Army pamphlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (form)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIIM</td>
<td>joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCRP</td>
<td>Marine Corps reference publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCTP</td>
<td>Marine Corps tactical publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decisionmaking process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations [mission variables] (Army)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MOE  measure of effectiveness
MOP  measure of performance
NCO  noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NTTP  Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
PDSS  predeployment site survey
S-1  battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2  battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3  battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4  battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6  battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-8  battalion or brigade financial management staff officer
S-9  battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SFA  security force assistance
SFAB  security force assistance brigade
SOP  standard operating procedure
TC  training circular
U.S.  United States
USC  United States Code
XO  executive officer

SECTION II – TERMS

**air and missile defense**
Direct (active and passive) defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets. (JP 3-01)

**area security**
A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area. (ADP 3-90)

**Army personnel recovery**
The military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. (FM 3-50)

**assessment**
The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

**battle rhythm**
A deliberate, daily schedule of command, staff, and unit activities intended to maximize use of time and synchronize staff actions. (JP 3-33)

**combat power**
(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADP 3-0)

**command**
The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. (JP 1)
command and control
   The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
   attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1)

command and control warfighting function
   The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of
   combat power. (ADP 3-0)

commander’s critical information requirement
   An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely
   decision making. (JP 3-0)

commander’s intent
   A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that
   supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting
   commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the
   operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

commander’s visualization
   The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and
   envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 6-0)

control
   (Army) The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance
   with the commander’s intent. (ADP 6-0)

counterintelligence
   Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against
   espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of
   foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or
   activities. (JP 2-01.2)

country team
   The senior, in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S.
   diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or
   agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

essential element of friendly information
   A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise,
   lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy
   detection. (ADP 6-0)

field artillery
   Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of indirect fire cannon, rocket, or
   surface to surface missile launchers (JP 3-09).

fires warfighting function
   The related tasks and systems that create and converge effects of all domains against an adversary or
   enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations. (ADP 3-0)

friendly force information requirement
   Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting
   capabilities (JP 3-0).

geospatial intelligence
   The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually
   depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence
   consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-03).

human intelligence
   A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0).
indicator
In the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. (JP 5-0)

information collection
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55).

intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(Army) The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3)

knowledge management
The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADP 6-0)

leadership
The activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)

local security
The low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

logistics package
The grouping of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander (FM 3-90-1).

measure of effectiveness
An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

measure of performance
An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

measurement and signature intelligence
Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0).

medical evacuation
The process of moving any person who is wounded injured, or ill to and between medical treatment facilities while providing en route medical care (FM 4-02).

mission command
(Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0)

open-source intelligence
Relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements. Also called OSINT. (JP 2-0)

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational control
The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Also called OPCON. (JP 1)

physical security
That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0).

priority intelligence requirement
An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01).

protection warfighting function
Related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0).

risk
Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. (JP 5-0)

risk management
The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0).

running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0).

security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

signals intelligence
Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0).

situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables. (ADP 6-0)

support operations
The staff function of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing sustainment in support of units conducting decisive action in an area of operations. (ATP 4-93)

sustainment warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (ADP 3-0)

targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

technical intelligence
Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages. (JP 2-0)
unified land operations
The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0).

warfighting function
A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (ADP 3-0)
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

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to the Secretary of the Army
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