Department of the Army
Pamphlet 525–30

Military Operations

Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Procedures

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
9 June 2015

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY

DA PAM 525–30
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Procedures

This new publication, dated 9 June 2015 --

o Implements strategic readiness assessment procedures and processes per AR
   525-30 (throughout).

o Implements extensive information regarding Army strategic readiness and how
   it is reported, prepared, reviewed, and submitted (throughout).

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## Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Procedures

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

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History. This publication is a new Department of the Army pamphlet.

Summary. This pamphlet explains and documents the basic Army strategic readiness assessment processes and general reporting procedures used in determining, analyzing, assessing, and reporting Army Strategic Readiness in accordance with the three Joint Staff Criteria (Joint Capability Assessments, Army Plan Assessment, and Readiness Deficiencies) and six

Army Strategic Readiness Tenets (Manning, Equipping, Sustaining, Training, Installations, and Capacity and Capability). This pamphlet outlines the process for coordinated Army Strategic Readiness Assessment execution within the Department of the Army to support National objectives.

Applicability. This pamphlet applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. Also, it applies to Department of the Army civilians.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this pamphlet is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this pamphlet by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must

include formal review by the activity's senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25–30 for specific guidance.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.

Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
This Department of the Army pamphlet (DA Pam) explains and documents the basic Army strategic readiness assessment (ASRA) processes and general reporting procedures. This process includes determining, analyzing, assessing, and reporting Army strategic readiness in accordance with the three Joint Staff criteria (Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), Army plan assessment, and readiness deficiencies) and six Army strategic readiness tenets (manning, equipping, sustaining, training, installations, and capacity and capability). The ASRA prepares the analysis by criteria, key indicators, and measures and develops the assessment through the Strategic Readiness Assessment Group (SRAG). The ASRA is then delivered quarterly to the Army's senior leaders. While this publication explains and documents the basic processes and general procedures for assessing and analyzing Army strategic readiness, AR 525–30 is the authoritative publication for Army strategic readiness policy. Selected policy provisions that are established in AR 525–30 are replicated in this publication to enhance the utility of this publication to its intended users. However, in the event that any provisions in this DA Pam conflict with those in AR 525–30, the provisions in AR 525–30 will take precedence.

1–2. References
Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanations of abbreviations and terms
Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary.

Chapter 2
The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process

2–1. General
The ASRA Process is a quarterly comprehensive analysis of the Army's strategic readiness levels across the total force necessary to inform the Army's senior leaders, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress on the status of the Service to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy (NMS). This assessment combines objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective strategic measures and indicator assessments to portray a holistic view of current and projected strategic readiness. The ASRA is the Army's source document to meet readiness reporting requirements of the Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR) and the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). It also assists senior leaders in congressional hearing preparation, questions for the record responses, the comprehensive Joint assessment (CJA), chairman's risk assessment (CRA), and the Secretary of Defense Risk Mitigation Plan. Figure 2–1 visually depicts the relationship of unit reports, the Army's strategic readiness tenets (SRTs), and Joint Staff criteria used to develop the ASRA. This chapter provides an overview of the quarterly ASRA process and describes how the ASRA contributes to both Joint Staff and OSD readiness assessments provided to key leaders and Congress as mandated by Title 10, United State Code (10 USC).

Figure 2–1. Army strategic readiness assessment process

2–2. Strategic readiness reporting synchronization

a. The ASRA process begins with monthly strategic readiness updates (SRUs). The SRU, chaired by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), provides an overview of the Army's tactical, operational, and strategic readiness levels. Tactical level readiness is the summation of the monthly commander's unit status reports (USRs), which is highlighted every month. Specific operational and strategic level readiness analysis and topics are covered and differ from month to month; however, over the span of a quarter, all key strategic readiness criteria are covered. The SRU allows Army senior leaders to provide clear readiness guidance and facilitate monthly interaction between the Army Staff (ARSTAF), Army commands (ACOMs), and Army service component commands (ASCCs). It is designed to promote an early, shared understanding of the Army's current and projected readiness status of Army units, resourcing, policy, or employment decisions, risks, and other key guidance factors.

b. During the third month of each quarter (DEC, MAR, JUN, and SEP), the Army produces the actual ASRA comprehensive written report. This report and recommended input to the Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR) is specifically briefed to the Army Senior Leaders during the third month of each quarter's SRU.

c. The JFRR is the principal assessment of the Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) and assesses the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to execute the NMS per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401–01E. The Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) has oversight of the JFRR and is briefed quarterly by the Services, combatant commands (CCMDs), combat support agencies, and Joint directors during the Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment Group (JCCAG). The JFRR is based on three assessments. First, analysis of the nine Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). Second, it includes an assessment of the readiness of Army units to conduct contingency operations. Third, the JFRR incorporates readiness deficiencies provided by ASCCs, ACOMs, and DRUs. The result is an aggregate readiness assessment (RA) level with two accompanying top concerns. Taken together, this assessment fulfills the statutory and policy requirements for a Service readiness assessment.

d. The Army uses the ASRA and the Joint Staff utilizes the JFRR to inform their submission to the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). The QRRC is mandated by Congress under 10 USC 482, quarterly reports, and identifies readiness deficiencies, key indicators, and other relevant information related to each identified deficiency, and remedial actions to correct them. Army submission topics include logistics, personnel strength, and training.

e. The comprehensive joint assessment (CJA) requests comprehensive senior military leader assessments from Service chiefs and combatant commanders relating to their ability to meet 10 USC and Unified Command Plan responsibilities and support the NMS within their area of responsibility or functional area. The ASRA provides the Army and ASCC input to the six CJA requirements (integrated response, security environment, current operations and health of the force, near term military risk assessment, near term risk drivers and mitigation, and implications for the future force).

f. The chairman's risk assessment (CRA) provides to Congress the chairman's assessment of the nature and magnitude of strategic and military risk in executing the missions called for in the NMS. The CRA provides a holistic assessment of the ability of the Armed Forces to meet strategic requirements in the near-term. The Army uses the ASRA to provide input to the CRA.

g. The SECDEF Risk Mitigation Plan is a document submitted to Congress that addresses concerns outlined in the CRA. This plan may recommend changes in strategy, development of new operational concepts or capabilities, increases in capacity, or adjustments in force posture or employment.

h. Figure 2–2 represents the temporal flow of information, beginning with tactical level USR data, and culminating in the QRRC. The analysis and assessment provided by this ASRA process synchronizes and feeds all readiness reporting requirements as dictated by policy and statute.

Figure 2–2. Temporal overview of the strategic readiness update, Army strategic readiness assessment, Joint forces readiness review, and quarterly readiness report to Congress

2–3. Army strategic readiness criteria

The Army uses four strategic readiness criteria to determine the ASRA. In accordance with CJCSI 3401.01E, three criteria are mandated by the Joint Staff. They are JCA assessments, Army plan assessments, and overall readiness deficiencies. These three joint staff criteria incorporate the Army's 10 USC "man, train, equip" responsibilities and demonstrate how they directly affect joint operations in support of the NMS. Additionally, the ASRA incorporates a specific Army criterion which consists of six strategic readiness tenet (SRT) assessments. The three Joint Staff and Army SRT criteria assessments determine the overall ASRA readiness assessment level. All of these criteria are covered in more detail later in this pamphlet. The Army measures each criterion using a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures. The overall Army strategic readiness assessment level is determined by the lowest rating of these criteria.

CRITERIA	HOW THE ARMY MEASURES EACH CRITERIA					Criteria Assessment	Army Readiness Assessment (RA) Level
MANDATORY JOINT STAFF CRITERIA							
Joint Capability Areas (JCA)	Army JCA Assessments					RA Level	
Plan Assessment	Joint Combat Capability Assessment Plan Assessments (JCCA-PAs)	TPFDD Readiness Analysis	Apportionment Table Readiness Analysis	ASCC Mission Essential Task Assessments		RA Level	RA LEVEL
Readiness Deficiencies	Army Readiness Deficiencies					RA Level	
ARMY CRITERIA							
Strategic Readiness Tenet Assessment	Manning	Equiping	Sustaining	Training	Installations	Capacity & Capability	RA Level
Army Measured Indicators	Man the Force	Equipment On Hand	Maintenance	Operational Training	Installation Services	Capacity	
		Equipment Modernization	Strategic Mobility	Institutional Training	Infrastructure		
	Health of the Force	Critical Materiel Availability	Munitions	Training Support	Natural Infrastructure	Capability	
			Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS)		Army Energy and Water Program		
Criteria Assessment	RA-Level	RA-Level	RA-Level	RA-Level	RA-Level	RA-Level	

Figure 2–3. Joint Staff and Army criteria used to determine the Army strategic readiness assessment

2–4. Strategic readiness tenet measures

a. SRT measures are based on objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective assessments, or a combination thereof, for each tenet. Aggregation and analysis of various strategic measures reveal emerging strategic readiness indicators. Assessing measures is the most crucial point of the strategic readiness analysis, because the level of assessment identifies, with more specificity, the trends, shortfalls, or gaps in particular indicators. Specific measures may be selected from a menu of different data points, and preference of one measure over another may change over time according to variables such as senior leader priorities, evolving geopolitical events, or domestic political conflicts. For example, measuring adverse readiness impacts due to sequestration may only be pertinent during the immediate years surrounding passage of the Budget Control Act.

b. There are a set number of measurable data points for the six strategic readiness tenets that each primary ARSTAF office uses to determine its current and projected tenet readiness assessment level. Additional quantitative and/or qualitative measures are also incorporated into the readiness assessment level of each tenet. These measures vary by tenet. While qualitative measures are not as precise as quantitative measures, they are equally relevant when conducting analysis. The amount of impact qualitative measures will have is determined by the appropriate ARSTAF section tasked with submitting their tenet.

c. Assessing measures includes not only a current status, but also accounts for risk across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This leads to strategic decisionmaking by linking specific strategic shortfalls to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System. This translates the strategic measures from a single point of reference to a piece of the larger strategic mosaic and enables senior leaders to make strategic decisions.

2–5. Strategic indicators

a. These indicators are those general topics that impact the overall readiness of an individual tenet. They provide the framework for a consistent readiness assessment of each tenet because strategic indicators remain constant over time. These indicators inform decisionmakers that a policy lever needs to be implemented in order to achieve an optimal outcome.

b. Each tenet has its own individual indicators that are combined and measured to provide the readiness assessment of that particular tenet at the strategic level.

2–6. Strategic levers

a. These levers are those actions, mitigation measures, or decisions that are implemented to alter the effect of the strategic indicator in order to improve the readiness assessment of the respective tenet. Strategic levers are specific actions or policies that are defined and measureable. They are determined by deriving the individual functions that affect the measures within each indicator. These actions must be analyzed until the root cause of a strategic effect can be pinpointed. The depth of this process will vary with each measure.

b. Analyzing and assessing strategic levers should be done by evaluating each individual action for its root impact on a strategic indicator. The goal of this deepest level of analysis is to identify those specific actions that may be taken to mitigate the negative effect revealed by the indicator. Once the impacts to readiness are defined, it is possible to assess which actions have such an impact that they are identified as critical capabilities.

c. The assessment of risk associated with a particular strategic lever (that is, the ability to support CCMD operational plans (OPLANs) enables the depiction of potential changes in indicators and outcomes over time. In this manner, Army senior leaders can see how the implementation of an action on a lever will change their risk over the FYDP.

2–7. Readiness assessment levels

a. In order to develop an overall assessment and to ensure common language when assessing the cumulative effects of readiness assessments across all readiness tenets and criteria, it is essential that assessments are conducted within a common framework. The Army's overall strategic assessment will follow the existing Chairman's Readiness System (CRS), as outlined in CJCSI 3401D. This will allow a seamless transition of the Army assessment to the CRS.

b. Table 2–1 identifies the readiness assessments outlined in CJCSI 3401.01E that the Army will use in the overall assessment of each strategic readiness tenet.

Table 2–1
Readiness assessment level definition

Readiness assessment level	Definition
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact on readiness and ability to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the global employment of the force (GEF) and Joint strategic capabilities plan (JSCP).
RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact on readiness and ability to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP.
RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact on readiness and ability to execute assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP.
RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude accomplishment of assigned mission(s) in support of the NMS as directed in the GEF and JSCP.

Chapter 3
Determining, Analyzing and Assessing Joint Capability Areas

3–1. General
The JCA assessments are the first of the three mandatory Joint Staff criteria that inform the ASRA. JCAs are collections of like DOD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decisionmaking, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force development and operational planning. The JCAs outlined below are in accordance with the 2015 JCA definitions.

3–2. Joint capability areas
a. JCA 1 (Force support): The ability to establish, develop, maintain, and manage a mission ready total force.
(1) Lead reporting responsibility. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DCS, G–3/5/7) (DAMO–ODR).
(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.
(a) DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SS).
(b) DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODO).
(c) DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR).
(d) DCS, G–1.
(e) Office of the Surgeon General.
(f) U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).
(3) Measures.
(a) Global Force Management.
(b) Force preparation.
(c) Human Capital Management.
(d) Health readiness.
b. JCA 2 (Battle space awareness). The ability to understand dispositions and intentions, as well as the characteristics and conditions of the operational environment that bear on national and military decisionmaking by leveraging all sources of information to include intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, meteorological, and oceanographic.
(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–2 (DAMI–OP).
(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.
(a) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
(b) ACOMs.
(c) ASCCs.
(3) Measures.
(a) Planning and direction.
(b) Collection.
(c) Processing and exploitation.
(d) Analysis, prediction and production.
(e) BA data dissemination and relay.
c. JCA 3 (Force application). The ability to integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in all environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission objectives. The Army as a Service does not execute the force application JCA. The Army assessment is based on ASCC readiness reporting to their CCMD.
(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility: ASSCs.

