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Cold Region Operations

1. This change rescinds paragraphs 2-63 through 2-66 and re-numbers paragraphs 2-67 through 2-82 for consecution.
2. ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D, 28 January 2011, is changed as follows:

Remove Old Pages

pages i through ii

pages 2-15 through 2-18

Insert New Pages

pages i through ii

pages 2-15 through 2-17

3. New or changed material is indicated by an asterisk (*).
4. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

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Cold Region Operations

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- Friendly troops may advance or withdraw at any place over the charges without being restricted to the cleared lanes.
- Charges laid under thick ice are difficult, and often impossible, to detect by use of mine detectors.
- When the holes over the charges have refrozen, the field is difficult for the enemy to breach.
- Charges are not affected by weather or snow conditions.

2-61. Placing charges in ice has the following disadvantages:

- Emplacing explosives requires considerable time even when troops have ice cutting equipment.
- Charges can be set off when hit by artillery fire.
- Gaps blown in the ice tend to freeze over rapidly in low temperatures.
- Continued exposure of the demolition firing system to weather reduces the reliability of the system.

2-62. Units use ice demolitions for protection from frontal or flanking attacks. Normally, units lay one or more sets of charges close to the friendly shore and others farther out in the direction of the enemy. If desired, units allow the enemy to advance past the first set of charges and then detonate both at the same time. The enemy thus will be marooned on an ice floe, unable to continue to advance or retreat, and can be destroyed. Units can use the same trapping method against enemy armor, or detonate the charges directly under advancing tanks. Commanders keep ice demolitions under observation and secured by friendly fire.

2-63. Ice breaching denies the enemy use of frozen waterways as an avenue of approach. To properly create a water obstacle in this way, units must first construct a detailed engineer reconnaissance.

CONSTRUCTING OBSTACLES

2-64. Troops can use obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment. Obstacles are classified as natural or man-made. In cold region environments, units can use either obstacle type or a combination of the two to hinder and restrict enemy maneuver.

Natural Obstacles

2-65. One of the most important natural obstacles that Soldiers and Marines can use in cold region environments is slope. A steep slope is an obstacle to troops and vehicles even under normal conditions. When covered by deep snow or ice, it becomes much harder to surmount. The bogging-down action and the loss of traction caused by deep snow frequently creates obstacles out of slopes that personnel might easily overcome otherwise.

2-66. An avalanche makes an excellent obstacle for blocking passes and roads. However, this type of obstacle is only available in hilly or mountainous terrain with few natural avenues of approach. An avalanche can have a far-reaching influence over combat operations. However, avalanches that occur naturally may help the enemy unless their timing and location are just right. Units can predict where an avalanche can and probably will occur. By using artillery fire, bombs, or explosives, units might induce the avalanche to slide at the desired time. This type avalanche is an artificial obstacle in the technical sense. Generally, it will be of more value than the natural type.

2-67. Windfalls are another natural obstacle that precludes movement and maneuver. These occur when strong winds knock over trees in a wooded area. These obstacles reduce the effectiveness of personnel who wear skis and even snowshoes. Covering windfall with snow enhances the effectiveness of this technique.

Man-Made Obstacles

2-68. Man-made obstacles include abatises, wires, and ice. An abatis is similar to a windfall. Units fell trees at an angle of about 45 degrees to the enemy's direction of approach leaving the stump attached to hamper removal. Along trails, roads, and slopes, abatises can cause much trouble for skiers and vehicles. Units can also use wire obstacles (concertina and single strand) to great effect. Another useful obstacle units can make involves pouring water on road grades. The ice that forms will seriously hamper vehicular traffic. FM 3-34, FM 5-34, FM 5-102, and FM 90-7 discuss techniques of man-made obstacles.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

2-69. Units execute retrograde operations in the same manner as they do in more temperate climates. In cold region environments, units frequently have suitable conditions for leaving strong combat patrols up to a strength of one or two platoons to harass or ambush the advancing enemy. Units can launch surprise attacks against columns of vehicles and troops at natural defiles.

