



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

22 JUL 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Army Directive 2013-17 (Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program in Initial Military Training)

1. References:

a. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, 15 Nov 12, subject: Lackland Air Force Base Investigation Findings and Recommendations.

b. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, 25 Sep 12, subject: Prevention and Reporting of Sexual Assault and Other Misconducts in Initial Military Training.

c. Initial Military Training Assessment: Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program, 18 Jan 13.

d. Air Force Education and Training Command (AETC) Commander's Report to the Secretary of the Air Force, 2 Nov 12.

2. Sexual harassment and sexual assault have no place in our Army. I expect each of you to make the eradication of these intolerable actions one of your top priorities. Sexual harassment and assault contradict our Army Values and have a devastating effect on mission readiness. Our Soldiers who are undertaking Initial Military Training (IMT) are particularly at risk, and it is in that environment where we start the process of shaping our future leaders. Accordingly, I am directing several actions to ensure that the IMT environment is as safe as possible for all participants.

3. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Army reviewed the U.S. Air Force's investigation into sexual harassment and assault in the IMT environment at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB). From this review, the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-1 developed a series of authoritative lessons learned. Specifically, the Lackland AFB investigation identified five factors that generally contribute to the abuse of power, sexual assaults, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and poor training in the IMT environment. These factors were a result of the lack of leadership oversight, minimal leadership experience for training corps officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), lack of emphasis on NCO responsibilities and visible officer presence, barriers to reporting and detection, and lack of institutional policy and guidance to maintain safeguards. The enclosure to this directive details these factors and provides additional findings and analysis taken from the DCS, G-1's review of the Lackland AFB investigation.

4. Effective immediately, I direct a thorough review of SHARP processes and procedures, cadre selection and training, and manning so that we can improve our IMT

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environment and ensure that it fosters a climate free of sexual harassment, sexual assault and prohibited relationships. Specific roles and responsibilities follow.

a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) will consider the Armywide analysis done by the DCS, G-1 and provide recommendations to me by 6 September 2013.

b. The DCS, G-1 will:

(1) use the lessons learned from the Lackland AFB investigation (identified in the enclosure) to review SHARP Training Support Packages for IMT Leader Courses and modify the packages as necessary;

(2) develop a SHARP Organizational Inspection Program for commands to use to report the status of their SHARP program's compliance with applicable regulations, policies and procedures;

(3) review the officer and NCO selection process for assigning command teams to brigade and battalion IMT command positions to make sure it comports with the findings in the Lackland AFB investigation;

(4) review the selection, eligibility, training and assignment criteria for personnel who directly supervise IMT and ensure that personnel selected for this critical assignment understand they are responsible for training, mentoring and shaping the future of our Army;

(5) review the manning requirements for full-time sexual assault response coordinators and victim advocates for IMT units;

(6) ensure that SHARP-specific questions are added to command climate surveys, as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army during the 2012 SHARP Summit, to help commanders evaluate the effectiveness of their SHARP program; and

(7) consolidate Armywide reports and analysis and make recommendations through the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) by 23 August 2013.

c. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command will:

(1) ensure that all IMT trainees and students receive SHARP training within the first 14 days of arrival at training;

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(2) make sure the lessons learned from the Lackland AFB investigation (identified in the enclosure) are incorporated into the Army's Leader Development Training;

(3) review the ratios of drill sergeants and Advance Individual Training platoon sergeants to trainees/students and make sure they are appropriate, including a sufficient number of female drill sergeants/cadre in IMT and Advanced Individual Training. If necessary, submit a request to fill in excess of authorizations to the Office of the DCS, G-3/5/7 for approval;

(4) guard against misconduct at IMT by reviewing institutional safeguards to prevent the abuse of power, sexual harassment and assault, unprofessional relationships and maltreatment and institute acceptable reporting procedures. These areas must be addressed at the beginning of all IMT;

(5) ensure that Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-6 (Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration) is updated to show that the "Battle Buddy System" applies not only to IMT trainees and students, but also to drill sergeants and Advanced Individual Training platoon sergeants and cadre when counseling or interacting with IMT personnel outside the classroom or training environment;

(6) review internal controls to make sure Department of Defense and installation helpline information is accurate and available 24/7 for all IMT trainees, students and permanent party personnel to reduce barriers to reporting;