(3) Measures.

(a) Maneuver.

(b) Engagement.

d. JCA 4 (Logistics). The ability to project and sustain a logistically ready Joint force through the deliberate sharing of national and multi-national resources to effectively support operations, extend operational reach, and provide the Joint force commander the freedom of action necessary to meet objectives.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–4 (DALO–ORR).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.

(a) Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM).

(b) Chief of Engineers.

(c) ACOMs.

(d) ASCCs.

(e) DRUs.

(3) Measures.

(a) Deployment and distribution.

(b) Supply.

(c) Maintenance.

(d) Logistics Services.

(e) Operational contract support.

(f) Engineering.

e. JCA 5 (Command and control): The ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander or decisionmaker over assigned and attached forces and resources in the accomplishment of the mission. The Army's assessment of the command and control JCA reflects Army equities in CCMD exercise of command and control over Army forces. This is not an assessment of the Army's ability to command and control service retained forces.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7(DAMO–ODR).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility: ASCCs.

(3) Measures.

(a) Organize.

(b) Understand.

(c) Planning.

(d) Decide.

(e) Direct.

(f) Monitor.

f. JCA 6 (Net-centric): The ability to provide a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and that also protects information from those who should not have it.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: Chief Information Officer/G–6 (SAIS–CBP).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.

(a) DCS, G–2.

(b) U.S. Army Cyber Command.

(c) 2nd Army.

(3) Measures.

(a) DOD Information network capabilities.

(b) Enterprise services.

g. JCA 7 (Protection): The ability to prevent and/or mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel (combatant and/or non-combatant) and physical assets of the United States, allies and friends.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODP).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.

(a) ACOMs.

(b) ASCCs.

(3) Measures.

(a) Prevent.

(b) Mitigate.

h. JCA 8 (Building partnerships): The ability to interact with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, security

institutions, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities in order to build effective, legitimate, interoperable, and self-sustaining strategic partners.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SS).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.

(a) ACOMs.

(b) ASCCs.

(3) Measures.

(a) Communicate.

(b) Shape.

i. JCA 9 (Corporate management and support): The ability to provide strategic senior level, enterprise-wide leadership, direction, coordination, and oversight through a chief management officer function.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: Office of Business Transformation.

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility.

(a) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA (AL&T)).

(b) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA (FM&C)).

(c) Office of General Counsel.

(d) Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison.

(e) CIO/G–6.

(f) Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8 (DCS, G–8).

(g) U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command.

(3) Measures.

(a) Advisory and compliance.

(b) Strategy and assessment.

(c) Information management.

(d) Acquisition.

(e) Program budget and finance.

3–3. Assessment of Joint capability areas

a. JCAs are assessed through the Y/Q/N rating scheme, as directed by CJSCI 3401.01E. The determination of whether a JCA is Y/Q/N is determined by observed performance, resource availability, and military judgment. Table 3–1 defines the Y/Q/N assessment.

Table 3–1
Joint Staff readiness metric

Rating	Definition
Y	Unit can accomplish task to established standards and conditions.
Q	Unit can accomplish all or most of the task to standard under most conditions. The specific standards and conditions, as well as the shortfalls or issues impacting the unit's task, must be clearly detailed in the Mission Essential Task (MET) assessment.
N	Unit unable to accomplish the task to prescribed standard and conditions at this time.

b. Table 3–2 shows the overall relationship of JCA Y/Q/N ratings as they relate to RA-levels. The JCA RA-levels are then incorporated into the overall ASRA.

Table 3–2
Joint capability assessment risk assessment levels

Measure: Army Joint Capability Area (JCA) assessments							
RA–1	No more than 2 JCAs "Q"	RA–2	No more than 4 JCAs "Q"	RA–3	5 or more JCAs "Q"	RA–4	4 or more JCAs "Q" and 1 "N" or 2 or more JCAs "N"

3–4. Coordinating instructions

Draft JCA input is due to DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) during the first week of the third month of each quarter (DEC, MAR, JUN, and SEP). Final JCA input is due to DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) during the second week of the third month of each quarter.

Chapter 4
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Army Plans

4–1. General

The Army plans assessment is the second Joint Staff criterion that informs the ASRA. These assessments are a reflection of the Army's ability to source combatant command (CCMD) operational plans (OPLANs) and assessments of the Army's mission essential tasks (METs) and are composed of Joint combat capability assessment-plan assessments (JCCA–PA), time phased force deployment data (TPFDD) readiness analysis, apportionment table readiness analysis, and the ASCC's MET analysis.

4–2. Joint combat capability assessment-plan assessment

According to CJCSI 3401.01E, plan assessments gauge the CCMD ability to successfully execute key contingency plans. Force sourcing for plans will be conducted and evaluated by the Joint force providers and their Service components. Output of plan assessments will be an assessment of the overall ability to execute the plan supported by an analysis of the impact of sourcing and logistics shortfalls and readiness deficiencies on military risk.

a. The definitions of military risk (low, moderate, significant, and high) depicted in table 4–1 are established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These definitions are cited in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) and CJCSI 3401.01E.

Table 4–1
Joint staff military risk level definition

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff military risk levels	
High	Achieving objectives is unlikely. No sourcing solutions for combatant commander (CCDR) critical requirements. Deployed forces are not ready; extreme stress on the force (less than 1:1).
Significant	Achieving objectives is questionable. Shortfalls in CCDR critical requirements. Next to deploy forces ready "just in time;" prolonged stress (1:1).
Moderate	Achieving objectives is likely. World wide sourcing solutions for most CCDR requirements. Strategic depth ready for current operations; increased stress (1:2).
Low	Achieving objectives is very likely. Full capacity to source CCDR requirements. Strategic depth ready for full spectrum conflict; limited stress (greater than 1:2).

b. Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSW).

c. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

(2) ACOMs.

(3) ASCCs.

d. Measures (applies to each CCMD group of plans).

e. The readiness assessment levels (RA-levels) identified in table 4–2 are derived by assessing risk in the following categories for each plan:

(1) AC dwell.

(2) Readiness.
(3) Suitability.
(4) Availability.
(5) Sustainment.

Table 4–2
Joint combat capability assessment-plan assessments readiness assessment levels

Measure: Joint combat capability assessment-plan assessment (JCCA–PA)							
RA–1	Low Risk	RA–2	Moderate Risk	RA–3	Significant Risk	RA–4	High Risk

4–3. Time phased force deployment data readiness analysis

a. Assessment of TPFDD readiness will focus on the OPLAN(s) that Army senior leaders determine is(are) the most significant during the reporting quarter. Each TPFDD contains requirements varying from corps down to squad and/or team level. Each requirement is assigned a unit identification code (UIC). Each UIC is associated with a standard requirements code (SRC) based on the unit's core mission. Within this analysis, the Army defines "ready forces" as those reporting core level (C-level) 1 or 2. Analysis is conducted to determine how many units grouped by SRC are reported to be at C1 or C2. This analysis provides a more accurate assessment of the Army's ability to source the required forces to execute the selected OPLAN(s).

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSW).

b. Measures: The quantity of C1/2 units available for a selected OPLAN(s) categorized by SRC. This measure is graphically depicted in table 4–3.

Table 4–3
Time phased deployment data measurement readiness assessment levels

Measure: Time phased force deployment data (TPFDD) readiness measures							
RA–1	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient ready forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities

4–4. Apportionment table readiness analysis

a. According to the global force management implementation guidance (GFMIG), analysis of apportioned forces provides an estimate of the Services' capacity to generate capabilities along general timelines for CCMD planning purposes. Apportioned forces are those capabilities that a CCMD can reasonably expect to be made available. These forces are not necessarily an identification of the actual forces that will be allocated for use when a contingency plan transitions to execution. Within this analysis, the Army defines "ready forces" as those reporting C1 or C2. The overall readiness assessment for the apportionment table readiness analysis is determined by selecting the lowest RA-level of the three measures listed in table 4–4.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSW).

b. Measures.

(1) Operations capabilities.

(2) Operations support capabilities.

(3) Force sustainment capabilities.

c. Table 4–4 shows the RA-level associated with the quantity of C-level 1/2 units grouped by capability.

Table 4–4
Apportionment table capability measurement readiness assessment levels

	Measure: Operations capabilities						
RA–1	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–2	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–3	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–4	Sufficient ready forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities

	Measure: Operations support capabilities						
RA–1	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–2	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–3	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–4	Sufficient ready forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities

	Measure: Force sustainment capabilities						
RA–1	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–2	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–3	Sufficient ready forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of ca-pabilities	RA–4	Sufficient ready forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities

4–5. Army service component command mission essential task analysis

a. Each ASCC conducts an assessment of its METs in accordance with the Y/Q/N scale detailed in table 3–1. These METs are determined by each respective ASCC commander in consultation with their combatant commander to be necessary to accomplish their CCMD OPLANs. The overall Y/Q/N rating for each ASCC is then determined by each ASCC commander. The Q and N ratings referenced in table 4–5 refer to the combination of overall Y/Q/N ratings for each ASCC and their corresponding RA-level.

(1) Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

(2) Supporting reporting responsibility: ASCCs.

b. Measure.

c. Table 4–5 shows the RA-level associated with the Y/Q/N assessments of the ASCC METs.

Table 4–5
Army service component command mission essential task measurement readiness assessment levels

	Measure: Army service component command mission essential task assessments						
RA–1	No more than 2 ASCCs "Q"	RA–2	No more than 4 ASCCs "Q"	RA–3	5 or more ASCCs "Q"	RA–4	4 or more ASCCs "Q" and 1 "N" or 2 or more ASCCs "N"

4–6. Assessment of Army plans

a. The overall readiness assessment of Army plans is a combination of the components identified in paragraphs 4–2 through 4–5. When determining the overall RA-level for Army plan assessments, the JCCA–PA and ASCC MET assessments carry the most weight. The lowest RA-level of either of these two will act as a constraint on the overall Army plan assessment RA-level. For example, if JCCA PA is assessed as RA–1 and ASCC MET is assessed at RA–3, then the overall Army plan assessment criteria will be RA–3.

b. Additionally, the TPFDD readiness assessment and apportionment readiness assessment act as constraints on the overall Army plan RA-level as explained below:

(1) If either the TPFDD or apportionment RA-level is assessed at RA–3, then the overall Army plan assessment RA-level cannot exceed RA–2.

(2) If either the TPFDD or apportionment RA-level is assessed at RA–4, then the overall Army plan assessment RA-level cannot exceed RA–3.

(3) If both of the TPFDD and apportionment RA-level are assessed at RA–4, then the overall Army plan assessment RA-level will be RA–4.

4–7. Coordinating instructions

Draft ASCC MET assessment input is due to DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) during the second week of the second month of the quarter (NOV, FEB, MAY, and AUG). Final ASCC MET assessments are due to DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) during the third week of the second month of the quarter.

Chapter 5
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Army Readiness Deficiencies

5–1. General

The final set of Joint Staff criteria used in the ASRA process is the identification of readiness deficiencies by ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, ARNG, and USAR. Readiness deficiencies are defined in CJCSI 3401.01E as a shortfall of resources to meet the requirements of a reporting organization's assigned mission, plan, or other documented responsibility. While this is one of the more subjective assessments within the ASRA process, it provides the commanders of the various stakeholders with an opportunity to highlight the specific issues that most affect their units. Readiness deficiencies should be thoroughly explained and linked to an identified resource shortfall.

5–2. Reporting responsibility

a. Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

b. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) ACOMs.

(2) ASCCs.

(3) Army National Guard (ARNG).

(4) U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

(5) U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE).

(6) 2nd Army.

(7) Military District of Washington.

(8) INSCOM.

(9) U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM).

(10) U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM).

(11) Other DRUs report readiness deficiencies at their discretion.

5–3. Measures

All stakeholders (ACOM, ASCC, DRU, ARNG, and USAR) will identify their top two readiness deficiencies as determined by the commander. Upon receipt of these deficiencies, DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) will aggregate and synthesize the individual stakeholder ratings into an overall readiness deficiency readiness assessment level that will be incorporated into the final ASRA. The list of stakeholder deficiencies will also serve as the basis for the top two readiness concerns that DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) will construct and include in the ASRA narrative. Table 5–1 defines the readiness deficiency assessment levels.

Table 5–1
Readiness deficiency assessment levels

Measure: Readiness deficiencies							
RA–1	Negligible Impact	RA–2	Limited Impact	RA–3	Significant Impact	RA–4	Preclude Mission Accomplishment

5–4. Coordinating instructions

All stakeholders will submit a draft of their top two readiness deficiencies in a memorandum format to the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) during the second week of the second month of the quarter (NOV, FEB, MAY, and AUG). Final readiness deficiency memos are due to the DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) during the third week of the second month of the quarter. ARNG and USAR readiness deficiencies will be briefed during the first SRU of the quarter. ACOM and ASCC deficiencies will be briefed during the second SRU of the quarter.

a. Within the submitted memorandum, the following points must be addressed for each readiness deficiency:

(1) Title of readiness deficiency.

(2) Current requirement not being met as a result of the concern and the source document that requirement originated from (that is GEF, JSCP, QDR, CONPLAN, OPLAN, and TSC Plan).

(3) Quantified shortfall and/or operational impact and/or MET(s) impacted by requirement not being met.

(4) Any actions taken to date and proposed actions necessary to fix the deficiency.

(5) Risk and planned potential and/or mitigation action to manage the risk.

(6) Point of contact information.

b. When submitting the memorandum for the top two Army readiness concerns, DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) will address the following points in accordance with CJCSI 3401.01E, see enclosure C:

(1) Subject: Title of the top concern.

(2) Major points: Bulleted synopsis of the concern and/or problem.