2-70. When troops must delay or withdraw, the cold region environment battlefield favors the defender. Defending forces often know the terrain. Further, they are better prepared to cope with mobility and trafficability problems than the attacking force. Mobility problems often make a passage of lines more difficult to coordinate and control. Commanders must pay extra attention to identification of vehicles, routes of passage, signals, and coordination of movements.

2-71. While conducting retrograde operations is never the preferred option, it sometimes becomes necessary in the cold region environment. The Marine Corps' performance at the Chosin Reservoir withdrawal best illustrates this. In the winter of 1950, 20,000 United Nations (UN) troops found themselves cut off and surrounded by over 200,000 Chinese forces. The cold affected both sides in the fight. Temperatures reached -48 °F. However, UN forces successfully withdrew to the port of Hungnam. UN forces suffered 2,500 killed, 5,000 wounded, and 7,500 frostbite victims, but in the end the cold took a much heavier toll on the Chinese. The Chinese suffered ten times the number of dead as UN forces with 12,500 wounded and 30,000 frostbite victims.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

2-72. *Stability operations* encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (joint publication [JP] 3-0). FM 3-0 and FM 3-07 outline activities for stability operations. Units execute the methods outlined in these manuals in the same manner anywhere, regardless of the environmental conditions. However, when conducting operations in the cold region environment, certain aspects of restoring and providing essential services differ from those found in warmer regions.

2-73. Many of the same factors that limit offensive and defensive operations impact stability operations. Extended lines of communication, lack of rail networks and airports, difficult terrain and weather, and limited road networks limit the amount of logistic support the Army can deliver in support of civilian populations. In addition to these limitations, units need many transportation assets to maintain the force, especially if forces are engaged in on-going operations.

2-74. Soldiers and Marines concentrate on six key tasks to restore essential services to the population in the cold region environment. These factors are—

- Providing emergency medical care and rescue.
- Preventing epidemic disease.
- Providing food and water.
- Providing emergency shelter.
- Providing basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal).
- Providing a source of heat.

2-75. All environments require the first five tasks and are mentioned in FM 3-0. In addition to this, units provide a way to keep individuals warm. Commanders meet this task by providing clothing appropriate for the climate, a heat source such as an approved stove, or ideally, both of these items. Providing shelter and a form of warmth are key in the cold region environment since 80 percent of dislocated civilians are women and children.

2-76. Potentially this problem is limited since many cold regions have relatively small populations. Smaller populations in turn require far fewer resources than large populations demand. However, exceptions to this rule exist—such as Korea and Europe—which contain large populations.

2-77. Commanders address engineer concerns before they commence and maintain stability operations. For example, in 1995, before beginning Operation Joint Endeavor, 20,000 Soldiers had to cross the Sava River into

Bosnia-Herzegovina after the bridges were destroyed. This problem was compounded since the Army undertook this operation during the worst Balkan winter in 70 years and the river was flooding. An improvised float bridge served as a critical lifeline for the operation for six months until more semipermanent structures could be repaired.

CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2-78. *Civil support* is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 3-28). When Army units engage in civil support operations in a cold region, specially trained units with cold region expertise will execute them, usually National Guard. Examples of this include cold weather air rescue operations. In extreme circumstances, Regular Army or U.S. Army Reserve forces augment state and local resources. In certain cold regions, federal agencies and state and local authorities have developed mutually beneficial relationships. These relationships provide the Army with valuable training opportunities. In addition, these relationships foster positive civil-military relationships and can help reduce the cost to state and local government agencies. However, these relationships can be suspended due to operational commitments such as deployments to a contingency operation. Marines can utilize the Marine Corps assets in many of the same civil support roles if tasked by Headquarters, Marine Corps. An incident command staff and commander will utilize both Army and Marine Corps units. Soldiers reference FM 3-28 for more information.

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