(7) review procedures and assess available resources to ensure that systems are in place to provide medical and psychological care for victims of sexual assault;

(8) ensure that units have the appropriate number of sexual assault response coordinators and victims advocates available to respond to victims of sexual harassment and assault; and

(9) submit a report to the DCS, G-1 by 23 August 2013 detailing the actions taken pursuant to this directive.

d. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Human Resources Command will review the drill sergeant candidate and cadre selection process for IMT assignments to ensure that only the most suitable personnel are selected.

e. Commanders of Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands and Direct Reporting Units will:

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(1) review the enclosure and address the issues specific to them as outlined in this directive;

(2) review internal controls to ensure that Department of Defense and installation helpline information is accurate and available 24/7 for all personnel to decrease barriers to reporting;

(3) ensure that units have the appropriate number of sexual assault response coordinators and victims advocates available to respond to victims of sexual harassment and assault; and

(4) submit a report to the DCS, G-1 by 23 August 2013 detailing the actions taken pursuant to this directive.

f. Senior commanders at each Army installation will:

(1) review the enclosure and address the issues specific to them as outlined in this directive;

(2) ensure that, if you have IMT training conducted on your installation, you review the processes in place and make the necessary changes for addressing cases of sexual harassment and assault;

(3) consider locating the SHARP office in an area near the chaplain's office, if feasible, to ensure easier access for Soldiers in an environment that is less compromising or restrictive for reporting;

(4) review internal controls to ensure that Department of Defense and installation helpline information is accurate and available 24/7 for all IMT and permanent party personnel to decrease barriers to reporting; and


(5) submit a report to the DCS, G-1 by 23 August 2013 detailing the actions taken pursuant to this directive.

g. The Inspector General will inspect the Army's efforts to implement the lessons learned from the Lackland AFB investigation as part of the fiscal year 2015 inspection program.

5. The policy in this directive is effective immediately and applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. The Office of the DCS, G-1 will incorporate this policy into Army Regulation 600-20 as soon as practical. This directive is rescinded upon publication of the revised regulation.

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6. My point of contact is the SHARP Program Office, 703-571-7353 or DSN 671-7353.



John M. McHugh

Encl

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE INVESTIGATION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AT LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE

On 2 November 2012, the Commander, Air Education and Training Command (AETC) reported to the Secretary of the Air Force on command's efforts to correct deficiencies identified as a result of the commander directed investigation (CDI) at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB) led by Major General Margaret Woodward, USAF. The investigation was initiated after an increasing number of allegations against military training instructors (MTIs) assigned to basic military training (BMT) at Lackland AFB came to light, suggesting that the MTIs had engaged in misconduct ranging from unprofessional relationships to the sexual assault of trainees and students. AETC's leadership made four commitments:

- investigate thoroughly all allegations of misconduct,
- care for the victims of the misconduct,
- hold perpetrators of the misconduct accountable while protecting due process for those accused, and
- correct the underlying problems that led to the misconduct.

General Woodward's team produced 22 findings categorized into 5 major areas:

- leadership, where deterrence was found to be hindered by insufficient leadership oversight;
- selection and manning process for MTI, where the MTI corps consisted of members with minimal leadership experience and one MTI had too much power;
- training and development, where the MTI culture and training did not adequately emphasize the responsibilities of noncommissioned officers (NCOs);
- reporting and detection, where barriers hindered reporting by MTIs, trainees and students, and
- policy and guidance, where enduring institutional safeguards are necessary.

Associated with those CDI findings are 46 recommendations for action.

The following paragraphs identify the lessons learned that the Air Force is implementing to guard against misconduct at BMT and hold accountable individuals who engage in unprofessional conduct.

Lessons Learned

1. *Lack of Leadership Oversight*

The CDI team concluded that the vast majority of training commanders work tirelessly to ensure mission success. However, the team found insufficient oversight of BMT squadrons, which consist of as many as 1,000 staff and trainee personnel. One officer—the commander—was not sufficient to provide oversight. Perpetrators who were interviewed said that the lack of oversight by some unit leadership contributed to their ability to avoid detection and their belief they would not be discovered.