(3) Narrative: Detailed discussion of the problem in narrative form. Include background information, causal factors, and any functional information to help better understand and/or provide clarity to the concern.

(4) Impact: Identify the critical effects the top concern has on the organization. Include affected METs, assigned plans and missions, and/or JCAs. Provide any further implications.

(5) Recommendation: Propose solution and/or mitigation options that would alleviate the concern and/or problem.

(6) Comments from leadership: When possible, include succinct comments from the reporting organization's commander, Service chief, or director adding personal perspective and emphasis on the concern and/or problem.

(7) Point of contact information.

(8) Security classification levels for the document and for each paragraph.

Chapter 6
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Manning Data

6–1. General
The manning tenet assesses the Army's ability to provide qualified personnel on time to meet the needs of the Army and the CCDRs in support of the NMS. The manning tenet covers human resource functions from the tactical to the strategic level.

6–2. Reporting responsibility
a. Primary Reporting Responsibility: DCS, G–1.

b. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) ASA M&RA (Civilian Management).

(2) MEDCOM.

(3) USAR.

(4) ARNG.

6–3. Measures
Analysis of the manning tenet measures focuses on total Army personnel trends, both military and civilian. These measures evaluate how well the Army personnel system puts the right people in the right units at the right time. Table 6–1 defines the manning measurement assessment. Table 6–2 defines the personnel readiness (P-level) measures.

Table 6–1
Manning measurement readiness assessment levels

Measure: Total Army personnel availability, assigned military occupational specialty (MOS), and available senior grade							
RA–1	0–1.54	RA–2	1.55–2.44	RA–3	2.45–3.34	RA–4	Greater than 3.34

Table 6–2
Personnel readiness (P-level) measures

Total Army personnel availability							
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent
Total Army assigned MOS							
RA–1	85–100 percent	RA–2	75–84 percent	RA–3	65–74 percent	RA–4	Less than 65 percent
Total Army available senior grade							
RA–1	85–100 percent	RA–2	75–84 percent	RA–3	65–74 percent	RA–4	Less than 65 percent

a. Overall total Army P-rating.

(1) Total Army personnel availability.

(2) Assigned military occupational specialty (MOS) match.

(3) Total Army available senior grade.

b. Individual soldier dwell time.

c. Adherence to G–3/5/7 directed manning guidance.

d. Accession rates.

e. Attrition and separation rates.

f. Time on station.

g. Percentage of units meeting deployment manning requirements.

h. Civilian priority functions.

i. Annual workforce guidance measures of performance.

(1) Civilian workforce within authorized full time employees.

(2) Under and/or over executing civilian pay.

(3) Reductions in force and/or programmed losses.

(4) Contract service spending.

j. Civilian, contract, and or military workforce mix.

k. The measure listed in table 6–1 generates an RA-level, based on the average P rating of total Army units, as determined by table 6–2. In addition to the measures listed in table 6–1, there are additional measures that inform the development of the overall RA-level for the manning tenet. Examples of these measures include those listed in paragraphs 6–3*b*through *j*. Those additional measures reflect changes to health of the force and can be incorporated to elevate or decrease the overall manning tenet RA-level; much like a unit commander can subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit readiness assessment as outlined in AR 220–1. These additional measures may be further elaborated upon in the manning ASRA narrative.

6–4. Strategic Indicators

In order to assess the strategic readiness of the manning tenet, it is necessary to identify and assess each of the strategic indicators. These indicators are linked, but not identical, to the JCAs discussed in Joint Publication 1–0.

a. Man the force is ensuring the right Soldier is in the right place at the right time.

b. Health of the force is measured by available and projected available inventory.

6–5. Strategic levers

The strategic levers in the manning tenet are those actions or decisions that can affect or influence the manning measures and indicators outlined above. The effects of policy and all resources necessary to achieve mission readiness must be considered before employing these levers.

a. Accessions, retention, and separation policy.

(1) Reclassification actions for excess inventory should be considered when assessing personnel end strength. One option is to adjust accession and retention programs to increase and decrease inventory to meet required skills or grade levels. Another option is to implement early separation and retirement programs. Additionally, adjustments to the promotion model can be made in order to accelerate or decelerate promotions and/or increase inventory with necessary grades.

(2) Capacity of the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, legal processing timelines, scheduling of Noncommissioned Officer Education System, individual and/or organizational performance standards should all be considered when assessing the health of the force.

b. End Strength Adjustments: Senior leaders may determine that Army end strength must be adjusted. Adjustments to the Army end strength must be accomplished through legislation changes reflected in the National Defense Authorization Act. Variables that affect end strength are listed below:

(1) Accessions.

(2) Retention.

(3) Separations.

(4) Promotions.

(5) Assignments.

c. Impacts to personnel readiness are affected through accessions, retention, and separations, as well as adjustments to medical policies, Soldier programs, and training strategies. Readiness impacts due to force structure updates as determined through the total Army analysis process and force generation models also affect these levers.

Chapter 7
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Equipping Data

7–1. General

The equipping tenet of readiness assesses the Army's ability to properly equip and modernize forces to meet the needs of the Army and the CCDRs in support of the NMS. Any trend or issue that affects the ability of the Army to equip the force is relevant to this analysis. Where possible, assessments are objective and measurable. They should also link directly to the ability to support specific OPLAN requirements of the ASCCs. Risk should also be considered, such as long lead times and turn-around times, production capacity limits, and the criticality of equipment functions in the ability to execute OPLANS.

7–2. Reporting responsibility

a. Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–8.

b. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) Army Materiel Command (AMC).

(2) DCS, G–8 Programs analysis evaluation.

(3) USAR.

(4) ARNG.

7–3. Measures

Analyzing and assessing measures in the equipping tenet should consider core functions at the strategic level down to the unit level and consider such inputs as the industrial base, available capital, and upcoming assigned missions. These measures should quantify the degree to which the right equipment is available for the right unit at the right time. High demand/low-density (HD/LD) capabilities must have special consideration, as they could result in a scalable impact on the Army's ability to execute operations. Table 7–1 defines the equipping measurement assessment.

Table 7–1
Equipping measurement readiness assessment levels

Measure: Total Army units equipment on hand (EOH) S1 or S2						
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	70–89 percent	RA–3	60–69 percent	RA–4	Less than 60 percent

Measure: Total Army units EOH S1 or S2 projected						
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	70–89 percent	RA–3	60–69 percent	RA–4	Less than 60 percent

Measure: Total Army equipment modernization level 4 or higher						
RA–1	60–100 percent	RA–2	40–59 percent	RA–3	30–39 percent	RA–4	Less than 30 percent

Measure: Total Army equipment modernization level 4 or higher projected						
RA–1	60–100 percent	RA–2	40–59 percent	RA–3	30–39 percent	RA–4	Less than 30 percent

| Measure: Total Army pacing item EOH (line item numbers (LINs) rated at S1 or S2) |||||||

Table 7–1
Equipping measurement readiness assessment levels—Continued

RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	70–89 percent	RA–3	60–69 percent	RA–4	Less than 60 percent
Measure: Total Army pacing item EOH (LINs rated at S1 or S2) projected							
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	70–89 percent	RA–3	60–69 percent	RA–4	Less than 60 percent

a. Equipment on hand (units rated at S1 or S2).

(1) Total Army equipment on hand (EOH) rated at S1 or S2.

(2) Total Army EOH rated at S1 or S2 projections.

b. Total Army equipment modernization (Mod Level 4).

(1) Total Army equipment modernization levels (Mod Level 4).

(2) Total Army equipment modernization (Mod Level 4) projections.

c. Total Army pacing items (ERC P) EOH.

(1) Total Army pacing items (ERC P) EOH by line item number (LIN) rated at S1 or S2.

(2) Total Army Pacing Items (ERC P) EOH by LIN rated at S1 or S2 projected.

d. Each measure listed in table 7–1 generates its own RA-level. The overall RA-level is determined by taking the lowest readiness assessment of the six measures. While the measures listed in table 7–1 are quantitative measurements, readiness assessments and projections should also consider qualitative measures, which should inform the calculation of the overall readiness assessment rating for the equipping tenet. Examples of these qualitative measures include projected effects of modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) changes, transportation and sustainment costs, changes to research and development funding levels, and outcomes of unit equipping re-use working groups. These qualitative measures can be incorporated to elevate or decrease the overall manning tenet RA-level, much like a unit commander can subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit readiness assessment as outlined in AR 220–1. These additional measures can be further elaborated upon in the equipping chapter of the ASRA.

7–4. Strategic Indicators

a. Shortages of EOH: Capability gaps or shortfalls in EOH rates affect the Army's ability to provide ready forces. Critical thresholds must be identified in order to inform senior leaders of decision points for the utilization of scarce funds and resources.

b. Changes to modernization and/or recapitalization: Deferred modernization or recapitalization for a system or critical piece of equipment indicates that there is (a), a lack of sufficient budgetary capacity or (b), an evolving threat or requirement has moved modernization and/or recapitalization to a lower priority. In either case, this indicator must be analyzed to assess how it will impact Army strategic readiness.

c. Changes to critical materiel availability: A reduction in critical materiel capability is a leading indicator of a decrease in equipment readiness. Examples include the loss of production line capacity to generate new platforms or replacement parts, or shortages in critical raw materials.

7–5. Strategic levers

Strategic levers in the equipping tenet are those actions or decisions that can affect the EOH and modernization measures, and further impact the equipping strategic indicators. Levers may have an effect through deliberate action or inaction. Strategic levers for the equipping tenet includes the following:

a. Adjusting Materiel Management Program.

(1) Re-distribution of existing equipment (lateral transfers).

(2) Increases or decreases in the purchase of new equipment.

b. Adjusting modernization strategy.

c. Managing impacts of MTOE changes.

d. Analyzing and assessing equipping strategic levers require careful consideration of the effects of action/inaction on the equipping community and strategic equipping capability. When analyzing strategic levers for equipping, consider the policies, procedures, and requirements of other organizations across the Army, DOD, and subordinate commands. Other considerations that apply to the analysis of strategic levers for equipping are external factors such as work stoppages, production, and potential political ramifications.

Chapter 8
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Sustaining Data

8–1. General
The sustaining tenet of readiness assesses the Army's ability to project and sustain forces to meet the needs of the Army and the CCDRs in support of the NMS. The sustainment tenet covers logistics functions from the tactical to strategic level. Where possible, assessments are objective and measurable. Long lead times and turn-around times, production capacity limits, product shelf-life, and criticality of force projection and sustainment functions in the ability to execute OPLANS requires an application of risk over time to all sustainment strategic measures.

8–2. Reporting responsibility
a. Primary reporting responsibility: DCS, G4 (DALO–ORR).
b. Supporting reporting responsibility.
(1) AMC.
(2) ACSIM.
(3) USAR.
(4) ARNG – Integrated Logistics Support – X (ARNG–ILS–X).

8–3. Measures
Sustaining tenet measures focus on identifying the trends, shortfalls, or gaps in particular capabilities that would indicate a current or future change in the readiness of the sustainment strategic indicators. Analyzing and assessing measures in the sustainment tenet should consider functions across the spectrum, from production processes in the organic and/or commercial industrial base through user actions at the tactical level. Any trend or issue that affects the ability of the Army to project and sustain the force is relevant to this analysis. During analysis, avoid identifying specific units, installations, depots, or strategic ports unless the issue affects the overall strategic indicator. The focus is on the strategic effect or trend. Table 8–1 defines the sustaining measurement assessment.

Table 8–1
Sustaining measurement readiness assessment levels

Measure: Maintenance enterprise							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment
Measure: Strategic mobility							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment
Measure: Munitions							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment
Measure: Army pre-positioned stocks (APS)							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment

a. Maintenance enterprise.
(1) Field maintenance: unit equipment readiness rates.
(2) Overall depot maintenance (organic industrial base).
(a) Capacity utilization: An assessment of how well depot and arsenal plant capacity is utilized to sustain current workloads, to include core depot capabilities (CDC) and critical manufacturing capabilities (CMC) respectively. The physical plant capacity used is based on a single shift, 40-hour week (1 shift, 8 hours, and 5 days per week). Capacity utilization is calculated and measured by the amount of workload expressed in actual direct labor hours (DLHs), in accordance with the DOD 4151.18–H.
(b) Workload: An assessment of whether depots and arsenals have sufficient workload to sustain CDC and CMC. This measure reflects maintenance or manufacturing workload, expressed in DLHs by fiscal year (FY), inclusive of all

funding sources (that is, operations and maintenance, Army; operations and procurement, Army (Army Working Capital Fund).

(c) Workforce: An assessment that determines whether the depots and arsenals have sufficient direct labor employees and/or workforce skills to sustain current workload. The direct labor force includes permanent, temporary, and/or term government and contractors direct labor (D/L) employees.

(d) Mission support functional capability: An assessment that determines component weightings and component mission essential status. This includes facility deficiencies.

(e) Facilities standards: An assessment of whether the depots and arsenals have sufficient modernized facilities to meet quality work environment standards to sustain CDC and CMC. This includes buildings and other structures, special tooling and test equipment, plant equipment, and other real estate required to sustain CDC and CMC while maintaining quality work environment, safety, security, and environmental standards.

(f) Efficiency: An assessment of how efficient depots and arsenals are in production and manufacturing. This is composed of productive yield and net operating result.

(g) Productive yield: The average number of DLHs for each fulltime equivalent position involved in production. The productive yield goal is 1615 DLHs per FY per D/L employee.

(h) Net operating result: A difference between revenue and expenses within an FY.

b. Table 8–2 defines the maintenance enterprise assessment.

Table 8–2
Maintenance enterprise assessment measures

Measure: Field fully mission capable maintenance							
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 90 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent
Measure: Overall depot maintenance							
RA–1	Can support full range of missions	RA–2	Considerable ability to support missions	RA–3	Limited ability to support missions	RA–4	Little or no ability to support missions
Measure: Plant capacity utilization to sustain core depot and critical manufacturing capabilities							
RA–1	Greater than 85 percent	RA–2	75–85 percent	RA–3	65–74 percent	RA–4	Less than 65 percent
Measure: Workload sufficient to sustain core depot and critical manufacturing capabilities							
RA–1	Greater than 95 percent	RA–2	90–95 percent	RA–3	80–89 percent	RA–4	Less than 80 percent
Measure: Workforce deviation from total number of personnel to sustain total annual workload							
RA–1	Plus or minus 5 percent	RA–2	Plus or minus 6–10 percent	RA–3	Plus or minus 11–20 percent	RA–4	Greater than 20 percent
Measure: Facility standards							
RA–1	Minor facility deficiencies	RA–2	N/A	RA–3	Some facility deficiencies	RA–4	Significant facility deficiencies
Measure: Mission support functional capability							
RA–1	Greater than 5 percent	RA–2	6–10 percent	RA–3	Greater than 11, less than or equal to 20 percent	RA–4	Greater than 20, less than or equal to 40 percent
Measure: Quality rating							
RA–1	Greater than 5 percent	RA–2	6–10 percent	RA–3	Greater than 11, less than or equal to 20 percent	RA–4	Greater than 20, less than or equal to 40 percent
Measure: Quantity rating as percentage of permanent and semi-permanent assets required							
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 95 percent	RA–2	80–94 percent	RA–3	Greater than or equal to 60, less that 80 percent	RA–4	Less than 60 percent

Table 8–2
Maintenance enterprise assessment measures—Continued

	Measure: Production yield measured by direct labor hours (DLH) for each full time equivalent position						
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 1615 DLHs per direct labor employee	RA–2	1614 to 1575 DLHs per direct labor employee	RA–3	1575 to 1535 DLHs per direct labor employee	RA–4	Less than 1535 DLHs per direct labor employee

	Measure: Net operating result (NOR) measured by the difference between revenue and expense						
RA–1	Plus or minus 5 percent of NOR	RA–2	Plus or minus 6–10 percent of NOR	RA–3	Plus or minus 11–20 percent of NOR	RA–4	Greater than 20 percent of NOR

c. Strategic mobility based from installation status report (ISR).

(1) Projection of forces/equipment/supplies off an installation.

(a) Installation deployment planning.

(b) Installation deployment training.

(c) Installation staging operations.

(d) Installation HAZMAT prep.

(e) Installation container and pallet operations.

(f) Installation arrival/departure airfield control group.

(g) Installation seaport support activity operations.

(h) Installation commercial truck operations.

(i) Installation convoy operations.

(j) Installation railhead operations.

(k) Installation in-transit visibility operations.

(l) Installation in-processing readiness site.

(2) Movement to port of embarkation assesses enablers, ports and ammunition terminals with sufficient capacity to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations.

(3) Assessment of the delivery of forces, equipment, and/or supplies to a theater of operations is an assessment provided by U.S. Transportation Command.

(4) Assessment of the Intra-Theater Mobility Support to the Joint force commander including the Army's organic lift capabilities, truck transportation, and the Army's Watercraft Systems.

d. Table 8–3 defines the strategic mobility assessment.

Table 8–3
Strategic mobility assessment measures

	Measure: Projection of forces, equipment, and/or supplies off an installation						
RA–1	90–100 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–2	70–89 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–3	50–69 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–4	Less than 50 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations

	Measure: Projection of forces, equipment, and/or supplies to port of embarkation						
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment

	Measure: Projection of forces, equipment, and/or supplies to theater of operations						

Table 8–3
Strategic mobility assessment measures—Continued

RA–1	90–100 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–2	70–89 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–3	50–69 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–4	Less than 50 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations
Measure: Intra-theater mobility support to the Joint force commander							
RA–1	90–100 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–2	70–89 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–3	50–69 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations	RA–4	Less than 50 percent of installation trained, prepared, and resourced to support strategic deployment in support of contingency operations

e. Munitions measures the weighted average of key preferred munitions based on the following:

(1) On-hand inventory at depots.

(2) Current production.

(3) Shelf life.

f. Table 8–4 defines the munitions assessment.

Table 8–4
Munitions assessment measure

Measure: Munitions fully mission capable							
RA–1	100–90 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent

g. APS

(1) APS brigade set readiness equipment on hand divided by equipment readiness.

(2) APS operational projected stocks readiness EOH.

(3) APS sustainment stocks readiness EOH.

(4) APS funding posture against critical requirements.

h. Table 8–5 defines the Army prepositioned stocks assessment.

Table 8–5
Army prepositioned stocks assessment measures

Measure: Army prepositioned stocks							
RA–1	Greater than 90 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	65–80 percent	RA–4	Less than 65 percent
Measure: APS brigade set readiness (EOH divided by equipment readiness)							
RA–1	C–1	RA–2	C–2	RA–3	C–3	RA–4	C–4
Measure: APS operational project stocks readiness (EOH)							
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent
Measure: APS sustainment stocks readiness (EOH)							
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent
Measure: APS funding posture against critical requirements							
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent

i. The measures listed in table 8–1 each generate their own RA-level. Tables 8–2 through 8–5 display, in greater detail, the sub-measures that combine to form the four main measures (field maintenance, overall depot maintenance, strategic mobility, munitions, and APS). The overall RA-level for the sustaining tenet is determined by taking the lowest RA of the four main measures. Caveats to these ratings may be further elaborated upon in the sustaining ASRA narrative.

8–4. Strategic Indicators

In order to assess the strategic readiness of the sustainment tenet, it is necessary to identify and assess each of the strategic indicators that comprise the tenet. These indicators are linked, but not identical to, the JCAs defined in JP 4–0. See AR 220–1 for more details on unit status reporting for equipment readiness.

a. Field level maintenance.

(1) Unit and/or equipment readiness: Unit readiness should be assessed in the aggregate for the Army identifying capability gaps or shortfalls in operational readiness rates that affect the Army's ability to provide ready forces. Carefully analyze USR ratings R–2 through R–4, to determine if the causes are systemic or a result of an anticipated action such as reset.

(2) This capability area seeks to identify trends that affect readiness across the force. It is not intended as a tool to measure individual unit readiness; however, unit readiness data for specific HD/LD capabilities could have strategic implications and should be considered.

b. Organic industrial base:

(1) The organic industrial base is the strategic capability of the sustainment system. Assessment of the organic industrial base is an indicator of the Army's ability to support CCMD OPLANS.

(2) Organic industrial base strategic plan assessments are conducted quarterly to analyze capacity, workload (hot-warm-cold status of production lines), fiscal conditions, balance between operational reset (OCO funded) and sustainment reset (Base funded), supply chain support, environmental considerations, worker availability, etc.

(3) AR 750–1 provides more detailed information on the Organic Industrial Base Program.

c. Deployment and/or distribution. The ability to deploy forces around the world and sustain them for extended periods of time is the foundation of our national military strategy. It requires synchronization of Army capabilities (both operating and generating forces), joint interdependencies (strategic, operational and tactical lift) and other Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national (JIIM) capabilities and requirements. It is essential to continually assess readiness to ensure we can accomplish the deployment and distribution functions as critical components of Army strategic mobility.

(1) This assessment should portray a strategic capability to project forces to a theater of operations and the ability to provide or plug into a strategic distribution network to sustain the forces in the field. The overall assessment should be general in nature, but may be deduced to specific unit, installation, depot, or strategic port capabilities if they can be shown to have a specific impact on the general deployment and/or distribution capability.

(2) AR 525–93 provides specific information on assessing deployment capabilities. Unit deployment readiness is reported through the USR. Installation deployment support assessments are reported through the ISR. AR 56–4 provides specific information on assessing distribution capabilities.

d. Munitions. The readiness of strategic munitions is essential to supporting OPLANs, however, the plans are developed by the geographic combatant commander and do not consider the threshold imposed by constrained resources in the Army. Adverse trends in Army munitions will result in degraded readiness for OPLANs and other contingency operations. Cost and other factors inhibit munitions quantities world-wide and may not satisfy all OPLAN requirements. Therefore, it is essential to maintain a readiness assessment of the Army's ability to meet the total Army munitions requirements as set by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and consider the ability to surge munitions to support a particular OPLAN.

(1) In the assessment of munitions, risk assessments play an extremely important role. Factors to consider include, but are not limited to, munitions stock levels, materiel condition and shelf-life, location and movement windows, production capability, environmental concerns, and treaty considerations.

(2) AR 5–13 provides more detail on Army preferred munitions.

e. Army prepositioned stocks.

(1) APS places sets of equipment and supplies around the world for the initial support of forces until a deployment and/or distribution network is established. The APS equipment sets support the initial deploying units to a contingency operation. The readiness of these sets is an indicator of the ability of operational forces to accomplish the initial phases of CCMD OPLANs.

(2) Readiness of the APS sets should be considered with regard to supporting the OPLANS for the region they are assigned. This level of assessment must focus on the general level of ability to support OPLANS and not focus on individual details unless they have a strategic effect on the ability to provide APS to the OPLANs.

(3) AR 220–1 provides more detailed information on assessments of APS.

8–5. Strategic levers

These levers in the sustainment tenet are those actions or decisions that can affect the sustainment measures, and further impact the sustainment strategic indicators. These actions may have an effect through deliberate action or inaction. When developing sustainment strategic levers consider the effects of time, space and environment. The effects of fiscal conditions, resourcing and policy also provide leverage across the sustainment functions. Levers include the following:

a. Adjustment of Service Life Extension Program. Service Life Extension Programs extend capital asset life by retrofit, major modification, remanufacturing, betterment, or enhancement.

b. Adjust depot workload rule: Although this requires legislative changes to the National Defense Authorization Act, adjustment of the depot workload rule would allow capacity gaps in the public sector to be filled by the private sector. This may be advantageous in certain cases.

c. Analyzing and assessing sustainment strategic levers require careful consideration of the effect of action on the sustainment community and strategic sustainment capability. When analyzing strategic levers for sustainment consider the policies, procedures and requirements of other organizations across the Army, DOD, and JIIM sustainment community. Other considerations that apply to the analysis of strategic levers for sustainment are external factors such as work stoppages, scarcity of resources and/or components, Navy, and Air Force lift capabilities, and environmental impacts.

Chapter 9
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Training Data

9–1. General

The training tenet of readiness assesses the Army's ability to properly develop leaders, train individuals, and train units to meet the needs of the Army and the CCDRs in support of the Army training strategy, Army leader development strategy, and the NMS. The training tenet covers training functions from the tactical to strategic level.

9–2. Reporting responsibility.

a. Lead reporting responsibility: DCS G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR).

b. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

(2) U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).

(3) USAR.

(4) ARNG.

9–3. Measures

Analyzing and assessing measures in the training tenet should consider functions across the institutional, operational, and training support areas. Relevant trends or issues affecting the ability of the Army to develop leaders, train individuals, and train units, are represented at the strategic level. Where possible, assessments are objective and measurable, and where feasible, should link directly to the ability to support specific OPLAN requirements of the ASCCs. Assessing risks of measures is particularly critical in the training tenet. Increasingly longer lead times to re-generate training readiness in units and Soldiers in accordance with force generation criteria, degradation in necessary experience in leaders, or degradation in theater specific training requirements are detrimental to the ability to execute OPLAN requirements. Table 9–1 defines the training measurement assessment.

Table 9–1
Indicators for training tenet readiness assessment levels

Indicator 1: Operational training (unit training proficiency)							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment
Indicator 2: Institutional training (trained and experienced leaders)							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment

Table 9–1
Indicators for training tenet readiness assessment levels—Continued

	Indicator 3: Training support						
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment

   a. Operational training.

   (1) Total Army training proficiency (T-level).

   (2) Brigade combat team (BCT) decisive action (DA) Combat Training Center (CTC) completion.

   (3) Training proficiency for operations capabilities.

   (4) Training proficiency for operations support capabilities.

   (5) Training proficiency for force sustainment capabilities.

   (6) Training proficiency for executive agent capabilities.

   (7) Training Proficiency for support to other services capabilities.

   (8) Training Proficiency for set the theater capabilities.

   b. Table 9–2 defines the operational training assessment.

Table 9–2
Measures for the operational training indicator

	Measure: Total Army training proficiency						
RA–1	75–100 percent T1 or T2	RA–2	60–74 percent T1 or T2	RA–3	40–59 percent T1 or T2	RA–4	Less than 40 percent T1 or T2
	Measure: Brigade combat team (BCT) decisive action (DA) combat training center (CTC) completion						
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 15 BCTs	RA–2	10–14 BCTs	RA–3	5–9 BCTs	RA–4	Less than 5 BCTs
	Measure: Training proficiency for operations capabilities (T1 or T2)						
RA–1	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient trained forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities
	Measure: Training proficiency for operations support capabilities (T1 or T2)						
RA–1	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient trained forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities
	Measure: Training proficiency for force sustainment capabilities (T1 or T2)						
RA–1	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient trained forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities
	Measure: Training proficiency for executive agent capabilities (T1 or T2)						
RA–1	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient trained forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities
	Measure: Training proficiency for Army support to other Services capabilities (T1 or T2)						
RA–1	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient trained forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities

Table 9–2
Measures for the operational training indicator—Continued

Measure: Training proficiency for set the theater capabilities (T1 or T2)							
RA–1	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 95 percent of capabilities	RA–2	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 85 percent of capabilities	RA–3	Sufficient trained forces in greater than or equal to 75 percent of capabilities	RA–4	Sufficient trained forces in less than 75 percent of capabilities

c. Institutional training.