With only 1 instructor assigned to a flight of 50 trainees, individual instructors, who average 85 to 100 hours of work a week, are under considerable stress and have the inherent opportunity to abuse their power. To solve this problem, the CDI team looked to strengthen the current integration model by creating MTI teams of four instructors for two flights, with a minimum of one female instructor on each team, regardless of the gender of the trainees.

The investigation also determined leadership preparation will be strengthened considerably through an expanded leadership orientation course that places additional emphasis on the potential for abuse of power, sexual assault, unprofessional relationships and maltreatment, or poor training.

AETC's goal is to raise professionalism in BMT to the highest level possible. The command cannot achieve this goal unless it selects the most highly qualified Airmen for MTI duty and then gives them high-quality training and a reasonable workday. The changes AETC is making to MTI selection, professional development and work period will contribute significantly to enhancing the ability of MTIs to execute their duties professionally

2. *Inexperienced Military Training Instructors*

In examining the MTI selection process, the CDI team found that some MTIs were too inexperienced to effectively exercise the authority and power they were given over trainees. During interviews the team learned that some MTIs had little to no previous supervisory experience. This lack of experience was considered particularly relevant in an environment where 1 MTI is typically responsible for a flight of 50 or more trainees.

A set of initiatives that will pay significant dividends involves placing MTIs in a stronger position to successfully execute their duties. AETC believes that the single most important decision it can make is to reduce the MTI duty day, which can extend as long as 16 hours for weeks at a time. Consequently, AETC will assign two MTIs to each BMT flight, which will allow it to split the duty day in half. In addition, AETC will increase the required grade level for MTI duty to technical sergeant (E-5), which will bring more experience and maturity to the MTI corps, and will change the qualification training

course and establish a deliberate development program, which will improve initial qualification and supplemental training for MTIs.

3. Lack of Emphasis on Noncommissioned Officer Responsibilities

The CDI team identified an MTI culture that emphasized MTI duties above the professional responsibilities of an NCO. In its report, the team concluded that this departure from Air Force core values ultimately created an environment that emphasized fear and power over trust and respect. For some MTIs, the power they hold over impressionable young men and women—and their access to those same people—may tempt them to consider unprofessional conduct.

One key tool for leaders in preventing misconduct is knowledge of behavioral indicators in both instructors and trainees. Except for the most experienced, surprisingly few MTIs were capable of identifying worrisome signs of ongoing misconduct. If commanders, supervisors and MTIs received training in this aspect of behavioral science, the entire training leadership team would be better equipped to identify and intervene when individual behavior departs from the norm.

The CDI team determined that MTI training should be reinforced with a “back to basics” program that emphasizes the Air Force’s core values and NCO professional standards of conduct. This training should emphasize the need to hold accountable those individuals who either cannot or will not meet these standards. Only when they are fully developed as NCOs can instructors be expected to effectively lead their trainees by example.

The CDI team also determined that AETC must take better advantage of the unique opportunity afforded during BMT to prepare their newest Airmen to deal effectively with sexual assault and unprofessional behavior throughout their Air Force careers. This process of increasing the capacity of trainees to be part of the solution set will begin before they enter BMT. Recruiters will deliver a briefing that covers sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment and poor training, and the reporting of misconduct during BMT. This briefing will be repeated after the trainees arrive at BMT.

4. Barriers to Reporting and Detection

The investigation also showed that, in the eyes of faculty and staff, the reporting process for both trainees and instructors, coupled with poor detection methods, contributed to a culture where leadership appeared to tolerate misconduct. However, results from the CDI survey of more than 18,000 personnel also indicated that recent command emphasis was remarkably effective in this area.

AETC will increase the number of sexual assault response coordinators (SARCs) in BMT. This will provide more trainee contact with SARCs and also increase the portion of the sexual assault prevention training curriculum that SARCs will instruct.

The CDI team found that the Trainee Comment Sheet did not adequately address the misconduct reporting function. For example, it lists sexual harassment as a reporting option, but does not list sexual assault, unprofessional relationship, poor training, or maltreatment. The comment sheet also includes language that may discourage trainees from reporting incidents. Bold lettering at the bottom of the sheet warns trainees that:

making a false statement on this form may result in punishment under Article 107 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and that problems, when possible, should be resolved at the lowest possible level of the chain of command.