(1) Individual training performance rates ((program rates + graduation rates)/2).

(a) Initial military training (basic officer leaders course, warrant officer basic course, advanced individual training, one station unit training).

(b) MOS transition training.

(c) Functional training.

(d) Flight training (initial entry rotary wing and graduate level training).

(2) Professional military education readiness (quota utilization/graduation rates).

(a) Officer education system.

(b) Warrant officer education system.

(c) Noncommissioned officer education system.

(3) Civilian education readiness (quota utilization/graduation rates).

(a) Basic course.

(b) Intermediate course.

(c) Advanced course.

d. Table 9–3 defines the training support assessment.

Table 9–3
Measures for the institutional training indicator

Measure: Institutional training performance rates							
RA–1	90–100 percent	RA–2	75–89 percent	RA–3	65–74 percent	RA–4	Less than 64 percent
Measure: Professional military education readiness							
RA–1	85–100 percent	RA–2	75–84 percent	RA–3	65–74 percent	RA–4	Less than 64 percent
Measure: Civilian education readiness							
RA–1	85–100 percent	RA–2	75–84 percent	RA–3	65–74 percent	RA–4	Less than 64 percent

e. Training support.

(1) Training support services.

(a) Services.

(b) Facilities.

(c) Products.

(2) Training ammunition.

f. Table 9–4 defines the training support system (TSS) services assessment.

Table 9–4
TSS services measures

Measure: Training support system (TSS) services							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment
Training land sustainment, ranger operations, training support centers, and mission command training support program							
RA–1	Green 95–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 86–95 percent	RA–3	Red 70–85 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent

g. Table 9–5 defines the training support system services sub-measures.

Table 9–5
TSS services sub-measures

TSS services sub-measures							
Sub-measure 1: Training land sustainment							
Measure: Percentage of heavy and light maneuver land available							
RA–1	Green 95–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 86–95 percent	RA–3	Red 70–85 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
Measure: Percentage of command validated land rehab and management projects executed							
RA–1	Green 95–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 86–95 percent	RA–3	Red 70–85 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
Measure: Installation approved and/or updated integrated training area management (ITAM) plan							
RA–1	Green Yes	RA–2	N/A	RA–3	N/A	RA–4	Black No
Measure: ITAM plan supports commander's training needs							
RA–1	Green Yes	RA–2	N/A	RA–3	N/A	RA–4	Black No
Measure: Percent of required geographic information systems products to support ITAM, range operations, and range modernization							
RA–1	Green 95–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 86–95 percent	RA–3	Red 70–50 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
Measure: Site remediation program proponent data layers meet Army quality assurance plans							
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 50–89 percent	RA–3	Red 25–49 percent	RA–4	Black less than 25 percent
Measure: Percentage of funded range and training land assessment completed and in accordance with approved ITAM plan							
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 50–89 percent	RA–3	Red 25–49 percent	RA–4	Black less than 25 percent
Sub-measure 2: Range operations							
Measure: Percentage of training days available							
RA–1	Green 83–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 75–82 percent	RA–3	Red 67–74 percent	RA–4	Black less than 67 percent
Measure: Range complex utilization rate							
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 75–89 percent	RA–3	Red 74–60 percent	RA–4	Black less than 60 percent
Measure: Percentage of required onsite safety inspections conducted							

Table 9–5
TSS services sub-measures—Continued

RA–1	Green 83–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 75–82 percent	RA–3	Red 67–74 percent	RA–4	Black less than 67 percent
			Measure: Percentage of validated requirements requested that were completed (rapid reconfiguration rate)				
RA–1	Green 83–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 75–82 percent	RA–3	Red 67–74 percent	RA–4	Black less than 67 percent
			Measure: Percentage of events cancelled (range effectiveness)				
RA–1	Green 0–6.4 percent	RA–2	Amber 6.5–8 percent	RA–3	Red 8.1–14 percent	RA–4	Black greater than 14 percent
			Sub-measure 3: Training support centers				
			Measure: Percentage of validated training aids, devices, and simulators (TADS) requests provided from training support center (TSC) inventory				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 70–89 percent	RA–3	Red 50–69 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
			Measure: Percentage of training event non-occurrence due to non-availability of operators				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
			Measure: Percentage of customers trained				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
			Measure: TADS operational readiness rate				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
			Measure: Percentage of valid local requests for devices				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 75–89 percent	RA–3	Red 50–74 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
			Measure: Percentage of total number of valid Army-wide requests				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 75–89 percent	RA–3	Red 50–74 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
			Measure: Percentage of validated requests for graphic training aids filled				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
			Sub-measure 4: Mission command training support program				
			Measure: Provide integrated collective mission command staff training				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
			Measure: Provide mission command training at the individual operator and leader level				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent
			Measure: Provide support to spoke and deployed or remote sites				
RA–1	Green 90–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 80–89 percent	RA–3	Red 70–79 percent	RA–4	Black less than 70 percent

Table 9–5
TSS services sub-measures—Continued

	Measure: Plan, coordinate, and maintain training and exercise communications and network systems						
RA–1	Green less than 10 percent	RA–2	Amber 10–20 percent	RA–3	Red 21–40 percent	RA–4	Black greater than 40 per- cent

h. Table 9–6 defines the training support system facilities assessment.

Table 9–6
TSS facilities measures

	Measure: TSS facilities						
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible im- pact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant im- pact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplish- ment
	Training land, mission training complex, training support center, and ranges						
RA–1	Green less than 5 percent	RA–2	Amber 5–20 percent	RA–3	Red 21–60 percent	RA–4	Black greater than 60 per- cent

i. Table 9–7 defines the training support system facilities sub-measures.

Table 9–7
TSS facilities sub-measures

	TSS facilities sub-measures						
	Sub-measure 1: Training land						
	Measure: Percentage of land in critical condition not available for live training						
RA–1	Green less than 5 per- cent	RA–2	Amber 5–20 percent	RA–3	Red 21–60 per- cent	RA–4	Black greater than 60 percent
	Sub-measure 2: Mission training complex						
	Measure: Percentage of mission training complex available and/or scheduled that cannot support assigned missions						
RA–1	Green less than 5 per- cent	RA–2	Amber 5–20 percent	RA–3	Red 21–60 per- cent	RA–4	Black greater than 60 percent
	Sub-measure 3: Training support center						
	Measure: Quality simulations and/or simulator facilities						
RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 per- cent	RA–4	Black less than 50 per- cent
	Sub-measure 4: Ranges						
	Measure: Quality of small arms fire ranges						
RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 per- cent	RA–4	Black less than 50 per- cent
	Measure: Quantity of small arms fire ranges						
RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 per- cent	RA–4	Black less than 50 per- cent
	Measure: Quality of mounted operations in urban terrain ranges						

Table 9–7
TSS facilities sub-measures—Continued

RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
Measure: Quantity of mounted operations in urban terrain ranges							
RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
Measure: Quality of multi-purpose ranges							
RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent
Measure: Quantity of multi-purpose ranges							
RA–1	Green 75–100 percent	RA–2	Amber 60–74 percent	RA–3	Red 51–59 percent	RA–4	Black less than 50 percent

j. Table 9–8 defines the training support system products assessment.

Table 9–8
TSS products measures

Measure: TSS products							
RA–1	Issues and/or shortfalls have negligible impact	RA–2	Issues and/or shortfalls have limited impact	RA–3	Issues and/or shortfalls have significant impact	RA–4	Issues and/or shortfalls preclude mission accomplishment
Selected live, virtual, and constructed TADS							
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent

k. Table 9–9 defines the training support system products sub-measures.

Table 9–9
TSS products sub-measures

TSS products sub-measures							
Sub-measure 1: Instrumentable multiple integrated laser engagement system (I–MILES)							
Measure: Percentage of I–MILES fielded versus required							
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent
Sub-measure 2: Virtual gaming engagement skills trainer							
Measure: Percentage of required versus available							
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent
Sub-measure 3: Virtual gaming virtual battle space three							
Measure: Percentage of required versus available							
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent
Sub-measure 4: Virtual gaming close combat tactical trainer							

Table 9–9
TSS products sub-measures—Continued

	Measure: Percentage of required versus available						
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent

Sub-measure 5: Virtual gaming aviation combined arms tactical trainer							
	Measure: Percentage of required versus available						
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent

Sub-measure 6: Joint land component constructive training capability							
	Measure: Percentage of required versus available						
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent

Sub-measure 7: Joint land component constructive training capability-entity resolution federation							
	Measure: Percentage of required versus available						
RA–1	Green greater than 100 percent	RA–2	Amber 81–100 percent	RA–3	Red 71–80 percent	RA–4	Black 61–70 percent

l. Table 9–10 defines the training ammunition assessment.

Table 9–10
Training ammunition measures

Training ammunition							
	Measure: Home station training						
RA–1	Brigade, company, platoon-individual/ crew/squad	RA–2	Company, platoon-individual/crew/squad	RA–3	Platoon-individual/crew/ squad	RA–4	Greater than individual/crew/squad
	Measure: Institutional training						
RA–1	90 percent	RA–2	80–89 percent	RA–3	70–79 percent	RA–4	Less than 70 percent

m. Each indicator listed in table 9–1 generates its own RA-level. The sub-measures will be averaged to provide an assessment for each training support service, facility, and product measure. The overall training RA-level is generally determined by taking the lowest RA-level of the training indicators. Other additional measures than those listed in tables 9–2 through 9–10 inform the calculation of each indicator and can be considered in the overall RA rating for the training tenet. These measures can be incorporated to elevate or decrease the overall training tenet RA-level, much like a unit commander can subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit readiness assessment as outlined in AR 220–1. These additional measures may be further elaborated upon in the training ASRA narrative.

9–4. Strategic Indicators

In order to assess the strategic readiness of the training tenet, it is necessary to identify and assess each of the strategic indicators that link training to overall readiness. These indicators are linked but not identical, to the Army Training Strategy and Army leader development strategy, in support of the Army strategic planning guidance.

a. Operational training. Operational training encompasses training activities that unit leaders schedule, and individuals, units and organizations undertake. Total Army indicators for operational training are observed and assessed through unit level training readiness, bilateral and multi-lateral training events, and Combat Training Center programs.

b. Institutional training. The institutional training includes outputs generated by Army centers and/or schools that provide initial training and subsequent functional and professional military education for Soldiers, military leaders, and Army civilians.

c. Training support. Training support helps deliver relevant live, virtual, constructive and gaming training enablers through products, services, and facilities. Training support helps create training conditions that realistically portray the

decisive action training environment and enable mission essential task list (METL)-based operational training strategies and institutional strategies reflected in the appropriate points of instruction.

9–5. Strategic levers

The strategic levers in the training tenet are those actions or decisions that can affect and influence the training measures and indicators outlined above. Strategic levers include the effects of policy and consider all resources necessary to achieve mission readiness, policies, procedures, and requirements of other organizations across the Army, DOD, and JIIM training communities.

a. Operational training. Senior leaders may adjust Army training strategies, reprogram resources, or adjust Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) aim points (deployment timelines).

b. Institutional training. Senior leaders may adjust Army leader development strategy, adjust policies regarding school attendance, modify duration of courses, or more closely synchronize professional military education and promotion policies.

c. Training support. In support of training and leader development strategies senior leaders may prioritize, redistribute, and adjust resources allocated to TSS facilities, services and products within the training support enterprise.

Chapter 10
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Installation Data

10–1. General

Installation readiness is achieving mission excellence through streamlined processes, strategic partnerships, and good stewardship of resources that address Army priorities and meet the mission requirements of senior commanders. This translates into the ability to provide a growing and transforming Army with the infrastructure and support services it needs to remain a highly effective, expeditionary and campaign-quality force, today, and in the future.

10–2. Reporting responsibility

a. Primary reporting responsibility: ACSIM.

b. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) IMCOM.

(2) USACE.

(3) AMC.

(4) CIO/G–6.

(5) USAR.

(6) ARNG.

10–3. Measures

These measures for the installation tenet provide a more specific breakdown and analysis of the four indicators. They focus on identifying the trends, shortfalls, or gaps in particular capabilities that would indicate a current or future change in readiness of the installation strategic indicators. Analyzing and assessing measures in the installation tenet should consider functions across the installation management community. Many of the measures outlined below are reported monthly in the ISR and the Army Energy and Water Reporting System. Any trend or issue that affects the ability of the Army to provide effective installation management in support of the force is relevant to this analysis. Table 10–1 defines the installation measurement assessment.

Table 10–1
Installation measurement readiness assessment levels

Measure: Installation services							
RA–1	Less than 0. 49	RA–2	0.5 to 1.49	RA–3	1.5 to 2.49	RA–4	Greater than or equal to 2.5
Measure: Installation infrastructure							
RA–1	Less than 0. 49	RA–2	0.5 to 1.49	RA–3	1.5 to 2.49	RA–4	Greater than or equal to 2.5
Measure: Installation natural infrastructure							

Table 10–1
Installation measurement readiness assessment levels—Continued

RA–1	Less than 0.49	RA–2	0.5 to 1.49	RA–3	1.5 to 2.49	RA–4	Greater than or equal to 2.5
Measure: Army Energy and Water Program							
RA–1	10 to 8.76	RA–2	8.75 to 6.74	RA–3	6.75 to 3.26	RA–4	Less than or equal to 3.25

a. Installation services.

(1) Mission support.

(2) Infrastructure readiness support.

(3) Information technology services management.

(4) Security services.

b. Natural infrastructure.

(1) Mission support.

(2) Sustainability.

c. Infrastructure.

(1) Operations and training.

(2) Maintenance and production.

(3) Mobility.

d. Army Energy Program.

(1) Reduction in energy intensity.

(2) Increase use of renewable energy.

(3) Reduce petroleum use in non-tactical vehicles.

(4) Reduction in water intensity.

(5) Reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

(6) Facility energy and water evaluations.

(7) Army metering.

e. The assessment of installation services, natural infrastructure, and infrastructure depicted in table 10–1 is based on a composite score derived from a rating assigned in the ISR. Each measure has sub-measures that are evaluated on a range of 1 (highest) to 4 (lowest).

f. The assessment of the Army Energy Program mirrors the metrics reported in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). The performance of these measures is weighted based on criticality and rated against the aggregated score of the seven metrics. The metrics are adjusted annually consistent with statute. The raw data is then loaded into the ACP strategic management system and a score of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) is generated.

g. The overall readiness assessment for the installation tenet is derived from taking the lowest of the four measures captured in table 10–1.

10–4. Strategic indicators

The installation tenet is comprised of four indicators which are strategic priorities whose cumulative ratings impact the overall tenet rating.

a. Installation services.

(1) The Army's installation services provide support to the total force and protects installations, people, and the environment. This indicator captures timely, cost-effective and appropriate levels of services.

(2) These services mitigate the stress of repeated deployments of personnel, equipment and infrastructure. This enables the Army to fulfill its missions, and properly station the force, while ensuring that the delivery of critical services to Army installations is appropriately prioritized.

b. Natural infrastructure. Land, airspace, and water located on Army installations.

c. Infrastructure.

(1) Facilities located on Army installations.

(2) The Army's facility investment strategy plans the sustainment, repair and maintenance for the training infrastructure, including ranges, virtual and constructive training facilities, urban operation training complexes, classrooms, and training land that are required to support decisive action (DA)/unified land operations (ULO) training throughout the ARFORGEN cycle to create the training conditions that realistically portray the operational environment.

d. Army Energy and Water Program.

(1) The program is empowered to achieve energy security and sustainability objectives that support the generating and operating force in the conduct of unified land operations.

(2) This indicator also focuses on providing greater resilience in operational capability by expanding the use of on-site renewable energy, increasing the use of alternative fuel, and assuring the delivery of power and water.

(3) The Army Energy and Water Program is accessed via the utilization of active reporting by the installations in Army Energy and Water Reporting System and captured in the ACP.

10–5. Strategic levers

a. These levers in the installation tenet are those actions, decisions, and doctrine that can affect the installation measures and indicators. In the development and/or identification of installation strategic levers the effects of time, space and environment must be considered. The effects of fiscal conditions, resourcing and policy also provide leverage across installation functions.

b. Analyzing and assessing installation strategic levers require careful consideration of the effect of action and inaction on the installation community and strategic capability. When analyzing strategic levers consider the policies, procedures and requirements of other organizations across the Army and DOD community. While not the only lever, installation sustainment funding affects all of the indicators outlined above. Other considerations that apply to the analysis of strategic levers are external factors such as work stoppages, scarcity of resources and/or components and environmental impacts.

Chapter 11
Determining, Analyzing, and Assessing Capacity and Capability Data

11–1. General

The capacity and capability tenet measures the ability of the total force to provide Army forces with sufficient capacity and the capability (readiness) to execute current operations, projected operational demand, and surge requirements established in strategic documents including the Defense Strategic Guidance, Global Employment of the Force (GEF), and the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). This tenet is the area in which the indicators, measures, levers, and enablers from the other five strategic tenets directly impacts the ability of the Army to provide trained and ready forces. In the simplest of terms, strategic requirements form the denominator of Service obligations and the inventory and readiness of Army forces available to execute those requirements forms the numerator. The final calculation provides the assessment of the capacity and capability of the Army which is depicted in figure 11–1. Capacity and capability assessments must be inclusive enough to assess the near term preparation of forces to meet annual requirements outlined in the GFMAP as well as broader strategic requirements for forces outlined in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the GEF.

NUMERATOR
INVENTORY AND READINESS OF ARMY FORCES

DENOMINATOR
STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

= CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY

Figure 11–1. Calculation of capacity and capability

11–2. Reporting responsibility

a. Lead reporting responsibility: DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR).

b. Supporting reporting responsibility.

(1) DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSW).

(2) DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODO).

(3) FORSCOM.

(4) USAR.

(5) ARNG.

11–3. Measures

The measures for this tenet will reflect the ability of the Army to provide capacity and capabilities in enumerated quantities. Staff sections must incorporate assessments of the quantities and readiness of enabling units in order to provide a holistic approach to the employment capabilities of Army forces across the spectrum of conflict. While the strategic indicators focus on the inventory and readiness of higher level headquarters, BCTs, and combat aviation brigades (CABs), the strategic measure will expand to include aggregated assessments of units by type, function, size, component, phase of ARFORGEN, and other mechanisms. Table 11–1 defines the capacity and capability measurement assessment.

Table 11–1
Capacity and capability measurement readiness assessment levels

Measure: Validated Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) requirements						
RA–1	95–100 percent	RA–2	90–94.9 percent	RA–3	85–89.9 percent	RA–4	Less than 84.9 percent
Measure: Total Army BCT readiness						
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 30 C1 or C2 and greater than 17 DA CTC within one year	RA–2	23–29 C1 or C2 and 17 DA CTC within one year	RA–3	16–22 C1 or C2 and 10–16 DA CTC within one year	RA–4	Less than 16 C1 or C2 and 10 DA CTC within one year
Sub-measure: Active Army BCT readiness						
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 25 C1 or C2 and greater than 15 DA CTC within one year	RA–2	19–24 C1 or C2 and 15 DA CTC within one year	RA–3	15–18 C1 or C2 and 10–14 DA CTC within one year	RA–4	Less than 15 C1 or C2 and 10 DA CTC within one year
Sub-measure: ARNG BCT readiness						
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 5 C1 or C2 and greater than 2 DA CTC within one year	RA–2	4–5 C1 or C2 and 2 DA CTC within one year	RA–3	Less than 4 C1 or C2 and 1 DA CTC within one year	RA–4	Less than 4 C1 or C2 and 0 DA CTC within one year
Measure: Total Army non-BCT readiness						
RA–1	Greater than 67 percent C1 or C2	RA–2	50–66 percent C1 or C2	RA–3	40–49 percent C1 or C2	RA–4	Less than 40 percent C1 or C2
Sub-measure: Active Army non-BCT readiness						
RA–1	Greater than 67 percent C1 or C2	RA–2	50–66 percent C1 or C2	RA–3	40–49 percent C1 or C2	RA–4	Less than 40 percent C1 or C2
Sub-measure: ARNG and USAR non-BCT readiness						
RA–1	Greater than 67 percent C1, C2, or C3	RA–2	50–66 percent C1, C2, or C3	RA–3	40–49 percent C1, C2 or C3	RA–4	Less than 40 percent C1, C2, or C3
Measure: Assigned mission (A-level) rating of deployed units						
RA–1	90–100 percent A1 or A2	RA–2	80–89 percent A1 or A2	RA–3	70–79 percent A1 or A2	RA–4	Less than 70 percent A1 or A2
Measure: A-level rating of preparation to deploy order units within 60 days of latest arrival date						
RA–1	90–100 percent A1 or A2	RA–2	80–89 percent A1 or A2	RA–3	70–79 percent A1 or A2	RA–4	Less than 70 percent A1 or A2

Table 11–1
Capacity and capability measurement readiness assessment levels—Continued

Measure: Total Army projected readiness							
RA–1	Greater than or equal to 20 BCTs C1 or C2	RA–2	15–19 BCTs C1 or C2	RA–3	10–14 BCTs C1 or C2	RA–4	Less than 10 BCTs C1 or C2

a. Capacity. Percentage of validated GFMAP force requirements.

b. Capability.

(1) Total Army BCT Readiness.

(a) Active Army BCT readiness.

(b) ARNG BCT readiness.

(2) Total Army non-BCT readiness.

(a) Active Army non-BCT readiness.

(b) ARNG and USAR non-BCT readiness.

(3) A-level ratings of deployed units.

(4) A-level ratings of preparation to deploy order units with 60 days or less latest arrival date.

(5) Total Army projected BCT readiness.

c. The measures listed in table 11–1 each generate their own readiness assessment level. The overall RA-level is determined by selecting the lowest RA of the six measures. The RA-level of the OPLAN assessments explained in chapter 4 is also considered when assessing the capacity and capability tenet.

11–4. Strategic Indicators
Indicators for this tenet are focused on two areas. The first, capacity, is the inventory of units or ability to generate units. The second, capability, is the ability of Army units to execute core and assigned functions. Core functions generally map to those unit readiness levels measured by C-ratings while assigned functions typically reflect the assigned mission readiness (A-level), both of which are outlined in AR 220–1. Analytically, the C-levels reflect readiness to execute unit designed core functions that CCMD planners take into consideration when developing OPLANs, while the ability to execute near term operational requirements found in the GFMAP is measured by the A-level.

a. Capacity. The leading indicator for the assessment of Army capacity is the amount of Army forces contained within the Army's current and future inventory in order to respond to OPLANS. Typically, this assessment is done within the semi-annual total Army analysis and identifies quantities of units by standard requirements code (SRC).

b. Capability. The corresponding leading indicator for the assessment of the capability portion of the tenet is the amount of Army forces at the required readiness levels necessary to execute those missions identified by CCMD OPLANS and or missions tasked through the annual GFMAP. Army corps and division headquarters, brigade combat teams (BCTs), combat aviation brigades (CABs), and other high level maneuver formations are often times the leading example of unit readiness used to portray Army readiness to both internal and external audiences. C-levels and the associated resource areas of personnel, equipment on hand, serviceability, and training are the primary measures. Of the four levels of OPLANs, this will typically involve analysis of those units aligned to level 3T and level 4 plans as defined in JP 5–0. Analysis that compares the readiness of all Army forces specified in level 3T and level 4 plans will be conducted as part of each ASRA. Simultaneously, the capability tenet must also include the assigned mission readiness of those forces executing approved GFMAP missions. These assessments will focus on those units reporting assigned mission readiness (A-level).

11–5. Strategic levers
There are several strategic levers available to senior leaders that are either actions, mitigation measures, or decisions that can alter the effect of the strategic indicators listed above. Generally, levers fall into four bins; informative, strategy, resourcing, and policy. Not every strategic readiness shortfall can be addressed by Army or DOD leadership, Presidential actions or decisions, or even congressionally approved laws or appropriations. Those levers are purely informative and provide information to shape mitigation decisions and provide clarity of strategic risk. Others will be more direct and impact the resourcing, assignment, allocation, and other functions of Army forces.

a. Informative levers. The first is the chairman's risk assessment (CRA). Army input into the annual CRA and subsequent Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) risk mitigation plan is the first instance where strategic capacity and capability shortfalls can be directly addressed. Following the CRA is the Secretary's Risk Mitigation Plan which is required by law based on the level of risk assessed by the CRA. The mitigation can be to accept the risk, provide additional resources, or revise the strategic requirements. Each of the risk mitigation actions will take into consideration the service readiness and ability to generate forces.

b. Strategy levers. This lever is typically the result of five major documents; the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Security Strategy, NMS, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and GEF. Strategic requirements (that is, global end states, forces for theater security cooperation, forces allocated for rotational missions) form the denominator for these assessments. Adjustment of these documents by growing or reducing the requirement for Army forces acts as a lever for the assessment of Army capacity and capability. The DCS, G–3/5/7 will use the analysis from the ASRA to inform the process to develop and or update these strategic documents.

c. Resourcing lever. This lever is the easiest lever to quantify readiness shortfalls and solutions for senior leaders. For example, if the rate of M1A2 tanks that are fully mission capable fell last quarter due to shortages of repair parts and mechanics, improvements are linked to improving resourcing for parts by 20 percent and growth of mechanical specialists by 7 percent. Resourcing levers are often approached without adequate acknowledgement or integration of the time necessary to apply resources to grow readiness. During the ASRA, the use of resourcing levers can have the most impact on aggregate service readiness, however service-wide impacts to trends are typically not visible in the year of execution and serve as a lagging indicator.

d. Policy lever. Policy levers include those actions that Army senior leaders can take within their authorities under Title 10 USC without additional resources or approval from Congress. Some policy levers can be undertaken within the prerogatives of the Service secretaries (force structure design changes, Soldier skill growth, and equipment distribution), while other policies require approval from the Secretary of Defense or OSD (that is, Soldier dwell, Reserve Component utilization plans, or mobilization alert timelines).

Chapter 12
Determining, Analyzing and Predicting Future Strategic Readiness

12–1. General
Army readiness assessments combined both quantitative and qualitative assessments. The Army future readiness projections include both tactical unit readiness projections as well as strategic readiness projections.

a. Tactical unit readiness reports contain more quantitative assessments, including personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and allow for commander qualitative input like training and C-level subjective upgrade or downgrade.

b. Strategic readiness projections are informed by the functional proponents for each of the SRTs. The proponents will project the readiness for four future quarters. Each projection will be included in the quarterly ASRA and will contain a detailed description of the strategic indicators and levers and the corresponding values that support or detract from the tenet readiness projection.