While it is appropriate for trainees to learn about the UCMJ and chain of command, the comment sheet is not the place to reinforce those messages. Trainees are already reluctant to report MTI misconduct. Fear of being charged with making a false statement or experiencing backlash for elevating their concerns to the chain of command could reinforce trainees' reluctance to report. The CDI report stated that U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-6 (Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration) provides specific guidelines for investigating and responding to the Army's version of comment sheets and that AETC would use the guidelines as a benchmark to correct its program.

In addition, the locations of comment drop boxes strongly affected trainees' ability to use the comment sheet. Before March 2012, the BMT drop boxes were not available in the dormitory stairwells, and the drop box in the chapel was located in such a way that when the door was open (which it was on Sundays), it blocked access to the box. Further, the drop boxes in the squadron dining facilities were—and still are—located in direct sight of the table where the MTIs sit to eat their meals. Because of these locations, trainees did not believe they could anonymously use the boxes without risking backlash from an MTI.

When the MTI was the perpetrator, victims sometimes did not want to report misconduct to the chain of command out of misplaced loyalty to the MTI. The nature of BMT lends itself to the MTI becoming a mother or father figure for trainees and students. This misguided loyalty leads to trainees wanting to please their MTIs, which resulted in a strong reluctance to report allegations of sexual assault or harassment, unprofessional relationship, maltreatment or poor training. Furthermore, trainees were afraid that any relationship with an MTI would be construed as consensual and that they themselves would be charged with violating the UCMJ.

During focus groups, trainees suggested that they are more willing to report if they are actively engaged by people they know and trust. BMT should allow SARC to pair with the chaplain or have their own separate offices within the squadrons. By having an independent SARC office within the squadron and chaplains assigned to each BMT squadron, AETC would minimize interruptions to basic training and greatly enhance a trainee's opportunity to report allegations of misconduct. Further, trainees cannot use

the SARC 24/7 hotline because they do not have access to a phone, except for 15 minutes once a week under the direct supervision of their MTI. Installation of a phone in each dormitory that is connected directly to the SARC hotline would give trainees ready access to a SARC.

5. Lack of Policy and Guidance to Maintain Safeguards

After reviewing considerable policy and guidance and conducting more than 200 interviews with witnesses and perpetrators, the CDI team concluded that commanders, supervisors, instructors and trainees understood applicable regulations and guidance regarding professional conduct. However, inconsistent punishment of some personnel contributed to the perception that at least some individuals in authority would tolerate unprofessional behavior. The team also found cases where corrective action for similar infractions varied significantly, and some individuals were not held fully accountable for their behavior. The team concluded that this inconsistent approach to accountability contributed to the development of a culture too accepting of misconduct.

AETC is instituting a set of policy changes to ensure that leadership is promptly notified of potential misconduct, that credible allegations of misconduct result in immediate removal from the training environment and that more appropriate thresholds are set for the temporary or permanent removal of an MTI from the instructor corps. Taken together, these actions to strengthen the leadership team will provide the most effective means of ensuring that AETC is well-positioned to address the critical issues affecting BMT today and maintains this position of strength for the long run.

AETC also established a new policy for counseling trainees. If an MTI or supervisor must counsel a trainee one-on-one in private (that is, behind closed doors) and is of the opposite gender of the trainee, another permanent party staff member of the same gender as the trainee will be present.

In addition, AETC moved to improve trainee safety by mitigating the ability to isolate them. Following the “battle buddy” system used at Army enlisted initial entry training sites, AETC expanded the “wingman” policy to require trainees to be accompanied by another trainee whenever they are outside a group setting. Previously, BMT instructions required trainees to have a wingman only during hours of darkness, a base exchange visit, and base liberty or town pass unless accompanied by family members. By adopting the Army’s “battle buddy” system, AETC anticipates it will teach teamwork, responsibility and accountability; improve safety; and reduce the likelihood and opportunity for sexual harassment and assault, misconduct and suicide.

Conclusions

The AETC Commander drew three overarching conclusions from General Woodward’s CDI:

- weaknesses developed over time in each of the previously described institutional safeguards;
- leadership failed to detect and prevent these weaknesses, and
- MTIs did not sufficiently police themselves.

Of these three, leadership stands out as the most important area to address. Strong leadership can overcome weaknesses in institutional safeguards and the MTI culture. Average or weak leadership will struggle to successfully navigate through the unique challenges that exist in the BMT environment.