12–2. Unit readiness projections
The projection of unit readiness will be conducted through the application of readiness business rules to units over time. The purpose of these projections is to forecast anticipated readiness levels based on departmental resourcing and other decisions to support operational and budgetary Army planning requirements. While individual commanders may have the capacity to improve readiness at different rates, the Army will take those projections into consideration. However, the Service wants to avoid the projection of unit readiness as a forcing function for increased and unwarranted subjective upgrades by commanders.

a. The central automated repository for projections of the future unit readiness of major Army formations is contained within the Master Army Synchronization Tool (MAST), which is part of a suite of systems contained within the Mobilization Common Operating Program and the Defense Readiness Reporting System - Army (DRRS–A). The DCS, G–3/5/7, DAMO–ODR, is the office of primary responsibility for sustaining and updating future readiness projections. The purpose of these projections is to provide Army senior leaders with projections of unit readiness levels based on available resources.

b. MAST incorporates two authoritative data systems, DRRS–A, and the Joint capabilities requirements manager. These systems are used in order to provide a framework to apply tactical readiness projections based on Service determined business rules. As data sources and systems mature, MAST will expand its projection capability to incorporate additional systems.

c. Initially, MAST projections will be based upon business rules developed by the DCS, G–3/5/7 and coordinated with the ACOM, ASCC, DRU, USAR, and/or ARNG. These rules incorporate major training events, deployments, or force adjustments as the key elements for projecting force readiness. Each projection takes into consideration the resources necessary to build readiness and incorporates a rate of readiness atrophy. Some examples are as follows:

(1) BCT readiness projection (AC).

(a) BCTs attain and sustain C–2/T–2 three months prior to CTC rotation.

(b) BCTs attain C–1/T–1 at a CTC rotation.

(c) BCTs sustain C–1 for 9 months following the CTC rotation.

(d) At the ninth month BCT will atrophy to C–2 for three months.

(e) BCT will atrophy to C–3 at the 12th month from a CTC rotation unless another training center becomes available.

(2) Other BCT readiness factors.

(a) Brigade modernization and/or conversion that involves on-post movement of units will not drop a readiness rating level.

(b) Brigade modernization/conversion that involves off-post movement of units will project a decline of one C-level until modernization/conversion is complete.

(c) BCT transformation to a different functional capacity (that is, from Armor to Stryker or Infantry to Armor) will incorporate C–5 projections.

(d) BCTs that conduct a mission rehearsal exercise during a CTC rotation will be projected to attain a C–2/T–2 level of readiness. Those BCTs will be projected to sustain C–2/T–2 until deployment, during which time they will be projected to sustain C–4/T–4 due to the bifurcation of the unit and rapid atrophy associated with performing stability operations. In the event that the DA/ULO (Core) mission is the same as their assigned mission, the BCT will sustain C–2/T–2 until re-deployment.

(e) BCTs that deploy without organic combat power or BCTs that are conducting split based operations will be projected to report no higher than a C–4 during the deployment period.

(3) ARNG BCT projections.

(a) ARNG BCT projections are aligned to the 5 year ARFORGEN model.

(b) ARNG BCTs will only be projected to attain C–2/T–2 at the conclusion of a CTC rotation.

(c) ARNG BCTs will be projected to retain a C–2/T–2 for 1 year following a CTC rotation.

(4) Non-BCT projections: Generally, corps and division HQs will peak in readiness at the execution of a Mission Command Training Program rotation. Headquarters will sustain overall readiness at similar rates to BCTs (9 months C–1 and 3 months C–2) before requiring additional training events to sustain readiness.

d. The business rules listed above are continually reviewed to ensure they remain viable and may be adjusted as necessary.

12–3. Strategic readiness projections

Army service assessments at the strategic level have an inverted assessment paradigm. While each strategic readiness tenet (SRT) assessment is supported by multiple quantitative assessments, the overall and projected readiness assessments involve a qualitative arrangement and incorporation of the measures and indicators to provide a holistic approach. This reality is not meant to dissuade the Service from avoiding information systems to support this assessment; however it recognizes the reality of assessing the Army's complex resources, processes, and requirements through one stand-alone metric in the Service readiness assessment level.

a. The projection of Army readiness is informed by the current and projected assessments of the six SRTs and will include, but is not limited to, the following factors:

(1) Major combat unit readiness projections.

(2) Demand for Army forces as outlined in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) and Global Force Management Board.

(3) Army JCA assessments.

(4) JCCA–PA.

(5) TPFDD.

(6) Apportionment table readiness analysis.

(7) ASCC MET assessments.

(8) Army readiness deficiencies.

(9) Army readiness top concerns.

(10) Readiness trends of Army enabler units.

b. Strategic readiness projections consider the quadrennial defense review (QDR), the GEF guidance, the Army's role in the National Military Strategy, and any planned or anticipated budget constraints. From the Service strategic readiness perspective, tactical and operational units provide the "means" and the Service determines the "ways" to meet the "ends" outlined in the NMS. Army readiness is a reflection of how effectively these "ways" are being executed. The Army SRTs are closely aligned with the Army's program execution groups. This allows Army senior leaders to link readiness shortfalls to the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system. These shortfalls are then rectified through the employment of the strategic levers outlined in previous chapters. Effective strategic readiness projections enable the Army's senior leaders to decrease risk over the FYDP.

Chapter 13
Strategic Readiness Assessment Group Procedures

13–1. General
The Strategic Readiness Assessment Group (SRAG) is the forum for the formal analysis, review, development, and presentation of the ASRA for approval. The most important mission of the SRAG is to analyze the impact each tenet has on the Army's overall readiness and develop the overall ASRA through the incorporation of Army and Joint Staff criteria discussed in chapter 2. Additionally, the SRAG facilitates the preparation and execution of the monthly strategic readiness update (SRU).

13–2. Strategic Readiness Assessment Group Overview
The SRAG convenes at three levels: action officer (AO), council of colonels (COC), and general officer steering committee (GOSC).

a. The AO level develops the formal assessment for presentation to the COC for additional guidance, input, and approval consensus. After approval by the COC, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–OD), prepares the formal assessment for presentation to the GOSC, which provides additional guidance and input prior to presentation before Army senior leaders.

b. DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) is the proponent responsible for the SRAG Forum. DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) is responsible for the coordination, facilitation, and presentation for all levels of the SRAG. The Director, DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–OD), serves as the host for the SRAG GOSC. The permanent members of the SRAG will consist of two representatives (primary and alternate) of the tenet proponents and other invited stakeholders from the ARSTAF, ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, and USAR.

c. The SRAG will convene at the AO level on a weekly basis.

d. The SRAG will convene at the COC and GOSC levels on a monthly basis.

e. The SRAG forums lead to the development of the ASRA 4 times yearly.

13–3. Execution
a. The SRT proponents—

(1) Develop, analyze, and present the overall measure of their respective tenet during the designated SRAG meetings. This presentation will allow all tenet leads to hear, first hand, any issues, positive or negative, that may impact their tenet. This will facilitate crosstalk amongst the tenets, which is the major intent of the Army strategic readiness process.

(2) Participate in the weekly SRAG Army Working Group, quarterly COC, and ASRA GOSC.

(3) Provide an O–6/colonel to participate in the quarterly SRAG COC.

(4) Provide an appropriate level general officer to participate in the SRAG GOSC.

b. The Joint Staff criteria proponents—

(1) Provide their respective criteria input to DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) for inclusion into the ASRA in accordance with quarterly timelines developed in the SRAG.

(2) Participate in the quarterly SRU that correlates to their individual criteria.

(3) Provide an O–6/colonel to participate in the quarterly SRAG COC.

(4) Provide an appropriate level general officer to participate in the SRAG GOSC.

c. DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR)—

(1) Provide, on a quarterly basis, the schedule for the SRAG.

(2) Plan, coordinate and execute each quarterly SRAG COC and GOSC.

(3) Chair the weekly SRAG meeting.

(4) Brief the SRAG during the first meeting of each quarter, on any ongoing strategic readiness issues that may impact the overall ASRA.

(5) Develop the quarterly written ASRA incorporating input from the ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARSTAF, ARNG, and USAR.

13–4. Coordinating instructions
Table 13–1 captures the significant quarterly milestones and product submission timelines for the SRU, ASRA, and QRRC. While this battle rhythm will not change significantly from one quarter to the next, specific dates are subject to change due to special events, holidays, and general officer calendar availability. Specific dates and times will be disseminated during the weekly SRAG.

Table 13–1
Quarterly Army strategic readiness assessment battle rhythm and product submission synchronization matrix

Month	Week	Submission	Month	Week	Event
1	2	Draft special topic submission due to DAMO–ODR (O–6 reviewed)	1	1,2,3, and 4	SRAG action officer working group (AOWG)
1	3	Draft ARNG/USAR submission due to DAMO–ODR (O–6 reviewed)	1	3	SRU council of colonels (COC)
		Final special topic submission due to DAMO–ODR (O–6 reviewed)	1	3	SRU general officer steering committee (GOSC)
1	4	Final ARNG/USAR submission due to DAMO–ODR (O–6 reviewed)	1	4	DCS, G–3/5/7 prep
			1	4	VCSA prep
2	2	Draft ACOM, ASCC, and DRU deficiency memo due to DAMO–ODR	1	4	SRU to VCSA
			2	1,3, and 4	SRAG AOWG
		Draft ACOM and ASCC quad charts (MET assessments) due to DAMO–ODR	2	2	SRAG COC
2	3	Final ACOM, ASCC, and DRU deficiency memo due to DAMO–ODR (GO approved)	2	3	SRU COC
		Final ACOM and ASCC quad charts due to DAMO–ODR (GO approved)	2	3	SRU GOSC
2	4	Draft ARSTAF SRT assessments due to DAMO–ODR (narrative)	2	4	DCS, G–3/5/7 prep
		ACOM, ASCC, and DRU JCA inputs due to assessment leads	2	4	VCSA prep
3	1	Draft JCA assessments due to DAMO–ODR (O–6 reviewed)	2	4	SRU to VCSA
			3	1,3,4	SRAG AOWG
		Final GO approved SRT assessments due to DAMO–ODR (narrative)	3	2	O–6 Joint combat capabilities assessment group (JCCAG)
3	2	Consolidated ASRA disseminated for ARSTAF review	3	2	SRAG GOSC
		Final GO approved JCA assessments due to DAMO–ODR	3	3	SRU COC
3	3	ASRA DA Form 5 (Army Staffing Form) submitted to DCS, G–3/5/7 for approval	3	3	SRU GOSC
			3	4	DCS, G–3/5/7 prep
1	1	DCS, G1, G4, G8, DAMO–ODO, and DAMO TRC QRRC inputs due to DAMO–ODR	3	4	VCSA prep
			3	4	SRU to VCSA
1	2	QRRC submitted to OSD	1	1	GO level JCCAG
			1	2	Executive JCCAG

a. Each month, prior to the SRU, DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) facilitates a monthly COC, GOSC, and prep session with the DCS, G–3/5/7, and prep session with VCSA. These meetings are in addition to the weekly SRAG AO Working Group and quarterly SRAG COC and GOSC.

b. The DCS, G–3/5/7 prep session will consist of representatives from DCS, G1, DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR), DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–TR), DCS, G8, and ACSIM. During the first month of each quarter (OCT, JAN, APR, and

JUL), ASA (FM&C), ARNG, and USAR will also attend. Any organization presenting a special topic will attend. During the third month of each quarter (DEC, MAR, JUN, and SEP), all JCA assessment leads will also attend.

c. To ensure that topics are relevant and necessary, the SRAG determines the special topics to be briefed during the quarter. The DCS, G–3/5/7 approves the topics prior to each SRU.

Chapter 14
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Production

14–1. General
This chapter outlines the construct of the ASRA narrative as well as guidelines for the format of product submission. The lead proponent for each criteria outlined in chapter 13, section 2, is responsible for submitting a narrative and slide deck for their respective criteria. JCAs will be submitted with the narrative on a facer slide. Readiness deficiencies will be submitted in accordance with paragraph 5–4. ASCC MET assessments will be submitted in accordance with paragraph 4–7.

14–2. Product submission
Tenet proponents will submit their narratives in accordance with the following guidance:

a. The overall classification is secret. Each paragraph should have an individual classification level.

b. Each proponent will identify the author and general officer approval authority with corresponding contact information.

c. The BLUF paragraph will summarize the readiness of the respective SRT. This will include the RA-level.

d. The narrative will list the projected RA-level for four future quarters.

e. The narrative will include a description of the indicators used to derive the assessment. This incorporates–

(1) The relationship of indicators to strategy and POM. Example: "Low material readiness rates are associated with reduction in operational tempo maintenance funding. This will impact the ability of contingency forces to respond to OPLAN(s)."

(2) The trend analysis of each indicator. Example: "The M1A1 fleet failed to meet Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) readiness goals due to ARNG serviceability; however, this is a recurring trend that has traditionally been rectified during the 4th QTR of each FY."

f. Recommend internal and external strategic communication message.

g. May contain graphics and/or figures for illustrative purposes. Example: Program Update Brief strength deviation chart.

h. Each narrative must contain a description that summarizes the linkage and impact of the tenet's readiness and/or indicator to the Army's 10 USC responsibilities or other lead agent authorities.

Chapter 15
Security Classification

15–1. General
This chapter outlines the rules and regulations governing the security classification of the ASRA, including the assessments contained in the four ASRA criteria. These assessments include C-level ratings, A-level ratings, RA-level, JCAs, JCCA–PAs, ASCC MET assessments, TPFDD assessments, apportionment table assessments, readiness deficiencies, and readiness concerns. Classified information will be marked, protected, and transmitted in accordance with the provisions of AR 380–5 and AR 25–2.

15–2. Security classification and declassification of Defense Readiness Reporting-Army Information
a. The policy governing the classification and declassification of information contained in the DRRS–A is contained in the security classification chapter of AR 220–1. This includes, but is not limited to the following:

(1) Secret for the C-level and A-level assessments of a MTOE organization at the brigade level and above, to include the major units and major headquarters are listed.

(2) Secret for the C-level and A-level assessments of one battalion or five or more separate MTOE company and/or detachment-size units (AA-level UIC) that are represented or reflected in the report.

(3) Secret for reporting the RA-level of a strategic readiness tenet.

(4) Reports that reference specific plans, operations, or exercises will be classified either with the classification of the plan, operation, or exercises.

(5) The CUSR data that is aggregated or projected for identifiable entities and large groupings above the level at

which Army units are required to report will be classified secret if the data references deployability, employability, or associates a specific CUSR metric or overall unit assessment with a specific number of units or a specific percentage of units.

b. The originator will ensure that the appropriate security classification, authority for classification, and the duration of classification are assigned to each report.

c. DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) will review classified CUSR data to ascertain whether the classification level still applies. Downgrading of classified materials will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

d. AR 220–1 may be cited as the classification authority for CUSRs, sensitive information extracted from reports, readiness status information applying CUSR metric procedures and metric criteria. The responsible ACOM, ASCC, DRU and/or DARNG, when applicable, may establish more restrictive (higher) classification guidance for CUSRs and the data contained in CUSRs, not to exceed secret collateral, in coordination with HQDA.

15–3. Security Classification and Declassification of Defense Readiness Reporting-Strategic Information

a. The policy governing the classification and declassification of information contained in the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic (DRRS–S) is contained in the security classification guidelines section of CJCSI 3401.02B. This includes, but is not limited to:

(1) Secret for reporting RA-level of a Service.

(2) Secret for reporting readiness deficiencies required by CJCSI 3401.01E.

(3) Secret for reporting readiness concerns required by CJCSI 3401.01E.

(4) Secret for reporting JCAs.

(5) Secret for reporting JCCA–PAs.

(6) Secret for reporting TPFDD data derived from Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

(7) Secret for reporting apportionment table analysis compiled from DRRS–A data.

b. Data extracted from the DRRS and/or GSORTS database will be classified by the reporting organization or in accordance with CJCSM 3150.02, whichever is higher. Composite or aggregated information extracted from a DRRS and/or GSORTS database may be classified at a higher level than individual readiness reports in accordance with Service directives.

c. The reporting headquarters will review classified readiness data and ascertain whether the classification level still applies. The service headquarters will determine the downgrading of classified material on a case-by-case basis.

d. Information contained in DRRS–S is no higher classification than secret. Information of higher classification cannot be entered into DRRS.

e. In accordance with CJCSI 3401.02B, Services will only release information on Service units. The releasing headquarters will provide only that amount of information required to satisfy the requirement. Releasers will notify J–3 Joint Staff and OSD (Readiness) of any release of readiness data to any requester outside the DOD.

15–4. Security classification and declassification of the quarterly army strategic readiness assessment

a. The classification of the ASRA composed of the three Joint Staff criteria and the six Army SRTs, will have an overall classification of secret. This classification applies to any briefings or presentations that display any of the assessments contained in figure 2–1.

b. As the authority for the ASRA security classification, DCS, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODR) will ensure that the appropriate security classification and the duration of classification are assigned to each report.

c. Release of information within the ASRA to any requestor outside the DOD, as outlined in AR 220–1 and CJCSI 3401.02B, will be coordinated through Army, Joint Staff, and OSD proponents.

Appendix A
References

Section I
Required Publications

AR 220–1
Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration - Consolidated Policies (Cited in paras 6–3*k*, 7–3*d*, 8–4, 8–4*e*(3), 9–3*m*, 11–4, 15–2*a*, 15–2*d*, 15–4*c*, figure 2–2, and glossary.)

AR 525–30
Army Strategic Readiness (Cited in paras 1–1, and figure 2–2.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.01E
Joint Combat Capability Assessment (Cited in paras 2–3, 2–7, 3–3*a*, 4–2, 5–1, 5–4*b*, 15–3*a*(2), 15–3*a*(3).) (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm.)

Section II
Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication. DOD publications are available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/. USC is available at http://uscode.house.gov.

AR 5–13
Total Army Munitions Requirements Process and Prioritization System

AR 10–87
Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

AR 25–2
Information Assurance

AR 25–30
The Army Publishing Program

AR 25–50
Preparing and Managing Correspondence

AR 56–4
Distribution of Material and Distribution Platform Management

AR 71–32
Force Development and Documentation

AR 380–5
Department of the Army Information Security Program

AR 525–29
Army Force Generation

AR 525–93
Army Deployment and Redeployment

AR 750–1
Army Materiel Maintenance Policy

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01B
Joint Strategic Planning System (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401D
Joint Combat Capability Assessment (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.02B
Force Readiness Reporting (Available at http://dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3401_02.pdf)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.02
Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)

Department of the Army General Order 2012–01
Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA PAM 220–1
Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army Procedures

DOD 4151.18–H
Depot Maintenance Capacity and Utilization Measurement Handbook

DODD 5100.01
Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components

Joint Capability Areas
Definition of 2015 Joint Capability Areas dated 9 JAN 2015 (Available at https://intellipedia.intelink.gov/w/images/2/2a/JCA_Definitions_2015.pdf)

JP 1–0
Joint Personnel Support (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_0.pdf.)

JP 1–02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.)

JP 4–0
Joint Logistics (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.)

National Defense Authorization Act (current fiscal year)
(Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action.)

10 USC
Armed Forces

10 USC 482
Quarterly reports: personnel and unit readiness

Section III
Prescribed Forms
This section contains no entries

Section IV
Referenced Forms
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (http://www.apd.army.mil).

DA Form 5
Army Staffing Form

DA Form 2028
Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms

Appendix B
Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Narrative Outline
The ASRA narrative that is submitted to senior Army leaders will follow the outline below.

B–1. Outline
a. Executive summary.
(1) Current assessment.
(2) Projected assessment.
(3) Top two readiness concerns.
(4) Army strategic readiness tenet assessments.
(5) Army readiness assessment RA-level.
(a) Criteria 1: JCA.
(b) Criteria 2: Army plan assessment.
(c) Criteria 3: Army readiness deficiencies.
(6) Future Outlook.
(7) Army Assessment of Joint staff criteria.
b. Section 1 Manning.
c. Section 2 Equipping.
d. Section 3 Sustaining.
e. Section 4 Training.
f. Section 5 Installation.
g. Section 6 Capacity and capability.
h. Annex A: Proposed themes and messages.
i. Annex B: Joint force readiness review brief.
j. Annex C: Consolidated readiness deficiencies.

B–2. Timeline
The ASRA will be submitted in accordance with the timeline annotated in table 13–1.

Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

AO
action officer

ACOM
Army command

ACSIM
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

ACP
Army campaign plan

AMC
Army Materiel Command

AOWG
action officer working group

APS
Army pre-positioned stocks

AR
Army Regulation

ARFORGEN
Army force generation

ARNG
Army National Guard

ARSTAF
Army Staff

ASCC
Army service component command

ASRA
Army strategic readiness assessment

BCT
brigade combat team

C-level
core level

COC
council of colonels

CCDR
combatant commander

CDC
core depot capabilities

CCMD
combatant command

CJA
comprehensive Joint assessment

CJCSI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMC
critical manufacturing capabilities

CRA
chairman's risk assessment

CRS
Chairman's Readiness System

CTC
combat training center

CUSR
Commander's Unit Status Report

DA
decisive action

DA PAM
Department of the Army pamphlet

DCS, G–1
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1

DCS, G–2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2

DCS, G–3/5/7
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7

DCS, G–4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4

DCS, G–8
Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8

DJS
Director of the Joint Staff

DL
direct labor

DLH
direct labor hours

DOD
Department of Defense

DODD
Department of Defense directive

DRRS
Defense Readiness Reporting System

DRRS–A
Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army

DRRS–S
Defense Readiness Reporting System-Strategic

DRU
direct reporting units

EOH
equipment on hand

FORSCOM
U.S. Army Forces Command

FY
fiscal year

FYDP
future year's defense program

GEF
global employment of the force

GFMAP
global force management allocation plan

GFMIG
global force management implementation guidance

GO
general officer

GOSC
general officer steering committee

GSORTS
Global Status of Resources and Training System

HD/LD
high demand/low-density

HQDA
Headquarters, Department of the Army

IMCOM
U.S. Army Installation Management Command

INSCOM
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

ISR
installation status report

ITAM
Integrated training area management

JCA
Joint capability area

JCCA-PA
Joint combat capability assessment-plan assessment

JCCAG
Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment Group

JFRR
Joint Force Readiness Review

JIIM
Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational

JP
Joint publication

JSCP
Joint strategic capabilities plan

LIN
line item numbers

MAST
Master Army Synchronization Tool

MEDCOM
U.S. Army Medical Command

MET
mission essential task

METL
Mission essential task list

MOS
military occupational specialty

MTOE
modified table of organization and equipment

NMS
national military strategy

NOR
net operating result

OPLAN
operational plan

OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense

PPBE
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution

QDR
quadrennial defense review

QRRC
Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

RA-level
readiness assessment level

SECDEF
Secretary of Defense

SRAG
Strategic Readiness Assessment Group

SRT
strategic readiness tenet

SRC
standard requirements code

SRU
strategic readiness update

TADS
training aids, devices, and simulators

TRADOC
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TPFDD
time phased force deployment data

TSC
training support center

TSS
training support system

UIC
unit identification code

ULO
unified land operations

U.S.
United States

USACE
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers

USAR
U.S. Army Reserve

USC
United States Code

USR
unit status report

VCSA
Vice Chief Of Staff of the Army

Section II
Terms

Army command
An Army force designated by the SecArmy, performing multiple Army service Title 10 functions across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control.

Army force generation
A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements (see AR 525–29).

Army National Guard
As used in this regulation, ARNG describes Army units under the control of the individual States and Territories that become a component of The Army when in the service of the United States. Also, those Army organizations designated as force structure component (COMPO) 2.

Army service component command
An Army force designated by the SecArmy, composed primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component for a combatant commander. If designated by the combatant commander, it serves as a Joint Force Land Component Command or joint task force. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with operational control and administrative control (see AR 10–87).

Army service component headquarters
An Army headquarters designated by the SecArmy to support sub-unified commands see AR 10–87).

Assigned mission
An operational requirement that a unit is formally assigned to a plan for, prepare for, or to execute.

Assigned mission level
The A-level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit's ability to accomplish its primary assigned mission. The A-levels are further explained in AR 220-1.

Category level
The C-level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit's ability to accomplish/provide core functions and/or designed capability and to execute decisive action as represented in its mission-essential task list (METL). This overall assessment is derived by considering the current status of four measured areas-personnel, EOH, equipment readiness and/or serviceability and training-that indicate the availability status of resources (personnel and equipment) and unit training proficiency measured against the requirements and capabilities established by the unit's modification table of organization and equipment.

Combatant command
A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military departments. The organization is established and so designated by the President, through the SECDEF with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command (see JP 1–02).

Command authority
The authority over a subordinate unit and/or element that enables a reporting unit to task organize and direct that unit and/or element for operations in accordance with the ACOM relationships defined in Army doctrine (that is, organic, attached, and operational control).

Direct reporting unit
An Army organization composed of one or more units with institutional or operational functions; designated by the SecArmy; providing broad general support to the Army in a normally single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. DRUs report directly to a HQDA principal and/or ACOM and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army (see AR 10–87).

Equipment readiness and/or serviceability
A logistic indicator that portrays the combined impact of equipment shortages and maintenance shortfalls in a unit's ability to meet wartime requirements. (Note: the term "equipment serviceability" is used at the Joint level).

Future-years defense program
A requirement under 10 USC 221 requires the SECDEF to submit to Congress each year, at or about the time that the President's budget is submitted to Congress, a FYDP (including associated annexes and appendixes) reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary to support the programs, projects, and activities of the DOD included in that budget. Any such FYDP shall cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is submitted and at least the four succeeding FYs (for a total of 5 years).

Generating force
The generating force mans, trains, equips, deploys, and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. The generating force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operating forces of the Army. The generating force is also the Army's principal interface with the commercial sector. Our Nation's industrial base provides equipment and sustainment for the Army, which is managed by the various headquarters of the generating force.

Major headquarters
An Army headquarters higher than battalion level.

Major unit
An Army unit larger than battalion size.

Measurement
A status assessment that is highly objective because it is calculated from authoritative data.

Mission
The task together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason there for. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military organizations, a duty assigned to an individual or organization; a task (see JP 1–02).

Mission-essential task list
A compilation of collective mission essential tasks, which must be successfully performed if an organization, is to accomplish its wartime mission. Also see standardized METL.

Modification table of organization and equipment
An authorized document that prescribes the modification of a basic table of organization and equipment necessary to adapt it to the needs of the specific unit or type of unit (see AR 71–32).

Operating forces
Operating forces consist of units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight. They include about two-thirds of the Active Army, and three-fourths of the Army's Total Force.

Readiness
The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels: unit readiness and Joint readiness. Unit readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Joint readiness is the CCDR's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute their assigned missions (AR 220–1).

Reporting unit
AC and RC units and key installations (includes both operating forces and generating force) that are registered in the DRRS–A database and that are required to submit a unit status report in accordance with the provisions of AR 220–1 to meet either internal or externally-directed requirements.

Standardized mission essential task list
A set of essential standardized tasks for like units that reflect their as designed capabilities. The standardized METL will be developed or prescribed in accordance with Army doctrine established by TRADOC and will be approved by the DCS, G–3/5/7.

Task
A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations.

Training level
The overall unit training level indicating the degree of unit training proficiency in the wartime tasks for which the unit was organized and designed. The T-level is measured against the unit's all-inclusive training requirements to achieve or sustain full METL proficiency. It incorporates the unit's pre-mobilization training requirements and nuclear, biological, chemical training requirements, if applicable.

Unit
Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organization and equipment; specifically, part of an organization. An organization title of a subdivision of a group in a task force. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued or used. In this meaning, also called unit of issue. Headquarters and support functions without wartime missions are not considered units (see JP 1–02).

Unit readiness
The ability of a unit to perform as designed.

Unit status
The measured resource and/or status levels in a unit at a specific point in time.

Section III
Special Abbreviations and Terms
This section contains no entries.